

T24573

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DATE 20 June 1973

Michael M. J. FISCHER Author 11 January 1946 Birth Date

ZOROASTRIAN IRAN BETWEEN MYTH AND Title of Dissertation

PRAXIS

ANTHROPOLOGY Department or School PHD Degree August 73 Convocation

Permission is herewith granted to the University of Chicago to make copies of the above title, at its discretion, upon the request of individuals or institutions and at their expense.

Signature of writer

Extensive Quotation or Further Reproduction of This Material by Persons or Agencies Other than the University of Chicago May Not Be Made without the Express Permission of the Writer.

8-24-73 Date filmed

Number of pages

NOTE:

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ZOROASTRIAN IRAN BETWEEN MYTH AND PRAXIS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

BY

MICHAEL MAX JONATHAN FISCHER

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

AUGUST, 1973

PREFACE

O.1. Introduction: A Fieldwork Proposal

This research project began as a study of "Religion and Social Change among the Zoroastrians of Iran" (Fischer 1969). It was intended to use the Zoroastrian experience to "test" or further refine sociological theories of religion developed primarily to explain Protestant groups in Europe and America. Zoroastrianism was chosen for three reasons: (a) a religion important in world history in ancient times, it has survived to the present, but remains one of the least well described religions in the academic literature; (b) its adherents form a relatively small group,¹ small enough it was hoped for a single investigator to gain a feel for the total range of variation in religious practice and belief; (c) it exists in an obviously and self-consciously modernizing environment, involving social re-stratification and industrialization. It was hoped that these conditions of change plus a tradition by and large historically distinct from that of Protestantism would provide a clear counterpoint for theories arrived at by a process of analytically ordering Protestant experience. The Zoroastrian population, according to the preliminary census data available (the national Iranian censuses of 1956 and 1966), seemed to be distributed in three ecological settings—rural villages, provincial towns, capital city—which were supposed to provide a rough continuum of industrial change, a continuum both in the sense of a synchronic cross-section of an on-going collective process, and in the sense that persons in the city would be able to provide individual accounts of moving from village to town to city.

The general analytic strategy was derived from a strategy which had proved useful in an earlier piece of research (Fischer 1969b). A rural community in Jamaica had been observed to divide itself through

¹ The Zoroastrian population of Iran is on the order of 20-25,000, that of India some 100,000.

religious behavior into two classes, a phenomenon which paralleled a number of other empirical descriptions both of sectarian histories and of the place of different religious groups in industrial and agricultural settings in the U.S.A., and which therefore fit the sociological theories of Max Weber as developed by Ernst Troeltsch, H. R. Niebuhr, Bryan Wilson, and others. These theories stressed two things: (a) the correlation between type of religious group membership and the socio-economic position of the members; (b) the differential efficacy of different forms of sect organization for socio-economic mobility. If there was to be any general validity to these theories, it was argued, they should be applicable to the Zoroastrian case; if they were not applicable, the theories would have to be modified.

To give further leverage on problems of how exactly to formulate such comparative questions, it was proposed, depending on difficulties of access and availability of time, to do comparisons with other religious groups. The distribution of Zoroastrian population dictated Yazd as a field site, a town of 100,000 people with some 25 surrounding villages containing Zoroastrian population. Yazd also contained Jewish, Bahai, and Muslim population. The sister town of Kirman, also approximately 100,000 population with a similar ethnic-religious distribution but with no Zoroastrian villages, provided a second best field site and a possible comparative case. It was further proposed to spend some time with the Zoroastrians of India.

One major problem in formulating comparative evaluations was how to compare beliefs coded in different idioms. Following Weber's useage of the "Protestant Ethic," it was hoped to find a means to compare the structure rather than the content of belief. The means to this, it was hoped, was to establish some index of stratification within each religious group against which other kinds of variations could be compared.

0.2. The Fieldwork

As it turned out, despite various vicissitudes and some re-orientation, the resulting investigation did follow relatively closely the outlined proposal. Fieldwork was carried out in Iran from May

1970¹ to December 1971 under auspices of H.I.M. Ministries of Science and Higher Education, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, to whose officials grateful thanks are due.² The periods May 1970 to February 1971 and July 1971 to December 1971 were spent based in Yazd. March to June 1971 was spent in Western India. The interstitial periods were spent in Teheran as well as on brief trips to other sites of Zoroastrian population, including Quetta and Karachi in Pakistan. Archival research was carried out in Paris and London during January and February of 1972.

Although Zoroastrians of Iran do live in the three ecological settings anticipated, it turned out that the village setting contains primarily a remnant population of the old and some young women with children. That is, the prime labor force lives and works outside the villages, and helps to support the villages from the outside. For some purposes an older population knowing former ways of doing things can be of major interest, but since my questions involved differential usage of religion by age, status, and economic group, and since the reputedly "most traditional" village (Sharifabad-e Ardekan) had just been studied in 1963-64 by Professor Mary Boyce (University of London, S.O.A.S.), I found a better field base to be a suburb village of Yazd city. Again my choice of such a village rather than the Zoroastrian Quarter of the city proper was dictated both by the difficulty of getting accommodations and by the less "hollow" social structure of these villages containing all age groups and occupations. Such choice, however, was merely a question of intensity of participant-observation, and to varying degree I did manage to work with the entire Yazd Zoroastrian population, my reception probably being more restricted among the upper class of the population than by geographic factors (the reverse, perhaps, being the case in Teheran for different reasons).

¹ September 1969 to May 1970 was consumed in a complicated bureaucratic ballet to gain research permission. I believe I am indebted to the Governor-General of Yazd for breaking the log-jam.

² Financial support was provided by a National Institute of Mental Health grant (USPHS 1-TO1 MH-12 073-01).

During most of my first stay in Yazd I tried to remain primarily with the Zoroastrian population, not pursuing to any great extent relations with Muslims or Jews. During my second stay, I continued to live in a Zoroastrian area, but my greatest intensity of interaction was with Muslims, and secondarily with Jews.

Formal techniques of investigation included survey questionnaires (in factories, in the bazaar, and in residential quarters), some mapping, some detailed genealogical mapping, a few in-depth formal interviews (with persons occupying official roles), and a larger number of consciously repeated interviews with selected informants (see the interview guides for the University of Chicago Family Study: Wolf 1964, R.T. Smith 1968, Alexander 1973). Survey questionnaires were primarily useful for demographic data and for learning regarding any given issue which questions elicit stereotyped responses, which ones elicit thoughtful consideration, and which signal current disputes (respondant is very much aware that there is another side and is concerned that his side will prevail). All such questionnaires were administered by myself and provided a highly productive language and cultural idiom learning context. Genealogies also provided some useful demographic data. If pursued more systematically with a greater input of time, the population could have been mapped sufficiently to give more definite answers to pre-World War II land tenure procedures and to such hypotheses as that the Yazd villages used to be grouped into four relatively distinct breeding populations. Only mildly successful attempts were made to train Zoroastrian informants; much better results were achieved with Muslims.

The exigencies of population distribution meant that in Yazd, the primary division in religious behavior was between the non-rich and the rich, that is, between those who participated in local level religious activity and those who only organized it at higher financial and administrative levels. Comparisons with the Jewish and Muslim patterns showed local level activities of very similar form. Comparison with the Parsis (Indian Zoroastrians) seemed to show a greater degree of personal religiosity among the Parsi elite, and a greater maintenance of religious knowledge in general.

Historical investigations served to throw contemporary religious patterns into much sharper relief. In particular they served to show how modernization and revitalization of Iranian Zoroastrianism on the Parsi pattern during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries was cut off by the nationalist restrictions of capital and travel (by both Iran and India). Investigations into earlier Parsi history (for which fuller materials exist than for Iranian Zoroastrians) showed rather dramatic changes in community organization and the place of religion within it. Secondly, the historical investigations served to illuminate sociological patterns in Iranian Islam, for which statistical patterns in the present were harder to obtain (access to government figures, aside from published census data, not being achieved, and personal censuses being carried out necessarily, due to manpower limitations, only in a spot check manner). These comparative studies both in space (with Jews, Muslims, Bahais) and in time were indispensable for searching out sociological patterns of variation in religious behavior. They also served to expand the "limits of naiveté" of the study from being merely circumscribed by Zoroastrianism.

Thus the one major re-orientation of the study is that it is no longer focused entirely on Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism and Islam form the two major foci of interest with minor attention to Judaism and Bahaism. The "Zoroastrian Iran" of the title has come to refer only in part to the ethnographic Zoroastrians and primarily to the nationalistic symbolism of Zoroastrianism for Iran at large. The substantive questions of the social and cultural patterning of religious behavior, however, remain the same.

0.3. Field Report and Dissertation

The dissertation is organized in three parts and nine chapters. The three parts may be tagged respectively investigations into "time, space, and category" or "diachrony, synchrony, and meaning" or "historiography, ethnography, and cultural analysis." The titles of the three parts are also orientation cues.

Part I, "Alexander's Prison," plays on the standard Persian metaphor of "prison" (zندان) representing the tribulations of life (as opposed to the rose garden paradise of the next world). Alexander's Prison is a nick-name for Yazd, being connected both with an origin legend for the city and with an "ancient" building. The invasion of Alexander is used as a major Persian excuse for the cultural disarray into which Iran is felt to have fallen (he burned the royal libraries at Persepolis), the other excuses being the invasions of the Arabs, the Turanians (i.e., Turks of all sorts from ancient times to the medieval Mongols), and the Europeans. "Alexander's Prison" contains three chapters having to do with anthropological problems, religio-political problems in Iran, and organizational problems of Zoroastrianism.

Chapter I introduces the problems of comparative analysis and the strategy of allowing the definition of "religion" to be determined by its usage. It also introduces the overall conception of the dissertation as proceeding from perceived problems in the social system communicated by native actors, the task being then to record and clarify this phenomenological base. "Religion" (دین, مذهب) is thus approached not as a technically defined concept (à la either the more restricted fiat of Spiro (1966: 96) or the more flexible all-inclusivity of Geertz (1968: 97) but as something defined by actors as problematic. That is:

- (a) People (planners, politicians, social scientists) talk about the problem which "religion" and "traditional values" pose for development.
- (b) People (natives) talk about the problems which "religion" (usually the religion of others, of dominant groups, in this case Islam, but also of old customs and rules, orthodoxy, fundamentalism) poses for leading a quiet, pleasant life.
- (c) People (natives, believers, politicians) insist that "religion" is a good thing, which just because it sours on many occasions should not be thrown out.

While people have clear ideas of what they mean when they label certain things as religious, those things are not all of the same epistemological status. Some initial suggestions are hazarded about the relation between theology/ideology and sociological operations to illustrate the necessity of ambiguity in the former and consequent difficulties of interpretation

without sociological usage as a control. This is simply the old anthropological caveat to theologians that what is the case and what is said to be the case need not always be the same, and that the relation between the two is a complex one, neither being a simple reflection of the other. The metaphor of information processors (individuals) within a communication system (culture) utilizing analogue codes may perhaps be introduced merely to affirm the semi-autonomy and non-one-to-one reflectivity, but nonetheless direct interrelatedness of social and cultural processes. These questions are taken up again in the final chapters (VI, VIII, IX) of the dissertation, but the attempt always is not to force the data into predetermined metaphoric or other models, but to allow it to be "inductively" ordered insofar as the data for such ordering exists.

Chapter II begins with the phenomenological datum of feelings of religious persecution not only by Zoroastrians but by a large number of parties to the Persian political system. The strategy of clarifying such phenomenologically presented problems leads into an analysis of the Iranian political system and the uses made of religion within its context. The phenomenological datum is given an objective base by reviewing in Appendix I a series of religiously phrased riots over the past century. A more inclusive phenomenological framework is sought by attempting to explore the constraints on the development of forms of political consciousness, and in particular of the push towards democratic consciousness in the wake of the British and Soviet (and now American) desires for followers (i.e., the British Parliament and the Russian Revolution provided models, but there was also encouragement from both exemplars).

With regard to the more limited data set of riots, a first approximation correlation is suggested between politico-economic problems and riots. A detailed examination of the riots shows most of them to use religious idiom rather than to be directly about religion. That is, only Bahais or only Jews may get killed in a particular riot, but the history leading up to the riots may show that this was merely a demonstration of power by a network of merchants and ulema or a frustrated attack against a weak group of commercial competitors when the real issue

is manipulated markets at a higher level (tariffs, taxes, hoarding, etc.). Riots occur irregularly and seem to correlate with a combination of economic pressure (more continuous than riots) and weakened political control: thus, in general, you get riots at the end of the Qajar Period, after Reza Shah's deposition and during Mohammad Reza Shah's reconsolidation of power, and you do not get as many riots even when there are similar economic problems under Reza Shah and today. Secondly, you seem to get religious riots (as opposed to other kinds of riots) either when victim groups are explicit symbols of European aggression or when open political protest is too dangerous: thus the conflict of the Tudeh era in class rather than religious terms, as contrasted with the Bahai riots of 1955-56. These are, of course, highly over-generalized summations (viz. the 1970-72 riots with regard to the first statement, and the religious fighting in the Tudeh era with regard to the second). For the time being, one ought to stick to less broad generalizations and to more detailed attempts to elucidate political forces.

Placing the religious riots in the context of the broader questions about the role of religion and Islam in Iranian politics, a second kind of correlation is suggested between vocal Islam and conservatism. Through a search having to do with the constituencies supporting the riots, it seems that the rejection of Islam as a modernizing ideology (as perhaps Pakistan attempted) had the result that those most hurt by economic changes (bazaaris, ulema dependent on the bazaar and traditional modes of production) rallied to Islam. As so often, religion lends itself to moral outrage by the impotent against their pragmatic (rather than necessarily atheistic) governors. This polarization leaves Islam in a prominent position of political opposition to the regime, and its diffuse appeal to a larger population than any specific set of political opponents makes it impossible to outlaw as was communism.

In sum, the phenomenological datum of the chapter is analyzed in the following propositions. Religion in the minds of minorities (and others) is intimately connected with past persecutions. Persecution is a politico-economic symptom of social agitation against structural problems in the society. Solution to these problems has been sought in

.

(a) law and order authoritarianism to deal with the agitation (symptoms), and (b) economic re-organization to deal with the underlying structural issues. Authoritarianism impoverishes quality of life even under good material conditions, and people react against it as a social problem itself. Under an authoritarian system, a practical means of protest for the weak is a diffuse ideology, the legitimacy of which is recognized by the managers of the authoritarianism. Religious persecution remains a valid fear of minorities where such minorities are visible symbols of, or in fact are connected to elements of the structural problems (the Western dominated world economy in this case). The question, "why reaction in terms of Islam and not in terms of universal ethics," has to do with Safavid-Qajar history and the political use of the Islamic institution by the state. Different strata of society have differential access to Islam as a politically effective tool.

Chapter III turns substantively from Islam (and its relations to minority religious groups including Zoroastrians) to Zoroastrianism, and analytically from the formulation of political justifications in religious terms to the reasons for changes in religious doctrine and religious organization. Again a phenomenological starting point (debates and disputes within Zoroastrianism today) is worked back through historical antecedents, and this leads to a differential grouping of how ideological terms were used. Some (ritual calendar, priest and lay endogamy) had to do with differentiation internal to the community while others (monotheism, towers of silence, nirang) had to do with defense against external (Christian, British) challenges. Both internal and external differentiation required new approaches to communal organization, again disputed in religious terms (vegetarianism, monogamy, caste rigidity and recruitment) but eventually reformulated in more secular terms (from priest coordination, to a legislative and judicial Panchayat, to coordination by courts). Again the procedure yields a political system in which religion is used for varied ends of coordination and separation. This much concludes the historical setting for Part II.

Part II, Dar ul Ibadah (House of Devotion), concerned with a more synchronic analysis of the uses of religion in Yazd, is framed in

architectural metaphors. Dar ul Ibadah is a second traditional nick-name for Yazd, and to this day Yazdis of all religions pride themselves on being religious fanatics (mota'asseb). At the entrance to town stands a large, unfinished gate called Darvozeh Qur'an (Qur'an Gate) and this serves as the title for the chapter on Islam. The Jewish community of Yazd has a nick-name of being a Jerushalayim Ha-Ketana (Little Jerusalem). Parallel titles for the Zoroastrian and Bahai chapters had to be invented. Atashkade (Fire Temple) has been used by Ayati (1938) as a tag for Yazd, but out of consideration for Zoroastrian sensibilities, I supplemented this with the ambiguous dadgah which can refer to the towers of silence as well as to a respected fire, but which carries also, and as its primary meaning, a moral connotation (judgment for deeds). Bab means "gate" and was the title assumed by the predecessor of the Bahai prophet, who (the latter) called himself the "Glory of God" (Baha'u'llah); the image of a gate of promise to Glory, plus the combination of the two formative figures of Bahaism seemed to make an apt title.

The four chapters on the four religious groups in Yazd are conceived as being parallel analyses, but rather than repeat in each chapter the same ideas, it is intended to use different parts of the ethnographic display for different parts of the argument and in a chapter nominally on Zoroastrianism comparative references to the other religions may be made where appropriate. The four chapters are preceded by a description of the changing social structure to which they refer. Chapter IV describes Yazd in transition from a mercantile entrepot with some peasant agricultural support, to an industrial town within a planned economy.

Chapter V attempts to explore the social functions of religion on the local level. The proposition is explored that there is a peasant form of social organization, including religious activities, which operates similarly whether the community is Zoroastrian or Muslim. This, however, is tempered with a recognition of the constraints imposed on religious development by historical context. The argument in other words is that one can argue for functional similarities between Zoroastrian and Muslim village religion in Iran while recognizing their operation in

the larger national political system to be quite different. The common peasant form of social organization is detected in land tenure and vaqf (religious endowment), in the marriage system, in the food and charity redistribution systems, and in the formation of shrines. The chapter focuses on Zoroastrianism and pairs initially with Chapter III, which pairing may be read in terms of a heuristic puzzle as to why, of the Iranian and Indian Zoroastrian communities, the wealthier and more Westernized one (until recently), namely the Parsis, should have retained a greater degree of religiosity than the reputedly more traditional Iranian one. Part of the answer lies in the contrasting Muslim and Hindu-Muslim milieux, but part of the answer is also that the political use of Zoroastrianism in the two milieux was different. This contrast is particularly clear for the elites of the two Zoroastrian communities.

Read together with Chapters II and VI, Chapter V also pairs the Zoroastrian case against the Iranian Muslim one, emphasizing that loss in religiosity of the Islamic elite—if it ever displayed much—does not imply a similar loss in potency of Islam as could be argued for Zoroastrianism. The organization and national position of Islam is quite different from that of Zoroastrianism so that whereas the result of modernization for Zoroastrianism has been liberalization of doctrine and ritual, the result of modernization for Islam has been a drift towards conservatism with the liberals being siphoned off into other groups. (Note, a drift into conservatism, not an increase in orthodoxy as occurred earlier in Parsi history.)

Chapter VI turns from problems of social function to parameters of religious symbolic/semantic performance. Again no pre-defined boundaries are imposed on what is "religious" and religious usages are allowed to shade naturally into slangs and vulgarities. The results suggest that (a) Shiite talk orders itself into a relatively coherent set of statements, loosely called a "paradigm;" (b) various subsets of this paradigm can be isolated, loosely called "paradigmatic sets" since they form either spacially bounded and stylized dramatic forms (rosa, hey'at, zurxane, shabi dar avordan), or temporal units (Moharram, Ramazan, the ritual calendar), or semantic domains defined by the uses of a word

or by verbal contests; (c) many of these performances are patterned along sociological constraints (bargaining) or purposes (group definition); (d) much of the communication burden of these symbolic/semantic performances is to be decoded not as propositional statements but rather as co-ordinators of social groupings; (e) the paradigm and paradigmatic sets have a dramaturgical ordering which contributes to their appeal and maintenance.

Chapter VII uses Judaism to review briefly with yet another set of names, customs, and surface meanings how many of the same underlying patterns exist as for Islam and Zoroastrianism. In particular, transitional elements of the ethnographic present are referred to their antecedents (economic position, inter-ethnic relations), parallels with Islamic and Zoroastrian practices are noted, and perceptions of persecution are placed in political context.

Chapter VIII uses Bahaimism to explore the relations between individual belief and religious grouping. The evidence of "culturally given" stereotypic usages (in missionary argument, in dreams, and in life histories) is used to formulate the position that (a) varied individual opinions are of less importance than that the individual acknowledge public ritual demands; and that (b) doctrinal arguments are of less importance as beliefs than as symbolic ordering devices, as ways of obtaining public consent for social activity.

Part III takes its title from Farahani's line "From Persian sulphur the land of Arabia became as brilliant as Palestine," that is, physically the fires of natural gas vents and culturally the sparks of civilization which via Salmon Farsi inspired the Prophet Mohammad represent the cultural creativity of Iran. Chapter IX turns to an integrated consideration of meaning creation whether in traditional social form as in religion or in individual artistic form, in order to open up the "collective representation" position of Chapters VI and VIII to account for flexibility and change, creativity and innovation. Short stories and films are first analyzed, beginning with a restricted "structural" analysis of explicit meanings generated within a bounded text, and then gradually relaxing the restrictions to allow for generation of meaning from the context of

such bounded texts. Daryoush Mehdiyoye's film Gav serves to set the problem of meaning interpretation. Bozorg Alavi's story Sarbaz-e Surbi and Sadeq Hedayat's Shabhaye Veramin are used as strictly bounded texts, while Sadeq Chubak's Mardi dar Qafas expands the restriction to allow the tradition of modern short story writing to supply identifications of meaning not contained directly in the text. Similar analyses are explored for several films before returning to traditional social meanings (ritual calendars, legends of social grouping, religious paradigms).

The position being explored is one following Roman Jakobson (1960) and Roy Wagner (1972) that meaning is constantly created and decays. Lexemes can be used as simple defined signs or through multiple usages be built into symbols. Symbols inversely can decay by repeated identical usages into mere signs. Insofar as "prison" is simply synonymous with "this world" and further metaphoric play is not engaged in, it becomes merely a sign with a standard meaning for any Persian speaker or reader. It is suggested that while for given periods symbolic usages crystallize into paradigms, paradigmatic sets, or symbolic/semantic performance domains, a longer time span will show such usages to meld and decay (as in the introduction of Shiism under the Safavids, or the changes in Zoroastrian doctrine reviewed in Part I, or the shrine and legend formations reviewed in Part II). A tentative suggestion follows that such symbolic crystallizations may correlate with modes of social integration. Such a correlation is very schematically suggested as following a three step social structural change for Yazd—

- (a) a mercantile and peasant economy embedded in a patrimonial system with royal monopolies on major sectors of production;
- (b) a mercantile and peasant economy together with a nascent urban industrialization embedded in a colonial system;
- (c) a state economy bidding through nationalized industry and central planning for a place in the world economy of multi-national corporations—

in which xeirats (a commensal ritual) and similar local level operators may be sufficient for (a), and rosas (a form of preachment) or religious paradigms such as invoked by the Mahdi of the Sudan and by Iranian mujtaheddin

at the same time for (b). Today for (c) both forms are not obsolete, but are encompassed by larger scale nationalist operations such as the attempt to elevate Zoroastrianism by the Shah into a symbol of the Iranian genius which was able to withstand and absorb the Greek, Arab, Turk, and European invasions. That is, one need not argue that xeirats, for instance, necessarily become obsolete under (c). Rather in a village economy such rituals perform multiple functions (resolution of conflict, respect for the dead and inspiration for cosmological speculation, reaffirmation of solidarity of a kindred, support of the priesthood, circulation of wealth) many of which are better performed other ways in a state economy (salaried priests, increased monetary liquidity, courts and village councils).

"Religion" then—the term with which we began—is allowed, following its usage, to be not one thing, but a category covering a series of different kinds of cultural operations (general paradigms, specific rituals, inter-group regulation, intra-group coordination). Culture, symbols, and ideology can in turn be viewed as "liquid" neither merely following social contingencies—having partial autonomy of elaboration and serving as immediate guides for action—nor fully autonomous and apart from the action from which they are drawn and which they coordinate.

0.4. Conclusions and Contributions

The contributions of a dissertation based on fieldwork ought to be of two sorts: ethnographic and theoretical. Given the current state of Middle East ethnology, perhaps the former is the more important at the moment. Discussion even of such elementary things as marriage patterns are made difficult by the paucity of information. Is patrilateral parallel cousin marriage merely a conceptual mnemonic (cultural model), a preferential strategy, a desirable strategy under only certain conditions, a Middle Eastern preference or only an Arab one? Such questions are answered in the literature with a casualness that makes sources nigh useless, although the situation has improved in recent years. For more controversial issues such as contemporary politics there seems to be an unwritten rule against publication: reception is too uncertain. And so the literature

remains full of platitudes about the backwardness of Islamic countries due to the religious insistence on not distinguishing between church and state or on viewing the state as illegitimate because not guided by a divine Imam. The major break-throughs here for Iran are the work of Binder (1962) and Zonis (1971a) and the unpublished dissertations of Ashraf (1971) and Abrahamian (1969). With regard to religion per se, coordinated description with other spheres of life is practically non-existent for Iran although a wealth of travellers' notes and Orientalists' spade work is available.

For local level descriptions of Iran, the author appears to be one of only the second generation of post-war ethnographers. The first generation consisted of about a dozen people, only two of whom have so far produced non-tribal studies.¹ Human geographers also did some work but contributed little outside of the economic sphere to sociological or cultural information. My own stay in Iran (1969-71) coincided with the first cresting of what now has become a flood of ethnographers. One other ethnographer should be cited among the first generation, although formally an Orientalist rather than an anthropologist: Prof. Mary Boyce, a student of Henning and his successor as dean of Zoroastrian studies in England, spent a year in the village of Sharifabad-e Yazd.

The ethnographic contributions of this thesis thus lie in providing descriptions of:

- (1) Middle Eastern religious communities in context:
 - (a) Zoroastrian communities to be compared with Mary Boyce's several articles, E.G. Browne and other older academic visitors;
 - (b) An Iranian Jewish community to be compared with Loeb's study of Shirazi Jews (1970) as well as with travellers' accounts and the records of the Alliance Israelite Universelle;
 - (c) Village and urban Islam to be compared with Robert Dillon's forthcoming dissertation on Kirmani villages;

¹ Alberts (a village near Teheran), Barth (Basseri), Irons (Turkomen), Kendall (a village near Isfahan), P. Lienhardt (Isfahan bazaar: never written up), E. and R. Löffler (Boir Ahmad: a settled tribal section), Pehrson (Baluchi), Spooner (Baluchistan), Saltzman (Baluchi), N. and R. Tapper (Shahsavend), Thaiss (Teheran bazaar: still unavailable).

(d) Contemporary Bahaism;

- (2) An Iranian city to be compared with English's geographic description of Kirman (1966), Frieden and Mann's planning study of Kirman (1971), and H. Rotblat's analysis of marketing in Qazvin (1972).

A more analytic classification of ethnographic data presented includes: legends, marriage patterns, land tenure, rituals, gaming, rioting, dreaming, migration, occupational and conversion patterns. Further substantive contributions include the collection of historical data on inter-religious group relations, the political organization of Islam, and the organization of Zoroastrianism over the past four centuries.

With regard to the comparative questions raised in the Proposal regarding the sociology of Protestantism and the development of the Protestant Ethic thesis, some general affirmative answers can be given that tightly knit sectarian-like organizations have aided socio-economic mobility among the Parsis, Jews, Bahais, Iranian Zoroastrians and Muslim groups such as the Ismailis and perhaps even some Sufi groups like the Naqshebandi (merchants in Western Iran). One can further in a preliminary way suggest a la the studies of Bryan Wilson's group (1967) some of the organizational variations and their effects: the oligarchical organization of the nineteenth century Parsis, the patriarchal organization of the Ismailis (which had something to do with the striking success in organizing a cooperative society in the Shahrabak area in contrast to the failure of surrounding Jafari groups), and so on.

With regard to entrepreneurial spirit, it is apparently rare to have a description of non-governmentally inspired, communally-oriented, but capitalistically organized enterprises such as given in Chapter V for post-war Nasrabad. This has implications for the negative effect on such activities of the current comprehensive government control: the peasants are not so a-capitalistic given the chance. Given, however, the demands of a developing nation, Wertheim (1964) is correct to criticize Geertz for looking to the stern, pious Moslem santris (i.e., the petty bourgeoisie with a "Protestant Ethic") as the future agents of economic growth: rather, following Max Weber's realization that large scale bureaucracy has come to stay, Wertheim looks to a fertile symbiosis of aristocratic prijaji with

administrative qualities and the abangan commoners with a collectivist ethic. So too for Iran, economic take-off, release from the grosser forms of exploitation, and integration with the industrialized sections of the world seem to depend on national scale mobilization: the struggle is to prevent this from becoming a totalitarian exercise. (Thus the literary themes discussed in Chapter IX.)

With regard to Zoroastrian and Islamic studies, I believe this is the first time in the English literature that relatively full descriptions of rosas, zurxanes, religious riots, and similar forms have been made available, allowing for future structural analyses; furthermore the interrelations of some of these forms (xeirat, rosa) with land tenure suggest directions for comparative statements on a sounder basis than the "amongitis" of the Frazerian generation.

With regard to bazaars, an attempt has been made to gather such studies as are available and to suggest (a) how transactions are structured by the nature of the several markets rather than looking only to the gaming nature of bargaining; and (b) how comparative statements might be made contrasting different degrees of market openness (see the contrast of Yazd and Kirman in Chapter IV).

With regard to marriage patterns, an attempt has been made to gather such statistical evidence as is available and to suggest how in the future correlations with social structural positions might be pursued so as to answer the questions listed at the beginning of this section.

Not included in the dissertation, but part of the fieldwork was collection of materials for the analysis of the Zoroastrian and Jewish dialects in Yazd. Some of this material is being looked at by Karl Cranke at the University of Michigan in connection with his forthcoming dissertation on the Central Plateau dialects, a key to understanding of inter-ethnic patterns of migration and segregation.

With regard to inter-religious relations, an attempt has been made to go beyond cultural differentiation, and through historical and political analysis to elucidate conditions under which rules of separation harden and loosen, as well as to explore where the forms of separation (rules of

uncleanness, caste criteria, economic differentiation) come from.

Methodologically, the dissertation attempts to reinforce certain tendencies as opposed to others:

- (a) To take as starting points for analysis problems suggested by participants in a social system (rather than questions which contribute only to academic puzzles);
- (b) By contributing a further series of cases to the sociology of religion, to interpret the Weberian methodology as a search for the sanctioning interrelations of politico-economic organization and ideology (rather than as a search for direct practical effects of theological formulations);
- (c) To sustain Weber's concern to be able to evaluate more and less stable forms of organization (as against relativistic anthropological tendencies: to say the Bongo-Bongo do it differently than do the Nakiremans is a starting point, not an end point);
- (d) To insist on "inductive" ordering procedures as well as deductive hypotheses, and in particular to pay attention to emic as well as etic categories.

0.5. Acknowledgments

Grateful thanks are due many more individuals and institutions than can be listed here. A minimum list includes the following.

In Teheran, the Zoroastrian Anjoman of Teheran both for its hospitality and for its Ardeshir Yeganegi Memorial Library facilities; Dr. Esfandiar Yeganegi, Majlis Representative of the Zoroastrian community; Dr. Farhang Mehr, President of the Zoroastrian Anjoman; Mobed Rustam Shahzadeh; Mr. Parviz Varjovand; Mr. Gushtasp Bakhtian; Mr. Fereydun Zardoshti; Mr. Fereydun Felfeli; Mr. Fereydun Khodadad Felfeli, Mr. Rustam Khodadad Felfeli, and Mr. Mehreban Felfeli; Sartip Amir Asad Shah Khalili, representative of the Agha Khan in Iran; Sayyid Reza, folklorist and counsellor to scholars from Herzfeld to the nascent American Institute; Dr. Iraj Afshar and Prof. S. Hossein Nasr of the University of Teheran; Dr. Keyvan Tabari and Miss Parvin Hejazi of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education; Dr. Kia of the Ministry of Culture; Mr. Ali Namdar of Central Customs; the British Institute of Persian Studies, its Director, David Stronach, and its Assistant Director, Tony Hutt; my second home in Teheran, the American Institute of Iranian Studies, its Directors, Bill

Sumner and Ed Davis; Dr. Liimatanan, U.S. Science Attache; and all the young scholars who tried to keep my head above the cultural waters.

In Zahedan, Mr. Soroush Arzomand. In Kirman, Mr. Jamshid Soroushian.

In Yazd, Governor-General Reza Dabiran; Postmaster-General Habibullah Qaimmagami; Dr. Resavi, Director-General of the Ministry of Health; Dr. Mortaz, Director of the Goodarzi Hospital; Mr. Muneri, Director of the Marker Boys School; Mr. Rombod and Mr. Cohenkadosh, Director and Principal of the Ehtehad School; Ayatollah Saduqi; Ayatollah Vaziri; Mr. Mehdi Abedi, librarian at the Vaziri Library, who helped me greatly with translation as well as guidance and friendship; Mr. Hussein Barbari; Mr. Akhtar Khavari; Dr. Paknejad; Mr. Rustamkhani; Mr. Rustam Felfeli; Mr. Shahriyar Dahmobe; Mr. Firuz Faromarz and the young men of Khorramshah; Dastur Soroush Shahzadi; Dastur Mehreban Siavash; Mr. Rustam Bellivani; and all the warm and friendly people in Nasrabad, in the bazaars and factories, quarters and villages of Yazd.

In Bombay, Mr. Nanabhoy Jeejeebhoy; Mr. Maneck D. Petit; Sir Jamshed Jeejeebhoy, 7th Bart.; Dr. P.B. Warden; Dastur Minocher-Homji; Mr. Sapur F. Desai; Dastur Jamshid Katrak; Mr. Rashid Shahmardan; Dr. Jehangir Sukhardia; Mr. Fereydun R. Nureyasdani-Irani; Mr. Shahriyar F. Irani; Mr. Shellim Samuel; Mr. M.D. Japheth; Mr. Ruttonjee A. Wadia; Mr. Shahriyar Falohati and the staff of the Ideal Restaurant; and the facilities of the Jamshetjee Nusserwanjee Petit Institute, the Cama Oriental Institute, the Parsi Punchayat, and the Bombay University Library.

In Surat, Dr. Ratan Marshall; Mr. Gareysh Pandya; Mr. Maneck Gheyara, President of the Surat Parsi Punchayat; Davar Kawasji T. Modi; Mr. Dinshaw Bagharia; Dastur Nadirshaw Sena; the young men of the Bori Sunni Educational Society; and the facilities of the Surat Municipal Library.

In Vesu, Dastur Bahadur Kavasji Mehnti and Mr. Mir. In Navsari, Dastur Mehrji-Rana, 16th. In Poona, Dr. Sami Mody. In Karachi, Ervad Godrej D. Sidhwa.

And finally in Chicago, to all the members of the Department of Anthropology and Near East Center who expressed such faith in me, allowing

me to work out the theses which follow and others in Anthropology 333, and in particular those who read through and commented on a bulky manuscript without the aid of subtitles, summaries or glossary: Raymond T. Smith, David M. Schneider, Marvin Zonis, Milton Singer, and the organizer of the expedition into the lands of good and evil, Nur Yalman.

0.6. Orthography

Transliteration generally follows Lambton (1954), that is: (a) x = kh, š = sh, č = ch; (b) spoken forms rather than Arabicized orthography is preferred: Ramazan, not Ramadan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE..... ii
LIST OF MAPS..... xxiv
LIST OF TABLES..... xxv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..... xxvi
GLOSSARY.....xxvii

PART I: ALEXANDER'S PRISON

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION..... 2
 1.1. Problems and Approaches
 1.2. Summary of the Argument
CHAPTER II. RELIGIOUS TENSION AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF ISLAM..... 22
 2.1. Introduction
 2.2. Iranian Politics: Consciousness and Power
 2.3. The Islamic Role
 2.4. Summary of the Argument
CHAPTER III. ZOROASTER'S REALIZATION: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
 ZOROASTRIANISM..... 57
 3.1. Introduction
 3.2. Six Current Debates
 3.3. The Rise of a Parsi Caste
 3.4. A Half-Step Behind: Iranian Zoroastrianism
 3.5. Summary of the Argument

PART II: DAR UL IBADAH (HOUSE OF DEVOTION)

CHAPTER IV. THE YAZD MEIDAN..... 112
 4.1. Introduction
 4.2. An Overview
 4.3. Agriculture
 4.4. Urban Manufacturing and Trade
 4.5. Comparisons and Contrasts
 4.6. Morphology and Community

CHAPTER V. <u>ATASHKADEH O DADGAH</u> (PLACE OF FIRE AND JUDGMENT).....	152
5.1. Introduction	
5.2. Zoroastrian Villages of Yazd	
5.3. Community Rituals	
5.4. Summary of the Argument	
CHAPTER VI. <u>DARVOZEH QUR'AN</u> (GATE OF THE QUR'AN).....	237
6.1. Introduction	
6.2. Shiite Idiom	
6.3. Paradigmatic Sets	
6.4. Summary of the Argument	
CHAPTER VII. <u>JERUSHALAYIM HA-KETANA</u> (LITTLE JERUSALEM).....	312
7.1. The Changing Community	
7.2. Internal Structure	
7.3. External Integration	
CHAPTER VIII. <u>BAB-E BAHA</u> (GATE OF GLORY).....	335
8.1. Introduction	
8.2. The Bahai Paradigm	
8.3. Bahai Development in Yazd	
8.4. Individual Belief and Social Constraints	
8.5. Summary of the Argument	
PART III: PERSIAN SULPHUR	
CHAPTER IX. POWERS OF IMAGINATION.....	372
9.1. Introduction	
9.2. Bounded Texts	
9.3. Texts and Contexts	
9.4. Religious Calendars and Other Sociological Charters	
9.5. Symbolic Power and Its Limitations	
APPENDIX I. RELIGIOUS RIOTS.....	406
APPENDIX II. PARSİ VOICES.....	457
APPENDIX III. <u>ROSAS</u>	465
APPENDIX IV. JEWISH RITUAL CYCLE.....	476
APPENDIX V. <u>MOBHASSEH RAJEB-E XODA</u> (DIDACTIC DEBATE ABOUT GOD).....	481
APPENDIX VI. SHORT STORIES AND FILMS.....	484
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	507

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Major Trade Routes Around 1900.....	128
Map 2. Yazd Street Bazaar Shop Distribution.....	145
Map 3. Zoroastrian Villages of Yazd.....	156
Map 4. Nasrabad Residential Distribution.....	164
Map 5. Zoroastrian Great Shrines.....	207
Map 6. The Jewish Quarter of Yazd.....	313
Map 7. 1892 Riots Against Bahais.....	417

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Comparative Age Composition of Bombay Parsis.....	71
Table 2. Crops Grown in a Suburb Village of Yazd: Nasrabad 1970-71..	124
Table 3. Retail Shop Distributions: Yazd, Kirman, Qazvin.....	145
Table 4. Yazd Produce Bazaar.....	148
Table 5. Yazdi Zoroastrian Village Demography.....	160
Table 6. Pahlavans by Occupation.....	253
Table 7. Sample Trade Slang Vocabulary.....	271
Table 8. Butchers' Slang.....	272
Table 9. Iranian Ritual Calendar.....	295
Table 10. Short Genealogy of Bab/Azal/Baha Leadership.....	338
Table 11. Tin Soldier.....	380
Table 12. Veramin Nights.....	384
Table 13. Short Story Transformations.....	388
Table 14. Social Grouping Legends.....	400

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1. Ritual Setting for an Eleventh Month Death Memorial Ceremony.....	188
Illustration 2. Muslim Bridal Setting.....	203
Illustration 3. <u>Naxod Fal</u>	290
Illustration 4. <u>Abjad Talisman</u>	293

GLOSSARY

abambar, water storage or reservoir.

abjad, numerical system based on values assigned to each letter of the alphabet.

aethoran, referring to the Zoroastrian priestly class.

agiary, Zoroastrian fire temple of the second rank.

ah, prayer.

axond, Muslim preacher.

'alim (pl. 'ulema), learned man, especially in Islamic religious affairs.

anjil, Old Testament.

anjoman, society.

arbab, master, landowner, landlord.

aš, stew.

Ashura, the tenth of Moharram, anniversary of the martyrdom of Hussein.

atabat, Shiite shrine cities in southern Iraq: Karbala, Nejaf, Kufa.

Ataš Bahram, Fire of Victory, highest level Zoroastrian fire.

Ataš Dadgah, tertiary rank Zoroastrian fire.

atašband, caretaker of the fire.

ayatollah, high ranking member of the Islamic religious class.

ayeh, sentence of the Qur'an.

bab, gate, chapter.

bagh, garden.

bast, asylum.

batini, esoteric.

behdin, Zoroastrian layman.

bid'a, (blameworthy) innovation.

čador, veil.

cune zadan, bargain.

da'a, prayer, supplication.

dadgah, court, third rank fire, tower of silence.

dang, a sixth of any piece of real estate.

Dar-e Mehr (sometimes also Darb-e Mehr), second rank fire.

darun, Zoroastrian ritual cake made in high liturgy.

dastban, field watchman.

dasteh, group, especially one which practices exercises of pious flagellation.

dastur, Zoroastrian priest.

daxme, tower of silence, platform for exposure of corpses.

deh mobed, village priest, usually a layman who takes care of a fire temple.

erfoni, gnostic.

fal, divination.

falgir, diviner.

farman, royal order.

farmandar, governor.

farmandar-e koll, independent governate (not part of a governate-general), the current provincial rank of Yazd.

fasli, seasonal, the Zoroastrian calendar which begins on Noruz-e Jamshidi, i.e., 21 March.

fatwa, decision, legal opinion.

gahambar, Zoroastrian seasonal five day celebration.

gaomez, purified and consecrated bulls' urine, also called nirang.

ghosl, cleansing ritual ablution.

gonah, sin.

goriz, the "running away" or tie-in at the end of a rosa with the story of Karbala.

hadith, tradition going back to the Prophet based on an isnad or chain of transmitters.

haj, ritual pilgrimage to Mecca.

halal, religiously approved.

hammam, baths.

haoma, sacred drink prepared in Zoroastrian high liturgy rituals corresponding to the Hindu soma.

harram, religiously disapproved and forbidden.

hey'at-e mazhabi, religious assembly, in Yazd usually referring to gatherings for mourning exercises of dasteh.

husseineya, courtyard for rosa, tazieh, šabi dar avordan.

ijtihad, interpretation.

imam, leader of worship.

Imam, one of the twelve descendants of Ali and Fatimeh who led the Shiite religious community.

imanzadeh, shrine at a grave of a descendant of an Imam.

Irani, Persian nominative for "Iranian;" Western India English usage for Iranian immigrants; used within the Indian Zoroastrian community to distinguish Iranian Zoroastrians from Parsis.

Isnā 'Ashari, Twelver Shiism, the religion of the majority of Iranians.

jadid-ul-islam, new convert to Islam.

Jafari, Twelver Shiite, named after the sixth Imam, after whom the succession is disputed between the Twelvers and the Seveners.

jeheziye, dowry which a Muslim bride brings to the marriage.

jezia, tax paid by protected non-Muslims.

jihād, war in defense of Islam, either socially or spiritually.

jinn, spirits.

jube, open sewer or water conduit.

kabissa, Zoroastrian calendar intercalulation.

kallak, octagonal pillar on which fires were placed for lighting, found in courtyards of mosques and husseineyas.

katkhoda, village headman.

kuche, alley or small street: in a city like Teheran, kuche is used as "alley" is used in English; in a village or small town any unpaved path or road is a kuche.

kusti, sacred thread worn by Zoroastrians.

xaneqah, religious hostel, Sufi center.

xeirat, charity or goodness, food distribution (see Chapter V).

xotbe, homily delivered at Friday and festival prayers.

xun baha, blood price.

la'anat, curses.

madresseh, religious college.

mahalleh, neighborhood.

majlis, assembly, gathering.

Majlis, lower house of the Iranian Parliament.

makru, religiously disapproved but not forbidden.

maktab, elementary religious school.

mann, measure of weight, in Yazd equalling six kilograms.

marja taqlid, source of imitation, the leading mujtahed.

masjid, mosque.

Masjid-e Jome, Congregational Mosque.

mazhab, religion, sect.

mehr, portion paid by groom or groom's family as part of a marriage contract.

membar, pulpit on which an axond or imam speaks.

miandar, leader in the gowd or pit of a zurxane.

mihrab, niche in mosque wall indicating the qibla or direction of prayer.

mirab, caretaker of water.

mobed, Zoroastrian priest.

modir, director, chief.

monajot, meditations, free form praise of God.

morsed, leader, teacher, guide.

mujtahed (pl., mujtaheddin), member of the religious class eminent enough to issue fatwa, one who interprets.

mullah, member of the religious class.

mutavalli, overseer, administrator of a vaqf.

nabi, a prophet.

nafs, animal spirit, soul.

namaz, formal Muslim prayer.

namus, honor of a man through his women.

naxl, tear-shaped wooden structure representing the casket in which Hussein's body was carried.

nasu, pollution, filth (Zoroastrian term).

nasu-salar, Zoroastrian corpse bearer.

naujot, Zoroastrian initiation ceremony.

nejas, ritually unclean (Islamic term).

nirang, purified and consecrated bulls' urine used in Zoroastrian high liturgy ceremonies.

ostad, mastercraftsman.
oughaf, (s., vaqf), religious endowments.

padan, veil worn over the face, especially by Zoroastrian priests before the fire.

pahlavan, athlete, hero.

pari, fairy.

pak, clean.

Parsi, Indian Zoroastrian.

pir, elder, saint.

pishnamaz, leader of prayer.

porseh, death memorial (third day).

qabile, deed, land deed, marriage contract; in Abadan pušte qabile refers to sedagh.

qadi, judge.

qanat, underground water channel.

qand, sugar cone.

rakat, unit of namaz.

ramz, raml, code, secret code.

rosa, Islamic preachment form framed with the life of an Imam, and especially the story of Karbala (see Chapter VI).

rosaxond, preacher.

rosaxane, place where rosa occurs.

ruh, soul, spirit.

ru'ya, dream.

salavat, formula of "greeting" the Prophet (see Chapter VI).

sanad, document, informal land deed.

sargolfi, key money.

sayyid, descendant of the Prophet.

sedagh, portion paid or promised by the groom's side in a marriage contract in case of divorce.

sedreh, sacred shirt (Zoroastrian).

sejdeh, prostration of a namaz.

senf (pl., asnaf), guild.

siraf, money lender or money changer.

sabi dar avordan, passion plays of Moharram, also tazieh.

sahada, testimony, the witness of faith formula.

sari'a, Islamic law.

sir baha, "milk money," money paid by groom's side to bride's side at the time of marriage.

šohet, Jewish ritual butcher.

sureh, chapter of the Qur'an.

takiye, another name for a housseineya.

tasbi, prayer beads, rosary.

tassawuf, gnostic, mystic, Sufi.

tazieh, mourning, also sabi dar avordan.

ulema, Muslim clergy.

umma, the community of Muslims.

vaqf (pl. ouhaf), religious endowment.

ziarat, pilgrimage, visit.

ziaratgah, shrine.

zikh, recollections, spiritual exercises to render God's presence throughout one's being.

zurkhane, traditional gymnasium.

PART I
ALEXANDER'S PRISON

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problems and Approaches

One of the legends of the founding of the city of Yazd, on the southern edge of the central desert in Iran, is that originally it was the site selected by Aristotle to incarcerate the soldiers of Darius IV taken captive by Alexander. There is, in fact, a building in Yazd which bears the name Zendan-e Eskendar (Alexander's Prison). It is the ruined remains of a medieval madresseh, but that makes it no less suitable as a node of symbolic elaborations. The courtyard, inhabited now by a cow and some chickens, contains a deep well. This well is the entrance to a large tunnel which, it is said, used to pass beneath the city walls and run underground to the nearby town of Taft. So large was this tunnel that a soldier on horseback could gallop through it. The encounter between Alexander and Darius leads to other associations as well, of which the most extreme and arresting is Darmesteter's exasperated, ". . . the contempt of Greece for Persia, born to slavery, has been one of the most powerful sources of the progress of humanity" (1925: 6).¹

The following study, based partly on a brief residence in Yazd from May 1970 to February 1971 and from July to December 1971, had

¹ Indian Zoroastrian (henceforth, "Parsi") authors tend to accept this criticism, and this remains also an obstacle to more Parsis accepting the Shah's invitation "to return" to Iran. F.C. Davar, citing Dastur Dr. Dhalla's (1922) observations on the disadvantages of absolutism—power's corruption of the ruler, and the "slave-mentality" of the ruled—adds, "The day of democracy had not dawned in Iran [in Achaemenid times] as it has not up to the present day. . . . The Iranians prayed to God for a kind and noble ruler, while the Greeks craved not for monarchy, however benevolent, but political independence and an effective voice in the administration of the country" (1953: 28-29). What is important about such sentiments is not their historical accuracy, but their ideals for

originally a dual goal. The ethnographic goal was a description of the Zoroastrian community in Iran about which little of sociological value has been published. The theoretical goal was to apply a community-study approach to the internal religious dynamics of a transitional urban modernizing situation. The two goals dictated the town of Yazd as a field site. As it turned out, they also involved quite directly an analysis of the whole process of modernization in Iran in two primary respects. (1) Economically, Zoroastrians have been very much involved in the British engagement with Iran over the past century and a half: there is probably no Zoroastrian family which does not have a member who does not now or has not in the past lived in Bombay or Western India.¹ (2) Religiously, Iran has only very tentatively begun those reforms which in Europe are associated with the French Revolution. The Pahlavis have done for the minorities of Iran what Napoleon did in Europe: the legal

the living. G.K. Nariman adds justly the observation on the relation between elitism and excellence which fits the Greek tradition as well: "The Persian world presents itself to our eyes as a society eminently aristocratic. . . . Agathias relates what is highly probable, namely, that the Neo-Platonic philosophers gave up Persia because they were displeased with the cruelty and oppression reigning among the possessors of power and because they were disgusted with the life of the harem and the immoderate sensuality." Yet the aristocratic elite provided one of the great administrations of its day and was admired as sincere and chivalrous gentlemen. "The cause of the decadence of the Iranian people was the democratization which was brought in the train of Islam. . . ." and the final coup de grace was delivered by the Turkish invasions (n.d.: 89-92).

¹ One genealogy, for instance, of a teacher, son of a merchant, shows of about 200 persons, 74 reside(d) in the Yazd vicinity, almost as many (61) in Bombay, 23 in Karachi, and only 23 in Teheran. A second brief genealogy, of a peasant, shows of 170 people, 60 reside(d) in the Yazd vicinity, 45 in Teheran, 35 in other parts of Iran (mainly Ahwaz), 18 in Bombay, and 12 in Pakistan. Another genealogy of a teacher, son of a peasant, shows a more significant shift towards Teheran with 112 in the Yazd area, 81 in Teheran, 12 in other parts of Iran, but still 29 in Bombay. Residence pattern at the moment is one kind of synchronic count, but it will under-estimate the extent of movement to and from Bombay. Another way to count is that of 21 current shopkeepers in Yazd, all of whose fathers were Yazdis, 11 had themselves been to Bombay (although only 8 to work, 1 having gone to the hospital there, one as a tourist, and one merely having been born there), 11 of 24 counted brothers had been to

supports of the ghetto are swept away. But as yet there is no Feuerbach, no Marx, no Durkheim, no Wittgenstein, no Nietzsche for the land where Zarathustra spake.¹ Rejectors of religion as superstition are easy to come by, but analysts who try to elucidate that which keeps religion meaningful to so many people are rarer handmaidens of social change. That Islam reigns so strong is not to be dismissed as a passive laggardness in throwing off an older, medieval stage of social development, but owes much to the development of the world economy and its political organization, as well as to the internal political development of Iran. These two circumstances have had far reaching effects on the Iranian Zoroastrian community, on the rapidity of its modernization and on the conflicts generated with the more slowly modernizing Islamic nation amid which it is set.

The desert town of Yazd, sculpted through the plasticity of mud building materials into picturesque domes, wind towers, arches and walls of narrow alleys has struck many a casual visitor as being somehow one of the most "essentially Iranian" towns in the country. To Iranians that means it is one of the least modern and most conservative of Iranian towns. So conservative is it that here remains the last old center (together with its sister city of Kirman) of the ancient religion of pre-Islamic Iran, Zoroastrianism. Or so it seems: for most of the Zoroastrian families who now live here have concentrated in the surrounding villages over a number of centuries from other places, driven from those places by another kind of Iranian conservatism: religious persecution. Yazd lays a claim as well to this kind of conservatism, standing in popular reputation with the religious shrine cities of Qum and Meshed as the most intolerant in

Bombay (and one more lives in Pakistan), 15 of their fathers had been to Bombay, and 13 of 31 counted fathers' brothers, making a total of 50 of 97 males or just over half. Of 14 white collar Zoroastrians (teachers, clerks and a nurse), 3 had themselves been to Bombay, 8 of their fathers, 3 of 6 counted fathers' brothers making 14 of 34 males.

¹ Whom does one include for Iran: Kasravi? Does one include the slogans of "back to true Islam" (Jamal-ud-din or Malcolm Khan) or "back to simple, martial Zoroastrian morality" (Por-e Davud)? Closest within Islam

Iran. To Bahais, the name Yazd means a place of several hundred martyrs picked apart limb by limb, organs slashed and splattered on the reanimating pages of eye-witness recorded history. To Zoroastrians and Jews, Yazd is the society where the "covenants of Omar," Jame'a Abbasi, et al., were institutionalized in everyday life: to be ritually unclean and to have no legal standing was a matter not merely of constant fear of theft and murder, but of daily humiliations. To Ismailis, the Yazd area is the scene of the murder of a divine Imam and of a continuing battle against the ritualistic intolerance of their Muslim Jafari brothers. But, above all, and basic to all of this, for the ordinary member of the Isnā 'Ashari (Shiah Jafari) majority, Yazd has been a place of political and economic insecurity. Mullahs educated in the atabat (Nejaf and Karbella, the Shiite centers in southern Iraq) vied with Governors appointed by the crown. The Governors vied with the local land and merchant based power structure for control of the surplus value of local economic activity. The taxpayers—artisans and peasants—appealed to each of the three for protection against the other two. Guilds, zurxanes, xaneqahs, dasteh, and rosaxanes provided organizational channels for advancing and protecting these various interests. When these failed, brigandry was an alternative resort which only worsened the general condition.

Zoroastrianism and Isnā 'Ashari Islam each claims Yazd as its own, and form also in the wider culture of Iran at large dialectic poles of identity: Iran is fiercely non-Arab and equally fiercely Islamic. For Muslims this is a schizophrenic contradiction: barbarian Arabs, who notoriously can keep their minds on nothing but sexual pleasure, destroyed the great civilization and imperium of Sassanian (and Zoroastrian) Iran; nonetheless these racially inferior Semites must be thanked and exalted in iterated rituals for bringing to Iran the divinely perfect religion of Islam; their barbarism is only confirmed by their subsequent ruining

perhaps are the authors from the Indian subcontinent such as Iqbal or the Qur'anic criticism reviewed in Baljon (1968). But also perhaps one ought not to dismiss the poets and short story writers of Iran (see Chapter IX).

for the past twelve centuries of the Islamic just society by their murder of Ali and Hussein. For Zoroastrians, the matter is simpler: Sassanian Iran was corrupt and therefore unstable; the Arab barbarians toppled the state (probably with the help of a fifth column of underground Mazdakites, who as Iranians would be more capable of such a feat) and imposed the barbaric religion which has kept all Islamic countries backward, and thanks to their initial military overlordship forced cultivated Iranians into racial contamination and the intellectual dissimulations of a Hafez, Saadi, Ferdausi, and Omar Khayyam, when the only effective challenge would have been direct confrontation as soldiers of Good combating all Evil.¹

We have here two visions of the moral goals of man's endeavors. That they are in a sense competitive—believers of one reject believers of the other as ignorant fools—is perhaps less important than that each is a simplification of the facts of life and of history. It is the analysis of such simplifications ("myths" if you will) and their uses that may provide a key to certain aspects of religious sociology, particularly to the appeal and efficacy of religious systems as well as to the disillusionment with them. Traditional accounts of these two visions would state them in equally appealing fashion, with footnotes on practical (and therefore, presumably, minor) problems of implementation, e.g., thus:

ZOROASTRIANISM gives man a role in the cosmic battle to re-establish the supremacy of Good. The era in which he is allowed to fight for Good is one of instability and injustice: for man, evil is always present. But the effect of Zoroastrian morality is the same as that of Camus: the world is absurd/evil but meaning/good can be created and maintained as long as men do purposeful/good acts. Thus the golden rule of Zoroastrianism—good words, good thoughts, good deeds—is both an existentialist program and the essence of ritual purity for religious acts. The problem with Zoroastrianism

¹ "Why did then the mighty edifice [of Sassanian Iran] collapse so hopelessly under the shock of a few thousand miserable 'lizard eaters,' veritably like a pack of cards? It came down because the moral foundations of the nation were sapped by religious maniacs and it ultimately survived the cataclysm because it had clung to some of the planks of shipwrecked Zoroastrianism" (Nariman 1925: iv). See also Rashid Shahmardan's articles in Parsiana 1971.

is that of all cosmological teleologies. In the great battle between Good and Evil (Ormazd and Ahriman), man was created with free will to choose to fight on the side of Good. The reinforcements of Heaven and Hell are provided to help him choose Good. The problem of free will, while not solved, is a lesser one: if one wants purgatory or hell, one can choose to fight on the side of Evil, and this is a fairly good metaphor of the proposition that evil breeds evil, or to put it in existentialist terms, hell is a metaphor of alienation (see below). The larger problem is that the outcome of the cosmic battle is known: Good will win with or without man's choice. Given that the End is predetermined, there are no rules for ordering moral behavior except the pragmatic one of choosing whatever will keep one allied with the Winner, i.e., particularistic injunctions elaborated either in the sacred books or through theological casuistry. This is either reason to give a fair amount of power to the priesthood, or reason to reject any but existentially intentional and momentary decisions. Just then as Protestantism can legitimate social forms from ascetic villages to hedonistic country clubs,¹ so Zoroastrianism can legitimate social forms

¹ The issue was classically posed by Max Weber in his Economy and Society, to which, in a sense, the essays on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism stand as but an example. The point here at the moment is that raised by the economic historians (Tawney, Robertson, etc.) that the elements of economic individualism, acquisitive proclivities, calculus of utilities, etc., were not specific to Protestants. The philosopher John Herman Randall, Jr., generalized this by pointing out that the Protestant Reformation made salvation a purely religious problem, not dependent on human conduct (predestination, sola fide), and thus "opened up the way for the assimilation of any pattern of values that might seem good in the light of men's actual social experience" (1948). This is a point worth stressing since so many commentators on religion seem to assume that one can work from theology to social behavior in some simple way. Weber himself a number of times seems to make this assumption: "We are interested in . . . the influence of these psychological sanctions which originating in religious belief and the practice of religion, gave a direction to practical conduct and held the individual to it" (1930: 97); "The Calvinist faith is one of the many examples in the history of religion of the relation between the logical and the psychological consequences for the practical religious attitude to be derived from certain religious ideas. Fatalism is,

from Iranian or Gujurati agricultural villages to the Sassanian heretic-hunting state church. What then remains of Zoroastrianism? Only the signs and practices: wearing the sedreh and kusti (sacred shirt and thread), care of the fire temple, exposure of the dead . . . ? And when the dead

of course, the only logical consequence of predestination. But on account of the idea of proof, the psychological result was precisely the opposite." (ibid., fn. 66); "Here we shall inquire as to the manner in which Indian religion, as one factor among many, may have prevented capitalistic development (in the occidental sense)" (1958: 4). But if one returns to the fuller argument in Economy and Society these statements take on a more defensible supporting role. It is a mistake to see Weber as reversing Marx's causal chain as Weber himself protested; rather he should be seen as refining Marx's analytic grid: one of the central issues in Economy and Society is the relation between two kinds of power—coercive power of which economic power is a type case, and legitimate authority. The relation between the two is not a homology: while economic power is a major means of establishing and maintaining a system of legitimate authority, the possessors of legitimate authority are not only interested in economic means and ends. The question then becomes as to how else legitimate authority is exercised. This Weber attacks, for instance, in his study of forms of administration and argues that their degree of stability depends upon their source of material support: you can have bureaucracy without a money economy, but it is less easy to achieve long term stability (in kind payments degenerate into tax farming, fief granting, etc., which in turn implies decentralization of power, etc.). Given a system of administration and its means of support a next question is its implications for the modes of recruitment to public offices and the kinds of education received and thus the kinds of ethos developed. It is at this point that ethos, economic spirit (Wirtschaftsethik) and so on are introduced. We still have chivalrous men today who believe in self-perfection and Renaissance comprehensive cultivation rather than specialization and discipline in concert with others. But the most rational portions of the bureaucracy (technicians, secretaries, clerks, etc.) work better with the latter kind of ethos. It thus clearly bowdlerizes Weber to say that Calvinism causes Capitalism, and even merely to contrast his phrase "elective affinity" of causes with single causation is to make too indeterminate the complex of relations with which he was trying to work. I firmly agree with Bryan Wilson (1967) that the productive starting place of the Protestant Ethic thesis is with the organizational forms of sects and churches: cf. Weber's articles "Kirchen u. Sekten in Nordamerika" and "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism". In a footnote to the latter, Weber says of the former, "I have repeatedly referred to this article as supplementing The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The present rewriting is motivated by the fact that the concept of sect as worked out by myself (as a contrasting conception to "church") [in that article] has in the meanwhile and to my joy been taken over and treated thoroughly by Troeltsch in his Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen" (Gerth and Mills 1946: 450).

are buried or cremated, the sedreh-kusti not worn, the fire temple not attended? Then perhaps only the self-identification: I am a Zoroastrian?¹

ISLAM places the responsibility of instituting the just society neither on the existential individual nor on the priest, but on the community. Cosmology and the clarity of divine instructions are similar to Zoroastrianism.² Ethics takes a slightly more realistic view of man: law and fellow believers exist to help those who endanger the communal

¹ The rhetoric is directed at the dilemma of the two traditional polar definitions of religion: Spiro's "substantivist" (doctrines and institutions), "I shall define 'religion' as 'an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings'" (1966: 96); Geertz' flexible approach to the religious perspective as that inclusive self-confirming system in which "the world view [notions of how reality is put together] is believable because the ethos [the way things are done] which grows out of it is felt to be authoritative; the ethos is justifiable because the world view upon which it rests is held to be true" (1968: 97). The alternative is to begin with an agnostic attitude towards a definition of religion, and tease it out as it appears in the society under study. This anthropological methodology is quite consonant with the interpretation of Weber given above, and is quite explicitly that of Durkheim: "We do not actually possess any scientific notion of what religion is. To obtain this we would have to treat the problem by the same comparative method that we have applied to the question of crime, and that is an effort which has not yet been made. It has often been said that religion was, at each moment of history, the totality of beliefs and sentiments of all sorts relative to the relations of man with a being or beings whose nature he regarded as superior to his own. But such a definition is manifestly inadequate. In effect, there is a multitude of rules, either of conduct or of thought, which are certainly religious, and which, moreover, apply to relations of an entirely different sort" (1933: 168).

² The absurdity of attempting to differentiate central principles of complex religious traditions at this level of generality is delightfully acknowledged in the well-known, left handed compliment of the Christian Islamicist W. Cantwell Smith, that Islam can take you to the church, it can take you down the aisle, it can take you right up to the railing, it only cannot quite take you to the altar itself. (A crescent shaped wafer might get caught in the throat, and besides without wine it would not be any good!) The problem is knowing how to differentiate different symbols which may have similar functions or meanings, or similar symbols which may play different kinds of roles in different symbolic complexes. How often is a premature and illegitimate jump made to a generalization of the form: Old Testament Judaism is based on the concept of vengeance, an eye for an eye, and strict contract; or Islam is based on a fatalism born of the overwhelming power of God and a lack of the concept of love?

good. The individual then has the freedom to attempt to attain the exemplary life or merely to live the social life. All individuals are equal within the religious community with two exceptions. People are born with unequal capabilities, and specifically some people are more capable than others of attaining higher degrees of consciousness. Prophets, Imams, and saints therefore are to be accorded proper respect and obedience, although characteristically, it is expected that, men being men, they would not recognize a Christ, and the saint *must command* special respect by virtue of performing special deeds. More importantly, men are born to different social stations. Now this is a clear case on which "sociologists" can challenge Islam on self-claimed competency to provide the just society. Islam has an answer: second only to the duty of prayer is the duty of zakat, the social tax on surpluses of productive wealth which is to deal with all cases of poverty within the Islamic community:

When functioning in an efficiently organized manner, the Institution of Zakat ensures a constant readjustment of the distribution of the Nation's wealth, and this embodies on the economic plane the best guarantee that any human community could possibly hope for against the disintegrating forces of class hatred, that terrible evil born of social injustice (de Zayas 1960: xxi).

The flaw is not even the need to adjust the administration of zakat to changing economic realities: this can be done as Miss de Zayas demonstrates by a judicious application of ijtihād (interpretation of the law). The flaw is that state taxation (which has nothing to do with zakat) is subject only in a moral way to the economic theory of Islam, and that so-called Islamic governments levied such heavy taxes that, as Goitein (1970: 104) so neatly expresses it, the masses seemed to toil first of all not for food but to pay taxes, so did they fear the means of collection, gaining respite only during periods of famine when their rulers had to observe the Arabic proverb that you cannot kill a cow and milk it at the same time. One cannot claim that these are not true Islamic governments and at the same time include in the legal structure of Islam anyone who professes the šahāda (profession of faith). The non-religious test of any social program is the extent to which it achieves its goals in practice, not the extent to which it expresses ideals. The sanction on a king or ruling elite for not

paying their full zakat is experienced in damage to their souls, which is of little aid to the umma (community). The only unanswerable response would be to say that the just system of Islam is based on voluntary cooperation of people who want it to succeed, and that the just system only comes into existence insofar as this cooperation is practised.¹ That is the argument used by Bahais. Muslims tend rather to say that there was a short period of perfection in early Islam which later became corrupted; whether or not that perfection can be recreated without the arrival of the Mahdi is somewhat dubious. The example of zakat serves to illustrate the general question of the relation between social reality and stated social intentions of religion.

Statements of religion in a similar form, more or less elegant or elaborate, can be found in almost infinite numbers dating from every period of history. The sword with which to slash this repetitive Gordian knot, found by what Ricoeur (1969) has tagged "the school of suspicion"—Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Durkheim, etc.—is to evaluate not the pious ideals, but their effects, again not in the naive sense that they have failed to create the Kingdom of God on earth (Zoroastrianism for one, Buddhism for another, do not regard this even as a viable ideal), but in terms of social-psychological processes. Is there not, for instance, something significant about the logical form of most religious cosmologies: their teleological nature, the capacity for almost syllogistically tautological demonstrations lent by the ambiguous nature of symbolic discourse, the necessity for symbolic terms in attributions for the metaphysical? Are such observations not related somehow to the often recorded, religious feeling² of comfortable "certainty?" Are they not suggestive of why it is so often felt that "all religions really say the same thing?" Does not the "simplification," or the "condensation into symbols" (as Freud might have put it), suggest parallels with the dynamics of psychoanalysis, and

¹ Jihad provides the non-voluntary means of arriving at the desired state, a notion reintroduced by communist revolutionaries with such notions as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the coercive violence required to achieve it.

² I am avoiding here the word "experience" preferred by so-called

thereby also suggest something about the frequently asserted feeling that religion provides psychological relief, "helps to bring things into perspective," and so provides the security of no longer being confused, of understanding? Do such observations not indicate something about how it is that learned theologians and unlettered farmers feel able to communicate so much more effectively about religion than other things?

A paradigm case for the last query is the concept of Hell envisioning a life after death of everlasting punishment which the Bishop Ian Ramsey finds morally repugnant, logically inconsistent with other Christian doctrines (God's goodness, mercy, love), and cosmologically implausible. He interprets the word-picture of Hell as a mode of expressing a moral insight whose propositional content is:

. . . wrongdoing always seems to involve some kind of separation between wrongdoer and the person wronged. . . . Such a state of separation may not always be a state of unhappiness . . . but it would seem likely to be a state leading to personal disintegration and destruction (1969: 211).

Yet, and herein lies the value of such a "cultural device for organizing motivational and cognitive diversity" (Wallace 1961a, 1961b), "Hell" may serve the same social purpose of instilling a desire to avoid wrongdoing in a peasant who believes he will be tortured after death as it does in Ian Ramsey's aversion to alienation.

For the philosopher of theology, Ramsey's mode of interpretation opens the door to many cognitive conundrums in religious language. Thus the problem referred to above that "in the long run God's purpose will triumph and it will not matter much what we did" is opened to the suspicion that the statement is epistemologically incoherent: God's purposes, capabilities, and activities are something we can never be in a position to apperceive; so all our talk on the subject is talk about our own epistemic conditions (see Ramsey 1969: 215). This raises the issue of the definition of God. Again the concept is subject to the same rules of interpretation as Hell. Not only are such concepts open (vertically)

"phenomenologists" since in traditional theological language "religious experience" is already a loaded term.

to different interpretations by different persons operating within the same social system, but they are also open (horizontally) to symbolic elaborations. Thus "sin," Ricoeur points out, is not merely an emotively pregnant image for "rupture of a relation, estrangement, absence, vanity," but is defined for users by contrast to an open ended series of related terms such as "guilt" and "evil." To the philosopher, "evil is nothing in itself . . . it is only . . . a relation inverted with regard to the order of preference and subordination indicated by obligation" (Ricoeur 1969: 109). But to an actor evil exists "only in the act of taking it upon oneself, of assuming it, of claiming it" (*ibid.*).

There are two elements in this seemingly existentialist conclusion to Ricoeur's probing of symbolic usage. First there is the possibility (realized in increasingly many people's development) of transition from the state of the naive believer caught up in a system of symbols whose truth to him is a function of their mutual definition and confirmation (God exists because if he did not there would be no Hell and then people would not refrain from sin in which case there would be no social order, but social order exists—is a typical response of Iranian provincials) to the self-conscious existentialist who accepts a position for pragmatic reasons: meaning exists only by intentional act (in this case, to adopt conventionalized symbols to refer to social-psychological relations). Secondly, this transition (from "believer" to "unbeliever") brings us to Wittgenstein's concern that unbelievers cannot communicate with believers: "I give an explanation: 'I don't believe in . . . ,' but then the religious person never believes what I describe" (1966: 55, cited in Hudson 1969: 40). Hudson discusses three implications of Wittgenstein's example of Judgment Day. To the believer acceptance of such a concept is a commitment to certain kinds of norms by which deeds can be evaluated. Such a word-picture also operates to distinguish what constitutes explanations: "This is a punishment" explains illness in a sense that "This is pneumonia" would not—or in anthropology, Evans-Pritchard's discussion of why the Azande granary fell at this particular time is not a query of material causes (1937: 69-70). And thirdly, emotions of awe, terror, and so on are part of the substance of the belief. These emotions

of awe and terror may be relieved by a variety of other devices also offered by religion which again may be utilized differentially by persons of different motivation and belief, such as prayer, and may indeed operate like a classic Khushwant Singh "device for organizing motivational and cognitive diversity:"

Shunno, a widowed, fifty year old, servant woman, whose sexual instincts have been "sublimated in hard work, religion and gossip" bullies Mundoo, a servant boy, when the mistress of the household is away. Mundoo therefore puts gum and red ink in Shunno's morning ablution utensils. Each night she fills a brass jug with water and puts a keekar (acacia arabica) twig in to soak; in the morning while it is still dark, she chews the twig until one end becomes soggy and fibrous, and with this she brushes her teeth, and with a piece of the bark she scrapes her tongue until she retches and spits. With the water in the jug, she washes her privates. Mundoo's additions cause her to notice "a slimy feeling between the thighs; her left hand which she used to wash her bottom felt as if it had been dipped in glue and she had to wash again until she felt clean." She then notices red stains on her trousers and when she splashes water between her legs, it trickles down red. Shunno consults the saint, Pir Saheeb. He prudently locks his compound and examines her in private. He finds no indication of disease, but becomes aroused: his vows of celibacy give little outlet to sex except the liberties he takes with the little boys he tutors in Qur'an. "These were not the normally accepted expressions of sex and therefore did not violate the rules of celibacy as he interpreted them. Neither did intercourse with an infidel woman who might in this way be brought on the right path. And it was obvious she had come with something of the sort in mind. So the Pir Saheeb put the other lamp also on his ancestor's grave and obliged. Shunno made a nominal protest . . . and then accepted the inevitable." Shunno repeats the visits to Pir Saheeb several times and her temper improves. She stops beating or nagging Mundoo and gives him sweets. "There was no reason for Mundoo to take recourse to bottles of gum and red ink. The cure was a complete success" (Paraphrased from Singh 1959: 54-58, 135-41).

The unbeliever is excluded from all three functions of the Judgment Day word-picture except insofar as he is willing, for the sake of social interaction, to accept the first in the sense that Ramsey accepts the notion of Hell.

One tends to imagine that the dynamic for the transition from believer to unbeliever is provided by increasing scientific knowledge. History suggests otherwise, and the flexibility of religious systems, as indicated above, tends to suggest why they are relatively impervious to simple

intellectual attacks which mistake the basis of certainty in belief. For "primitive believers" who think that religion can supply all the answers (the supplantation of the shari'a by a civil code, for instance, is still a sore issue among religious conservatives in Iran), certainty in the truth of religion stems less from its ability to provide social rules (since there is also a secular political-economic source of social rules) than from the form of religious semantics,¹ specifically from tautological teleologies which (while to the logician "metaphysical") cannot help be "true." Less primitive believers, to a greater or lesser extent, place religion in brackets (allegory, opening prayers) when deciding pragmatic issues. For instance, an issue par excellence between primitive and less primitive believers, and one with which we will be concerned, is that of the mutual tolerance of different religions. In Europe, religious tolerance was directly the result of the need to reconstruct a basis for national politics after the religious wars of the Reformation, rather than any change in intellectual sensibility. For the sake of peace, for the sake of the economy and social welfare, religion had to be made a matter for the individual. It took yet another century and a half for an intellectual "school" to emerge which would conclude with Feuerbach, on a basis more sophisticated than syncretistic good will, that there were different ways of formulating the truths of religion. Feuerbach could say in 1841 that prayer in any religion was a functional equivalent of the Christian dogma of Incarnation (1957: 54). Nonetheless, more than a century after, the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, agreeing on the goal of ecumenical unity, could not agree—but rather formally agreed to ignore the disagreement (January 1972 "Agreed Statement on Eucharistic Doctrine")—on the meaning of the dogma of the Eucharist. The problem is both an intellectual problem, and perhaps more fundamentally a social problem: so ingrained is the differentiating mechanism of religious identification that few believers are comfortable with the implications of thorough ecumenicism.

¹ This is not to prejudice the issue of supernatural "experience" but such experience must then be formulated in verbal symbols, and perception or mental integration of such experience is structured by such symbols.

The issue in its starkest contradiction is this: while on the one hand religion operates as ego-support and facilitator of social solidarity, on the other hand its sociological manifestations appear also in all sorts of intolerant unpleasantness of men towards each other because it is one of the major means of drawing boundaries between "us" and "them." Such boundaries are drawn as much within as among confessional groups as the cyclical or spiral sectarian and denominationalizing processes of Protestant history demonstrate (see, e.g., Troeltsch 1931, Niebuhr 1929, B.R. Wilson 1967). And it is with the dynamics of such forms of organization that Max Weber provided seminal inspiration rather than with his methodologically dubious speculations about the force of theological formulations operating as psychological sanctions for pragmatic behavior: sectarian organization, not Calvinist theology, may, under conditions B.R. Wilson has attempted to specify, aid social mobility of its members. Similar is the insistence of religious movements that moral codes and building of righteous character are the key to a better social order: emphasis on moral character is a mechanism of social mobilization (through assent and consequent informal or formal social control) which can be turned both to conservative preservation of a given social order or to reaction against a given order and attempts to institute a new one. This mechanism is therefore often assimilated as a tool of political movements (fascism, communism); conversely the religious demand can be an idiom of political-economic protest.

It is these social uses of religion, inexplicitly underlying the manifest theological content (expressing relative deprivation, aiding and inhibiting adjustment of groups to the political economy), which probably provide greater incentives to reject religion, or at least endorse the position that institutionalized religion is a perversion of true religion, than intellectual reactions against theological obfuscations (since intellectual skill means capacity to interpret any nonsense into sense). Intellectually, for instance, the transition from believer to unbeliever would seem to be a function of the demand that religion be analyzed into its implications for the individual and for social groups. This demand would seem to fit with the demands for individual autonomy as appropriate

to an urban society with a mobile and highly differentiated division of labor. It is therefore not surprising that psychoanalysis (and the related Western interpretation of "Oriental Religion" as a form of psychotherapy) should have become so popular. Psychoanalysis is different from and yet very similar to religion as an explanatory construct by which to interpret everyday experiences. In logical form psychoanalysis is very much like religion: as Merleau-Ponty pointed out (1945), psychoanalysis cannot be scientific since it excludes all counter-evidence; rather the psychoanalysts' hermeneutic musing multiplies the communication between us and ourselves, since by taking sexuality as the symbol of existence and existence as the symbol of sexuality, the relation between the two symbols is homologous with the circular movement of our sentient life in which the future grows out of the past and the past is significant in terms of the future. But a crucial difference between religion and psychoanalysis is that the latter has transformed the reference concepts of mental health from the group basis of the former to an individualistic basis: you no longer become ill because you sin against group morality but because you have problems in interpersonal relations; no longer do "they" suffer because they do not behave in proper ritual fashion, but everyone suffers more or less the same stress-caused neuroses. Psychoanalysis, however, does not necessarily replace religion (a) because it speaks to the individual and not the on-going group, and (b) because psychotherapies and analyses have always been part of folk culture in addition to religion. Indeed modern theology has added to its repertoire this individualistic idiom both in its apologia (the "theology of encounter;" "situational morality," even "Catholic existentialism") and in its program (e.g., Mircea Eliade's endeavor to resacralize the modern world, to make it again a toy of the meditative mind for those to whom physics is either too difficult or insufficient [1969]). The issue of increasing tolerance, therefore, cannot be approached by attempts to destroy "religion:" as Wittgenstein indicated, it is nigh impossible to consistently oppose religion because "religion" will not stand and fight. Why? Because definitions of religion (what people would agree to be the underpinnings of their belief), like definitions of suicide, like definitions of adultery

are invariably normative, and frequently do little more than reflect the shallowest social attitudes . . . Studies of suicide [and religion] are soon elaborately confused about desire, intention, deed and consequence, ownership, and responsibility (whether we belong to ourselves, society or God); neglect the differences between act and action . . . physical and metaphysical murders become hopelessly intertwined . . . If we are to call suicide every self-taken way out of the world, then even the platonic pursuit of knowledge . . . is suicidal . . . as are, of course, the search for ecstatic states, and longings for mystical union. It is the habit of such examinations to mess up these matters as if they were so many paints whose purpose was purely to give pleasure to the fingers. Nowadays the significance of a suicide [religious act] for the suicide [believer] and the significance of that [act] for society are seldom the same (Gass 1972: 3-4).

The issue of increasing tolerance therefore must be approached another way: either (a) by making each group secure enough so that it does not feel called upon to engage in unpleasant hostility against other groups (the "traditional" balance of power politics espoused by Middle Easterners who see Lebanon as a kind of model, and now again in American political theory by ethnic, including "black;" groups who have come to realize how current pluralist arrangements perpetrate inequities which might be corrected through a new form of pluralism); or (b) by imposing some kind of a-religious and a-group ideology according to which the State is the tool of individual members of society rather than an arbiter among groups (the ideology of Soviet socialism, Attaturk modernization, and mid-century America melting pot) which has increasingly fallen under the suspicion that even partial withdrawal of support by some members to the "social contract" leads to a polarization of those who insist on recognizing the State or Contract as authority versus those who recognize only their own contracting authority. Both of these approaches are normative ideologies as can be seen even from the fact that both exist simultaneously in American thought. To the descriptive social scientist both are statements of strategy in the adjustment of groups to new "social contracts" in recurrent struggles to institute the acceptable distribution of satisfaction (all ideological terms: acceptable, satisfaction). In Islam a contractual form of the first ideology is invoked, under which an unstable relation of protection is afforded non-Islamic groups until such time as they can be

converted. Individuals are only allowed to join the social contract, not to depart from it; they may alter it only under the cover of affirming it (e.g., the importance of hadith, the permissible forms of ijtihad).

1.2. Summary of the Argument

Substantively the word "religion" is what Wittgenstein called an "odd-job" word: it is used not with any precise technical meaning but gives cues or orientations. Since "religion" is used as a cue of problems in Iran (and elsewhere) we should be concerned to refine the nature of the problems:

- (1) People (planners, politicians, social scientists) talk about the problem which "religion" and "traditional values" pose for development.
- (2) People (natives) talk about the problems which "religion" (usually the religion of others, of dominant groups, in this case Islam; but also of old customs and rules, orthodoxy, fundamentalism) poses for leading a quiet, pleasant life.
- (3) People (natives, believers, politicians) insist that "religion" is a good thing which just because it sours on many occasions should not be thrown out.

While a proponent of all these views has clear ideas of what he means by "religion" all the utterances of "religion" do not form a coherent set.

Approaches to the sociology of religion seem to fall into five groups:

- (1) The so-called "functional" approach associated with Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and their students which focuses on the ramifications of ritual activity for other spheres of life.
- (2) The so-called "phenomenological" approach, which in its more sophisticated forms as in the work of Clifford Geertz is combined with a nineteenth century "anthropogeographic" appreciation of historical contingency and focuses on the dialectic between the creation of culture by individuals and the structuring of that creation by the culture into which they are born.
- (3) The social psychological approach associated with the names of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim which attempts to correlate the structure (rather than the content) of belief to social position.
- (4) The linguistic approach associated with the name of Wittgenstein which asks the communication burden rather than the truth table of religious statements.

- (5) The psychological approach which focuses on the relief afforded the individual which is either a combination of (2) and (4) above as in William James, or a reference of (2) above to a second, simplified symbol system as in the followers of Freud.

A combined consideration of all five approaches seems to reconfirm the methodological points:

- (1) That ideology is logically too ambiguous—and is functionally required to be so—to bear the weight of a prime cause in the sense of Weber's "psychological sanctions," but
- (2) That ideology can be a "material force" in the Marxist-Weberian sense of motivation and is constrained by forms of organization as Weber suggested with the concepts of sect and church, and
- (3) That although organizations are created to implement ideology, it is not ideology but a set of individuals with a particular interpretation of an ideology, who give form to an organization, and it is the result of such organizations which we recognize as historical forms of religion, but
- (4) That ideology can aid the resolution of "real" social problems through a translation or transformation into symbolic analogues.

The argument here and in the following chapters rejects the dichotomization of making either "material" or "ideational" factors primary to social causation. "Mind" is a function of "brain" and the brain like other information processors depends on inputs of values as well as programs, and is subject to faulty programming as well as mechanical failures. In the case of brains, much of the input comes through interaction and communication with other brains. For some reason this simple division of labor between computer (individual) and information (culture) gives anthropologists trouble when they try to translate from individual to collective levels of analysis. The following chapters will attempt to analyze bodies of collective data in order to delineate the dynamic feedback between myth and praxis, where "praxis" refers to action based on informational feedback (at its most efficient, self-reflective, intentional action) and "myth" refers to

- (a) myth in the usual sense of a type of narrative;
 - (b) more broadly, forms of "explanation which make no appeal to testability or falsifiability as their criterion of validity (although they may use criteria of possibility and confirmation);
- but primarily to

- (c) the cultural process of transforming "real" problems into symbolic analogues, or inversely, from the fieldworker's point of view, the dynamics of using symbol systems to deal with real problems of social tension.

The movement of the thesis is conceived as proceeding from perceived problems in the social system communicated by the native actors to the temporary participant-anthropologist. The task of the anthropologist is to record, then analyze (take apart) these perceptions so that a clearer understanding of the factors causing problems may be achieved.

CHAPTER II
RELIGIOUS TENSION AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF ISLAM

There is a popular summer drink in Teheran, one of whose principle ingredients is vinegar. The skill with which Iranians are able to convert that bitterness into a sweet and refreshing taste is intriguing. And so it is with their politics. For the underlying harshness is not obvious and the trappings of democratic rule are present.
—Marvin Zonis [1970b: 94]

2.1. Introduction

The drink sekanjebin tastes sweet but is made with vinegar. Iranian politics, inversely, tastes harsh but is made with not easily evaluated opposed interests, like, but more complicated than the scorpion and tarantula put in one bottle.¹ Although this research project began as an inquiry into the internal dynamics of Zoroastrianism, no religious question in Iran can be broached without considerable attention to the overriding issue of Islam. To talk of religion to non-Muslim Iranians inevitably means talking about persecutions at the hands of Muslims. Even discussion of non-Muslim ritual activity is phrased in Islamic terms with constant comparison and contrast. The issue of Islam is unhelpfully stalemated if it is approached primarily as one of inter-religious or inter-ethnic relations. The issue is of comprehensive importance, second only to that of the authoritarian monarchy itself for the form in Iran of political activity, and for the issue of political maturation, an issue which Reza Shah naively introduced as one of changing the Persian character from lethargy to energy, from individualism to altruism, from prevarication to simple truth, and from corruption to honesty.²

¹ And in the long run, hopefully, less pessimistic than this fight to the death, since society has the possibility of "synthesizing" its contradictions. The scorpion and tarantula image is used by Louis J. Halle (1967: xiii) to express Herbert Butterfield's thesis that ". . . irreducible dilemma lies in the very geometry of human conflict."

² Minister of Court Timurtache in a speech to the Iran No Party in

The issue of Islam is not particularly illuminated by recognizing that the ulema have provided one of the best organized political lobbies on behalf of certain conservative positions. Leading ulema have belonged to the landed gentry and thus had something to lose from fiscal and monetary control falling into relatively less malleable European hands, e.g., under M. Naus (Belgian Director of Customs at the turn of the century), Dr. Lindenblatt (German Director of the National Bank from 1928), W. Morgan Shuster (American Treasurer-General of Persia in 1911), Dr. Millspaugh (American Financial Advisor 1923-27 and 1943-45), et al. The clergy lost direct sources of income in the Government supervision of oughaf (religious endowments) and in the reforms of the judiciary initiated (incidentally implementing the Constitution) by Ali Akbar Davar as Minister of Justice (1927-33).¹ But these facts provide a motive for only some of their actions. The issue is only really broached when one realizes that the Islamic religious institution² has provided the only relatively safe platform for political opposition to the ruling government, whether Qajar or Pahlavi. No other religion in Iran is in a position to exercise such a function, with the singular exception of Bahatism. And Bahatism's success (in Iran, as opposed to its success in America where it is a somewhat different phenomenon) is largely due to its origin within Islam and to its argumentation in Islamic terms; and precisely for this reason has it been so vigorously persecuted by (members of) the Islamic

1927, summarized in Great Britain, Public Records Office, Confidential Reports, FO 416/81 #113 (1927: 137).

¹ In 1922 and 1926 state courts had been given already some appellate jurisdiction over shari'a courts, and "experimental" civil and criminal codes were drawn up in 1911 and 1926, respectively. Under Davar, in 1928 the Civil Code was promulgated, the first ten articles being a verbatim translation from the Code Napoleon. In 1929 decisions based only on the strength of sworn witnesses, a shari'a procedure, were disallowed. In 1932, the 1929 "experimental" law of registration of documents and property was put into effect, taking this function from the ulema. In 1936, judges were required to have law degrees or pass a bar exam. And in 1940, the Penal Code was rewritten on the model of Fascist Italy.

² In using the term "institution" I am taking advantage for purposes of discursive diaphoresis of its dual referents both to formal social organization (ulema, courts, etc.) and to cultural norms.

institution, which latter is granted privileged status not only by the Muslim rank and file, but by the Iranian Constitution which makes it a duty of the king to propagate Jafari (Isnā 'Ashari) Islam (Art. 1), which grants a committee of mujtaheddin the power to veto laws not in accordance with the shari'a (the now lapsed Art. 2),¹ which grants freedom of education except as proscribed by the shari'a (Art. 16), and which grants freedom of the press except heretical works containing matters harmful to Islam (Art. 17).

That the Islamic institution has exercised such a role gives also a motive for progressive alliances. The lesson to be learned from the fact that the ulema were among the most effective leaders of the Constitutional Movement is not only the historical judgment that the Movement was a conservative one or a liberal-conservative coalition² against a system of economic self-destruction, but also that as a political institution there is no reason to identify Islam's interests only with those of the landed and judicial clergy. Religion provides a multivocal ideology, an ambiguous symbolism, which when endowed with

¹ The label "experimental" referred to in fn. 1, p. 23, was to avoid problems with this Article when in 1911 Adolph Permi began to work on a civil code, and when the Reza Shah governments began to construct a European style judiciary. Between 1922-39 eight French and two Italian professors taught at the University of Teheran Law Faculty and consulted with the Government. Their textbooks appealed to the "spirit" and not the "letter" of the shari'a (Banani 1961: 69-78).

² The central points seem to be that (1) the bourgeois merchants were interested in reversing tightening customs controls: there were merchant strikes, i.e., closings of the bazaars, each time M. Naus tried to raise customs duties on native merchants to a par with those paid by foreign loans which financed the government. (2) The large landowners were interested in reversing (a) the heavy revenues squeezed from them by the impecunious Court, and (b) the customs and other regulatory pressures on their sales of wheat and other agricultural goods, the manipulated speculation of which led to recurrent bread riots. (3) The ulema were interested in reversing the control of the Government by militarily powerful foreign Christian creditors. (4) The lower classes were interested in relieving the financial and wheat squeezes caused by the economic crisis. That there were people thinking about structural changes of the society is evidenced by the Adelat and Jangali groups, and some less radical intellectuals such as Taqizadeh, Sayyid Jamal-ud-din, and Malcolm Khan. The results of the agitations, however, were first of all,

political legitimacy provides, at least potentially, a platform for airing all kinds of opinions and protests. If in the anti-Jewish Kirmanshah riots of March 1909 the mujtaheddin and leading ulema deplored the incitement to riot by some rough-neck sayyids, nonetheless the sayyids were but utilizing a political device which the mujtaheddin themselves had cultivated as a tool of protest. Again, although Reza Shah went out of his way to denigrate the importance of the ulema by violating bast (asylum) in shrines, by striking ulema, by talking to them discourteously, and by reducing their access to him, his government did recognize the principle of appeal to Islamic legitimacy, e.g., in the 1927 proclamation issued by Prime Minister Mehdi Hedayat warning that those who used religion as a masque for agitation "should in accordance with the order of the Koran be prosecuted and severely dealt with because they are more harmful to the country than those who openly revolt and commit treason."¹

When one begins to analyze the operation of these two major political institutions—monarchy and Islam—one quickly becomes aware of the delicate nature of their existence: a dominance carefully built on the default of other possibilities.² Iran is a pluralistic society not only religiously,

a failure to establish a democracy and return to monarchy, and secondly, a constitution which, aside from remaining only partially implemented and eventually providing a respectable "front" for absolutism, fundamentally legitimated existing property and social relations: the Constitution (Art. 15, 18, 20) and subsequent legislation in 1927, 1928, 1929, and 1934 protected existing property rights, and strengthened the position of owners over that of users with respect to determination of usage, legal title, and taxation (Kaviani 1963). Note for instance that the six enfranchised classes excluded the majority of the population: Qajar nobility, other nobility, ulema, landowners of property worth more than 1000 tomans, merchants with fixed offices, and 105 of the more respectable guilds. The 1909 revision of this electoral law removed this estate system but retained the property qualifications: the result was that the percentage of landlords rose well above the 20% to which they were limited by the 1906 law. In 1919 the liberals pursued their ideals to a disastrous victory: the property qualification was abolished and universal male suffrage was introduced with the result that power was handed over completely to the landlords, and progressive votes were drowned in the deluge of rural villager votes controlled by the landlords (Abrahamian 1969b).

¹ Great Britain, Public Records Office, Confidential Reports, FO 416/81 #86 (1927: 104).

² For a discussion of the monarchy and its administration see Zonis (1971a).

but ethnically and even linguistically. Because Farsi was a literary language cultivated by the educated from the Ottoman west to the Mughal east, Abrahamian perhaps overstates the case when he points out that the linguistic dominance of Farsi was a deliberate political attempt to unify Iran by the 1905 Constitutionals who "exacted from the Turkish-speaking Qajars an electoral system that gave over one third of the parliament seats to the Farsi speaking capital and restricted entry into the Majlis to those who could read and write Persian" (1970: 293). It is nonetheless significant, as he enumerates, that Farsi-speaking Persians comprise only 45% of the population, Turkish speakers some 26%, Kurds 7%, Arabs 3%, Baluchis 2%, and so on. In each of these cases, there is a dominance (by the monarchy, by Islam, by Farsi) in the name of national integration or law and order presumed prerequisite for socio-economic development. When the conflicts which these dominant relations try to bridge become too great, the underlying instability is revealed as during the Constitutional agitations (say, 1900-25) and during the period between Reza Shah's removal and the reconsolidation of the monarchy by his son (1940s and 1950s).

One of the striking things about reading the historical record is the echoes 50 or 100 years ago of current day Iranian conversations. One is compelled not so much to the conclusion that nothing has changed—the period has seen three important different political-economic frameworks for everyday life: the Qajar period of mercantilism and dependence on foreign loans, the centralized self-dependence of Reza Shah's state economy, and the rentier boom of Mohammad Reza Shah's petroleum—but to the recognition of historical backdrops to these present day conversations of which their speakers seem only partially aware, e.g., of political conditions which have left for today a residue of religious bitterness, or of economic conditions which today are resignedly referred to as political manipulation of Iran by the great powers. What has not changed is the authoritarianism used to maintain the much vaunted stability of Iran. Whether education and prosperity will bring a gradual democratization of the monarchy as is hoped only time will tell. Until such time, the success

of the monarchy in controlling the Islamic institution as it is gradually attempting to do through monitoring of rosas, restriction of public religious processions, institution of the new Religious Corps, etc., means a decrease in the political freedom of its citizens—a destruction of opposition on the right as it has fairly successfully accomplished on the left. Whether or not this is a good thing is not an easy question to answer. If you happen to be a member of a religious minority it seems to be a decidedly good thing, an important protection. That members of the religious minorities, however, are fearful of what might happen "after the Shah" indicates that at the very least, it is a race against time for new modes of behavior and thought to become acquired.

The question, to state it quite baldly, is one of political philosophy and needs to be approached with information both historical and sociological. Confused in the discussion are three problems: the general political development of the populace; the legitimacy of Islam; and the severe curtailment of the role of the ulema. Two opposing paradigms can be constructed if one assimilates the second problem to the first or to the third. Thus, in the one case, the rejection of the ulema need not imply rejection of the good ideals of Islam. Even the folk culture recognizes mulla-bazi (deceit of the mullahs) as a fact of life, and the elite do not treat Islam as very central in their own lives (Zonis 1971a: 152-3). But in the other case, non-Muslims, for instance, whose perceptions of Islam are totally colored by their persecution at Islamic hands, cannot make this fine distinction and insist that if a social organization operates badly, it is pure casuistry to claim that its conception is good.

There is no logical reason why Islam should be made responsible for the entire organization of Muslim society: indeed Muslims are rightly annoyed by this burden since from their point of view Islam has not been properly instituted, and political efforts should be directed towards its proper institution. But here the problem begins: the refusal to separate the techniques of politics from their religious garb. Bahai propaganda to perpetuate what is eternally valid in Islam but to change the decaying social organization is violently rejected. Jews shrug in despair saying: Musulman vashiand (Muslims are savages). Zoroastrians resignedly cite the prediction

in the Avesta that Shah Bahram Varjovand will return to usher in an era of justice and prosperity when Zoroastrianism will again be supreme. "We await, as one man put it, "the fall of the black pyjamas." Many Zoroastrians recall the approach of radical hostility to Islam by Reza Shah as the only technique which could have made Iran today one of the civilized nations. That Islam poses a serious and immediate problem in Iran is evident from the religious cast of political turmoil over the past century (see Appendix I). Iranians are ambivalent about how much credit for this to give the ulema. A priori it would seem that as religious leaders, the ulema must bear responsibility, but to blame only the ulema is too facile. In order to provide a sociologically realistic evaluation of the role of Islam in Iranian politics, the discussion will proceed by first dealing with the question of political development and then place Islam in context.

2.2. Iranian Politics: Consciousness and Power

Defenders of the monarchy (led by the Shah's books, The White Revolution and Mission for My Country) argue that Persians have not experienced that evolution of political consciousness which provided the foundation for democracy in Europe and America. This was demonstrated by the two historical attempts at democracy—the Constitutional Period and the Mossadeq Period—which were disastrously anarchic. The reasons for the disasters are to be sought generally in the "oriental personality" which is presumed to be fatalistic and collectivistic, rather than informed by optimistic faith in the human ability to alter its own condition. The solution is to be sought in education and in material prosperity. The requirements for eventual political maturity are capital surpluses derived from domestic production rather than external sources so as to keep labor unrest to a minimum (poverty and underemployment are unstabilizers), which surpluses can be invested in social services such as health and insurance (again to remove causes of unrest) but especially education to develop the politically "responsible" democrat of tomorrow. As Bijan Kaviani put it in 1963 warning against a polarization of the upper classes regarding the masses as uneducated to the degree of obvious inability or irresponsibility

for political purposes and thus espousing increasingly authoritarian measures to control them; and of the lower classes regarding the upper classes as hopelessly corrupt and thus finding revolution to be the only solution.

The necessity today of the monarchy is indisputable. It is a sure tool against anarchy. If it did not exist, the radically different trends within the people would create a continual condition of tumult, unrest and insecurity, which would lead the country backwards (1963: 138).

Kaviani (p. 68 ff.) accepts the "oriental personality" thesis deriving the occidental outlook from the Greek philosophic tradition, rather than from, say, the reaction to the medieval Christian outlook which after all is not so far removed from the Islamic outlook. The distinction, he recapitulates (as so many casual theoreticians have proposed), is that the oriental—i.e., Islamic—model of the universe is not one of harmonious laws which can be manipulated, but of a despotic God to whose partially revealed laws man must surrender himself; this is indeed the meaning of the world islam, and the relation of the musulman (one who surrenders) to this God is expressed in Persian by the reflexive bandeh (slave). Note that despite the linking to this thesis, the second sentence below is a separable empirical observation:

What basically divides the Oriental from the Greek Man is that the Greek understands the world as something objective, i.e., something-in-itself, whereas the Oriental is subjectively disposed towards the world. He sees it as a way-station, something ephemeral, full of sorrow, gruesome, and unfulfilling of his wishes and desires (1963: 67-68).

But while Kaviani accepts the formulation of the problem in psychological terms, he also more importantly points out structural obstacles to political learning. First of all there is the economic dependence of the masses, and the ability of those on whom they depend to coerce them, even if otherwise they were presumed capable of independent political judgment. Secondly, there is the Government role in election procedures, not merely the misuse of its position to judge qualifications of candidates and voters, stuff ballot boxes, truck voters to cast votes, etc., but ab initio the obviation in the nomination process of any flow of information from the lower levels of society: the nomination process

is presided over solely by the various Governors who are responsible not to a local constituency, for they are not elected officials, but to the executive branch of the central government which appoints and reassigns them.¹ Kaviani comments:

Quite apart from the fact that the whole point of voting is not understood at all by the people, the complete shutting out of their initiative annihilates from the start any positive interest in it. . . . Where moreover the people have no responsibility for creating the apparent conditions they turn their desires and interest to material things, something the overseeing Government knows very well how to turn to advantage (1963: 95).

The structural problems are more thorough-going than this. Iranians are fond of complaining that all political strings are controlled in Washington, Moscow and London. This is indeed the accepted or orthodox paradigm for political talk in Iran as it removes blame from Iranian politicians and thus neither threatens the status quo nor compromises the speaker. As it is usually used, it avoids the full assessment both of external constraints—that limits to freedom of action of the Iranian economy are not due to avaricious intriguing of particular great power leaders or capitalists as much as to the organization of the world economy—and of internal pressures which are not limited to corruption and excessive bureaucracy, but are due also to such things as the consequences of inflation upon wage and salaried labor, and of taxes upon the petty bourgeoisie.

To a large extent the paradigm used is still that of the semi-colonial status of Iran in the nineteenth century. European imports during that century destroyed much domestic industry. Particularly hard hit were the finer quality weaving industries: silk weaving declined drastically in Yazd (Curzon 1892, Vol. II: 211-12), Isphahan had similar problems (ibid., p. 41) as did other cities. Mercantile profits were to be made rather as agents for the foreign trade. Local industries which

¹ A striking feature of the political set-up discussed in Zonis (1971) is the circulation of officials. Like the Democratic Machine in Chicago (Royko 1971), the primary goal is to keep as many people as possible committed or at least indebted to the Machine: political banishment for mistakes is counter-productive as it aids the opposition.

were established in the latter part of the century to compete with foreign imports collapsed. Jamalzade speaks of thirty such factories as the sugar mill founded in 1898 by Amin ud-Dowleh which was bankrupted by Russian dumping of sugar (cited in Ashraf 1971: 50). Similarly native financiers, such as the Zoroastrian Arbab Jamshid, and native trading companies, which tried to raise capital by issuing bank notes, were run out of business by the Russian and British banks claiming exclusive concessions. It was a semi-colonial situation not only in the sense that while Persia maintained her legal independence the control of the Qajars deteriorated and became susceptible to Anglo-Russian pressures, but also in the sense that neither Britain nor Russia established any sort of coordinated policy of economic use of Iran. Their subjects gained concessions to banks, mineral rights, railroads and factories not so much with the idea always of establishing economic institutions as to prevent rivals from obtaining them. The result was often simply to tie up resources unproductively. Iranian writers do not so much decry "exploitation" as loss of autonomy to introduce new economic initiatives. The significance of the diplomatic history of the Treaties of Golestan (1813), Turkemanchai (1828), the Commercial Agreement of 1841 with Britain, and the subsequent commercial accords is that customs schedules were taken out of Persian hands and were manipulated to Persia's disadvantage (see, e.g., Amini 1932). Parts of the Persian economy were, however, thereby subordinated to the imperialists. For instance, the 5% ad valorem customs of the Turkemanchai agreements, while higher than the 1-1½% ad valorem rates in Kirmanshah before Belgian administration, secured for Persia preferential treatment when Russia later raised her tariffs on the European and Black Sea frontiers. And it was thanks to this preference that poor quality Persian cotton, and poorly cleaned Persian wool were able to maintain a viable export position. Similarly the British mercantile system made use of opium poppy grown in central Iran. The ultimate crystallization of British colonialism in Iran was, of course, the D'Arcy Concession and the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was also the beginning of real industrialization and of creating an industrial wage labor class. In 1950 the Company's employees still constituted almost

half the industrial workers of Iran. The British Government obtained 53% of the organization in 1914 and by means of subsidiary companies and mergers (the British Tanker Co., British Petroleum, Home-Light Oil Co., British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate associated with the French Societe de Petrole, the D'Arcy Exploitation Co.) the British siphoned off a much larger percentage of the returns than would have been the case had the Persian Government owned the 53% (on the period until 1950, see Bryan 1957). As long as the Company only exported crude oil, it could have little developmental effect towards local industrial growth, except to supply by way of royalties the capital for Government investment.

While much of twentieth century Iranian history revolves around the division and distribution of oil royalties, the semi-colonial paradigm becomes simplistic if it ignores the restratification of the labor force in the Reza Shah era¹ and the complicated struggle for political control after his abdication. It is certainly true, as Ahmad Ashraf stresses (1971: 50) that the "triumph of both the tobacco protest and the constitutional revolution was due partially to colonial rivalries and intrigues" (and partly to the factors sketched in fn. 2, p. 24), and that the support of Reza Shah was in the British interest. But beneath the imposed stability and increasingly desperate bargaining for more oil revenues for state investment, the Reza Shah government also laid the foundation of the conflicts of the 1940s and 1950s. It was the peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie which suffered most in the attempts to rationalize the economy. Taxes became increasingly regressive: by 1939 only 11% of government tax revenue came from levies on wealth and income, and 70% from levies on consumer goods (U.N. figures, cited by Abrahamian 1969b: 32; see also section 2.1 in Appendix I).² The printing press was

¹ Between 1929 and 1941 the number of industrial workers doubled from 300 to 600 thousand. The first union was founded in 1918 by printers, typesetters and shoemakers of Teheran. Between 1918 and 1927 six unions were established and strike actions had been employed for an eight hour day by the graphics union and textile workers. The 1921 strike of oil workers led to the imprisonment or exile of labor leaders, and murder of labor leader Hejazi (whose name is always cited as a martyr in the suppression of the labor movement).

increasingly resorted to and the consequent inflation fell heaviest on wage and salary labor. Protest in the cities was disarmed by the banning of guilds, unions, and similar associations; in the villages, katkodas now became appointees legally of the landlords; and the Society to Guide Public Opinion (Anjoman-e Rahnama-ye Fekre Omumi), patterned on the Italian fascist model, was established. Among those who prospered were government officials and army officers who misused their positions to gain land, of whom the most conspicuous was Reza Shah: by the time of his abdication he had acquired 2167 of the richest villages, cultivating 15% of the arable land of Iran. The old elite as a whole maintained its position. (Reza Shah married a member of the deposed dynasty and Farman-Farma, one of its princes, became his tutor on aristocratic style.) Ashraf notes that 90% of the 2300 members of the 118 cabinets between 1907-70 have been from the large landowning families (1971: 169), and that according to a 1957 Ministry of Agriculture survey there were 4000 owners of at least one village, of whom 1000 possessed about 12,000 villages or a quarter of all villages in Iran, and of these some thirty families owned 40-200 villages (p. 165).

The war years intensified these problems while allowing political debate. An index of the result is the contrast of 19 premiers and 30 cabinets in 13 years with the 9 premiers and ten cabinets of the preceding Reza Shah era. Inflation was tremendous, both exports and imports declined drastically, textile mills closed, crops failed. When the price index rose from 162 or 242 in 1941 to more than 1000 in 1945-53, wage laborers could survive only through militant action: Isfahan saw 17 strikes between March 1942 and June 1946; Teheran had more than 50 between March 1944 and December 1946, and over 200 between August 1951 and August 1953 (Abrahamian 1969b: 40-41). There was fear of communal riots such as

² The sugar and tea tax levied to build the trans-Iranian highway is but one, if the most frequently cited, example; but it should not be treated in isolation. That north-south line helped to free northern Iran from dependance on Soviet markets: for the first time oil from Iran's own fields in the south could be substituted for Soviet imports, and there was a possibility of exporting northern Iran's produce south instead of north.

had engulfed India: in Shahrud Bahais were attacked, in Meshed Jews, in Kirman Zoroastrians, in Azerbaijan Armenians, and in the Caspian coal fields Azaris fought Farsis (ibid., p. 30). In December 1942 there was a twelve hour bread riot in Teheran during which bakeries were plundered and the Majlis broken into. The preceding July had seen riots in Rasht against merchants suspected of hoarding rice, and the following winter brought riots in Isfahan during which one Governor was run out of town and his successor taken hostage.

The two decades following Reza Shah's abdication were ones of serious struggle for political control. Unions and political parties of all stripes became active as soon as Reza Shah, the keystone in the previous organization of political control, was removed by the Allies (for endangering their war effort by cultivating German ties for his own position vis-a-vis the Allies). Under the economic conditions indicated above, the monarchy could expect support only from the land-owning aristocracy and the army officer corps. It was the army above all which had to be kept firmly in the Shah's control if he was to stay in power. During the 13th Majlis (1942-44) which had been hand-picked by Reza Shah this was no problem: the Majlis picked the premier and confirmed the cabinet, and the Shah picked his own Minister of War (three of four so chosen were themselves from the officer corps). The elections for the 14th Majlis, however, were not controlled by the Shah, but by local governors under the aegis of the occupying Allies. Suddenly there was serious opposition in the Majlis by people kept silent during the previous decade.¹ The Majlis opposition soon polarized on the issue of oil concessions: those favorable versus those unfavorable to Soviet demands for a concession in the north to counter the British concessions in the south. The effect at first was to polarize pro-Russian conservatives with

¹ E.g., Mohammad Mossadeq (forced to retire in 1926), Sayyid Ziya Tabatabai (forced abroad after 1921), Asad Bakhtiari (imprisoned 1934-41), Abu al-Qassem Amini (a Qajar), Sardar Farkhar Hikmat (a southern aristocrat), as well as the new Tudeh Party representatives: Radmanesh and Keshavarz from Gilan, Ferdose and Gonabadi from Khorassan, Iraj Eskandari from Mazandaran, Kambaksh from Qazvin, Ovanessian for the Armenians, Fadakar from Isfahan (and Pishevari from Tabriz although he was never allowed to take his seat.

pro-Russian progressives against anti-Russians; and later anti-Russians with progressives for nationalization of the entire oil industry which coalition brought Mossadeq to power.

With this issue dominating the Majlis, internal domestic pressures had to be dealt with by unions and parties on an extra-parliamentary, indeed extra-legal, basis: although a bill for legalizing unions was drawn up in 1946 it took until 1950 to pass it, and then only without enforceable provisions (Abrahamian 1969b: 34). The two most important of many such political groups were the Tudeh Party and Qavam's Democratic Party.¹ It

¹ The Tudeh Party was the best organized alternative to the re-establishment of what Ashraf identifies as the system of "patrimonialism." Its ideological relations to the Soviet Union inevitably were confused in the latter's claim to leadership of the international socialist movement. It appealed primarily to the industrial working class and to those parts of the middle class which identified with the latest European fads whether clothes or serious ideology. But it succeeded only when direct economic issues were involved. Abrahamian cites a purely political strike action in 1946 against Premier Qavam which aroused only luke-warm enthusiasm, and Bozorg Alavi cites in explicitly tactical terms the failure of strikes such as the 1952 railroad workers strike which was too isolated from general discontents, contrasted with the successful 1951 Isfahan strike of locomotive drivers and textile workers, and the 1953 glass worker and shoemaker strikes protesting the swamping of the market with cheap American imports, an issue of appeal to broad segments of the public needed to support the strikes with material aid. The Tudeh did not successfully organize peasants, largely because, as Abrahamian notes (1969b: 269), the leadership accepted the theory of peasant passivity. He notes that the two main attempts to organize in 1946 and 1953 were ill-timed and blocked by Government action. Unlike Alavi who claims all peasant revolts as part of the Tudeh movement, Abrahamian notes that the Gilan discontent was channelled through the Jangali Party, and the Kurdistan discontent through the Sadat Party (founded by, intriguingly, the ulema and Naqshebandi merchants). Nor did the Tudeh appeal to the traditional petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar, both because of its atheism, and because of the conflict between this bourgeoisie and its own wage laborers. This is an important point: when Reza Shah removed the guild tax and dismantled the guild structure, he opened the way for wage earners, apprentices, and journeymen to separate their interests from those of their small capitalist bosses, the ostads or master craftsmen. Abrahamian cites a 1949 election survey (ibid., p. 42) which showed that the ostads were going to vote for conservative religious candidates, while their employees, in times of sharp inflation, were going to vote for secular radicals. Real conflicts of interest were not only confined within the guilds. In 1952-53 shopkeepers and bazaar cotton-spinners of Semnan fought a pitched battle with union workers of a textile mill underselling them;

is the history of the struggle of such groups which throws into relief much about politics in Iran which otherwise remains obscure. In a sense, two battles were being waged simultaneously, one for control of the national political system centering on the issues of oil and control of the army (by Shah or by Majlis), and the other a struggle by various

five workers were killed and 40 arrested, and the union then called a boycott against the bazaar. Similarly, 300 underfed and unemployed workers fought bazaaris at Masjid-e Suleiman. In Isfahan, after the Tudeh had successfully gained closed shop agreements in 1943, there was a bloody battle with several hundred unemployed workers organized by S. Ziya Tabatabai's Eradeh-i Melli Party. Similarly, battles were fought in Mazandaran where Farsi workers were organized by S. Ziya's Party, and Azaris by Tudeh. In general Tudeh strength lay where the wage labor class was being created: the cities of Teheran, Isfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Ahwaz, Abadan; the Azari wage laborers in East Azarbaijan, Mazandaran, and Gilan; the Qashqai, Lur and Bakhtiari workers in the Khuzistan oil fields. Conflict in the latter two areas was intensified by the fact that the laborers were outsiders. Among Zoroastrians and to a lesser extent Jews and Bahais, there was a fear that the implications of socialism (equality through secularization) really meant Iran for Muslims only, a fear which subsequently was transferred to Mossadeq's National Front.

Qavam's Democratic Party was created as an electoral vehicle to keep Qavam in control of the 15th Majlis when he had lost the reason for his appointment as premier: when he persuaded Stalin to withdraw Russian troops from Azarbaijan, anti-communists no longer had a motive to support him, and when subsequently against his pleas the Iranian army marched into Azarbaijan, the leftists lost interest in him. As Abrahamian describes it, the Party was an attempt to unite radical slogans and workers with conservative policy and aristocrats, and quotes a left wing expose of one of its merchant leaders (ibid., p. 114):

"Herati, the robber baron from Yazd, who has squeezed his factory workers in order to finance the party in return for a parliamentary seat, claims that he is in the Majlis to protect the wages of the same workers. Yesterday he bought himself a Cadillac limousine, so he can travel to the Majlis in comfort, and thus be better prepared to defend the wages of the starving workers in Yazd."

(The Herati and Aidum brothers built the second oldest textile mill in Yazd; the former were Muslim, the latter Zoroastrian, though at least one brother became Bahai.) A trade union network, cell organizations, youth and women's associations, para-military groups, and four newspapers formed the structure of the Party. It managed to pack the 15th Majlis, and to successfully compete with Tudeh unions through its own Syndicate of Iranian Workers and by negotiating for higher wages with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Soviet-Iranian fishing company. It also drove out of existence similar parties such as S. Ziya Tabatabai's anti-communist, national socialist Eradeh-e Melli. But after the election its alliance of contradictory interests gradually fell apart: of 84 bills introduced the first year to

segments of the depressed population to forge political tools to protect their interests. For an evaluation of popular political consciousness, it is the latter struggle which is of primary interest; but in the end, the solution of the first struggle inevitably subsumed the latter struggle (a result which would have equally been the case had Iran gone communist). With the re-establishment of royal power after Mossadeq, the effective political tool, as in the United States, became a messianic anti-communism which disallowed any balanced evaluation of political alternatives. Legitimate interests of the second struggle had to be dealt with, but through royal control, not through autonomous political competition. The Marxists, in opposition from their refuge in Europe, only provided a schema of political history and potential which was so selective as to obscure practical means and obstacles for their own objectives.

With this background, it will become clear that the whole paternalistic explanation of Iranians as politically underdeveloped who have to be guided at each step along the way from above is an integral tool of royal control, although in its pragmatic way much more seriously realistic than Marxist claims that an overthrow of the monarchy would bring instant socialist revolution. For an outsider's evaluation of political consciousness, constraints on power, and the political role of Islam, both the royalist and the Marxist paradigms must be treated primarily as elements of the politics under analysis, not as explanations of it.

The re-creation of royalist control began with the 16th Majlis elections, but it was a long, delicate process. In 1947 an assassination attempt on the Shah provided the opportunity for instituting martial law, censorship, exiling briefly opponents (Qavam, Kashani, Mossadeq),¹

the 15th Majlis only ten passed (*ibid.*, p. 81). For a more complete account of the various factions, parties, and their social bases, see Abrahamian (1969b) and Mohammad-Nejad (1970).

¹ Note the range of politics represented by these three: Qavam, a centrist of the traditional elite; Mossadeq, a republican, if aristocratic, nationalist; Kashani, a religious leader of the bazaar.

imprisoning others, returning to the Shah his father's vast estates (which the 14th Majlis had taken away), and convening a Constitutional Assembly to give the Shah (a) the right to dissolve Parliament and call elections; (b) the right to appoint half of a Senate or Upper House henceforth to be convened. This was symbolically capped by the return of Reza Shah's body to Iran for entombment in a monumental mausoleum and his official entitlement as "the Great." The elections for Parliament were once again supervised by the royalists; and this led to protest strikes and demonstrations. In June 1948 Ayatollah Kashani led a march of bazaaris carrying Qur'ans on their heads to the Majlis to demand free elections and protest the nomination of Hajir as Premier; they were met by troops who opened fire. In October 1949, at 109 Kakh Avenue, Mossadeq's home, the National Front was created, a coalition of anti-royalists composed of the political spectrum from religious and bazaar conservatives such as Kashani on the right to the Tudeh and communists on the left. That fall the National Front led demonstrations against the rigging of elections in Teheran, and its leaders by taking bast on the palace grounds obtained a promise from the Shah to investigate the elections. November was Moharram, and on the fourth in the Sepasalar Mosque where mourning proceedings were sponsored by the royal Court, the Shah's representative, Premier Hajir, was assassinated by Hussein Imami of the terrorist Fedayin-e Islam, allies of Kashani. On the eleventh the Teheran elections were voided. Abrahamian suggests (1969b: 87) that the Shah loosened his control of the new elections out of deference to American ideals of democracy since he was about to ask the U.S. for increased economic security support (the army did double in size between 1946 and 1951). This was a nearly fatal move: six of the twelve Teheran seats were won by the National Front. In 1951 the carpenter Khalil Thamasbi of the Fedayin-e Islam assassinated Premier General Razmara. Razmara was succeeded by Hussein Ala who lifted the martial law and had his cabinet selected with the consent of the National Front. He fell from power when general strikes shut down the oil industry because he failed to enforce the Majlis passed law of nationalization. At this point in 1951 Mossadeq was offered the premiership.

Mossadeq's base of support was not in the Majlis and so he used to stay in power what had brought him into the premiership: mass demonstrations. He too made a miscalculation by refusing to try to rig the new parliamentary elections as Qavam had done in a similar struggle with the monarchy for the 15th Majlis. As a result the royalists had a monopoly on rigging, and when the results came in, Mossadeq stopped the elections with only 79 delegates elected. He called out a three day demonstration to demand special economic powers and control of the army. For the moment it worked: the army was immobilized by signs of defection among the troops; and Mossadeq became Premier, Minister of War, and dictator of finances, electoral law, the judiciary, press, education, and medicine. He took back Reza Shah's lands from the Shah, purged 136 army officers, cut the military budget, transferred much of the army into the gendarmerie, and set up an investigation into War Ministry finances. But after six months when Mossadeq asked for extension of his extraordinary powers, the Senate refused (the Majlis agreed). Since its two year term was ending, Mossadeq dissolved the Senate. He soon found a way to dissolve the Majlis as well, by having his supporters resign reducing the body to less than a quorum. He had his actions confirmed by referendum but his hand was played out: he was bankrupt (thanks to the British blockade in response to the oil nationalization), he could not get American support, and his National Front Coalition was breaking up.¹ A royalist army officer group calling itself the Committee to Save the Nation, with American backing, supported the Shah's claim that since the Majlis was dissolved, he, the Shah, should appoint a new Premier. General Zahedi was installed.

From this point on the task of the monarchy was simply to consolidate control in such a way that heavy handed military means would be increasingly

¹ Particularly anti-Tudeh members of the coalition such as Ayatollah Kashani, Baghai, and Makki turned against Mossadeq over his extended use of dictatorial powers. The result was not only to strengthen the Shah's hand, but to force Mossadeq to rely on the Tudeh, a party which when the affair came to a head was unwilling to subordinate itself to the goal of keeping the National Front in power. For a good analysis of the National Front, see Mohammad-Nejad (1970).

unnecessary.¹ And it is part of this process that the royalists argue that the Iranian populace is unready for democracy, that as a function of illiteracy and lack of formal education the masses do not have the requisite competence to deal with the complex issues of economic policy and diplomacy. The meaning of this becomes clear when one considers that even high school and university students have little such competence (nor does much of the American electorate as occasional Gallup polls make clear, revealing vast numbers of people who do not know the names of the Secretary of State, or who, not recognizing the provisions of the Bill of Rights, think them to be subversive proposals). The alternative to this requirement of "perfect knowledge" is some form of self-interest. An illiterate laborer may neither be able to manage his own budget nor understand anything about economic theory, yet he knows the effect of and can react to a regressive tax. This is not the place to speculate about possible alternatives but merely to suggest through the history of union and political organization of the late forties and early fifties that alternatives exist. A limited debate about such alternatives does occur in the Iranian press, generally along the lines that we should develop institutions which have the effect of providing situations in which the citizenry can progressively learn to participate and manage its own affairs. Suggestions have been of four types:

- (a) the call for a two or multiple party development within the general framework of the present parliamentary system, now made possible by the growth of an educated middle class (journalist Tabari);

¹ See Appendix I.2.2 for a review of the techniques of the Zahedi Government. Zonis (1971: 293) points out the structural inability of police control to function as a "two-way channel of communication," i.e., not only to enforce policy among the populace but also to aggregate and articulate the latter's interests and needs to policy makers. His count of frequency of communication by members of the Iranian elite to members of various occupational groups revealed that the security forces were one of the most central units of the communication network. That the Shah takes this problem seriously emerges from his whole style of attempting never to shut the door against an opponent in the hope that he may join the Shah's team. The possible implication of solving this persistent problem by a single party state is discussed further below.

- (b) proportional representation so as to make the object of electoral competition not personalities but programs, and to provide more stable nuclei for development of party organizations than personalities (Kaviani 1963);
- (c) decentralization of power into regional councils (Razmara, M.R. Pahlavi);
- (d) single party with cell structure (communists; Timurtache and his Iran No Party with strikingly fascist elements; recently Iran-Novin's Secretary-General Kalali).

Under Iranian conditions (c) and (d) probably go together: decentralization under royalist, rather than Majlis control.¹ The Shah currently fosters (a) as the dressing for his system of control, and (b) is unlikely to be introduced since it would probably weaken that control. Under these

¹ The first town and provincial assembly elections held in 1970 under a recent program of decentralization, differ little from the national form of Iranian elections (see Kaviani's description of the 1960 elections in Appendix I.2.3): apathy of the voters, obliging workers and other syndicated groups to vote, bussing them in groups to do so, police surveillance of the polls, spreading of the voting over time, and the revealing dynamics of post-facto justification by statistics. The 1970 elections were held in two parts, rural elections taking place after urban places had finished voting. Even the urban voting was spread over several days, albeit unofficially. Most people knew nothing about the elections and expressed a strong negative desire to know anything about them. A few expressed a casual pragmatism ("if someone pays me to vote, maybe I will") or a minimal group solidarity (village Zoroastrians were loaded into trucks and taken to polling stations to vote for a Zoroastrian candidate several days before the official election date). With only last minute announcement of candidates, 910,000 people were officially counted as voting in the 150 urban areas. Official results were announced within 16 hours of the closing of the polls showing the ruling Iran-Novin Party capturing all but thirty seats. These results upon closer examination became hazy: the opposition Mardom Party was said to have gained the other thirty seats, yet ninety-five Mardom candidates won as did seven independents and 840 Iran-Novin candidates, giving a total of 942 instead of 960. The point stressed by election officials and by Interior Minister Hassan Zahedi (Kayhan International, 8 September 1970) was how suprisingly well non-Iran-Novin candidates had run, implying that democracy was taking root, since only Iran-Novin had formulated a platform ("What the Shah and his White Revolution have done for you"—an unopposable slogan), but thereby inadvertently underlining that the elections had been conducted through informal parti-bazi rather than at the polls. In Yazd, for instance, all seats were uncontested. It was said that such elections provide political education for increasingly freer elections.

circumstances, Kalali may be right that (d) may further rationalization of creative idea inputs over the current "two party" system in which the only ideas which can be politically accepted are those funnelled through the executive branch from the top down. The Shah openly argues that there are at present no real policy alternatives (and therefore there is little role for a multi-party system).¹ In the same vein, the royalist paradigm agrees that one's decision on the "speed with which democracy can be introduced" will be determined by one's historical judgment on past Iranian political behavior, and that therefore the Constitutional and

¹ "We have parties like Mardom and People's in the opposition, but their difficulty is that there is nothing much for them to oppose" (Kayhan International, 15 August 1971, p. 6). Premier Hoveyda repeatedly points out the puerile level of opposition in the Majlis: "I cannot invent an effective opposition. Nor can I do for the Mardom Party what its own leaders should do" (Kayhan International, 18 September 1971, p. 4). Hoveyda's encouragement in the 1971 general elections of political debate elicited from the Mardom leadership only vague assertions that once in power they could do better. Journalist Amir Tabari, trying to encourage debate, remarked that Hoveyda's intention was " . . . to tell the people that they could speak their minds on a large number of topics" (Kayhan International, 18 November 1971, p. 4). He argued that twenty years ago a government tottering from day to day near bankruptcy could not afford political luxuries of democracy, but that today when basic economics have been set aright and the budget has grown from the fifty million dollars of twenty years ago to sixty-eight hundred million dollars, and when an educated public is rapidly growing, there is an opportunity for a party system. He argues that political parties need no longer be merely vehicles of job sinecure (and hence the lopsided advantage of the party in power), but does not himself see beyond a system in which major parties are "indissolubly united" on "almost all fundamental political issues" and the "real differences" are only of "approach and temperament." He however elicited an entirely different set of ideas from Manuchehr Kalali, Secretary-General of the Iran-Novin Party (Kayhan International, 11 November 1971, p. 4). Kalali after describing the growing cell structure of the party responded to the hypothetical situation that Mardom completely wither away and the question where this would leave political debate, by saying that political debate is and should continue to grow within the Iran-Novin Party cells and in "open seminars" of the Party in which the public may participate. What he is picturing is a single party system such as Mexico has utilized, also the communist countries, and which Kenneth Kaunda has recently seriously suggested is a more effective instrument for political maturation than pretense at parliamentary democracy where for the time being democracy has little chance of functioning. The decision to create a college to train more Iran-Novin professionals can be seen as a move towards consolidating a single party, but also presents the possibility of training effective future dissenters in the local paths of power.

Mossadeq periods are test cases. But the conclusion the royalist paradigm draws is that those two periods merely demonstrate the anarchy which ensues when the Shah is not there to guide his people. The following and preceding pages should at least demonstrate the self-servingness of this conclusion. It is likely that Iran was doomed by the historical circumstances of the forties either to the kind of royalist domination she got or to the kind of Soviet domination suffered by Eastern Europe.¹

Since the 1963 riots it has become the royalist paradigm that the battle for development is between the "black reactionary" alliance of Islam and the great landowners against the Shah and his hardworking peasantry. Interestingly, little is said about the industrial working class which provided the mass support for the communists and Tudeh during the forties. It is interesting not only because it is not true, as Marxists claim, that all the workers supported the Tudeh—some were

¹ As Zonis points out (1970a), thanks to the Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet abrogation of the 1907 Anglo-Russian accords, Iran escaped being dismembered then by the two colonial systems. In the post World War II period Iran depended on the United States to keep her from falling back into Russian and (less successfully) British hands. The cold war was serious business through the 1950s. Promises of an oil concession were required to get Soviet troops out of Iran, and when the promise was not kept, Iranian troops had to be bolstered by U.S. aid. The C.I.A. fearing communist subversion probably had a hand in the overthrow of Mossadeq. When Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, Soviet hostility increased and provided Iran with a tool (red-subversion scare) to use against internal dissidents (see Appendix I.2.2). In 1957 the Americans helped create SAVAK as an efficient secret police. American development aid from Point Four to setting up the Plan Organization and to the White Revolution (according to Ashraf [1971: 386], land reform plans were drawn up and pushed by American advisors) was all done with the rationale of anti-communism. By the mid-sixties Iran was more able to fend for herself: direct U.S. foreign aid ended in 1967 (except for army and gendarmerie training missions). A steel mill for gas barter and a hundred million dollar arms purchase deal with the U.S.S.R. were entered into, followed in 1973 by a two billion dollar arms purchase deal with the U.S.A. And the Shah became a leader in uniting oil producing countries for bargaining with the oil industry. What the alternative under Soviet hegemony would have been like is impossible to say, but the 1965 extradition by the U.S.S.R. to Iran for execution of the guard who allowed Iran's leading communists to escape from jail (Zonis 1970a: 175) foreshadowed what I.F. Stone saw in the Nixon-Breznev accords: a new Metternich-like conservative consolidation, i.e., immediate economics over socialist solidarity.

organized by the Democrats and fascists—but also because industry was the first sector to be successfully controlled by the monarchy: what was largely a state owned sector in the 1930s was sold to the old, landowning elite,¹ and what was in the 1940s fast being developed into a militant unionized labor force² was transformed into state controlled labor syndicates. While students, intellectuals and middle class discontent has also been cowed, this is not as effective as with labor. Resort is still made to elaborate public red-scare tactics when the students express discontent: the 1970 bus fare strike³ was first covered by the televised expose of saboteurs from Iraq allied with the recently killed General Bakhtiar, and then dismissed as provoked by Bakhtiar-communist agents-provocateurs.⁴ Contrast the handling of the bus drivers' strike⁵ for higher pay in 1971:

¹ In the 1930s Reza Shah tried to funnel merchant and landowner capital into state controlled industries, so that by the time of his abdication the landowning class probably already had substantial industrial interests. In 1966 as part of the White Revolution, sale of shares of the state owned factories began, and in six months (August 1966–January 1967) shares of glycerine mills, soap mills, oil mills, oil seed mills, the Shahi Canned Food Mills, and the Veramin Vegetable Oil Mills had sold out. Shares were distributed to landowners as compensation for land reform (Ashraf 1971: 182).

² The Tudeh's United Trade Unions of Iran by 1946 had 186 member unions with 400,000 workers. It was recognized by the International Labor Organization against vigorous royalist opposition (the burning of offices and destruction of files, harassment of members). It sponsored seven major strikes in 1942, ten in 1943, fourteen in 1944, seventeen in 1945, and twenty-five in 1946 (Abrahamian 1969b; Alavi 1955).

³ Students protested the raising of the nominal bus fares as unfair to the lower classes. More than 100 buses were attacked. Reportedly five students were killed, five hundred injured, and a thousand arrested, of whom thirty to eighty remained incarcerated for an extended period (figures from the March issue 1970 of Shanzdahom-e Azar, cited by Ashraf 1971: 325).

⁴ The sequence was first the killing of Bakhtiar in Iraq by SAVAK agents. Then the strike occurred, and then televised press conferences on the round-up of Bakhtiar agents with fanciful descriptions of sophisticated cameras hidden in walls, surveillance for years, and infiltration of Bakhtiar's five man central committee by three (sic) SAVAK agents.

⁵ The bus drivers, Zonis points out (1971: 93), had been effectively organized by Shoja ed-din Malayeri and were used in pro-Shah demonstrations during the 1963 troubles. But organization is also potential trouble and Malayeri was transferred to head the Caspian Fisheries.

it barely lasted a day, the raise was granted and there was almost a black-out of publicity. Of the middle class, students can afford to be the most demonstrative of discontent. As Abrahamian points out (1969b: 17) the vast majority of the middle class is state employed: 203,400 salaried personnel in 1956 plus 8000 army officers, versus 88,000 privately employed and 10,000 college students plus 190,000 secondary students.¹

Even the political elite is not allowed to have uncontrolled organizations. In 1951 Freemasonry was re-introduced with royal patronage.² Within a decade more than 900 prominent Iranians had joined and almost all of the 150 dominant families were represented. In 1955 all lodges were dismantled by royal command and reconstituted into one National Grand Lodge with headquarters on a royal donated plot and organized under the leadership of the President of the Senate. Since 1955 five of the seven premiers, including the current Premier Hoveyda, have been members. In 1969 a list of members was briefly circulated along with "revelations" that identified each member as either a British or American agent—a ploy suspected by Ashraf (1971: 248) to be a royalist means of asserting the omnipresence of the royal eye.³ Zonis (1971) more generally shows how the elite is controlled by rotating officials, deliberate overlapping of responsibilities, deliberate appointment of personally antagonistic officials, co-opting

¹ Many of the privately employed must be well-to-do professionals. But the students represent anxious new competitors for places in the middle class, a growth initiated by Reza Shah: from 400 domestically trained college students in 1901-23, to 1900 between 1923-39 plus many more trained abroad; and from 2000 high school students in 1928 to 25,000 in 1940.

² Freemasonry had also operated in Iran during late Qajar times, but was disbanded by Reza Shah (Algar 1970).

³ The major occupations of members of Homayun Lodge is reconstructed by Ashraf (1971: 246) from the banned volume three of E. Ra'in's Freemasonry dar Iran (Teheran 1969: 640-80):

premiers, ministers, undersecretaries	30	13.4%
top officials, army generals	69	30.5
senators, majlis deputies	18	7.9
professionals (journalists, judges, professors physicians, engineers)	47	20.7
landowners	26	11.6
leading merchants, contractors, industrialists	36	15.9
	<u>226</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

with prestigious jobs, and manipulating taxes, import-export licenses, production permits and contracts.¹

Control of the bazaar has been pursued in a parallel way with that of labor through government controlled guilds. A 1957 law established the High Councils of Asnaf (guilds) of which the most fully implemented and the most important to control is the Teheran High Council. Ninety guilds belong; membership on the Council is by patronage, and the honorary chairman is the Governor (Ashraf 1971: 206). The guilds fix prices, and overall price control is insured by government import policy: if the price of oranges climbs too high because of hoarding or for other reasons, import restrictions are lifted and the market is flooded with Israeli and Pakistani oranges until the price is driven down to the proper level. In the Kirman bazaar prices have a tendency to gradually inflate, so periodically the gendarmes come through and post the official price (Dillon, personal communication). This may possibly be due to the over-export of admittedly increased local agricultural productivity.² The normal control over provincial bazaars is through the Office of Commerce and Tradesmen (Edareh-ye Khorobar va Pishvaran)³ which together with bazaaris periodically sets wholesale and retail prices, and posts them. The problems involved

¹ In a more general summary (Zonis 1970a), he classifies this into five techniques of royal rule, pointing out that politics in Iran is not the relationships written in the constitution, but the actual interactions of the Shah, Princess Ashraf, Assadollah Alam, and the senior personnel of SAVAK, The Special Intelligence Office, the army intelligence unit, the Imperial Guards; the army; the national police; the gendarmerie; the National Iranian Oil Company; the cabinet; a few private corporations; and certain foreign ambassadors.

² Especially Jiroft has become one of Iran's prime agricultural producing areas. It is possible that its marketing arrangements as well as those of "older" oases such as Mahan (Jiroft was productive in earlier days but its water system was allowed to deteriorate in Qajar times) bypass Kirman in similar fashion as the landowner export marketing system bypassed local markets around the turn of the century, leading to the bread riots already cited. With modern transportation, such severe bypassing need no longer occur.

³ Established by the Municipality Law of 1955 (Rotblat 1972: Chapter VI).

in this procedure are discussed by Rotblat (1972: Chapter VI). Briefly, this office does not have an independent instrument for determining fair prices aside from the anticipated estimates by bazaaris of actual supply and demand. Rotblat thus found that the posted prices in Qazvin were almost invariably higher than actual prices, because bazaaris estimate in their own interest conservatively (i.e., underestimating supply and over-estimating demand) and therefore free market prices are not interfered with. Basic items everywhere such as bread and meat (which are more easily controlled at the flour mills and slaughter houses) are always under strict control. As a matter of basic peace and order, the Government has an interest in preventing high prices in basic necessities, and this provides a rule of thumb for controls such as the gendarme procedure or easing import restrictions.

Land reform remained until the 1960s (aside from some 500 villages of the royal estate "distributed" by the Shah in the 1950s, and the sale of less productive land by Reza Shah to other landowners in 1937) the untouched area partly because the peasantry remained relatively docile,¹ partly because every parliamentary attempt at land reform was blocked by the landowner dominated Majlis,² and partly probably because the largest

¹ This puzzles Ashraf but his own terms of analysis provide an adequate explanation: although peasants suffered during the war years, they were not so cut off from elementary food needs as wage laborers whose income became increasingly inadequate as inflation progressed; they were more controlled by landowners who had armed servants, if need be; and their response to scarcity would probably be migration to town to be counted not as peasants but as lumpenproletariat.

² There was strong opposition to a bill introduced by Premier Qavam for a 15% increase in crop shares, a bill forced upon him by peasant revolts in Gilan in 1946 (Ashraf 1971: 170; Alavi 1955: 57). The Land Reform Bill of 1960 was emasculated by the Majlis and loopholes were added in favor of landowners in the second and third stages. The Shah had to disband Parliament in order to institute the reform. The problems with the 1960 Bill were essentially that it was based on maximum holding limits which would have required a cadastral survey, and the loophole of allowing titles to be transferred to family members. Arsanjani's 1962 "ammendment" which was put into effect while Parliament was dissolved avoided the cadastral survey by limiting each individual to one village, and avoided the problems of re-evaluation of holdings by basing compensation on taxes previously paid; division was based on current cropping patterns, and the new peasants

landowner, the Shah, required the income from his lands until he could otherwise establish his control.¹ Land reform is one of the "free world's" biggest political footballs and it is not always clear what Marxists intend by their demands for it either. In Iran clearly the dismantling of the royal domains and the latifundia of the thousand families and of the Imam Reza Shrine holdings was required. But the goal of raising productivity always implied mechanization, "industrial agriculture," not peasant cultivation. American advisors were convinced by Point Four and Near East Foundation agricultural experiments in the 1940s and 1950s that yields could be doubled and trebled. Raising the nutritional level of the population was a humanitarian necessity by any standard. But political and economic goals in this case are not the same (except in the long run in which it is expected that an increase in labor productivity raises the standard of existence for all). It is argued that the distribution of land to the peasants has enabled the Shah to give up his dependence on the landowners and rely upon a grateful peasantry. It may be that the peasants have gained a certain political independence as is expressed in isolated incidents of refusal to pay for land which the peasants say the Shah has admitted was theirs by right from the beginning, and so requires no repayment, which payment would constitute financial bondage for some fifteen years more. But the independence of the Shah is due rather to the tremendously increased flow of oil revenues in recent years, and the land reform has politically fragmented the agricultural classes. Large landowners have not been hurt much, for they have been given and preferentially sold shares in industry as compen-

were required to join cooperative. The 1963 amendment then required settlement of villages retained by the landlord along similar principles of rent, division, or sale, allowing one individual to hold a maximum of 30-150 hectares of unmechanized land or 500 hectares of mechanized land; this law also provided for the leasing of religiously endowed lands. The 1966 Stage Three provisions were to encourage cooperativization and mechanization.

¹ The 14th Majlis insisted that the Shah give up his inheritance, but during the martial law after the 1947 attempt on his life the lands were returned to him. Under Mossadeq the lands were taken from him again, but he again reclaimed them after Mossadeq so that in 1960 he still had 822 villages cultivating 10% of the arable land of Iran, 56% in the prime Caspian area (Ashraf 1971: 166; Abrahamian 1969b: 81). Much is made of

sation. For the peasants, only tenants and share-croppers gained land. In some villages this has caused an inversion of previous relative wealth relations: former landless tenants now own more than former small holders.¹ Ashraf suggests that the previous conflict between peasant landholders and village proletariat (landless wage laborers) must now be exacerbated, and that in any case a new vector of conflict is introduced with mechanized farms competing with traditional peasant techniques. The Shah declared all three stages of redistribution of land officially completed at the time of the 2500 Year Celebrations in October 1971; unofficially much paper work still goes on (Kirman and Yazd were still finishing Stage Two and only beginning Stage Three), but more importantly, redistribution is to be followed by reconsolidation of small holdings into "agro-industrial cooperatives" which can apply modern mechanized techniques, and this is still in the experimental stage (officially this is Stage Three). Peasants are sold shares in the cooperative and the cooperative becomes the corporate legal person responsible for debts, hiring agricultural experts, and so on. The problems noted already by Alberts study of a village in the Shah's pre-1960 distribution are still of concern in the Qazvin trial cooperatives:

Government bureaucrats . . . become the functional equivalents of the landlords . . . in a position to dictate policy to a submissive peasantry. . . . the villagers are subjected to the conflicting demands of government engineers, leadership in the village is fragmented, and little attempt is made to involve the peasants themselves in the decision-making process. (Rotblat 1972: Chapter VI, p. 24, discussing Eliasian's 1970 study of Kamalabad-e Qazvin, a report within the Qazvin Development Project).

The peasants become shareholders, but not directors of the join-stock enterprise: they are thereby proletarianized, functionally little different

of his proclamation in 1951 of the sale of these lands to the peasants tilling them and the failure of the issue because of landlord opposition in the Majlis; but the conditions of the sale were not without advantage to him: prices were based on current values to be paid by the peasants with a 20% downpayment and annual installments over 25 years. Opponents asked what moral right the Shah had to such payments when the land was illegally acquired by his father in the first place.

¹ A case study will soon be available for a village near Kirman done by R. Dillon. Similar results were noted in the preliminary land distributions of the Veramin area by Gharatchehdaghi (1967).

from wage laborers. With increasing mechanization, their labor will also become redundant.

If we have stressed in all these sectors the political control through fragmentation of bases of opposition, co-optation of potential dissenters, and direct supervision, yet we do not mean to say that the interests of these sectors have not also been served: the syndicates and guild organizations carry with them health insurance, pensions, bonuses, sick pay, etc. It is a hypothesis for examination elsewhere that this form of political organization operates so as to keep benefit increments at the minimum level to avoid open discontent. Of immediate importance here is the light thrown by the historical development of this political system on the role of Islam.

2.3. The Islamic Role

We can now perhaps return to the three problems distinguished earlier—political development, legitimacy of Islam, and curtailment of the ulema—and argue that the attempt simply to curtail the traditionally recruited and conservative ulema and to draw progressives away from religious institutions tends, insofar as it succeeds,¹ to leave the legitimacy of Islam entirely in the hands of the conservative ulema who survive, and while inhibiting their traditional constituency—landowners and bazaaris²—broadens their constituency among the disenchanting who have

¹ Sons of the old rohani (learned ulema) families are likely today to be physicians and lawyers rather than ulema.

² It appears from the historical record to be the case that Islamic religious leaders spoke out primarily on behalf of the bazaar bourgeoisie and landowners. Abrahamian (1969b) who deals with the period 1941-53 has cause to mention primarily leaders of the bazaar such as Ayatollah Kashani who lived on bazaar tithes. Ashraf (1971) dealing with the 1963 disturbances attempts to distinguish two groups, one speaking as concerned landowners, the other speaking for the bazaaris. In the former he lists Behbehani and Borujerdi, Khonsari, Tonekaboni, and Amoli. In 1960 they opposed land reform on the grounds that it was opposed to the Islamic sanctity of property rights. In mid-1960 Behbehani again wrote to the Premier protesting that while still opposed in principle to all land reform, now that the law was a fait accompli, he was only addressing himself to the question of religious endowments: that land must not be touched. In the second, more

no other means of protest. Hussein Nasr makes the argument in quite another context that Islam cannot gain respect by being expounded as another version of socialism or rationalism since the thoughtful man so

progressive group, Ashraf counts Khomeini, Milani of Mashad and Shariat-mardi of Qum. Ashraf argues that this group "never attacked the government on the issue of land reform," but only on the dictatorial methods of the Shah, citing in support the call in the "clandestine tract" of the Council of United Muslims in 1963: "The estates and wealth of the majority of the ruling class have been acquired through illegitimate means. Thus after vigorous investigation their wealth should be confiscated and the shares of public factories should not be transferred to the landowners." Yet he notes that their political stance was very closely tied to the interests of the traditional bourgeoisie: (1) Milani wrote to the Premier on 2 February 1963 that the land reform would be detrimental to petty landowners; (2) Khomeini issued a proclamation in 1963 against the cooperative societies as "detrimental to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie." The bazaar buys and sells from the small landholder, the one for whom land reform did nothing; cooperatives eliminate bazaari middlemen (see Ashraf 1971: 220-26; Appendix I.2.3 below). The data from the Constitutional Period also shows a prominent connection between the discontents of the bazaar and action on the part of the ulema, as well as that certain of them behaved no differently than their lay counterparts in manipulating the grain markets at the expense of the poor. This connection with the bazaar is worth exploring. Algar in his work on the ulema of the Qajar period notes the correlation between economic pressure on the bazaar and ulema outcries but does not explore the material connections: rents on shops in the bazaar collected as parts of religious endowments (10% of which may accrue to the administrator), the khoms collected from the bazaar (a part of which may be retained by the collector), the fees for judicial decisions and for religious preaching and for notary services. Here is one traditional source where hush money, from the Shah or in rural areas from the local landlord, could be overbid. Algar speaks of "enough reason implicit in the structure of Qajar society for an alliance" between the ulema and bazaaris, but means only that they represented two powers independent of the state—economic and religious—and that state intervention was harmful to both, in the form of taxes for the one, and in the form of expanding the civil legal jurisdiction for the other. Furthermore their tools of protest—sanctuary in shrines and closure of the bazaars—were in tandem powerful means to paralyze the urban economy (1969: 207-8). Algar stresses only the conventional attitude that there was an inherent conflict between state and ulema based fundamentally in the illegitimacy of the state, according to Shiite doctrine, while the Imam is not in the world. The explanatory power of this "illegitimacy" has clearly been overplayed, not only by Algar. He himself points out that a kind of state clergy was created by the Safavids, and that the religious leaders were co-opted into the political economy in various ways, not only by being landowners and manipulating the grain markets (he singles out Haji Mirza Ali Kani and Mirza Aqa Javid, p. 16), but also in direct contravention

attracted will then turn to the purer forms of these ideologies (1968b).¹ Zonis cites the case of the five arrests leading to the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, and notes two salient characteristics: the forbearance of the Shah in an attempt to co-opt the Ayatollah, and the "dogged persistence of Khomeini in pursuing a course that he must have realized was intolerable to the regime" (1971: 46). The explanation is given in a discussion of the ten ulema reputed to be among the 170 most powerful men in Iran and why they should be among them when their occupation is considered by two thirds of the elite to be of negative service to Iran (1971: 315):

Only members of the ulema tested over the years and found willing to play by the existing rules of the political elite game are tolerated and every effort is made to prevent the rise of other ulema. House arrest, withdrawal of vagf (endowment) funds, restrictions on travel, forbidding of the mullah in question from publically speaking in the mosques or informing him that SAVAK agents attend his public appearances, closing religious presses, banning gatherings for religious purposes, and infiltrating the Sufi orders are all some of the more or less serious techniques available to the government in its campaign. These have restricted ulema access to elite status, prevented the rise of ulema to lower level elite positions, enhanced the relative importance of those ulema already within the elite, and resulted in the rank order disparity noted above (1971: 194).

Zonis gives a hint of a suggestion (p. 45) that Khomeini's "dogged persistence" was due primarily to his assertion of leadership in hopes of being recognized as the Shiite leader primus inter pares, the Marja-e Taqlid (Source of Inspiration), to succeed Borujerdi. (The title was, in fact, accorded to S. Mohsen Hakim instead.²) Even if so, the means of asserting leadership—by vocal opposition to the government—reinforces

¹ Islam, he says, can present an alternative ideology to the West by rejecting ecumenicism, by emphasizing the reality of divine revelation, permanence over change, the ontologically transcendent nature of symbols (as opposed to conceiving them as conventions), qualitative over quantitative goals of science, and reconstructing society in the image of the Qur'an not vice versa; thus can Islam reestablish philosophical certainty where now alienation reigns (Nasr 1966, 1967, 1968a, 1968b, 1970).

² The recognition of a mujtahed as marja taqlid is somewhat more complicated. Taqlid is the imitation of the decisions of a mujtahed by an ordinary Muslim because the latter cannot spend his time in study and so

the point that Islamic visibility is best in political protest. A recent means of curtailing the ulema has been to conscript religious students into the army. This has had a dramatic impact on the Theological Faculty of the University of Teheran: many conscriptees have not returned to theological studies, and others have had their faith strongly shaken. The Theological Faculty has become less of a seminary and more of a place for people who could not gain entrance to other faculties. To avoid defaulting the legitimacy of Islam to the conservative ulema who staff the madressehs of Qum and elsewhere, the long discussed Sepah-e Din (Religious Corps) has been formed to train religious leaders and place them in villages and elsewhere as is already being done with the Literacy Corps, the Health Corps, and the Agricultural Extension Corps. Religious conservatives are quite well aware that this constitutes an attempt to control religion. The Government on the other hand is certainly equally aware that the restriction of political debate (in the sense it was engendered by the National Front) has left religious idiom to fill the vacuum of political protest. The preceding pages have shown how this "vacuum" came about, and in a sense they have reversed the "royalist paradigm" by focusing attention not on the failures of democracy in the Constitutional and Mossadeq Periods nor on the reactionary nature of the ulema or Islam, but by placing these in their context of Iranian politics at large.

If it is true that violence is an index of social instability—of the instability of an economic system and its inability to provide demanded expectations or of the instability of "common sense" notions of order and acceptable behavior because of a sensed opportunity to change things—then the nineteenth century in Iran must be seen as one of flux and instability, rather than, as is often casually said, stable feudal or imperialist oppression, crescendoing in violence until the era of Reza Shah, and

relies on expert advice. When Borujerdi died, the Shah trying to avoid having Khomeini recognized as the single marja taqlid sent a telegram of condolence to Hakim, an Arab living in Nejaf. Although he gained only a limited following, he was recognized to hold this title until his death in 1970. The Shah in 1970 sent letters of condolence to Ayatollahs Khunsari and Shariatmardi. Khomeini's name, however remains a rallying point for protesters (see Appendix I.2.4; Algar 1972).

breaking out with fewer instances since then. Religious riots extend throughout this period, the United Nations being appealed to on behalf of Bahais as late as 1955-56. Even today the potential is ever present: during Ramazan 1971 there was talk in Yazd of collecting weapons to kill Bahais and beat up Jews, but this was called off allegedly because Government retaliation (with the 1955 U.N. publicity in mind) would be severe while world attention was focused on the 2500 Year Celebrations. Religious riots are perhaps the most difficult forms of violence to deal with, since religious differences, as a diffuse object of irritation, are not themselves usually the reason for the rioting. Many of the religious disturbances in the 1900-20 period were connected to bread riots or to customs controls or to agitations against foreign loans. These latter riots and riots against taxes, student strikes in support of teachers' pay (1960) or against raising public transportation fares (1971), while also involving a number of social conflicts are slightly more straightforward.

One of the complications, quite apart from the political employment of religious riots, is the element of ferocious bestiality and frenzied torture involved against which pales such police actions as in 1962 at the University of Teheran described by Chancellor Dr. Farhad in his letter of resignation as unheard of "cruelty, sadism, atrocity and vandalism." Religious riots were associated not only with the bad enough but relatively decorous methods of torture and execution—drilling holes in the skull to be filled with kerosene and lighted, blowing people from cannon (a European contribution), etc.—but with frenzied women scratching and biting victims, mobs tearing bodies apart, and so on. This kind of violence invites comparison with crimes of passion (as opposed to deliberate codified blood feuds) reported daily in Iranian newspapers, and with the aggressive behavior of Iranian males towards immodestly dressed women (see section 6.3.5). Cruelty and violence are, no doubt, part of Iranian life: viz. Chubak's description in his story Id-e Omar (1966) of a village idiot being led around by his penis and then being tied to an effigy of Omar stuffed with explosives, or the similar treatment meted out to the village idiot in the film Gav. But it is hard to know how to balance against such outbursts of primitive violence the usually gentle Iranian character as demonstrated,

for instance time and again in male (both adolescent and adult) disputes which in the Anglo-Saxon world would lead to blows but which are ritualized by Iranians into verbal expressions of intent to fight and expectations of being prevented from doing so: the "hold me back, I want to fight" ritual. The question of violence in religious riots is not one of cross-cultural contrast (see, for instance, Natalie Davis' review of religious riots in sixteenth century France [1972]) but one of sociological explanation.

A psychiatrist would no doubt turn for explanation to the sexual repression imposed (and intensely felt) by Islamic modesty rules. A sociologist might begin by noting the structural similarity of the "marginal" roles "village idiot," "woman in public," and "religious non-conformist." Neither approach seems to be particularly helpful, and we will leave the problem for the time being, returning to the datum from which we began, that this is the phenomenological canvass minorities have in mind when the subject of religion is broached. Nor are the minorities the only ones who feel themselves unjustly beleaguered: the established Shiah feels the same, not only vis-a-vis the Sunnis who ideologically ruined historical Islam as the just and legitimate society at Kerbala, and who in the form of the Turkish Ottomans were the peril against which the Safavids raised Shiism to the state religion, but most importantly vis-a-vis their countrymen who seem to be following the way of the West.

The latter day importance of Shiism, stemming from its Safavid establishment, thus, has its roots in the history of political development, and is but one example of the long and complex history of political movements in the Islamic world which have been usually treated in their religious garbs under the various labels of Shiism, Sufism, etc. Even certain parameters of Isnā 'Ashari ideology ought to be evaluated in terms of the political units which would be aided by a change of emphasis. For instance, Ismailis can convince us with the simple rationality of maintaining that Ramazan fasting is useless if one continues with unethical practices, or that the true Haj is a spiritual dedication; but it is not only against the Ismailis that Isnā 'Ashari ritual literalism is maintained: the Alevi of the Anatolian plateau hold similar views. The Alevi also stress love

of Ali to a greater extent than Isnā 'Ashari, a technique of dissidence practiced by other groups as well.

2.4. Summary of the Argument

To recapitulate, we have been describing the Persian condition with the following series of propositions:

- (1) Religion in the minds of minorities (and others) is intimately connected with past persecutions.
- (2) Persecution is a politico-economic symptom of social agitation against structural problems in the society.
- (3) Solution to these problems has been sought in: (a) law and order authoritarianism to deal with the agitation (symptoms); (b) economic reorganization to deal with the underlying structural issues.
- (4) Authoritarianism impoverishes quality of life even under good material conditions, and people react against it as a social problem itself.
- (5) Under an authoritarian system, a practical means of protest for the weak is a diffuse ideology, the legitimacy of which is recognized by the managers of the authoritarianism.
- (6) Religious persecution remains a valid fear of minorities where such minorities are visible symbols of, or in fact are connected to elements of the structural problems (the Western dominated world economy in this case).
- (7) The question, "why react in terms of Islam and not in terms of universal ethics;" has to do with Safavid-Qajar history, the political use of the Islamic institution by the Safavid and Qajar states, and with the "universal ethical" terms used as political propaganda to seduce Iran by both sides in the twentieth century cold war.
- (8) Different strata of society have differential access to Islam as a politically effective tool.

CHAPTER III
ZOROASTER'S REALIZATION:
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ZOROASTRIANISM

. . . und Zarathustra will wieder Mensch werden/ Also begann Zarathustra's Untergang. (Nietzsche 1966: 10).

3.1. Introduction.

If in the preceding chapter we began with the datum of religious tension (perceptions of persecution, religiously phrased riots) and had to peel back layers of "myth" to characterize the politics of Iran, perhaps we ought to begin here by acknowledging the even more severe problems of minority historiography. The great enthusiasm with which history is recounted as a series of atrocities and persecutions must be partly analyzed—like the caste system of India, the millet system under the Ottomans, and the ghettos of Europe—as an aspect of social stratification, but one is perhaps missing an essential part if one does not also see the glorification of martyrdom as an "insulating" technique (B.R. Wilson 1967) of group boundary maintenance. Where traditional historiography consists of buildings donated by philanthropists and wars fought by petty kings, balanced accounts require determined detective sifting. Iranians candidly acknowledge the vague boundary between history and legend, saying tārix tārīk-e (history is obscure).¹ While in Iran the glorification of martyrdom technique is ascendant, the Parsis in India more equanimously appeal to the "unique heritage" technique, but their historiography also requires some re-ordering.

We used historiography in the preceding chapter to explore the relations between the political economy and religion; in this chapter we want to use historiography to show how religious institutions change. The

¹ Dar bahar esh zad o marg-ash dar Dei ast/ Pasha ke dunad ke tarix-ash ke ast? (Born in spring, dead in Dei/ what does a mosquito know of dates?) This is reputedly a Yazdi official's ad lib to a question about the age of Bagh-e Dowlatabad, a palace mentioned further in Chapter V.

task may be sharply formulated by contrasting it with the approach of a historian of religion. Prof. Mary Boyce, a leading authority on Zoroastrianism, begins a recent summary with the assertion,

Zoroastrianism is characterized by immense conservatism. Essentially and in details, therefore, the later religion is unchanged from that of ancient Iran (1971: 211).

From a sociological point of view, the statement is suspicious, or rather it is a cue that what is to follow is not a discussion of religious behavior, but rather one of such categories as doctrine, liturgy, ritual, eschatology, etc. We have already indicated in Chapter I that even such categories are not easy to deal with once one asks what they mean to members of society. Take for example from Chapter II the appeal to the sanctity of private property in Islam:

The ulema at the time of the planning of land reform in the early 1960s opposed all land reform ostensibly on the grounds that it violated the sanctity of private property according to Islamic law. The Shah remonstrated at the subsequent violent demonstrations led by the ulema in 1963, saying that the riot-caused destruction violated the sanctity of private property according to Islamic law (Appendix I.2.3.).

The unsatisfactoriness of Prof. Boyce's statement is increased when one considers the following changes in ritual, dogma, and recruitment:

- (a) that once presumably the ritual of fire care was a public state function, and that now it is a priestly function about which the laity know little;
- (b) that where once monotheism was ridiculed, now it is dogma;
- (c) that where once conversion to Zoroastrianism was encouraged (occasionally even forced), now it is disallowed.

Thus despite her fieldwork and superbly detailed description and collation with historical materials, it is apparently left to social anthropologists to shift the stress toward actual social modes of operation, to transform, in Geertz' felicitous phrase, "ethnographic curiosities into sociological reality" (1962: 18).

The task gains relevance by the fact that historical change has caused large numbers of Zoroastrians to view their own customs as ethnographic curiosities. It seems at first something of a reversal of role for an anthropologist to be confronted by his informants with the

demand that he explain to them why they do not allow non-Parsis into their fire temples,¹ or why a Yazdi mother-in-law's sister-in-law is so insistent on feed one food that one can prepare quite adequately oneself.² But this is after all a raison d'etre of the anthropological enterprise: a consciousness of the oddity of our own social behavior as well as puzzlement at why others are different. We may therefore best begin by posing a few of those questions which are currently dividing Zoroastrians and about which they debate: (1) the ritual calendar, (2) the use of bulls' urine (nirang, gaomez) in purification rituals, (3) use of the towers of silence (daxme), (4) upkeep of the priesthood, (5) conversion

¹ A good introduction for those unable to visit India are the Parsi novels, More of an Indian by B.K. Karanjia (1970) and The Fire Worshippers by Perin Bharucha (1968). The plots of both are built around the issue of intermarriage, a good vehicle for examining Parsi customs. From the latter, for instance: "'She was quite a character . . . she had this . . . prayer room . . . There was a Krishna, a Laxmi, a dancing Shiva, a Ganesh, a Virgin Mary, a crucified Jesus, a resurrected Jesus, two or three Muslim pirs. A St. Francis and even the Pope! Naturally there were several pictures of Zoroaster also. There was also . . . Gautama Buddha . . . St. Christopher . . . Now I realize why the old lady didn't believe in taking chances,' Nariman laughed. 'If she couldn't understand her prayers she was making quite certain somebody on her table top did!' . . . 'And you can't blame people for it either. . . . Ours is a very old religion but as it stands today, it's rather incomplete; so it is inevitable that people turn to other faiths about which more is known. . . . If ever I felt the need for divine interpretation I don't think I'd find much solace in Zoroaster. I mean what would be the point in my mumbling something in a dead language to a prophet about whom I know so little! By the way, how long ago was the religion founded?' Sohrab bit his lower lip and scratched his chin. 'HMMMMMM' he said, and then again, 'hMMMMMM'" (p. 15-16). "'Why don't most Parsis eat beef? Is it for religious reasons? Because as far as I know, which I admit is very little, we don't worship the cow as something sacred, do we?'" (p. 55). "'Oh! and I always thought [not accepting converts] was for religious reasons!' 'How could you,' chided Khurshed gently. 'After all if Zoroaster hadn't converted Maidhyoi-Maongha how would the religion have got started?'" (p. 57). "'At the moment there's only one explanation that strikes me as to why Parsis don't approve of cremation. . . . Fire is something sacred to us, so I assume that if a corpse is burnt that would amount to defiling something which is sacred. Why this should extend to an electric crematorium also I couldn't really say'" (p. 43).

² In a society where sharing of food is an index of social solidarity and cleavage, to give and receive is a claim of equality?

and intermarriage, (6) cousin marriage. These issues are of different types, revealing different kinds of sociological changes. They should provide an entry to the recent history of Zoroastrianism as a case study in the exploration of how religious institutions change.

3.2. Six Current Debates

3.2.1. The Ritual Calendar

The debate over the calendar is primarily interesting because it led to the formal split of the Parsis into two sects. In the early eighteenth century the fact that the ritual calendars followed in India and Iran were a month apart became a cause célèbre. One group, the Qadmi (old), decided to change to conform to Iranian practice; the majority, the Shehenshahi (imperial; or possibly, from šahr-sai, urban), stuck to their own calendar. After much vigorous polemic and research, it is now agreed by all that neither calendar is correct: the fasli (seasonal) calendar beginning on the vernal equinox (21 March) is the correct one (approximately the current civil calendar in Iran). But the cause of the split, as we shall suggest, probably had less to do with the calendar than with the growth in control of the mercantile upper class. An accretion to the calendrical mistakes (failure to insert the required intercalulations, called kabissa)¹ was the theological casuistry that the ritual year should not start on the same day each year so that the festival days can rotate and thus bless each day of the year. The matter of the proper ritual date, says a Teherani Zoroastrian with forceful depreciation, is of real concern to those who fear the sky will rain blood if it is mixed up.

3.2.2. Bulls' urine (nirang)

The issue of bulls' urine (nirang or gaomez) in purification ceremonies has two points of interest. The less important is that its

¹ The Qadmi argued that one intercalulation had been missed while the ancestors of the Parsis were in Khorassan (see below under 3.3.1). The

use is opposed nowadays by Westernized people, and is supported only by the orthodox, primarily in India where it can be intellectually supported also by Aurvedic medicine which reports that for certain internal diseases, urine or its chemical equivalents are effective.¹ The urine is taken from a special pure white bull, a tail hair of which is also used for another kind of ceremony, a bull fed on a clean diet and the urine filtered through sand and ash and consecrated by prayer. In Iran there are no longer any such bulls kept, and the little nirang still collected is taken from bulls owned by Muslims in the village of Shahrifabad near Yazd. Since nirang is a central feature to the whole structure of ritual purification, Boyce's stress that the modern era is seeing the dissolution of traditional Zoroastrianism is fair enough. But what is of more interest is to see how such problems are interpretatively dealt with. In India we will distinguish three "schools" of interpreting Zoroastrianism, what I will call Gathic, Vendidadic, and Ilm-e Khshnoom. (In Iran these are less discussed, the differences there being more simply between folk and metaphoric interpretations.) Their separation can also be dated from the eighteenth century. It was just as the British were beginning to take control of Surat that Anquetil du Perron came to India in search of the Avesta: he was the first to bring to Europe a translation and thereby stimulate European scholars to work on the texts and help the Parsis regain a knowledge of the languages in which they are written. Scholars such as Haug taught the Parsis that Zoroastrianism was an ethical monotheism which could bear comparison to the best Christianity, and for which they should be proud to stand up against missionary attacks.²

Shehenshahi argued that intercalulation was only for the fiscal, not the ritual year in Sassanian times, and so since the fall of Yazdigird III, there was no need for it.

¹ E.g., Dr. Kharshedji Framji Khory's note in Kavasji Kanga's Gujurati translation of the Vendidad that the mixture of bull's urine and ash is chemically a mixture of carbolic acid and carbonate of potash, prescribed by modern doctors for disinfecting internal organs (cited by Mehta 1944); see also Dubash (1906).

² In 1839 two Parsi boys were baptised by the Rev. John Wilson, causing a great furor, litigation in court, and petitions to the British government. One of these two became the Rev. Dhanjibhai Nauroji who

The Parsi students of these Europeans began to organize societies, publish articles and educate their followers in an ethical Zoroastrianism purged of superstitions and non-Zoroastrian accretions to the original pristine religion represented by the Gathas, the oldest section of the Avesta, linguistically different from the later texts and attributed to Zoroaster himself. Many of these reformers were also members of the Freemasons and of the Theosophical Society.¹ In contrast, the conservative orthodoxy insisted on the importance of the Vendidad and exact performance of all rituals and formulas, the Vendidad being a Pahlavi text recited during various of the "high liturgies" but which in content is a kind of sanitary code concerned with rules of purity and pollution. Many of the conservatives developed their own brand of esotericism, *Ilm-e Khshnoom*, in reaction to both the rational modernists such as the late Dastur Dr. Dhalla and to the theosophists, since both were for them threatening the sacralized word of traditional behavior, the one looking for the touch point of certainty to rationalism, philology and archeology, the other to non-Zoroastrian leaders and conveyors of truth. Not that *Ilm-e Khshnoom* did not also draw on Hindu and Sufi lore: it involved much astrological speculation, theories of mantra- and thought-vibrations, perfection of the progressing soul

recounts (1909) that Sir Jamshedji Jeejeebhoy offered him a lakh rupees to return to the fold. Rev. Dhanjibhoy shortly after ordination in England returned to baptise yet another Parsi. The first baptisms led to the issuing of a series of tracts by Parsis defending Zoroastrianism and attacking Christianity, to which Wilson responded in a 610 page book entitled The Parsi Religion . . . Unfolded, Refuted, and Contrasted with Christianity (1943). J.J. Modi (1932) relates that Khurshedji Rustamji Cama, who did much to organize educational facilities for Zoroastrian studies as a defense against the Christian challenge, himself was nearly converted by Wilson. An indication of the times is that K.R. Cama not only taught Avestan grammar to priests but joined both Freemasons and Theosophists, but never formally prayed before the fire. When asked by Modi why, he replied, "I do not need that help." Cama lost an election to the Parsi Panchayat because a son-in-law was rumored to be converting to Christianity (he changed his mind).

¹ Manockji Cursetji (K.R. Cama's father-in-law) was the first Indian Mason, and Kawasji Merwanji Shroff was the first Indian Theosophist (having been made a member already in New York before Col. Olcott and Madam Blatavatsky came to India). By 1888 Parsis predominated in the Theosophical lodges of Bombay (14 lodges were founded 1880-1928): K.J.B. Wadia (1931) gives the names of well over a hundred prominent Parsi members in the first 50 years of

rhetoric, stories of advanced souls or rishis hidden in the Himalayas or Mt. Demavand who can communicate with advanced souls on earth and who will eventually direct a spiritual regeneration. Khshnoom is derived from Av. khshnu (xšnu, to be enraptured).¹

3.2.3. The Towers of Silence (daxme)

The issue of the towers of silence again has to do with pressures of Westernization. Opponents of the towers object to the faint smell of putrifying flesh. Supporters of the towers deny that there is either smell or putrefaction: the prayers over the corpse have the magical property of ensuring that there is no spoilage. There are two main theological reasons cited for the use of the towers. First is that, as the Vendidad says, the corpse is the most polluting object in the world and should not be allowed to pollute the purity of the four elements; so a stone platform is built away from habitation, high on a hill, and the corpse is there exposed to the sun (an agent of purification through dessication) and vultures. Secondly the ethical injunction of Zoroastrianism that one must be generous and helpful to all the creatures of Good (Ormazd) encourages one to make a gift of one's body after one no longer has need of it to the birds who can use it for sustenance. In Iran a third reason spoken of only sub rosa is that the speed with which a body is disposed of is taken as a divination of the progress of the soul in the other world and can be a signal for intensification of death ceremonies among the living (see Chapter V.3.1). In Gujurat the version is slightly different: if the funeral rites are not performed properly the soul remains on earth and attached to its earthly ambitions, and thus are created the ghosts which explain strange sounds, accidents in which a driver thinks he sees

the lodges. The movement stressed not only the revival of religion, and the syncretistic optimism that the ancient wisdom of the East was still evolving in advance of the West (and indeed could offer that inner peace sought by the West), but theosophists were also concerned with practical social service; e.g., Annie Besant organized the first scout movement in India, later amalgamated with Baden-Powell's movement.

¹ The best expositions of Ilm-e Khshnoom are Ervad P. S. Masani (1917) and F.S. Chiniwalla (1942). Ilm-e Khshnoom was founded by one Behramshah

something and swerves off the road to avoid it only to find nothing there, and so on. The alternative to exposure in Muslim Iran is burial, but in such a way as does not put the corpse directly on the ground,¹ and so, as Zoroastrians wryly point out, is not much of an improvement, merely substituting worms for birds, but is simply a concession to the Islamic-Christian milieu. In India where burial is much more strongly felt to be a filthy way of disposing of the dead, cremation is the alternative which is now being suggested by a very small minority of Parsis, now that it can be done electrically without involving a real fire as would the traditional Hindu custom. By its supporters cremation is considered to be an improvement in technique not available to the ancients but fully in conformity with their religious requirements. Cremation is not possible in Muslim Persia, as a Roman Catholic priest recently found out when he tried to arrange one for a German Protestant friend.

A survey of 92 Yazdi Zoroastrians on the question, "Which do you think is better, the daxme or the graveyard?" revealed a somewhat different set of considerations than the two "traditional" answers cited above: in fact only one respondent referred to the four elements, though others accepted it as a theological justification when asked. Fifty-seven of the surveyed Zoroastrians were villagers of Nasrabad (described further in Chapter V): 26 were for the graveyard and 22 for the daxme, and 9 said they were equally good. Of the thirty-five surveyed Zoroastrians who were not Nasrabadis, fourteen were white collar (four teachers, nine clerks, and a nurse) and twenty-one were shopkeepers: almost all of these chose the graveyard, only three definitely preferring the daxme, but four more preferring the daxme were they not living in a Muslim milieu. Quite a number of people, in fact, mentioned as a consideration that they might prefer the daxme if it were not for Muslims climbing the walls, breaking the

Navroji Shroff of Surât who went to Persia and there claimed to have visited the advanced souls in the interior of Mt. Demavand.

¹ The body is placed on a metal stretcher, the legs of which keep the body off the ground. The bed of the stretcher is made of strips of metal so that the body while supported is also open to the elements from the bottom. Metal being non-porous does not conduct pollution or disease bearing microbes. The sides of the grave are cemented and a cement cover placed on top so that

the locks, taking pictures,¹ and generally desecrating the ritual segregation of the disposal system. Others say they prefer the graveyard "for history:" you know exactly where a loved one's remains are; there is a remembrance which may stand for centuries. Others say that the daxme was an innovation of the Arab slaughter of Zoroastrians where there was not time to bury people individually and that the graveyard is the original Zoroastrian way. As to the argument of hygiene, most agree that the daxme is the cleaner way: microbes remain in the soil. A few simply say that while graves are not bad, the daxme is the Zoroastrian way, and many more say that an individual ought to have a choice, it does not really matter: some people want to "eat the air" (bad bexordan) and not be shut up in the earth.

In India graveyards have also occasionally been used, though conservatives would prefer to suppress the knowledge of this. Where, however, a population was not large enough to build and maintain a daxme, the Vendidad allows for a burial.² But again the issue of daxmes has a second interest for us: only Zoroastrians may be placed in the daxme, and this is enforced by the trustees of the daxmes who happened to be the rich merchants of the community controlling the Panchayat. In 1906 this became part of a celebrated case before the Bombay High Court: the industrialist R.D. Tata married a French woman and sued to have her admitted to Parsi ranks. The issue involved questions of whether there had been in India in recent centuries any conversion to Zoroastrianism, of the powers of the Panchayat, and so on. The court decided that as Mrs. Tata had been invested with the sacred thread and shirt (sedreh-kusti), albeit incorrectly by conservative account, she was a Zoroastrian, but not a Parsi and therefore not entitled to Parsi community services.

dirt does not fall onto the body. One feature of the daxme which many would like to carry over to the graveyard is equality: that the rich not be differentiated by fancier headstones. This is only partially implemented: there are several standard headstones varying in cost.

¹ The most recent incident was in 1970 when Khanom-e Arbabi hired a helicopter to take photos of the exposed bodies for the mass circulation Roshan Fekr (Smart Idea). Her text began, "It is strange; it is shocking; it is terrifying . . ." (Arbabi 1970: 10).

² There is also the general clause in the Vendidad that when it is

3.2.4. The Priesthood

The issue of the priesthood may lead to some interesting developments. The priesthood is hereditary: any male descendant of a priest (dastur, mobed) to the fifth generation may take up the profession. Dasturs are paid traditionally by the work they do. In Iran this is not enough to live on, and consequently today there is not a single novice priest; there are only 15 active priests in all Iran, the youngest of whom is middle-aged. There are two possibilities of what will happen in the next generation: either priests will be simply imported from India, or a form of priesthood of the believers will appear, something which has in fact begun. Since for many years there have not been enough priests to service the village fire temples, an office called deh-mobed (village mobed) was created in which a villager, a layman took over the care of the fire temple. There is even a case, it is said, of an Iranian deh-mobed who enrolled himself in the Cama Aethornana school for priests in Bombay, some three decades ago, and was allowed to study until the Parsis, who have no such office,¹ discovered that the boy was not of a priestly family. In Zahedan, similarly, the leader of the community, an Irani brought up in Bombay, performs most of what needs to be done, with the approval he says of a high priest in Bombay; when there is an initiation or wedding, however, the Zahedanis go to Kirman or Yazd. Zahedan is innovative as well in another respect: there is no real fire, but only an electric light bulb—it is the symbolism, the respect and the meaning which is important.

In India the problem is not so far developed: there are plenty of priests, the problem is of their quality. With the development of the merchant class, as mentioned, fire temples began to be built and endowed under trust-fund arrangements. The appointment of high priests gradually

impossible to carry out fully a ritual injunction, one should do one's best and be resigned to the will of God. Conservatives would not like this interpreted too freely: Sassanian Iran is said to have fallen because one man failed to carry out a ritual prescription.

¹ Where, however, there is insufficient population to support an agiary (second rank fire), a layman may similarly care for a dadgah (third rank fire). This is currently the subject of dispute in Suwali, an old out-

came to be controlled by the trustees, and they now are beginning to confirm priests by merit rather than by lineage. A program is now also being started through the Cama Aethorman to train priests and then place them on a salary basis, thus raising the level of material reward as well.

3.2.5. Conversion and Intermarriage

The greatest issue at the moment is that of conversion and intermarriage. The community, being very small—on the order of 100,000 in India and 20,000 in Iran—and inbred, is in danger of extinction, particularly now that many of the young are going to Europe and America for study and there marrying non-Zoroastrians. One who is not a Zoroastrian by birth cannot become one, or at least, as mentioned, this is the general rule. It is agreed that this is not a religiously or theologically grounded rule, but rather a pragmatic rule for survival.

In Iran it is expressed as a fear still today that were there visible apostasy from Islam there would be violent killing of Zoroastrians. There is also a deep running bitterness against Islam and those who converted to Islam. Although there is a group that thinks allowing people to convert to Zoroastrianism would cause a renaissance and would bring in many Iranian intellectuals, yet there is a very popular phrase often repeated in such discussions by those who are opposed: siah sefid nemiše (black cannot become white, i.e., what is stained cannot become pure again). Originally all Iranians were Zoroastrian, according to this argument and it was those who could not, or would not stand up to the persecutions who left the faith of their fathers: why should these cowards and opportunists be received back? "It is not we," a Zoroastrian woman

port of Surat and home of Maneckji Limji Hataria (about whom more in section 3.4), now a small village. The old village priest died and the villagers want to degrade the agiary into a dadgah which they can care for themselves. The priests, who do not want to have to care for an agiary out in a forlorn village, argue that the agiary should be moved to a larger population center, and a dadgah created from scratch: one ought not to degrade a fire. The issue is money: the endowment of the agiary goes with it if it is moved, and so the villagers do not want to lose the endowment, nor do the priests.

bitterly put it, "who can accept converts: the fathers of these Muslims were Zoroastrian and they abandoned it." There is a suggestion in her arguments that nothing prevents those who find the religion of Zoroaster inspiring from living according to his precepts; there is no need for them to intermarry with the "true" Zoroastrians though that in time might also occur. There is something precious, however, in Zoroastrian blood which ought not to be given up as something without value. The racial idiom quite often is referred to: Zoroastrians represent the blood of the true Aryan stock, and that racial purity must be protected. Now, after a thousand years, it is impossible to tell which of Iranian Muslims are still pure Aryans (Iranians) and which are mongrels of Arab mixture. What is being asserted¹ is a pride in the heritage not only of being descendants of famous ancient peoples traced back beyond the classical empires into a legendary time of Aryan migration from Central Asia, but equally as resisters against coercion to convert.

Nonetheless, support for allowing conversion is slowly and cautiously growing. The rule of not allowing converts is already not an absolute one: jadid-ul-islam (new converts to Islam) have been readmitted to the fold, converts to Bahaimism can be readmitted, foreign wives can occasionally be admitted, children of non-Zoroastrians can occasionally be admitted (but not adults). The question, say most Zoroastrians, lies primarily in Muslim hands. An old priest in Yazd is reported to have advised a Muslim who wanted to become Zoroastrian, "Don't bother me! Just go down to the Government registry and change what it says on your identity card." The

¹ Racial categories in contemporary Iran are used primarily to make two kinds of cultural statements, one having to do with claims of superiority, the other with feelings of inferiority. The latter is the insistence by Iranians that they are not "white" like Europeans, and this they will go on to say has nothing to do with skin color; but it is clear they are more white than other third world peoples such as Arabs and Africans. See B. Lewis (1970) and Goldziher (1967: 243-44) on the use of color in Islamic literature as an ambiguous (innate/acquired) analogue of mental standing as well as of biological pigment: in relation to Persians and Greeks whom they called "red" or "white" Arabs called themselves "black;" but in relation to Africans whom they called "black," they were "red." The statement of superiority is made primarily in contrast with the Semites: the contrast between Aryan and Semite involves a whole set of characteristics culminating

issue has been raised several times at Zoroastrian Congresses, and it is reportedly Parsi opposition which is a major obstacle there. But, in fact, the Zoroastrian Anjoman of Iran has passed a resolution allowing that:

Subject to the laws of Iran,¹ the marriage of a Zoroastrian and a non-Zoroastrian shall be performed in accordance with Zoroastrian rituals and shall accordingly be registered with the Registrar of Zoroastrian marriages provided an application is made to the Teheran Zoroastrian Anjoman together with the following documents: (1) An Affidavit signed by the non-Zoroastrian party to the effect that the said person believes in the Zoroastrian faith and sincerely wishes to be accepted in the Zoroastrian community; (2) A certificate issued by an authorized Mobed testifying that the person in question has learnt the basic prayers and the essential principles of the Zoroastrian faith; and (3) A certificate by seven Zoroastrians that that person is of good character and integrity (Nargolvala 1969).²

Arguments in support of allowing conversion center around fears of extinction:

(a) there is a feeling that for true vitality to be rekindled the number of Zoroastrians must be increased above the ever more middle class reproduction rate (i.e., one and two children families); (b) there is a recognition that intermarriage may in the future increase and in a Muslim milieu without possibilities of conversion to Zoroastrianism, all intermarriage would represent a loss to the community; and (c) there is a feeling that continued inbreeding will be biologically deleterious (Zoroastrians are convinced they have a higher rate of inbreeding than other groups and that they have particularly high incidences of diabetes, heart disease, and mental illness³). Many cautiously say they are for allowing conversion, but only with a proper screening procedure so as to admit only worthy people.

in the differences between Semitic religion and Aryan religion. Some educated Zoroastrians do not even shrink from the further step of accepting Hitler's Nazism as Aryanism, albeit gone slightly astray. Such people tend to argue that Semitic religions are indeed Nietzsche's "slave morality"—peace seeking, confrontation avoiding—whereas Aryanism is virile world confrontation: there is evil in the world and one must face it with all the antagonism required to subdue it.

¹ A Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman since by Islamic law children belong to the father; but a non-Muslim man must convert to marry a Muslim woman. Parsis use a similar rule: a man married to a non-Zoroastrian woman may bring his children, but not his wife, into the fire temple; a woman married to a non-Zoroastrian man may not bring in her children.

² An American wife in Teheran feels that were she formally to convert, it would be received with polite condescension.

In India it is likewise agreed that the rule of not allowing conversion is not a religiously grounded rule. It is quite candidly argued that were conversion allowed, there would be a tremendous inflow of low caste people which would inundate the great charity programs which the wealthy but small community has built up. The debate as to how recently there were conversions to Zoroastrianism is a very emotional one in Bombay, and the now California resident Dastur Bode has had tomatoes and rotten eggs thrown at him because he was thought to have married Zubin Mehta with his Christian wife. (Defenders say he only administered the Pahlavi benediction, but he was involved in a similar controversy over initiations earlier.) Jehangir Chiniwalla, chairing a lecture on the fall of the Sassanian Empire spelled out the moral lesson to be drawn: the great empire fell because the people intermarried. The legend justifying Parsi exclusiveness is a nice one: when the Parsis fled from Iran to India after the Arab conquest, they asked permission to settle from the local Hindu chief, Jadi Rana, pleading that they would be like a gold ring in a full glass of milk: adding value without disturbing or changing the milk. Thus one of their promises was not to marry with the local population. How old this legend is remains unclear: it was first written down only in 1600, and while most Parsis regard it as a fanciful way of encoding true history, there have been suggestions within the Parsi community that it was a justification of the claim of one segment of the priests to authority over the rest of the priests, that is a counter in the struggle which lasted throughout the 17th century (see 3.3.1 below). In Karanjia's novel (1970: 49), Mr. Modi expresses his opposition to intermarriage so:

. . . when our forefathers first landed in India, there was no ban on proselytizing. . . . Well one thing led to another, but so far as being exclusive is concerned, our dwindling numbers have made it necessary. We are a mere lakh and twenty-five thousand today. So you see, each of us isn't a practioner only, but a protagonist. But this is the essence of our religion, a fighting one.

³ This will be tested in a joint study by the University of Teheran, Johns Hopkins, and N.I.H. Pilot studies by Dr. James Bowman, now of the University of Chicago, have suggested that Zoroastrians and other minorities may be separable on blood-typing, G-6-PD, and Haptoglobin frequencies (1959, 1961, 1964, 1964b, 1967).

But this kind of argument is shattered by the hard facts put forth by those of a demographic bent. Parsi demographer and former Secretary of the Parsi Panchayat, S.F. Desai, has repeatedly (1940, 1948, 1964, n.d.) pointed out warning signs of falling birth rates, stagnant marriage rates, climbing mean age of marriage, declining fertility, growth of an impoverished class (40% of the Parsi population has sought some sort of welfare relief), and possible concentration of deleterious recessive genes. Sekar (1968) restates the case similarly, and it is reconfirmed by the special census analysis of the Parsis (1961 census figures), from which the following figures are taken. Since 1941 the total population has been declining, its high point being 114,890 in 1941. The decade 1951-61 saw a drop of nearly 10% to 100,772. This may partially be due to migration abroad, but since 1881 the mean age of the Parsis has continued to rise, so that by 1961 it was 37 (versus 24 for all India), and the age composition in Bombay was such as to expect the population to show a negative growth rate:

TABLE 1
COMPARATIVE AGE COMPOSITION OF BOMBAY PARSIS¹
(In Percent of the Population)

Age Group	Parsi Population Greater Bombay	All India	Sundbarg Theoretical Models		
			Progressive	Stationary	Regressive
<15	17.84	41.03	40	26.5	20
15-49	51.57	47.16	50	50.5	50
50+	30.59	11.81	10	50.0	30

If the death rate continues to exceed the birth rate as it has in the 1955-61 period, a further decline in total population figures can be expected. A sample survey of 9,215 Parsis in 1961 revealed figures of about 7% chronically ill persons, including 0.4% mentally ill and 1.0% heart disease; the figures for the 15-44 year old age group were 3%, 0.5%, and 0% respectively. Of the reasons given by the increasing number of never

¹ Figures from the Government of India (1971: 9).

married persons 40% of the males cite low income as the reason, 6.4% want of accomodation, 5% a combination of the two, 6.1% disinclination to marry; females cite most often disinclination (16.7%), difficulty in finding a suitable mate (11.4%) and low income or want of accomodation (16.5%). As to declining fertility, 11.1% of ever married women aged 45-69 (i.e., completed fertility) have never conceived, and an analysis by age group shows a decrease in the younger women of the proportion having five or more pregnancies. Average number of children per ever married woman (age 15-69) is 2.4. Of ever married women (15-69) 14.3% married blood relations, distributed as follows: MBs 14.2%, MZs 23.3%, FBs 17.4%, MFZs 19.6%, MB .9%, Husband's younger brother .9%, other blood relation 23.7%. Sekar puts it this way:

A culture cannot be preserved for any length of time by the mere imposition of religious and social codes of human behavior. Nor does its continuance rest merely on the attitude of one section of society however powerful it may be. It is on the will of the people, their determination to ensure its survival . . . must first manifest itself in an anxiety on their part to propagate their race (1968: 52).

3.2.6. Cousin Marriage

The question of inbreeding, of preferential marriage with cousins, is of interest beyond the medical question in two respects: there is the question of the sociological function of the marriage system which will be dealt with in Chapter V, and there is the old debate of the Orientalists about the word kwetudinas in the Avesta, which has been translated after Greek sources as "next-of-kin" marriage (brother-sister, mother-son, father-daughter) and which is highly recommended in the texts. Parsi scholars have challenged the translation: returning to a philological reconsideration of the word (qaetu, self, from Av. qa = Skr. sva = Lat. sibi + datha from Av. da, to give, make, create) and a contextual analysis of its use, they suggest it be translated "gift for/to/of self," i.e., communion with God.¹ Others have

¹ The locus classicus for this argument is Darab Dastur Peshotan Sanjana's (1888) superbly detailed investigation of every occurrence of the word qaetvadatha. It occurs 25 times in the Pahlavi texts, but never in passages about marriage. The context is always as a good work which is highly meritorious but without further explanation, e.g., in Gatha IV.8

suggested that it was a brief custom introduced by the mad king Cambyses on the royal Egyptian pattern; or that it really means preferential cousin marriage or patrilineal endogamy, but these seem absurd after Sanjana's tour de force (1888). A few people, including a contemporary anthropologist (Spooner 1966) persist in repeating the Greek charges without any further supporting evidence that it was a wide spread custom (if so, it would raise theoretical questions about why it was introduced, and why it disappeared).¹ One ought to point out that allegations of institutionalized next-of-kin marriage is a popular mode of abuse in the Middle East by members of one religion against another (e.g., today it is used against Bahais, and many Iranians believe the charge to be true).

3.3.0. The Rise of a Parsi Caste

These being some of the issues and some of the attitudes currently engaging the Zoroastrians we may now use them as a guide to the relevant past. The antecedents of these disputes, it will be argued, show how the changing bases of power within the community led to changes in the

(quoted again in Yasht XXIV and Visperad III) it is a qualifier of "pious youth;" in Yasna XII.9 it agrees in case, number and gender with "religion;" in the Bahram Yasht it is wished that khvetuk-dasih continue in the pious family and so on (see Sanjana for the complete list). The reflexive gaetu occurs also with verezenya (an "active laborer" for good) and airyamna ("joyful devotion" to God). In other words, the only reason for ever having translated gaetvadatha as "next-of-kin" marriage is that the Greco-Roman writers attribute such a custom to the Persians. Of such authors, there are twelve of whom only four are independent sources (the others citing these): Xanthus (his veracity was challenged by the ancients); Herodotus (who never went to Persia; whose writings are quite candid about the difficulties of separating truth from fiction; who interestingly never mentions the name Zoroaster although Xanthus had earlier and Plato did later; whose accuracy is challenged by both Ctesias and Plutarch); Ctesias (whose reputation was built on being able to contradict Herodotus by first hand knowledge of the Persian court, but whose account conflicts with Berossus, the Bible, and cuneiform tablets); Agathias (the sixth century Byzantine whose accounts are also to be read with caution). In any case, the Greco-Romans only allege four instances: Cambyses (not remembered either for his sanity or his respect for morality), Artaxerxes II, Qabad I, and Terituchmes—all singular instances, and of a type common in Greek stories about Greeks as well.

¹ Two decades ago Ward Goodenough also pointed out the inadequacy of evidence for using such a Persian custom in the debate about the universality of the incest taboo as Slotkin suggested (Goodenough 1949; Slotkin 1947, 1949).

exercise of both religious and political authority: how Zoroastrianism grew in India from a rural priest- and ritual-coordinated community (not unlike the rural Iranian communities to be described in Chapter V) into a merchant controlled caste, and thence into the more loosely coordinated community of the present.

This relevant past only begins to become clear in the sixteenth century with the arrival of the European East India Companies. As we have hinted, one can also date modern Zoroastrianism from this era in at least three ways: (1) the studies of Zoroastrian religion initiated by the orientalist, Anquetil du Perron, began a period of reform and theological reformulation; (2) the writing down in 1600 of the Parsi origin myth, the Kisseh-e Sanjan, crystallized a Parsi self-conception into a social charter for the following four centuries; (3) the Parsi community which had not done badly under the Moghuls rose to top native caste in British India, only one caste as it were below the British pure white varna.¹ It is this last which provides us with a chronological skeleton. As the Parsis rose in political and economic power, they could use their influence through their British overlords to intervene on behalf of their coreligionists in Iran, where oral tradition would have us believe the Yazd and Kirman populations had become completely degraded since Safavid times economically, politically, religiously, and emotionally.²

¹ Quite parallel to what we shall suggest about Parsi caste rules, the Agha Khan III comments in his memoirs (1954: 125) on the rigidification of the British caste rules, noting that during the Viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin, Sir Jamshed Jeejeebhoy led the Vicereine in to a dinner on his arm with the Viceroy following, offering his arm to the hostess, Lady Jeejeebhoy; but a few years later "and thereafter until the end of the Indian Empire—it would have been inconceivable that the Viceroy . . . would have gone to a reception at the house of a Parsee gentleman, however distinguished, and allowed him to lead the Vicereine in first and then have followed with his hostess."

² This is worth exploration. It is true that the Iranian economy was in severe decline since the end of the Safavid dynasty, and even during the height of the Safavid dynasty, Persia was more of a strategic market than a productive one. Persian silks were of poorer quality than either Chinese or Bengali silks and the Dutch who obtained from Shah Abbas a share of the royal monopoly of silk for themselves and the British (to the exclusion of the Portuguese) tried to avoid taking as much silk as they

The growth in power of the Parsi merchant class affected the organization of the community reducing the power of the priesthood in favor of the merchants. I will suggest that this period saw a rigidification of Parsi caste rules, not very different from Protestant sectarian processes described by Max Weber, and part of a general process in Western India, as suggested by Helen Lamb (1959), in which merchants freed themselves and their communities from priest intimidation. The merchant controlled Parsi Panchayat not only involved itself in welfare services but at times dictated community morality. Religious "orthodoxy" became a tool of merchants interested in using the reputation of the community as a kind of credit voucher in which religious credibility becomes transformed into business credit. The "honesty" of Parsis is proverbial still today, as are the assertions, "Parsi, thy name is charity," and "You will never see a Parsi begger." Businessmen speak of bygone days when the word of a Parsi sufficed as security for transactions involving large sums of money. Those days are gone, not because men are very much less honest today—Justice Davar had no compunction in pointing out Parsi perjury and priestly money-grubbing (1908: 64-67)—but because the nature of economic transactions has changed. It is not only of Parsis that it is said in old sources on mercantile conditions that bags of money were circulated without counting. And it is still a sound business rule that a disappointed customer will not come back. But a Brahmin former partner in a Parsi firm recalls the day just before World War II he went to a new British bank

had contracted. They rather sold pepper, spices, sugar and piece goods for European gold and silver. The gold and silver yielded a profit in exchange of 6 to 11%, a minimal amount in days when Chinese silk sold in Amsterdam could yield over 300% profit over 15 months (Persian silks yielded only 25%)—these figures from the 1620s (Glaman 1958). It is further true that the Zoroastrians (and Jews, Armenians, and Assyrians) had to pay the jeziya tax as did the Parsis under the Moghuls until the late seventeenth century, and that there were periodic persecutions. But we know that Zoroastrians did take part in international trade. Yazdi Zoroastrian merchants brought a copy of the Arda Viraf Nameh to Gujurat in 1576. Rivayats were exchanged with some frequency between Gujurat and Iran in the following centuries, and while we know little of other businesses—their messengers might have engaged in, when Mullah Kavus went from Surat to Yazd in the 1760s, he was operating within a merchant network.

and asked for a credit account of several crore rupees on a transaction with a Japanese cloth supplier, money to be re-paid the bank when final sale was concluded. The manager, reasonably enough, wanted a deposit. This Brahmin was quite taken aback, protesting that never before had the firm been required to place a deposit, and if he liked he should check with the firm's own bank on its financial standing. The manager did so, and was duly impressed by the credit standing of the simple dhoti-attired man before him.¹ Nonetheless, it was the bank's policy that a deposit be paid.

With the departure of the British, the privileged position of the Parsis began to disappear, but perhaps again less because of the simple disappearance of their patrons than because of general social changes. The growth of the industrial economy and the advancement of other, larger communal groups into the expanded managerial-executive field caused a diminution of proportion of Parsi influence. Parsis view this with varying degrees of disapproval, expressed primarily as a feeling that individual enterprise is going out of the community: no longer the romance of a daring merchant prince braving the pirates and typhoons in the South China Sea, but only the dull monotony of pencil pushers in over-crowded cities. Such is the disgust with this prosaic existence that a very mild rural priest even broke into a smile at the mention of the most recent of sensational Parsi crimes: a Parsi military officer's telephone impersonation of Indira Gandhi's voice resulting in a gift of Rs. 60 lakhs from the vaults of the State Central Bank in New Delhi "for secret aid to Bangla Desh."² It is at least a spark of adventure in an otherwise dull community, he commented.

¹ This man enjoys pointing out the difference between himself and his Parsi partner who dressed in the best English clothes. They were invited to a big function and when he arrived his partner in a Rs. 300 suit rushed up to him crying, "Look how you come! What shall we do: you have no trousers, no stockings!" The Brahmin gentleman calmly replied that he was dressed in his national attire and was not ashamed. In the course of the evening, the Parsi partner was asked to make a speech but had not sufficient command of English, whereas he himself was fluent. When subsequently the firm went bankrupt during the War—Japanese funds were frozen and the British Government paid less than cost for cloth delivered—leaving a debt of Rs. 4 lakhs, the Parsi had a heart attack and died, whereas he sold his bungalow, moved his family into a crowded tenement near a married daughter in Surat, and lives more-or-less contentedly on Rs. 100 a month (or actually on what his eldest son earns).

Parallel with the contribution of the growth of the industrial economy to Parsi decline was the contribution of the Indian attempt at a socialist welfare economy. Prohibition destroyed at one blow the base of much of Gujurat Parsi affluence: their toddy trade. Parsis had also run private bus services in rural Gujurat. The State Transport system ended that. And finally, the land tenure acts based on the principle that the tiller of land should be the owner hit hard at Parsi landlords dependant on Dobra (an agricultural caste) labor. The impoverishment of the Gujurat Parsis stimulated Parsi flight into Bombay and continued the swelling Parsi relief rolls which had become an increasing problem from the first half of the twentieth century.

Bombay is a city in which everyone has a problem. Those of the Parsi lower classes are those known to social workers in every big city (see P.A. Wadia 1949). The rich businessmen complain of a tax-structure which makes efficient productivity above a certain level unprofitable, and which forces them to keep two sets of books (white and black money). In between the salaried white collar workers complain of being squeezed harder: having no access to black money, they bear the brunt of taxation. Not willing to live like the really poor, city rents (actually pagri or key money, rather than rents which are reasonable) or house prices are difficult to meet and simply locating nice apartments is problematic. For this reason Parsi housing colonies cater as much to the middle class as to the lower class for whom they were originally intended. It is a city in which perhaps the small Irani restaurant owner is the freest, dealing as he does in cash; but even he is eyeing the booming Iranian economy with its lure of greater profits and less crowded, cleaner living. His problem is that he cannot cash in his Indian investments and take them for reinvestment to Iran.¹

² This occurred in spring 1971 before India actually intervened to aid the establishment of Bangla Desh. There was undoubtedly more to the case than meets the eye: Mr. Nagawala was arrested, confessed, tried and jailed within days, a most unusual speed. The papers were full of recollections of Sam Patel's similar bank robbery in London; and there was a dramatic arrest in Bombay of Phiroze Darawalla, a candidate in the March 1971 elections on charges of multiple murder.

¹ A small scale way around this is to support Iranian visitors in

We will turn to the Iranis and the Iranian case shortly (section 3.4). But in the following two sections we will search first this Parsi setting more deeply to find clues to the changes Zoroastrianism has undergone.

3.3.1. Priestly Oligarchy to Merchant Panchayat

First let us explore the suggestion that the merchants used caste orthodoxy as credit vouchers. The evidence lies primarily in the historical coincidence of their rise in general influence and their vigorous pursuance of control of the community through a Panchayat with a sanction of excommunication. Such powers formerly lay with the priests, who attempted to exercise sanctions of denying and granting religious sacraments. We return to the sixteenth century. Political stability in Gujurat was not secure: to the south was an uneasy relationship with the Maratha Confederacy, and from the sea the Portuguese were testing footholds. Before the turn of the century the Muslims had conquered Sanjan, the town where the Parsis' Atesh Bahram (highest level fire) had been located. The Parsis supported their Hindu overlords and when the latter were defeated, they fled with the fire, named Iranshah, into the hills, to Bansda, and finally to Navsari where the fire remained until 1741 or 1744. The main commercial center for the Southeast Asian trade of Gujurat in the early sixteenth century was Randar, with secondary ports at Surat, Broach and Cambay. In 1512 and again in 1530 and 1531, the Portuguese burned Surat; by 1560 they were in control of Daman and Sanjan. In 1573 Emperor Akbar beseiged Surat. In 1602 the Dutch arrived in Cambay. And in 1612 the English established their first factory in Surat. Until 1759 when the British assumed indirect rule of Surat, this jockeying went on. The English and the Dutch allied against the Portuguese; the Arabs allied now with Shivaji (the Maratha leader), now with the Moghuls against the Portuguese; the English fought the Dutch (1665-67); Shivaji made incursions into

India—Iranian students for example—and have them repay in rials to an Iranian account. A similar reverse process operates for those who want to sever ties with Iran and liquidate Iranian holdings.

Gujurat (1664-1706); the Sidis attacked Bombay (1692); the Navab of Surat established semi-independence (1733-59), but in the power play after his death the Dutch were squeezed out by the English. By the 1730s Surat which had become the most populous city in India was in decline; Bombay had taken over.

Parsis during this period had been drawn to Surat. It was a period of urbanization for many, the creation of classes of brokers, merchants, clerks, and artisans. In the rural areas, Parsis collected toddy, ran the internal transportation system, and were landowners. When the Atash Bahram Iranshah was brought to Navsari, it was done under the guidance of the Navsari desai (revenue farmer), a Parsi layman by the name Changa Asa. The desai-gir is said to have been in Parsi hands two and a half centuries before Akbar's conquest, but Changa Asa is the first name we know, and it remained in his family until 1608. Parsi ritual organization was based on a division of their Gujurat residence areas into five panthaks (parishes), priests being assigned to each and making their living by charging for their services. When Iranshah was transferred to Navsari, its Sanjana priests came with it, but were forbidden to perform any services other than the care of Iranshah. As their number increased the income from the Atash Bahram became insufficient to support them.¹ They appealed to the gazi (judge) Jiaoodin of Navsari, but he ruled against them (Mehrji Rana 1899). Slowly the Navsari priests (Bhagaria) began to gain a kind of general control. In 1573 when Akbar took Surat he met the Bhagaria chief priest, Mahyar, and gave him a land grant; in 1578 Mahyar was called to Delhi to expound Zoroastrianism in connection with Akbar's syncretistic Ilahi religion. In 1579/80 Mahyar was made the official chief priest of the Parsis of Navsari and his title Mehrji Rana became a hereditary one down to the present day. It was promulgated that before performing rituals priests needed his permission.

As they became increasingly destitute, the Sanjana priests began to chafe at the restrictions on their activities and this grew into a

¹ Sanjana priests did have their own panthak between the Rivers Dantora and Par. The implication is partly one of a shift in population away from Portuguese held territory or more likely towards Surat.

major dispute over the next century until in 1741 or 1744 they took Iranshah away from Navsari. In 1600 Bahman Kaikobad composed the Parsi epic Kisseh Sanjan. He was a descendant of Nagan Raga, one of the three Sanjana priests who had carried Iranshah to Navsari, and in 864 lines he told the earlier history associated with the fire:

After the Arab victories at Kadesia (638 A.D.) and Nehavand (641 A.D.) when the royal court fled, a small band of Zoroastrians hid in the mountains (of Khorassan, it is assumed) for a hundred years. They then migrated to Hormuz where they stayed fifteen years. They suffered some religious persecution, and a dastur, after reading the stars, advised them to leave for India. They came first to Diu where they stayed nineteen years before sailing on for Gujurat. This time they sailed into a bad storm and vowed that if they survived, they would consecrate an Atash Bahram. They arrived safely and asked permission from the local king, Jadi Rana, to settle. He, after inquiring about their ways, consented. They chose a spot and called it Sanjan. Then they asked permission to build a fire temple; when this was granted they cleared a space for three farsakhs which none but Zoroastrians might enter, for any noise would disturb the efficacy of the ceremonies. They prospered and gradually spread out to other parts of Gujurat. Then came a disaster: one Sultan Mahmud sent his vizier Alef Khan to attack their Hindu king. The Parsis loyally fought with the Hindus: at first the battle went badly and the Hindus fled, but Ardeshir rallied his Zoroastrian troops and put the Muslims to flight. Battle lines were reformed and a call for individual combat went out: Ardeshir accepted and slew his opponent. Alef Khan became enraged and swore to exterminate the Parsis. Ardeshir fell, and the Parsis fled taking their fire to the mountain Bahrut. Twelve years later they moved to Bansda where the fire remained fourteen years. Then the honorable Changa Asa who gave out sedreh and kusti (sacred thread and shirt) to those who needed them, came and argued for removal of the fire to Navsari where it would be more convenient to more people. Three priests carried it to Navsari.

Along with this document, there also exist sixteen Sanskrit šlokas, which are supposed to be the reply of the pioneer Parsis to Jadi Rana's questions about their faith and customs. Because there are very few other accounts of Parsi origins, Parsi scholars have invested much energy in trying to make this poem yield historically true statements. B.N. Bhathena (1944) and a few others, however, have suggested that it is absurd to make history out of a tale which was probably codified to support the Sanjana priests' demand for more freedom from the restrictions placed on them when they moved their fire to Navsari. Of the memorial pillar erected at Sanjan under the direction

of such Parsi scholars as J.J. Modi, and to which there is now an annual "pilgrimage," Bhatena scoffs, it commemorates the "great humbug of the Kisseh Sanjan," an insulting poem which makes out the early Parsis to be cowards, leaving Iran out of fear for their lives, and settling in Sanjan under childish terms. Bhatena is overly polemic and himself suffers the delusion that the poem must be absolutely historical or a "palpable falsehood," but a number of his points are well taken, and with a slightly different viewpoint can illuminate a few things about the myth:

- (1) There were Zoroastrians in India before the Arab conquest, and there was a flow, if small and intermittent, of Zoroastrians from Iran after the conquest. Nor did all of these Zoroastrians live in the coastal area of southern Gujrat: there are references to them in Sind, Punjab, Kashmir, Kutch, Kathiawar, and Malabar.
- (2) By oral tradition, the 16 ślokas are attributed to a Neriosang Dhaval, one of the two cousins who presented the Parsi petition to Jadi Rana, and who in response to his inquiry about Parsi ways also translated into Sanskrit several Zoroastrian sacred texts (Yasna, Khordeh Avesta). These two cousins are supposed to have been grandsons of Shapur Sheriar, the brother of Yazdigird III, and apical ancestor of all Parsi priests. Now, first with regard to the priestly genealogies, they all experience a telescoping of several centuries in the upper reaches of their ascending generations. Secondly, with regard to the name Neriosang Dhaval, there is a second, historically better known person with such a name, a thirteenth century savant who wrote in Sanskrit. Thirdly, with regard to the manuscripts of the ślokas, the oldest one dates only from the second half of the seventeenth century (i.e., post Kisseh Sanjan) and contains only two ślokas. The rest are from the eighteenth century. Bhatena suggests that the ślokas were written to provide post facto confirmation for the Kisseh Sanjan, but while suggestive, Bhatena attributes too much of a falsifying intent to the Sanjana priests, since:
- (3) In early European accounts, we have some other versions of the arrival of the Parsis. Most of these vary only in details such as the number of ships used by the refugees, or the places of landing: they came from Jask, and landed not only at Sanjan but also at Cambay, Surat and Navsari. Most important of this kind of variant is the tradition in the family of the Modis of Surat, themselves Bhagaria, that there were numerous landings and that their family stems from a landing at Bhagaria.¹ Another important

¹ Related to me by the current Davar Modi, the fifteenth title-holder, Kavasji T. Modi. The Parsi Indian independence leader Behramji M. Malabari

kind of variant is that reported by Ogilby in 1670 who says the Parsis told him (quite the same, incidentally, as what the Bene Israel of Maharastra tell of themselves¹) that they had forgotten their origin, and even who they were, and that they were re-instructed by new arrivals from Persia (Seervali and Patel 1899: 9). Compare this with P.P. Balsara's recent history of the Parsis (1963: 57) where he says that when the Parsis came to India they either did not bring their religious books with them or if they did, soon lost them. This would strengthen the speculation that even if there was a migration from Hormuz or Jask soon after the Arab invasion of Iran, it was not because of religious persecution, but for reasons of trade. A copy of the Vendidad was brought by Ervad Mahyar of Ucca, Punjab, from Iran in the twelfth century, and it was copied in Cambay in 1323. A copy of the Arda Viraf Nameh was brought to Cambay from Iran in 1527 by Kama Asha, and copies of the Vištaspā Yašt and Visperad were brought in 1626 by Bahman Aspandiar. It was for this reason (lack of texts) that no less than twenty-two missions were sent to Iran between 1478 and 1773 with questions about religion and ritual (the rivayats), and in these the Iranians of Yazd expressed their amazement that none of the Parsi priests could read Pahlavi properly, and suggested people be sent to Iran to be instructed.

- (4) Bhatena objects to the description of Zoroastrianism offered by the priest to Jadi Rana and to the childish terms Jadi Rana placed upon the refugees.² These terms were that Parsi women adopt Indian dress, that the Parsis adopt the Indian language, that they perform their marriage ceremonies in the evening, and that they disarm. If

poked fun at K.T. Modi's predecessor Khan Bahadur Mody Davar Rustonji: "His one ambition in life is to be known as the supreme head of the Parsis throughout India and Persia. With this view he will wait upon the new Collector or Judge with musty old documents proving him the direct descendant of Yazdigird, the last Zoroastrian king of Persia, and by inference of course, of Zoroaster, Jamshid and others. All this is very fine, and European officials generally pass a pleasant hour in humouring the amiable Mody Saheb. But his enemies, almost the whole Parsi community to a man, spoil the fun by defining the word "Mody" as a grain supplier. . . . the dictionaries are on the side of the enemies . . ." (1884: 27). Actually this Modi family belongs to a younger branch of the Bombay Modis.

¹ For the origin legends of the Bene Israel, see Samuel (1963).

² "The priest does not sing the sublime songs of the immortal Gathas, he does not explain the highest philosophy of Asha; he seems to have no knowledge of the sublime principles of Vohuman, Vahistaman, Sepentamanue, Kshathram, Armaiti, and Ameretat . . . All that this learned Priest could say to the King of Sanjan was that they worshipped the Sun, the Moon, the Cow, Fire, Water and other creations of God; and that they wore Kusti or the sacred thread round their waist; and that their women during menstruation did not look at the Sun, the Sky and the Moon, and that they also avoided water and fire . . ." (1944: 15).

one conceives these verbal exchanges not from the point of view of refugees but from the point of view of the need to explain customs centuries after they have been adopted, those which distinguish and those which serve to integrate Parsis with their surroundings, then they make perfectly good sense.

- (5) Finally Bhathena objects to some ethnographic absurdities in the poem. For instance, Iranshah is said to have been consecrated with the ritual alat (implements) brought from Iran by the refugees; but sea voyaging would make the alat unusable (purity is lost by sea voyaging according to the Vendidad and confirmed in the rivayats). He also queries why there has never been found any trace of the first fire temple in a clearing of three farsaxs.

Shortly after the composition of the Kisseh Sanjan, the desai-gir of Navsari was taken over by Mehrji Rana, chief of the Bhagaria (Navsari) priests, from the family of Changa Asa. It only remained in the Mehrji Rana family until 1619 but it then passed into the hands of another Bhagaria priestly family where it remained until the descendants were pensioned off by the British in 1817.¹ And it was a member of this family, Desai Khursedji Temulji (desai of Navsari 1728-79) who led the movement to establish a new Atash Bahram in Navsari in 1764 after Iranshah had been taken away. This gradual concentration of control in Bhagaria hands was not seriously challenged until 1673 when the behdin (laymen) of Navsari declared their right to choose which ever dastur they wished to perform their family rites. In 1683 a warning letter was sent by the leaders of the now more important Surat community to Navsari that Sanjana priests abide by the old division of duties. Two years later a formal agreement was signed by the Sanjana and Bhagaria priests to honor this division. But in the next year (1686) the Sanjana priests and the behdin revolted: there was a violent clash in which first two Bhagaria priests were killed, and then the enraged Bhagaria killed six behdin. The case was taken to Surat for trial, six Bhagaria priests charged with murder and six more charged with

¹ Dastur Keikobad Mehrji Rana, son of the first Mehrji Rana, apparently got caught by the occupational hazards of a revenue farmer: he was imprisoned for three years by Emperor Jehangir for debts owed the Government (Modi 1930). The desai-gir went to two brothers, Behram and Homji Fereydun who had assisted the previous holder of the desai-gir, i.e., they had assisted Behram Jesa, aide to the Changa Asa family. When Behram Jesa died they split the office, but later two of Homji's sons bought out Behram. The brothers were cousins of the priests upon whom Emperor Jehangir had conferred land grants in 1618.

incitement to murder. The Modi Kurverji Nanabhoy intervened in Surat and the priests were released, but a petition was circulated by the behdin complaining of extortion by Bhagaria priests for their ritual services. In a related incident, a Sanjana priest in Bulsar, Jamasp, had stopped paying tribute to Navsari; when the Pindaris attacked the town he fled by boat to Navsari, thereby losing his ritual purity. In Navsari he renewed his bareshnum (nine day purification rite) from Sanjana rather than Bhagaria priests. A Bhagaria priest, Minochehr Homji, sided with the behdin and consecrated a Dar-e Mehr (second level fire) in his home where behdin boycotting the Bhagaria could have services performed. He was soon joined by other Bhagaria defectors. Eventually the behdin forced the Bhagarias to sign a statement allowing freedom to entrust religious work to any priest desired; and in 1691 the Sanjana priests signed a similar statement also agreeing to boycott those Bhagaria the behdin were boycotting on pain of a fine of five rupees and loss of their priestly share for three years. The dispute continued, was taken to the Gaekwad ruler in Broach who ruled in favor of the Bhagarias, and finally the fire was taken away to Bulsar and then Udvada where it is still enthroned (see Katrak 1941).

So ends the Bhagaria-Sanjana dispute in name but not the real changes at issue. A challenge had been made by the laymen to a consolidating oligarchy. They had broken the absolute direction of religious communal affairs by priests, but not by the oligarchy of whom the priests were but a part. The power of excommunication by refusing to perform rites (and the associated power of extortion) was taken away from the priests but it was to fall into the hands of the merchant controlled Panchayat. The dispute over the calendar which split the Surat community into Qadmi and Shehen-shahi was in this sense a continuation of the Sanjana-Bhagaria dispute.

The scene now shifts from Navsari to the great port of Surat. Many of the families of Surat were from Navsari. Rustam Maneck, broker for the Portuguese, Dutch, and English, is the greatest name: he was of a priestly Bhagaria family from Navsari. Modi Kuverji, who had intervened to free the Bhagaria priests accused of murder, is another famous name: his family built the first fire temple and first tower of silence in Bombay (1672),

and his father had gained some notoriety by building a tower of silence in Surat and then dying before it was complete—his body was first put in another daxme and then transferred, much to the horror of many in Iran as well as in Gujurat (the case is discussed in a rivayat). Rustam Maneck, aside from being an indispensable member of the East India Companies, founded a section of Surat (Rustapura) for Parsis migrating from Navsari to escape Maratha incursions. When Shivaji attacked Surat, Rustam paid him to leave the Parsis alone. In 1672 he paid jezia tax for poor Parsis, and soon thereafter got Aurangzeb to waive it altogether.

The calendar dispute flared up in the 1740s. The traditional account notes that in 1720 a Dastur Jamasp came from Kirman with a rivayat and noticed the discrepancy in the calendars, but nothing much was made of the fact until 1736 when a layman from Iran, one Jamshid, began to agitate about the issue. In fact the issue had been noted even before Jamasp. It is interesting that 1736 is also the year the priests of Surat declared they would no longer give daughters in marriage to behdin, an issue which smouldered until 1777 when the laymen declared they would not give daughters to priests. The case went to court and the behdin were upheld. Parsi writers agree that the effect the priests were attempting to achieve was to allow wealth in but not alienate it through dowries and legacies. In the following year however the mutual exclusiveness which was now much to the priests' disadvantage, having many unmarried women on their hands, broke into an open fight, as it was ignored by a behdin and a priestly family who betrothed their infant children. At this point the British asked the community to form a new Panchayat to deal with such cases. We run ahead of our story, but previous to this Panchayat, there had already been a self-constituted Panchayat formed in Bombay probably around 1730 by five members of the Surat mercantile oligarchy now relocated: the three sons of Rustam Maneck, the grandson of Heerji Wacha Modi who had built the first Bombay tower of silence, and Bamanji Limji, founder of the great ship-building family.¹

¹ Bamanji began in Surat as a ships' carpenter, and so was the first of his family to move into the oligarchy. But the other four all were sons of established families.

In 1736 then, the Iranian Jamshid stirred up a group of behdin, most of whom says J.J. Modi (1916: 82) were churigars (bangle makers) or were taunted by that name (implying effeminacy [Karaka 1884: 105]), in favor of the Qadmi calendar. Dastur Darab of Broach, one of the three priests who had studied briefly with Dastur Jamasp in 1720, was approached and agreed to establish a separate fire temple for the Qadmis. His brother's son, Mullah Kavus, was dispatched to Iran to make further studies on the subject, but as he stayed away more than a decade clearly it was not a yes-no question the answer to which anyone was anxiously awaiting. When he returned, he succeeded Darab as High Priest of the Qadmi though a year later he retired to Hyderabad leaving his son Mullah Firuz in charge. Now this Dastur Darab is the Darab with whom Anquetil du Perron dealt. Du Perron complains (Kanga ed. 1876) that the Parsi priests were not very forthcoming and that he had to play one off against another to be allowed to see different manuscripts and to receive the necessary pieces of instruction to decipher the texts. Fortunately the community was divided into two hostile sects and he could play off one against the other. He also alleges that he was allowed by Dastur Darab to enter the fire temple secretly. It was this final allegation which provoked J.J. Modi to do a marvelous analysis of the facts and nonsense of Anquetil's account (1916).¹ Modi first of all admits that part of Darab's go-slow behavior might have

¹ Anquetil is full of inconsistencies. He says he went disguised as a Parsi, yet he carried sabre and pistol. He says he went through dark streets at 6:30 on June 22, but the sun does not set by 6:30 on June 22, and in his diary he gives the time as 8:00 without any mention of secrecy. He claims it was a clandestine visit, yet there were Parsis in the fire temple while he went around taking detailed measurements. Going through Anquetil's writings, Modi comes to a characterization of him "as a person of rather rough manners, unsteady habits, quarrelsome disposition, and a little self-conceit, which led him to exaggerate things to such an extent, as would make one doubt the truthfulness of his statements" (1916: 69). Modi gives no quarter, as one must, to the style of aristocratic peevishness so fondly cultivated in certain European quarters, but he certainly demonstrates Anquetil's allegations about the visit to the fire temple to be problematic. He suggests the solution that Anquetil was openly shown the temple while the sacred fire was removed for cleaning the temple before the Adargan (day Adar of the month Adar) celebration, and that a mock-up was put there for Anquetil's benefit so the feeding of the fire could be demonstrated. Similar such demonstrations while a fire temple was undergoing renovation have been

been due to the mutual misunderstanding of goals and pedagogy (in the traditional priestly pedagogy one is taught the alphabet very slowly). But he points out that Anquetil arrived in Surat the year before the English finally supplanted the previously dominant Dutch, and that undoubtedly the Qadmis were trying to use their aid to Anquetil as a means of increasing support from the French versus the Dutch with whom the Shehenshahi oligarchy was closely tied. It also turned out that the only person who really took up the Qadmi idea as early as 1720 had been Maneckji Edulji, the broker for the Armenian merchants of Surat; in 1688 the leading Armenian merchant Khoja Phanos Kalantar had signed an agreement with the British to use East India Company shipping (Seth 1937: 248). More work in East India Company records will have to be done to make these connections stick, but the politics of the situation now appears as follows.

The leader of the Shehenshahi, Muncherjee Sett, was also the chief broker for the Dutch. He had previously worked for Rustam Maneck's family and was well connected to both the Modi of Surat and the desai of Navsari. When the Navab or mitsaddi of Surat, Teg Beg Khan, died, Mucherjee was taken prisoner by the Maratha together with Sabdar Khan, whom the Dutch wished to succeed Teg Beg. The Dutch responded by closing the mouth of the Tapti River and thereby the trade of Surat, forcing the Maratha candidate Miachand to come to terms. The English countered by trying to bolster Miachand, but he did not reciprocate and instead imprisoned the British agent Farokhdin. The British in turn blockaded the Tapti forcing a replacement of Miachand by Sabdar Khan, but by now the Dutch had switched their support to Sabdar Khan's nephew. The British in compromise allowed the return of Miachand but when he proved uncooperative the British with Maratha collusion seized Surat castle and installed Sabdar Khan and Farokhdin as civil and military governors in the manner Akbar had previously divided the responsibilities. Now, the first half of the eighteenth century was one

performed for others: Moulton, Haug, Darmesteter, Jackson, Spooner, Menant. It is customary before Adargan to white-wash and make repairs to the fire temples; the fire is removed for this. In 1760 Adargan fell on 23 June, and Anquetil probably visited the temple a day or two earlier. The 23 June date, however, is the Shehenshahi date, and Darab was Qadmi. Modi forestalls this objection by arguing that the fire temple had been established before Darab became Qadmi, so the fire's anniversaries would occur on the Shehenshahi date.

of economic crisis in Surat partly due to Maratha control of rural areas, the revenue of which had supported the government and the aristocracy, and partly due to the shift of trade to Bombay. In the early thirties the previous Navab had been forced out of office for trying to squeeze extra revenue from the merchants. Famine struck in 1731. The Parsi laymen had complained already about the excessive rates charged by the priests. And perhaps in an attempt to conserve their wealth when this means of extortion was taken away, the priests decided not to give daughters to the laymen. It was in this context that apparently artisans, with upper class leaders to be sure, appealed to pre-existing issues of disagreement (but issues which had not caused real concern previously and which were eventually to fade away rather than be resolved), in order to establish an independence from the Muncherjee Sett et al. leadership. What the specific problems underlying this were would require more investigation: there is both a suggestion of artisan revolt, and perhaps more likely, the center of Qadmi strength seems to have been in Broach, possibly tied more to the Baroda of the Gaekowads than the Bombay of the British. In any case, as J.J. Modi suggests, the Qadmi ties to the French (and English) seem to have been an attempt to use the general political disorders as a means of leverage.

3.3.2. Panchayat to Court Coordination

With the formation of the new Panchayat at British request in 1778, the historical records of the development of the communal polity become much richer and clearer. The British request, as noted, had come after the daughter of a behdin was betrothed to the son of an aethorman (priest); both had been excommunicated by a general meeting of the Anjoman of Surat: no one was allowed to give the offending families food, water, other benefactions, or dine with them.¹ The boy died shortly and the Anjoman withheld permission to put him in a daxme; the body had to be left on an open hill (Jeejeebhoy 1953: 295). Passions rose, and all sides

¹ A leading member of the Panchayat, Muncherjee Bamanjee Seth, defied the outcasting and dined with the offenders. He was fined and made to undergo barešnum to which he consented after some resistance. His defiance of

appealed to the British Government, which recommended the formation of a Panchayat. A Panchayat of six behdin and six priests was formed including Qadmi as well as Shahenshahi. The Panchayat stood in relation to the Anjoman as an elected steering committee: appointment to it lay in the hands of the General Assembly (or Anjoman) of all Parsis (this right being exercised in 1818, 1823, and 1836). Community ordinances could be framed by either body but had to be passed by the Anjoman before execution by the Panchayat.

The relationship of the Panchayat and the Anjoman was an uneasy one, existing as it did within the larger polity of the colonial government but without direct legal ties to that source of authority. In the 1790s the Anjoman and Panchayat concerned themselves with marriage rules (second marriages were disapproved and could only be done through the consent of the Panchayat and under the direction of dastur Cursetjee Jamsetjee for the Shehenshahi or dastur Mullah Firuz for the Qadmi), betrothal pledges (breach of which were grounds for outcasting), disputes over priestly dues (complaints for the recovery of payment to be channelled through the Panchayat), and community comportment (the Panchayat could suspend priests for violating their bareshnum, the Anjoman forbade the inclusion of meat in wedding menus on the grounds that killing dumb beasts was an improper mode of celebration). By the first decades of the nineteenth century, this first Panchayat had begun to decline: no new appointments were made as the elders died, and their sons carried on the obligations without formal right; attendance declined. In 1818 a new Panchayat of 12 behdin and six priests was elected by the Anjoman, and it carried on in similar manner. There is a marvelous description in the case of J.B. Luskuree of its method of dealing with contempt. This was a case of re-marriage without the consent of the Panchayat. The defendant was outcasted (excommunicated) and when he used insulting language to the Panchayat, the latter filed charges in Petty Sessions Court where the defendant agreed to submit to the Panchayat. The proceedings of the Panchayat on 16 June 1818 read:

of the outcasting order apparently had to do with another dispute: he was charged by the Panchayat with mismanaging Panchayat funds.

It is now resolved that Anderoo (priest) Jamshedjee Byramjee should (in the presence of the Anjoman) scratch his nose with the sole of his dirty shoe; place a "putka" (dirty cloth) round his neck, and thus beseech pardon from the Panchayat (Davar 1949: 7).

He had to repeat this performance before the Panchayat and again before the Anjoman. His readmission to the caste required four more steps: (a) undergoing the "humiliating process of purification;" (b) paying a dhoti (cloth) fine; (c) lodging two thousand rupees for maintenance of his first wife with the Panchayat; (d) having his second wife also pay the dhoti fine and undergo the purification (Manockjee 1860: 9). The following year further codes of conduct were passed, affecting the public morality of women and their religious freedom: (a) women were not allowed out alone between sunset and sunrise in response to anonymous complaints of immorality; nasusalars (corpse bearers) were posted to seize offenders who might have their heads shaved as a mark of infamy; (b) women were not to be allowed to go to Hindu or Muslim places of worship, perform Hindu or Muslim rituals, wear Hindu or Muslim charms, or allow their children to do any of these things. Manockjee, himself a former member of the Panchayat, commented: "Such resolutions as those mentioned above, it is true, could not be held good in an English court of law, but then dread of the late Parsee Panchayat was so great that no Parsee would presume to talk of the law to members of that body" (1860: 12).

The codes for conduct continued. In 1823 codes were issued forbidding the expensive and endless number of rituals at weddings and deaths. Priests were not allowed to go uninvited for the "gifts to the pious" (asodad). Caste dinners and circulation of trays of food and sweets on death memorial days were proscribed or limited to two hundred pounds of meat. Caste dinners were allowed for gahambars but without meat or poultry.¹ Wailing sessions of women after death were limited to the fixed number of days. Professional mourners were proscribed. Child marriages were disapproved as were excessive gift exchanges from day of exchanging horoscopes to consummation of marriage (such exchanges had occurred on all holidays, birthdays, etc.).

¹ This restriction to vegetarianism for gahambars is still observed in Surat. In Broach, however, meat is eaten.

In 1830 decrees were issued against the admission of illegitimate children by non-Zoroastrian mothers to the Parsi caste.

From the 1830s on, however, the fragility of the Panchayat's authority became increasingly evident. Three leading members resigned over the failure of the Panchayat to enforce the bigamy laws with impartiality, the continued absorption of illegitimate and non-Zoroastrian children into the community, continued cases in the community of concubinage (unmarried unions), and the inability of plaintiffs to gain satisfaction from the Panchayat. This last was in some respects the most serious since now people sought redress from the civil courts, and there the danger existed of establishing precedents of allowing illegitimate children inheritance rights. The Panchayat appealed to the Court of Directors of the East India Company to intervene with the Bombay Council to grant it some legal standing. Francis Warden in an explanation of the refusal pointed out that there was an increasing number of Parsis who objected to the interference of the Panchayat in their private lives, and that to grant the request would lead to an interminable number of law suits (see Davar 1949). In 1838 the Panchayat appealed to the Legislative Council of India for a law of inheritance and for legal status; again they were turned down.¹ The ebb to which they were reduced was demonstrated when they called an Anjoman meeting to discuss Parsi objections to autopsy at the British request for an opinion on the subject: only some twenty people showed up. But the next day, 93 Parsis signed a letter saying dissection and autopsy were repugnant pollution of the worst sort.

In the 1860s finally a legal set of procedures were established for Parsi disputes. A suit in 1856 by a Parsi woman for maintenance and restoration of conjugal rights had been ruled out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on its ecclesiastical side. But repeated such demands on the legal system led to the formation of a commission of inquiry and eventually the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Acts of 1865. The power of the Panchayat meanwhile shifted from a legislative and judicial to an exclusively financial base: it was the trustee for an increasing amount of community

¹ Such civil divorce and marriage acts were not drawn up in England itself until the second half of the nineteenth century.

charity funds.

The legal charter of the twentieth century Parsi community was finally crystallized in the Honorable Justice Davar's 121 page Judgment on the Parsi Panchayat Case in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay: Suit No. 689 of 1906, Sir Dinsha Manockji Petit and Others, Plaintiffs, vs Sir Jamshetji Jeejeebhoy and other Defendants, Delivered Friday 27 November 1908. There were two issues: whether the defendants were properly appointed trustees of the Panchayat properties and funds, and whether a convert to Zoroastrianism is entitled to benefit from the religious institutions and funds under the management of the defendants. It was the second issue which brought the case to court. In 1903 R.D. Tata married a French girl in Paris, brought her to Bombay, had dastur Kaikhosrow Jamaspi perform the naujot (initiation of investment with the sedreh-kusti), re-married her in a Parsi ceremony, and then claimed for her all the rights of a Parsi, including use of fire temples, daxmes, and charitable funds. The Panchayat called a meeting of the Anjoman in which it was decided that Mrs. Tata was not entitled to these rights. The whole issue of the constitution and rights to use such community property was brought to court, based on the charge that the Panchayat had no legal right to appoint, as it had been doing, the trustees of the funds and properties.

The court reviewed the history of both issues. With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered new procedures for the appointment of trustees to be worked out. The second issue was ruled in law to have no standing,¹ but its merits were nonetheless fully evaluated, coming to a judgment against the plaintiffs. It was admitted by the defendants that they considered three classes of people Parsis: descendants of emigrants from Persia; Persians who remained Zoroastrian; and an exception for children of Parsi fathers and non-Parsi

¹ Despite the fact that the defense made an issue of the point, the plaintiffs made no move to include among their number either Mrs. Tata or the Rajput woman cited in the case in a similar status. There was therefore no one seeking relief, and so were a decision issued it would bear no binding status, Mrs. Tata always being free to file suit in her own behalf.

mothers. The history of the third class was reviewed carefully: it arose, the court concluded, because Parsi males working in rural Gujurat would take local concubines, usually of the lower caste Dobra. Some of these women were brought to Surat as servants or mistresses, and many of their offspring were smuggled into the community by friendly priests who would perform a naujot ceremony for a consideration. It was argued that these were children of Parsi boon (seed). But the practice was never fully condoned, the children being regarded as tainted, and stigmatized with the name parvara. Cases of alleged conversion were reviewed one by one, but none were found to be demonstrable except the half-caste cases.¹

Justice Davar was a partisan of the conservative orthodoxy,² and while he treats matters of law and evidence with meticulous care, he appends the following opinions. (1) To admit converts would ruin the quality of the community:

Who are the people that are most likely to ask for admission? Generations may elapse before a well-born, well-educated and cultured person like the French lady would ask for admission; but throw the door open and thousands of undesirable aliens—such as Bhangis, Mahars, Kahars, and Dubras—will seek admission; and men of the stamp of the Plaintiff's witness, Sorabji Punthakey, are always ready to perform their Navjot ceremony for a small monetary consideration. The funds of 50 odd lacs of rupees, richly endowed institutions for poor Parsis,

¹ There have been several instances of mass naujot investitures. Changa Asa around 1640 gave out sedreh-kusti to those who had none at Maleksarai. A few years later the same was done at Navsari. The traces of these people can be seen in the genealogies of Navsari where persons are listed as Adivasi (aboriginals). (The Kisseh Sanjan notes Changa Asa's investiture, but the main references are Dastur Mehrji Rana's Bhagarsatni Bansavali and Sorabji Maneckji Desai's Tavarik Navsari. I am indebted to Dr. Jehangir Sukhadia of Bansda and Bombay for these Gujurati references.) Again on June 6, 1882 at the Mezergan Fire Temple another such ceremony was held for the children of Parsi fathers under the auspices of the Parsi Punchayat; also those who had been married by Brahmins were remarried. In 1908 the decision of Justice Davar (and Beeman) intervened, but a later court ruling confirmed that children of Parsi fathers are Parsis. These half-castes claimed their rights, causing a renewed uproar as they had neither fire temple nor naujot. Dastur Bode became involved, together with the social worker Burjorji Bharucha, in investing such people in 1942.

² Not only is P.S. Masani's tract against Dr. Dhalla (1917) dedicated to him, but in the introduction by J.J. Vimadalal who elsewhere (1910) crusaded against allowing converts, the Justice is lauded for prevailing upon the Punchayat not to publish Dhalla's Zoroastrian Theology (now a classic).

comfortable homes for the blind and infirm, Dispensaries, Sanitariums, Convalescent homes, would attract many thousands of the most objectionable people. . . . The ruin of the Community would be accomplished. . . . Sorabji Punthakey . . . had not the grace [even] to stop short at Sweepers and Lalias (Davar. 1908: 82).

(2) The opinions of witnesses such as K.R. Cama, Sheriarji Bharucha, and Behramjee Anklesaria are to be discounted because they are members of the Rahanu Maye Mazdyeshni Sabha, a reformist group, i.e., by definition concerned not to expound but to change the religion (ibid., p. 85). In particular, their opinion that any priest may convert someone without need to consult or receive permission from anyone would allow "black sheep amongst the clergy who will do anything for money" such as Sorabji Punthakey to allow in sweepers, barbers, butchers, or shoemakers without making them first give up their unclean professions (ibid., p. 82).

(3) The Zoroastrian religion inculcates purity and cleanliness such that no occupations of these kinds¹ are taken up by Parsis, non-Parsis are excluded from fire temples, non-Parsis may not go beyond a certain point at daxmes, non-Parsis may not watch funerals, non-Parsis may not sit on the same carpet with the bride and groom during marriage ceremonies, and the orthodox will not drink water touched by, or eat food cooked by, non-Parsis (p. 83). (4) The accuracy of the rivayats, which say it is meritorious to convert others, is doubtful, but even they point out the need to verify the sincerity of a candidate before admitting them (p. 85). In sum:

(a) Zoroastrianism permits and enjoins conversion. (b) But for 1200 years in India conversion has not been practised. (c) The Parsi Anjoman is on public record opposing conversion, and has even resolved henceforth not to admit half-castes. (d) Were conversion permitted, the proper procedure would be to test the sincerity of the candidate, administer naujot, then bareshnum, and naujot again. (e) Legal precedent (Peshotan v. Meherbai 13 Bom. 302; Shirinbai v. Kharshedji 22 Bom. 430) has established that customary practice is to take

¹ In many travellers' accounts it is said that Parsis would not engage in smithing out of respect for fire. Good Parsis still object to smoking for the same reason. The same people in Surat, however, touch live coals to their children's faces as punishment for abusive language. The religious justification against being a barber, butcher, or shoemaker is that dealing with portions of the body which have become separated from the organism (hair, blood, skin) is unclean (nasu). Note the unclean/sacred ambiguity: nirang (bulls' urine) is purifying; the daxme is referred to as both a place of pollution and sanctity.

precedence over ancient but disused religious texts. (f) Becoming a Zoroastrian does not entitle you to benefits of Parsi funds and institutions. (g) The word Parsi has only a racial significance, and has nothing to do with religious profession: one can be a Christian Parsi (ibid., p. 93-94).

Since the 1908 decision and the establishment of Parsi legal evolution (see Rana 1934, Bulsara 1936, Jhabvala n.d. [c. 1955]), the major theme in community concern has been the improvement of the social condition of all Zoroastrians. Until the 1930s and 1940s, when restrictions on capital movement were imposed by both India and Iran, this included an important effort on behalf of the Zoroastrians of Iran. In many respects the development of welfare activities proceeded along similar lines in Iran as for poor Parsis, but in recent years, change in Iran appears to have outpaced that in India. The rise of the millionaire Parsis--the Wadias, the Petits, the Jeejeebhoyes, the Tatas (relative newcomers), et al.--is well known as they were among the leaders of Indian commerce and industry. Less well-known are the struggles of nearly half the community to keep their economic heads above water. We have already noted the main adverse effects of India's welfare socialism upon the rural Parsis--the land reform, state transport system, and prohibition.¹ To help the increasing flow of Parsis to the cities, primarily Bombay, charity funds were established by many of the wealthy families, some but not all under Panchayat direction. They support schools, hospitals, sanitariums, fire temples, daxmes, vocational schools, university scholarships, housing colonies, funds for weddings, initiation and death ceremony costs, milk programs for school children, and so on. But the goal of a fully adequate welfare system internal to the community was never achieved, and real destitution has continued even to the point of "chronic

¹ A few more minor problems: schools exclusively for Parsis may not receive government funds, so where once there were seven such schools in Bombay, now there are two. Land is desperately needed for public housing, and it is regarded a matter only of time before the government declares the beautiful Malabar Hill public domain (now Parsi owned, supporting parks open to the public as well as the daxmes and some of the best address apartment buildings). Even in Surat, the land surrounding the daxmes is being encroached upon by the municipality. (In the wake of the dropping of medical, educational and religious lands from land reform exemption, the Panchayat has leased some of this land to small holders and a larger piece to Gujarati

starvation" of some four hundred Parsi families (two thousand people) in rural Gujurat, as a stunned survey team discovered in 1967 (Mistry 1967: 1). This entire subject is ripe for a comprehensive study, not merely as has been attempted from time to time in order to coordinate programs, initiate new ones, expand coverage, etc., but as a case study over a long time period of the whole issue of welfare planning, efficacy and limitation of methods--an issue of broad concern not only to Parsis.¹

3.4. A Half-Step Behind: Iranian Zoroastrianism

Perhaps the greatest contrast between India and Iran is that Iranian Zoroastrians have benefited from the tremendous expansion in the last two decades of middle class opportunities. When Maneckji Limji Hataria was deputed to Iran in 1854 by the Persian Zoroastrian Amelioration Society, he found a declining population, almost entirely illiterate, religiously impoverished, suffering a tax burden which had been fixed previously when the population had been larger, despised and ill treated by an equally illiterate, oppressed and increasingly intolerant Muslim population.

3.4.1. Parsi Intervention

Maneckji's style of attack can only be described as "Parsi aristocratic," but it is a style probably well attuned to the times. He

merchants for a wholesale art-silk bazaar, planned as a new growth pole for the city and to absorb Gujurati merchants who feel they cannot get a fair deal in Maharastran Bombay). The daxme vultures are another problem: human deaths are down to less than a hundred a year (the largest of the daxmes, the Muncherjee Seth Daxme, built in 1762-71, with a diameter of $107\frac{1}{4}$ feet, can hold 357 bodies: 119 men, 119 women, 119 children), and so the vultures cannot support themselves on Parsis alone. Periodically the city rids itself of stray dogs by poisoning and dumping the dogs; the vultures feed on these and die in turn.

¹ Preliminary studies with statistical coverage are Bulsara (1935), P.A. Wadia (1949), S.F. Desai (1948), Shah (1954), Mistry (1967). The problem of coordination is a legacy of the style of philanthropy by the rich with an idea more to immediate needs or conspicuous largess than comprehensive planning. After the 1841 Surat fire, for instance, which began in a Parsi section of town, Sir Jamshid Jeejeebhoy gave funds for rehabilitating houses, compensation also to non-Parsis, and more for establishing community services. These last were first placed in the management of the Davar Modi family, but disputes kept it a political football until in 1936 the Surat Parsi Panchayat

settled in Teheran where he could cultivate the powerful, not only the royal court but perhaps more importantly the foreign diplomatic community. Almost immediately, he obtained permission to build a daxme south of Teheran, and when this was destroyed, he received permission to rebuild it. His first concerns in Yazd and Kirman were to rebuild their fire temples (Yazd in 1855, Kirman 1857). In 1857 he began to establish schools in Yazd and Kirman.¹ In 1865 he took 12 pupils from Kirman and 20 from Yazd to study in Teheran; from these and their successors he began to recruit teachers sending some of them for further study to Bombay. He rebuilt and built more religious structures: a fire temple in Khoramshah-e Yazd, new daxmes at Yazd (1864), Kirman and Shahrifabad-e Ardekan, water storages and rest houses at the shrines of Pir-e Banu and Pir-e Sabz (see Chapter V). And he began to agitate for the removal of the jezia tax and legal disabilities. Towards the Governor of Yazd he played the threatening schoolmaster:

Sixty years ago 6000 families paid a jezia of 200 tomans, but now 1000 families must pay 878 tomans. The Zoroastrians cannot pay such an amount each year. Please charge only the 200 tomans and you may collect this from the British Consul each year. This will encourage the Zoroastrians to dilligently pursue their agriculture rather than emigrate from Iran. Please make sure that the amount of 200 tomans should not change from year to year. Governors may change from year to year, but this amount should not. And also please ensure the civil freedom of the Zoroastrians and not allow others to be cruel to them. Signed Maneckji Limji on behalf of the Zoroastrians of India, with a copy sent to the Shah, dated 1860 (Hataria 1866: 9).

And again:

I wrote to you before and now I write again that you please do something about the jezia. It has now been a long time and we have not seen any results, so I am troubling you again and requesting that you do something so that the reputation of the Shah of Iran is not spoiled. We do not wish to ask the Consul of Great Britain to demand a reply from you because the Shah of Iran might not like it (ibid., p. 63).

was formed and took over the funds. The feud continues with the current Modi still in charge of nominating delegates to the Parsi Matrimonial Courts and the Godavara local punchayats, while the Surat Punchayat handles most of the community charities: two schools, a maternity clinic, a home for the aged and infirm, a general hospital, doles, etc.

¹ Boyce (1969c) and others have said that previously schooling had been forbidden to Zoroastrians. The status of the assertion is unclear as the same authors speak of the studies of young priests under old priests on a regular schedule. If there was some operative ban on public schooling,

Towards the Shah he was cajoling as one is with an exasperating child:

I sacrifice my soul under the dust of the feet of your kingdom as my native homeland which I love. That is why I came to Iran. The Zoroastrians of India sent you a letter two years ago signed by one hundred important personages; the letter was written on deerskin and was put inside a silver pipe. It was addressed to His Majesty the King and with it came a gift symbolic of the royal dignity. And in the letter they requested you to please do something for our Zoroastrians in Yazd and Kirman that they should not suffer so much. The gift contained a sword and golden kamerband symbolic of your victory, a gold watch and two golden chains signifying hopes that every hour of your life be more prosperous than the last hour, a gun with two boxes of thousands of bullets as a sign of your always capturing the enemy, a gramophone meaning you should always be happy and joyful. The jezia tax must be abolished and you must use your justice in this manner. . . . It is now four years that I am taking trouble over this matter and I have spent more than 2000 tomans and still I have not been able to get any results. I request your majesty to write in your own handwriting an order that the cruelty which has fallen on the Zoroastrians of Yazd and Kirman should be abolished. And if you do so, the whole world will always remember your name (p. 64).

Eventually Maneckji did get such orders from the Shah but they were disregarded by the local authorities in Yazd. While he negotiated with the ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Russia to bring pressure on the Court, he also wrote to the religious authorities appealing to the basic justice of Islam and the contractual rights gained by paying jezia:

To Sheikh-ul-Mashaikh. As you know, the community of Zoroastrians has been deprived of doing masonry, carpentry, tailoring, brick making, cloth weaving, being a porter, messenger, watchman. These are the people who grow vegetables on their land but are not allowed to sell in the market. Is it just that these people who pay you heavy jezia and who are so obedient to the Government and to you should be so treated? Is it according to the Muslim religion and the law of God? Please reply.

To one of Maneckji's letters the Sheikh responded underlining his own status:

My dear friend, Fakhrul Mujtahedin (the crown of the learned) with his elevated authority is writing to you that in Iran if a non-Muslim kills a Muslim and nobody takes action, we the ulema have the right to issue

it is not said if this was a legal (Qajar) ban or a religious (ulema) ban, or merely popular disapproval. The Muslims also only had maktabs (religious schools) and it should not be expected that Zoroastrians or other non-Muslims would have been welcome in these schools.

a fatwa (decision) that this person may be killed by a Muslim. If a Muslim kills a non-Muslim punishment is sufficient if he pays eight tomans.

Maneckji asked if it was just that Muslims come into Zoroastrian houses of worship, shrines, and even daxmes, acting disrespectfully and humiliating Zoroastrians and torturing them, and that the responsible men of town encourage rather than protest such behavior even though jezia is being paid; and that if a Zoroastrian dare ride a donkey or a horse he is beaten and tortured. The Sheikh merely wrote in the margin the curt answer: torturing people without reason is prohibited. To Maneckji's query of the same form about Zoroastrian girls being converted forcibly and married to Muslims, again in the margin the Sheikh notes: no one can convert anybody to Islam by force, but even if it happens, after they are married we may not ask them how they came to be Muslims. And to Maneckji's charge that Zoroastrian children were being stolen and sold as slaves, he appends the note: to buy and sell is prohibited. Suppose, continues Maneckji, a man robs a girl, converts her and marries her, and when her relative dies the Muslim husband demands the inheritance of the relative, is this right by the law of God and Islam? Bismillah-e rahman-e rahim, reads the scribble in the margin, "regarding this, one should refer to the mujtahed of the place where it occurs."¹

It was not only with Muslims that Maneckji had problems. Not all of the Zoroastrians appreciated the way he took their problems in hand. There was objection to all this education and to equality of emphasis on educating villagers as well as urban folk.² In an 1877 response to one of several attacks on Maneckji by Yazdis in Bombay, Bahram Por-e Rustam, one of the students Maneckji had recruited from Nasrabad-e Yazd, indicates that Maneckji was attempting to enforce a similar community morality which the

¹ For the translation of these letters from Gujarati and Persian, I am indebted to Mr. Adi Forudi of Bombay, and to Mr. F.R. Irani-Nureyasdani for the loan of this somewhat rare book of Hataria.

² Rashid Shahmardan (1960: 585) relates that Ostad Keyomarz, a second generation teacher of Maneckji (trained by Ostad Shirmard, a student of Maneckji) tried to exempt the poor from tuition fees and met considerable opposition.

Punchayat was unsuccessfully attempting to enforce in Bombay and Surat. Among the worthy services such as establishing schools, lightening the jezia, forcing people to call Zoroastrians respectfully Parsi or Zardoshti rather than Gabr, Majusi, or Najes, also

Maneckji reinstated many customs which had been abandoned previously such as the sedreh-pushtan and its Avestan prayer, the proper servicing of the Azar Bahram, how to put good smelling things on the fire, how to build daxmes and its Avestan ritual and so on. He also ordered the bringing of dogs to the daxme . . . And he ordered you to stop doing a variety of things that people were doing: smoking, killing living creatures on fixed days in the name of sacrifice [gorbani], eating the meat of cow and camel, dancing and playing music when a person dies, drinking wine during the day and going into the kuches and bazaars, going to the spinning workshops after dark [woman's work], performing Muslim marriage customs, having more than one wife, binding henna on hands and feet and fingers, putting on tight dresses and short trousers with half the foot exposed, failing to do ablutions after shaving the head, carrying a body and so on. (Full letter quoted in Shahmardan 1960: 389-395).

After the Armenians had successfully achieved a waivers of the jezia tax, Maneckji increased pressure on R.F. Thomson, the British ambassador to the Court of Nasradin Shah, to get a waiver for the Parsis as well, and this was finally accomplished in 1882, the glorious year of the horse, as it says in the farman (royal order). A jashan celebration (which involves reading the names of the ancient kings and heroes and prominent personages of the communities honored) was held in the garden of the Shah's son-in-law, Haji Mirza Ali Khan Qajar Zahir-ud-dowleh, with members of the British Embassy, the royalty, Armenian merchants, and the Teheran Parsi community in attendance, a gathering described by the Bombay Gazette of 16 November 1882 as the first of its kind among the Parsis of Persia since the fall of the ancient Persian Empire.

The struggle for civil equality was not over by far. In 1898 Muzaffar-ud-din Shah again ordered that Zoroastrians not be subject to special indignities. Nouie Aidin, the former C.M.S. headmistress in Yazd, remembers a Zoroastrian civil rights march through the Yazd bazaar in the Reza Shah period:

The Zoroastrians were told by Reza Shah that there were no laws restricting them, and that they could do anything they wished, but they had to stand up for their own rights. So they arranged to have

the little boys of the school wear a cap. The Muslim boys used to try to snatch them off and so the boys would walk around with their hands clutching their caps to their heads. Then since they had not been allowed to ride through the bazaar five or six men decided to ride through the bazaar. They informed the police who posted guards. The route was shaped so: A _____ c/d _____ B. Between the short space of c-d there happened to be no policemen and the Muslim shopkeepers dumped them off their donkeys but they got up and rode on.

Fereydun Zardoshti, one of those boys, remembers it this way:

In those days Zoroastrians had to wear cream colored shabby clothes, just as Jews had to wear patches on their clothes. So these two teachers [Sohrab Safrang and Fereydun Keyomarz] decided to institute a school uniform, a yellow uniform, sort of military style, which was nothing great, but was enough to make us proud. This was 56 years ago [1926]. And it was sufficient to arouse a great reaction among the Muslim population.¹ For 19 or 20 days the Zoroastrians took bast in the Gahambar-xane near the old fire temple. And some made a run for the Hindu-European Telegraph Line and called for help to Arbab Kei Khosrow in Teheran, and to Bombay. Jehangir Readymoney (who had been a member of Parliament in England) asked the English Government through their Ambassador in Teheran to do something. This was during the Governorship of Amir Khan Bakhtiari and although the central government was not very strong, with its support he maintained order. Thereafter a boycott was instituted: nothing was sold, medical services were refused [to Zoroastrians]. And so an appeal to Bombay brought the first doctor to help the community: the Sir Ratan Tata Dispensary was set up in the [Zoroastrian] mahalleh and free medical care was given. These services gradually came to be expanded . . . Then schools were established to stop fanaticism on the theory that with education fanaticism would die down. Soon 75% of the students were Muslim, for they were the best schools in town. Similarly in Teheran—the Mansur Cabinet was known as the Firuz Bahram Cabinet since several of the ministers were educated [in this Zoroastrian high school]. Meanwhile people were fleeing to seek their fortunes in Bombay: they set up tea shops, provisions stores, and a few went into business. In fact the number who made it big were few.

Today non-Muslims still may not become ministers or judges (Art. 58 of the Constitution) and when in the last Constitutional Convention, Zoroastrian Majlis Representative Dr. Esfendiar Yeganegi suggested that this be changed, he was hooted down. One may not judge these things in absolute terms: no other minority representative could have dared to even make such a suggestion,

¹ Kei Khosrow Shahrookh had similar problems in Kirman when as a teacher he introduced uniforms and himself wore a Parsi style cap (Shahmardan 1960: 563).

but a Zoroastrian, Yegenegi notes, is immune from the charge of being a foreigner. And under the Pahlavis, the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian heritage has become a pillar of Iranian nationalism. Still when the grand old nationalist Por-e Davud died requesting in his will to have Zoroastrian funeral rites, this apparently proved too much for the Muslim population to tolerate.¹

3.4.2. Yazd and Post Safavid Zoroastrianism

The history of the Iranian Zoroastrian community in post-Safavid (and Safavid) times is a poorly explored one. During that period there was a reversal of religious leadership: in the earlier rivayats the Iranians are surprised by the ignorance of the Parsis, but by the mid-nineteenth century Parsis are disappointed that the Iranians have no more religious texts than they (the Parsis) do, and that the Iranians seem to be ignorant and unobservant of customs which the Parsis had come to regard as orthodox. One of the recently disappointed wrote in 1969:

Let me explode one myth that Yazd is the most important place for Zoroastrians to visit . . . The Atash Behram which was built by the Petit family is not very old² and Zoroastrian culture and civilization did not flourish here for 1300 or 1400 years ago till Reza Shah brought it into its own. Yet it is important. There the people fought a rearguard action in hiding, in terrible conditions (Nargolvala 1969: 18).

And a Yazdi priest bitterly complains about Parsi visitors, "They say we are dirty; it is not we who are dirty, but they." One almost suspects that

¹ Ibrahim Por-e Davud, the son of Jewish converts to Islam, strictly speaking, remained a Muslim all his life. As a young nationalist he filled his political poetry with calls to the Iranian people to throw off their alien Turkic Qajar rulers with the military prowess of yore and return Iran to its Sassanian grandeur. In Europe he met Lady Cama who introduced him to Parsi practices. He thereafter became the foremost Iranian scholar on things Zoroastrian and did yeoman's service for the Zoroastrians of Iran by translating into Persian the Avesta. The story of his death was told to me in Bombay by Parsis of standing: anyone with access to his will can check the fact, but even if not true the story is representative of mutual Muslim-Zoroastrian feelings. His request posed problems for both communities. In a sense he was a Zoroastrian: it is said he kept a fire burning in a special room in his house and there recited the Avesta. But he never was initiated through a naujot and so no Zoroastrian priest normally would administer the

the growth of orthodoxy among the Parsis led them to expectations of ritual behavior which were never approached by their Iranian mentors. It is one thing to express an opinion on ritual interpretation, quite another to practise it. More light on this matter may be thrown by examining the accounts by Mullah Firuz of his trip to Iran with his father in 1768-1780 at the height of the Parsi Qadmi-Shehenshahi controversy not only over the calendar, but over pronunciation (ashem vohu or ashem vahi), whether a corpse should have a face mask (padan) as it is carried to the daxme,¹ whether a corpse's limbs should be straight or crossed,² and so on.

It is intriguing that these emissaries should have spent relatively little time with their coreligionists in Iran: Mullah Firuz studied for eleven months with Yazd's dastur Murzeban while his father went to study astrology in Kirman. (Kirman seems to have been known for astrologers: one of Kei Khosrow Shahrookh's great grandfathers, Gushtasp, was a famed astrologer there at the time of Agha Mohammad Qajar.) But the two spent more time in Isfahan and Shiraz in royal, merchant and Muslim scholarly circles. This was the period of Karim Khan Zand, a period of peace and

administer the death rites (although in fact it is probably true that many Yazdi Zoroastrians never went through a naujot and still were put in the daxme). The major problem however was this: when word came that he was dying, Muslims gathered in his house as was custom, but also to ensure that he be buried according to Muslim rites. The Shah happened to be out of town and the Government did not know how to proceed, but fortunately Por-e Davud lingered on a few days and the Shah returned to make the politically pragmatic decision: bury him according to Islamic rites. A picture of Por-e Davud's coffin being carried into the Sepah Salar Mosque can be found in the memorial issue of Hukht (Aban 1348/1969).

² The fire itself, say Yazdis, is much older: the Petits merely built a new building. Yazdis claim their Atash Bahram to stem from Sassanian times. There is, however, a note in Karaka's History that Nasarvanji Kohiyar sent a fire to Yazd from Gujurat overland in the 1790s.

¹ Anquetil du Perron speaks of watching a funeral procession and this causing protest among the Parsis of Surat. The orthodox throughout the next centuries maintained that non-Parsis might not view a corpse, and to ensure this covered the face as well as the body; the padan also presumably helped limit the pollution of the corpse. But Dr. Sukhardia says all this is tenuous: until ambulances were used, funeral processions carried bodies through the streets in view of all and without padan.

² According to Dastur Dabu's Rahnemah-ye Din this confusion arose from the mistranslation of the words ferestpade bia justair bia vitrem in

and relative prosperity after the disasters of the Safavid decline and Afghan invasions which had seen the destruction of the Zoroastrian quarter in Isfahan and the forcing of Zoroastrians out of the city of Kirman into a quarter exposed to the ravages of the Afghan wars. In Yazd, Khan Bozorg was Governor and was engaged in a period of building (see Chapter V). Mullah Kavus intervened with Karim Khan Zand on behalf of the Kirmanis, but otherwise seems to have been little concerned by Zoroastrian living conditions. The way these conditions are usually described is to use as examples the flight of Kei Khosrow Izedyar from Kirman and Murzban Sohrab from Yazd to Bombay, both it is said because daughters (and thus namus or honor) were coveted by Muslims. Both of these men came to Bombay in the early 1790s, i.e., only a decade after the return of Mullah Firuz. Izedyar's daughter married into the Petit family, a family which was one of the great patrons of aid to the Iranian Zoroastrians over the next century, being among the founders of the Zoroastrian Amelioration Society, builders of a new fire temple in Yazd, and so on. Izedyar was also an ancestor of Iranian Parliament Member Kei Khosrow Shahrookh (murdered 1940). But it is Murzban Sohrab whose position is most intriguing: his patrons in Bombay were the Dadyseths, who were also the patrons of Mullah Firuz. In his own right, Murzban Sohrab was no oppressed or impoverished peasant: he was kalantar (mayor) of the whole Zoroastrian community of Yazd and owned a large house in Kasnavieh. Financed by the Dadyseths he returned to Yazd to found a new village for Zoroastrians where they might begin anew without Muslim proprietors and interference: this is the village of Mobarake on the road between Taft and Yazd. It is bitterly related that the Governor of Yazd, Zein-ul-Abedin (third son of Khan Bozorg) came to demand half of the water found by Murzban Sohrab and with it built a second village called

answer to the query, "Oh God what kind of pits for the dead in the house of the deceased?" (Vendidad V.11). The answer was that the pit should be large enough so that if the arms (justai) are extended and the legs (ferest-pade) are straight they will not touch the sides. "Extended" was wrongly translated as "folded" and was rationalized as making the area of the pollutant (i.e., the corpse) as small as possible, when the question was really about the area of pollution around the corpse rather than the area of the pollutant itself.

after him Zeinabad. Zein-ul-Abedin is remembered as an ill-tempered man who suddenly died in a fit of anger while punishing a man (Ayati 1938: 379). His village, however, became a residence of Zoroastrian jadid-ul-islam; it would be interesting to know more about the whole social history of these developments in the first decades of the nineteenth century.

There are four decades between Murzban Sohrab's exploits and the arrival of Maneckji Hataria. These are decades of expansion of British presence and continued decline of the Iranian economy, so when we hear of the childish and outrageous discriminations visited upon the Zoroastrians in the latter part of the nineteenth century we ought to weight both hypotheses and not simply jump to the first: (a) that these discriminations had been continuous ever since Safavid times; (b) that these discriminations increased as general Iranian conditions worsened. The rivayats speak of the terrible conditions at the time of Shah Sultan Hussein Safavi, but before that we have the stories of Dastur Azar Keyvan and other mystics who wandered from Iran to India. And then we have the Zand quiescence before the British and Russian colonialism began to seriously exacerbate the problems of the decadent economy. By the end of the nineteenth century, the colonial system was so developed that it was as natural for Iranian Zoroastrians (and Muslims to a lesser extent) to be drawn to Bombay for work as it was for Hindu merchants to operate in Iran. Few of the Iranians we noted, made it into big time business,¹ but those few were extremely important.

In 1886 Arbab Jamshid set up a banking concern which became in the following two decades one of the main financial institutions of Persia with offices in Baghdad, Bombay, Calcutta and Paris. A second such operation was that of Arbab Khosrow Shahjehan (Jehanian). As Napier Malcolm pointed out in 1905, Arbab Jamshid was far more influential than Maneckji Hataria

¹ Some made it as darvishes: the best known in America is Meher Baba (Mehreban, son of Shahriyar Mondegar, who had come from Khoramshah-e Yazd). Others include Mehr Jambur (also from Khoramshah-e Yazd), Irani Baba (from Ahrestan-e Yazd), Rustam Darvish (from Khoramshah-e Yazd), Khodabaksh (from Pusht Khan Ali in Yazd proper). Short biographies are given in Shahmardan 1960.

or his successors (1905: 46).¹ He brought provincial Zoroastrians to Teheran, employing the literate ones as clerks, and finding agricultural or other work for the illiterate ones. The Jehanian firm was heavily involved in the Nationalist Movement (F. Mehr 1969), Arbab Jamshid to a lesser extent. But the Anglo-Russian scramble for control of Persian finances (see Chapter II) put both out of business.

The second generation of wealthy Zoroastrians made their money by investing in cheap land and import-export operations,² and later reconverting into industry. Today there are five major Zoroastrian firms in Iran, nearly invisible in proportion to total industrial investment, but leaders in their respective fields. The recent economic boom has encouraged Iranis from India to return to Iran, and the Shah would like to recruit Parsis as well.³ One of his delightful finesses in the game of politics was to figure out a way to operate his new steel mill while easing out the Russian advisors and without bringing in American or European advisors: a contract was signed with Tata of India for advisors and training. Other overtures to the Parsis have also been made, first declaring all Parsis to be special guests of Iran when they come, thus reducing the red tape with respect to residence and work permits, and then allowing Parsis to claim Iranian citizenship after three months residence:

¹ The Russian Embassy stands on what was formerly Arbab Jamshid's Park-e Atabak. The land was taken by the Russians as collateral for Arbab Jamshid's debts to the Banque d'Escompte, and is still a subject of negotiation between Iran and the U.S.S.R. The latter wants to own it; the former is agreeable only if Iran may own its property in Moscow.

² The money exchange portion of such business is primarily remembered by Yazdi villagers, but F. Zardoshti probably correctly points out that this could only provide a part of the capital needed. The mechanism, as explained by Yazdis, is that small amounts of rupees would be given in Bombay for payment in rials in Iran: the siraf or trader would thus amass capital which he would invest in goods to be sold in Iran; the receipt of payment could then be paid out to Yazdis in rials. Such transfers were done by merchants, says Zardoshti, since it was a business too small for commercial banks.

³ Early in the reign of the current Shah, there was talk of giving Parsis a section of land as a territorial base in Iran. There is some question as to the likelihood of Parsis returning to agriculture, and some say the land offered was worthless, being the only portions of the Marv Dasht (near Persepolis) never settled in the archeological record. But Zoroastrians say

Letter to Mr. Nequabat, Governor of Yazd, dated 7/3/47 [23/5/1968], No. 1223 M: According to the letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister in the meeting of the Council of Economy held in the presence of His Imperial Majesty on 16/2/1347 [6/5/1968], the object of demand of some Parsis, residents of India, who are very interested to return to Iran was put before His Imperial Majesty. Shahanshah Aryamehr thus ordered: "Our aim and object is to make Parsis return to Iran; this is their country. Of course, we do not need those who lack experience, but if some capable Parsis, businessmen, capitalists, want to come to Iran, why should we object to their coming back. In the first place, be careful that they are specialists; but we do not call them minorities: they are Iranians who are returning to their country. If it is necessary, make a resolution so that from the beginning when they come to Iran, they may obtain citizenship of Iran immediately. Convey to all administrations that they should not treat Parsis as foreigners. These are Iranians who have been staying for a long time outside the country and they are coming back, so they must be welcomed with open arms. Negligence on the part of officers in charge will be of great responsibility and we will take responsible people to task." It is requested to take steps in executing His Imperial Majesty's order. Signed Abdul Reza Ansari, Minister of Court; copies sent to the Office of Education and to High Schools.¹

The rise of the Zoroastrians of Iran, thus, parallels that of the Parsis, albeit decades later and with the aid of the Parsis. There was the same rise via mercantilism with the same ethic of honesty. Again people remember how bags of money would be left, with such-and-such a merchant without being counted. And still today Zoroastrians are hired in banks, as accountants, and in offices on the theory that they are more honest. Small merchants will even in the course of bargaining resort to saying, "I am a religious man and my Prophet's first law is to be honest, so if I say I bought this screw for two rials, I am not lying."² There was then the same

the real reason was that they wanted to establish a model agro-industrial community with free social services, which the Iranian government feared would by its example stir up revolutionary discontent in the rest of Iran. Others say the issue of dispute was that the Parsi entrepreneurs insisted on complete internal autonomy which the Shah would not grant.

¹ Characteristically, when I inquired from the Consul-General of Iran in Bombay about this letter and subsequent statements of the Shah on the subject, he denied their existence. I found the letter in the files of the Parsi Panchayat: it had been forwarded and translated by Soroush Lohrasp of the Teheran Zoroastrian Anjoman.

² I am not disparaging the honesty of Zoroastrians: they are by-and-large very honest. So are most men with the possible exception of Lurs and

change in the economy from simple import-export to better returns from industrial investment (thanks to Government controls). There was a similar rejection of priestly control although the nature of the process is vague: all we know is of the priestly jealousy involved in the murder of Ostad Master Khodabaksh, after which the priesthood rapidly disintegrated.¹ There seems thereafter to have been little recourse to an "orthodoxy" and liberalization has been rapid due to rejection of the oppressive past,² and in part due to taking Parsis and Europeans, rather than Muslims, as a reference group (differences of caste behavior are not acceptable in Iran as in India and Iran seems much more envious of attaining Western glitter and much less certain of its spiritual superiority to the West). Urbanization has brought about a change in family patterns from joint family village life, although this is less pronounced in Teheran than Bombay since Iran did not have the comprehensive form of joint families that Gujarat had.

Isfahanis (or for my Gujurati friends, Ahm'dabadis). The point is simply that a high emphasis on honesty is a plea for trust. Protestation of honesty is a common technique of the lower classes looking for work; their protestation is often not accepted by others. An Iranian Zoroastrian points out that the reason Zoroastrian protestations are accepted is that being a small and weak group, to cheat against Muslims would bring severe retaliation. Cheating against other Zoroastrians is much safer than cheating against Muslims. Insistence on scrupulous honesty in actual practice is a standard technique of businessmen who are trying to establish a regular clientele. Appeal to honesty is a technique of all salesmen, and it is a standard issue of complaint by peasants against peddlers and bazaaris from whom they buy, since they stand at a disadvantage in terms of knowledge in any bargaining situation.

¹ Ostad Master Khodabaksh, born in Nasrabad-e Yazd in 1860, emigrated with his parents to Bombay during the terrible famine of 1870-71 where he was educated in both Zoroastrian and secular subjects. The Yazdi merchant, Kei Khosrow, recruited him to teach at his school in Yazd, still called Dabirestan Kei Khosrowvi (though now in newer facilities). He quickly became the leader of the liberal faction, speaking out in favor of the fasli calendar, against ritual sacrifices, and sympathetic to Bahaim. A society was formed to oppose his faction, the Majma-e Haqshenas va Haqguye Yazd, and in 1918 he was assassinated by a Zoroastrian gendarme named Fereydun Rustam Kermani, apparently at the direction of Kei Khosrow Shahrookh and with the collusion of several Yazdi priests. His co-worker Ostad Keyomarz (born in 1859 in Khoramshah-e Yazd), mentioned earlier in connection with the dispute over allowing village students to study without paying tuition was sent a postcard eighteen days after Khodabaksh's murder by the Majma ordering him to leave or suffer the same fate (the postcard is reproduced in Shah-

Current economic expansion in Iran has meant a more complete process of the younger Zoroastrians moving into white collar jobs and less of a poverty program than experienced by Parsis.

3.5. Summary of the Argument

A commonplace of anthropology is to analyze myths as "social charters," as justifications for social customs and as symbolic codifications of socially approved modes of behavior. Where one has historical data of change in economy and social organization, then, if the "myth as charter" thesis holds, one must be able to show both that and how the community's myths are adjusted. Although they live in Iran—where information collection is problematic in the superlative degree—and in India, Zoroastrians provide a case of change in almost the entire range of social institutions from religion (which was the focus of this chapter) to family patterns, economic position, and political behavior. One of the things we have tried to suggest by noting various responses of the religious institution to historical developments—the East India Companies and the rise of the merchants; the work of Anquetil du Perron and the European scholars; the elaboration of Gathic, Vendidadic and Ilm-e Khshnum interpretations; the composition of the texts over time; metaphorical and mythical justification; and so on—is that a realistic account of Zoroastrianism, as of any religion, must involve a great deal more than a formalistic account of doctrine and ritual.

mardan 1960: 603); he returned to Bombay. How exactly Kei Khosrow Shahrookh was involved is unclear. Some say he wanted to ensure winning an electoral battle against Khodabaksh for the Majlis seat. A small shrine is maintained by a nephew of the merchant Kei Khosrow (who had brought Khodabaksh to Yazd). As for Kei Khosrow Shahrookh, an elder of the community puts it this way: no man's life is all good or all bad, and on the balance, Kei Khosrow did much good; and for the bad, he was himself to suffer an ignominious assassination in a dirty alley at the order of Reza Shah, who was incensed at the propaganda directed against him during the war by Shahrookh's son from Germany (thought to be a German agent, but as it turned out, a double agent for the British).

² To the point that when, towards the end of my stay in Yazd, I was able to purchase some of the fine needlework done by Zoroastrian women in earlier days, and I delightedly showed it to some Zoroastrian friends, they turned away in disgust saying, "Oh, that old stuff! We want to forget it. We have better things today."

First of all, we have tried to specify how ideological terms are used for group boundary and identity definitions:

- (a) The nineteenth century rigidification of Parsi caste rules, including attempts to enforce vegetarianism, monogamy, and caste exclusiveness.
- (b) Disputes over the calendar, priest and lay endogamy, etc., were idioms of, not themselves issues of dispute.
- (c) Other theological issues such as monotheism (and in Iran daxmes and nirang) came to be important in the context of European Christian colonialism.

Second, we have observed how the dynamics of internal differentiation (b) and external differentiation (c)¹ required a new approach to communal organization:

- (d) The attempt to institutionalize a means (the legislative and judicial Panchayat) of providing a uniform communal idiom or code failed.
- (e) A more flexible means (civil judiciary plus a voluntary "service" Panchayat) of coordinating a variety of interpretations and different idioms or codes was adopted.

More generally then, we have confirmed that orthodoxy and reform are polar dynamic tendencies (i.e., orthodoxy need not imply historical priority), and without denying that communities can be constructed by conscious design (Amish, Israeli Kibbutzim), that religious change usually has been generated by social organizational change:

No longer should it be permitted for historians to write as if philosophies move autonomously in a social vacuum, one idea hitting another, splitting it, growing, decaying and being taken over. . . . Instead of marveling at the way in which Hebrew philosophers rejected the dualism of Zoroaster and the demonology of Canaan, recommending them for maintaining their monotheistic ideas intact, we should rather marvel at the way their legislators organized their social relations. Because this is the level of creativity which lays the groundwork for distinctive world views. The choices people make about how they deal with one another are the real material which concerns the student of comparative religion. (Mary Douglas 1970: 119-22, criticizing both Duchesne-Guillemin and Jung).

¹ By saying "we too are monotheists" the Parsis were saying "our tradition is intellectually equally valid and so there is no reason to convert to Christianity." The abandonment of daxmes, pushed by M.P. Kei Khosrow Shahrookh at Reza Shah's request, was similarly to avoid the appearance of backwardness, as was the more popular abandonment of nirang.

PART II

DAR UL IBADAH (HOUSE OF DEVOTION)

CHAPTER IV
THE YAZD MEIDAN¹

God gave three things: the land of Kirman which you can cultivate for a century without fertilizer, the water of Isfahan, and the farmers of Yazd. Only he did not put them all together, and so Yazdis are to be found working everywhere else such as Jiroft [the fertile oasis in Kirman Province]. --Katkhoda, Nasrabad-e Yazd

4.1. Introduction

Yazd is a town which has more than doubled in size over the past century. It is, in other words, a town for which the development of the national economy has meant a maintenance if not increase in functional rank.² Part I, and Chapter II in particular, has suggested a correlation between this rise and decline in economic position and the fortunes of inter-ethnic relations. Chapters V-VIII will be concerned with an ethnographic account of the several religions in Yazd. They will be synchronic descriptions. The function of this chapter therefore is a transitional one: to provide the economic description which can both link into the diachronic schemes already developed and locate the socio-economic context of what is to follow. Ideally, the reader will thus be able to place a description of village Zoroastrianism in a state of dissolution, for example, within its broader context, and not mistake it for a description of Zoroastrianism in general.

¹ Meidan (city "square") is used figuratively for a field of endeavor, e.g., an older man retiring from active life may say to his junior: meidan mal-e šomast (the field belongs to you).

² By functional rank, I am referring to the geographical tradition of Location or Central Place Theory. See, for instance, Brian Berry's study of change in Iowa where some towns have been degraded in number of services they provide, and other towns have increased thanks to the development of the transportation system allowing service areas for central places to be enlarged.

The economic changes are what is most dramatic, but for our purposes perhaps what is more essential are the related sociological changes, particularly the loss of importance of religious authority, and of guild structure.¹ What is to be described in Chapter VI may, in part, be the remnant symbolic dressing of this ancien municipal structure. Secularization, centralization, and bureaucratization are descriptive terms that come to mind easily to describe changes of the Pahlavi era, but such description is a tricky task. It is true that most important municipal decisions are made in Teheran, yet much of the implementation of road building, public service construction, and possibly also tax collection, is handled by way of an intricate network of increasingly subtle bribery and parti² negotiations. ("Bribery" as used here is not a pejorative, but a concrete label of what ideally ought to be described as a form of administration, much as for the money market, economists and planners must be able to deal with a black or free market as a structural form consequent upon certain conditions. In Yazd, much of the municipality is reputedly run by bribes extorted from house owners to adjust the line of new roads and alleys from destroying their property; real estate speculation is another such field of informal bargaining and mutual favors.) In this sense, then, there is a kind of municipal autonomy beyond the formal decentralization of offices (e.g., the local city planning offices, the city council, etc.), although it is tied to the central government and available only to the monied and powerful. The ancien guild, and perhaps also the local religious structure of qadis, mujtaheddin, and sheikhs ul-islam had not much more autonomy. The sheikh ul-islam was a royal appointee; the mujtaheddin and qadis relied for their formal legitimacy on the ejazes (writs of permission to practice) of their teachers and

¹ The reference to "sociological changes" here is Weberian: the arguments of Economy and Society, specifically to questions of the relations between authority and economy rather than to the auxiliary typological distinctions between oriental and occidental (or pre-industrial/industrial, etc.). See, for instance, Ira Lapidus' study of Mamluk cities (1967) and note how much richer the data is than the constricting typology would allow.

² Parti (from English, "party," i.e., influence) or parti-bazi is the Persian counterpart of Arabic wasta: see Nader (1965), Ayoub (1965), Khuri (1972).

subsequent support of the Islamic "hierarchy" (cf. the network of these people described in Appendix 1). The guilds appear to have been the major administrative links between the urban labor force and the central government: taxes were levied upon a guild of craftsmen and then internally apportioned by the (elected or externally appointed) rais (chief) and his aides.¹ Guilds to some extent still operate in this way and are being reintroduced under Pahlavi aegis.² It may be of some conceptual aid, perhaps, to apply here Weber's notion of strengthening and weakening forms of patrimonialism: the Pahlavi era has seen a revitalization of the patrimonial organization (increased centralization away from the centripetal tendency towards feudal land grants, tax-farming, dependency on mercenaries, slaves and minority personnel) largely through bureaucratization (the introduction of a salaried civil service but one which relies on overlapping responsibilities, deliberate appointment of personally antagonistic officials, rotation of high supervisory officials, etc. [Zonis 1971; page 30 above]). There is a striking pattern, for instance, of heading all Yazd agencies with non-local people.³ One of the most important features of this centralization has been secularization, that is, a transfer of "loyalty" from the Islamic institution

¹ For reviews of recent research on guilds in Egypt and Turkey, see Gabriel Baer (1969, 1970a, 1970b). The comments here, however, derive from the oral history of Yazdi bazaaris.

² The word senf (guild, pl. asnaf) is generally used merely to mean all persons who do the same work, e.g., carpenters, grocers, etc. The degree to which there is a formal organization with a rais and regular meetings is variable. The bakers have both formal rais and meetings to petition the administration about flour prices, licensing, etc. The cloth sellers have a rais whose job is to aid the tax assessors and make collections for holiday decorations in the bazaar and so on; there are no senf meetings and the power of the rais is reputedly less than it was in the last century. The grocers also have a weak rais who acts as a liaison with the administration to regulate prices. A new senf and rais for butchers was created when the Yazd slaughter house was put into operation. And so on. The 1957 law establishing the High Councils of Asnaf and their role in controlling the bazaars has already been discussed in Chapter II (p. 46).

³ With occasional exceptions. Until 1971 the Director-General of the local Ministry of Health and of the Ministry of Culture were Yazdis, but they were then replaced by non-Yazdis. When electricity generation, started by a Zoroastrian entrepreneur, was nationalized, its direction passed into the hands of a series of non-Yazdis.

to the monarchy by way of transferring such legitimizing powers¹ as courts, registeries, hospitals, schools, etc. Another important feature has been the increase in centrally organized security through police and gendarmes: the review of violence in Appendix I, although it focused on religiously phrased violence, reveals an urban pattern not unusual for Middle Eastern forms of patrimonial authority, a pattern aptly characterized by Lapidus as the primary means of protest for the common people trapped "between violence and impotence." In the last century Yazd too had its forms of zu'ar or urban gangs (Lapidus 1967: 153-63, 173-4), strongmen called gardan koloft who controlled the streets with their riflemen (tufangči).²

4.2. An Overview

Today a small desert city of about 100,000, Yazd was once one of the more prosperous of Iranian cities. In early Qajar times, says Hambly (1969), Yazd was even possibly the largest of second rank cities in Iran (there being then only two cities of more than 100,000: Herat and Isfahan). Yazd suffered least from the chaos following the dissolution of Safavid Iran and maintained its manufacturing base of silk, carpets, namad (felt mats), cotton cloth, cotton-wool cloth (Yazd cotton, Kirman wool) and even imitation English damask and velvet. It also had in its hinterland some mines of lead, copper, iron, silver and gold. It was reckoned to have 24,000 houses (or about 60,000 people) of which a sixth were Zoroastrian. Earlier Marco Polo (thirteenth century) had called it "a good and noble city, and has a great amount of trade" (Yule 1903: 88) and Friar Odoric (fourteenth century) called

¹ The word "powers" does double work: not only as "means," but literally "power" in the Weberian sense of the probability that an order given will be obeyed.

² Also a popular literary subject: the bullying idlers (daš) or boys of the streets (kuče mardha). What confuses Lapidus working with fragmentary documents is that such male behavior can range from very informal kuče mardha to organized urban gangs of bandits operating from caravanserais or mountain retreats between towns. (This assesment of zu'ar stems from comments of Janet Abu Lughod in Prof. Milton Singer's Seminar on urbanization, December 1972.) See also the group of young unmarried men called zu'ran el-hamula in the Arab villages of Israel studied by Cohen (1965: 128).

it the "third best city of the Persian Emperor" (ibid.). Agriculture, however, was always another story: Lambton (1953: 813) cites the tale of a fourteenth century landowner who went to Firuzabad-e Yazd to see what he could collect from the yield of his land. For three days he tried in vain to find a katkhoda (headman). All he found were seventeen tax collectors who were beating a daštband (watchman) and two peasants in hopes of forcing them to produce food and disclose the whereabouts of the other villagers.

In the nineteenth century Yazd seems to have declined, although Major R.E. Smith was favorably impressed in 1865 with the trade volume and mercantile enterprise, noting that Yazdis were operating as far afield as Mauritius (sugar), Java (tea), and China (opium) (Yule 1903: 88). Several of the leading families of Yazd today stem from nineteenth century merchants who came to Yazd to make their fortunes.¹ In 1893 J.R. Preece estimated a maximum town population of 35,000 containing some 250 merchants with a trading capital of two million tomans. There were thirty-three caravanserais, fifteen for merchants and eighteen for travellers (Great Britain, Public Records Office, Trade Reports, FO 60/563 [1893: 15]). A century earlier, the Vaqfnameh of Madresseh Shahzadeh (dated 1221 A.H./1802 A.D.) lists seventy merchants occupying ten caravanserai. Preece reports that despite declining exports of opium, assafoetida, madder roots and saffron—all declining because of adulteration—Yazd was, thanks to the closing of the Afghan route, the supply center of tea, Manchester piece goods, etc., for Bokhara and Central Asia. Yazdi processed henna (from Bam) and sugar² (from Russia, then displaced by Mauritius) were distributed all over the country. In the latter part of the century trade became intermittently hampered by the disturbances leading to the Constitutional Period, but was supported by the competing Russian and English colonial systems.³ The reasons for the

¹ E.g., the family of the current Member of Parliament for Yazd, the Rashtis: a merchant from Rasht, made good in Yazd, founded the villages of Qassemabad and Rahmatabad.

² Preece reports there were fifteen sugar refineries in Yazd and that Yazd refined sugar was preferred by the religious since they could be sure nothing unclean had come into the processing. Yazd still maintains a reputation for sweets.

³ In the British trade reports around 1907-10 there are comments that

disturbances—crop failures, market manipulations, expanding government demands, mismanagement of government revenues, external interference and constraints—have been outlined in Chapter II. The mercantile economy, however, was probably only irrevocably dislocated by Reza Shah's state economy in the 1930s when capital was forced from mercantile into industrial directions. But whatever the state of the mercantile economy, the local economy was incapable of self-sufficiency in basic necessities such as food. Famines were almost cyclical every eleven years or so, and when they occurred the roads became unsafe, and with the transportation so slow anyway it was almost impossible to get relief even should there be a surplus in another part of the country. Canibalism was not unknown in such times of extremity: during the 1871 famine a man was executed for that offense in Qum and the Governor of Yazd had to place guards at the graveyards to prevent the disinterment of the newly dead (Elgood 1957: 517). Cholera came in epidemic waves. The expansion of poppy cultivation may also have had a negative effect on the food crop production.

Whether or not as tradition (copied from one history of Yazd to the next) would have it, Yazd began as a prison for Alexander's captives because Aristotle thought it good for little else, and grew because of a vow of an Iranian king that, granted victory, he would build a city here at the site of the old fort—a vow to God (Yazdan) from which he took the name Yazdegird—the thus codified truth is that Yazd has always depended on external exigencies rather than growing from the surplus of its own soil. Yazd's agricultural exports are fruits and nuts (pomegranates, grapes, melons, peaches, apricots, walnuts, almonds, etc.¹) but it is a contribution of the modern distribution system that Yazdis have fresh fruit to eat in winter. Although the desert fringe provided a refuge center for Zoroastrians in

the Bushire and Shiraz markets had subsisted for years on British credit. The political and economic agitations were causing such insecurity of the roads that many firms were bankrupted, insurance and transport costs rose to prohibitive levels. But the British feared to lose the interior markets to Russian goods from the north.

¹ Pistachios are primarily grown in nearby Rafsinjan and smaller amounts in Ardekan. Date palms do not find a congenial climate in Yazd, but are found in Bafq and Rafsinjan. The variable in the case of pistachios seems to be brackish water and saline soil; that in the case of dates, temperature.

medieval and Safavid times, it could never have been a single homesteading area such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia presented to the "tired and poor" of Europe. Indeed, even though they did not have as integral an urban function as did the Jewish minority of Yazd, which did most of the silk spinning as well as being cloth merchants and rural peddlers, yet it seems that the Zoroastrian rural role was like other villagers tied into the rural economy fattening and selling sheep in winter for Bakhtiari, Luri, and Qashqai tribesmen,¹ knitting woolen goods (distributed by Jewish or Muslim peddlers), weaving shal (men's work) and karbaz (women's work) cloth, serving as camel drivers and inter-urban merchants, and taking part in the British India trade as that developed. By the turn of the century, a number of Zoroastrians were firmly among the mercantile elite: the firms of Arbab Jamshid (Jamshidian), Shah Jehan (Jehanian), and a Zoroastrian-Bahai firm (Iranian) were the largest, but there were a number of large individual traders as well. The folk legend² of one of Yazd's major mosques, the Masjid-e Rig (Sand Mosque),³ is in many ways epigrammatic of Yazd both ecologically and religiously:

¹ There is still a Gahambar (Zoroastrian seasonal celebration, see Chapter V) endowed in the name Gahambar-e Luri held in the town of Taft. The story is that a Lur left some sheep with some Zoroastrians but failed to return in spring for his money, nor did he come the following spring. Eventually the Zoroastrians decided to use the money to endow a Gahambar in his name. As they were reading the Gahambar, which they held in the spring, a Lur came and sat through the proceedings. At the mention of his name, he jumped up and asked what was going on. He then decided that he preferred having his memory perpetuated by the Gahambar rather than taking his money, and he left. The Reinhold Löfflers report that occasionally Lurs from the Behbahan area still take sheep to Yazd to sell. The other tribal name usually remembered by locals is Bakhtiari, although this may rather have to do with the Bakhtiari khans who served in Yazd as Governors. The reference to Qashqai is Ann Lambton's "Qashqai and other tribesmen" (1953: 355). References to Qashqai brigands in the area occur both in oral and written histories. In the hills to the south of Yazd are also two other tribal groups, the Afshari, settled by Aqa Mohammad around Kirman as an auxiliary military force, and known today in Yazd for their cheap carpets; and the Ismaili Ataullahi of the Shahrabak area. The Shahrabak area is the main sheep raising area for Yazd; otherwise meat is trucked from Teheran for slaughter in Yazd, a portion of it being Australian sheep. In October 1971, e.g., the Government contracted to import 23,000 sheep per month from Australia (Kayhan International, 23 October 1971, p. 2).

² Compare the story of Abraham and its pairing with the Ismail theme and the Qur'anic verse 65:2 in Rumi (1910: 36).

It is told that in one of the famines that was wont to strike, the people marched on the Governor. He for his part, having exhausted whatever public stores of wheat there were, sent a camel train to Isfahan and pleaded with the people to wait for its return. When at long last the camel caravan returned, he sent a scout to meet it well before it reached town. It had been to Isfahan and Isfahan had no wheat either and so it had returned empty. The Governor ordered the camel bags filled with sand and brought into a caravanserai. The people gathered and the Governor temporized saying that division would occur in the morning as it was already dark. The people waited. The Governor, now that the affair was entirely in the hand of God, spent the night in prayer. In the morning the sand had turned to wheat, and in thanksgiving the Governor ordered the Masjid-e Rig built.

4.3. Agriculture

Given the indubitably ancient existence of Yazd,¹ it is often asked why there is no man-made tepe (mound) development as in Fars, Khorassan, or Seistan. The exception to this is the hills (with sherds, but modern ones) which people say were made by excavating gardens, and which are used to replace exhausted soil in the gardens. One answer suggested by an archeologist serving as head of the local Ministry of Culture is—should the observation still hold after an archeological survey of the area has been properly made—

³ According to the histories, this mosque was built in the eighth century A.H. by Amir Moin-ud-din Ashraf of the Oreizi Sayyids. Its dome was partially destroyed in the flood of 760 and was repaired the same year (Ayati 1939: 139).

¹ Many of the villages surrounding Yazd have traditions back to pre-Islamic times. Villagers of Faraj, Meherpadin-e Mehriz, Bida Khavid, etc., claim their mosques to have been Zoroastrian fire temples, converted to mosques during the conquest period. The histories say that Khavidak, Faraj, and Farafar were built by Qobad, son of Firuz, king of Iran (Mostafi 1960 [III]: 720), Abrandabad by Governor of Yazd, Abrand, at the order of Irandoxt, daughter of Khosrow Parviz (*ibid.*, p. 713), Bondarabad by a pre-Islamic governor named Bondar (*ibid.*, p. 718), Firuzabad-e Meybod and Firuzabad-e Majumerd by King Firuz, etc. What one is to make of all these stories is not always clear, for even the histories cannot improve on the folk legends that the castle of Meybod was built by demons (*div*) at the order of Suleiman (Kateb 1966: 40) although it was rebuilt by Mohammad Mozaffar in the eighth century A.H.; or that Zarch was built by Zal-e Zal, father of the legendary Rustam, and so on. What in fact we have to go on are datable buildings, few of which predate the seventh century. Of the legends, the most intriguing, found all over the Iranian plateau, are claims to have been situated next to the sea (shades of the Tethys or Pleistocene lakes!). Both the Tarix-e Yazd and the Jame ul-Xeirrat record that Bideh, Meybod and Aghda were near the sea;

that two processes may be at work: firstly, some places may have been simply buried in the shifting sands, such as is the case of the so-called shahr-e kohne (old, or literally "worn-out" city) buried between Ashgozar and Jafarabad, where school children go to find old coins. But secondly, even should some sort of mound begin to develop, it would be subject to the degradation of the very fine blowing sand which will take off the paint of a car left out in the desert. A current attempt to develop gardens to the north of Yazd shows quite dramatic year after year covering of cultivation by the blowing sand and destruction of mud walls. The government hopes to combat the desert with strategic forestation programs.¹ But for the time being, the desert, the blowing sand, the insecurity of water, the parching sun—these are the elements that make the history of Yazd's smaller villages a game of musical chairs between broken ganats (underground water channels, the maintenance of which is expensive) and the shifting sands (reclamation of land by reconstruction of a qanat after a seven year lapse at Aliabad involved first scraping off layers of sand before sowing wheat²); and are one raison d'etre of the ubiquitous high walls and deep dug gardens (the other function of the walls being protection against thievery, and that of deep dug gardens to bring them closer to qanat level or to help the gravity flow of water). Modern technology has added deep wells to the water game,³ but with the water table dropping an estimated twelve feet per decade that too is problematic: wells are being deepened from ninety to a hundred thirty meters.

If in the nineteenth century, the rural Yazd economy declined so badly as to cause widespread out-migration, things have only marginally improved

and they can even say that Bargin was the outport of Meybod (Afshar 1966: 70).

¹ Experiments along the northern edge of the desert near Sabzevar and Nishapur with the Haloxylon tree have proved encouraging. Seeds were first imported from the U.S.S.R. in 1965. It can put down two meters of roots in eight months and can be used for fodder and fuel. It grows four or five meters high but is not suitable for carpentry (Kayhan International, 21 September 1970).

² The qanat was moved away from some deep wells in Yazd and this apparently restored the flow of water. The charge that deep wells have siphoned off water from the older qanat system is a frequent one.

³ A leader in this development was Dr. Esfendiar Yegenegi, now Zoroastrian Majlis Representative.

in the agricultural sector during the twentieth century. Prof. Mansur Atai's study (1965) of changes between 1926 and 1964 reveals a decline in real income from agriculture per unit area and per unit labor. This he attributes largely to the decrease in value of wheat and barley (the major crops) relative to the price index. That is, although wheat and barley acreage has increased, the fall in value of wheat and barley has offset increased volume as well as increased income from other local crops such as cotton, sugar beet and rice (as opposed, e.g., to Gilan where agricultural income in the same period has doubled, based on tea, tobacco and rice). In particular, productivity per hectare has not increased—wheat returns are about 1:10 in the poorer areas and 1:25 in the better areas—and the average price of produce for one ox (i.e., 1.8 hectares) has dropped by one fourth in real terms over this 35 year period. Population growth, as elsewhere in Iran, has outpaced expansion of agricultural production, increasing respectively 1.75 and 1.23 times over the thirty-five year period.

Most Yazd villages use a system of cultivation based only on human labor. Tractors are now being introduced on a rental basis with one tractor serving a large area. This is a technological break-through in spreading the cost of capital investment, since it did not pay a farmer to keep an ox, but even a tractor at ten tomans an hour is viewed by farmers as of limited use. When Prof. Atai asked Yazdis whether they could increase their acreage if they had an ox, they replied negatively because there was insufficient water. Their small plots of four to five thousand meters they prefer to work by hand, for one can do a better job of preparing the soil this way, and there may be some payoff for this with crops such as melons. So still in 1971 one can see plowing done by two men: one harnessed to pull, the other guiding from behind; and two to five man spade teams. Milch cows also may be used for plowing. The worst problem is the continued drought. Yazdis speak of perpetual snow in by-gone days on the near-by mountains (Shir Kuh), of winter snow on the Yazd plain, and most importantly for the welfare of the wheat, of winter rains. Such precipitation has been withheld for 14-17 years now. Atai has the precipitation figures for 1940-42 and then for the 1950s: there is a drop between these sets of figures as well. (1972 was apparently an unusually wet year.) Atai sees the effects of this in the abandoning of ox

cultivation in favor of simple manpower in Mahabad-e Ardestan, and in the mixed cropping of turnips, alfalfa and beats in Zarch, or of turnips and wild rocket in Khavidak (Khedtk), etc.

Mixed cropping is part of a carefully intricate economy of field usage. Alfalfa and turnips are commonly sown together, the turnips being ready for harvest in three months when the alfalfa begins to sprout, or one can leave the turnips in the ground until March just before it flours, and transplant it so one can harvest the seeds (used for oil). Alfalfa being a perennial harvested for about three years would not be sown with turnips if one wanted the turnip land for something else such as squash. A similar mixed cropping in spring is beet together with onions and cabbage. A common rotation cycle is watermelon one year, wheat the next, and fallow the third, since wheat depletes the soil but watermelon does not. Decisions about what to plant are guided by the market and climate: turnips sell for double their wet year price in dry years; scarcity of vegetables and fodder causing prices to rise encourages one to plant more of these. The closer to town one observes fields, the greater seems to be the percentage given over to alfalfa, not only to restore nitrogen to the soil, but more importantly for sale as fodder to the owners of one or two sheep in the many households of the city. Other modes of maintaining the fertility balance also have this dual utility: dunging is done by bringing soil into the household stalls and then carrying it back to the fields so that endless donkey loads of soil circulate between field and household. Whether or not the hills described above used to replace exhausted soils with fresher soil contain carbonate of lime (as in true marl), the farmers demonstrate the qualitative difference between the two by spitting on both and noting the different resulting smell; at least it is a vertical form of fallowing. Fish and bones are also occasionally turned into the soils; chemical fertilizers are much more rarely used; all of these fertilizers are items of purchase adding to production costs.

What is being described, in other words, is an agricultural poverty which cannot be eliminated with land reform rhetoric alone. Ann Lambton (1965b) puts it this way: the traditional land system in Iran was a bureaucratic

rather than a feudal one¹ based on the need of the state for money, not for protection. In the nineteenth century near-subsistence agriculture became unable to supply the funds for the expanding administrative needs, which led to perennial financial crises. The attempts to squeeze more revenue from agriculture, suggests Gharatchehdagh (1967: 23) may have had a direct connection to the four major famines between 1860 and 1880, and that in turn to emigration. Today the government does not depend on agriculture as its major source of income. And the corollary is that the landowners have also turned to other ventures. The problem for agriculture remains, however, to transform it into intensive productivity, and merely this is a problem in Yazd. Latifundia was never a serious problem in the Yazd area: the hills to the south still have a two class society of landowners and tenants, but while families own villages, individuals do not own vast areas as was the case in other parts of Iran;² on the Yazd plain land was more often small holdings. A ganat might be built by one or a few persons, but gradually shares were sold off, as, for instance, in the last two centuries Khalilabad-e Taft.³

The real problem begins with poor soils (see Atai's map). To the south and east are calcerous lithosols, sierozem and regosols which are arable only where there is good water and good drainage, for they contain large amounts

¹ The difference being that the land grants are crystallized in a feudal system with land holders forming a political estate which can make demands on the monarchy, while in a bureaucratic patrimonial system, the monarch retains the ability to circulate and replace the land holders or tax administrators.

² The owners (arbabs) gained land by virtue of constructing water systems. The arbab families themselves do little farming but take a portion of the produce. From the peasant point of view, it matters little that the land has become fragmented among increasing numbers of arbab descendants since there is little intermarriage between the two strata. Indeed for one such petty arbab family involved in the ownership of at least three villages (the number of villages probably depends on how far you trace out the network) the rate of cousin marriage is well over the 50% mark.

³ The selling of new shares was also a means of raising capital to pay for the maintenance of the water system. Normally such maintenance costs were levied upon each shareholder commensurate with the number of shares he owned.

TABLE 2
CROPS GROWN IN A SUBURB VILLAGE OF YAZD: NASRABAD 1970-71 ¹

Crop	Season	No. of Waters	How Long Ea. Water	Seed	Yield	Shop Price	
						Buy	Sell
<u>Winter Crops</u>							
Wheat (<u>gandom</u>)	Sow in Mehr-Aban-Adar; harvest in Ordibehešt-Khordad	6-7; but if rain, 4	1-1½ hr.	1½-2 m.*	30 - 50 m.*	55 r./m.*	60 r./m.*
Barley (<u>jou</u>)	Similar to wheat	4-5	1¼ hr.	¾ m.	40 - 70 m.	50 r./m.	56 r./m.
Turnip (<u>shalgham</u>)	Sow in Shahrivar	6	1½ hr.	½ kilo (=10 T.)	500-1000 m.	14 T./š.*	dry year; 6 T. wet
Raddish (<u>torobche</u>)	Aban- Esfand	4		12 dram (= 1 T.)	50 m.		
Spinach (<u>espinach</u>)	Mehr-Esfand	3 if rain; else, 6	40 min.	1 m.	120 m.	1-1½ T./m.	
Dill greens (<u>shevitch</u>)	Mehr-Esfand	3 if rain; else, 6	40 min.	2 m.	80-1000 m.	50 T./š.	
<u>Summer Crops</u>							
Sugar beet (<u>choghandar</u>)	Sow Esfand, harvest Ordibehešt; sow Ordibehešt, harvest Tir; sow Khordad, harvest Aban	18 (ea. 8 days)	1½ hr.	3 kilo	700-1000 m.	12 r./m.	but if buyer does the harvest- ing, 6 r./m.

Eggplant (<u>badenjan</u>)	Sow Esfand, transplant in three months, harvest in Aban	24 (ea. 4 days if possible)	1 hr.	500 seeds	500 m.	1-6 T./m.
Lettuce (<u>kahu</u>)	Sow in Farvardin or Mehr	4 if rain; else, 7	1 hr.	1 kilo	200 m.	
Onion (<u>piaz</u>)	Sow Farvardin	20	1 hr.	3 kilo	500 m.	1 T./m.
Cucumber (<u>xiar sabz</u>)				$\frac{1}{2}$ kilo	0-1000m.	1 T./m.
Watermelon (<u>hindevaneh</u>)	Sow at Noruz, harvest in three months	6-7		3 kilo		
Sweet melon (<u>xarbuze</u>)	Sow at Noruz, harvest in three months	6-7		3 kilo		
Alfalfa (<u>aspe, yonge</u>)	Sow in Shahrivar	in summer, ea. 8 days	$1\frac{1}{2}$ hr.		80 m. ea. 21-30 days	$6\frac{1}{2}$ r./m. 8 r./m.

* Abbreviations: m. = mann (= 6 kilo); r. = rial; T. = toman (= 10 rials); š. = shall (= 20 mann = one bar = one donkey load). Seventy-six rials make one U.S. dollar.

¹ Calculations are estimates of four farmers checked with others, based on one gafiz (1000 sq. meters) taking water from a well at 14 toman per hour (about 50 gafiz worth). Time for which the water purchaser must pay increases slightly with the distance from the well. Cost estimates for fertilizer and man hours digging are not included. This table contains only a partial listing of Nasrabad crops; also grown are cabbage, cane for fodder (galami), three kinds of squash, leeks, mint, parsely, coriander, chives, carrots, various alaf (grasses) for fodder (narmegias, mendo, etc.), and many fruits from sweet and sour pomegranates to fourteen varieties of grape, and peaches, apricots, figs, mulberries, and plums. For further notes see footnote 1, p. 126.

of salt and gypsum. To the northwest are saline alluvials, good for wheat and barley, and with sufficient water also cotton and beets, but again one must watch the salinity of the water. Around Yazd proper and stretching westwards are desert soils which are fertile where there is water. Water as we have pointed out with reference to the dropping water table is the major problem. If the traditional division of harvests is supposed to be roughly a fifth for each factor supplied, in Yazd, as Atai points out, water is more valuable than that. In Mehriz and Shahrabak, the farmer who supplies oxen, labor, seed, manure, and storage may still only keep as little as half and not more than two thirds of the produce: summer water is precious. In the Bafq area water is even more precious being scarce in winter and spring as well: the farmer here may keep as little as one third. One way to beat the system is to dig a well and tap the water table, and either use the water oneself with tractors and wage labor, or to sell the water, payment in advance. But few farmers can afford to do this: merchant or doctor entrepreneurs have that sort of capital. Small entrepreneurs who collect water fees after the water is distributed find themselves hard pressed to collect enough to break even.

¹ Regarding Table 2, the local climate seems too hot for many peas and beans, although nearby Ahrestan, only slightly higher, grows fava (baghali), and so these are brought from the hill villages: lentils, chick peas, kidney beans, and fava. The kuhistan (hills) is also the orchard and nut area. Yazd is too cool for much citrus although a few lemons and sour organes (portugal) are grown. For some reason potatoes have failed, nor are rice or cotton grown in the immediate vicinity, though cotton is a cash crop towards Ardekan and Meybod, and rice is grown further towards Isfahan. Sugar beet here is used for food and primarily for fodder, not as in Fars for sale to sugar mills; a Nasrabad farmer figures an income or profit of five to six hundred tomans per gafiz on sugar beet. Barley takes half the seed and slightly less water—maybe ten tomans less per gafiz—than wheat, but both take about forty jureh of water. Barley used to sell for half the price of wheat (and in the past the convergence of barley and wheat prices was an indicator of famine conditions), but now the price has gone up because following an epidemic (called sen or malak locally, now controlled chemically) farmers have stopped planting it. The price of wheat is up more than two tomans over the 1969 price, this attributed to the continuing drought. Good wheat crops are said to require winter rains to wash the heads of grain of some bug or microbe which otherwise attacks the grain.

Nor is the peasant quite so conservatively ignorant as is sometimes assumed. Why, queries Atai, is there such resistance to improved American cotton seed in Isfahan Province? The native cotton is low yield and poor quality but it is stronger for cotton mats, giveh (cotton-topped slippers), etc., which are cottage industries supplementing the farmer's income. Chemical fertilizer is used but sparingly and some farmers have complained that they do not know how to use it properly, having burned some of their crops in previous attempts, though they have seen its good results in Khorassan while on pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reza.


4.4. Urban Manufacturing and Trade

The traditional economy, thus, has always rather been based on Yazd's position as a transshipment point and the manpower growth there being available for processing and manufacturing activities of resources developed elsewhere: silk, henna, wool, cotton; a pattern continued more recently with sugar, merino wool, and synthetic fibers.¹ The Yazd route from Bandar Abbas to Teheran had a cost advantage over the shorter Bushire-Teheran route because the latter route was too steep along the initial section to use camels and so had to rely on mule caravans.² The Yazd route also handled a large part of the Meshed (Khorassan) trade with the south. The local regional economy was a fascinating quilt-work of village specializations articulated by the Yazd bazaar: pottery and zelus (a floor covering)

¹ Yazd's henna processing depends on Bam cultivation; its weaving on Khorassan, Mazandaran and Isfahan cotton and Australian (traditionally Fars, Isfahan and Kirman) wool; its silk on Gilan worms (and now American and Japanese synthetic fibers); its nylon on Khuzistan petroleum; its sweets first on French and Austrian, then Russian and Mauritian, and now on Fars sugar; its flour on Fars wheat. If P.W. English (1966) stresses the degree to which Kirman is a processing center depending on materials of its immediate hinterland, Yazd processing strikes a more mercantilist note.

² Bushire to Shiraz by mule or donkey took 25-30 days or some 50 days during the grazing season (to save fodder costs), a distance of 160 miles; and from Shiraz to Isfahan took another twenty days (310 miles). From Bandar Abbas to Yazd (520 miles) took forty-five days by camel or donkey; Yazd to Isfahan was another 150 miles. J.R. Preece calculated the cost differential between Bandar Abbas-Yazd and Bushire-Shiraz-Yazd to average twenty kran per karvar (1300 lbs.); the Shiraz route was never less than 160 kran/1300 lbs., while the Bandar Abbas rate could drop to 100 kran though it might take five

MAP 1
MAJOR TRADE ROUTES AROUND 1900
(After Maclean 1904)



Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in Meybod, soap in Abarghu, cotton ginning in Majumerd, givehs in Mehriz, glass blowing in Terang, etc.¹ Cloth weaving (rather than carpet weaving) was the largest source of traditional employment.

It is only in very recent years that the economy has been given a chance to reorganize itself thanks firstly to the now very good communications system tying Yazd into only a few hours² from sources of food, modern appliances, medical and social services.³ Still today trucks bringing to Yazd wheat, sugar (both from Fars), and even straw for fodder (from Kirman) leave Yazd empty.⁴ But the first major step in making Yazd a contributor as well as a receiver to the flow of modern goods was the establishment of textile mills, the Eqbal Factory being the first, established in 1936 under pressure from Reza Shah forcing local merchants and landowners to buy shares in the venture. Today there are almost a score of textile mills employing perhaps a sixth of the labor force. Despite a few insignificant other entrepreneurial efforts—television assembly, balloon manufacturing, specialized shirt tailoring, furniture making, an ice factory, electricity generation—the second major step of any social scale is the opening of the two thousand employee iron mine at Bafq to supply the Isfahan steel mill, with all its attendant services such as the arrival of the four hundred man strong railway. Mining has always been a part of Yazd's hinterland, but it

¹ On the potters of Meybod, see Centlivres-Demont (1971). A study of the contemporary local regional economy is being prepared by M.E. Bonine, phrased in Central Place terms, and focusing on consumer patterns, population thresholds for particular functions, etc.

² Yazd to Teheran: twelve hours by road, sixteen by train, one by air.

³ Yazd has three hospitals (the private Zoroastrian-established Bimaristan Gudarzi run by Yazd's leading surgeon, Dr. Mortaz, son of a Shirazi merchant who came to Yazd in the last century; the Ministry of Health's Bimaristan Pahlavi; labor's Bimaristan Kargaran) and three maternity clinics (the formerly Zoroastrian and now Red Lion and Sun Zayeshgah Bahman; the Nikpur Clinic; and the private clinic of Yazd's leading obstetrician, Dr. Majubian). There are twenty-eight doctors in town, most conducting private practice as well as working in the hospitals. The Jewish community has its own clinic run by the former head of the Ministry of Health, Dr. Razavi. But for serious complaints people fly to Shiraz, Teheran, or abroad.

⁴ Compare J.R. Preece: "A great obstacle to the perfect flow of trade is the want of adequate exports. Often camels go to Bandar Abbas empty" (1893: 22).

was not until the time of Reza Shah that mines began to be developed with modern techniques (first in Anarak near Nain) and not until the 1970s that mining became part of the productive—rather than simple resource extraction—industry, and promised to provide a sizeable number of jobs. Yazd sits to the west of the Kuhbanan Fault Line on the edge of the triangular "medium mass" of Iran's central plateau where most of Iran's mineralized ore bodies occur. It has long been known that this belt of primarily lead-zinc mines, but also Bafq's iron mountain and other mines, had numerous copper ore bodies, but only in the last few years has the Kirman area's copper been recognized as one of the largest reserves in the world. The exploitation of this resource may have a large role in continuing the economic reorganization of the Central Plateau region; speculation even has it that by the end of the decade, copper will provide the same kind of revenue that oil has been providing. Iran is in a strong enough economic position to insist that she will export processed rather than only crude ore. Again, the aridity of Central Iran may dictate the spatial effect of industrialization: if the water required for the ore processing cannot be ensured at the mining sites, then the processing will have to be done elsewhere (London Chamber of Commerce 1970: 6).

The credit infrastructure—Iranian cities are remarkable for the number and imposing solidity of their banks¹—and the dislocation in the

¹ Most important aside from the Government Bank-e Melli are the Bank-e Keshavarzi which specializes in loans for farmers wherever there is not a Ministry of Land Reform Sherkat-e Tavuni; the Bank-e Refah-e Kargaran which specializes in loans to factory workers; the Bank-e Etebarat Toze va Abani which specializes in loans to bazaar merchants; and the private Bank-e Sadarat which with its quick service and myriad branches (fourteen in Yazd and another twenty in the Farmandar-e Yazd area) is the most aggressive competitor for collecting both rural and urban savings. The Bank-e Sadarat seems to pay for its efficiency by higher rates of interest on loans: while the Bank-e Keshavarzi charges 6% and allows a single lump sum repayment, the Bank-e Sadarat charges 12% and requires monthly installment repayment. Other general private banks are the Bank-e Asnaf (which despite its name has nothing to do with bazaar asnaf [guilds], whose [the guild's] official connections are with the Bank-e Etebarat), Bank-e Teheran, Bank-e Sepah, and Bank-e Pars. In 1970 there were twenty-six banks in Iran of which nine had foreign participation: 2 British, 1 Japanese, 1 American, 1 American-German, 1 French, 1 Italian-French, and 1 Russian (London Chamber of Commerce 1970: 4).

agricultural and bazaar sectors provide a ready opportunity for manpower remobilization. (For the moment, banks are also a major absorber of labor with high school diplomas.) Although villagers to some extent still buy on credit,¹ and sell crops salaf-forushi,² degree of debt seems to be minimal (i.e., contrast with Seistan: Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi 1970: 140-211). Bazaar craftsmen scorn true debt arrangements such as Geertz describes for Mojokuto, with the proverb of buying only gelindari (pa-ra be gonge gelim deraz bekoni: stretch your foot only to the edge of your own floor covering), and although several bazaar sarafs (money lenders) still exist, resort to them (particularly to the largest whose name is always called to mind when the subject is broached), is viewed with horror (Xoda nakone! God forbid!) as being something one will only do if one cannot obtain credit with the banks. Use of these sarafs seems primarily to be by bazaar merchants for short-term loans of sizeable amounts to cover a check for a few days or the like, or for deals of marginal legality like land transfers. There is ready jockeying between factory and bazaar in the search for more lucrative positions. The building pace both of new buildings on speculation and of private replacement of gel-kari (mud wattle) with baked bricks and of wooden doors with metal is frenetic. There are pockets of real poverty—some tenants on pistachio lands (orchards were not included in Land Reform),³

¹ The problem of retail credit, such as the notched stick for buying meat (instead of paying for each purchase, a notch is cut) seems to be partly a problem of psychology and management on the part of the retailer who can be bankrupted by allowing too much credit. A former Zoroastrian shopkeeper claims he could not hold his clientele without granting credit, but then could not force them to pay. He had been exploiting a commercial niche outside the city, avoiding thus the tax collected on goods brought into town. Whether there were other structural problems in his position besides being a powerless Zoroastrian—the reason he gives for not being able to enforce payment—is unknown. For such structural problems, see Szanton 1970 and Rotblat 1972, but Rotblat does not discuss cases of bankruptcy.

² Salaf-forushi or short selling is the system of selling agricultural crops whereby before harvest an assessment of the value of the crop is made and credit is advanced by the buyer to the farmer (for water payment, etc.), or full payment is made on the crop, risks of thievery, spoilage, etc. falling on the buyer.

³ Two small owners (Zoroastrian, incidentally) of pistachio land in Ardekan complain that their respective tenants keep spending money to go to

some poorer villages, some carpet-weavers working on a contract basis, porters, older unskilled persons who may need to send their children to work rather than to school. There is also a small group of beggars, lottery ticket and fortune sellers, and Baluchi-Seistani sidewalk peddlers. Yazd, however, is relatively free from these forms of unemployment in contrast to Teheran. Emigration to Kuwait as well as elsewhere in Iran is a frequent solution: just as Yazdis in an earlier day (and still today) monopolized the tea houses of Bombay, today in Kuwait all the bakers are Yazdis. The primary nature of poverty in Yazd seems to be one of job formation and wage levels rather than one of debt-enslavement: a miner working for 5-8 tomans a day, or a factory worker working for ten tomans a day (sometimes working a ten or twelve hour day), or a more old fashioned weaver working for a toman an hour cannot be said to be affluent in an economy where meat (sheep) costs 10-14 tomans/kilo, rice 3-5 tomans/kilo, eggs six or seven tomans a kilo,¹ and cheese ten tomans/kilo (Tabrizi). His diet will remain bread (one toman/kilo), yogurt (14-18 rials/kilo), onions (4 rials/kilo), and abgusht (described by a local doctor as "a bone in a pint of water:" a broth with a piece of meat and naxod—a chick pea selling for 22 rials/kilo—and bread).² Chicken (ten tomans/kilo) is a festive food.³ A full time shop

Mecca and then have not enough money to make water payments which then means poor crops and inability to pay rent, not to mention hunger, tattered clothes, and insanitary homes. Their gut reaction is to abuse these people for so foolishly spending money against the dictates of Islam, but one of the tenants is reported to have answered that the axond (preacher) told him that if he went on the haj he would go to Heaven.

¹ The Government fixed prices in Aban 1971 were 58 rials/kilo wholesale; 62 rials retail; market prices were higher. The Government charged hoarding and threatened to use its control measure of opening the market to imports.

² A now well-to-do goldsmith describes the upward mobility of his family directly in terms of food: when his father began working at the Eqbal Factory for four tomans a day, he would buy some yogurt, mix it with water to make dough, and this dilution with bread was a meal for his family of five children. Zoroastrian villagers still use as their primary justification of gahambar and xeirat food distributions the fact that not so long ago this might be the only substantial meal a poor man could have. Still today it is not uncommon for villagers to eat meat only once or twice a week and then only in the form of abgusht. A miner in the hills behind Bafq estimates he buys ten kilos of meat a month for his five member family. The Central Bank estimates in general a family budget to be 43.24% food, 12.50% clothing, 12.06% housing.

clerk makes around 250 tomans/month. White collar workers (teachers, bank clerks, government clerks and factory clerks), master masons (20-25 tomans/day) and taxi drivers (20-30 tomans/day) do slightly better making around 600-1000 tomans/month. The real quantum jump comes with those skilled beyond a high school diploma: an engineer (mohandess, the word is also a title of respect) can make about 6000 tomans/month. The primary question then becomes how workers wages can be raised. The Government has taken one step requiring workers to get a share in company profits thus tying wage increases to productivity.¹ In a few companies this has not yet taken effect and wages are artificially suppressed,² but the other question is thereby also raised of increasing productivity (as well as perhaps increasing worker's shares in profits), a question referring to the internal organization (efficiency, quality control) of industrial units as well as

³ Of the foods listed in the Central Bank Family Budget Survey of 1965, poultry is the category which shows the highest increase in demand relative to rising income: with one percent increase in income, it shows a 1.70% increase in demand versus 1.46% for processed foods, 1.13 for milk, 1.10% for butter, 0.64% for meat, and 0.97% for fish, and 0.84% for eggs and poultry.

¹ The Labor Act of 1958 gives the Government power to set minimum wages. The Act has been invoked three times: (1) March 1969 daily minimum wages of unskilled workers were set at 50-60 rials depending on the region of the country; (2) in March 1971 increased minimum wages were to be linked to productivity which required industries to produce job classifications by 23 September 1971 (1 Mehr 1350); (3) on November 8, 1971 a decision was made to increase wages in certain industries (Kayhan International, 9 November 1971, p. 2).

² One mining company which only recently hired the professional help of a mining engineer, geologists, and a surveyor, has experienced an increase in output due to the solving of some technical problems. At the same time a previous labor shortage caused by the company's refusal to pay more than five tomans a day has been completely reversed by raising the average wage level three tomans with hopes of further increases. These are full wages as this company has not yet introduced the profit-sharing required by law. At the moment there is a struggle between labor and the company executive over the nomination of a labor representative to the Ministry of Labor; with that resolved, presumably the company will be forced to conform. That there is even such a struggle is a side benefit of the technical personnel input which supports the miners and protects them from executive retaliation. (This input is non-Iranian).

to investment in capital equipment so that Iranian products may be competitive in the world market.¹

The dominant note at the moment is an unsettled fluidity, which as long as the economy expands will be covered by a general optimism. There is, however, an attendant insecurity focused on Government activity. It is the Government which institutes the large-scale projects. It is the Government which limits foreign and private mining exploration. It is the Government which has placed a ban on new textile mills in the Yazd area. It is the Government which is reorganizing the guild-union-syndicate organizations and their attendant tax-insurance regulation. It is the Government which appropriates land for public domain. It is the Government which from one day to the next can freeze land speculation-(as it did in Fall 1971). It is the Government which arbitrates land disputes and which has nationalized but not taken over services such as irrigation wells (leaving some operations unprofitable but unsalable). All of these are proper Government activities; what makes people insecure is the manner in which they are instituted and the ignorance-incompetence of both the man-on-the-street and the petty bureaucrats.² In part this insecurity operates to

¹ The A.I.D. report (Wright 1965) discusses the general problem of investment in relation to technical needs and profitability for mining. The company discussed on page 133 (fn. 2) has not even provided a microscope for its geologists, and only recently has been persuaded to buy core-drilling equipment so that the size of its ore bodies can be determined and a rational exploitation plan developed. Similarly in the textile industry, foreign advisors to one of the larger mills complain that they could greatly increase output but (a) the executive management seems uninterested, (b) the laborers are unwilling to take orders and resent quality control even to the point of violence. Without such quality control, Iranian textiles have no hope of competing abroad. Both these cases are old firms, the latter with problems of an aging labor force which has been with it since its founding. Iranians see their problem as one of securing trained middle level management, and some of the younger firms run by newly minted engineers seem to do better.

² Durkheim, writing in the context of the Third Republic, saw this problem of state centralization as crucial to the formation of a properly organic industrial society: "A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, that a hypertrophied State is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be able to be expressed through the single and unique organ of the State. Moreover the State is too remote from individuals; its relations with them too external and intermittent to

to encourage spending rather than saving, to build now before new taxes are instituted, new zoning rules are passed, stricter scrutiny of ownership titles are possible, etc. In part the insecurity makes people wait for the Government to do things that otherwise they might do themselves. The defense on the side of the Government is perhaps that the administrative structure is so inefficient that the only practical way to exercise control over on-the-ground activity is by activity initiated and put into operation from the top requiring little or no feed-back. It might also be argued that Iran is a small enough society to operate as a single political field with all decisions being taken to Teheran. The real problem, however, is the uncertainty of future expansion: as Minister of Cooperative and Rural Affairs Valian has pointed out, job formation in the cities cannot absorb the out-migration from the rural areas, and he suggests attempts be made through cottage industries and other means to keep people in the rural areas.¹

Textile mills have been the major new source of employment. Eberhard in a study of Afghan factories (1967) has suggested that twentieth century industrialization which demands more skilled workers than did eighteenth or nineteenth century industrialization—although it is not clear that this minor premise is true—will draw factory labor from urban shops and crafts rather than directly from agriculture; labor problems will center on keeping skilled labor, unskilled labor being replacable through automatization. This is partially confirmed in Iran: unskilled labor both in the Sepenta Stell Rolling Company in Teheran² and in Yazd textile mills do draw directly

penetrate deeply into individual consciences and socialize them within. Where the state is the only environment in which men can live communal lives, they inevitably lose contact, become detached, and thus society disintegrates" (1933: 28).

¹ Valian's worry is, of course, also the motivation for Iran's large scale birth control programs, and the Shah's prodding towards creating a stock market (one exists but all its members can comfortably pose for pictures around a single table and little is traded) by urging the large industrial groups to sell shares to the public thereby also creating a new capital pool. Regarding Valian's suggestion, see Geertz (1963; 1972) and Dillon (p. 139 below) on the implications of such a dual economy.

² Unfortunately my survey of the Sepenta Factory was lost, and so I

from farmers. But a closer analysis does indicate some trends supporting Eberhard's structural observations. Thirty of the forty-four workers of a nylon factory established in 1968 by a Yazdi, Germantrained engineer, were surveyed: previous occupation of twenty or two thirds had been either in a similar factory (11) or in an urban craft, service or shop (9); only three had been farmers, six having been students and one unemployed. Father's occupation of a smaller sample (12) was reversed with two thirds farmers and one third non-farmers. As in the Afghan factories where a 74% literacy rate existed in a country with 95% illiteracy, here 66% (20) had had at least five years of education. Again in Yazd's second nylon factory, established in 1965, although interviewing was not permitted, an estimated thirty of 130 workers came to the factory from another factory. Now for contrast, take the second oldest mill in Yazd (interviewing in the oldest mill was not allowed), a combined spinning and worsted wool weaving mill. Seventy of seven hundred workers were interviewed of whom only six had worked for the factory less than five years (annual turn-over rate is about 4%) and half had worked for more than fifteen years. Of these seventy, previous occupation for only four had been another factory, but only five had previously been farmers. Fifteen plus one of the previous four had been weavers. Thirty-four or almost half had been students or children or had no regular previous employment (seven of these were women of eleven women in the sample representing one hundred female workers). The other twelve all came from urban occupations (four shopkeepers, three craftsmen, a baker, teacher, gendarme, water drawer, and balloon factory clerk). That is, five farmers, thirty-one urban occupations and thirty-four new members of the labor force. Of the seventy, only thirty-four had no schooling at all of whom ten were women, and thirty-six had at least two years school, although only eight had more than six. Fathers of these seventy factory employees were more rural, thirty of them living outside the immediate Yazd urban area, but still only twenty-two were full-time farmers; fourteen were

can only rely on impressionistic memory that it emphasized more strongly against Eberhard and the Yazd data the direct absorption of agriculturalists in the unskilled labor force. See also Bartsch (1971).

weavers or associated with the textile process (a spinner and a dyer) and nine were already textile mill workers; eleven were shopkeepers, merchants, brokers, or camel drivers; and ten were masons, mechanics, police, watchmen, stone and water carriers (with four uncounted).

Eberhard points out that if planners desire to absorb rural labor directly into factories this can be done paying in economic cost for social ends, by placing factories in overpopulated rural areas away from cities. This kind of effect can be observed in the lead-zinc Bafq Mining Company which draws its staff from urban Iran but its laborers primarily from surrounding villages: of 315 laborers and foremen, 286 are from the nearby villages, eight from the town of Bafq, three from Yazd, eight from Teheran, and ten from the mining center of Anarak. Turn-over problems as expected are located in the staff rather than among the laborers. The Felzad mines show a similar pattern with foremen seeded from Anarak and the laborers from the surrounding villages. Where more skilled and semi-skilled labor is required, as with the Bafq iron mine (although technically a simple operation) more labor is recruited from Yazd proper.

Wage levels are an obvious critical factor in these recruitment patterns. We mentioned before the difficulties of one mining operation in recruiting labor because of the low salaries offered, even in the extremely poor area in which the mines were located, and the dramatic reversal once salaries were raised. Bartsch has commented upon this point citing older managers who prefer to hire untrained personnel to be trained on the job because they believe this to keep labor costs down. Bartsch attributes rising labor productivity to increasing amounts of automation and work reorganization in the better managed factories, not to upgrading of labor skill, and comments:

Despite the views of some Iranian factory managers, when considered in terms of its damage to, and poor maintenance of, machinery, its wastage and spoilage of raw materials, and its relatively low productivity, unskilled and semi-skilled Iranian labor is not cheap and contributes heavily to the high unit costs of production incurred by factories (1971: 26).

Fluidity of commitment to traditional jobs may perhaps be indicated by the figures that of eighty questioned bazaaris (in the gold and cloth

bazaars) only thirty were the sons of bazaari shopkeepers or craftsmen; another seventeen were sons of weavers and another eleven were sons of men associated with the cottage textile industry as peddlers, spinners, dyers or silk worm sellers. (Only six, however, were sons of peasants.) Occupations of their wives' fathers follow a similar pattern. This is hardly suprising since the textile mills have reduced the importance of cottage weaving, almost completely destroying the silk weaving industry for which Yazd was famous.¹ (The luxury silk brocade, termeh, still survives, but with synthetic thread and new color schemes.) To some extent, carpet weaving has increased with the decrease in cloth weaving, but since this is primarily women's work it is an income supplement rather than a central occupation for the labor force, and thus only for merchant contractors is it a substitute for cloth-weaving. Other traditional employment shows similar changes. Factory-made shoes are replacing giveh slippers

¹ Unfortunately I have no figures for the number of cottage cloth weavers: it is however a quite large figure. These weavers are concentrated in Fahedon, a quarter of the old city, but many other houses in other quarters also have looms. The looms vary from old wooden looms to small electric looms. An interesting technical report by Catherine Cromstedt (I.L.O. 1969) is available and points out that competition with the factories encourages these weavers to use low quality materials (cheap viscose and cotton), work too quickly and yield too many broken threads and colors which are not fast; this leads to low prices, which forces them to use even cheaper materials. Her suggestion is to develop the already existing Ministry of Interior Cooperative to buy yarn from the factory (since they can only accept bulk orders), organize standardized dying, employ instructors to introduce designs and products which are not directly competing with factory items, as well as aiding in marketing. Weaver laborers working on the old wooden looms earn one toman per hour. Private loom owners figure a full day's work can yield approximately eight or nine tomans profit; two examples: (1) A weaver of mesterizeh meški, a black broadcloth for the ubiquitous pyjama-trousers, using an electric loom estimates a profit of three rials/meter, making daily eight or nine tomans. The thread comes from Isfahan and costs about 15 rials/meter. He sells it in Bazaar Khan for 19 rials/meter; the shop sells it for 20. (2) A factory worker has replaced his old wooden loom at home with an electric one for \$300. His wife and wife's sister's husband operate it and can produce thirty meters a day of silk-cotton fabric which sells for 25 rials per meter. One hundred meters requires ninety tomans worth of silk thread, sixty tomans of cotton, plus thirty tomans in dying costs. With electricity and overhead, he figures a profit of two rials/meter or six tomans/day (seven and a half by the above figures). (This implies an overhead cost of 45-50 tomans per meter, which works out if either he pays both WiSiHu and Wi

in consumer demand. Cloth merchants complain of reduced profit margins with standardization and public knowledge of factory prices. Namad (a felt-like carpet material) making, cloth block printing, and silk worm raising are practically extinct occupations. And although Yazd is still a city of numerous small shops on the medieval pattern, the bazaaris have largely moved out of the nineteenth century covered bazaar onto the paved avenues of the Pahlavi era.

4.5. Comparisons and Contrasts.

It would appear that the textile mills and the new steel and iron industry are the dominant factors in Yazd's recent economic history, in sharp contrast with a town like Kirman, one of whose striking features is what Robert Dillon aptly calls "craft involution,"¹ that is, Kirman's traditional carpet weaving, organized and rationalized in the late nineteenth century, initially under the encouragement of British Consul Percy Sykes, has increasingly intensified its use of labor. Before its rationalization, carpets were woven not for an open market but only on order. Over the last seventy years or so, entrepreneurs have set up looms first in the houses of Kirman and increasingly expanding into the villages. Quality has declined as production has intensified: not merely are double knots used, but often now the knots are not even tied. Since income depends on output, and village population has increased beyond what agriculture would support, it is advantageous for families to have many children to put to work; their recruitment into the weaving craft is often involuntary and accomplished by beating if necessary.² The consequent

slightly less than he himself makes at the factory: 85 rials/day; or he pays only one, and only half the dying cost [one box] was figured above.) He blames the factories for reducing the profitability of cottage weaving. When he sells the cloth he wants cash since he buys thread with cash. The factories give out cloth on ninety-one days credit during which time the shopkeeper has time to sell; make a profit, and pay, for which accomodation he must also pay; but it means that he who wants immediate cash gets paid less for the same piece of cloth.

¹ The following characterizations of Kirman owe much to discussions with Dillon. The other two basic sources are a city planning study done by Frieden and Mann (1971) and the older human geography by English (1966).

² Something quite remarkable given the usual Persian indulgence of

social structure of Kirman as described by English and confirmed by Dillon is of a small upper class tightly controlling the three major means of production: carpets, agricultural land, and livestock.¹ Yazd appears to be somewhat more open. Land has already been described as less in the hands of a few large owners.² English speaks of tractors being introduced only by arbab landowners; Boyce who worked in the Yazd area also in the early 1960s speaks instead of tractors being used on a peasant rental system (1969b). Again while there are a few large sheep owners—the largest owner of sheep in the village of Mehriz is reputed to have well over a thousand head of sheep given out to a number of shepherds—the main livestock

children's wishes. A popular proverb says that the demand of a child is more compelling than the order of the Shah, and the story told with it is of Napoleon meeting the English ambassador on his hands and knees carrying a child on his back. Napoleon looks up at the Englishman who has just entered and says that if he has children he will understand, and continues to play horse and rider.

¹ English described the Kirman economy as little changed from a primordial nineteenth century two class society characterized by (a) extant but minimal contacts with other towns and only among the upper class, (b) patrilocally extended families, (c) almost complete lack of social mobility, (d) control of the value system by the clergy (1966: 98-99 and passim). One wonders if the late nineteenth century but primarily the twentieth century was not a period of consolidating this upper class. The (Zoroastrian) Soroushian family, for instance, presumably gained its vast land holdings during this period with capital from the India trade. The Arjoman weaving empire was built almost entirely on the rationalization of carpet weaving and establishing an international marketing system. Before its nineteenth century assimilation to the British Baluchistan and Persian Gulf sphere of interest and its twentieth century absorption into the Pahlavi state, Kirman was a frontier post often much more outside the functional control of the Persian state than Yazd which apparently since Safavid times was always a secondary entrepot and textile center to Isfahan. Kirman until the mid-nineteenth century was not even a major caravan entrepot for the Gulf-Khorassan trade, most caravans going either to the east or west via Yazd. Compare for instance J.R. Preece's report in 1893 that there were no wealthy men in Kirman, not even a merchant worth ten thousand tomans. Kirman was even supplied from Yazd with foreign items like piece goods (as it still is today with flour). External trade was in the hands of British Indian subjects, mainly from Shikapore. Zoroastrians played the role of Jews: they were dominantly urban (1700 in town versus 300 in villages) and served as peddlers. There were only about one hundred carpet looms, of which fifty were owned by the six best known master weavers; no carpets were woven on speculation, only on demand, a few for India, a few for gifts for notables. Preece ends by suggesting the carpet industry ought to be organized on a commercial basis.

² Unfortunately this also must be left in a speculative and qualitative

area near Yazd is around Shahrabak (sheep and goats¹) and owners around Yazd generally have very small herds of less than a dozen. Carpet weaving is an important activity in Yazd as well as in Kirman, but here the contrast begins to emerge quite sharply.

First of all, carpet weaving is secondary to cloth weaving, and is a supplementary rather than full time occupation. It is women and children's work whereas in Kirman men weave as well. (Manshad-e Yazd is the only place which seems to have a significant number of male weavers.) Nonetheless, bazaaris estimate there are some 35,000 looms in the Yazd area.² There are at least forty-five carpet shops in Yazd (Kirman significantly has a quarter less). While some of these may own ten to thirty looms, much of the business is buying from non-contract weavers who own their own looms. Yazdis point out with obvious pride that of the two possible reasons for an arbab contract system of weaving—lack of money and lack of knowledge—it was only the latter which initially, some thirty years ago when carpet weaving was being re-introduced, allowed something of an arbab system to develop. A loom costs only some five hundred tomans (\$65), and the pipe cutting blacksmiths who supply the frame material report a brisk business with individual weavers. What the weavers did not know at first was where and how to buy the raw materials in the bazaars. As they learned this—many now even buy their own dyes from the six dye shops serving exclusively small weavers—they lost any need for an arbab. There is only one

form as access to land registry records was not achieved during this research period.

¹ Camels are raised further east (Sirjan, Zahedan), cattle on a small scale around Meybod and Ardekan to the northwest.

² Despite a letter of introduction from a Director-General in the Ministry of Economics, the local agency chief refused to give me any official estimates of either carpet or cloth weavers on the grounds that, "Economics is something very important to us and we have to be very careful about what information we let out because this is not an advanced country like yours and there are some negative things which if known could ruin [sic: shekastan] our economy." Unfortunately it was too late in my stay to pursue the matter by re-initiating action in Teheran. A flavor of the country comes across in the characteristic mutual evaluations of the bureaucrats and the bazaaris. When I suggested to the official that I would have to depend on bazaari estimates, he expressed horror at using such an unreliable source. When I told of my troubles to the bazaaris they laughed and said never mind:

advantage to the arbab system: with quality control a reputation can be built up which raises the selling value of the carpet. There are several such arbabs in Yazd, one of whom adds even a further feature of using natural dyes rather than the otherwise now ubiquitous chemical dyes. This arbab, Binesh, owns eighty looms in the one village of Dehballah as well as looms elsewhere; but the number of such really large arbabs does not run more than four or five.

The contrast of Yazd with Kirman might profitably be carried out through a further comparison of their bazaars, a comparison which then may be expanded elsewhere. Bazaars are units that researchers tend to deal with in at least a cursory quantitative manner, and so we have shop counts for a number of cities besides Yazd and Kirman: Shiraz (Clarke 1963), Tabriz (Schweitzer 1972), Qazvin (Rotblat 1972).¹ But fuller studies of bazaars are rare, and for Iran so far only a study of the Qazvin bazaar is available (Rotblat 1972). Thus, only preliminary indications of what such comparisons might yield can be presently attempted.

Even physically the Kirman and Yazd bazaars contrast. Kirman's old bazaar (built by Wakil-ul-Mulk in the reign of Fath Ali Shah) is a pedestrian thoroughfare through a large city block formed by the new paved avenues. It connects the Masjid-e Jome and a major meidan and so is a popular promenade. Yazd's Shah street on the other hand was cut through the nineteenth century bazaar leaving several disjointed segments.² As a result the Yazd bazaar moved out onto the new streets leaving areas such as

the government has now idea how many looms there are, because people never report accurately to the government; our estimates are much more accurate.

¹ Similar counts are probably also already or soon will be available for Kashan, Mashad, Abadan, Sari, Rezaiyeh, and Teheran. Unfortunately comparability is hindered by lack of uniform definitions. Overall numbers for retail and wholesale units are also available in the Ministry of Economics' Industrial Survey.

² Meidan-e Khan and Bazaar Qaisari, the shop rents of which helped support the Madresseh Khan, were built in the reign of Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834); Bazaar Khan was built in the reign of Nasraddin Shah (1848-96). These bazaars were outside the city walls

Meidan-e Khan and Bazaar Kashikari backwaters for those who could not make a go of it on the streets.¹ The Kirman bazaar in contrast modernized itself with walk-in stores, glass display windows, etc. In Yazd the process has gone even further: with the filling up of the prime shopping streets (Pahlavi and Shah), two story buildings are rapidly making these street bazaars into dual level ones; and the latest innovation is the block building housing a variety of shops and offices such as the fifteen unit Photo Sayeh Building. Frieden and Mann describe the process well, a process of renewal which the Greek planner K.A. Doxiades once even suggested be made part of urban growth by designing the CBD as a moving parabola:

A general cycle can be deduced from the existence of the Kirman bazaar, the Yazd "street bazaar" and Teheran's Lalezar Avenue and Plasco Arcade. At some point in a city's development the street attracts many of the stores from the bazaar as well as the stores which come as a result of new demands and new goods. After a certain period of time, certain streets and more particularly, certain blocks, can be clearly identified as important shopping areas. Locations on these streets become valuable enough to warrant the construction of large arcades or perhaps, more appropriately, bazaaarches. It is likely that after another period of time, and due to traffic congestion, certain streets will be closed to traffic and the pedestrian bazaar will be recreated. We as planners certainly hope to reduce or even eliminate this expensive and needless cycle by careful connection between vehicular transportation networks on the one hand and pedestrian urban activities on the other (Frieden and Mann 1971: 115).

The evolution of Yazd includes plans to move trucking, bus, garage, and

¹ E.g., in Meidan-e Khan where rents are nominal thirty to fifty tomans per month to even fifty tomans a year, and where there is no sargolfi (key money), one finds the following: a butcher who had a shop on the street but became too old to work and took over this shop to have somewhere to sit (he sells about six kilos of meat a day), a provisions seller who was a partner in a store on the street but when the partnership broke up was unable to meet the rent; a young quilt sewer who had been an apprentice in a shop on the street, but wanted to strike out with little capital on his own; a blacksmith who had tried to work in the factories but found he could do just as badly in the bazaar; two immigrants from the villages, a former sidewalk hawker of giveh (cloth shoes) who decided to move up to a permanent shop; a former weaver making rubber buckets from used inner tubes; two members of the fast dying hallaji (cotton carding) trade; a sweets seller in decline (and two who are not in decline but are also not among the top rank). The majority of the bazaar of some thirty-five or forty shops have come to serve rather a neighborhood bazaar function: vegetables, fruits, tea, sugar, bread, meat.

machine services to the periphery of town to allow a less congested city center. The distribution of shops will continue to be regulated by rents and sargolfi (key money), and by Government zoning rules and incentives.¹

A few figures can give some focus to this description. Demographically Yazd and Kirman are about the same size, with Yazd showing a higher rate of increase. At the time of the first national census in 1956 Yazd had 63,502 persons, Kirman 62,157. Ten years later Yazd had grown to 93,241, an annual rate of 3.9%, well above the national rate of 2.8%, while Kirman had grown only to 85,404, a rate of 2.1%. Since the two towns do not show very different fertility or birth per thousand indices, this must have to do with rates of in-migration and labor absorption capacity.² Yazd has a very poor agricultural hinterland, the population of the smaller villages of which are leaving, and it has a sizeable industrial labor force (about a sixth of the labor force works in the textile mills, three of which have over seven hundred workers, and one almost fourteen hundred). Kirman has a richer agricultural hinterland, practically no industry, and carpet weaving which keeps the population in the villages despite the growth of population beyond the carrying capacity of the land (given current technology). Yazd has a fourth more retail establishments

¹ There is talk of trying to revitalize some areas of the bazaar, although not necessarily with the same activities that were there previously. Frieden and Mann object to a Government law regulating distances between competitor stores such as shoe stores, which Frieden and Mann point out gives the edge to big chains such as Kafshe Meli which can buy up all the corners and squeeze competitors out of business. They argue that in some respects the bazaar style clustering of shops of similar function is an optimal solution both in terms of stability and for customer comparison shopping, even though mathematically the optimal customer solution would be an even distribution of homogenous retail outlets (see Bunge 1962 on the ice cream vendor problem). Lapidus adds the interesting note that the form of bazaar shop concentration by goods, at least in Mamluk cities of Syria, is a result of administrative fiat: merchants of a given commodity were made to group together so that they could not so easily avoid taxes (1967: 100).

² Birth per thousand (number age ten and under in 1966 divided by the total 1966 population) for Kirman was 28.5; for Yazd 28.7. Fertility (ten years and younger in 1966 divided by number of females between 15 and 44 in 1956) for Kirman was 1.75, for Yazd 1.93.

TABLE 3
RETAIL SHOP DISTRIBUTIONS: YAZD, KIRMAN, QAZVIN


	Kirman	Yazd	Qazvin
total retail units	c.2000	2500+	2616
covered bazaar	675	533	1026
major shopping streets	674	1700+	296

than Kirman (see Table 3 and Map 2), but almost two and a half times as many wholesalers: Yazd 191, Kirman 78 (Industrial Survey figures).¹ Presumably middle-man activities are less concentrated in Yazd than Kirman and inferentially then a more open set of opportunities for entrepreneurs exists.

For a further comparative analysis of how such bazaar opportunities operate, we must go to Rotblat's description of the Qazvin bazaar. Qazvin is the center of a large-scale development project which began with land reform efforts and is continuing with the creation of a major industrial park outside of town which will employ fifty thousand workers. The bazaar represents an employment sector for people who cannot find employment elsewhere. It is a sector in decline and stagnation. The multiplicity of middlemen tends to keep prices close to perfect competition, so that bargaining is relatively infrequent once proper prices have been established. While credit arrangements between peasants and their commission agents for selling their produce, or between regular customers and retailers are important, and revolving credit for "jobbers" who buy in bulk at discount from large inter-urban traders is essential, the elaborate debt and credit arrangements for reducing risk and ensuring regular customers and suppliers described by Geertz for Indonesia (1963), and by Benedict (1970) for Ula, a

¹ Frieden and Mann work with a figure of 2000 retail establishments in Kirman in 1970. The Ministry of Economics Industrial Survey in 1346/1967 uses a figure of 2043; the corresponding figure for Yazd is 2576. Of the 2000, the bazaar block of Kirman—the bazaar itself plus the avenues circumscribing it—contains 1349 shops which are split evenly between the bazaar (674) and these avenues (675). Of the 2576 shops in Yazd, the bazaars themselves contain some 500 odd retail units, while the major streets contain nearly two thousand, leaving little for the neighborhood bazaars which in

MAP 2
 YAZD STREET BAZAAR SHOP DISTRIBUTION



western Anatolian town, seem to take on a more controlled and limited role in Qazvin and Yazd. The availability of bank credit may account for the bazaari scorn of true debt arrangements cited above, which in any case contrasts with the bazaris of Ula who say, "Cash is good, but it also makes for conflict" (Benedict 1970: 224). Cash makes for conflict in Yazd as well (see Chapter VI), but Yazdis prefer the cash while Ula bazaris prefer a fixed clientele of debtors. How far this is only an apparent contrast remains to be determined: it is certainly true that everyone in Yazd seems to have an interest in any promising deal, be it pooling money to operate a taxi, buying land on speculation, buying grain on speculation, etc. But there does seem to be a consensus among Yazdis that people are no longer in debt as they used to be. As evidence they point out that ten or twenty years ago there were several hundred money dealers (saraf) in the bazaar. Today there are only three and a few others work on a more informal basis. Craftsmen and weavers seem to buy their materials for cash and intermediate processing operations seem to be done on relatively fixed commission bases; this at least contrasts with those carpet weavers who receive looms, wool and a small monetary stake from an arbab.

4.6. Morphology and Community

Bazaar, citadel, and mosque are three traditional foci of the public Muslim city. Fragments of Yazd's old citadel wall still stand but today the buildings of government administration have spread out all over the city. The bazaar too has moved out not only from the old city, but also out of the nineteenth century bazaar onto the new streets. The Yazd Masjid-e Jome with the highest pair of minarets in Iran was in delapidated ruin until this century. It is now retiled, its minarets grown even taller with the addition of airplane warning lights, and a modern library has been added on through the efforts of Ayatollah Vaziri. Other old mosques have been restored: Mullah Ismail has new masonry, Imam Jafar's interior has been

the Frieden and Mann estimates for Kirman make up the third third of the two thousand shops. The Qazvin covered bazaar has been less dispersed onto the streets, and there seem to be more secondary and neighborhood bazaars.

TABLE 4
YAZD PRODUCE BAZAAR (SEPTEMBER 1971)

Commodity	Place of Origin	Price (rials/kilo)	
		Wholesale	Retail
almonds, shelled (<u>marghze badam</u>)	Yazd: Pusht Kuh		125
apples (<u>sib</u>)	Yazd: Pusht Kuh	8	10
beans: favia (<u>lapte baqali</u>)	Mashad		95
<u>lape</u>	Qazvin		28 & 30
kidney bean (<u>lubia</u>)	Rasht		15 & 17
cabbage (<u>kalam</u>)	Yazd: Nosratabad	4	5
carrots (<u>havitč</u>)	Yazd: Mandavo	3	4
chick peas: <u>naxod</u>	Kirmanshah	20	22
<u>naxod berešte</u> or			
<u>naxodči</u> (roasted)	Shiraz	24 (xami)	30*
<u>naxod-e tabrizi</u>	Tabriz		50
chick pea meal (<u>ard-e</u> <u>naxod</u>)			20*
cucumber (<u>xiar sabz</u>)	Yazd: Mandavo	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	5
dill greens (<u>ševitč</u>)	Yazd: Mandavo	8	9
eggs (<u>toxme morgh</u>)	Teheran		70
grapes: <u>angur-e siah</u> (black)	Yazd: Ashgozar	6	7
<u>angur-e khalil</u>	Yazd: Ashgozar	6	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>angur-e komari</u>	Yazd: Ashgozar	9	10
hazel nuts (<u>fendug</u>)	Yazd: Pusht Kuh	55	60
<u>kašk</u> (a sour milk solid) &	Shiraz	62	65
<u>gharevarut</u> (made from <u>kašk</u>)	Shiraz	28	30
lentils (<u>adas</u>)	Qazvin		24 & 30
melons: watermelon (<u>hindevaneh</u>)	Hamadan, Kirman, Jiroft, Shiraz	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
<u>xarbuzeh</u>	Mashad, Herat-e Kirman, Isfahan	5	6
<u>talebi</u>	Jiroft, Isfahan	1	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
mint (<u>nana</u>)	Yazd: Abshahi	5	7
onions (<u>piaz</u>)	Yazd	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	4*
pepper (<u>felfel</u>)	India	125	130* (ground)
pistachios (<u>peste</u>)	Rafsinjan	130 (with skin)	140* (dried)
pomegranates (<u>anar</u>)	Taft (poor quality) (better)	3	4 10
raisins (<u>kešmaš</u>)	Kashmaz-e Mashad		40
rice (<u>berenge</u>)	Rasht		30-50
seeds: squash (<u>toxme kadu</u>)	Tabriz		100* (toasted)
watermelon (red, black)	Yazd		52
sunflower (<u>toxme golak</u> ,	Tabriz		23
<u>oftab-gardan</u>)	Yazd		10

TABLE 4—CONTINUED

Commodity	Place of Origin	Price (rials/kilo)	
		Wholesale	Retail
spinach (<u>espináč</u>)	Yazd: Mandavo	12	14
squash (<u>kadu</u>)	Yazd: Buluk	5	6
tomato (<u>gowje</u>)	Isfahan	5	6
tumeric (<u>zarcube</u>)	India	50	55*(ground)
vetch (<u>mas</u>)	Hamadan		18

(*Processing involved by the retailer)

completely redone in mirror work (thanks to the philanthropy of Rohanian in 1971), and several others are under repair. New mosques have risen, notably that of the pistachio magnate Barxordar which sports atop its dome a rotating green neon sign reading "Allah," the Hazire Mosque contributing to the skyline a third pair of minarets (the second pair belonging to Amir Chak Mak where Moharram processions used to be held), and the recently deceased capitalist and philanthropist Rasulian has contributed a modernistic mosque with a four-sided leaning minaret. The traditional gymnasium (zurxane) has declined in popularity and has been supplanted by the Sports Club organizing teams by mahalleh and age. (Minority groups are still not well integrated: the Zoroastrians have their own sports facilities and are reputed to be good basketball players, but have no other organized sport.) Other new entertainment is the Khane Farhang (House of Culture), which opened in 1971, and the cinemas.

Cinemas are an interesting litmus for Yazd, inasmuch as there are only two and attempts to open two more failed. (Kirman, by contrast, has five and has had an active Khane Farhang for a number of years with films, drama, music, etc.) It can be argued that the locational choice of both these latter were bad, crediting customers with the will to go further from the city center than they actually would. But a more important factor is the ambiguous attitude towards cinemas: Yazdis compliment themselves that they waste little time on cinemas, and that it is primarily non-Yazdis working in Yazd who patronize the cinemas. The Government encourages cinemas as one form of entertainment which should be available to all, by

keeping prices down to as low as fifteen to thirty rials. Cinemas are frowned upon by the Islamic clergy and are a standard item in things of Hell (jehanam) in rosa speeches: Gus Thaiss reported similarly that in the Teheran bazaar, radio, TV and cinema were referred to as distractions of the true believer deriving from the hairs of the Dajal or Anti-Christ who precedes the Mahdi (1971: 200). (Some members of the Islamic hierarchy, recognizing that cinemas have a tremendous appeal for youth—the songs released through films are in themselves a major attraction—have argued that religious foundations should build a counter film industry to present the youth with a viable alternative.) The puritanism of Yazd is also evident in the little playing of backgamon or chess, games played passionately elsewhere in Iran (chess, however, less so than in Afghanistan), and in the almost complete absence of tea houses in the traditional sense of a gathering place to sit and talk. True tea houses are found only as functional appendages to garages for truckers; in the bazaar tea is brought to the shops from small stands where there may be also a place for four or five people to sit; other places which serve tea are primarily kebabis. A somewhat different, if more obvious, index of puritanism is the degree to which all classes of Yazdi women remain wrapped in their chadors; chador cloth is a major item in any cloth merchant or peddler's stock. The opening night of a film may find a number of upper class, and usually non-Yazdi, women without chadors defiantly banded together, and escorted by their menfolk; but even so, the majority of women seen without any sort of veiling usually turn out to be Zoroastrian women who have been living in Teheran.

Zoroastrians and Jews are moving out of Yazd and those residential segregations of the old Zoroastrian and Jewish Quarters are thus weakening. But new ones arise. Quarters have always had their own character. The old city is the center of poor weavers, of whom the bourgeoisie joke that they have been working in their filthy basements so long and hard that they do not realize the world above them has changed: they probably do not even know that Yazd has paved roads. Pusht-e Bagh towards the Taft side of town is where coppersmiths and ironsmiths, often immigrants from the hills

to that side, have clustered. In Jakubi and Mariamabad, as Jews, Zoroastrians and Bahais have moved out, immigrants from the Bafq hinterland have moved in. And so on. An entirely new suburb uphill to the south is tentatively being developed by capitalist and former Majlis Representative Sarofzadeh as an enclave for the upper classes who want privacy from the busy-body gossip of the old neighborhoods. To the west an industrial workers colony is being planned. To the east suburban garden and housing subdivisions are being created.

In the following chapters religious segments will be described not so much from the vantage of the present in transition to the future, but from the vantage of the present looking back.

CHAPTER V
ATESHKADEH O DADGAH¹
(PLACE OF FIRE AND JUDGMENT)

5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the social functions of religion on the local level, and in particular three propositions:

- (1) That there is a peasant form of social organization, including religious activities, which operates similarly whether the community is Zoroastrian or Muslim.

This will show up in land tenure and vaqf (religious endowment) organization, in the marriage system, in the food and charity redistribution systems, and to a lesser extent in the formation of local shrines (insofar as such formation is connected to the demarcation and guarding of agricultural property), all of which are phrased in religious terms or have religious components. The proposition is "functional" in form, but the demonstration can only be an "inductive" comparison. The proposition, furthermore, is not that the particular forms to be described are necessary to the operation of any peasant community, but that these particular forms interdigitate in such a way as to support and facilitate the necessary operations of political-economic adjustment.² An analogy with the chassis of an automobile may be drawn: a chassis is necessary, but it may be of different types. To

¹ A central Zoroastrian symbol of divinity is fire. The lowest of the three grades of consecrated fire is called a dadgah. Colloquially the tower of silence where the corpses are disposed is also called a dadgah, partly because a dadgah fire is kept lighted there, and partly because it is from here that the souls leave the corpses for judgment in the next world. Dadgah (from dadān [to give] + gah [place]) means "court," as in a court of justice. The general term for the building in which consecrated fires are housed is atesh (fire) kadeh (place). Ateshkadeh and dadgah thus represent the full cycle of religious life from the active acknowledging (by the living through worship before the fire) of moral standards of judgment to the passive invocation (upon the deceased) of those standards of judgment.

² On the problems of functional analysis see Hemple (1959). The "propositions" here are not precise enough to fully meet the criterion of falsifiability, but are rather meant to serve as a preliminary formulation in

To explain the selection of the particular forms (the particular type of chassis as well as the covering body and engine) one needs a second proposition:

- (2) That the historical continuity and contextually limited differentiation¹ of religious traditions contain two tendencies:
 - (a) Within a common social environment there is a mutual accommodation in custom such that, e.g., Zoroastrian wedding, pilgrimage, charity and mortuary behavior in Iran is closer in many respects to Iranian Muslim patterns than to Parsi (Indian Zoroastrian) patterns.
 - (b) The process of social group definition is coded in terms of mutual (dialectical) contradistinction. This is clearest in accusations of uncleanness, idolatry, sexual deviance, etc., themes which will be examined more closely in Chapter VI.

The order in which the chapter will proceed is to pick up the historical threads of Chapters III and IV by describing the current process of demographic and economic withdrawal from Yazd of the Zoroastrian population. The conflicts over land and water involved in this recent economic history will serve to lead into the uses of ritual to help resolve conflicts (at least by providing a forum and acceptable excuses for compromise), and to bind the community together. That religion can be divisive and used for drawing social boundaries within groups should be evident from Part I and needs no further emphasis here. The goal throughout is not to judge religion as divisive or integrative, but to explore its position in social life. This leads to the third proposition:

- (3) That what is "religious" is something which may not be decided by definitional fiat, but is a matter for empirical discovery.

Part of the argument for this proposition is contained in the preceding chapters. It is not simply a plea for attention to emic or native

opposition to the assertions that there are racial or other "essential" differences between Zoroastrians and Muslims. The task of anthropology is not to rest with such "black box" cover terms of cultural differences, but to explore how they come about and are used.

¹ Compare the argument in linguistics over the arbitrariness of words. Aside from onomatopoeic words and the like, the connection in the abstract between words and their meaning is arbitrary, but once a language exists, the etymological development of words is not unlimitedly arbitrary.

categories but rather is addressed to the coordinate problems of knowing what to look for in describing religious change (over time) or comparing religions (over space). It is indeed a most "peculiar embarrassment," as Geertz so eloquently put it, that the subject matter of the comparative study of religion should have remained so elusive:

The problem is not one of constructing definitions of religion. We have had quite enough of those. . . . It is a matter of discovering just what sorts of beliefs and practices support what sorts of faith under what sorts of conditions. Our problem and it grows worse by the day, is not to define religion, but to find it (Geertz 1968: 1).

Three contrasting cases for this search have been introduced in some detail in Chapters II and III. Chapter III might be read in terms of a heuristic puzzle as to why, of the Indian and Iranian Zoroastrian communities, the wealthier and more Westernized one (at least until recently), namely the Parsis, should have retained a greater degree of religiosity than the reputedly more traditional Iranian one. Part of the answer lies in the Hindu milieu which encourages the forms of religiosity of Zoroastrianism, whereas the Muslim milieu in Iran respects little of Zoroastrian practice. This issue of why the Iranian milieu should more strongly polarize categorical differences than the Hindu one also will be explored in the following chapters, but perhaps most simply has to do with the relative size of the populations involved (Zoroastrians are a minute minority in India, more so than they have been in Iran) and the relative number of sub-groups in the populations (Zoroastrians in India and even in Gujurat are only one of a large number of caste groups, but one of only a very few major categories in Iran: Zoroastrian, Christian, Jew, Bahai, Sumi, Ismaili, Jafari, and a few much smaller Muslim groups). But part of the answer to the puzzle is also that the Parsi elite in the last three centuries has consistently supported the religious institutions and tried to manipulate them as a technique of community control and therefore to be religious remained something very respectable. Among the Iranian Zoroastrians, by contrast, the merchants and political elite were the first to drop their religiosity. One cannot predict by analogy with either case what the corresponding situation would be for Islam in Iran. It is not the case that because the elite in Iran is losing its religiosity—if it ever displayed much—that

Islam is losing its potency as could be argued for Zoroastrianism both in Iran and more recently in India. Islam remains a very potent social instrument for reasons explored in Chapter II and to be pursued in Chapter VI. The organization of Islam is quite different from that of Zoroastrianism and whereas the result of modernization for Zoroastrianism has been liberalization of doctrine and ritual, the result of modernization for Islam has been a drift towards conservatism with the liberals being siphoned off into other groups.

In sum, the argument is that one can argue for functional similarities between Zoroastrian and Muslim village religion in Iran while recognizing their operation in the larger national political system to be quite different. What is being suggested is that analyzing the relation between religious symbols or ideology and behavior by looking for the structured reinforcements and sanctions for given kinds of behavior, including verbal responses—power relations in Weber's sense—provides a way of describing the differential role of religion in different social contexts.


5.2. Zoroastrian Villages of Yazd

There are about thirty villages in the Yazd Farmandar-e Koll which still have some Zoroastrian population.¹ All, except the summer resort village of Ahmad Khan, are located on the Yazd plain: i.e., non are mountain villages partaking of the two class arbab-rayat social structure found in the Push Kuh and Pish Kuh hills to the south. While there are larger and smaller land and water owners, and while there are land poor tenant-renters, the system of land holding is xordeh-malek (small owner) with no marriage segregation between landowners and land renters as in the mountain villages, although this is a question of degree and access to wealth: rich tend to marry rich in the former villages,² and newly rich land holders in the latter villages may be

¹ Ahrestan, Kheirabad, Khoramshahr, Qassimabad, Cham, Mobarake, Zeinabad, Khalilabad, Taft (with four distinct mahalleh), Rahmatabad, Mehtiabad-e Homeh (Ghulabad), Mariamabad (Moriabad), Nasrabad (Narsiabad), Kasnavieh (Kanu), Hassanabad-e Ardekan, Husseinabad, Nosratabad, Jafarabad, Aliabad, Kuchebiuk, Elahabad (Elabad), Sharifabad-e Ardekan, Mazar Kalantar, Mehtiabad-e Rostagh, Ahmed Khan (in summer), and one family still spends half the year in Abshahi.

² The pressure to marry within the confessional group is stronger than

MAP 3
ZOROASTRIAN VILLAGES OF YAZD



admitted to the marriage circuit. All thirty villages are closely tied to the urban economy, since few could even theoretically support themselves by agriculture, and since Zoroastrians do not rely on weaving for supplementary income as do similar Muslim villagers. Many Zoroastrian villagers are supported by funds coming from relatives in Teheran, and previously in India. The elderly members of the labor force claim to be farmers, but most of their sons are white collar workers or shopkeepers in Yazd or Teheran. All the villages are declining in Zoroastrian population as the process of migration away from the rural poverty of the last century goes to completion.

This demographic decline goes hand in hand with religious change. By reputation at least Yazd is the center of traditional religious practice, but this too is changing. For forty years there has been no functioning daxme in Teheran, the daxme at Rey having been closed in 1936 at Reza Shah's request, and the property at Qala Firuz having been purchased as a graveyard for the Teheran community.¹ A Teherani who wishes his body to be exposed must be taken to Yazd. In the Yazd area there were six functioning daxmes in 1970: two at Sharifabad-e Ardekan, one for the villages to the northwest of Yazd at Elabad, one for the villages to the south of Yazd at Cham, and two for the city itself to the southeast. One of the latter two was closed in 1971, and there is an understanding between the community and the Imperial Government's Ministry of Health² that the remaining daxmes will eventually be

than to marry of equal status. The titular head of the Zoroastrian community in Yazd claims that the rich marry poor co-religionists as a mode of social responsibility. In fact, marriages between unequals is usually the result of an exchange agreement made at an earlier time when there had been equality. In one case, a boy was promised to a girl when his sister married her brother. When it came time for him to marry, he had become educated and had a good job, while his father-in-law had become impoverished. The boy reluctantly honored the agreement for the status differential was tolerable. In another similar case, the status differential became intolerable when the husband, a physician, moved to the U.S.A., where a poorly educated wife seemed an obstacle.

¹ Zoroastrian Member of Parliament, Arbab Kei Khosrow Shahrookh, parleyed Reza Shah's request into the agreement for the Qala Firuz land. The Iran League in Bombay, the Irani Zoroastrian Anjoman of Bombay, and the Zoroastrian Ladies Association of Yazd issued a pamphlet in protest, entitled "Dokhma: A Scientific Method of Disposal of the Dead Among Zoroastrians" (1936).

² The former local head of the Ministry of Health in Yazd categorically

phased out. Sharifabad-e Ardekan is the most "traditional" of the Zoroastrian villages due largely to the alliance between the katkhoda, a local lawyer, and a dastur who married the sister of the katkhoda and who resided in the village until 1971. This was the only village to have a full-time resident dastur in recent years, the other dasturs all living in the Zoroastrian Quarter of Yazd called after them Mahalleh Dasturha (or more generally, Pusht Khan Ali¹). While in Yazd closing of daxmes is a reality, Sharifabad built a new one only a decade ago. Whatever nirang (the purified and consecrated bulls' urine used in certain rituals) still used in Iran is collected in Sharifabad, albeit nowadays from Muslim owned bulls. But even Sharifabad is sounding its death rattle. The 1971 two and a half millennial celebrations encouraged the Zoroastrian community to move one of their eight Yazd dasturs to Shiraz; this meant that the Sharifabad dastur had to take over his villages and so now lives only part time in Sharifabad. But even without this push, the age structure of Sharifabad, like that of the other villages, shows the young have left. Of an estimated 100 households, 41 were enumerated giving a sample population of 108. Eleven of these houses are empty, so the 108 represent 30 houses. Fifteen or half of these houses have only one or two inhabitants, and only one of these fifteen contains a person under 45, a case of a woman and her 14 year old daughter. The male-female ratio is nearly equal (56-52) but there is the thinning of population between ages 20 and 50: seven males and ten females.

This sort of age structure is repeated for most villages. Some villages barely exist at all. Asrabad and Sadrabad have been completely taken over by sand and have no population. Jafarabad has a population of

stated that the daxmes had been closed at his request since 1968, since in his opinion they constituted a health hazard from air borne microbes. Parsi authors have similarly inveighed against the microbiological hazards of graveyards (Rustomjee 1964: 14; Iran League 1936).

¹ This name is associated with a story about the protected status of Zoroastrians. In some accounts it was the Imam Ali himself who accorded protected status to the Zoroastrians and allowed them to live "behind his house." Others say that the name has nothing to do with the Imam, but that there used to be a caravanserai between the Zoroastrian Quarter and the city owned by someone named Ali.

of six who say they find the sand dunes beautiful. But the out-migration holds even where sand is not the problem. Zeinabad has a winter population of twelve households of 31-37 people of whom 24-26 are over thirty years of age. There are no men of prime labor force age (20s, 30s, 40s) except for two twenty-five year olds described as mentally disturbed. Only one woman is currently bearing children (i.e., all children, three in number, under fifteen belong to her). The Iranian Statistical Center's Village Gazetteer gives an estimated population from the November 1966 Census of 62 or 21 households. Aliabad, a village whose sweet water supply has diminished, but in 1971 got its sweet water qanat operational again after a seven year lapse, has a winter population of 74 Zoroastrians in 21 households (there are also eleven Bahai and Muslim households). Eleven children belonging to these twenty-one households live in Yazd in winter so as to go to high school. In 1966 there were 48 households with 168 people. Today of the prime work and child bearing age (20s, 30s, 40s) there are nine males and thirteen females. Of the thirteen females, two do not have a spouse (one widow, one unmarried), and three have spouses who are not resident in the village (working in Teheran or India). Of the nine males two drive trucks outside the village, two more are young men waiting to go into the army, leaving only five farmers, one of whom is a retired teacher. Of 53 males of the immediate families of these households (i.e., heads of households, sons of heads of households, husbands of daughters of heads of households), 27 are in Teheran, four in Yazd, seven in other villages of Yazd, seven in India and Pakistan, and eight in other cities of Iran.

Closer to town, and with the coming of the railroad station to its northern edge almost a suburb of Yazd, is the village of Qassimabad. In 1966 it had 74 households with 302 people; it has now 60 households with 234 people plus eight non-Zoroastrian households with thirty people. The forties are a big age category both for males (20) and females (19) but there is still the thinning in the thirties (two males and eight females) and twenties (four males, five females) which also shows up in the inverted age pyramid of the children. Of males of the immediate family, 71 are in Teheran, 3 in Yazd, 8 in India and Pakistan, 7 in other villages of Yazd, and 11 in other cities of Iran.

TABLE 5
YAZDI ZOROASTRIAN VILLAGE DEMOGRAPHY¹

Village	Age Approx. Yrs.	Population				Households	
		1953	1956	1966	1970	1966	1970
Hassanabad-e Ardekan	70	985	504	649	168(Z)	130	38(Z)
Mazar Kalantar	400		277		113+20		40+4 30½+4(Z)
Shahrifabad-e Ardekan	very old		1362		[c.270(Z)] 108 sample		30(Z- sample)
Aliabad	50	387		168	74+11(Z)	48	32 [21(Z) 3(B)]
Qassemabad	100	544		302	256 [224(Z)]	74	68 [60(Z) 3(B)]
Rahmatabad	100	1570	1236	1386	65(Z)	324	22(Z)
Mobarake	170	350	258	184	63+8	55	30 [22(Z) 6(J)]
Zeinabad	170	274	136	62	31+3	21	11 [6(Z) 5(J)]
Sare Deh, Taft					40(Z)		16(Z)
Bagh-e Khandan, Taft					30(sample)		12(sample of c.20)
Nasrabad	300			313(Z)	326(Z)	480 [90(Z)]	86(Z)

¹ 1953 figures are from the Iranian Army survey, Farhang-e Geographiye Iran, Vol. 10; 1966 figures are from the Iranian Statistical Center's Village Gazetteer, Vol. 8, except for Nasrabad, figures for which are from a local count; 1970 figures are the author's enumerations. Summer populations are indicated by +figures. Z = Zoroastrian; B = Bahai; J = Jadid-ul-Islam. Mazar Kalantar has a rare case of a Muslim-Zoroastrian marriage in a Zoroastrian community with off-spring marrying Zoroastrians. Ramatabad has a Zoroastrian case of polygamy. The under twenty figures for Hassanabad reflect that there is a local high school for boys, but girls go to Yazd.

		Males of Immediate Family																
		Age Structure (1970)										Total	India/ Pakistan	U.S./ Europe	Teheran	Yazd City	Other Iranian Cities	Other Yazd Villages
-20 M F		20-29 M F	30-39 M F	40-49 M F	50-59 M F	60+ M F												
51 29 +3 +13		1 -	1 9	13 11	12 8	8 9						48	9	3	24	5	5	2
22 21		- 2	5 11	5 5	6 11	14 11						61	-	-	52	3	6	-
24 17		6 4	- -	1 6	4 5	21 20						63	1	3	54	3	2	
14 16 +4 +6		3 4	4 6	2 3	2 3	9 9						53	7	-	27	4	8	7
47 55		4 5	2 8	20 19	3 7	28 24						99	8		70	3	11	7
14 8 6 11 +5 +3		- 1	- 3	4 6	5 3	9 12						38	3	2	20	4		
		1 4	1 8	5 7	3 3	6 8						45	9	-	23	4	7	2
2 3 +2 +1		2 -	- 1	- 4	3 3	9 4												
4 9		- 1	1 2	2 1	2 6	6 6												
10 5		- 1	2 2	1 4	1 3	1 4												
61 93		14 26	18 17	7 17	6 18	27 22						94	25	2	44		7	14

Finally, Nasrabad is one of the suburb villages which receives school children for the winter. It is part of the municipality's public service area (water, electricity, police), but is still enough on the edge of town to also have farm land attached. Of 89 Zoroastrian (including Zoroastrian-Bahai) houses with a population of 326 (133 males, 193 females), there is a fuller representation of the prime labor force age: 39 males, 60 females. But of these 39 males, only twelve are directly involved in agriculture, and of these only seven as farmers with land in the village: two have land elsewhere which they farm in the summer; two own tractors which they rent out; and one runs two irrigation wells. White collar jobs account for eleven men: eight teachers, three bank clerks. Nine run private enterprises: cloth shop, radio shop, watch repair, electrician, mechanic or tailor. One is a truck driver, one a student, one an invalid, and one just out of the army. Of interest is that at least twenty-five, i.e., more than a quarter of the households do not own the house they live in, meaning that they have moved into a house vacated by someone living in Teheran, in the city of Yazd, in India, or elsewhere. Rent is not the proper term for their position as money payment is usually not involved; rather they agree to keep up the gahambar seasonal ceremonies attached to the house, and occasionally also to read the sol (death memorial) ceremonies for the deceased of the house.


A similar pattern exists in the Zoroastrian Quarter of the city. Earlier in the century this was the locus of priests and wealthy merchants, but now most of the old families have left for Teheran and villagers have taken over their houses. There is some resistance to sale of these houses to Muslims since they are the somewhat sacred loci of the ancestors and should be the site of death memorial services if possible. Also there is still the desire to keep the quarter as a haven free of Muslims who once were persecutors. Nonetheless, a number are being sold. Ritual activity seems to be somewhat attenuated in this quarter more than in the villages, the remnant of the merchant class remaining aloof from village "folk religious" practices such as communal cooking of charity ash (stew), etc. Statistics from the two Zoroastrian boys high schools show that practically all fathers of the Zoroastrian students are villagers rather than urbanites.

Residential segregation occurs also in the villages. Map 2 shows the pattern for Nasrabad. Open Bahais in Nasrabad are all of Zoroastrian origin and so are residentially part of the Zoroastrian portion of the village. Similarly in Nosratabad all the Christians (five households, six people) are of Zoroastrian origin and live amid Zoroastrians. The ritual centers of Zoroastrian population clusters are marked by tall cypress trees in the courtyards of the village fire temples. In Taft and one or two other villages these trees become lost amid the other trees (especially the many pomegranate orchards of Taft), and in Zeinabad the cypress tree stands in the center of the village square rather than by the fire temple. The ritual perimeters of Zoroastrian population clusters are marked by small shrines: Nasrabad has five, Mazar Kalantar has sixteen, Khoramshahr four, and so on. Public baths and water supplies are also segregated. In the case of water, where a single abambar (underground water reservoir) is shared by Zoroastrians and Muslims, there are two sets of stairs leading to different taps, although the water is the same. (It is the touch of a non-Muslim which makes food or water unclean to the Muslim, and such touch does not occur with this arrangement.) There are no shops except for a butcher in the Zoroastrian part of the village, and that butcher is a Muslim from the large agricultural village of Ashgozar. Zoroastrian housewives still bake much of their own bread; all licensed nunvais (bread bakers) are Muslim.

5.2.1. Nasrabad: Land, Water and Ritual

Nasrabad, as one can see from the plan of the kuches (alleys), was always essentially a Zoroastrian village: the new blocks of straight kuches surrounding the old nucleus house textile mill workers and other urban Muslims who have migrated to town from villages or other quarters of Yazd. Fifty years ago, old timers relate, there were only four or five Muslim houses, and some eighty or ninety Zoroastrian houses full of people, not half empty like today. The origins of the village are lost in legend, but the legend confirms an agricultural fact of the recent past, namely that Nasrabad's irrigation water until the Reza Shah era came from the Dowlatabad qanat:

MAP 4
 NASRABAD RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION



The legend has it that the original population of Nasrabad lived several hundred yards to the west of the present village in the shadow of the gubernatorial palace, Bagh-e Dowlatabad. The Governor had many wives but no children. He brought a Zoroastrian girl into his harem, successfully impregnated her, but she aborted. The air was filled with the Zoroastrian xash-bu (good smell) of aromatic fires from the village, and the Governor was told that Zoroastrian magic had caused the abortion. He ordered all the adult Zoroastrians to be killed. Now this occurred in the time of Shah Abbas whose mother, Gohar Taj, was a Zoroastrian. Gohar Taj dreamt that half of Yazd was in flames. She asked Shah Abbas to investigate. On the road he found streams of refugees and was told of the death decree, and that the Governor was separating the boys from the girls. The boys were being sent taraf-e nar (to the male side) to a place which therefore became known as Narsiabad (the official name of the village) which in local slang becomes corrupted to Nasrabad. The girls were sent to Kuche Biveji which becomes corrupted to Kuche Biuk.

Another variant of the legend focuses attention on Zoroastrian status within Muslim society:

In the Bagh-e Dowlatabad mansion lived the notable Mir Miran. He conscripted the free labor of the local Zoroastrian men for some construction work. In charge of the labor gang he put an overseer who was continually abusive to the laborers and complained that they did not work hard enough. Eventually the men got fed up, and when one morning the overseer greeted them with the words, "Well, how come you are not working?" they replied, "We are working," and the fifty men began to beat him to death. The body was walled up in the center of the wall they were building. Night fell and Mir Miran came to inquire where the overseer was. The men responded that he had come in the morning and had left in a great hurry. Inquiries all around failed to locate the overseer. Two years later when the masonry had dried out, a stain appeared on the wall; so the wall was ripped apart to determine the cause of the stain. A mass of bones was found, and it was surmised that this had to be the missing overseer, and that the only ones who could have killed him were the Zoroastrian workers. Mir Miran gathered his men around him. He took his hand and dipped it first in honey and then in a pile of opium seeds. Holding up the hand, he then said that he was giving permission to kill as many Zoroastrians as there were opium seeds on his hand, i.e., unlimited license to kill. Meanwhile the mother of Shah Abbas had a dream that there was trouble in Yazd and sent the Shah to see what was happening. When the Shah arrived in Yazd the people said they had been given license to kill as many Zoroastrians as they wanted. The Shah said: "No. First we will kill Mir Miran." This was done. Then to placate the aroused Muslims, he said that he would turn the Zoroastrians out of their houses and make them move away from the Government buildings (of Bagh-e Dowlatabad). And so the new Nasrabad was founded.¹

¹ This legend is also told for the ziaratgah (shrine) Baba Kamal, nine

A third variant gives as the motive for making the Zoroastrians move, the disturbance caused to inhabitants of Bagh-e Dowlatabad by Zoroastrian ritual life. The officials complained about continuous wailing and continuous death ceremonies that the Zoroastrians were forever carrying on. And so the Zoroastrians were requested to move a bit further away. Although this third variant was told to me by a Zoroastrian, the latter heard it from a Muslim, which may explain the element of wailing. Zoroastrians attempt to keep wailing at death to a minimum in conscious contrast to Muslims: death is not an unhappy event for the soul involved, and the only unhappiness should be the separation from loved ones which the full death memorializing should help to bridge (letter writing to one away on a trip, being an analogy). Indeed Parsis in the last century complained about the overly gay aspects of Yazd funerals (analogous perhaps to the jazz funerals of New Orleans).

Shah Abbas is the protagonist in scores of such stories, and his name is less a historical reference than a marker of what otherwise would be glossed "it is said."¹ Dowlatabad, according to the local histories, was built around 1172 A.H./1754 A.D., just in time for the visit of Karim Khan Zand, by the Yazdi aristocrat Aqa Mohammad Taqi Khan, popularly known simply as Khan-e Bozorg (Great Khan). Khan-e Bozorg also had the qanat-e Dowlatabad dug, and made a portion of it² vaqf for the palace grounds. The rest of the water supplied the three villages of Ahrestan, Kuche Biuk, and

kilometers northeast of Kirman, except instead of dipping the hand in honey, it was shireh (heavy cream), and instead of dividing the boys from the girls, the Governor wanted to collect all at Baba Kemal for convenient slaughter. Zoroastrians hold a xeirat (see section 5.3.2) in honor of Shah Abbas here for saving them (Soroushian 1956: 208).

¹ A modern operation of this form was the way news of the dismissal of the chief of Pahlavi Hospital made its way into the villages. In the summer of 1970 Iran was the only country from Central Asia to Morocco not to acknowledge cases of cholera during that year's epidemic. The version current among the local physicians was that the chief lost his job because too many deaths had occurred from this non-existent disease. In the villages, reflecting other problems, it was said that the Shah had arrived one night incognito. He flew his own plane, and hired a taxi to take him to the Hospital. There he found no nurses or doctors on duty. He returned to Teheran and fired the chief.

² Ayati (1923: 370) says that one fifth equalling 416 jureh was Dowlat-

Nasrabad. By the end of the period of Constitutional agitations, the qanat was in disrepair, and so in 1310 A.H./1931 A.D. when the Reza Shah Government began registering urban land, little protest was made over the manner in which the local functionary, Mr. Akrami (a descendant, incidentally, of Khan-e Bozorg), distributed titles. Shrewd speculators, including a number of Zoroastrians, both from Nasrabad (having made their money in Bombay) and from Pusht Khan Ali (merchant money), bought what in those days were good sized blocks of land. The map of Nasrabad's fields shows this redistribution quite clearly with the small convoluted gardens maintained by small holders at the time contrasting with the straight edged, larger blocks of what was then dry land. The new owners drilled deep wells after the war, and most agriculturalists pay a nominal rent on the land of three or four mann (18-24 kilos) per qafiz (now 1000 square meters) of wheat,¹ plus 14-20 tomans per hour for water. But through the war years there was almost no water, and most people who continued to farm had land in Raimabad, slightly downslope from Nasrabad. Most, however, left to go either to other villages or to India. A very rough feeling for the kind of mobility forced upon villagers such as Nasrabadis may be gained from two figures. Of seventy households surveyed, almost half (32) stated that their parents were from another village, and in less than a third (20) had neither the head of the household himself nor his father been to Bombay or Karachi. With the restoration of water in Nasrabad, the village drew population from villages where water was drying up. Jafarabadis first moved to Aliabad, and then some came to Nasrabad, while another group went to Hassanabad-e Ardekan. Asrabadis, Elabadis, Husseinabadis, Sadrabadis all are represented in the current Nasrabad population, as are eight other villages which are less dessicated.

The post war years were not negligible in terms of entrepreneurship and innovation for Nasrabadis. A factory for generating electricity was

abad vaqf. Old men remember one fourth of a sixteen day cycle with 130 jureh per day. Divisions of course may have altered over time.

¹ Return on a qafiz is about 30-70 mann of wheat from one and a half mann of seed. A mann sells for four or five tomans (in 1969 the price was 35 rials, in 1970 it was 55 rials). This is a good return: the poor villages around Bafq get 1:10 returns.

started and operated until 1968 when the Government took over the Kavusi (the Zoroastrian entrepreneur who supplied electricity for the city) enterprise in town, and extended electrical services from the city to Nasrabad. The German made machinery had been bought (but never fully paid for) from Kavusi a decade earlier, and was run by a five man partnership, all Zoroastrian or Zoroastrian Bahai. The water for the operation came from one of the deep wells, the only community owned well, a fifty-two member partnership. The manager of the well was also one of the five partners of the electrical enterprise. I was not allowed to see the current contract of the well partnership, but the first contract, beginning in 1334 S./1955 A.D. and supplanted by the new contract in 1970, had 2080 shares¹ divided among thirty-four signatories; twenty-two of these were Zoroastrians plus two Zoroastrian-Bahais, and nine were Muslim plus one Muslim-Bahai. Linked to the production of electricity also was a small flour mill. The organizer of the electricity project had also introduced a salt factory, but that closed when he died during the installation of the electricity equipment. Another man attempted to introduce a glass factory, but that came to nought. In the Muslim section of the village, entrepreneurial activity is limited to shopkeeping, cottage weaving (electric looms), and one dyer. One poor old man also grinds salt in a little mortar, but that is hardly innovative entrepreneurship. More to the point is a former camel owner who traded in his camels for a tractor which he now rents out.

¹ That is 2080 jureh, adapted from the old agricultural system of a sixteen day cycle with 130 jureh per day: $130 \times 16 = 2080$. The way the present water distribution works, however, is that anyone who wants water buys it by the hour, previously at nine tomans per hour for twenty-five qafiz worth of water, and now that the well has been redrilled from ninety to one hundred thirty meters at thirteen tomans for forty qafiz worth. These rates are minimally negotiable by the farmer: the stated rate is fourteen tomans but most people refuse to pay more than thirteen and some pay less. The rates are subject to Government regulation, but referral to court proceedings would ruin the manager's ability to live in the community with any peace. He is in a particularly bad position as irrigation wells, like electricity, are nationalized in theory. Shareholders in the earlier contract received a fixed dividend of two tomans per jureh per year; this has been reduced to one toman in the new contract because of capital investment costs. Surplus profits accrue to the manager, who claims to barely break even, but he does not keep accurate enough records to know for sure.

Today Nasrabad has been absorbed into Yazd, and most of the labor force works in the city outside the village, or more properly now mahalleh.¹

The various economic changes and adjustments described inevitably incurred conflicts of various kinds. Conflicts over water—who should get served first, how much and when payment should be made—have been hinted at. Petty thievery of one another's crops caused a group of farmers to reintroduce after a four year lapse the old office of daštban, a paid watchman, in 1971. There were constant quarrels over the electricity service. Conflicts over land are also common. A common move if one suspects the land-owner wants to dispose of the land is to plant alfalfa, which is a three to five year crop, and the owner, if he insists on immediate possession of the land, must pay a compensation called dastrangi for whatever investment the cultivator has made in the soil. Dastrangi can be claimed for plots which have last been planted with watermelons since watermelons require much fertilizer and do not exhaust the soil. Wheat, on the other hand, exhausts the soil, and there is no dastrangi on wheat land. Dastrangi, like sedagh,² acts as a mild deterrent, as well as a monetary adjustment for real losses. The cultivator is also protected at the moment by the fact that real market prices of land are far above the Government fixed prices, and there seems to be a legal principle of allowing the current tenant to purchase the land at the latter price if the owner wants to alter its usage or ownership but not its agricultural status. This

¹ Nasrabad is a distinct section of town, i.e., people can easily point to the kuches which form its boundaries. It consists, however, of two mahalleh (neighborhoods), one Zoroastrian and one Muslim, but these have no proper names.

² Sedagh or mehriye is an amount of money contracted by the groom at the time of marriage as payable to the bride should he divorce her. Usually glossed in English as "brideprice," this sum in Yazd is usually paid only in part at the time of marriage. It is said that it is to the bride's advantage that it not be paid until divorce becomes a real possibility, since payment at that time can act as a deterrent to the husband not to go through with his divorce intent. The portion paid at the time of marriage is called shir baha (milk price) and theoretically is paid to the mother of the bride for the milk she gave in bringing up the girl. This is all Islamic practice; Zoroastrians have no sedagh, but there is a folk custom corresponding to shir baha of paying thirty three coins to the bride's father when she is being taken from his house, in recognition of his expense in raising her.

nicety, however, is somewhat obviated by the informal power of large owners with access to skilled legal brokers.¹ Registration of land is also still a source of much conflict and bureaucratic maneuver.²

One of the most interesting conflicts over land began during the dry pre-war years when many people left Nasrabad. One man, call him Ardeshir, moved away to another village. His brother's son, call him Hormuzdiar, struggled on with the family lands in Nasrabad and some rented lands in Raimabad. As things got worse his landlord in Raimabad took back his land to farm himself, leaving Hormuzdiar destitute with wife and children. He made the long journey overland via Zahedan to Bombay where he collected money from Nasrabadis there to refurbish the village fire temple and to utilize some of their lands for its support. Returning to Nasrabad, by various means as manager of the temple and of its yaof lands and so on, he managed to make ends meet. When after the war, Nasrabad's fortunes again improved, Ardeshir returned to claim his part of the family lands. Hormuzdiar refused to give them back, saying that he had given them up. The dispute went on to Hormuzdiar's death bed. At that point Ardeshir went to him and said, "If you die without giving me my land, I will not come to bless your corpse, and it will sit in the daxme and putrify but it will not go away" (i.e., neither will the vultures touch the body, nor will the soul be able to cross over into the next world). Hormuzdiar replied, "Go on! Get out of here! I am not going to die!" When Hormuzdiar died, Ardeshir did not come to bless the body. One of Hormuzdiar's sons, call him Rustam, who had returned from Bombay was told of the dispute and of Ardeshir's curse. He, half gullible, went to the nasusalar (corpse bearer) who was the watchman of the daxme in which his father had been placed. This nasusalar told him that although quite some time had passed, the body, now bloated,

¹ A shrewd move by one Zoroastrian land holder whose title was in dispute was to donate a piece of the land to the city. The Governor by signing the transfer deed was also thereby acknowledging the Zoroastrian's title to the remaining land. A similar donation to the city of a garden was made by a Muslim developer who held land near the new public garden.

² A small holder fears to go to court over a tenant who is recalcitrant in paying the nominal rent because the tenant demands a receipt for rent payment. The landlord refuses because a receipt might give the tenant an option to buy the land should he wish to change the tenancy. He prefers to forego the rent.

still remained in the daxme. Rustam begged to verify this himself, but the nasusalar would not grant him entry, saying that an ordinary man could not stand the sight. Rustam then decided that whatever the truth of this matter, Ardeshir's case had some merit, and was certainly worth settling in the interests of community peace. He called upon the aged Ardeshir, and agreed that if he could get half a dozen people to sign a statement that they remembered the land to be rightfully his, he, Rustam would sign over the deed. The land would legally revert to Ardeshir, but since Ardeshir did not live in Nasrabad, it would remain in Rustam's possession and he would pay a small annual rent. This was done. Rustam then took Ardeshir to a bath and went with the old man to the daxme where Ardeshir blessed Hormuzdiar's soul, and a yasht dowre daxme was held. After a few days Rustam was told that Hormuzdiar's body had gone. Ardeshir is now dead, but the dispute has still not been resolved. Rustam found that his brothers did not appreciate his ways of dealing with the family property, and so he left the affairs to his younger brother. This brother does not recognize Rustam's signature on the deed to Ardeshir's land as valid since the land of Hormuzdiar had never been divided among the heirs and was not Rustam's to give away. This is a perennial source of ill will between the two brothers, expressed by the elder's refusal to drink tea in the house of the younger.

There are other property conflicts involved here as well, since for three generations inheritance has not been divided. Hormuzdiar, in whose hand all the land was held at one point, had ten children, a brother and two uncles.¹ His heirs waited for division until his youngest child reached maturity, which has only recently occurred. Another son meanwhile had married his brother's daughter, and a third has recently died (these being changes in the composition of competing claims). When land was being registered by Mr. Akrami before the war, Hormuzdiar had all the land in his control registered as private land (melki). His brother objected that most of this land was given to him in trust, and that it should be registered as land held in trust for the descendants of the family (vagf-e oladi).

¹ Hormuzdiar's father had two brothers, Ardeshir and a convert to Bahaism. When the latter converted, he was cut out of consideration to family property. This brother's son, in any case, married a Jewess and moved to America.

This brother, whose urban business, Yazd's first cinema, had closed, and who needed land, took physical possession of part of the land. The rest of the land passed into the control of Hormuzdiar's sons who have rented most of it out. Since the land is agreed to be vaqf, its produce is supposed to support three gahambars (described below).

Here the real complications begin, and their brief recitation will serve to show one way religious rituals articulate with the village economy, and why the yasht dowre daxme (described below) mechanism, while it provided a sufficient psychological motive for Rustam to yield to Ardeshir, yet failed to solve the tenure problem. Land ownership, in the absence of written deeds, is claimed by a process of having a certain number of people witness that a given piece of land belongs to the claimant: such a deed is called a sanad.¹ This was the technique used by Rustam to transfer land to Ardeshir informally (i.e., without reference to the Government Registry). Informally also the deal could be consummated by payment of a rent to Ardeshir for the use of the land. But physically, the land is being cultivated by several people who pay rent to Rustam's brother. One piece of the land was given by Hormuzdiar's wife as security for a loan to another woman. This woman is willing to continue to pay rent, but not to return the land. There are now four competing claims for the land: firstly there was Hormuzdiar's attempt to register land all as his own private property. This would today give his heirs a free hand in disposing of the property. It would also cut anyone out of a share except his direct descendants. For the latter reason Hormuzdiar's brother and uncle objected that the land was joint family land and was in Hormuzdiar's possession only as trust (vaqf-e oladi). Others in the community point out that the gahambars which are supported by the vaqf endowment are held in the village fire temple and that this indicates that the vaqf was not a vaqf-e oladi (trust for one's children), but a vaqf-e amulmanfa (religious endowment) made up of lands entrusted by a number of people to Hormuzdiar in his function as manager of the fire temple (deh-mobed, literally "village priest" but meaning "lay

¹ In Qajar times apparently called istiṣhād-nameh as opposed to a title deed called gabaleh (Lambton 1967: 54-55).

priest," i.e., a behdin, literally a follower of the "Good Religion" or layman, who cares for the fire in the absence of a priest; also atash-band or fire caretaker). Were the case to go to court, a possible decision feared by the litigants is that the land might be appropriated by the Office of Endowments (Edare Oghaf), and thus be alienated to the whole community. One of the brothers said the affair should not go to court in any case as it looks bad for a family to squabble so publically. In fact the issue has been taken for arbitration to the police who washed their hands of the case, saying that brothers ought to be able to solve their own disputes. Fourthly, the issue is now complicated by the rights of the tenants using the land.

The value of the land being discussed is not very much under its present usage, it is claimed. As urban land it will be worth considerably more. Again no one would supply figures but something of the value can be estimated from the fact that the three gahambars it supports cost about 600 tomans. Were all of the 600 tomans supplied from land rent, the amount of land (at the average rent of three or four mann of wheat per qafiz) would work out to about forty qafiz. Some of Hormuzdiar's sons would just as soon sell their shares when division takes place, but at least one argues that vaqf land cannot be sold, at least it cannot be alienated from beneficiaries of the vaqf, since vaqf land is supposed to be a trust in perpetuity for coming generations.

5.3. Community Rituals

Vaqf is only one of several ritual forms which serve as a cementing bond for the community. It happens to have an Islamic facade (in name at least), but interdigitates well with other village bonds. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with six more specifically Zoroastrian elements of this interdigitation: four memorial and horizontally integrating rituals (yasht dowre daxme, xeirrat, death memorials proper, strengthening the fire); weddings and the inter-generational ties of the marriage system; pilgrimage and non-kinship, non-property based integration. While these elements have a Zoroastrian facade, there are Muslim parallels which will be noted.

5.3.1. Yasht Dowre Daxme

Yasht dowre daxme (yasht around the daxme) is a memorial service done at night at a daxme for a deceased person. Unlike the codified memorial rites on the third, fourth, tenth days, month, and year anniversaries, this may be done at any time. It begins at dark, and the participants individually recite the patet prayer of repentance. They also roast vinegar, tumeric, oil, salt, garlic, and rue in a small fire to give off a xash bu (good smell) which is meant to kill microbes in the air. Two dasturs are hired to read the yasna¹ which takes about four hours. While the dasturs recite, the laymen picnic, part of the idea being that those who share food with the dead bless them. Fruit is cut open and placed before the dasturs; these and dried fruit and nuts are blessed by the recitation and their eating by the memorialists is both tribute to the deceased and physically salutary for the consumer. The ritual setting also includes water and myrtle (murd) twigs. The dasturs may leave after the recitation, but the memorialists remain the night so as to say the morning patet at dawn.

One such ceremony I attended was done on the sol, or first anniversary of a death. The deceased had not been placed in the daxme but was buried in the Zoroastrian cemetery below the Yazd daxmes. The family and friends first proceeded to the grave where they poured a circle of vinegar around the grave and roasted the combination of vinegar, garlic, tumeric, rue, etc., mentioned above. The form and memorial function of the yasht dowre daxme is not altered by the fact that the body has been exposed to the worms rather than to the birds. The difference in form of disposing the dead, however, is recognized to have one functional difference: one cannot use the grave one can a daxme for divination of the progress of the soul.² An old man listing the reasons he preferred the daxme to the graveyard gave as his first reason

¹ The folk name refers to yashts, the invocations to the thirty yazatas (angels). Only twenty yashts are still extant. One priest says only the Sorush Yasht or Ahnevadgatsh is read, but that would not take two hours. Yasna, chapters of the Gathas, is also the liturgical name of the shortest of the three main ceremonial recitations: Visperad, Vendidad, and Yasna.

² There is also the difference that light does not shine on a body in the grave except the metaphoric light of divine presence. In a daxme light should be constantly on the deceased: during the day, the sun; at night the

that one could determine if the body remained unduly long in the daxme that the soul might need the help of a yasht. Opponents of the daxme cite such claims as the kind of abuse of position engaged in by unscrupulous priests or other functionaries who receive pay for extra services thereby. The same Rustam of the story above repeats a story he heard from Shahriyar, another old man, that the latter was owed some money by a dying man. He did not go to the čaharom (fourth day memorial) to bless the body. It is on the morning after the third night, as the sun crosses the horizon, that the soul of the deceased is taken by the "angel" Soroush, who has been protecting the soul on the earth for the three nights, to be judged and to cross the Chinvat Bridge into hell or paradise. This morning, the čaharom, the men gather to settle the debts of the deceased and to make claims on his estate. Shahriyar did not go to this ceremony. After some time had passed, he went to the nasusalar at the daxme and asked whether the body was still there, for he had not blessed it. The nasusalar is said to have replied, "Why do you come now? You should have come immediately. Then I could have called people and we could have arranged something. But now it is too late."

The relation between these ritual acts of the living and the welfare of the dead ancestors is subject to some speculation. Most Nasrabadis assume there to be a world of souls metaphysically co-existent with the world of the living, and dreaming forms the most common form of communication between the two worlds.¹ The theory that the soul, or one of several souls contained in each human being, wanders in dream from the body is very widely held. Visions of saints and angels are then communication from God, and the sites of visions are often made into shrines. "There are three ways God communicates with you," said one man: "through dreams, through a stranger, and through business successes." The last constitutes approval. The second requires an open attitude of sociable good will towards others. Dreams present problems

the light of the atesh dadgah maintained in the rest houses near the daxme. A hole near the top of the daxme wall directed towards this fire allows its rays entry to guide the souls even at night.

¹ Of fifty-five Nasrabadis asked if they believe in life after death, only two said no; thirty-eight said yes; eleven used the positivist responses, "How are we to know?" or "I have not been there to see" or "God knows;" four did not respond.

of interpretation, not the least of which is that there are non-divine causes for dreaming such as over-eating.¹ But not all Nasrabadis insist that there is a direct relation between ritual acts of the living and the welfare of the ancestors. Some take the intermediate position that a gathering of the living to pray for the deceased is like collecting character witnesses to plead before the divine judge that whatever sins were committed were done unwittingly, were not part of the defendant's normal behavior; and that God takes such peer group recommendations into account. Some take the radical "Durkheimian" view that the rituals are really only for the living to remind them of and rededicate them to their moral duties. This is also blended by a few with reincarnation: the rituals remind you of moral duties and of the retribution you will experience for present acts in the next life on earth.²

¹ Dream interpretation is a subject of much folk interest. (Even the Shah cites dreams ordaining his role in his Mission for My Country.) One rule is an inversion procedure: if you dream of throwing money away, you will receive money; dreaming of weddings and flowers is inauspicious, of crying auspicious. Some themes have standard identifications: dreaming of eating fruit is a sign that a wish will come true. One problem in collecting useful sets of dreams in the manner of Western psychoanalysis is that people feel there to be something damaging to themselves or their dream experience if non-trivial dreams are revealed.

² The question of belief will be dealt with further in Chapter VIII. For the moment a single conversation will serve as a reminder of the problems involved. It is a conversation with a Nasrabadi who was opposed for a long time to the anthropologist's presence, but at a time a slightly more favorable attitude was emerging. The conversation therefore always contained an element of sparring. Both the sentiments and the love of sparring are not unrepresentative.

Nasrabadi: Do you believe in a soul (ruh)?

Anthropologist: No.

N: Then why when I sleep, in a dream my soul is in Teheran?

A: May I answer with another question first: how do you know that your soul is in Teheran? If I now say "Ferdowsi Street" do you not get a picture of being on that street in your mind?

N: Yes.

A: Now are you, or is your soul, here or there?

N: I'm here. No, you do not understand: in my dream my soul is there. Why?

A: I understand. I only ask how you know it is there?

N: Look, see that light bulb?

A: Yes.

N: Electricity makes it bright. Everything has a body and everything has its electricity. An engineer turns on the electricity, so God is my maker. You don't see the electricity. Electricity is like the soul.

5.3.2. Xeirrat

Considered in terms of formal structure, the yasht dowre daxme is one of several rituals that are loosely called by participants xeirrat. Xeirrat literally means charity or "goodness;" and refers here to a kind of commensualism. Interestingly, among the Turkish speaking Shahsevand almost the same term, xeir o-shar (good and evil), is used for the "dyadic relation of mutual attendance at feasts," i.e., for an ego-centric group of people who invite and are invited to feasts of varied occasions, formal and informal (defined by whether or not invitations are sent), marital, mortuary, etc. (N. Tapper 1968). Such xeirrat among rural Zoroastrians are done (xeirrat kardan, to do goodness) on the occasions of the six gahambars, on occasions of fulfillment of vows (if my son gets well, if my son passes his exams) and on occasions of death memorials. Food sharing at weddings would not be considered xeirrat, but the sending of food from the wedding party to poor people not in attendance is xeirrat: that is, as the world literally implies, there is a moral content to xeirrat.

(We go into another room to eat. N. turns on the light.)

A (jokingly): You have become God.

N (laughs. N: You have been to all of these shrines: what did you learn?

A: Well, I learned their stories. I learned what people say about them.

N: Yes, but did you learn if there is any truth to them?

A: That depends on what you mean. I learned that people have faith in them, and that constitutes a kind of truth.

N: Now look, if someone says there is stew, people will go to get stew. Either there will be stew and they can eat it, or there will not be stew.

A: I did not ask for any stew.

N: Well, what then did you see at Pir-e Banu (a shrine to be described)?

A: I saw a building and a mound of earth.

N: But that is all?

A: Yes: I did not ask for stew. But you too have been there: did you find stew?

N: No. I only found people who said they had found stew. But then do you think there is any truth to people who go there?

A: Belief itself, as I said, is a kind of truth: people who are sick and who believe go there and are cured.

N: Why don't they go to a doctor?

A: There are some things a doctor cannot cure.

N: Like I have a cold, but I don't go to a doctor because I know he cannot do anything: I just take some pills.

A: But you do not go to a shrine?

N: No, because I do not believe in them.

This is, of course, and with economic reason, an almost universal peasant ritual from the semi-sedentary Amazonian bands (reaho) to the intensive rice cultivating Indonesians (slamatan). Among rural Muslim villages of Iran rosa xondan takes this form: a full meal is provided. Robert Dillon, working in a village near Kirman in 1971, reports (personal communication) that his villagers made such a feast with a frequency that works out to once every second or third day. There is, of course, a clustering of such rosas during Ramazan and Moharram which probably accounts for half to a third of such feasts. Every family is expected to give such a feast during the year, and almost all do. In Yazd, the rosa has become urbanized and only tea and cigarettes are served.¹ The frequency of rosas remains high, but the expense is reduced. Similarly among urban Zoroastrians in Teheran (and the Teheran-oriented Pusht Khan Ali Mahalleh of Yazd) an explicit substitution for communal feasts by other forms of charity is recognized. "It makes more sense," is the standard comment revealing community discussion and agreement, "to give people as charity something they can use, rather than something they already have: food almost everyone has, clothing some may need, contributions to educational, health and other facilities are definite community needs." In the villages of Yazd, two non-religious functions—and it is these which define xeirat rather than their religious garb—are consciously recognized: (a) that normally one does not eat with someone with whom one has an argument, and that since this is a religiously sanctioned occasion for eating together, it can serve to ease gracefully the final small concessions needed for agreement, and thus can be a force for patching up quarrels; (b) that until very recently, food was not so plentiful, and such feasts provided a square meal for poor people who otherwise would have nothing nourishing. Scattered references have already

¹ It is remembered that in the past serving food at rosas in the villages was not uncommon. Ash (stew) is still cooked on occasion, especially on Ashura when it is called Ash-e Imam Hussein. An Ash-e Imam Reza is cooked once a year by the Muslims of Nasrabad, and even the Zoroastrians contribute to this one. "Urbanized" is, of course, a loose term: the argument has to do with changes in the nature of the economy away from food-poor villages.

been made to the very real food problems experienced by rural Iran.¹ How much of a redistributive function such rituals performed is today hard to estimate in Yazd, but the cost and frequency of the rituals can be suggested in a qualitative way. Xeirat in its more restricted sense refers to the preparation of ash (stew) for the entire community. It is cooked in the kitchen of the fire temple in huge cauldrons. A small amount is eaten by the principal celebrants on the spot, and the rest is taken around from house to house, where each household may take enough to eat for three days. Obviously the cost of such a xeirat varies with the size of the community.

¹ For the present day see Chapter IV. A thirty year old Zoroastrian bank clerk gets extremely upset when anyone criticizes the Shah, who for him personifies the economic miracle of the last decade. He remembers working for the Bank-e Keshavarzi in Kirman during the early 1960s when its services were first being extended, and taking American wheat as well as cash loans to destitute rural trogdolytes. Their homes were so unsanitary, he recalls, that he could not bear to stay and eat with them, but preferred to eat alone in his jeep. One thing he cannot understand: the American wheat was black, spoiled. How much better, today, to have healthful, clean Iranian wheat. (Iran still imports wheat from the U.S. and Australia)

The war years were an economic disaster for Iran. There was a tremendous drop in foreign trade volume: between 1939 and 1942 exports dropped by a half and imports by a fourth. Textile mills closed, unable to compete with the goods supplied in the train of the Allied forces. The crops failed in 1942, and the Persian Government in desperation virtually turned the economy over to Millspaugh. Inflation was tremendous, the Allies obliging the Bank Melli to increase the volume of rials from 1350 million in 1941 to 7200 million in 1944. The price index for those years rose from 242 to 1085. Sugar, tea and cotton piece goods were rationed, but the rural population got no rations and had to depend on the black market. Profiteering on war contracts boomed. When in 1949 the crops failed again, wheat was supplied by the U.S., but was spoiled when it arrived; more wheat was purchased from the U.S.S.R. with enormous profits, Alavi alleges, accruing to Princess Ashraf, Premier Said, and businessman Wahabzadeh. The Russians in the north exploited oil, cut the trees, controlled agricultural output and forced trade agreements unfavorable to Iran over Teheran munitions and the Caspian fisheries.

In the immediate post-war years, American advisors found that the Iranian peasant lived on less than 2000 calories a day (U.S. average = 3200); 25-35% of the population was infected with malaria; wide-spread malnutrition complicated epidemic proportions of tuberculosis, dysentery, trachoma, and venereal disease. An estimated 15% of Iran's annual crop was being destroyed by pests; there were locust plagues in both 1951 and 1952. In Mamazan, a village near Teheran, the Near East Foundation found it could double grain yields and more than double other yields. (See Alavi 1955: 33-35; Pirnia 1945; Stevens 1951; U.S. Department of State 1952.)

In Nasrabad (1970) it costs about one thousand tomans (\$130): a good sized sheep worth 200-250 tomans, rice, potatoes, beans, chick peas, greens, flour for bread, plus payment to the cooks. Such xeirats will be made by richer members of the religiously active community on the six seasonal gahambars, for vows, celebrations,¹ and on more important death memorials such as the tenth day, the first month, and the anniversary. There are several terms used here colloquially with overlapping meanings: xeirat ("charity:" ash distribution), sol (annual death memorial), gahambar (seasonal feast), and sopreh (the cloth on which food is placed). Sol is used loosely to refer to other death memorials than the annual ones; gahambar is often confused with xeirat for feasting on occasions of vows and celebrations; a xeirat in the sense of ash distribution may be made on a sol or gahambar; sopreh refers to commensualism, the actual eating off one table cloth on any of these or other occasions (e.g., rituals such as Sopreh Bibi Sešambe, to be discussed later).

Let us begin with the gahambar proper, the seasonal feast, and it will become clear why all these terms have been introduced together. The gahambars are five day celebrations every two months. Originally, it seems quite clear, both on the grounds of the meaning of the six names² and on grounds of cognate rituals of other ancient peoples, especially in Mesopotamia, these feasts were associated with the agricultural cycle: the several harvests, sowings, lambing, etc. As, however, the ritual calendar, through inattention to intercalulation, fell out of phase with the agricultural cycle, the feasts lost their association with this meaning and became simply a period every two months to seek God's aid. Zoroastrian and European

¹ For instance, when the grandson of an old Nasrabadi lady, living by herself very poorly, got married in London, the village was treated to such a xeirat.

² Maidyojarem, "mid-spring" harvest of winter wheat and barley; Maidyoshem, "mid-summer;" Paiteshem, "grain-bringing" or "harvest time" of summer crops; Yathrem, "home coming" sowing of winter crops; Maidyarem, "mid-year" dead season; Hamspatdem, "equal heat." These are the suggested meanings of Louis Gray, Ervad Kanga, Dastur Dabu, and K.R. Cama, collated and cited by T.R. Sethna (1966: 87). The corresponding dates should be: 30 April-4 May; 29 June-3 July; 12 September-16 September; 31 December-4 January; 16 March-20 March.

scholars have spent much energy arguing this point. Nasrabadis also have their proofs for pet theories: those who, were they in universities, would be in departments of the history of religion with their evolutionary-ecological bias, affirm this meaning with the etymology gahambar, from gah-e (time of) ambar (storage). Others with a more sociological functionalist bent prefer the etymology gah-(ba)-ham-bar (time of being together).¹ The gahambar they say is a combination memorial for the dead and a charity for the destitute that the latter might receive something to eat. Some ascribe it to Noshiravan Adel, during whose reign there were a series of earthquakes, storms, droughts and other natural calamities.² Noshiravan called his seers for consultation and in a dream was told to institute this gathering for prayer and charity six times a year. He did so and things improved; the descendants must continue to do so, that the rains may come, the earth be fertile, and so on.

We have already indicated that the amount a person spends on a gahambar depends on the amount of productive wealth he has from endowments of previous generations. In this way, the role of the ancestors and the agricultural cycle are integrated. If one asks Nasrabadis the survey question, "Has the inheritance of your parents been divided yet?" the most frequent response, almost two out of three, will be that the parents had nothing to divide, with the plausible implication of poverty. A few will say that the inheritance has been divided, and a few will say that it has not yet been divided because a parent is still alive, or a brother has not reached maturity, etc. One or two may say that by Zoroastrian custom property is not divided, and it is the duty of the youngest son (the last to achieve headship of a household, and so the customary inheritor of the

¹ In Gujurat, this meaning of gahambar has become a colloquial double entendre referring to sexual fun, e.g., I went to a gahambar last night.

² In the Parsi literature the gahambars are ascribed to the great "culture hero" Jamshid, the fourth Peshdadian king, who introduced among other things the four estates of society (priest, warrior, agriculturalist, craftsman). According to this ascription, each of the gahambars commemorates the time at which the beings composing the universe were created: sky, water, earth, vegetation, animals, and man. This order of creation is suspected by many Zoroastrian writers to be a Semitic borrowing, particularly as it first appears in the Pahlavi writings.

paternal house) to read a gahambar in the house. This response suggests a second survey question: "Are you responsible for a gahambar?" Now the answer is overwhelmingly (four out of five), "Yes," and many will specify that they support a number of separate gahambers, e.g., one for the house, one in another village, two from my father, etc. For some of these you will be told that there is no longer any income from the land but that the gahambar is maintained anyhow. The result is that (a) while every productive endowment carries an obligation to read a gahambar, one can also read one without such an obligation, and (b) there are numerous such endowments of varied productivity whose gahambers will be distributed on the thirty gahambar days.

For the community, then, a five day gahambar will consist of one or two ash-e xeirat focused on the fire temple; a number of gahambar-e nuni, literally "bread or food gahambar," costing one to three hundred tomans and involving the distribution of a couple of breads to each person (two to ordinary people, more to the poor), raisins, perhaps lorki¹ and fruit, and a couple of spoonful of cooked food such as potatoes or rice and eggs; and a number of gahambar-e lorki, costing forty to one hundred tomans and involving the distribution of only lorki. In the same way, xeirat often means ash distribution, gahambar often means a food distribution of the gahambar lorki to gahambar nuni value, even when what is meant is technically a month death memorial involving a sopreh and the sending of some bread and food to the poor and to what the Shahsavend call one's xeir-o-shar. The final day of the gahambar, especially of the Hamspathdem Gahambar, the last of the year, may be a community gahambar, given not by an individual, but supported by subscription of, among others, those too poor to give their own. No one should feel himself too poor to have a gahambar even if he can pay only a little.² Such a gahambar may cost three hundred tomans: one can

¹ Lorki usually consists of seven items of dried fruit and nuts, e.g., dried dates, figs, almonds, raisins, apricots, walnuts, pistachios, shredded coconuts, jujube nuts.

² There is a tradition that a poor man's gahambar has more merit than a rich man's. Noshiravan Adel prided himself on giving the most lavish gahambar in the world, but during one of them he dreamt that there was someone else giving a more meritorious one. Noshiravan searched the world for such

estimate how much was donated by the size and thickness of the bread; this three hundred toman one distributed one thousand small and thin breads (five or six inches in diameter), some raisins and one or two trays of assorted fruit.

Most of the smaller gahambars are read in the house of their endowers. The ceremonies take half an hour or so, depending on the number of gahambars being read. Then the priest and most of the celebrants will leave and move on to another house, while the chief celebrants may sit down to a sopreh. In this way, even without an ash-e xeirat, a poor man can collect food from the dozen or so small gahambars which take place on each day. The priest receives a nominal fee of fifteen rials for each recitation. Whether in a private home or in the fire temple, the setting of the religious ritual is the same. In a ritually clean place (ja-ye pak) which in a private house is the talleh or pešgam (arch),¹ the priest(s) and lay readers recite the texts, and the others join in at the appropriate point by rising and re-tying the kusti (sacred thread). The ritual setting includes an

a man who had not come to his gahambar, but had given a separate one. He found eventually a very poor, crippled dastur, who because of his infirmity was unable to come to the king's gahambar and who in order to participate in a gahambar had sold the door to his house to raise the money to hold one. A Muslim story with the same point is often told to supplement this one. In the time of the Prophet, there was a very rich man who said that after he died, his stores of dates should be given to charity. After his death, laborers came and cleared out the stores. Two dates stuck to the soles of one of the laborers. Someone asked the Prophet how much merit would accrue to the rich man for his act of charity. The Prophet answered: as much as the two dates on the soles of the laborer, but had he given the dates away while he was still alive, the merit would have been as much as the total stores of dates; he only gave away what was of no use to him and no sacrifice was involved.

¹ Persian houses are built around a courtyard. The old Zoroastrian village houses typically are built on a cruciform plan with a very small open court in the center. The poorer the house, the fewer the legs of the the leg being a room with an arched roof. One of the arches, often the shallowest one, is higher than the others, above the roof line, to catch any movement of air and direct it down into the house. This may be the only one of the arches to be completely open to the courtyard, but not necessarily. It usually has a raised platform as a floor. It is called the pešgam; the larger, more modern arch of a merchant house is called talleh.

afringan (fire holder) with fire to which bits of sandalwood may be added, ud (incense sticks from India), a lantern, freshly sprouting wheat, myrtle twigs, wine, milk, fruits cut open (watermelon, grapes, cucumbers, quince, pomegranates and so on), breads (regular bread, perhaps the heavy komatch bread, perhaps the oil bread with sugar called surok), some cooked food (rice, eggs, potatoes), and lorki. Towards the end of the ceremony, the good smelling (xash-bu) fire is wafted around the assembly and with the right hand people waft the smoke to their faces saying hamzurbim (may we all be strong together) or hamazur dahma (may all be strong in righteousness). On the first day of the gahambar, in the main fire temple of Yazd, the Vajeyasht-e Gahambar (i.e., a reading of the Visperad) is performed at dawn. It is a ceremony which takes about four hours. Theoretically it requires two priests, and is the occasion for making both haoma and darun. Today, however, only one priest does the ceremony and so the making of the darun must be dropped as also the purificatory rites of bareshtnum. We will return to these high liturgy matters; here it is only of interest that Nasrabadis do not even know that this ritual is being performed on their behalf.

The gahambar portion of the village food distributions thus occurs on thirty days of the year in six bi-monthly portions. Vow and celebration xeirats are irregular. But there are three other ritual cycles in the community. Most important are death memorials. Next are life cycle rituals of which weddings are the most important, and initiation rituals of minimal importance. And third are shrine pilgrimages.

5.3.3. Death Memorials

"Zoroastrian death ceremonies," said one Nasrabadi woman, "are the most burdensome of the several religions." Jews too, she had heard, were burdened, but Muslims and especially Bahais were more free. Before death, when one sees death approaching, there is some preparation: shaving of the beard, cutting of the fingernails. It is meritorious if the dying man says a last patet prayer of repentance, or a last ashem vohu.¹ If possible,

¹ The short ashem vohu formula may be repeated by those who do not know the technically more appropriate prayer for any given occasion. It

he should also swallow a few drops of haoma or pomegranate juice. After death the body is washed with soap and water, and with a bit of alcohol. formerly nirang was used instead of alcohol. The anus is plugged with cotton, and the corpse is dressed in a suit of white chehelvar (shroud cloth). The arms and legs are folded and a second shroud is wrapped around. In the charnel house prayers are read. Formerly, in the house and in the charnel house, the sag-did ceremony (sag, "dog," + didan, "to see") was performed in which a "four-eyed" dog is shown the body to ascertain that death has occurred.¹ Nasrabadis say that the dog is able to see into the next world and that he can guard the body by barking from the approaching devils of pollution and decay (the druj-nasu). The test of death is to place a piece of bread on the chest of the dying man: if the dog takes the bread, the man is dead. It is admitted, somewhat apologetically, that when this was attempted in the recent past, the dogs so feared being captured by men that their only reaction was to attempt to escape. Although it is true that dogs are no longer kept and that stray dogs are badly treated by the Iranian

reads: ashem vohu vahistem asti; ustha asti; ushta ahmai; hyat ashai vahistai ashem; which means: purity is good, it is best, it is happiness, happiness is his who is pure for the sake of purity. (Sethna n.d.: 1, 118). J.J. Modi substitutes "piety" for "purity" and points out (1934: 3) that the mourning period for a sinful man should be longer than for the righteous according to the Vendidad (XII: 1-19), and that traditionally the "sinful" have been identified with those unable to say such a prayer before dying. Mobed Rustam Shahzadi of Teheran suspects that the duty of daily recitation of the patet was something introduced to combat the early Christians.

¹ "Four-eyed" is often explained as a metaphor for the extraordinary vision of the dog into the next world, or as a poetic reference to some putative dogs with spots above the eyes. It is therefore striking that the dogs kept around the daxmes at Surat are in fact black with white spots above the eyes which give them the appearance of having four eyes. In Gujurat the sag-did is performed four times. At death, a peyvand (connecting bond, of string or a kusti) is held between two priests who recite the Honovat Gatha. The first sag-did is done as the recitation begins just before the body is taken out of the house; the second sag-did comes after the middle of the fourth Ha (part) of this Gatha, and the third at the end. The fourth sag-did is done at the daxme with the recitation of the Sarosh Baj. No bread is placed on the chest. J.J. Modi (1934: 8) says that a sag-did should be performed each Gah (watch) the body remains in the house. He also notes that should a dog not be available, the Vendidad (VII: 3) allows the sight of flesh eating birds to perform the same function.

population, yet in Gujurat villages where traditional practices are maintained, Parsis admit to similar problems. The body is then taken to the daxme or graveyard on a metal stretcher. At the daxme last respects are paid before the door. The body is placed on the ground, and a circle of vinegar is poured around it. Aromatic fires are lighted, fruit is cut open and prayers are offered. The two nasu-salars holding a peyvand (connecting string) between them then take the body into the daxme. The procedure at the graveyard is similar except that the iron stretcher is left in the grave so that the body will not be resting on the ground; the sides and top of the grave are cemented so that dirt will not fall directly on the body. Insofar as the idea is to keep the four elements as pure from the pollution of death as possible, this burial procedure is to facilitate the work of decomposition without placing the polluting corpse directly on the earth. With the disposal of the body begin the series of memorial services. The immediate family does not eat meat for three days and a lamp is kept lighted where the body last lay. Friends and family gather the next day bringing some myrtle or cypress twigs or eggs or fruit. The third day the women gather bringing similar items, and the fourth day the men gather, which latter occasion is used to settle the debts of the deceased.¹ Thereafter memorials are held on the tenth day, the thirtieth day, and each month thereafter until the anniversary, and each year thereafter until the thirtieth. The relative importance of these can be indicated by the fees of the dasturs: 20-100 tomans for the fourth day memorial, 200 tomans for the tenth day memorial, and 3-5 tomans for the month and annual memorials. Previously, instead of money on the fourth day, the dasturs would receive clothing and eggs which they would take to their homes to eat.

It is the morning of the fourth day that the soul crosses the Chinvat Bridge. A righteous soul finds a wide bridge leading to Paradise and his own good deeds personified in a beautiful young damsel as a companion (or handsome youth, if female). A sinful soul finds the Bridge narrowing to a

¹ In India the reading of the will occurs on the evening of the third day. The ceremony is called utumna, and it is acknowledged that this is a change from the original Zoroastrian law. It is attributed to the contract with Jadin Rana (see section 3.3.1 above).

razor-edge from which he falls into Hell with his bad deeds personified in an old hag as his companion. And so all the men gather to pray. The dastur leads the assembly in reciting the Khorshid Nayesh, Patet, etc., ending with the words in unison:

[With palms face up:] Gonah-eš xošk bad, va savab-eš-rah gabul kon.

[With palms face down:] Rah-e behešt baz, rah-e duzhak baste.

(Excuse his sins, and accept his meritorious acts. Road to heaven open, road to hell closed.)

This is repeated several times. Then tea is served and there is a food distribution, like at a gahambar nuni with eggs and greens and potatoes and bread, but without raisins. If the family is poor, the Zoroastrian Society helps with the financing. On the tenth day, people gather again to tie the kusti and ask God either in Dari or in Farsi to accept the deceased:

[Dari:] Xazoya ešveba bebehešt. Xazoya genohoš vebaxš.


[Farsi:] Xodaya ura bebehešt bebar. Xoda az gonah dar gozar.

(Oh God, take him to heaven. Oh God, excuse his sins.)

The si-ruz (thirtieth day) is the next big occasion and is celebrated with a xeirat food distribution and mehmani (invitations) for a commensual sopreh. Another xeirat then falls on the first anniversary. The other month and annual memorials are smaller affairs. The ritual setting of these memorials is again in the ja-pak (clean place) of the pešgam, and must include four items: wine, milk, pomegranate and quince. The wine refers to the scepticism of Shah Gushtasp, Zoroaster's first convert who said that he would believe in Zoroaster's message only if he could go to the next world and see that there are indeed a heaven and a hell. He was given the wine to drink and was transported to the next world in divine drunkenness (mast-e xodai, as opposed to mast-e mašrubī, the drunkenness of wine) where he remained three days. The importance of the cypress tree to Zoroastrians has a similar story: when Zoroaster first arrived at his court, Shah Gushtasp asked him to perform a miracle to prove his divine mission. Zoroaster took his shepherd's cane and planted it in the ground before him, and the cane grew into a tall cypress, each leaf inscribed in gold with an exhortation to Shah Gushtasp. The leading Shehenshahi priest of Surat, Dasturji Nadirshah Sena, explains the ritual setting this way: it includes the dadgah fire, flowers, wine, milk, syrup or sharbat, and fruit. The flower Zoroaster gave to Jamasp Vizier

ILLUSTRATION 1

RITUAL SETTING FOR AN ELEVENTH MONTH DEATH MEMORIAL CEREMONY



(Shah Gushtasp's vizier), which he sniffed and gained thereby knowledge of past, present, and future. Sharbat, he gave to Shah Gushtasp, who drank and saw his own sweet place in heaven. Fruit, he gave to Esfendiar who became invincible and so was named Ruintan (bronze bodied). Wine he gave to Mediomens who became illuminated in religion. Often the ritual setting also includes a white brick. The most common folk explanation (significantly enough both sociologically and phenomenologically) is that in the past Zoroastrian houses had to be marked by white chalk, and that the white brick is a mark of defiance: that despite all discrimination we still survive and insist on our identity. A second explanation is that something pure and white, as well as something fragrant, ought to be placed before the dead.¹

5.3.4. Atash Bozorg Kardan and Jashan-Xoni

A more elaborate way of memorializing a death is with a fire strengthening ceremony or with a jashan-xoni. The death anniversaries of Arbab Sohrab Keyanian, the former head of the Zoroastrian Community of Yazd, are marked by both a jashan-xoni and an initiation ceremony of poor village boys who otherwise could not afford such elaborate celebrations. The jashan-xoni falls in two parts: a liturgical recitation by two priests, both wearing the padan over their faces as they would before the Atash Bahram (cf. below), and holding hands or a peyvand between them as they feed the Atash Dadgah and invoke the spiritual messages represented by the wine, milk, myrtle, etc.; and secondly, a reading of a book of names beginning with the kings and pahlavans of ancient Iran and proceeding to the dead of the family in whose honor the ceremony is held. In India such a ceremony might be held on moving into a new house, opening a new store, etc.


The fire strengthening ceremony (atash bozorg kardan) is a very interesting rite having to do with the creation of ritual fire. In India a

¹ This is elaborated by Dastur Rustam Shahzadeh of Teheran who suggests that it may be equivalent to a mirror or bowl of water in which ancient seers were supposed to be able to see the soul. There is a black spot in the center on which the seer could concentrate. White, he points out, is the color of the Aryans, black that of the Semites both in priestly attire and as signs of ritual activity. Muslims put out black flags, Zoroastrians spread white chalk. In India Parsis put white chalk patterns of flowers and fish outside their doors for good luck.

clear distinction is maintained between the three levels of fire: the Atash Bahram, the Dar-e Mehr or Adarian, and the household fire or Atash Dadgah. Among Iranian villagers, any village fire temple may be interchangeably referred to as Atash Bahram or Dar-e Mehr. The ash of household fires used in religious ceremonies such as gahambars or death memorials is taken to the fire temple; i.e., ritual fires are only allowed to grow cold in the presence of the light of a higher level fire.¹ In India the everyday ritual distinctions between Atash Bahram and Adarian are (a) the number of times the Atash Nayesh (atash, "fire," nayesh, "ode") is recited, e.g., eleven times during the first gah in the Atash Bahram, three times in the Adarian;²

¹ According to the rivayats, all household fires, specifically the hearth fire used for cooking meals, are considered to be such first level fires and are to be used not more than three to seven days in a row, after which they are to be collected in the Atash Adarian. After four months and ten days, or minimally once each year, they are taken from the Atash Adarian to the Atash Bahram. In practice, ordinary ash from cooking fires in Iranian villages is used to clean eating utensils and as fertilizer.

² As a Gujurati dastur jokingly put it, the Atash Bahram recitation requires one packet of aspirin. The number of repetitions varies with the gah: in the Atash Bahram, Havan Gah (sunrise to noon) eleven times, Rapithvan Gah (noon to three) nine times; Ujiran Gah (three to sunset) seven times, Aevishathrum Gah (sunset to midnight) seven times; Ushen Gah (midnight to sunrise) nine times. While he recites, the priest moves to the eight positions around the fire as sketched. For the Adarian, the priest merely performs the padyab purification (reading the Khshnaothra Ahurahe Mazdao formula, and the Ashem Vohu; washing the hands and face; tying the kusti) and recites the Atash Nayesh. For the Atash Bahram both purification and the recitations are more elaborate. The elements of the latter are: (1) padyab; (2) farziat prayers (Sorush Baj; the gah prayer; Khorshid and Mehr Yashts during the day, or Srosh Yasht and Srosh Hadoxt at night); (3) placing six pieces of sandalwood on the fire first facing east, then south, then west; (4) washing the stone base (taxt) under the fire vase; (5) giving sandalwood and frankincense to the fire three times for humata, huxta, hvaršta (good words, good thoughts, good deeds); (6) circumambulating the fire standing in the eight positions (four sides, four corners); (7) reciting the appropriate number of Atash Nayesh, giving sandalwood during the first repetition and striking the bell at the words duzvarsta, dušmata, duzkux (bad words, bad thoughts, bad deeds) and drawing two circles in the ash of the fire vase at the end of the first repetition, and erasing them at the end of the second. During the first and fifth gah, the dastur stands facing east;



(b) the number of pieces of sandalwood put on the fire: one for the Adarian, six for the Atash Bahram; and (c) the ritual purity of the dasturs: for the Adarian any dastur, for the Atash Bahram only a martab priest who has undergone the bareshnum and xub purifications. These distinctions in Yazd are meaningless since there are no longer any priests who can maintain such purity, nor even enough priests to feed any of the fires in more than two of the five gahs each day: village atashbands or deh-mobeds have other jobs and so cannot feed the fires more than twice a day either.¹ In essence, the distinction between an Atash Bahram and an Adarian has to do with the number of fires of which it is composed. The Atash Bahrams are supposed to be descended from the imperial fires of Sassanian times (in Fars, Azarbaijan and Khorassan). It is claimed that the Yazd Atash Bahram is one of these fires preserved through the centuries, and that another is the Iranshah fire carried to India and eventually enthroned in Udvara. Seven more Atash Bahrams were subsequently created in India, and their sociological significance has already been indicated in Chapter III. An Atash Bahram is supposed to be composed of one thousand and one fires of sixteen different classes:²

corpse	91	goldsmith	60	brewer or idol worshipper	61
dyer	80	mint	55	soldier or traveller	35
king	70	ironsmith	61	shepherd	33
potter	61	armoror	61	lightning	90
brickmaker	75	baker	61	household fire	184
fakir	50			total	1128

the other gahs he faces west.

¹ "To feed" the fire is the translation of the Yazdi expression xorak dadan; in India the idiom of fragrance is used: bui dadan, or in Gujurati, bui devi, "to give aroma." The two expressions stress two kinds of feeding: the less frequent putting on the fire of a log of slow burning and little smoking dry hardwood (in Yazd, usually walnut or pistachio wood; in India the thorny bhaval), and the aromatic offerings of sandalwood.

² This list is cited by J.J. Modi (1922: 210) from Dastur Erachji Sohrabji Mehrji Rana. It differs slightly from the list given by B.P. Wadia in 1909, cited by Murzban (1917: 407): corpse, dyer, king, potter, brickmaker, coppersmith, goldsmith, mintmaker, blacksmith, weapon manufacturer, baker, distiller, warrior, shepherd, lightning, priest. Both lists differ from the Vendidad (VIII: 73-96) prescription which lists fires used in burning a corpse, filth, dirt; and fires from a potter, glassblower, coppersmith, goldsmith, silversmith, ironsmith, steelsmith, baker, furnace worker, tinsmith,

An Atash Adarian is composed of four fires, each purified three times, from the houses of the four social classes: aethornan (priest), rathaeshtaran (military officer); vastryosam (cultivator), and hutoxshan (townsman: craftsman and merchant).

The fire strengthening ceremony is considered by some Yazdis to have a merit almost equal to the founding of an Atash Adarian. Mary Boyce (1966b) has reconstructed some of its historical features in an analysis of the use of sheep fat offerings to the fire, something which is no longer done, and which is involved in the vexed question of Zoroastrian animal sacrifice, a question which many Zoroastrians prefer to avoid.¹ It is a relatively simple ceremony compared to the consecration of a new fire. Only one or

shepherd, soldier, neighbor. Kamdin Shapur's rivayat includes lightning, while Nariman Hushang's explicitly excludes it.

The procedure is lengthy. The number of fires (1001) refers to the number of purifications for the original sixteen fires, e.g., the fire from the funeral pyre is purified 91 times by Dastur Erachji and Wadia's procedures. This is done by holding over the fire to be purified a perforated ladle containing powdered sandalwood, frankincense and tinder. When this mixture ignites, it is considered a more pure form of the original fire. This is done in a series of 91 pits (magas) or in a number of fire vases. When each fire has been purified the proper number of times, it is taken to the fire temple. A long series of Yasna and Vendidad ceremonies are read with it. The final union of the sixteen fires must occur on the first Gatha Gahambar, i.e., the first of the five intercalary days at the end of the year. The fire room is consecrated by three more days of Yasna and Vendidad recitations and then a royal procession of priests carrying swords and maces takes the fire into the room for enthronement on a stone slab under a dome; a metallic tray called the taj (crown) hangs over the fire, and the swords and maces are hung on the walls. (For further details, see J.J. Modi 1922.)

¹ Especially in Iran, where it was only in the recent past that Parsis told them that sacrifices were against Zoroastrian law. Animals are still slaughtered for celebratory meals at shrines, etc., but violent objection is made to the label "sacrifice." The slaughter is for food and a form of xeirat not an offering to a god. The phrase gorbani kardan ("sacrifice") is used since that is the Islamic term, but more often one uses the verbs koštan (to kill), nazr kardan (to vow), xeirat kardan (to do good). Orientalists insist on calling such slaughter "sacrifice" because they wish to link contemporary practice with ancient Indo-European rites. Haug, for instance, identifies the gahambar with the Brahmin Chaturmasyaisht sacrifice, but notes as different that Brahmins throw parts of the slaughtered animal into the fire, while the Zoroastrians merely consecrate the meat and eat it. Hindus apparently also find the idea of sacrifice objectionable and explain its presence in various pujas as pre-Aryan survivals (Marvin Davis, personal communication).

two Adarian fires are used: their flames are placed on bricks before the fire with which they will be united. The ceremony consists of reciting the Atash Nayesh and the Afringan. The two days previous to this ceremony, the dasturs in their homes prepare by reading the Sorush Yasht and the Visperad.

The strengthening of the fire, the more obligatory death memorial rites, the xeirats, the gahambars and yasht dowre daxme fit into quite different theological sets: some are periodic, others have no set time for performance; some have more to do with creating fires, others with helping a soul, and yet others with celebrating happy events. Nonetheless through their food distribution form, all seem to be variants of one another and to fit into a larger pattern of circulating wealth, including adjudication of estates (čaharom, yasht dowre daxme), endowment of productive resources for the public (gahambars), as well as sharing or redistribution of food according to the wealth of the donor. The differential costs of the rituals (different rituals cost different amounts, and can be more or less elaborate) help to tie the village or mahalleh community together up and down the status scale as well as laterally through kinship and friendship networks. Those with more land are obligated to give more xeirats. Those with pretensions to leadership and power are encouraged to provide fire strengthening or fire creation rites. The vaqf system, as well as being an adoption of a Muslim form which Muslims would respect, was perhaps a form of mutual defense: by placing land in vaqf with gahambar benefits accruing to all, all had an interest in protecting it from alienation. This seems at least to be the message of the dispute between Hormuzdiar, Ardeshir and their descendants related on pages 170-73 above.

While many Iranian Zoroastrians react with anxious denial to such investigations considering sacrifice to be backward, and arguing that putting sheep fat in the fire would defile the fire, two Gujurati village dasturs demonstrate the more open and curious attitude of the Parsis by asking me what the latest academic word on this subject was. The argument, incidentally, that the fire would be defiled by such offerings cannot be maintained, since it would also apply to the funeral pyre fire used in creating an Atash Bahram. In the riyayats the principle is quite clear that dead matter burned completely to ash is purified by fire: fire is purifying (Dhabhar 1932: 57).

5.3.5. Weddings

Weddings are obviously another set of occasions for expenditure of wealth, but more important are their long term role in transferring property and defining group boundaries, and in this role the cousin marriage system operates (not unexpectedly) similarly to the vaqf tenure system. Both systems can be used to concentrate wealth either for peasant land conservation or for mercantile capital accumulation. Of 539 Zoroastrian marriages tabulated in one sample of Yazdi families, 192 or 36% were ba xish (with relatives). Similar figures in the approximate range of one in three can be obtained for Muslim Yazdis, as well as rural Muslims in Fars (Bruce Livingston, personal communication). Figures approaching one in two marriages can be obtained if one selects for local villagers, land-owning gentry, or upwardly mobile merchant families.¹

The cousin marriage system of the Zoroastrians does not seem to differ significantly from that of the Muslims although elements of the marriage formalities do differ. The central difference is the lack in Zoroastrian custom of the formalities corresponding to the Muslim mehriye ("brideprice," see fn. 2, p. 169 above). This is explained by Zoroastrians as related to the fact that, unlike the easy divorce procedure of Islam, Zoroastrianism does not allow divorce at all: divorce is a twentieth century innovation.²

¹ A sample of 381 Muslim marriages elicited from 126 informants in a Yazd factory and in the Yazd bazaar on own, parental, sibling and children's marriages yielded 109 or 29% as marriages ba xish (FBd-33, FZd-19, MBd-25, MZd-15, MFBd-2, FMBd-2, MMBd-1, MMZdd-1, FZsd-1, MZdd-2, FFBsd-1, far family-6, unknown-1). Of 56 marriages on a genealogy of the petty aristocracy of the hills to the south of Yazd, nearly half (27) were ba xish. An even higher percentage was obtained from the isolated villages behind Bafq. A Yazd Zoroastrian merchant family genealogy yielded 53 marriages of which 19 were ba xish, but of the 34 ba gher (with strangers) at least ten were Bahais who have an ideology of supporting ba gher marriage. In India, rural Gujarat Parsis again approximate the one in three cousin marriage figure. And in a Parsi merchant family, in the fifth descending generation from the founder, of 66 marriages, 39 were ba xish (of which 14 were true first cousins), another are possibly ba xish, and only 15 definitely ba gher (fuller analysis of the genealogy will make these figures more firm).

² The rivayats recognize one form of divorce. Male impotence is not grounds for divorce. Female sterility is grounds for bigamy, not divorce. Apostasy or desertion are grounds for a wife to remarry, but absentee husbands

The Muslim marriage exchange involves also a dowry (jeheziye) which the bride brings with her, usually consisting of the furnishings for the house: the house itself is provided by the groom, but carpets, cooking utensils, and other furnishings are the responsibility of the bride. Such a rough division of responsibility is also informally recognized by Zoroastrians as are ideal ratios of the value contributed by each family. Zoroastrians, since they have no formal mehriye, recognize in such ratios a greater financial burden upon the bride's family, perhaps as much as 3:1, whereas Muslims usually place the burden inversely at 1:2 or more, although where, as in Markan-e Isfahan, patrilocal marriage is still common, Muslim villagers recognize the burden to be on the bride's family (Kendall 1968: 97). In practice, of course, the ratio is determined by bargaining based upon the circumstances of the families. Custom also varies among the Muslims from area to area as to how much of the mehriye is actually to be paid at the time of the marriage and how much is only transferred in the form of a written deed leaving usufruct in the control of the groom. Whether or not it can be maintained according to Islamic jurisprudence, people will agree to the suggestion that the mehriye and jeheziye transfers of wealth to a woman in some sense compensate her for only half a male portion of patrimony. This is interestingly supported by the report of Yazd Zoroastrians that during the great migrations of males to Bombay around the turn of the century, wives left behind applied to be placed under Islamic law so that they could claim a share of inheritance. The custom among at least a segment of the Yazd Zoroastrian population was to give daughters no inheritance share at all, and so such wives had no independent source of income on which to depend while their husbands were away. Under modern conditions of social mobility, or at least of transfer to salaried jobs, where wealth is accessible to young men, both Zoroastrian and Muslim grooms may supply both house and furnishings.¹

who return and find their wives remarried may reclaim their wives. Adultery by a wife is cause for death, but since Iran is ruled by Muslims, she may be punished by being abandoned without a guardian; with her husband's consent she may remarry, and this constitutes the only recognized form of divorce.

¹ The procedure of choosing a bride and bargaining over the exchanges is formalized among Muslims as it is not among Zoroastrians due to the Islamic segregation of the sexes. The Muslim groom theoretically does not see his

Among Westernized Muslims who find the legal requirement of mehriye too tainted with the hint of bride purchase, a symbolic mehriye of a gold Pahlavi or a Qur'an may be given instead of real wealth.

Such changes would seem to support the generalization of a contrast between a fluid salary and money economy with a land based system under which mehriye and jeheziye and patrilineal inheritance provided a necessary mode of intergenerational adjustment of wealth and resources. That is, Zoroastrians and Muslims seem to adjust their techniques of exchange to the changing economy in similar ways. Changes in the status of these exchanges among Zoroastrians, however, also are simply compromises with the Islamic environment. Mehriye is said not to be a part of Zoroastrianism, but the rivayats recognize a mehriye and even supply a formula—two thousand dirams of pure white silver and two dinars of red gold of the Nishapur currency—although it is noted this is only a formula and should be adjusted to the circumstances of the parties involved, and that a wife should she so desire may transfer it to her husband (Dhabhar 1932: 197). Should the husband die without a will, her mehriye is settled along with other debts before the inheritance is divided. Zoroastrians like to claim that "traditionally" brothers and sisters received equal shares, and this may at times have been the case. The rivayats recognize a division similar to the Islamic rule of two parts for a son and one part for a daughter. In the last century in Yazd (but apparently not in Kirman) daughters received nothing. Today Zoroastrians are under a uniform legal code which the community adopted around 1935, the Ain Nameh Zartoshtian, and which again approximates the Islamic rule. In the text of the Iranian national law passed in 1312/1933 which allowed the recognized minority religious groups to have their personal law cases adjudicated according to their own customs, the word "law" was carefully avoided in referring to the minority codes so as to avoid conflict with any theoretical jurisdiction of Islamic law; the word "custom" is used

bride until he is married, although his sisters and mother will often arrange that he be in a place where she is to pass. The bargaining may be done in a formal meeting of males of the two families at which, for instance, the fathers of the bride and groom may sit next to each other, but remain silent throughout the bargaining. None of this applies to Zoroastrians.

instead. The inheritance law adopted by the Zoroastrians does differ from the Islamic code in several respects; for instance, a Muslim may only bequeath freely one third of his property and the other two thirds must be divided according to the allotted shares of Islamic law, but a Zoroastrian may bequeath his inheritance as he likes, the formula of division applying only if he dies without leaving a will. One of the reasons for adopting the Islamic formula was to avoid conflict with the Islamic law that jadid-ul-islam are entitled to disinherit their siblings: this law was enforced by court decision in the early part of the century in at least two cases, one Jewish and one Zoroastrian (F. Mehr, personal communication). Later the problem was circumvented by a decision that the law of inheritance to be followed was always that of the deceased, not that of his heirs. Another reason undoubtedly was the complaint of the Yazdi women cited above.

If the cousin marriage system provided an economic tool especially where land was held in communal vaqf form or remained undivided for several generations (since the children of siblings who marry each other are not competitors for inheritance), the economic rationale is not the strongest element in the ideology of endogamy. The Parsis recognize the economic rationale more frequently than do the Iranis but even they do so regularly only for the great merchant families. The ideology of endogamy is changing, and the conflicting arguments used to support or oppose cousin marriage highlight the ideology itself. Among the younger people who tend more and more to oppose cousin marriage, the most frequent argument is that doctors say that inbreeding leads to physical deterioration. This is indeed a sensitive issue among all age groups. Parsis, who again are less defensive about their problems, talk of insanity and mental dullness as a serious problem in their population. Iranis talk also of diabetes, heart disease, and physical deformity. For the less well-educated every case of physical misfortune of this type occurring to offspring of cousin marriages becomes both a further proof of the alleged correlation and a source of guilt for acquiescing in such a union. But it is not fair to say that inbreeding defects were unsuspected before the recent arrival of Western medicine. The most frequent reasons cited in favor of cousin marriage have to do with stability of marriage in terms of personal relations, and older people often will pose

the issue as a dilemma of choosing between two desirable goals: for the health of the children, marriage ba gher (with strangers) is better; for marital harmony and stability ba xish (with relatives) is better. Reference to traditional sayings further illustrates alternative strategies of marriage choice. The most common injunction, Arabic in vocabulary and so obviously Muslim rather than Zoroastrian in origin, and frequently mis-attributed to the Qur'an, but cited by both Muslims and Zoroastrians is (the opposite of Tylor's dictum) mo'amile ba gher, vasetat ba xish, i.e., "trade out, marry in." Another popular proverb cited especially by Muslim believers is aqd-e pesar amu doxtar amu dar asman baste shode (FBd marriages were sealed in heaven), although settled populations of Iran show no particular skewing of preference between cousins for the father's brother's daughter, in contrast to nomadic tribal populations and the Arabs of Khuzistan.¹ On the other hand, the Prophet Mohammad is also cited as urging marriage ba gher as a means of spreading Islam, a strategy now vigorously supported by Bahais. In folk philosophy this often becomes the observation that if you marry out, you increase your kin network: marrying in is redundant and you gain no new contacts. Hadith exist both supporting and opposing cousin marriage.² That in-marrying tightens family relations is, of

¹ Once when I was quoting this proverb, I mistakingly made the verb present-future (miše) so that the meaning would be: fathers' brothers' daughter's marriages are/will be sealed in heaven. Sayyid Reza, the grand old cook of the American Institute, corrected the tense and supplied the following derivation. Adam had two sons, Havil and Gavil. To Havil, God gave a woman of the maliks, and to Gavil a woman of the jinn. Havil had a son, Gavil a daughter. They asked God what to do, and he said to marry them to each other. In other words, the preference for the FBd is quite simply that this happened to have been the avaal harf-e xoda (the first word of God), that the first problem of this sort involved the FBd and God sanctioned it. It does not follow that everyone ought to try to marry his FBd, but if you do, you know that what you are doing is something acceptable to God. Incidentally, he pointed out, the line of Prophets do not come from either of these sons of Adam, but from a third, Boreysh, who was also mated to a jinn.

² Sheikh Esani's book Masolek observes that cousin marriage is makru in Islam. Marriage ba xish is meritorious if the girl is ugly or otherwise faces a poor marriage market, but there is the problem of disease due to inbreeding. The Sheikh points out that Ali first married his FBsd, but then for his second marriage gave instructions that he wanted a girl from a nomad tribe who was not related and who was healthy. Dr. Paknejad of Yazd, to whom

course, a second reason young people cite against it since they want to escape family control and assert independence. Young men say that a girl from outside the family will be shy and obedient whereas a girl from the family will nag, complain that she does not have as many nice things as others, etc. This is an obvious function of her knowledge of the strength of her structural position: if you beat or divorce a stranger girl, you only make her kin angry at you; but if you do the same to a relative, you cut yourself off from your own kin as well and so isolate yourself. On the other hand, to marry ba gher is to marry a relatively unknown quantity both in terms of moral behavior and again in terms of structural leverage over her behavior. A young Teherani Zoroastrian tells of the terrible shock he had when on the evening he had been planning to propose marriage to a girl he had been dating for some time, she suggested that he might touch her genitals. He immediately withdrew and she, puzzled, queried whether he thought he had been the only boy ever to touch her. From the experience, he concluded that the time-worn method of recommended mates by family members who had known the girls since birth was more reliable than dating and self-selection.

As to the marriage ceremonies themselves, a striking feature is the relative stress in the villages on the transfer of the bride from one house to another, rather than on the religious and legal formalities called govah by Zoroastrians and aqd by Muslims. A Zoroastrian govah may be attended only by close family and friends in Yazd at the home of the registrar. In Teheran or Bombay, by contrast, the govah is a central attraction of the party making. The govah in Yazd partakes of physical props more reminiscent

I am indebted for this reference, himself both a physician and of a family of rohani (learned ulema), puts it this way. It is makru and not harram because inbreeding produces genetic diseases at one end of a bell shaped curve, and at the other end are geniuses, and so if one knows there is no disease in the family, marriage ba xish should not be forbidden.

¹ It so happened that his conclusions about this particular girl were later reinforced by other free behavior on her part. He contrasted her with his own sister whom he took to the cinema and who refused to go there again because of the shocking behavior of the boys and girls there. For such reasons, village girls are thought to be more faithful wives.

of Muslim custom than Parsi custom:¹ a male relative of the groom holds over the head of the groom a tray containing noql (white sugar ball candy), sweet pomegranate (anar-e širin), a pair of sissors, green thread, an egg, and a green scarf. This much, at least, resembles the sugar rubbing done over the head of a Muslim bride. The ceremony is conducted by two officials. First the registrar asks both bride and groom whether they know each other and whether they wish to marry each other. The groom says yes. The bride does not respond, but is urged by the assembly to speak up and say yes, not be bashful for a response is necessary; and at some imperceptible nod it is concluded that she has concurred (i.e., silence is counted as a positive response). Both sign the marriage contract as do witnesses. The religious formalities then begin. The dastur asks the groom to face the sun and tie the kusti. Then the couple are seated next to each other and while the dastur reads the marriage formula the tray is held over the groom's head. The couple are again asked their consent, and again the bride must be coaxed to give some imperceptible assent which is received by the women with happy shouts of happeru happeru shad boše (hooray, hooray, be joyful). The groom is asked to repeat a formula and the assembly is asked to say seven yatha ahu vairyos. The dastur pronounces the blessing and sprinkles the couple with rice and thyme. The bride and groom first and then the assembly are shown a mirror, and rose whater is sprinkled upon them.² The egg is taken from the tray and thrown far away into the air.

The meaning of the symbols on the tray are vaguely and variously interpreted. Green is a Zoroastrian color, the color of life, of the cypress and of growing things. Brides often dress in green (although the fashionable nowadays affect a white bridal gown in European fashion), and she is given a green scarf to hold on her lap. The groom often also wears something green,

¹ The Parsi ceremony involves the spinning of a thread around the couple.

² A ritual of greeting a welcome visitor as well, the meaning sometimes being offered that the host can offer nothing nicer than one's own visage. Another explanation has it that any possibility of evil eye is turned back by the mirror and made pleasant by the rose water.

and bears on his shoulder a plaid headcloth of the sort that Zoroastrian men used to wear. Sweet pomegranate purifies the blood as well as being sweet, and so also represents life and health. The green thread is said by some to represent life which the scissors will eventually cut to the appropriate measure; but others say the scissors are a weapon against evil.¹ The egg, say some, is a symbol of unhappiness, and specifically of evil eye, and its breaking is analogous to the evil eye ritual at a trivium.² Others say that the egg represents the bride's fertility, or is itself a symbol of fertility which is given the father of the bride in exchange for her by the father of the groom; and by throwing it away, the father of the bride symbolizes the renouncing of any claims over her. The sweetness of the noql and the lorki which are passed around are self-evident, and become explicit if one reflects upon the sugar rubbing of the analogous Muslim ritual.

A Muslim aqd occurs in the home of the bride's father. Males and females are in separate rooms (or often even in separate adjoining houses). Two axunds, one representing the groom and one the bride sit in the male room and the mehr is formally negotiated. The representative of the bride (vakil)³ then goes into the bridal room where she has been preparing by

¹ Compare the open knife or open lock placed on the aqd tray and then under the bride's pillow until consummation in Muslim village ceremonies. The aqd and the other wedding ceremonies may be separated by several months. Since a disappointed suitor is said to be able to prevent consummation by closing a lock, the aqd is often held in semi-secret with only close relatives in attendance.

² Among Parsis when the bride enters the home of the groom an egg is waved around her head and broken to ward off evil. The trivium technique is, should a child fall ill or have an accident, to build a fire at the meeting of three paths and to write with charcoal on an egg the names of persons suspected of evil eye, and to place the egg in the fire so it will burst. There are several variations: the egg may be cooked and then thrown into running water, or za (a kind of crystallized sugar) may be boiled with sweet smelling condor while the ritualists repeat that camels and donkeys must fear this. In Gujurat the technique is called vtar: at a crossroads is placed an egg, a coconut, food and lead oxide (sidur); whoever steps over this will get the evil transferred to him.

³ Axunds are not necessary to a marriage. The requirement is that the bride or her lawyer (vakil) must agree to the marriage as must the groom, each in the past tense, called respectively ijah (bride's affirmation) and


performing two rokat and reading the Qur'an seated in a setting as sketched in Illustration 2. The vakil obtains her consent the third time he asks her. The vakil then returns to the groom and the contracts are signed and completed. The two axunds then recite the formal consents of their clients and they may then recite a xotbe. Nothing more happens in the male room: the guests are offered sweets and tea and perhaps a meal. A decorative centerpiece for the male room is often a large (four or five feet tall) white phallus called xunče, a Yazd sweetshop specialty, made of noql interlaced with green leaves to give it the appearance of a cypress, the symbol of youth; along the sides are green rods of neon lights which apex towards a red circular light at the top in the center of which are placed roses. Real celebration is a woman's affair. When the axund has gained the bride's consent to the marriage and specifically to the mehr, and has left, the women break out into shouts of sholululululu . . . A shoe of the bride and a shoe of the groom are taken and the two candles are extinguished by clapping these two shoes together over them. The two sugar cones (qand) are taken, a towel is stretched over the bride's head, and a green thread is threaded on a needle. One woman begins to rub the two qand together so that the sugar grains fall into the towel, and a second woman begins to sew the towel with the green thread. The two women do a short dialogue:

1st woman: <u>Misavam o misavam mehr o mahabat</u>	I rub and rub for kindness
<u>misavam.</u>	and affection I rub.
Others: <u>Či čī misavi?</u>	What do you rub?
1st woman: <u>Mehr o mahabat misavam.</u>	Kindness and happiness I rub.
Others: <u>Baroye ki misavi?</u>	For whom do you rub?
1st woman: <u>Baroye arus o damad misavam.</u>	For bride and groom I rub.
2nd woman: <u>Midusam o midusam.</u>	I sew, I sew.
Others: <u>Či čī miduzi?</u>	What do you sew?
2nd woman: <u>Mehr o mahabat midusam.</u>	Kindness and affection I sew.
Others: <u>Baroye ki miduzi?</u>	For whom do you sew?
2nd woman: <u>Baroyeh arus o damad.</u>	For the bride and groom.

The following day the sugar so rubbed should be eaten by the bride and groom together so that affection should grow between them. After the sugar rubbing, the bride's hair is combed and she is made to look her best. She takes her

qabul (groom's "consent"). An axund who knows how to sing the ceremonial xotbe is much appreciated and such a specialist is called a mohazardar.

ILLUSTRATION 2
MUSLIM BRIDAL SETTING



Karia baroye kar gošah is a stone which is supposed to keep away difficulties. Tasbi are prayer beads. Mor is the mud square to which one touches one's forehead during prayer. Noql are balls of sugar candy. Qand is a sugar cone. Haft Sin are seven items beginning with the letter sin such as sabzi (greens), sirke (vinegar), sir (garlic), sib (apple), samak (sumac), samanu (juice of germinating wheat mixed with flour), sanjet (jujube nut).

She takes her Qur'an and sits before the mirror on one of two chairs now set side by side. The sister of the groom then goes to call him, and he comes to sit on the second chair. From his pocket he takes a silk handkerchief filled with noql and one rial coins, and pours them over the head of the bride. He kisses her and presents her with a ruhnemah (keepsake), usually a watch.¹ After congratulations of the immediate family, the couple retires to the hajleh (bridal chamber) where they are served dinner, and then go to bed to demonstrate the virginity of the bride and consummate the marriage. In the morning the sister of the groom makes the bed and collects some coins left by the groom.

In both the Muslim and Zoroastrian cases, the aqd is only one step in the series of prestations from xastegari (expression of desire for a girl's hand) to namzad (engagement), to nikah (marriage), and the legal aqd may precede by some time the transfer of the bride to the groom's house and the wedding party. The xastegari, as noted above, is often formalized among Muslims. Among Zoroastrians the first main event is the engagement party for which there may be a procession from the groom's house to the bride's house, bearing trays of gifts covered with green cloth, and preceded by a mirror and a lantern. Members of the bridal party greet the groom's party all along the way with expressions of welcome. In the bride's house sweets and tea are offered, and gifts exchanged, among which may be cloth and accessories for the wedding outfits. The greater procession is, of course, the fetching of the bride after the govah to the house of the groom, and this is the great festival night. Women are sent around before hand to invite the female guests bearing a tray of noql.² Men later are sent to make formal invitations to the males. Food is prepared for two celebratory meals, one for the groom's guests in his house, and another for the bride's guests in her house. The evening begins with exchange of gifts on trays covered with green cloths, first from the groom's house to the bride's and then from

¹ Watches are repetitive symbols in many Iranian settings.

² The tray also contains three pomegranates, thyme, a couple of hazel nuts, a couple of almonds, some myrtle twigs, all covered with a green cloth. The noql are offered to eat. The pomegranate is given with thyme and myrtle and returned immediately with mutual expressions of well wishing.

bride to groom. The gifts are clothing, rings, watches. Much singing and dancing goes on at both places until eventually the groom's party proceeds to the bride's house. There amid much joking, singing, and poetry recitation, the slow procession moves towards the groom's house, the bride with a green scarf over her face, led by her reluctant father. He every so often stops and refuses to proceed, saying it has cost him much to raise his daughter, and his acquiescence must be purchased with a rial: he is supposed to collect thirty-three rials.¹ Fires are built along the path, and in some variations payment must be made to the owners of the houses along the way for free passage. At the entrance to the groom's house, his mother greets the bride with a gift (payandaz and sarandaz). The bride and groom then circumambulate a fire in the entrance of the house before proceeding to the hajleh. There the groom removes the green scarf-veil from the bride, takes three coins, placing them into a glass of sharbat (a sweet drink) which he shares with the bride. He then bites a noql in half and gives the bride the other half. And the guests take their leave, until the next morning when the immediate family comes for a celebratory breakfast.

The wedding ceremonies thus present in symbolic form many of the elements of the marriage system: the stress on transferring the bride in a community with vagf and high endogamy, becomes transformed in Teheran to more stress on individualism and the legalities of the marriage contract. The symbolic elements assimilated to Muslim patterns, today in Teheran assimilate to European ones.

5.3.6. Pilgrimages and Shrines

If the Muslim backdrop is necessary to understanding Zoroastrian marriage and land tenure forms, it is equally requisite for their pilgrimage behavior. Not only is there a historical transformation from monthly celebrations (jašn) when the day-name coincides with the month-name (e.g., dat Tir in the month Tir is celebrated as jašn Tiregan), to a more selective ritual calendar; but there has been what Mary Boyce calls an "imitative

¹ Representing the thirty-three yazatas. Thirty-three happens also to be the number of bricks to be placed on a Muslim grave by local convention.

process" whereby Zoroastrian practices which cannot be hidden away from the unfriendly Muslim eye (as can the fire care and high liturgy performances) take on a protective Muslim form. Boyce unravels for us (1967b), from material culled by modern Persian scholars, a classic case of legend formation having to do with the six great shrines of the Yazd area (Map 5).

The structure of belief about all these shrines is tripartite:


- (a) Mythical origin, which in the case of the six great shrines all have to do with the legend that at the time of the Arab invasion a daughter or son or queen of Yazdegird III fled before an Arab army towards Khorassan, came to a point of exhaustion near Yazd, called upon God, and was taken into the mountain, rock, well or cave before the bewildered Arab eyes.
- (b) Rediscovery in relatively recent times by a shepherd, child, etc., in need to whom the local pir (saint) appeared in dream and aided, requesting in return that a shrine be built.
- (c) Confirmation of faith by nejazat (cures of illness, blindness, or other infirmity), further visions and dreams.

Professor Boyce is concerned only with the first part and turns her attention as an Orientalist and "historian of religion" to the (speculative) possibility that one and perhaps a second of the six shrines were pre-Islamic shrines to Anahid, goddess of water and fertility. Whatever the merits of these speculations, what is far more instructive is that precisely the same legend applies to the Muslim shrine of Bibi Shahbanu at Rey and that for this one we have a chronology of legend elaboration in Shiite meditations on the mother of the fourth Imam, Ali Asghar, son of Hussein. The story here is as follows.

A daughter of Yazdegird III either was given to Hussein in marriage by Yazdegird seeking an alliance with the upstart Arabs on his border, or was captured in Khorassan by Abdullah ibn Amir ibn Kuraiz who sent her to Baghdad where the Caliph Omar would have sold her as a slave but for the intervention of Ali who either gave her to his son Hussein, or who asked her to choose a husband among the Arabs and she chose Hussein. When Hussein was killed at Kerbala, his horse, Dzou'l Djanah came to her tent, and she fled on his back towards her native Persia. The Arabs pursued her to Rey. There, exhausted, she remembered her husband's words, "Should the infidels approach say 'Ya Hu!' (Oh God!);" but in her fear, she said instead, "Ya Kuh!" (Oh Mountain!), and the mountain opened and she entered it. As it closed behind her, a bit of her veil caught in the rock. The Arabs saw this and since night approached, marked the spot with three rocks. When they returned in the morning, the entire slope was covered with rocks and so they could not locate the spot.

MAP 5
ZOROASTRIAN GREAT SHRINES

Pir-e
Bonu



• Zoroastrian Village (see Map 3)

Still today women who go to the shrine hold three stones as they make their wishes. Men are not allowed into the shrine, and it is said that one man who did enter, either went blind or was turned into stone. (See also Masse 1954: 411-12 for more details.)

The version that she chose Hussein for herself is popularized in rosa recitations adding the touch that Omar agreed to allow her to choose a husband because he thought she would choose him, since he was the most powerful; and that her choice of Hussein was a political act of recognizing Ali's claim to the Caliphate despite Omar's usurpation. Now historically, it appears, this wife of Hussein and mother of Ali Asghar was not a royal Sassanian princess but probably a Sindhi slave. In the legend, the fact that most of the early historians refer to her as umm walad (slave) is taken care of by having her captured in Khorassan. Khorassan, however, was captured during the Caliphate of Osman, not Omar (Omar died in 644, Osman in 656, Ali Asghar was born in 657). In historical sequence we have the following bits of elaboration first from two ninth century Sunni historians, and then from five Shiite sources (from Boyce 1967b):

- (a) Ibn Sa'd (d. 844) says the mother of Ali Zayn ul-Abedin was a slave girl called Ghazala who after Hussein died was married to his client Zuyaid.
- (b) Ibn Qutayba (d. 889) says Ali Asghar is the only person through whom the descendants of Hussein survive. His mother was a Sindhi woman called Sulafa or Ghazala who after Hussein died was married to his client Zuyaid.
- (c) Ya'qubi (ninth century A.D.) says Hussein had two sons, Ali Akbar by Layla, and Ali Asghar by Harar, a daughter of Yazdegird whom Hussein called Ghazala. This is the earliest mention of Ali Asghar's mother being of royal blood.
- (d) The Firaq al-Shi'a (tenth century, attributed to Nawbakhti) says Ali was the son of a slave called Sulafa, who before being captured, had been a daughter of Yazdegird called Jehanshah.
- (e) The Tarikh-i Qum (A.D. 988) says the mother of Imam Ali was Shahbanu, daughter of Yazdegird and she died giving birth to Ali. A second tradition says that she was called Salama or Sulaqa, but that her name was really Jehanshah, daughter of Yazdegird, and her grave is beside that of her son's uncle Hassan in Medina.
- (f) Ibn Babaya (d. 988) says when Abdullah ibn Amir ibn Kuraiz conquered Khorassan he took two daughters of Yazdegird prisoner and sent them to Osman. The latter gave one to Hussein and one to Hassan. Both died in childbirth. The son born to the wife of Hussein was given to a slave to raise, and this slave was inherited by him. He married

her off, whence derives the false accusation that he married off his own mother.

- (g) Kulini (d. 940) says Ali Asghar's mother was brought before the Caliph Omar who wished to harm her or sell her as a slave, but Ali intervened and bade that she be allowed to choose for herself a husband. She went at once to Hussein. Ali asked her name and she said Shahbanu. He said, no, your name is Jehanshah.

The connection to Rey remains somewhat obscure, but Boyce, following Nava'i and Parizi, suggests that one pay attention to the Parthian title "Shahbanu" (nowadays rennovated as the title of Queen Farah). In Sassanian times the title for the queen was banbišn, and banu seems to have been reserved for the goddess Anahid. The suggestion then is that tenth century Zoroastrians living as a minority under Muslim rule in Rey encouraged a confusion of the goddess Anahid with the mother of Ali Asghar as a way of protecting the former's shrine, and that the Muslim concept of ghaib šodan (ascension of the living into the next world) facilitated the introduction of a Muslim-like shrine among Zoroastrians who would not allow any hint of tomb worship. Whether this was the motivation, or whether it was more simply an Iranian elaboration of a connection between the former royal house and the divine house of Mohammad in a manner quite analogous to the elaboration of a connection between the Sassanian priesthood and the divine message of Islam in the legends of Salman Farsi (Massignon 1933), it is then argued that the priests of the (putative) Anahid shrine at Banu-Pars made a similar substitution of female patrons, and that the legend structure was then adopted for what might have been another Anahid shrine (since there is water) at Pir-e Sabz, and that it was then adopted for newer shrines even though they had no connection with Anahid.

The historical record does seem to indicate that the Banu-Pars shrine and the Pir-e Sabz shrine are older than the shrines around the city of Yazd: Maneckji in the 1860s and Watson (1866: 185) speak only of the former two. This seems eminently likely since the villages near Ardekan and Aghda are supposed to be older centers of Zoroastrians than the villages around Yazd or the merchant quarter Pusht Khan Ali. One furthermore has the evidence of the formation of the smaller shrines around these newer settlements. But quite as interesting is the fact that there are quite a few Islamic shrines

with the inverse legend: flight into the desert by early Muslims to escape Yazdegird's intolerance. Before considering this further, let us catalogue some of these shrines.

- (a) SETI PIR is located just to the north of Yazd. The legend is that six month old Mehrbanu, granddaughter of Yazdegird III, together with her mother, Seti or Masti, and Mobed Kerobad of Yazd hid from the Arabs in the well at this place. When the Arabs came to the well, it was filled with water. The place was therefore called Quala Hast-o-Bud (Castle Where They Are or Were). The story of how it was discovered has to do with the habit of Zoroastrians to go to Mashad on pilgrimage. They claim that the present site of the Shrine of Imam Reza was previously the site of the great fire Azar-bazin Mehr to which a newly crowned Sassanian sovereign would always pilgrimage. Now, one Zoroastrian who made this pilgrimage was discovered inside the shrine precincts to be a Zoroastrian. The Muslims threw him into a cell, and intended to kill him. He prayed to God and during the night as he slept, Mehrbanu, or in another version, several persons in green and white came to him and told him not to fear, but to build a shrine on the site where he would awake. He found himself in Yazd. As Zoroastrians did not have the right to build new buildings, he applied for permission from the mujtaheddin and they, after verifying his story in Mashad, granted permission.

The Muslim name for the shrine is Qala Asadon (from ostaxandan, place of bones). Where this name comes from is unclear, but it is suggested that this was a fort built at the time of the Afghan invasions and that the name may have to do with the slain of battles near the fort. If so, there might be a connection with the levies of Zoroastrian soldiers from both Yazd and Kirman raised by Mahmud in 1719 on the second Ghilji Afghan invasion against Shah Sultan Hussein. Shah Sultan Hussein, whose room in the Madresseh Mader Shah (or Madresseh Chahr Bagh) in Isfahan is still shown to tourists, is remembered as one of Iran's worst kings. He signed a decree for the forcible conversion of Zoroastrians to Islam, and the Zoroastrian Quarter of Isfahan (named Hassanabad) was destroyed, a mosque being erected on the site of the fire temple. The fire was safely evacuated to Kirman, and much of the population moved to Yazd. The residents of the Yazd suburb, Khorramshah, say their village was founded by these refugees. After the Ghilji Afghans revolted against Shah Sultan Hussein's interference with them, and invaded Persia under Mir Vais, the Zoroastrians suffered severely at the hands of the Persian troops who had been drawn eastwards from Isfahan into the Yazd-Kirman area to fight the Afghans. So when Mir Vais' son, Mahmud, led the second invasion, the Zoroastrians regarded them as liberators. The Afghan invasions not only destroyed the fast deteriorating Safavid Dynasty, but left the country in chaos. One hundred and twenty years later, when K.E. Abbott

visited Yazd, vaults along the city moat were opened and found to contain rows of bodies with clothing still clinging to the remains, apparently a collaboration of an Afghan massacre of Yazdis and the dry climate. Nadir Shah Afshar (1736-47) attempted to restore order to the country, but in the process the Zoroastrians were victimized by both sides. Jamshid Soroushian (1335/1956: 211) says that Nadir Shah had a number of Zoroastrian colonels in his army who rounded up Afghans and executed them. In retaliation, the Afghans massacred the Zoroastrians and leveled their quarter in Kirman, the ruins of which, two kilometers north of the city, are still called Mahalleh Gabr. Despite this alliance with Nadir Shah, a royal decree was issued calling for the forced conversion of Zoroastrians. (For the scattered pieces of this history see Karaka 1884: 57-59; Lockhardt 1958; Watson 1866: 185; Soroushian 1956: 211).

Zoroastrians generally assume the name Seti Pir to mean se-ta pir (three saints). The form of the ziaratgah (shrine) is three rooms, formerly three rock-hewn cavities. Underneath is a tunnel entrance which Yazdis say was dug by European treasure hunters. Europeans are credited with knowledge of where to look for treasure: while no one knows what, if anything, was taken, they suppose that Europeans would not dig unless they were sure of finding something. Europeans have carried off a number of mihrab and grave stones of artistic value, and that fact melds well with the legend that Yazdegird left a treasure buried in Yazd. Ayati (1317/1938: 171) records two treasures, one of Sassanian coins, uncovered in the last century.

People, primarily women, come to Seti Pir on the day Adar each month. On the last of Khordad or the first of Tir people gather here before going to Pir-e Sabz. The second day of the New Year (2 Farvardin) and other major holidays are also big days for visiting Seti Pir. (The dates being cited here are by the fasli calendar.)

- (b) PIR-e SABZ is located eight farsaxs to the northwest of Yazd. Its legend is that Hayat Banu, daughter of Yazdegird, fled before the Arabs who pursued her up against this mountain wall. She cried out, "Oh mountain protect me and like a mother take me to your breast." There appeared a cleavage between the rocks which she entered and it closed behind her. Since that time water drips from the rock into a pool. And so it is called by Muslims "Chak Chak Kuh" (Tear Drop Mountain). It is said that when there are many people there is more water. The time of gathering here is the first five days of the month Tir in summer, around the time of the summer solstice when the water level should be highest. This gathering is the greatest of all the shrine gatherings and so it is called vaxt-e vaxt (time of times). Next to the pool is a large old plane tree (cenar) said to have grown from Hayat Banu's staff which she left behind. The great mossy growth

along the wet mountain wall is the medicinal herb pare siah vešan (capillaire), good for fever as it is very cooling, and its juice is good for teething pains.

The story of discovery is that a shepherd lost his flock, searched long for it and exhausted fell asleep here. Hayat Banu appeared in his dream assuring him that he would find his sheep and that in return he should build a shrine. When he awoke the sheep had returned. How long ago this happened is not clear, but the Jame Mofidi (Mustafi III, 1960: 828) records that it was a Zoroastrian pilgrimage site visited for five days a year in the mid-seventeenth century. New buildings were constructed at the time of Maneckji under the reign of Nasraddin Shah.

- (c) PIR-e BANU is the shrine in the hills to the south-east of Aghda which Prof. Boyce thinks must have been a shrine to Anahid. The site is at the confluence of river beds, which when there is a storm must be impressive, but are normally dry. There are, however, three perennial springs which the shrine shares with the impoverished Muslim village of Sarjan. Much more impressive normally are the rough wind-eroded surfaces of the rocks and the denuded folded stratigraphy. Under the dome of the shrine is a three legged table serving as a kalak (place for fire) under which is a stone with a rill in it dividing it into the mother and her baby. The legend is that Banu, daughter of Yazdegird, fleeing the Arabs came to a farmer and asked for water. He was milking a cow and offered her milk instead, but the cow kicked over the bucket, and she had to run on thirsty until she could run no more. She tried to call out "Yallah!" (Oh God) but could only say "Ya Kuh!" (Oh mountain). The rocks opened and she entered but as the rock closed behind her it caught the fringe of her makno (head cloth) and this remained visible until a few decades ago, it is said, when a goat ate it.

The discovery legend is that a blind man came and slept near the makno and in his dream Pir-e Banu appeared and told him that this was a holy, that he would be able to see and that he should build a shrine here.

At the time of Maneckji, cows as well as sheep were slaughtered here, a practice which he stopped. Boyce, with her insistence on the conservatism of Zoroastrian practice, rejects the report of Yazdis that cows slaughtered at Pir-e Banu were killed and eaten by Muslims. She prefers to believe that Maneckji's references to participation in the pilgrimage by mobeds means that it was a priestly sacrifice surviving from the ancient priestly cow sacrifice to Anahid, now encompassed in the legend as retribution to the cow for having kicked over the bucket of milk. This is, of course, a viable hypothesis, although the formula in the Aban Yasht for Anahid's sacrifice is one hundred stallions, one thousand oxen and ten thousand

lambs; but Boyce's ethnography is certainly shakier than that of the present Yazdis when she says, "No Zoroastrian would conceivably offer a sacrifice by the hand of an unbeliever. Muslim beggars and poor people fairly regularly present themselves, however, at Zoroastrian religious occasions for a dole of food (1967b: 42). No Muslim who can possibly help it would eat meat slaughtered by a non-believer either: it is najes, ritually unclean. Yazdis say they had to buy a cow from Muslims in Aghda, take it to Pir-e Banu and bring it back to Pir-e Mehru in Aghda where it was killed and eaten by Muslims, all in exchange for free passage to the shrine. Given the degree of friendship between Zoroastrian and Muslim in the last century, this seems entirely plausible (and does not rule out that they may have slaughtered a cow or two of their own as well). Even today Muslim beggars at Banu Pars object that the meat must be slaughtered by a Muslim, although the poor people of Sarjan would probably rather have the meat than not, even if it is najes. If, however, Boyce admits her observation of the present to enter into the argument, then it must be pointed out that very often the slaughtering at these shrines is done by Muslims, and it is rare that a Zoroastrian thinks twice about meat killed by a non-believer.

- (d) PIR-e HERIST is located thirteen kilometers to the north-east of Ardekan at a completely dry site. This is the site of the ascension of Gohar Banu, daughter of Yazdegird. As she fled she came upon a man with a load of ginger and nabot (glass sugar). She asked him for water. He refused. At his refusal, his ginger and nabot turned to stone and were strewn about the site. Again the site is marked by a bifurcated stone, with a larger and smaller moiety representing mother and child. The discovery legend is that a boy was lost in the middle of winter for three days. Finally he was found here well fed and happy. He said that he had been looked after by a lady but she had now gone away. She had told him to tell his people to build a shrine.
- (e) PIR-e NARAKI is located between Mehriz and Cham to the south-east of Yazd. The legend here is that Naz Banu, wife or daughter-in-law of the Governor of Fars, fled before the Arabs towards Yazd. She went into the valley of Dar-e Zanjir but could not find shelter. So she ran to the valley of Gegun and climbed the mountain of Naraki. Here she prayed to God, and she disappeared into the mountain. Before this event, the mountain had been bare, but afterwards there was some water and greenery.

The discovery legend is about a quite specific person, the father of Shahriyar Bomasi, the great merchant-siraf who went bankrupt and lives in India. The father was in the habit of coming to Naraki. One day while he napped, Naz Banu complained to him that Pir-e Sabz and Pir-e Banu were visited but no one paid her any respect. So he decided to build a shrine. She again directed him to build her shrine at a rock with a cleft in it. Nowadays this shrine is part of the pilgrimage cycle and people gather here in the early fall.

Some stories of confirmation are these. The sister of Mahmud, the Muslim caretaker of the shrine from Sunniabad, was violently ill with much vomiting and diahrea. The doctor said she would die by midnight. Her husband prayed to God that he could not raise three children all alone. At midnight she arose and demanded to know why she was naked and not being attended. The husband said the doctor had predicted her death. She replied that this would not happen for Pir-e Naraki had appeared to her and had told her to get up since she was well. Mahumud, himself, was kicked by a mule and his arm was dislocated at the shoulder so that it both pained him and was useless. Twenty-one times he tried to have it reset, all without success. Eventually he decided to commit suicide since he could not earn a living to support his family. He fell asleep contemplating throwing himself into a well. While sleeping he had a vision of fifty beautiful girls in white; and one, Pir-e Naraki, came towards him holding a glass of milk and bidding him to drink. He stretched out his good arm, the left arm. She remonstrated, "Mahmud, when someone gives you something to drink, you do not receive it with your left hand, you take it with your right." "But I cannot," replied he. She countered, "Why not, let us see." He tried and his right hand easily went out and grasped the glass. He awoke and his arm was indeed healed, twelve years after it had been dislocated. Mahumud tells another story about some Zoroastrians who came in a car to picnic here. He came to see if they needed something, kerosene, eating utensils, etc. They offered him some food and he sat with them for a while. He asked if they had some business with Pir-e Naraki. They said no, they did not believe in such things and had come only to picnic. So he left. When they wanted to leave, their car overturned. They sought his help in getting a tractor, but even so it took five days to get the car back to Yazd to be properly repaired. Then there was the time that some Zoroastrians were leaving the shrine in Mehreban's bus. Mehreban did not come, and the passengers became impatient. One of them got behind the wheel and wanted to drive off. A big boulder rolled down in front of the bus causing no damage, but they waited for Mehreban. Finally in Mahmud's repertoire is the story of a fifteen year old girl seized by a band of robbers in the time of Mozaffar-ud-din Shah. She beseeched God for help and fainted. The robbers thinking she had died, threw her body off to the side, having no use for a corpse. She was found here at the shrine. Finally, a Zoroastrian woman tells the story of several sisters who were dying of a disease involving serious nose bleeding. One of the sisters expecting to follow her sisters to the grave, packed some belongings and went to spend her last days at Naraki. As she slept, Pir-e Naraki came to her and said, "Fear not, I am with you. Take these three leaves and keep them with you. Burn everything in your trunk." She did and was cured.

- (f) PIR-e NARESTANEH is located in the Darbid mountains forty one kilometers east of Yazd. These mountains are said to be young and growing because of the green mineralized outcrops. The legend is that here is where Ardeshir, son of Yazdegird ascended. The legend of discovery is

that a hunter pursued a deer up this little valley and when he turned the last corner he found before him not the deer but a handsome man who told him to build a shrine and to tell the people who had a wish that they should come here, light a candle and it would be granted.

It is an isolated place, but since it is a holy place, the shrine keeper need not fear. It is said that the previous caretaker was an old woman, and she would sleep here alone. One night she awoke to find something licking her face: a panther. She hit it with a piece of wood she always kept beside her and it went away. Another time a snake curled up beside her, but also did her no harm. The current caretaker, a delightful old man who spent a couple decades running a tea shop in Bombay, relates four dreams he had in connection with the shrine. First, he wanted to check and make sure that someone was really there, so before going to sleep at the shrine, he would pray to God that if there was really a pir, He should send a dream. He dreamt of a large room in which he saw himself sleeping. The room had two large doors and many lighted candles. The doors opened and a white robed figure approached him, greeted him, and then he awoke. So there is someone there. Next the water at the shrine began to dry up, and he prayed to God to know why this was happening. He dreamt he was at the entrance to the shrine, and there were lighted candles all about. Just inside the door he saw a woman in white, just her upper torso. She told him she was the reason the water had stopped, because she had done something bad or unclean, but not to worry, the flow of water would be restored. He awoke. Thirdly, he had a dream assuring him not to fear to sleep at the shrine alone. In this one he saw several white figures walking to and fro on a path, and a voice told him not to be afraid, for he was near God, and this was God's place. Finally, the caretaker had another dream which confirmed his nearness to God. In the dream it is approximately high noon and he is standing in a big circular space. He hears a voice call him, but he sees nothing. The voice tells him to look up. Above him he sees seven—or maybe it was eight, he is not sure any more—white spirits (fereshte). A voice says: man shah-e alam-am; man padeshah-e alam-am (I am king of the universe). He awoke.

It is also told that a Governor of Yazd, one Moshir ul Morgh, ordered a large old plane tree (cenar) to be cut down. The Zorostrians begged him not to do this, as it was not only a tree but also a pir (saint). He persisted and in return went blind, suffering great pain in his eyes. The doctors could do nothing and he was told that if he wanted relief from the pain he must give some money to the caretaker of the ziaratgah to pray the Bahram Yasht for him. (For special wishes the Bahram Yasht is recited once a day for forty consecutive days.) He did this, and so regained sight in one eye. He also gave the wood of the tree back to the caretaker to use as food for the shrine dadgah fire. (A similar legend is told of the cypress of Kashmar marking the grave of Zoroaster: the Caliph Mutawakkil or

Harun al-Rashid, to emphasize his sovereignty over Khorassan, ordered that this cypress be cut down and be brought to Baghdad so that he could use the wood to construct a palace. He was warned that it was a holy tree and were he to do this, he would not live to see the wood brought into the capital. He persisted and he died. As the tree was cut there also was an earthquake.)

- (g) SHAHZADEH FAZEL is located along the city walls just behind the cloth bazaars. Like the Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed and the Masjid-e Jome of Yazd, while basically a Muslim holy place, it is claimed by Zoroastrians to have been originally a Zoroastrian holy place. The Zoroastrians say the shrine belongs to Prince Ardashir, son of Yazdegird. Muslims popularly believe it to be the grave of the seventh Imam, Fazl ibn Musa. Ayati points out (1938: 174) that the grave was found when the city moat was being dug by the Mozaffarids and with it an engraved stone with the name Fazl ibn Ali; the family is unclear, but Ayati suspects it to be the family of Fazl ibn Sahl, minister to the Abbasid Caliph Maman, which set up a minor independent government in Yazd. One more shrine belongs to this Zoroastrian set of shrines with the legend of Yazdegird's family: Pir-e Borj. According to Rashid Shahmardan (1967: 169) its legend is that Prince Firuz, son of Yazdegird, ascended into heaven here.
- (h) AH-e MORAD, four farsaxs west of Kirman, also fits into the series, although like Bibi Shahbanu at Rey, not in the Yazd vicinity. It is supposed to be where Bibi Morad, a sister of Shah Herat, one of Yazdegird's court, ascended (Soroushian 1956: 209).
- (i) PA_YE SHAH or SHAH HERAT is seven farsaxs northeast of Kirman near a spring. Shah Herat was a governor under Yazdegird and found refuge here (Soroushian 1956: 210).
- (j) SULTAN SHAHADA is located to the east of Yazd near the large village of Faraj. This shrine is built around a large old cypress tree, now dead for lack of water. It used to be one of three such old cypress trees, the other two having died even earlier, one a farsax further east, and the other by the sister village of Sar-e Yazd. In a second courtyard of the present buildings is an imamzadeh with a number of graves. Nearby are ruins of older buildings including one with the name Bibi Hayat. The legend is that either a daughter of yazdegird or a sister's son of Ali was killed here in the Faraj battle between the invading Arabs and the retreating retainers of Yazdegird's court.

Whichever it was, pointed out a conciliatory Muslim youth, does not really matter, since after the marriage of Shahbanu to Hussein, Zoroastrians became damad-e ma (our sons-in-law). This is a popular picnic spot on Fridays. Zoroastrians come here as well as Muslims, although infrequently. Also in the vicinity, several farsaxs away, is a Chehel Doxtar (Forty Virgins) shrine where forty daughters of the Imams were killed and thrown down into a well.

- (k) GHAR BIBI, BIBI DARMANDA are two of three holy spots described by Strack (cited in Boyce 1967b: 41) in the Harm district of Fars near Yazd. The legend is that twelve thousand Arabs besieged the Zoroastrian commander Shah Karan at Karyun. The latter took advantage of the Muslim time for prayer, and attacked. The Muslims would not leave their devotions and so were massacred. Among the Muslims were forty virgins who prayed to Allah. The earth opened and swallowed thirty-seven of them. The three others fled the Zoroastrian army. One went north to a mountain where now is the cave called after her Ghar Bibi (Cave of the Lady). The second went to where there is now a small trickle of water from a cleft in the mountain wall. The third went south, became exhausted and died. So her shrine is called Bibi Darmanda (The Tired Lady), and her shrine is popular with childless women.
- (l) Around Ardekan, several of the six major imamzadehs and ziaratgahs have some variant of a legend that early Muslims had to flee the intolerance of Yazdegird, and ran into the desert where they perished: Haft Dar, Sayyid Mohammad, Mirza Shams ul-Haq, Hadijeh Khatun (near Meybod), Husseinaya Tat (behind Pir-e Herisht), and Abdullah (at Hajiabad).
- (m) SHEIKH QANAB is located two farsaxs east of Yazdekhest (Browne 1893: 229). Its legend is that two sons of Abbas (who lost his hand fetching water for Hussein at Kerballa) took refuge from the Umayyids here, and the mountain opened and took them in.

It has already been hinted that the ritual cycle into which the pilgrimages to the major Zoroastrian shrines (i.e., a-f above) fit is a kind of transformation of the older cycle of bi-monthly gahambars and monthly jasns. One can see the transformation in process by observing the lack of

agreement on ritual dates, which affects the times for visiting the shrines, although the pilgrimage cycle is primarily observed in summer around Tiregan according to the fasli calendar, and a smaller circuit in early fall. The following kinds of complications occur thanks to the two calendars. The Zoroastrian Anjoman and the Teheran community have adopted the fasli calendar (which begins on the vernal equinox, 21 March, called NoRuz-e Jamshidi), while the Yazdis still operate on the qadimi (old) calendar which now begins in late summer, almost half a year different so that Mehregan and NoRuz, the two heads of the year with the Sassanian monarch held public audience, are practically transposed. Thus the official celebration of Mehregan by the Yazd Zoroastrian Anjoman falls in the autumn during the civil calendar month of Mehr.¹ The celebration consists of an assembly in the fire temple compound with speeches, movies, and so on, its modernity symbolized by rows of charis, lecturns, and other mass assembly paraphernalia. The people, however, celebrate Mehr Izet or Mehregan in the middle of winter during the civil calendar month of Bahman with a gusfand berium.² A similar

¹The civil calendar and the fasli calendar are a few days apart since the first six months of the former have thirty-one days, while all months of the latter have thirty days adding at the end of the year the panjeh (five days).

²A sheep is slaughtered and hung head down inside a bread oven with a pan to catch the drippings. The insides are cleaned so that only the flesh remains. It is seasoned with tumeric and salt. The oven is sealed with several layers of gunny sack, and on top are placed a lamp, nine pieces of sweets (nine being an important number: nine months of human gestation, nine holes in the body, nine days that Zoroaster spent in Shah Gushtasp's prison, the nine bindings on the staff of Zoroaster, the nine holes in the alat or ritual implement which strains the haoma, the nine days of bareshnum purification and the nine groups of pebbles used). Anyone who is sick should eat one of these sweets. Next to the sweets also is thyme origan (avišam), capillaire

effect of the two calendars can be seen in the gatherings at the daxme which occur three times a year: during the panjeh (the last five days of the year), the saddeh ("one hundred" days or fifty days and fifty nights before the end of the year, but see Boyce 1970b), and Tir Izet or Tiregan.¹ The panjeh is observed in Yazd by the qadimi calendar, that is, now in August: fires are lighted on the rooves of Zoroastrian houses, and porseh (death memorials) are done at the homes of all the deceased, as well as communally at the daxmes. The saddeh, however, is celebrated by the fasli calendar fifty days before NoRuz-e Jamshidi. This time a large bonfire is built in one place, at the Marker's Girls' School in Yazd (and in Kirman at the shrine of Mehr Izet or Baghçe Budaqabad half a kilometer from Mahalleh Gabr). This is preceded in Yazd by an assembly with speeches and theatrical skits.² The saddeh thus belongs to the set of modern revivals,³ much as also the celebration of Zoroaster's death on the fifth of Dei in late fall and his birth on Khorshid Day (the sixth) of Farvardin. The latter has always been

(pare siah vešan), and a pomegranate. It is cooked until the meat is soft. Then in the evening, it is cut into little pieces and shared out as a xeirat with small breads (two per adult over fourteen, one per child) and lorki. The šir-e beriun (the drippings) are saved as a salve for aches. Modernists who think all this should be done in the fall grumble at the irony that such a gorbani (sacrifice) should be done in a month dedicated to the protector of animal life, Bahman. Interestingly, Zoroastrians seem to have no other folklore about sacrifice than that it is a repetition of the Abraham-Issac/Ismail (they are as conversant with the Bible as the Qur'an) dedication to God, and they invariably respond to Parsi criticism of gorbani, that it is not sacrifice but xeirat.

¹ Parsis visit their daxmes twice a year: Farvardin Day (the nineteenth) of Farvardin Month, and Farvardin Day of Adar Month.

² A popular form of folk entertainment. Young men do it in Nasrabad for Mehr Izet, and it is not uncommon at Muslim village weddings. The humor depends heavily on caricature, and role inversion: the peddler who refuses to sell his wares, or who sells cloth for 100 tomans/meter, but fifty meters for fifty tomans, and one hundred meters for one toman; the young rural doctor, who having no supplies must rely on displays of authority; the brutal landlord, his opium-dazed tenant, and the latter's son whose modus vivendi is exuberant buffoonery; the pompous mullah; etc.

³ In Muslim villages around Kirman the saddeh is part of the way the agricultural year is counted, i.e., fifty days before the vernal equinox (Dillon, personal communication). Thus perhaps the attribution of the discovery of fire is recent, for this would indicate that the saddeh belongs to

a popular date to attribute the birth of such heroes as Shah Kei Khosrow (who Ferdowsi says did not die, but ascended). The saddeh commemorates the discovery of fire by Hushang who threw a stone at a snake, missed, but the stone hit the canyon wall and gave off sparks.

Tir Izet is also celebrated according to the fasli calendar, i.e., in summer. In local opinion it marks the date of the massacre of 999,999 Zoroastrians by the Arabs during the invasion of Iran, this being then the origin of the daxme, since one could not bury individually each of the fallen. Through this legend the visitation of the daxmes and all the death memorial rites are linked into a cycle with the shrine pilgrimages and their legends. If this were the origin of the daxme, and for modernists that ancient Zoroastrians buried their dead is proved by the royal tombs at Naqshe Rostam, the tomb of Cyrus the Great at Parsagadae, and the ossuaries of the Persepolis region, then there is no reason to insist on maintaining' this form of disposing of the dead. It is, of course, not the case: exposure is a venerable custom of Central Asia since at least the second millenium B.C., although by no means need it have been the exclusive mode of disposal of the ancient Zoroastrians (although it is mandatory by the time of the Vendidad).¹ The legend has one further interesting step: the motive for the massacre was the revulsion of the Arabs for another Zoroastrian custom also under attack by the modernists. Either Shahbanu, wife of Hussein, or another Zoroastrian wife of an Arab leader, asked permission to purify herself according to the Zoroastrian nošveh or barešnum ceremony. Permission was granted. When she returned the husband asked her to describe the ritual. Upon hearing what to the Muslim were details of pollution, not purification, Omar or another Arab leader ordered the massacre. On the other hand, even modernists proudly claim that communal graves uncovered from time to time by excavation for new construction are evidence of forced Zoroastrian converts

the series including chehel bozorg and chehel kuchik (the forty and twenty day periods of winter and summer).

¹ See K. Jettmar's excellent review of the state of our knowledge (1967), and also J.J. Modi's review of Tibetan modes of disposing of the dead (1922a). Balsara (1936b: 104) gives an older justification of the daxme: that the bones of the deceased must be physically stored for the day of Ressurrection, citing the Vendidad VI: 49-51.

to Islam who refused to be buried like Muslims but signalled their identity with a form of burial as close as possible to the daxme.

In any case, the time for visiting the six major shrines is just before Tir Izet (13 Tir). There is an order to the visiting. The last day of Khordad or the first of Tir one goes to Seti Pir. The first five days of Tir are the great gathering at Pir-e Sabz called vaxt-e vaxt. The affair is a vast five day pajama party with a quite conscious function of renewing individual ties to the community through exchange of information on who married whom, who is related to whom, and simply meeting other co-religionists:

Who are you, you are not Khoramshahi, what right to Khoramshahi quarters do you have? Sure, I am Khoramshahi. Who then? Well, you know Jamshid, I'm his second wife. Oh, you know Fereydun, I'm his xale (MZ). I'm the son of Firuz; I live now in Kirman. Remember old Shah Bahram?—he died last week.

One sleeps at the shrine both to enjoy the good air and perhaps to have a significant dream. The ritual of "sacrifice" is as follows. The sheep is first taken to the dadgah and circumambulated three times around the kallak. It is supposed to walk, for if it sits down, it is a sign that it should not be killed. To avoid this eventuality, it is often carried around. It is then taken to the slaughtering place where it is first given some water, and then the butcher ties around its horns his own green handkerchief. The first portion of the meat to be eaten is the liver or kaliāl mol (blood cooked with onions).¹ Meanwhile women hand out a mixture of naxod (chick peas), noql, and thyme which is not eaten but is returned with an exchange of wishes for a good pilgrimage, nicely symbolizing God's demand of sacrifice of the son of Abraham as a test of faith and then returning the gift of life.

¹ Blood and liver are symbols of vitality, courage, compassion. Haim (1969: 232) gives idioms such as jegaram kebab šod (I was greatly moved with compassion), and jegar suz (heart-rending). In the refrain of the popular Dari song Homi Gol, the despairing lover cries, "Elohi nisto parbe, elohi khinjarabe" (I hope you die, I hope your liver fills with blood). Mark Slobin (1970: 99) gives an Afghan quatrain on the dangers of love: Ašūq šodara tegh be sar bayad xord/ Gar zahr bedhiš mesle šakar boyad xord/ Ruze be gonahi ašeqi košte šavam/ Darya darya xune jigar boyad xord (The lover must be ready to be pierced with a blade/ If you give him poison he must eat it like sugar/ Someday I may be killed for the sin of love/ He must consume seas and seas of

From Pir-e Sabz, many go on to Pir-e Herišt and Pir-e Banu. But many return to Yazd for Tir Izet and go to Narestuneh before Pir-e Banu. The time for Naraki is in the fall, and there is then a minor circuit as well: one may begin with Seti Pir, go to Naraki, and return to Yazd via Sarv-e Cham (the large cypress of Cham village serves as a local ziaratgah)¹ and Shah Bahram Izet in the suburb village of Khoramshah. The story of this latter is this:

A man called Pahlavan used to live next to the ziaratgah, then only a large plane tree. He felt that this tree was getting too big and was taking too much sun away from his garden. So one day he decided to prune it, but when he began, blood issued forth. Immediately he stopped and informed the people, and they built the shrine. Then one day a pahlavan (strong man, athlete) challenged Pahlavan to fight. Now the latter was a much smaller man. So he went into the shrine and said that if he won the fight, he would believe in the pir, but if not, he would destroy the shrine. The fight took place and the little man disabled his opponent with an open palmed jab up into the gut. He picked up his victim and threw him into the jube (water channel). Some time later a Muslim came at night and threw some manure into the shrine as a sign of contempt. The next day his legs were paralyzed and within three months he was dead.

And so people come here frequently to pray, especially on Bahram day each month (the twentieth). On Bahram Day, women may also cook oil bread (surok), and prepare naxod-e mošgel gešah (described below). Shortly before the time for Naraki, in the village of Kuche Biuk, a Shah Pari sopreh is made, involving the slaughter of a hen (or a goat). The stories and ritual activities of Mošgel Gešah, Sopreh Shah Pari,² Bibi Sešambe, and Pir-e

of liver blood. Muslims, of course, would not eat kalial mol (Farsi: jeger xun), but the ancient inter-clan la'acat al-dam (blood lickers) oath had the form of each party dipping a hand in a pan of blood and then licking them (W.R. Smith 1903: 57).

¹ Cham has a daxme for the villages on the Taft road, and also the graveyard for the jadid-ul-islam who for many years lived a dual existence wearing half Zoroastrian, half Muslim clothes, and so on. The graveyard too partakes of this half-Islamization: they are graves, but not dug into the ground; rather the body is laid on the desert surface and a mound of earth is built over it. Pleading forced conversion, these jadid petitioned the Zoroastrian Anjoman in Teheran for readmission, and this was granted a few years ago.

² Unfortunately, I never had the opportunity to see the ritual setting for a Sopreh Shah Pari.

Vameru form a set much as did the legends of the great shrines, and so we can deal with them also by first cataloguing their stories.

- (a) BIBI SESAMBE. A man had three daughters. His wife died and he remarried. The second wife insisted that he get rid of the girls by losing them in the desert. He said: how can I do that? She replied: I will give you a cauldron but not the top. I will also give you one mann (six kilos) of flour to take along. Take it and go. The father told the girls that he was only taking them out of the house and that he would return for them later. They asked where he was taking them. He said to Pir-e Mehr Izet. They came to a small, one room hut and he said that this was Pir-e Mehr Izet. He told them to prepare some stew and he would return to the house to fetch the cover for the cauldron. He returned home and told his wife that he had left the girls out in the desert. She said: good, now we can live happily together. Meanwhile the girls cooked stew and ate it and saw that their father was not returning. They ate all their provisions and the youngest said: we have eaten everything. So they prayed that if they were saved, they would make a kind of xeirat. The eldest got up and said: I will go out and find something for us to eat. She went out into the desert until she came to a place where there was a good smell. She found a small room and entered it. There she found three girls seated at an open sopreh, and she asked them who they were. They replied: we are daughters of Bibi Sešambe (Lady Tuesday). She asked and was permitted to help them prepare their sopreh, and after the work was finished had something to eat. She also took something for her sisters, and as she left, the daughters of Bibi Sešambe said: whenever you have a wish open our sopreh. Back with her sisters, the three girls ate and slept. In the morning, the eldest daughter went onto the roof and saw that a young man was approaching on horseback. He came up to the girls and asked what they were doing out in the desert. And he asked for water to drink. The eldest girl gave him a bowl of water, on the surface of which she placed a straw. He drank the water and then asked why she had put the straw on it. She replied that she had seen how thirsty he had been and had put it there that he might drink slowly and not catch cold by gulping it down. He was delighted by her answer and asked her if she would marry him. She said yes. He told her to climb up on the horse next to him, but she refused saying she would not go that way. He said: very well. And he returned home where he told his mother that he had found a wife. She asked, where? And he said, in the desert of God. She replied: you are the son of a king, you cannot just marry a girl of the desert. He said: she is good. The mother consented and told him to fetch her; but he said, not that way, he would take an escort. He did so and there was a great wedding celebration. The other two sisters were settled nearby. The three sisters then in accordance with their vow prepared a feast. A servant of the king asked what they were doing and, fearing magic, said he would report them as sorcerers to the king.

The girls opened the sopreh of Bibi Sešambe and prayed for divine intervention. The servant on his way to the king was carrying six watermelons and six sweet melons; these melons turned into severed heads. He was accused of murder and sentenced to death. He asked to see the three sisters, and when they arrived, pleaded with them that he was a poor man, and if he had said anything to make them curse him he was sorry and could they remove the curse. They then opened the sopreh again praying that they had forgiven the man and could the curse be removed. It was. All the people participated in the thanksgiving feast of the sisters. Anyone could get a wish. Anyone may open his own sopreh.

- (b) BIBI SHAH PARI. There once was a royal prince. Everyday he would go to a garden. One day he saw a spring in this garden and sitting by it was a girl. He fell in love and asked her to be his wife. She agreed on the condition that he obey whatever she told him. He agreed. They married and he took her home. A son was born. He barked. A dog came and took the child. Again a son was born. Again the child barked. A dog came and took the child away. Yet again a son was born, and also this one was given to the dog. The husband said nothing. Then one day the mother of the prince fell ill and began to sweat the sweat of the dying. The girl who was a spirit left, and went to perch on a ledge. The mother died and they went to bury her. The girl spirit laughed. The prince went with the funeral procession. When he returned, he said to his wife: until now I said nothing. Three children were born and all three you gave to a dog who took them away. I said nothing. Now why when my mother died you laugh? She replied: from now on, you will not see me with your eyes, but come and I will tell you. I gave the three children to the dog who is my mother, but to your eyes she was a dog. I gave them to be raised. I will now return the children to you. She brought the children to him and said: take the three children, but one of them when he is twenty-one will drown, the next when he is eighteen will burn to death, and the third when he is nineteen will be crushed to death by a collapsing roof. That accounts for three children. I laughed because your mother, wife of a king, was to have all this bad fortune. Her future was like a worn out shoe or a stale piece of bread. And then the daughter of Shah Pari disappeared. The prince went twice more to the garden in hopes of seeing the girl again, but she only gave him the reply that many people would like to see her.
- (c) PIR VAMERU. In the name of God, and with His permission, and with the permission of the thirty-three amšaspands and Shah Bahram Izet. There was a mother and a daughter. A boy was found to marry the daughter. He bought everything for her and filled the house with all things. He then said to eat, and he himself went away on a trip. When he had left, the girl did not work until the day her husband was due back. She then ran out and got four spindles and prepared some šu (wheat flour paste used to bind cotton when it breaks or unravels). She told her mother to cook a cauldron of šuli (a wheat flour stew

made with flour, onions, maš peas, naxod, rice and ghee) and to bring it close to her shoulder so that she could lick it while she spun. The mother agreed, and the daughter remained in the work room murmuring lis-e lis he belis (lick, lick, hey lick [onomatopoeic sound of spinning?]), sume darvoze rasid, tambun bekuneš narasid (my husband reaches the gate, his lounging pajamas have not reached his ass). Now for seven years the daughter of Shah Pari had a fish bone caught in her throat. No doctor could help, but when she heard the words of Roshanid who was weaving and spinning, she laughed and the bone came out by itself. Joyfully she ran to her mother with the good news. The mother asked what she did? She replied she had laughed at the carryings-on of such-and-such a girl. The mother said: let us go together to the house of this girl. So they went to the girl and asked why she was in such a hurry. She replied: I have no time to tell you the story. They replied, never mind, we are the daughters of Shah Pari; tell us whatever work, whatever troubles you have. She then said that such-and-such was her fate: that she had not done any work and now the time had come and her husband was due back the following day. They replied: do not worry; and they brought her all the best things for the home. The daughter of Shah Pari then said: now whenever you have need for me, take a bath, put esfand (rue), kondor and other sweet smelling things in a fire, and parigol and thyme on the floor, and I will come. One day her husband said: today we will have guests. She replied: it is a very joyful thing. And she went into the room, washed, put esfand and kondor on the fire, parigol and thyme on the floor. The daughter of Shah Pari appeared and prepared the best food, and then disappeared. Another day the husband said: today we have some guests coming and they will also want to go to the baths. She said, very well, and went and did the same, that is, washed and put esfand and kondor on the fire, and parigol and thyme on the floor. The daughter of Shah Pari came and cooked food, prepared the baths with loin cloths, wash rags, soap. And that is the story of Shah Pari and of Pir-e Vameru.¹

- (d) MOS̄GHEL GES̄AH. There was an old man named Xarkan (named after the xar cactus on which camels graze) who had one daughter. Everyday he would go into the wilderness to collect firewood which he would sell so he could buy something to eat. One day there was a wedding at the neighbor's house, and the smell of good food wafted across the way. The daughter said to her father: daddy, the smell of sheep liver is driving me wild with hunger, I am going to see if they will invite me in. The father said: do not go; tomorrow I will go to the wilderness and collect two loads of firewood. Just give me one day and we will have enough to make sheep's liver and kalia. The girl kept smelling the aroma and finally got up and went to the neighbors and asked for a little fire. They gave her this, but did not invite

¹ The connection to Pir-e Vameru remains obscure: perhaps the notion that they are at the shrine instead of doing their work, but with God's help their husbands will not notice.

her in. Again she got up and went to them and asked for some sour dough. They also gave her this but did not invite her in. She returned home and complained to her father that they had not invited her. He arose and went into the wilderness to collect two loads of firewood. When he had collected it, a dust devil arose, snatched the firewood up and carried it off. So he had to return home empty-handed and tell his daughter that the wind had stolen bread and liver from his reach. Again the next day he went to collect two loads of firewood, and again the dust devil took it away. He came a third day to collect two loads of firewood. And again the dust devil took it away. He asked himself what to do: I cannot go home again empty handed. At the crossroads he fell asleep. Three persons in green came before him and asked: old man, why do you sleep here? He answered: what shall I say? They said: tell us what is in your heart. He said: for three days running, I came to collect firewood and a dust devil came and carried it away. The three persons in green said: why do you come out of your house without remembering mošghel gešah? They said they would grant him his wish and instructed him to get up, take hold of the skirt of his shirt and put in it three handful of earth, and anything else he might see before him on his way home. He began to walk and he saw a dead snake (a cypress twig in another version) so he bent down and picked it up. He came home and said to his daughter, well tonight is not a thousand nights; come let us go into the house. He put the three handful of earth on a shelf and the snake in a cauldron which he covered. The two of them went to bed without dinner. Since they were hungry they could not sleep. The daughter saw a light coming into the room, and cried out to her father: look a light is coming in here, maybe the house is being robbed. He said: no, you are just hungry and so you cannot sleep; put your head under the blanket and go to sleep. Nothing happened until morning. In the morning when he arose, he saw on the shelf three piles of gold. He took one and went to the baker and asked for some bread in exchange. The baker sent him to a goldsmith who counted out three piles of rial coins, one large, one medium, and one small. With the money, he bought bread and liver and had them sent to his house while he purchased other things. The daughter would not take the things into the house, and when the messenger told the father of this, the latter instructed that they be left on the floor of the house until he arrived. His last purchase was naxod (chick peas) for mošghel gešah. He returned home and asked his daughter why she had not accepted the liver and bread. She replied: for three days and nights we had nothing to eat; where did all these things suddenly come from? He said: God gave them; so now take them and prepare kalia and bread. One day he asked her: what do you want? She said a house better than that of the Shah. So he built a house better than that of the Shah. Then he said: I have built this house, now I must go to Mecca and become a Haji. She said: OK, go. Before leaving, he instructed her: every week get some mošghel gešah, tell the story, and xeir kon (do good, give charity, i.e., hand out naxod). She said she would, and

he went off to Mecca. He had told his daughter to get mošghel gešah each week but she forgot. One day she went to the baths and knocked on the door. A man came out and said that the king's daughter was in the baths. So the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan turned to go home, but the princess invited her in. They washed their hair together, and the princess sent word that she had a guest and two trays of lunch should be sent. When the servant came to collect the trays after the meal, the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan asked what he would take for the tray. He said he would like one of the jewels on her necklace. She took it off and gave it to him. Later the princess complained to the king that she who was royalty had nothing to equal such a necklace, but the king cautioned her not to be jealous as the necklace was a gift of God. Another day the princess invited the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan to go swimming. The latter refused saying she did not know how to swim, but the princess insisted, and so she came. The princess took off her necklace, and put it on a branch while she went in to swim. The daughter of Pir-e Xarkan sat and watched. A green bird came and took the necklace. The princess came out of the water to dress and noticed that the necklace was missing. She accused the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan of stealing it, which the latter denied. The princess complained to her father and they told the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan that if she did not return the necklace they would imprison her. The princess complained: she gave us one jewel, but stole a hundred. The daughter of Pir-e Xarkan said: you can do to me what you like, but I did not steal it; it was taken away by a little green bird. She was imprisoned.

Pir-e Xarkan returned from Mecca and all the people went out to greet him. He asked why his daughter had not come and was told that she was in prison for stealing. He said: for three days and nights we had nothing to eat and she did not steal then, how did it happen that she stole now? He went to the prison and asked his daughter. She said she did not know why she had been imprisoned. Pir-e Xarkan sent her home, and took her place in prison. Meanwhile their house had been destroyed. Pir-e Xarkan began to doze and he saw three persons in green. They seemed to say, old man why did you forget mošghel gešah? He said: I had to go to Mecca to become a Haji, so I told my daughter to get mošghel gešah; she forgot. They said: well now then take mošghel gešah and xeir kon (do good, hand out naxod). Pir-e Xarkan replied: how can I, I have nothing here in prison. They said: get up and look under your shirt. He did so and found two pieces of money. He then got up and sat outside. He saw two men walking on the road and so he called to them: where are you going? They said: we are going to get an axund for a marriage. He said: first take this and get me some mošghel gešah. They did not listen, so he cried: go on then that your bride may cry. A little later he saw the two men again, this time running. He called out to them: where are you running? They said: we are running because we went to bring an axund and now the damad (groom) has a belly-ache and so the axund was not brought. Pir-e Xarkan said: take this and go get me some mošghel gešah. This time they took the money and did as he bid.

He gave out charity and all was well with the bride and groom. The green bird returned with the necklace and dropped it in the center of the king's palace. The king took the necklace and went to Pir-e Xarkan and said: the bird brought it back, your daughter did not steal it after all, I am at your mercy. Pir-e Xarkan forgave the king, and the Shah gave the daughter of Pir-e Xarkan his own son in marriage. The wedding celebrations went on for seven days and seven nights. Pir-e Xarkan said: now just as I received my wish so may God grant others their wishes.

Even merely from the stories themselves, one can see that the central idea of all is that most fully expressed in Mošghel Gešah: that although sometimes problems are so difficult as to require supernatural help, the giving of help to others is a prerequisite for good fortune. Mošghel (difficulty) ge-šah (which went away, Dari) refers to also to the work of cleaning naxod (removing the chaff) which is a lengthy and boring task. The story is repeated to alleviate the tedium, and can be lengthened or shortened according to the amount of naxod. The naxod are for cooking, but some are taken whenever one visits shrines to be left there and to be handed out upon return as a kind of passing on to others the efficacy of the pilgrimage. Eating naxod which others have left at a shrine (as also fruit left) also has a salutary effect upon one's well being.

A sopreh Bibi Sešambe can be prepared any Tuesday except in winter, is usually repeated three successive Tuesdays, and may not be viewed by any male. On Monday night a room, usually the kitchen, is made clean and three candles are lighted in it. The sopreh is laid out with a mirror, myrtle, dastambul (a round sweet smelling fruit, red and white striped), jujube nuts, kondor, sugar, šarbat, green raisins, tea, water, and flour stew (aš-e ard, šuli). Geles sefid (lime) is prepared in a water solution and hand prints are made with it on the wall (a common Iranian sign of making a wish, and warding off evil). The organizer of the sopreh takes a bath and begins a fast which lasts until after the telling of the legend the next morning. In the morning after breakfast, usually a hen is slaughtered (a sheep if one is being more extravagant) and the food is prepared. Around 11 a.m. three virgins are called to come and sit and listen to the story. Then any wish may be made. The virgins are personifications of the three angels (the three daughters of Bibi Sešambe) supposed to be present. In the after-

some white flour (atar) is placed in the room and the door is locked. If the wish is granted, there will be a finger print in the white flour the following morning.

This last divination procedure is very similar to the procedures both at the well of Seti Pir and the veju of NoRuz. To the south of the three rooms of the se-ta-piran (see p. 210) is a forty meter deep well (that in which Mehrbanu took refuge perhaps) and on the cover of the well is placed an egg wrapped in a green leaf. The egg is left overnight and on the morrow if there is a green spot on it, one's wish will come true; if there is a yellow spot, it will not come true. The well is a Chah Chehel Doxtaran (Well of Forty Virgins).¹ Seti Pir is not only visited at the time of the great pilgrimages in summer, NoRuz and other major holidays, but also has a special day, Ashtad, each month, just as does Shah Bahram Izet in Khoramshah, mentioned above. The third such monthly shrine is Pir-e Vameru. Its day is Bahman. These three days—Bahman, Bahram, Ashtad—are three of the four days specially consecrated for prayer each month, the fourth being Mehr.² One of the four is chosen by each groom during the govah ceremony as a day of charity, a day each month on which either he will donate his services or the income of his work to charity. Only one of these days, Bahman, however, is also part of the set of four days on which one does not eat meat: Bahman, Mah, Gush, Ram.³

Pir-e Vameru is located just on the edge of the Zoroastrian Quarter (Pusht Khan Ali), where once a dream was seen a long time ago. The shrine itself is a small room in a small house. It contains five oil lamps, four of which are set on white brick (p. 189 above) on the four corners of a sopreh. On the sopreh are donations of naxod, noql, dried fruit and nuts, fresh fruit, qand wrapped in green paper, myrtle, cypress twigs, and a

¹ Chah Chehel Doxtar are common (also in Turkish: Qirq Kiz). For the basic legend see under Ghar Bibi on page 216; but here the Zoroastrians say the forty virgins in question belong to the seven worlds (haft bare) below.

² Bahman, Mehr, Bahram, Ashtad are resp. the second, sixteenth, twentieth, and twenty-sixth of the month. They do not correspond to the days cited by Sethna (1966: 74) as approximating Sabbath days: 1, 8, 15, and 23, or Ahura Mazda, Daep-Adar, Daep-Mehr, and Daep-Din.

³ The second, twelfth, fourteenth, and twenty-first.

holder for incense. On the wall are hung dolls of both men and women, called Bibi Kuk, which are placed there by childless women, in hopes of conceiving. Tea and surok (oil bread) are made here by people who make vows to do some xeirat, and stew is cooked for lunch. As at any shrine the form of worship is individual prayer, reciting favorite sections of the Avesta such as the Bahram Yasht, the appropriate Yasht for the day, and so on. But in mid-morning everyone attempts to squeeze into the room to listen to the recitation of the story done by an old lady (it is not, however, an exclusively female affair like Bibi Sešambe). The fresh fruit on the sopreh is quartered, one piece being placed on each corner. The reciter then tells the story in flat somber tones while gazing into a mirror. A second woman beats a slow rhythm with a spoon on a bowl of water and punctuates the recitation with soft bales (yes). When the recitation is finished, the mirror is passed around and people line their eyes with surmeh (ash of pistachio or walnut which is supposed to give energy and general health).¹ The bowl of water is passed around and the water is poured into one's hand. Sweets are passed around. People then break up into more informal groups outside the room. Some prepare naxod-e mošghel gešah; others serve stew; others just chat, read each other's palms, and relax.

The veju (or čauš in Persian) of Noruz mentioned above is a four or six sided polygon of wood suspended in the tallah parallel to the ground. Underneath it is placed a mirror, rose water, cypress twigs, bread, and haft sin (see p. 203). The corners are marked, and it is said that the veju will turn during the night at the exact moment the new year arrives. In the morning, the members of the household partake of the sweets, and greet each other with the rose water and mirror. Noruz is a day for new clothes unless someone in the family has recently died. It is also a day that many people go to the fire temple, after which one goes to visit. Especially one must pay one's respects to grandparents and parents, the elder generation giving in return an aidi (gift). The next day one goes to Seti Pir. The sixth is

¹ The stick with which the surmeh is applied is also a common image for the air stream exhaled during a sigh: mil-i ah surma sifat (Monchi-Zadeh 1967:72).

a day of celebration, now considered the birthday of Zoroaster. The thirteenth is a general Iranian custom of leaving the house and going out on a picnic.¹ Preceding Noruz is not only the saddeh and panjeh, but also čahršambe suri, the last Wednesday of the year,² at which time children jump over a fire shouting sorxi to az man/ zarbi man az to (my yellow color to you, your red color to me), i.e., I want to be happy (red) not pale (yellow) in the New Year.

We have now finished describing the communal ritual cycles, monthly, and annual, and need now only quickly review the formation of local shrines. We may again begin with a short catalogue focusing on the shrines of Nasrabad.

- (a) SHEIKH PANHAN. The father's father's father of one of the village elders was accosted one day for tax money by a government revenue man at the edge of the gate to the village (where now the abambar is, see Map 4). He had some land in the nearby village of Kasnavieh but the water had dried up, and he just could not get the money together. In those days they beat you with sticks, set dogs on you, put ice on your chest, and performed other tortures to force tax money from you. He ran out into the fields to where the shrine now is and cried himself to sleep there in a room used as a rest place for farmers. He had a dream in which he saw a white robed person who told him to go home and make some balls of silk, and go to the bazaar and sell them, and continue to work at that until he had enough money to pay the tax. He went home and did so, paid the tax, made more money and bought the room where he had had the dream for thirty tomans, and instructed his wife that every night a candle should be lighted there. Since that time other people have had dreams associated with the shrine and have added things to it.

Today there are three rooms and a wall surrounding a nice garden containing five cypress trees, a sweet pomegranate, a sour pomegranate, a peach and a fig tree. The three rooms are a kitchen, the shrine itself where there is a kerosene lamp kept eternally lighted on a kalak, and a guest room. In the shrine is a photo of a baby boy (now grown and married) who came to a childless couple who had prayed here; the family, now living in Bombay, continue to send money towards the upkeep of the shrine. People come here particularly on Sizdah (the thirteenth of the New Year) to cook an ash-e xamir (a flour stew). It is a very pleasant spot, the wind in the tall cypress trees creating a gentle rushing sound. At least two people take care that a light is kept going in the shrine, one of the descendants of the man who origin-

¹ In the early years of the century, people did this on the thirteenth of Saffar (the month after Moharram) instead (E. Sykes 1910:208).

² Judgment Day is supposed to fall on the last Wednesday of Saffar, and so all Wednesdays are unlucky (E. Sykes 1910: 208).

ally created the shrine, another a woman who dreamt that she went to the shrine and saw two women who had asked her to stay, but she had declined saying she had to go home to her children; they had asked her to come back every day and so she does.

Most people say that the tax involved in the story was the jezia and one collector of lore states that it occurred at the time of the Afghan invasions when there was little fodder and the early wheat was being eaten by the animals. He says that the originator of the shrine dreamt of a sefid-pust (white skinned man) who told him not to cry, and to try to sow once more and that they would have plenty, and then he should buy land with the money provided. When he awoke there was indeed money and he bought the land. Today there are three gahambars in three related households (two first cousins and a second cousin) endowed from this land. The land in question is land in villages near Ardekan. Most people in the village say that the founder ran away from a government official trying to collect the jezia and that at the spot of the shrine, he disappeared from the official's sight, hence the name panhan (hidden). But some people speculate that since sheikh is not a title used by Zoroastrians, maybe the name is really shirin (sweet), or perhaps there was an even earlier Muslim story. A former caretaker of the shrine, now dead, used to say that the pir came in the form of a snake, which people who have been to Bombay point out is a symbol of a holy man (although according to the Avesta one of the creatures of evil). The pir in any case is the agent of the founder's escape from the revenue man, not the founder, so it is reasonable to call him Sheikh Panhan (Concealed Sir).

In any case, the shrine serves at least for the current generation as a mnemonic for the past history of jezia and of the movement eastwards from the Aghda-Ardekan area.

- (b) HAJI KHEZR. The name, say the Nasrabadis is the Arabic equivalent of Bahram, and is used to keep meddlesome Muslims satisfied in the same way that the Jewish shrine is called Haji Khezr Jahudi when its real name is Elias (in fact the name Elias is a second cover for the Muslims: to Jews the shrine is Eliahu Hanavi). The story is that there used to be a watermelon plot there. The farmer came and cut a melon and then went to do something else. When he returned, the melon was gone, but there were two crossed twigs in its place. It is said to be by the wish of Bahram that the plot not grow melons, and to this day melons do not prosper there. For why else should one plot with the same water, the same earth, the same fertilizer as the next plot not grow melons equally well? Similarly why do I get seventy mann of wheat on my plot while my neighbor gets only ten?
- (c) MEHR IZET. A woman is now rebuilding this pir after seeing a dream which she will not reveal. The original dream had to do with a woman who suffered a miscarriage and who there had a vision that she would not loose any more children.
- (d) MEHR IZET. There is a second Mehr Izet which is much older. The story is that it was very hot and a man wanted something to drink, but

the melons were yet very young and small. A person appeared and told him to look over there. And there the man found a three kilo melon which he cut and brought back to share with the stranger. The latter said to go bring a knife. When he returned with the knife, the stranger had disappeared and the melon had turned to gold.

- (e) GOHAR SHAB CHERAGH. This is on the old Raimabad qanat channel. One Khorshid Ruz in Farvardin Month (the sixth) a woman came here to fetch water for her cow. The water turned to gold on her hands, and also in the belly of the cow which needless to say died.
- (f) PIR MORAD located between Absahi and Qassemabad is again in bad disrepair because of repeated vandalism. An old Qassemabadi says that the story was that an old man went to this site and fell asleep and dreamt that the earth opened up and so he went in. He in fact died in his sleep. His family went to look for him and saw some broken earth. They dug around in it and found his body. In his coat was a note on which was written that those who had true faith in God could come here and their desires would be granted. The site had a well which is now filled in due to the construction on the railroad. It used to be a popular pilgrimage point and in 1303/1921 had been rebuilt by a Qassemabadi who had a dream there.
- (g) PIR CHEHEL CHERAGH also is in Qassemabad and was built at the site of a tree with forty shoots around its base by a childless man who had a dream and whose wish for a child was granted. The little room has forty candle niches.
- (h) PIR BORZU in Mobarake is a candle niche in a garden which belonged formerly to one Borzu who cut down a large plane tree. His son suddenly died three days later, and he went blind ten days later. So then the present owner's grandfather bought the garden, and he in a vision was told to build something on the site of the erstwhile tree, and he built this small candle niche shrine. His son used to see people dancing and sitting around this dadgah, but instead of keeping quiet, he told people what he saw. Shortly thereafter all the plants in the garden dried up and died: it had been a pomegranate garden. Now it is replanted with a variety of fruits and the candle is lighted once a day.
- (i) PIR SABZ KIRMAN is near the Mahalleh Gabr of Kirman. It is said that when a green flag was shown among the Afghan soldiers at Shah Bahram Izet another flag came on on this site, and the Afghans fled (Soroushian 1956: 208).
- (j) SHAH BAHRAM IZET KIRMAN is located outside Kirman's Noserish Gate. It used to be called Pir-e Sangi because it had a door of stone. When the Afghans came to Kirman they rested near here in preparation for destroying the Zoroastrian Quarter. Suddenly they saw a green flag here and they ran away thinking it was the enemy flag. Later Mohammad Ismail Khan wanted to build a road here despite protests. Suddenly an old man appeared out of the well in white and with a luminous face,

and told him: if you brick up my house I will do the same to yours and divide your family. The road was abandoned, and a shrine built instead which the Muslims call Pir-e Morteza Ali-e Gabran (ibid., p. 210).

- (k) PIR SHAH FERAYDUN in Sharifabad-e Ardekan was situated in four trees and was built by a woman who dreamt of a mounted man on a horse trying to find something. When she asked who he was and what he wanted, he replied: I am Shah Fereydun and I am looking for a resting place. (Shahmardan 1967: 169).

There are many more such shrines, but these suffice to demonstrate the repetition of themes and how closely linked they may be to the history of a community. The Yazdis undoubtedly know whereof they speak when they say that these pirangah often are formed out of watch-rooms and rest-houses for farmers who have to work at night (i.e., dastbands or watchmen, but also for farmers who have to work at night when their portion of the water cycle comes up then). They are indeed often, as Professor Boyce suggests, dedicated to Soroush or Bahram, or one of the other yazatas, but the implication need not be that therefore they are all two thousand years old, nor that they all were originally conceived of as belonging to Zoroastrian yazatas. She suggests that a number of the shrines are dedicated to Haji Khezr or Elias because they are rajal al-ghaib (men who never die but like Soroush can pass between this world and the next). That may be true, but so may the opposite: that the Muslim Haji Khezr appealed to Zoroastrians much as does Shah Pari and other local folklore. She does admit that sometimes the cover has become so good that the original has been forgotten, but she insists (1967b: 31):

Because these are living pirs, the Zoroastrians could adopt their names without offending principle. Conversely, so rooted is the cult of the grave among Muslims, that even in their shrines to Khwāja Khedr there is to be found a tomb-shaped object (fn. as for example in the hillside shrine to Khwāja Khedr near the city of Kermanshah).

Why she need go all the way across the country for an example of a Muslim Haji Khezr is not clear: surely in the Kermanshah example the grave was prior, the attribution to Haji Khezr later. Zoroastrians, on the other hand, have no graves to turn into shrines. An example closer to Yazd is the Muslim Haji Khezr hillside shrine in Kuhbanan which looks extremely like an abandoned village fire temple: it is a small room dug out of the rock with a ledge in back on which lamps are lit, and a small little wooden door opening into a

tiny little room roughly hewn out of the rock and covered with soot. Aside from the Qur'an and prayer beads on the main room floor and the wish-ribbons tied onto the little wood door (and the absence of a fire), there would be nothing to distinguish it from a fire temple. People run their hands in the soot of the little room for good luck.

Quite apart from the Yazdis who are concerned that the pirangah not be mistaken for idolatry or for serious worship of men in place of God, Yazdis point out that the pirangah are a means of making their surroundings pregnant with meaning and memory. A minor shrine on the way to Pir-e Sabz where one stops to light a candle in respect is Pir-e Khani, where a young man died in 1953 on his way to Pir-e Sabz. A far more important shrine is that in Pusht Khan Ali to Ostad Master Xodabak, whose assassination was described in Chapter III. The term pirangah is even applied loosely to the candle niches in the kucheh walls which gave light before there was electricity and still do where there is none. Lighting them each evening becomes something like a ritual, particularly since, after all, light is the symbol of divinity, and where there are human souls—in the house, in the kuches, in the daxmes—there should be perpetual light, natural light during the day, artificial light at night.¹ As one man put it the pirs of Zoroastrian pirangah are not saints or prophets, but merely men who were xoda-šenasian (persons close to God). A number of the shrines, as we have seen, as, e.g., Bagh Sharf-ed-din on the road to Taft, are respected by both Muslim and Zoroastrian; as they would put it, both Muslims and Zoroastrians respect all true shrines.

5.4. Summary of the Argument

It has been argued that there is a kind of social organization, including religious activities, which operates in Yazdi villages analogously whether Zoroastrian or Muslim, and that this changes as the villages develop

¹ Masse (1954: 4) notes a general Iranian habit which he ascribes to their Mazdayasnian heritage of saying salam or reciting the khalvat prayer when a candle or lamp is lighted in the evening. To blow out a light brings bad luck.

from the food-scarce economy of the recent past into the prosperity of the present (changes in charity forms, marriage patterns, wedding emphases). Cycles and circulation have been guiding metaphors: both (a) the circulation of wealth and adjustment of people to their resource base through adjudication of estates (čaharom, yašt dowre daxme), endowment of productive resources for the commonweal (gahambar, vaqf), sharing or redistribution of food according to the wealth of the donor (xeirat, ataš bozorg kardan, jašn), and arrangement of marriages (cousin marriage, mehr and jehezia); and also (b) the psychological-cognatic organization of activity into recurrent cycles through the death memorials, pilgrimages, and seasonal rituals. We began with the exigencies of demography and productive relations, making only descriptive references to the shrines as part of the landscape marking centers and peripheries. And gradually we worked our way through the coordination and re-division of the productive relations by rituals to a consideration of shrines in themselves. The shrines aid people to organize their experience: important people, events and experiences are tied to them. They provide occasions for renewing acquaintance, seeking social and spiritual support for dealing with problems. The logic of their validity is a loose and all-inclusive one, not disconfirmable, and available to those who wish to use them whether through total belief, or as symbolic instruments for other ends, or merely for the solidarity of picnics. The question of symbolic coherence was approached indirectly by showing the inconsistencies introduced by the different calendars and the resulting degrees of irritation about, duplication of, or new integration of the various elements.

CHAPTER VI
DARVOZEH QUR'AN¹
(GATE OF THE QUR'AN)

6.1. Introduction

We have described the Zoroastrian community as organized around sols, xeirats, gahambars, loosely coordinated by the priests—formerly through priest rotation and priest endogamy, now only through the calendars of appointments and decentralized payment for performing at these functions—and since the last century by a superimposed anjoman structure. The katkhoda was a local level political leader tied directly into the government administration; at a higher level there was a kalantar for the whole Zoroastrian community. Legal authority ultimately rested in the notary authority of the Muslim axunds, and in the Governor, one of whose offices was Judge of the Zoroastrians.² Just as modernization³ has involved the decline of the Zoroastrian priesthood, and growth of an anjoman organization with all the differences in ritual emphasis those changes imply, so too for Islam has there been similar change. The older formal elements of religious taxes (zakot, xoms, jezia), religious endowments (vaqf, of which 10% accrued to the mutavalli or caretaker), and religious courts have lost their importance: no longer is there a muhtasib⁴ to enforce community morality; the

¹ Several years ago, owners of land to the northwest of Yazd began to construct over the Isfahan road a monumental gate of this name to mark the entrance to the Dar ul-Ibadah. The funds were exhausted before the gate was completed, but since the goal had been achieved—the speculative value of the surrounding land had been raised—no more funds were raised. With its scaffolding, the gate stands like a misplaced missile launcher in the desert.

² In Safavid times Yazd was crown land governed by a Vizier who was vizier, protector of worship, gerek-yarek of crown land benevolences, khalisa vassel, mustafi (finance officer), and Judge of Zoroastrians (Röhrborn 1966:126).

³ I use the term in its restricted sense: changes leading to current conditions.

⁴ For a description of the duties of this official, see Ibn al-Ukhuwwa (1938).

religious taxes have become voluntary and generalized into charity in all forms. There is an imposition of modern (largely state organized) decor: guided Iran-Air tours for the Haj complete with modern Red Lion and Sun medical facilities, a civil service Office of Religious Endowments, a Ministry of Education religious curriculum, a National Service for clerics, not to mention the negative constraints: banning of excessive flagellation during Moharram, monitoring of rosas for anti-government sentiments, a sidelining of religious legal authority, etc. Living Islam is thus focused, like Zoroastrian xeirats and pilgrimages, on local level community forms: rosa, dasteh, xaneqah, and zurxane. The madresseh system of religious education carries on, but no longer do the eldest sons of the rich go there, but mainly the poor looking for a respectable way out of poverty; and perhaps even more significant is that below the highest level of mujtahed, reputations are made primarily as ahl-e membar, rather than ahl-e mihrab, ahl-e talab, or ahl-e qazi.¹ It is to these local forms then that we must turn particularly if we wish to gain a feeling for how the tremendous dramatic power and poetic beauty of Shiite legend and history provide an intellectual frame for much of Iranian life; that is, how the potency of this drama is maintained through community institutions such as rosa, dasteh, and so on.

A prefatory comment will place this chapter in context with what has gone before: in Chapter II the national political role of Islam and the state or royalist interest in controlling it was discussed. As part of the general control of the state, the landowning clergy and the vast resources

¹ Preachers, leaders of prayer, teachers, and judges are the four kinds of ulema. To practice one should obtain an ejazeh (certificate of permission) from a qualified mullah. One may obtain a number of such ejazeh. There are four kinds: (a) the most common is that given by a teacher to his pupil; (b) more prestigious is the ejazeh to accept the sameh-imam (share of the Imam) and xoms which is given by a leading mujtahed on the recommendation of leading ulema (Yazd currently has two so empowered Ayatollahs: Vaziri, the founder of the excellent library of the Masjid-e Jome, and Saduqi, a former assistant to Borujerdi; (c) naql hadis is a minor ejazeh for persons literate in Arabic but otherwise religiously untrained, allowing them to recount hadith; (d) naql-e mas'ale gui confers the right to settle religious disputes.

of the religious endowments have been subjected to similar control as other members of the elite. That section also posed the suggestion that a second social stratum particularly connected with the Islamic leaders was the bazaaris. This will be probed somewhat further here. In the preceding chapter a number of comparative suggestions were made about village organization. These need no great expansion: in terms of ritual morphology and economic function Muslim village rosa, shrines, pilgrimages, vows, and so on, parallel what has been described for Zoroastrians.¹ What is of greater interest is the way these local practices, more or less kept up in urban mahallehs, are reworked into the larger scale of interaction of the entire city. Although each mahalleh is distinct with its own mosque, baths, and shops, it is not self-sufficient. On Fridays there is a Congregational Mosque (Masjid-e Jome) to be visited; aside from minor everyday shopping for bread, meat and vegetables, the main bazaar is the source of purchases and sale of goods and services. Even for the modern classes of Yazd, both white and blue collar, although they do not sell in the bazaar, they buy there. The bazaar is thus in a real sense still the center of the city. The order in which we will proceed with this unwieldy subject of Islam in Yazd is to begin with linguistic ritualism, first Shiite idiom itself, then as it is used in three formal kinds of organization—rosa, hey'at-e mazhabi, zurxane—and then the other forms of linguistic ritualism found in the bazaar including obscenity, trade slangs, bargaining, and purity language. From this we will try to draw some tentative conclusions about the kind of place a bazaar is and the ways in which language is used before concluding with the city-wide religious memorials of Ramazan and Moharram.

6.2. Shiite Idiom.

Annemarie Schimmel's comment about Mohammad—" . . . that he was not a dogmatic theologian but a prophet overwhelmed by Allah," and that after

¹ See for instance Antoun's description of Ramadan in a Jordanian village (1968a). Details must be changed for a Yazdi village, but morphologically it is the same: e.g., instead of xotbes, rosas are the moral teaching devices.

his death the contradictory statements of the Qur'an were used to develop different concepts of God (1971:142)—is epigrammatic of Islamic "talk of God" in general. It is primary that every work is begun in the name of God (bismillāh), and every statement of future action is qualified by His will (inša'allāh), and praise of any object carries His attribution (māsā'allāh).¹ And it is within this rhetorical circle rather than from outside as a premise that the nature of God is discussed and theological errors cited: širk (association of other objects with God), tašbih (anthropomorphism), ta'tīl (depriving God of all attributes whatsoever). The constant repetition of the šahādah,² of the name Allah, of the pronoun Hu (He), etc., by mystics as a technique of enrapturization (zīkr) is but an extension of the common man's sprinkling of his conversation with bismillāh, inša'allāh, and the use of the tahlīl³ on occasions of disappointment and rebuke where speech might otherwise deteriorate into inarticulate wailing and abuse.

Thus while religious argumentation with non-believers can always be amicably be concluded with the agreement that what is central to religion is that a man be an ensan (righteous, of upright character, not hurting others)—much as there is an amical ritual conclusion to a bargaining situation when the amount of contention becomes sufficiently small: that money has no value (pul arzeš nadare), it is friendship that has value (dusti boše)—this is a

¹ "Oh God, I have ready for every dread which I encounter in this world or the next lā ilāha illā 'llāh, and for every care and anxiety, māsā'allāh, and for every grace al-hamdulillāh, and for every ease and hardship aš-sukrulillāh and for every wonder subhāna'llāh and for every sin astaghfiru'llāh, and for every pressure of circumstance hasbī allāh, and for every calamity innā lillāhi wa inna ilaihi rāji'un, and for every destiny and decree tawakkaltu'alā'illāh, and for every obedience and transgression lā hawla wa lā quwwata illā billāh." Taken from the Hizbu 'l-kalimāti 'l'ašhara by Ali Wafa, cited by C.E. Padwick (1961:xxviii). And one could add for every sneeze a yarhamakumillāh. Shop walls, bus fenders, car glove compartments carry slogans such as bar čašm bad la'anat (curses on the evil eye), ya qayem ahl-e Mohammad (Oh hidden one of Mohammad's family, i.e., the twelfth Imam).

² The profession of faith: wa ilāhukumu ilāhun wāhid lā ilāha illā hu arahmānu rahim; Mohammad rasulullah (And God is one God exclusive of any other; he is merciful and compassionate and Mohammad is his messenger).

³ The tahlīl is the formula of negation-affirmation from the first part of the šahāda: lā ilāha illā'llāh (There is no God but God).

short-circuiting of the problem of God.¹ For the same man who will thus allow the subject to drop in friendship will insist nonetheless with mathematical certainty that a montheist and a polytheist cannot both be right: $1 \neq > 1$. It is this linguistic cultural given that is codified as the dogma of tauhid (acknowledgment of God's unity) and elaborated by Sufi mystics as God being the only existant. That this easily becomes a kind of pantheism does not for linguistic reasons become connected with the proposition that therefore both montheist and polytheist can both be right, both because "polytheist" involves analysis of the world into segments rather than as tauhid, inclusive synthesis; and because in the popular mind the addition of all the polytheist segments need not include all aspects of the universe (i.e., there may be an aspect which does not have a god).

One need not adopt the extreme position that errors of belief are largely due to linguistic fallacies, or the more general version that language rigidly structures thought, to see that the great amount of religious ritualization in everyday talk poses a problem when dealing with non-believers. If accepting companionship is expressed by ya'allah, if the work chant of cooperative effort is ya Ali, and if sincerity is expressed by swearing ba Hazrat-e Abbas, ba Qur'an, or ba Abul Fasl,² one has to think twice when protesting to someone who does not believe in these.³ The second thought, if

¹ Monde šodam; haste šodam is an appropriate response when the "ensan argument" is introduced: "I have been mooted; I have become tired."

² These are by no means the only qasam (oaths) used in Islamic rhetoric but they are the popular ones. Oaths are made in religious writing by things which have value: by God, by the Qur'an, by the sky, by the sun; or for ultra-sincerity by oath taking itself (ba jun-e šoma qasam nemixoram). A religious Iranian youth pointed out to me that for this reason Arberry's translation of the ayeh: Val asr, "By the afternoon" is absurd: asr means "time." Time has value, the afternoon does not; and indeed some commentators suggest that the "time" referred to was the time of the Prophet when baraka was in the world. Similarly, rosaxond Islami proves the importance of books and libraries to Islam citing the opening of Sureh Nun va Qalam where God swears by the pen (Langerudi 1970: 23). It is interesting to contrast the Shiite oath Ali! with the Christian oath Christ!—the latter seems to have taken on a taint of blasphemy, whereas the former is a humble appeal for help.

³ One need only recall the illustrious objection of the English Parliament to the seating of Lionel Rothschild after his election to the seat

it comes, may be deflected with a joke. The joke itself, however, cannot avoid focusing attention on the differences with the result that the sensitive minority person may feel a sense of being made fun of, of being annoyed (aziat kardan--one of the most frequent of minority complaints), and the wit on either side may develop the issue into a more serious insult.

The difference is perhaps illustrated by someone within the rhetorical system turning it against the speaker, and someone in the position of an outsider. A boisterously good-humored group of Teherani youths on an Auto Taj bus (notable for its usually lower class clientele) released a loud salavat (Allāhumma salā 'alā Muhammad va āl-i Muhammad [Oh God, bring peace to Mohammad and his family]) as the bus got off to an hour behind schedule start. (It is traditional on Auto Taj busses to start the journey with the salavat, repeat it after each mountain pass successfully traversed, each collision mercifully avoided, each flat tire eventually changed and trip re-initiated, and finally as the trip is, by the grace of God, concluded safe once again from the perils of the Iranian highway.) At the first gas stop, a beggar got on to bless the travellers and draw their fraternal attention (baradar-e din, brothers in religion) to his hunger. The boys retorted that they were undoubtedly more hungry at the moment than he. They allowed him, amid much joking, to make his collection, even throwing him a few coins themselves; but they did not allow him to get away without asking the telling question whether the blessing ought, in justice, to include those who did not give.

In the response of the youths to the beggar's plea there is no challenge to the rhetorical system but only to his use of it. Closer to the boundary is the story of the testing of Mullah Hussein Kasefi Va'ez, the author of one of the most powerful of Shiah popular works, the Rosato Shahadah, on his sincerity in Shiism. He lived for many years in the Sunni city of Herat and when he returned to his native Sabzevar, he one day read

of the City of London, being returned eleven successive times between 1847 and 1858, twice because of his religion, but then eight times because he insisted on being sworn on the Old Testament and omitting the final words of the Oath of Abjuration of allegiance to the Stuarts, ". . . upon the true faith of a Christian" (Morton 1961: 139-44).

in a religious meeting about the twelve thousand visits of Gabriel to Mohammad. An old man rose and asked him how many times Gabriel had visited Ali. Mullah Hussein immediately understood the double edgedness of the question: should he say that Gabriel did not visit Ali at all he would be accused of having turned Sunni; if he said Gabriel did visit Ali he would be accused of being a liar. He answered twenty-four thousand times. How so, queried the old man. There is a hadith that Mohammad said, "I am the city of education and Ali is the gate to the city." Each visit of Gabriel to the city of education (Mohammad) required both an entry and an exit through the gate of Ali (Kashefi 1349: 5). The importance of such testing, and on the everyday level the persistence with which people inquire what a person is, i.e., what religion he is, suggest that Islamic, and within Islam, Shiah talk of God is a paradigm whose boundaries when breached—like other paradigms—threaten the paradigm as a whole.

The Rosato Shahadah, which formed the original reading matter for rosa-xanes and is now utilized in their ritual conclusions, is not simply a rhetorical frame for religious meetings. The stories of the fourteen moasum (the twelve imams plus Mohammad and Fatimeh are called the fourteen pure souls) are a reference frame in practical spheres of life, not the least of which is politics. When Ayatollah Haj Sheikh Abdul Karim-e Yazdi (who built the largest religious school in Qum, the Hose Elmiye Qom) was imprisoned by Reza Shah, Hussein Borujerdi wrote an ultimatum that Abdul Karim be released or he would march on foot from Borujerd and would make in Teheran a second Karbella, playing on his namesake, Imam Hussein, the martyr of Kerballa. Only slightly more veiled was Rosaxond Hejazi, speaking in Yazd on Ali's birthday in September 1971, when he rhetorically asked the people of Yazd, known for their religious sincerity why they allowed a liquor factory (Zoroastrian owned) to exist near town, why they allowed cinemas (one is Zoroastrian owned) to show sexy films, why they allowed pork to be sold in their town (eaten presumably only by foreign Christian technicians in the factories and mines). In Nasrabad a rosaxond was arrested for saying that conscription of women into the national service corps was against the laws of Islam. More circumspect axunds thereafter merely talked about the exemplary

woman as one who would not leave her house for any reason, to shop, to visit a dying father, to see a doctor, without the permission of her husband. Local rosaxonds on the evening after the Shah had laid a wreath on the tomb of Cyrus to mark two and a half millennia of continuous monarchy intoned to their listeners to make no mistake about the fact that the religion of Noshiravan Adel and the religion of Mohammad were significantly different, that what was really being celebrated was the independence and glory of Islamic Iran (while the Shah was speaking of Cyrus' example of providing religious freedom).

That minority groups should adopt Islamic terms of reference is thus not a very suprising tactic. Jews speak of Purim as Aid-e Omar, making an analogy for curious Shiah between Haman and Omar, if not covering the identity of the Persian/Assyrian minister with the Persian personification of evil politicians (Omar). Jews also generally call their learned men mullah rather than ray. Zoroastrians sometimes speak of their fire temples as masjid, and some even seriously argue that they should be properly called namaz kade (place of prayer) rather than atash kade (place of fire); and as has been noted, some of their shrines are called by Islamic names.

More problematic and more interesting are the internal debate rules: to what extent, for instance, are symbolic substitutions permissible? Such non-religious substitutions as writing "swords" to represent "eyebrows," "night and day" to represent "hair and face," are standard techniques in love poetry.¹ Substitution of abjad equivalencies are also commonly utilized techniques in literature.² The line from Rumi is a good case in point, Az

¹ E.g., In qadr baroye koštan-e ašeq-e xod šamšir bar nakaš (Do not wave the swords so or you will kill your lover, i.e., do not raise your eyebrows in the Iranian gesture of "no").

² In Ali qable nabil zatullah va keynuniate. The Bab's name was Ali Mohammad, and a play is made on the name here that "Ali" should come before the prophet (nabil). The Prophet Mohammad, of course, preceded his son-in-law Ali; but in this case the prophet (Baha'u'llah) is preceded by Ali. The identification of nabil and Mohammad is clinched by their equivalent abjad value of ninety-two, a verbal play calculated to delight Bahis and irritate Muslims.

ebadat mitavan Allah šod neytavan Musa Kalimullah šod, which might be read, "Can one become God through worship? No, one cannot: even Moses (only) became a talker to God;" or it might be read, "One can through worship become God, but one cannot become Moses Speaker to God" on the linguistic analogy of saying that one sees the sun in a mirror: one who always meditates on the words of God eventually comes to the point when he repeats them as if they were part of his own make-up, but he cannot in this way ever become the one who takes his people out of Egypt or goes up on the mountain to receive the Ten Commandments. The latter gnostic (erfoni) reading may be considered faulty by non-tassawuf minded people. But the clear boundary of unacceptability is only reached with Bahai attempts to identify the coming prophets with Baha'u'llah. The danger of the erfoni reading of Jalaluddin Rumi's line becomes clear from an Islamic point of view when it is used by someone like Ali Mohammad Shirazi, the Bab, or Mirza Hussein Ali Baha'u'llah to justify their own divine inspiration. It is at this point that it is violently objected that in a mirror one sees only a reflection and not the sun itself. That is, rules of debate are invoked transactionally. As Rumi himself put it: "The assertion, 'I am God' on the lips of Mansur was the light of truth; the words, 'I am God' on the lips of Pharaoh were a lie" (Rumi 1910: 29).

That religious language should be as transactionally guided as any other semantic sphere should not surprise any but those who assume religion to be a primordial anchor of non-changing stability. Another paradigmatic example is the problem of interest on bazaar loans which the Qur'an unequivocally (S.2, v. 275-80) states to be harram. Although the spirit of the prohibition was ethically praiseworthy (being based in reaction to overcharging and to the alienation of borrowers towards their creditors), the letter of the prohibition became economically irrational. Islamic jurists have therefore found a number of ways around it. There is first of all the qarz ul hassaneh (borrowing of goodness) which invokes an ethical obligation on the borrower to return more than he borrows in thanks for the goodness of the lender in helping him out of difficulty. (I.e., in a moral sense, there is a shift of emphasis in this formulation from payment for the service of capital to the more elementary moral relation of exchange: lender gives

up the use of his capital at a loss to himself in order to help another; borrower when no longer in need returns the capital and makes a gift of at least equivalent value to the loss involved in the original lending.) Other ways around the Qur'anic injunction are called hial-e šari (lawful deceits), are recognized to be zešt (ugly) but are accepted in practice: one may sell something for ten thousand tomans plus two matches and in the loan contract call it eleven thousand tomans; or one can become "partners" in an economic venture (see query number 134 in Ayatollah Hakim n.d.).

6.3. Paradigmatic Sets

6.3.1. Rosa

The setting par excellence for this kind of linguistic play is, of course, the rosa to which repeated reference has already been made. The rosa in kernel form is a series of preachments on all sorts of subjects from general ethics to birth control and child rearing, framed in references to the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbalā. In a sense, the passion plays (šabi dar avordan, less correctly also tazieh¹) and other observances of Moharram are simply the rosa writ large and intensified in drama. Rosas may be held on all sorts of occasions from Friday afternoons after the midday congregational prayer to occasions of vow (nazr) fulfillment, death memorials for relatives (porseh) and for Imams (death days are more frequently memorialized than birthdays), very much like Zoroastrian xeirats. In villages meals may be supplied and the preachment may be attenuated to merely reading religious texts. In town usually only tea and cigarettes are served, but a number of axonds ("preachers," from xondan "to read" the Rosato Sahadā) may talk for five minutes to half an hour or more and earn from five to a hundred tomans. In the villages, coordination of the days to hold rosas is done by the village axond in an idiom of auspicious-inauspicious days (but perhaps with an eye also to regularly distributing the communal meals); in town the coordination is in the hands of the anjoman in charge of a mosque of husein-

¹ Tazieh is the usual term in the literature, but Yazdis complain that tazieh means "mourning" and includes other forms of mourning as well as the passion plays; they do not understand why academics insist on being imprecise.

eya (an open square for rosa-xondan or for the passion plays). Good preachments are taped by listeners for later replay, and good rosa-xonds are periodically invited to deliver a series of long lectures: e.g., annually on the occasion of Ali's birthday a leading rosaxond (Falsafi in 1970, Hejazi in 1971) is invited to Yazd to deliver a series of ten at the Meidan-e Shah; Maneqebi delivered a similar series of ten at Yazd's Masjid-e Rasulian on the thirtieth to fortieth death memorial days for the philanthropist Rasulian.

The emphasis on Hussein is central. A religiously educated youth prefaced a description of a rosa with the following philosophical background:

Rosa is remembering a great soldier not only of religion but of freedom. In that time Yezid was strong and Hussein was weak. Everyone urged him not to go to Karbala for he would be killed. But he responded: yes, I will die, but marg behtar az zendigi ba mardom-e setamkar ast (death is better than life with oppressive people). To remember Hussein is to become a soldier in the path of freedom, not only of religion, but of freedom. Gandhi said: from Hussein I learned how to rescue India. That is one meaning; the second is that if you have a good friend and he dies or is killed, you are naturally sad. For these two reasons Shiism has rosa. But the people make a mistake when they say that it is only for crying for Imam Hussain and for the sadness of the event. The great Ayatollah Hakim who just died wrote: ma naboyad be xater ashura Hussein geriye konim; ma boyad be ashura-ye geriye konim ke natiye-ye engelab-e ashura-ye Hussein darad az bein miravad (we should not cry on account of what happened to Hussein on Ashura, but on Ashura we should cry that the results of Hussein's revolution on Ashura are in the process of disappearing). Hussein's pronouncements were more on the subject of freedom than about religion per se. He said: in lam yekon dinun fakunu anaran le vajhela, which Falsafi paraphrases in Persian, giram ke din nadarid vali azad mard bošid (even if you have no religion, be a free man).¹

The rosa begins with an Arabic formula or ayeh (sentence of the Qur'an) to which the audience responds with a salavat (marked by *), e.g.:

¹ A number of books have been written on the theme of Hussein's Revolution; for instance, Mohammad Ali Salmin (1943) writes that after the death of Mohammad, "Islam needed further perfection and purification, so that it might be installed afresh permanently and firmly. Hence there came the Supreme necessity for Hussein's matchless martyrdom" (p. 104). "The Karbela tragedy has given the best solution and answer to the most intricate problem in life. Why do the good and innocent invariably suffer in life? . . . Even such of those who have not the patience to believe in [compensatory] glorious life after death for such good and suffering souls [as Hussein] can at

- (a) Alhamdulahe rabele alahamin bar el khala khe ege ajmain va sallalaha allah mohammaden (*) va ahl hetarin va la'anatuallah allah ada'ehem ajmain ela qiameh yomedin (*). Thank God, Lord of the World, who made all people, and divine health to Mohammad and his holy family (*) and divine curses upon their enemies until Judgment Day (*).
- (b) Rabesh rali sadri va ya serli amri valul oghdatan menlesani yaf-ghahu goli. [This is Moses' plea to God when he is about to plead before Pharaoh:] Oh God, make me equal to the task, make it easy for me, correct my stutter that the people may understand what I say.
- (c) Bismillah-e rahman-e rahim alhamdullilah rabelalamin, va sallalaho allah mohammad va ahle hetaherin va salamo aleno va allah ebedalleh-e salehin. In the name of the merciful God, thanks be to him, Lord of the Universe, and blessings upon Mohammad and his family and to us and to the good slaves of God.

These introductions may be more or less elaborate. Rashed, who gives a weekly rosa on Thursdays, the eve of Friday, over the radio, always uses the third of these and does not wish listeners to respond with the salavat. He usually discourses on general ethics using an ayeh as his text; for instance, on the second night of Ramazan 1971 he expounded on Sureh Enseqaq beginning with the ayeh in the middle, "No, I swear by the twilight and the night and what it envelops and the moon when it is at the full, you shall surely ride stage after stage" (Arberry 1964:6637), saying roughly:

Just as there is day and night and the moon passes through different phases, so man grows from something invisible into a sperm into a fetus into a baby, a child, a man, an old man, and dies like a traveller going from one place to the next. But man knows not where he came from nor where he is going. You are part of both past and future but because

least believe the actual, far reaching results of the glorious martyrdom as recorded in history. . . . As saviours of Islam they will be remembered till the end of time. In their memory thousands of Moharram celebrations have taken place in the past and still thousands and thousands of such celebrations are in store" (p. 110). "What is the use of gaining the world by losing one's soul? . . . Hussein's martyrdom has solved for us the acute problems of life. He and his martyrs are a perennial source of inspiration and never failing consolation. Compared to those martyrs' ordeals and distress, our petty difficulties and calamities ought to dwindle into insignificance" (p. 111). "Islam's attitude towards life is bold and broad, practical and ideal. It does not advocate renunciation, asceticism, and monasticism. . . According to Islamic principles and practices, one living in the very midst of worldly surrounding can at the same time be in a state of complete detachment" (p. 112).

you do not see it, you imagine it does not exist; yet from the part you do see, you can understand that there is a future and a past which may be happy or sad. So too as there is flux in the world, there are differences among people: some are evil-doers and some are constitutionally incapable of doing evil; some thank God for all that happens and some do not . . . The Sureh says: "As for him who is given his book in his right hand, he shall surely receive an easy reckoning and he will return to his family joyfully, but as for him who is given his book behind his back, he shall be pushed from behind into destruction . . ." [The "book" being the record of one's deeds.]

A more elaborate introduction was used by Maneqebi in a festive rosa on the birthday of Ali in the house of Ayatollah Milani in Meshed in 1971:

- Opening: Vastiante be ezelete vašaneh va jal barut min kol-e movastaehm . . . (I trust in the Lord of Glory . . .)
- Salavat: Send a salavat to Mohammad who was skillful both in politics and in philosophy, the friend of God, and his family who are clean and the selected of God and deserving of respect. Divine curses upon their enemies and those who usurped their truth [i.e., Abu Bakr, Osman, Omar, Yezid]. God says in his holy book, "I selected some guides to direct the people according to my orders, and I instructed that the people do good deeds, pray, give zakot and worship me." I pray we may
- Da'a (Prayer): have health and good fortune under the shadow of the twelfth
- Salavat: Imam. May God keep us from evil. Send a salavat to Mohammad.
- Da'a: May God help us to be lucky in the shadow of the Qur'an, and may God end the problem of the Jews and Israel and of the Islamic cities [i.e., a veiled reference to Israelis in Iran],
- Salavat: and may he cure the ills of Muslims. Send a salavat to Mohammad. Would that we were all in the tomb of Imam Ali;
- Salavat: please send him a salavat.

This particular rosa is a very interesting one and a rough translation of it is given in full in Appendix 3. It is interesting for several things: (1) it is the speech of a well-known membari or axund on an important occasion in a prestige location, and was given a wider distribution than most such speeches by the recordings made by listeners; (2) it demonstrates well the form of such speeches: invocation, prayers, salavat, goriz (the tie-in at the end with the story of Karbala), and pa membari (a member of the audience stands and sings a response to the goriz); (3) its content demonstrates the confused defensiveness of conservative Shiism; (4) its delivery (recorded on tape but impossible to convey in print) demonstrates the emotionalism of the genre, and its headline style rather than sharp argumentation, not unlike in this latter feature public statements of politicians.

The subject matter of rosas may be adjusted to the occasion, particularly in short speeches such as are delivered by many different axonds at each rosa during Ramazan, which commemorates the death of Ali, as Moharram does the death of Hussein; Ali becomes the subject of the text, e.g., there is a favorite hadith in which Ali is asked if he thinks that he is better than Moses, Christ, etc., but the goriz is always back to Hussein and Karbala. The goriz is a signal for people to begin to cry and clap their foreheads (gerieh kardan, tabaki nešan dadan, vanemud kardan).

The rosa ends with all rising to salute first Karbala and then Mashad and Mecca. These salutations are called ziarat. The most typical form is:

- (a) [Facing Karbala:] As salam aleik ya aba abula, as salam salam aleik yabne rasul'ulla va rahmatullahe va barekato. Peace upon Abu Abdullah [the konye or tekonym of Imam Hussein], grandson of the Prophet (Rasul'ulla), health and divine blessings upon you.
- (b) [Facing Mashad:] As salam aleik ya gharibal ghoraba va ya moin az zo'afa. As salam aleik ya samuz almadfune be arze Tus. As sultan albal Hassan ya Ali ibn Musa Reza otlobna ende gabrek va rahmat-ullah-e va barakato. Peace upon the stranger in a foreign land [Imam Reza's home was Iraq, but he died in Tus, near Mashad], helper of the weak, sun of sons who was buried in Tus, who is King Abul Hassan, Ali Musa Reza; please invite us to Mashad, and health and divine blessings upon you.
- (c) [Facing Mecca:] As salam aleik ya saheb azaman, as salam aleik ya khalife tarakhman ajjalaloho ta'alla farjak va rahmatullahe va barakato. Peace upon the owner of existence, peace upon the divine caliph, may God bring you soon, and health and divine blessings upon you.

Numerous other versions exist (collected in Haj Sheikh Abbas Qomi's Mafati Hol Jenan) with such sentiments as curses upon those who killed the martyrs of Karbela and who rejoiced at the events (Ziarat Ali Akbar), and wishes that the saluter could have been sacrificed in their place, for "you are clean and so are your graves and you were fortunate; would that I had been killed along with you and had become fortunate and blessed like you" (Ziarat Shahadaye Karbela).

6.3.2. Hey'at-e Mazhabi

Second only to rosa is another form of religious gathering, hey'at

for dasteh, sine-zani, and tazieh. When Gus Thaïss suggests that the number of hey'at-e mazhabi convened by Teheran bazaaris is on the increase, he is referring to a form akin to the rosa.¹ The increase or decline of rosas in Yazd would be hard to estimate, but the number of this second form, what in Yazd is called the hey'at-e mazhabi, has increased: there used to be only two, one in Pir-e Borj and one in Pusht-e Bagh. Now each has subdivided, and for instance, there are off-shoots from the Pir-e Borj group meeting in the Khalife Khan Ali, Darsul Shahfah, and Gazargah mahallehs. These groups meet once a week to exercise and practice their precision in sine-zani. Sine-zani is a mild form of flagellation in which the arms are raised above the head, brought down either to the sides and then up or directly down onto the chest, right hand striking left chest and left right. Lines of young men do this in unison during Moharram and sometimes at the death of a friend. More violent forms of flagellation during Moharram involve the unison striking of the back with chains (reputedly the best chains are made in Mashad), and the cutting of the forehead with a knife (this is banned by the Government and still occurs only in one or two villages outside of Isfahan). Such groups of men are called also dasteh. The Dasteh Pambe Karun (the dasteh of cotton farmers, or in Yazdi: dasteh pambe gelun or pambe gelunok) of the mahalleh Mohammadiye Yazd, for example, has gained some fame by winning honors in competition in Mashad, the trophy being a special banner. Such banners, together with a lantern, are raised outside the house in which the hey'at meets, usually in rotation among the members. Anyone may join and there is a nominal dues of two rials a week. In fact, however, the groups are primarily bazaari focused: Dasteh Pambe Karun has carpenters, blacksmiths and coppersmiths; another hey'at is dominated by coppersmiths.

¹ Hey'at and majlis can be synonyms for "assembly," but in Yazd, majlis usually refers to rosa gatherings, while hey'at is reserved for this second form. Thaïss' hey'at in the Teheran bazaar (1971, 1972) seems to be a variant form which crystallized according to his old informant during the Constitutionalist Period. Their purpose for discussing community and political problems is more formalized than the forms discussed here for Yazd, which correspond rather to what Thaïss thinks are older forms in Teheran, the hey'at-e mahalleh and the hey'at-e senfi (neighborhood and guild hey'at, resp.).

6.3.3. Zurxane

A third kind of religious group is found in the zurxane. This is the traditional Iranian gymnasium (literally, "house of strength"). It would be interesting to know something of the early history of zurxanes. Iranians, of course, claim them to date to pre-Islamic times and the whole ideology of virility is closely tied to Firdausi's epic of pre-Islamic pahlavans, a term which means hero as well as strong man or athlete. The Shahnameh is one of the texts chanted to the beat of the zarb drum, but the entire choreographic litany has now an Islamic rhythm as will be seen. Today Yazd has only two zurxanes; once there were a score. Veterans claim that they were mahalleh oriented, and deny that they had any occupational or guild association (although there was a certain amount of residential clustering by occupation). The ideology of equality of all occupations and men was architecturally symbolized by a tiny entrance: the one hundred fifty year old wooden door which used to be the gate to Zurxane Haji Khezr is approximately twenty by forty inches. Thus even the tallest, heftiest, proudest pahlavan would have to bow his head, squat and squeeze to enter. Very many Iranians participate in zurxanes for a year or two during high school, but those who stick with it tend to be of the artisan class rather than industrial workers or white collar. This probably has to do with its aura of traditional urbanism with which the bazaar is associated, although there may be also a political problem involved.¹ Reza Aresteh (1961) gives the occupations of 182 recognized nineteenth century pahlavans, to which one can also compare a list of famous pahlavans of the last century or so given by Kazem Kazemi (1343/1965) in which occupations of 78 of 163 pahlavans can be identified although 31 of these are speculatively based on the evidence of their surnames:

¹ I have been told but am unable to confirm that zurxane groups were involved in anti-royalist activities during the 1940s and that since the monarchy has been reconsolidated, zurxanes have been very careful to give a royalist appearance in blessing the Shah, and in performing in parades and nationalist demonstrations. It is certainly the case that many Iranians consider the zurxane not quite respectable (except the showcase ones in Teheran: that of Bimokh Jafari, and that of the Bank Melli) and prefer the modern athletic clubs.

TABLE 6
PAHLAVANS BY OCCUPATION

Occupation	Aresteh	Kazemi	Zurxane	Haji	Khezr
			8:00	6:30	8:00
professional <u>pahlavans</u> , <u>morsheds</u>	50	1			
craftsmen, bazaar workers	39	33	10	2	6
shopkeepers, merchants	22	17			2
government employees, army	16	8		1	
clergy, poets, teachers	11	4		1	
tribesmen, farmers, herders	7	2			
aristocrats	6	2			
camel driver, miller, servant, cook, veterinary	31	11			
mechanic, driver, cinema clerk				1	2
high school student			4	6	5
total	182	78	14	11	15

The last three columns of Table 6 are counts made on two typical week day nights at the 8:00 and 6:30 p.m. sessions of Zurxane Haji Khezr in Yazd.

In addition to the small entrance, every zurxane is supposed to have posted the line from Firdausi: "From strength is a man a truth teller, from weakness a liar." The moral or religious element of the zurxane is quite pronounced. Aside from the obvious healing effects of exercise, people attribute healing powers to the air and community of the zurxane. Sick persons may be brought to the zurxane so that during the ah (prayer) at the end of the exercise, God may be asked by the community for a cure. The moršed (director) of Zurxane Haji Khezr relates:

In August 1971 a young man suffering from cancer was brought into the zurxane. He had been lying in bed neither dying nor recovering, and was both himself unhappy and making all those around him unhappy. He was brought to the zurxane and a prayer was made to God either to make him speedily well or to have him speedily die. Although they did not in fact expect any material results, he did within three days begin to gain strength. In the old days people said that breathing the air of the zurxane was itself beneficial. The sick would light candles in the zurxane. There is also a story that a pahlavan of Yazd ate three or four trays of baklava, finishing the feat by twisting the metal trays. The challenge of eating so much baklava lies in the fact that there is a good deal of ground almonds in the mix and this creates wind (bad)

in the stomach. This pahlavan had eaten enough to kill a lesser man, and so when he went out into the street, some beggars followed to see if he would keel over and die. Instead he came directly to Zurxane Haji Khezr and in one motion ripped the little door from its hinges. He lit a lamp inside and began to exercise. In the morning, the moršed came and saw the door torn off. When he went in to investigate, he found the dirt floor of the exercise pit (gowd) wet with the sweat of exertion. The pahlavan remained in perfect health.

There are many such stories about pahlavans. Yazd lays claim to three of the greatest: Pahlavan Yazdi Bozorg Hallaji, Pahlavan Yazdi Kuchik Mohammad Abdul, and Pahlavan Ali Asghar. It is told of these:

The first was a cotton carder (hallaj) by occupation and is said to have been discovered by the Governor of Yazd, who, riding through the Bazaar Meidan-e Khan, saw an enormous giveh (slipper) by one of the carding shops. The Governor tested his find in the gowd, and then sent him to the court of Nasraddin Shah. He is supposed to have performed such feats as walking across Teheran up-hill from Tuxane to Shemiran carrying mil (wooden weights looking like over-sized bowling pins) weighing eighteen mann-e shah (fifty-four kilograms) each; he could flatten a silver rial between his fingers and once ate two pans full of Yazdi baklava which by local dietary categories is so hot that one becomes sick from eating very much. The son of Pahlavan Kuchik is renowned for drinking šarbat containing several kilograms of qand (the process of making sugar into cones or qand is supposed to increase the heat of the sugar, inherently already hot).

All these feats are possible because Ali is the patron of the zurxane: he is supposed to have made it a ritually clean (pak) place. As a clean place, all wine and nejasat (ritually unclean things), smoking and bad language must be eshewed. Secondly, as in a mosque all persons are considered equals and are ranked only by expertise through years of practice. Beardless children are not allowed into the gowd. Of approximately 125 pictures on the walls of Zurxane Haji Khezr, there are numerous portraits of Ali, and he is the only Imam portrayed; other pictures are of the Shah and the royal family, the Masjid-e Jome of Yazd, and some European scenery. Also outside the zurxane, it is Ali's name which is invoked as a work chant at moments of exertion.

Religious elements are also an integral part of the exercise routine. Both on entering and leaving the gowd, one bends to the dirt, touching one's fingers to the ground, lips and forehead in a token of respect (xak-busi). Throughout there are frequent calls for all to bless the Prophet and his

family (salavat) and to curse their enemies (la'anat, bišbad!—i.e., bištar bošad—divine curses, may they increase). The songs sung by the modir or moršed, who sits upon a raised stand (sardan) playing a zarb (earthenware drum with animal, especially goat but also sheep and deer skin head, made in Meybod) and occasionally striking a bell, are partly from Firdausi's Shahnameh, partly from other standard poets, and partly religious songs. On Thursday evenings (šab-e Jome, Friday eve), religious songs predominate and there may be a communal singing of Junam Ali. During individual exercises which require turns to be taken in using the gowd there are three principles of precedence—being a sayyid, expert, older—and their application is through ta'arof bargaining (offering, deferring, insisting to go first on the grounds of being inferior), but the reason that sayyids are given priority is not because they are the blood of the Prophet but as a token of respect to the Prophet through ta'arof to his family. The miandar (leader, literally the man in the center; mian dadan is also idiomatic for "to give strength," thus miandar, one who holds the middle, anchor man) stands facing the moršed in the center of the pit. The next in status faces the miandar with his back to the moršed and the rest range themselves around the pit according to size.

There are eight traditional exercises done in the gowd and five different traditional styles:¹

- (1) Šena is a form of push-up done with a board (taxt-e šena) about an inch off the ground and slightly more than shoulder breadth, on which one places one's hands. The rhythm is for the moršed to sing a phrase, then with a roll of the zarb the pahlavans go down for one push-up, and in a second set for two push-ups, as follows with (*) marking push-ups:

Makon anče Guštasp (*) guyad hami (*) ke u rah-e daneš (*)
napuyad hami. (Do not do everything Gushtasp says because he does not know everything.)

Behahad be del (*) marg-e Esfedniar (*) ke farmudeh bar Rustam-
aš (*) kar zar. (He wanted the death of Esfendiar, so he ordered him to go to war with Rustam.)

The third set of push-ups is done turning on alternate arms giving a snake-like choreography (šena pič), and is done to a simple chant-

¹ The five are done on alternate nights in Zurxane Haji Khezr: čekoši, gahvorei, tabrizi, jangeli, kabuli. The following notes, particularly on texts, are based on Kazemi (1343/1965).

ed count: yek-i do ta, se, čahr, panj-o šiš . . . Texts which are used with the sena are the Shahnameh of Firdausi, the Hamle Haidari (Attack on Ali) which was started by Beman Ali Kirmani (a Zoroastrian convert to Islam who died before completing it) and finished by Bazel-e Mashadi, the Shahnameh Naderi (about the wars of Nadir Shah), and the Pahlavi Nameh Moshiri (about Mohammad Reza Shah), and occasionally the prayer da'a Josan Kabir. At the end of the exercise, the miandar says: dast o panjeh moršed dard nakon (may the hand and fingers of the moršed not hurt). The exercise also has a religious interpretation: each push-up is a prostration to God, and the interpretive enthusiast may even suggest that each hair on the head of each pahlavan is chanting, "Allah, Allah, Ali, Ali."

- (2) Narmeš (warm-ups) are exercises such as the windmill, toe touch, knee bends, arm rotations, head turns, etc.
- (3) Mil Gereftan is of three types: gavorgeh, čakoši, and mil bazi. The last is throwing the mil into the air with or without spin. The first two are alternating rotation of the mil around each shoulder, and the more strenuous rotation of the mil in the air above the shoulders (elbows raised, rather than by the sides). The moršed may begin with the salutation: ah-ye šir-e biaban-e Najaf, Ali-ye ajdardar, gaveh piltan, jamal-e Mohammad salavat beferestid! (Oh lion of the desert of Najaf, Ali slayer of dragons, large bodied Pahlavan, send greetings to the beloved Mohammad!) And the pahlavans respond with a salavat. Should a pahlavan's mil slip and come close to falling on the ground, especially if during an individual mil-bazi, the moršed cries out, Ali yaret, be čašm-e bad la'anat! Salavat beferestid! The athletes respond with a salavat. Should the pahlavan do something extraordinary such as throwing both mil into the air at the same time, the moršed cries: ayeh sepassalar-e Hussein! (Oh, General of Hussein!) Another compliment is: ay naze dastet janam mašallah (praise be the sacrifice of your hand, God's will is done). After much effort, the moršed may cry: ay tufan-e Karbala naze jan širin kar salavat xatme konid (Oh storm of Karbala, my sweet soul, mašallah, give a salavat). At the end the moršed cries ba salavat and compliments the pahlavan: dast mahrizat or xaste nabosid. The pahlavan responds: dast o panjeh moršed dard nakonad (may the hand of the moršed not hurt).
- (4) Čarx (whirling) and tak čarx (single whirls). A compliment for a good whirler from the moršed is: ay damad-e Hussein, Kasem ibn Hassan (Oh son-in-law of Hussein, Kasem ibn Hassan [a martyr of Karbala]). Terms of address to introduce whirlers may be:
- | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| for a young man | Ali Akbar-e Hussein! | |
| for an older man | Sepassalar-e Hussein! | (General of Hussein) |
| for even older men | Sepassalar-e Ali! | (General of Ali) |
| for very old men | Habibne Mazaher! | (Old Soldier of Hussein) |
| for tall men | Alamdar Hussein! | (Standard Bearer of Hussein) |

for sayyids Sarvar ka'emat bar xolo-e Master of all, with
xoše Mohammad salavat!

- (5) Pa Zadan (running in place) is taken from a darvish ziker, and Sufi poems or Hafez is the text.
- (6) Ah (prayer) or Xeirat (charity). The group exercise always ends with a prayer usually done by the miandar. A short ceremony called čeragh-e axer may also be done (see Sadeq Chubak's short story by this name) in dialogue between miandar and moršed:

Miandar: Jenab Moršed! (Honorable Moršed!)

Moršed: Ay voillah! (Oh God!)

Miandar: Agha-ye mara be talabat xedmat-e xodaš čeragh, čeragh-e aval karam konad! (A man invites at his own wish a light, may I light the first lamp?)

Moršed: Če šavad? (What will happen?)

Miandar: Aval kasike rah-ra tang o tang be azme jang ba abi Abdulla Hussein gereft Hor bud va aval kasike jan-e xodra fedaye Abi Abdullahel Hussein namud Hor bud. Dast-aš be dasteh Hor berasad bi porseš vorede behešt šavad. (The first person to oppose and then fight for and die for Hussein was Hor; may our wish-maker's hand touch Hor's and may he go to heaven without question.)

Someone will donate some money, which the Miandar places in the center of the gowd, and prays: Xodavand enša'allah rang-e sorx šoma-ra zard nagardanad dar šabab-e javani marg qesmat-e šoma nakonad. Xodavand enša'allah soli 2000 toman somara xarjeh ab va aš-e Hazrat-e Sayyid o šahada befarmavad. (God, may it be His will, give you health and long life and 2000 tomans a year for water and stew of Imam Hussein.)

Second Pahlavan: Jenab Moršed!

Moršed: Ay voillah!

Pahlavan: Agha-ye mara be talabat xedmat-e xodaš čeragh, čeragh-e aval karam konad. Be aval qatr xuni ke dar mihrab-e Kufeh az tarok-e Ali Ali hassalam čakid xodavand enša'allah arač-e aberuyeh un javan mard-ra piš-e mard va namard narisad. (A man asked us for the first light, that we make the first light. On the blood of Ali, the blood spilled in the mihrab of Kufa from the forehead of Ali), God willing, may the honor of the man who first gave not be lessened.

Someone gives more money.

Miandar: Jenab Moršed!

Moršed: Ay voillah!

Pahlavan: Agha-ye mara be talabat xedmat-e xodaš čeragh-e dovvom karam konad. (A man invites us to light a lamp in his service, may I light the second lamp?)

Moršed: Če šavad? (What will happen?)

Pahlavan: Xodara qasam midaham be do guš vore arš zinat-e farš ya'ani Imam Hassan va Imam Hussein do casme an no javan mard gerian našavad magar soli do maš dar azayeh pesar-e

Fatimeh Zarah. (I swear by the two earlobes of the sky, Hussein and Hassan, that good man shall not cry ever except in two months a year during Safar and Moharram in mourning the offspring of the son of Fatimeh.)

- (7) Kabodeh (chains). This is a metallic bow and chain held over the head and rocked from shoulder to shoulder. It is an exercise done individually in the gowd after the group exercises and the prayers.
- (8) Sang Gereftan. The sang are two large wooden weights held in each hand while lying on one's back, and the exercise involves rolling from side to side, a kind of weight lifting. The moršed may begin with either:

Dam be dam qadam be qadam ba yeki savar-e Arab va Ajam zobdeye olade navi, ya'ani Ahmad, Mahmud, Abul Qassem, Mohammad va be eske erodat va ejobat bihad o biadad salavat! (Minute by minute, step by step, with one astride, Arab and Iranian, Abul Qassem, Ahmad, Mahmud, Mohammad, the best sons of the Prophet, and for the love of friendship and answer innumerable salavat.)

or:

Har kar ke mikoni, begu bismillah. Ta jomle gonahhaneto baxšad Allah. Ta jan be tanat hast, himinra bargui. La hole va lakovete ullah belaha. (Everything that you do, say bismillah. Say this sentence that God forgive you your sins. As long as your soul is in your body say this. There is no power greater than God.

Then begins the count, from one to fifty, and then back to one. No one should do more than one hundred and seventeen (the number of sureh in the Qur'an):

One: great is the God of Abraham. Two: God is not two. Three: God who gives sustenance, the greatest master, Mohammad. Four: Allah, problem solver for the poor. Five: Ali, the opener of the Xebar castle [he opened it with a finger, one of five]. Six: six corners has the grave of Hussein [his son Ali Akbar's grave abuts and so adds two corners]. Seven: the seventh Imam. . . .

6.3.4. Bazaar

What has been described so far is not only a linguistic environment, but also socio-geographic spaces. All three forms, rosa, hey'at, zurxane, take place in small ritually clean spaces: a huseineya, a house,¹ or a gowd. All three involve the lower classes more than the upper classes,² and the

¹ In the film Mihadgah-e Hashem, Hashem decorates his house with black banners for a rosa. When he learns that his son is a rapist and murderer, he storms into the house crying to his wife to take down the banners, for the house has become unclean, a place of sin.

² The upper class dovre (discussion circles), often cited as an inform-

latter two particularly are associated with (but not exclusively) the bazaaris. All three are oriented to mahalleh residence quarters, although rosas and zurxanes can also be found in bazaars. It is often suggested that the bazaar is the seat of Islamic religiosity. In part that connection is the political one suggested in Chapter II where an economic explanation was offered of the religiously phrased riots which have periodically begun in the bazaars: many of the ulema, religious schools, and mosques have been supported by shop rents on vaqf land and by religious taxes. The economic squeeze on the bazaar by the colonial system thus found ready spokesmen in the ulema, made more effective by the seemingly disinterestedness of the language of ultimate right and wrong lent by religious rhetoric. But in addition to this, religious rhetoric is also used internally to the operation of the bazaar, and it is this which should be explored here. To do this properly should involve a dual exploration of the marketing structure itself as well as the communication terms which lubricate its transactions. The result should be an unfolding of the language games of piety, purity, obscenity, etc., which are so often naively reported as merely local color, in order that the underlying communication burden can be seen.

One may begin perhaps with the often speculated high percentage of hajis in the bazaar and with al-Ghazzali's frequently cited metaphor of the bazaar as a field for jihad, but then one should turn more seriously to bargaining and other modes of bazaar transactions. To determine the number of bazaaris who have actually been to Mecca is less meaningful than to recognize that, in contrast to an industrial worker for whom to be called Haji is merely a term of respect, for a bazaar merchant to be called Haji is a statement of trust in his honesty, and thus a direct assessment of his mode of earning a living. One addresses any unknown shopkeeper therefore as Haji. The prestige of actually making the Haj, however, has been devalued by the ease of the modern transportation system. Everyone, complain the religiously self-righteous, nowadays goes on the haj: the Qur'an says you must do so only if you have the means and if you have provided for your family; but nowadays people borrow to go on the haj. The Government, for al network in the political system, is a parallel kind of institution.

other reasons, has been trying to discourage the haj flood (it would prefer the money to be spent in Iran), but to the extent that the Government issues passports, increasing prosperity allows increasing numbers to go on the haj each year.¹ The respectful use of the address "Haji" in the bazaar on the other hand is still part of the arena of jihad spoken of by al-Ghazzali. In one sense the metaphor is cited (Thaiss 1971) on the assumption that the essence of the bazaar is competitive bargaining and comparative pricing due to the uncertainty and limited knowledge of buyer and seller; it is thus a constant jihad or holy war to maintain one's morality under conditions of interaction with others where there is temptation to take unfair advantage (usually by seller or buyer). More accurately, bargaining is in fact relatively infrequent and al-Ghazzali meant rather to alleviate ambivalence towards making money from selling goods necessary for life: to trade in order to provide for one's family is a form of jihad (defense of the faith) as long as it is not for self-indulgence or self-glorification (Lambton 1962: 124).

Two recent studies of Middle Eastern bazaars have remarked on the lack of aggressive hard selling and bargaining. Peter Benedict (1970) notes a contrast in the Anatolian town of Ula between the weekly market at the town which includes non-local sellers and the regular Ula bazaar shops. The former engage in hawking, bargaining, enticing customers into their stalls, and so on. The latter prefer to sell on credit and avoid these conflict producing methods. Ideologically the Ula bazaaris say that to attempt to entice customers into one's shop is harmful competition (rekabet) which hurts one's Muslim brother; competition stemming from envy (haset) will incur divine punishment (ceza); one should be content with one's due (nasib): if it is one's nasib, the customers will come from India and Yemen, if not what can you do? Benedict first discusses this set of verbalizations as

¹ In 1970 the number of Hajis was arbitrarily limited, but then the following year it was again opened up. In November 1971 the Interior Ministry tried again to limit the winter 1972 flood by decreeing that those who had already been to Mecca would not be allowed to go again. The pilgrims go in groups of 150 paying 55,000 rials per person (first class) or (second class) in groups of 100 paying 45,000 rials (Kayhan International 29 November 1971).

conservative business attitudes which are undergoing change, but he concludes by also seeing them as norms of behavior enforced by the structure of competition, with sanctions of boycott and refusal to give credit. Howard Rotblat (1972) describing the much larger Qazvin bazaar, and the Produce Bazaar in particular, is even more explicit. He argues that the large number of middle men in the Qazvin bazaar constitutes insurance of close to perfect competition, i.e., that prices approximate the intersection of supply and demand curves. There are certain places in the marketing linkages, certain roles, where there is greater adjustment of prices than others, e.g., "jobbers" and "peddlers," but in general price collusion at the expense of customers is not possible to maintain:

Peasants sell their goods through an agent who takes a fixed percentage commission of the best price he can get from retailers. Retailers also work on a percentage profit. Produce coming from outside the region is brought into the bazaar in bulk by traders who sell via brokers to retailers. Jobbers try to exploit a mediate position by buying in volume at discount and on revolving credit from traders and selling at prices slightly below the peasants' commission agents, but above retail prices. Their profit margins are small and precarious. Even more precarious is the "peddler" who tries to hawk goods quickly at prices as high as the market will bear. Towards the end of each day, he will have to lower prices to get rid of his stock. Commission agents and retailers who are the major elements in this market set prices each morning through a short "bargaining" period of tentative queries and price quotations at which time no sales are made; prices then remain fixed for the day. What keeps the multiplicity of middlemen in the bazaar is the lack of better employment elsewhere. And their competition keeps most prices relatively standardized. Persons accused of unfair competition will be "burned," that is cut off from sources of supply and credit (my paraphrase).

This perfect competition does not tell us anything, it should be clear, about over-all efficiency. As Fuad Khuri (1972) points out for Beirut, the transition from handworking to automation has brought a number of now unskilled laborers from the production into the distribution sector thereby raising the cost of the goods distributed (offset in part perhaps by decrease in unit cost of production). The Qazvin bazaar also is a sector of labor absorption in a changing economy, a situation which bazaaris clearly recognize, encouraging their sons to get out of the bazaar and into better positions. Since land reform, labor value of commission agents buying from

the local region has declined because peasants now do their own marketing in small units while previously landowners did the marketing in larger units. There has also been a decline in number of own-account traders, but an increase in speculative small bulk buyers wanting to sell in Teheran. The potential for future large scale cooperative marketing which will bypass this multiplicity of small scale units is obvious. In the meantime the multiplicity and adaptability of the bazaar system requires competition to occur not so much in the arenas of single sales but in the development of social relations. On the business side this means kinship relations of not very great extent (approximately first cousin) but of firm loyalty; on the customer-client side this means establishing long-term relations (possibly formalized through credit arrangements). Hence bargaining has relatively little place, prevalent only for commodities where prices are unknown—antiques, to a lesser extent carpets, etc.—and usually as a status jockeying technique rather than as real economic bargaining. Dalton Potter, commenting primarily on the Beirut bazaar, put it this way:

Bargaining, so often thought the dominant characteristic of the Middle Eastern bazaar, is essentially a claim by the consumer that he knows the market as well as the merchant and that the price quoted does not represent an accurate appraisal of current supply and demand . . . However, in the old bazaar where transactions tend to become ritualized, bargaining is also ritualized or disappears altogether, and in the Western market area, where the prices are largely based on world conditions and therefore on supply and demand beyond the appraisal abilities of the consumer, bargaining may be reduced to a minimum. In the intermediate areas energetic and continual bargaining takes place. It becomes a necessary preliminary to any transaction, so that both customer and merchant in a sense reassure one another that the other has performed a difficult social task satisfactorily (1955: 113-4).

The Yazd Produce Bazaar works similarly to that of Qazvin, with probably a greater percentage of its goods coming from outside the region. Cloth, silk thread, weaving, dying, copper, and various other commodities and production steps have been described in Chapter IV operating on fixed commissions. The context is then relatively clear for the following modes of transaction. Take first a case not in a shop but in an office, a man comes to "Ahmad" to find out if a transaction on his behalf has been accomplished:

Ahmad offered him tea, but the man refused. Ahmad signalled the tea boy to bring tea nonetheless, and when it arrived, the man said Ahmad

should drink it himself. Ahmad said jokingly that this would be a sin (gonah). And so a discussion developed on the duties of receiving and giving hospitality and on the gradations of moral compulsion (gonah or sin, harram or religiously forbidden, makru or disapproved). Gonah means what, asked the man. It is doing something bad, replied Ahmad, not like harram which is forbidden by religion, but just something bad. He kidded the man about drinking wine (which is harram), and the latter retorted that his father was seventy-five years old, had drunk wine all his life and was in perfect health. Ahmad continued his gentle ribbing by asking if the man had been to Mecca. Yes, fourteen times (he is a pilgrimage leader). Well, did you drink in Mecca? No, of course not. Why not? There is nothing to drink in Mecca. If there was, would you? Perhaps. How about Pepsi? Pepsi is gonah too. No, corrected Ahmad, Pepsi is only makru, introduced by Ayatollah Borujerdi.¹ Makru is not gonah, nor is it harram: it is between gonah and free choice, merely something which it is better not to do, but if you do it, it is not important. For instance, Hazrat-e Mohammad said that eating cheese is makru, but every Iranian has cheese for breakfast every morning; it does not matter.

The discussion went on and on until the visitor took his leave. At that point the host (Ahmad) expressed the hope that the transaction would be completed by the time of the next visit. Except for one or two such brief references to the transaction, the entire exchange was a discussion of mutual trust, and perhaps also an exploration of the different positions yet possible regarding their transaction before one or the other of them was forced into sanctions.²

This is not, however, as Fuad Khuri seems to suggest (1968) a general paradigm of bargaining situations: only some utilize such etiquette, perhaps primarily those which involve extended time, or those involving large sums of money where to fight over a few rials makes no sense. To watch purchases of small items such as a screw or light bulb in Yazd is to see by contrast the real conflict of buyer and seller emotionally exposed. First one argues about the price invoking the quality of the item and the character of the buyer (regular customer, friend, poor, etc.). Then the buyer takes the item

¹ At the time of the 1955 Bahai Riots: the Pepsi distributorship in Iran is held by Bahais. The makru decision is still in force, but today the Pepsi-Canada-Seven Up family of soft drinks, all controlled by the same corporation, are the most wide-spread and successful of the rival soft-drink companies.

² I am indebted to David Schneider for this latter suggestion.

and gives the seller less than his final price; or if the buyer does not have the right change, the seller gives him less change than the buyer last agreed to. This leads to loud altercation until a compromise or a defeat is registered, leaving both egos irritated:

A man came in for two light bulbs which Rustam gave him for 19 rials each, saying they had cost him 18. The man tried to bargain, but Rustam would have none of it. The man handed over some coins and took the bulbs: 35 rials he had given, and walked out despite Rustam's vigorous protests. This process was repeated by a young boy who bought two one toman bulbs. The result, said Rustam, was two rials profit on six tomans worth of bulbs. That, he grimly pointed out, was čune zadan (bargaining), stressing the word zadan (to hit, beat).

Losses on one sale must be made up on another. On some small items a difference in price from customer to customer may be structured by the units in which profits are calculated: in order to make a given profit on a thousand glasses, each glass may have a theoretical price of twenty-five rials and ten shahi, but since there are no longer any ten shahi coins, some customers must pay twenty-six rials and others twenty-five. Such differentiation of prices, in addition to those due to differential overhead (e.g., whether the shopkeeper does his own wholesale buying or uses a middleman), and market fluctuations (e.g., whether the goods were bought before or after customs duties were raised) require the buyer to engage in comparison shopping. Suspicion of collusion between sellers and ignorance about quality differences place the irregular shopper at a distinct disadvantage for many items. Under these circumstances a buyer may depend on establishing a long-term relationship with a seller, as is often the case with rural folk; and this also facilitates buying on credit:

Mahmud seems to keep all his accounts in cloth and gold with Rabi. He kept haggling over a gold pin with Ahmad, the goldsmith, and Rabi played the mediator as he knows about the gold market as well as his own business in cloth. Mahmud was with three women for whom he was buying čador cloth: they had the money, but he did the buying with their consent on his choices. After all the pieces of cloth were wrapped up, Rabi added up the price and Mahmud only mildly asked if he could not get it cheaper. A woman from Hajiabad was also there, and wanted čador material for a fifteen year old girl. Rabi picked out a gay pattern and cut it. Only then did she inquire about the price. Rabi folded it and said, don't worry, we will make it O.K. She then bought a silk handkerchief which Rabi gave her for six and a half tomans. She tried to say five, but Rabi put her down, saying anywhere else in the bazaar she could not get it for less than seven, and appealed for confirmation to Mahmud

who agreed.

Where polite etiquette is required, as for instance in buying an expensive carpet (the general price range is known, but each carpet will vary in quality and is subject to negotiation; old carpets are subject to greater market fluctuations), real bargaining needs a dallal (broker) to facilitate successive bidding when buyer and seller have become antagonistic and emotionally would prefer to have nothing to do with each other. For this service the broker retains a commission on the final sale (dallali).

Situations in which the buyer is at the severest disadvantage are those having to do with services:

Stopping by Ali Reza's watch shop I was given a demonstration of bazaari technique. A young Zoroastrian from Taft complained that on Friday he had come back to the shop as agreed and waited two hours, but Ali Reza never showed up. Ali Reza accused him of an insult which I did not catch, an insult of tremendous import to a married man (which Ali Reza is). He, the boy, should ask his father about its meaning, but he would not understand until he married. Ali Reza continued about how this insult had been used in a situation in Teheran and had led to a complete break in social relations. He then pulled status asking the boy how old he was. Fifteen was the answer, to which Ali Reza said: well, you are five years younger than me, and only in five years could you say such a thing to me, and that only if you marry in the coming year. The boy asked, what value did getting married have for Ali Reza. Ali Reza said he had no choice: he had been rich and young and so had to take a wife. Then he dropped the name of a well known Tafti to whom he claimed to be closely related. He concocted a tale about how there was something major broken in the watch, and how he had told the boy's friend on that Friday that it could not be fixed until he had the consent of the owner. Finally he charged the boy fifteen tomans, reduced it by a toman because the boy was a good kid, and allowed him to pay eleven and promise to bring the rest the coming week. As the boy left a farmer came in near tears about a watch he had bought, had had repaired, and which had broken within two hours of the repair. Ali Reza handled this by opening the watch and saying surely it had fallen to the ground, or he had banged it for it was broken. The man swore that this was not the case. Ali Reza brusquely said, O.K. you are right, come back in two days for the watch; and showed the man the door. He remarked to another customer standing by that it was like the story of the cock thief who swore he did not steal the cock, but it stuck its head out from under his coat: whom does one believe, the thief's oaths by Hazrat-e Abbas or the evidence of the cock? When the customers had left, I asked about the insult which I had missed. Ali Reza grinned and said that he had caught the boy before the insult had come out. Bazaaris must be sharp: a bazaari must be able to swallow a snake, disgorge it and swallow an afi, disgorge it, and swallow an ajdeha. An afi is an old snake; an ajdeha is a snake which although dying still

has snakes parturating from its belly; an ajdeha will eat both an afi and will swallow any animal whole. A bazaar must be an ajdeha. Afi is also someone who collects money, viz. the idiom afi ru-ye ganj (afi sitting on a treasure).

What these examples of various "bargaining" behaviors should suggest is that the bazaar is a relatively predictable environment structured by the marketing linkages: the degree to which bargaining is possible is constrained by the kind of market involved; the degree to which bargaining is utilized is dependent on the knowledge about the market of buyer and seller and on the nature of their on-going set of relations (rather than any one particular sale). Small differences can be settled by bargaining cues like the appeal to friendship over money (p. 240 above). Unreasonable and lengthy discussions can be reduced by appeals to religion (the brotherhood of all Muslims and the ethics of a Muslim merchant). But such appeals are only effective when the distance between the bids of the two bargainers is appropriate: if the distance is too great, the appeal to friendship will be countered by a laugh and the observation that friendship is indeed valuable but one must also live.

In the following sections, several other rhetorical sets common in the bazaar will be examined with an eye towards also discerning their rules of play.

6.3.5. Slangs and Profanity

The usage of slangs and profane repartee serves to define in-groups and out-groups, but it may do more as well. Much social relation building may be done through forms of verbal contests, some playful, some aggressive, some status assertive, some protective probing of things which cannot be ventured openly. Some of the usages which follow are very reminiscent of lower class verbal contesting in the West, best described in the academic literature for the Negroes of the U.S. and West Indies. R.D. Abrahams (1970) describes it as an oral culture as opposed to the middle class literate culture. More controlled data on role and age contexts of verbal behavior is required for comparison between strata of society and cross-culturally to validate such tags as "oral culture" and "verbal culture:" But certain

rhetorical patterns and sociological structuring can be suggested. In his Philadelphia material, Abrahams makes some tentative observations about the separation of the sexes and how in male society rhyming, playing the dozens, toasting, teasing, and other word games provide techniques of anxiety-release, sexual assertion, etc. Getting the upper hand in such contests is called mounting or downing, an explicitly sexual reference also used among Yazdi bazaaris. Indeed many of the forms of insulting and rhyming games given in the following pages are very close to Abraham's material. The Persian texts offered throughout this chapter are largely rhymed. The point of many of the profane chants is not the obscenity of the language alone, but the rhyming variations: points accrue for new variations and better rhymes. Abrahams also cites the interesting empirical correlation that the word game patterns are more structured among the younger boys, and that with age the subject matter of taunts, etc., also changes, e.g., from vilification of the mother to sex to less specific things. During late adolescence, Abrahams suggests, these games disappear but are not forgotten: when they surface again on occasion in a pool hall or army barracks they often lead to violence. In Iran this suppression does not occur so dramatically: games of rhyming, poetry and story telling are done throughout life. In recognition of their love of verbal games, Iranians enjoy applauding themselves as a nation of poets. Approaching Iran with this generalization in mind, however, causes most people to miss the contextual variation and to concentrate on the undeniable appreciation by all Iranians of classical literary poetry. This is not only to miss an arena of creative and often amusing competition but to miss a possible key to some Iranian behavior. Abrahams notes that in adult life verbal play leads on the one hand to obscene ballads, but on the other to religious preaching contests. So too in Iran much of the attraction of rosas is to hear thoughts well said. Iranians will lovingly contemplate such poetic images as that this world is but a caravanserai, a temporary stopping place between where we came from and where we are going, or the old image of the soul as a drop of water which came from the sea above and at the end of life evaporates to rejoin it. A librarian at the library of the Masjid-e Jome told enthusiastically of a "real" darvish who had come

and inquired of Ayatollah Vaziri whether there was to be found in Yazd a man so holy as to read the Masnavi with tongs (that his fingers not profane the pages), and when he, a white haired old man, was addressed with the polite form as jenab ali, immediately countered: jenab ali šomast, beman xar begu (you are the respected sir, to me say donkey). And when this registered surprise, he continued: rast migid, man xar nistam: xar bar mibare, man pir-e mardam, hič kar nemikonam (right you are, not even a donkey am I; a donkey can carry loads, while I, an old man, can do nothing). And so he continued ending with the Sufi image of the kernel of an almond, the beauty of which brought tears to his listeners' eyes.

Possibly the questions raised in Chapter II and then dropped about the directed frenzy of religious riots and about the hostility towards immodestly dressed women may find a lead here as well. For, in these two different contexts non-Muslims and women, respectively, are barred from the verbal contesting, barred, that is, from taking up verbal challenges and from building social relations in those terms. There is a point recognized often by creative writers in an aggressive encounter where the aggression can be parried and the tension diffused: thus the politician who can disperse an angry crowd. Julian Pitt-Rivers in some speculative comments on "The Hostile Host" has broached these problems in a different context: the ambiguity of a guest as required object of hospitality but at the same time as unknown and potentially dangerous. The solution is often a fight as a means of building commitment on both sides, the victor sparing the vanquished and the member of the in-group thereby providing an entre for the stranger on a basis of personal relationship now made more firm. Where, however, the hostility is not diffused, it may grow and erupt into violence: the adolescent unable to respond to a challenge of ridicule may find himself beat up. The sociology of these processes needs further exploration, but a first step is at least to collect the situations and forms of behavior. A collection of detailed stories about the problems of women in public could be gathered very easily. The suggestion here of a barrier to communication seems supported by the following five cases:¹

¹ See in a different context Paul Vielle's argument (1967) that the

- (a) Shortly after I arrived in Iran, when I could barely put together a Persian sentence yet, I escorted two English girls to Veramin. As we walked down a side street, school was let out and a horde of curious little girls poured out around us. A few began to call "Amrikayi! Amrikayi!" and the word soon grew into a chant. Little girls pushed others into us so that "unintended" touching could occur. Then as if they were extended feelers, small lumps of dirt were tossed at us. And eventually these turned to stones.
- (b) A parallel occurrence without women: three young foreign males entered a village near Sultaneiya to photograph, measure and draw a monument. The village males began to collect. Some of these were admitted to the comraderie of the three and were put to work to organize the exclusion of the others so that work could proceed. After a full day's work, the three made to depart, and as they did so, precisely the same events as in the first case occurred. Towards the end, the village male friends had to physically hold off the crowd with sticks and by throwing stones back while the three made their escape.
- (c) Again the same sequence of events is portrayed in the film Qaliče-ye Hazrat-e Suleiman. A Teherani girl walks through a village in a bikini to sun bathe in the fields. A crowd of men begins to follow her. The soft tossing of things begins and soon turns into stoning. The crowd is held off by two men swinging large sticks.

In at least the first two cases, the situation might have been defused had there been more communication between the two sides, but in the third case, it is not clear what the woman could have said; and it is between these two types of cases that most incidents fall:

- (d) In a provincial town like Yazd, it is common for young men to promenade in the early evening, and often they cruise with one eye on the look-out for prostitutes. A single woman, even in čador, standing somewhere alone may raise interest, and it is not uncommon for another male who knows her to casually counsel as he passes, "She is someone's wife."
- (e) The streets immediately to the north of the Teheran bazaar are known to be particularly frequent places for non-subtle pinching, a place where women are (a) anonymous, and (b) through the press of traffic unlikely to be able to initiate a sustained interaction which could involve either prophylactic or retributionary sanctions.

Leaving aside the question of women and situations in which certain categories of people may be excluded from the arena of verbal contest, let

barrier to communication between the sexes in the Iranian family has an effect on the birth rate. Beyond the point at which both parents might like to stop having children, the pressure of their male and female peer groups outside the family cause them not to act on this desire, nor even communicate it to their spouse.

us look at two such arenas: slangs and obscenity.¹ Discourse among shopkeepers, and especially between shopkeeper and his assistant when customers are present may be a slang unintelligible to the latter; there are at least four such craft slangs still recognized in Yazd. Friendly casual discourse among bazaaris is often a bantering obscenity, homosexual in character.

Of the four craft slangs, two simply utilize "pig-latin" type rules of sound or syllable changes from normal Persian (the goldsmith and copper-smith "languages"²), one has a slang vocabulary (the butchers' language), and one is a generalized slang which seems to include Hebrew words used in the Jewish section of the cloth bazaar but picked up by other bazaaris and so called zaban-e bazazi (cloth sellers' language) with respect to the cloth bazaar, but also zaban-e bazaari (bazaar language) when it merges with the obscene banter of the rest of the bazaar; but a fair portion of it seems in fact to be derivative of the Central Plateau dialects spoken by Zoroastrians, local Jews, and much of the rural population between Yazd and Isfahan.

The reason given for maintaining these slangs is, of course, so that others, e.g., customers will not understand. Thus in prime place among phrases so used are those which talk about the customer, the goods, or prices (Table 7). Butchers, people suggest, provide a prime example of why slangs are useful: they may try to pass off goat meat as sheep meat, or female sheep meat as male sheep meat since the former in each pair is not in much demand. The reason for the customer preference is usually phrased in

¹ Exclusion of women is, of course, not absolute: angry, obscene repartee can be heard in the kučes between mothers and their children. The social arena of such exchanges, however, is restricted. One effective response of a woman to physical or verbal annoyance is to immediately slug the offender; this will mobilize support among surrounding men for her.

² The goldsmith slang is formed by adding to each internal syllable of the Farsi word either eze, ašto, or ilu. E.g., (1) In kitab mal-e man ast (This book is mine) → Izin keze tezab maza leze mazan nazast. (2) Begu nadarim (Say we have none) → bezu guzu naza daza rizim or buštu guštu našta dašta raštım or budulu dudulu nadulu, dadulu didilim. The coppersmith slang is formed by substituting a sin (س) for the initial sound and suffixing mede, e.g., man → sarmede; soma → šomamede.

TABLE 7
SAMPLE TRADE SLANG VOCABULARY

Slang	Farsi	English
<u>dam</u> (B, Q)	<u>sobat</u>	talk
<u>dam var nayar</u> (Q)	<u>hiči nagu; harf nazan</u>	don't say anything
<u>dam varney</u> (Q)	" " " "	
<u>galandazeh</u> (M)	" " " "	
<u>paškane</u> (B)	<u>velleš kon</u>	let it go (he won't buy)
<u>varu parvareh</u> (G)	<u>velleš kon: moštiri</u> <u>xub nist</u>	let it go: he's not a good customer
<u>kas; kas na kufte?</u> (G)	<u>pul; pul nadade?</u>	money; he did not pay?
<u>amu; panj ta amu</u> (B)	<u>do toman; panj ta do T.</u>	2 tomans; 5 x 2 T.
<u>pašan amu me vede</u> (B)	<u>xarje dallali beman bedi</u>	give me my brokerage fee
<u>to</u> (G, B, Q)	<u>xub</u>	good (from Heb. <u>tov</u> ?)
<u>galoft</u> (M)		go ask for wages
<u>lepak</u> (M)		hide this

(B = cloth seller slang [bazazi], Q = butcher [qasabi], M= coppersmith [meskari], G = general bazaar slang.)

dietary terms: goat meat is cooler than sheep meat, although female goat meat is cooler than the male; young and male sheep meat are warm while a female which has borne young is cool to cold as are the stomach, liver and lungs of both sheep and goats. Meats which are cold are said to be hard to cook.¹ In fact, of course, what is being recognized is that one does not sell a female to the butcher until she is too old to bear young (or to have much taste). So housewives suspicious that old females are being passed off as males, check the penis on the carcasses carefully to make sure it has not been sewn on. When anyone slaughters for himself, crowds gather to buy or demand on various moral pretexts pieces of the meat, since this is sure to be prime male. Thus butchers have an entire vocabulary for their profession (Table 8).

¹ Hot and cold foods are a complex system of relative classifications. Sheep meat is warm, camel very warm, even inherently so because camels belong to hot climates, and although camel meat is very tough it is not as hard to cook as a female sheep which has borne young.

TABLE 8
BUTCHERS' SLANG

Qasabi	Farsi	English	Qasabi	Farsi	English
<u>lamaki</u>	<u>gušt</u>	meat	<u>lanakito</u>	<u>gušt-e xub</u>	good meat
<u>kafanaki</u>	<u>pust</u>	skin	<u>čizaki</u>	<u>ostaxun</u>	bone
<u>čerkaki</u>	<u>dombe</u>	tail fat	<u>dotolleh</u>	<u>miš</u>	maternal ewe
<u>šamaz</u>	<u>pi</u>	stomache fat	<u>siah xune</u>	<u>boz</u>	female goat
<u>tok</u>	<u>kalle</u>	head	<u>lamaki deraz</u>	<u>gušt-e nar</u>	male meat
<u>pakaki</u>	<u>šekam</u>	stomach	<u>pa dar</u>		
<u>tudeli</u>	<u>jegar</u>	liver	<u>nakerd</u>	<u>zešt</u>	ugly, bad

How much slang is really used for shady merchandizing is open to question. It is not really true in a parallel case that the Zoroastrian dialect (Dari) is not understood by Muslims as its speakers claim.¹ But what is undeniable is that the usage of slangs or even of word games where the vocabulary is perfectly intelligible to outsiders serves to separate "in-groups" and to mark social boundaries. Bazaari obscenity and purity languages are two polar types of such games. The former is a kind of "playing the dozens," but done with hilarity rather than aggressiveness:

- (a) Responses to a greeting: O morendazam (Oh one for whom I fart); O morendaz-e sarkar (Oh fartable sir); O Hassan Agha beendazam or O Hassan Agha chapundar (Oh Hassan Agha whom I may mount).
- (b) If in conversation one asks rhetorically dorost-e? (really?) without specifying the antecedant, one is opened to the response: nemidunam boyad az bače mahalleh beporsam (I do not know, I must ask the boys of the neighborhood [if his anus is alright]).
- (c) Similarly, if a reference to a friend is made, the query may be returned: dust baroye či? (friend for what?).
- (d) Constant references are made to one another as olad lisodeh, olad-e Mullah Abdullah, and olad-e Šallampur, all variations on "queer" or "son of a homosexual union:" in az habar-e taze šalampur bače bazi;

¹ Zoroastrians recognize the affinities with the local Jewish dialect, with Naini, and even with Kurdish. They claim that this proves that it was only recently that Nainis converted to Islam from Zoroastrianism. The same argument is used by Jews to claim that until recently Nain was largely Jewish.

nazar kon be in azarmonde ke olade šalampur bače bazi; maqad čerat pasm, agar ziad darad, vajebe bekešesid (vajebe atesēs konid), pas biyayid (how much lint has your ass, if much you must wipe it off or set it aflame, and then come).¹

- (e) For doing something stupid, one says: bala xunetun ejare dadid (you have given your upstairs, i.e., brain, out for rent). The answer is: xob, vali šoma pain xunetun ejare dadid (fine, you however have given your downstairs, i.e., your ass, out for rent).
- (f) The fine art of versified insult: if you say kaš (Yazdi for kašk, a milk solid), the response might be kose madaret por-e paš(m) (your mother's cunt is full of wool). If you say mas(t) (yogurt), the response might be: in ke mixasti bar vas (open what you want [pointing to the penis]). If you say pesse (Yazdi for peste, pistachios), a response might be: bakhiye kose nanat jesse (your mother's cunt is broken). If you say badam (almonds), a response might be: kallet tu kune babam (your head up my father's ass). If you say senje(t), which for some reason gets people angry (the same way saying twelve o'clock to a Sikh is supposed to anger him), responses can vary from insults to a plea of non-engagement: ridam tu lonje(t) (I shit in your mouth); zadam be konjeh (I fuck the deepest corner of your anus); xar-madar gende (your sister and mother are whores); sejel(t)am hamram nist (I do not have my identity card with me); sayyid? bale, sayyid-e xube (the sayyid? yes, he is a good sayyid).
- (g) Matlak-gui, a form of teasing in which you answer in such a way as to make the questioner look silly. Isfahanis are supposed to be reknowned experts, one Juzbashi even collecting money to demonstrate his talents.
- (h) Stories. A villager came into Yazd and heard the call to prayer. He asked a man, what is that noise coming from so many different rooves? The man replied: azin. What is that? It is time to go to namaz. What is namaz? You read namaz to go to behešt (heaven). "Oh," responds the villager grabbing the townie by the shirt, "I want to go to heaven." The Yazdi says, "Well don't grab me by the shirt, I cannot give you entrance to heaven. But come with me and we will go together to the mosque." So they go to the mosque and the Yazdi stations the villager directly behind the piš-namaz, and tells him to do everything the piš-namaz does. He himself stands behind the villager. When the villager bows down for the sejdeh (prostration), the Yazdi grabs his balls and squeezes. The villager is taken by suprise and grabs the balls of the piš-namaz. The piš-namaz, in pain, howls, "Allah-o-Akbar." The Yazdi squeezes harder, and the villager likewise, and the piš-

¹ Not all such banter is homosexual. People kid each other about going to the baths, a reference to the obligatory shower after intercourse. But Yazdis claim good-naturedly to be the greatest homosexuals in the world. Qazvin has a statue of the Shah facing Teheran with his hands protectively clasped behind him, but Yazdis need no such advertisement for their skills.

namaz howls the next line. After it is all over, the villager leaves telling the Yazdi that he no longer wants to go to heaven.

Two hippies are walking along. On a roof above them an axund clears his throat and spits down to the pavement, the missile just missing the hippies. The latter look up and see this axund and ask him: ridi ya tohfeh? (excrement or a gift?). He answers: agar ridi, tu zebilet; agar tohfe tu kunet (if excrement in your mustache, if a gift, up your ass).

There was a siraf or rabeh-xare (money lender) who collected much money and then fell very ill. A mullah who was also something of a practical joker went to call on him, and told him, "Last night I dreamt of you, but before telling the dream to you, I want to remind you—please excuse me—that if in a dream one sees someone dead, it means just the reverse, that the person will have a long life." The sick man responded, "Yes, yes, never mind, we must all die some day." Then the mullah began: "I dreamt that you were dead and that a great crowd of people had gathered to carry your coffin and that they took you to Rey to be buried at the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim. As they began to dig your grave, the son of the seventh Imam who is also buried there sat up in his grave and cried, 'No, no, you must take him to Hazrat-e Masume, the sister of Imam Reza, in Qum.'" The sick man was pleased by these words thinking that God loved him so. The mullah continued, "When they brought you to Qum and began to dig your grave, Hazrat-e Masumeh rose out of her grave and protested that you must be taken to Mashad. They took you to Mashad and as they began to dig your grave there, Imam Reza rose out of his grave and said, 'No, no, not here, take him to Kazeme' [the graves of the sixth and seventh Imams]; and at Kazeme the latter insisted you be taken to Najaf, and at Najaf, Ali insisted you be taken to Medina." By now the sick man was beaming. The mullah paused dramatically, and then said, "And as they began to dig your grave at Medina [where Mohammad is buried], Omar [who is also buried there] rose up and cried, 'Yeki goh kafist, bebareš birun!' (One piece of shit, i.e., me, is enough, take him away!)."

6.3.6. Purity and Nejasat

The purity game is taken much more seriously by respectable social scientists, but it too serves to draw social boundaries. Outsiders tend to be impressed by the severity of Islamic purity claims in excluding non-believers expressed also in claims to superior ethics and social organization, and contrasts are often drawn with more tolerant ideologies. Less often is it recognized that this severity is directed primarily towards the maintenance of the Islamic community, and that within the Islamic community there is considerable tolerance: to be a bad Muslim is only to be a fallible human

being, but not to be a Muslim is to reject God's commands and thereby to place oneself beyond any claim of mutual aid from believers. Where this boundary is placed may differ depending upon social exigencies: in Yazd the only Muslims are Shia Jafari, yet many of the conservative orthodox have strong reservations about Sufis. Rosaxond Maneqebi spoke for them in his speeches after the death of Rasulian:

Of Ali we know that he was born in the Kaaba and that as a child he came to Mohammad before Mohammad had revealed the Qur'an and asked permission to read from it. [Poem of thanks by Ali's father.] But do not think therefore that Ali is greater than the Prophet. The Prophet is the master, and Ali the student. However much we praise Ali, the Prophet is greater. It is too bad that there are a few who believe in Ali so much that they forget God and Mohammad. Ali says that we must pray, but they do not pray even two rakat. Ali when he prayed sometimes fell to the ground like a stick of wood, so did he fear God. Some say that Ali is God (Ali'ullahi) and forget the Prophet and God. In Mashad I went to see a morsed in the Mahalleh Gombad-e Sabz. I began politely greeting him in his own idiom, and I asked him how he had arrived at his station. He looked at me sideways as if I were a child. It took a great deal of effort said he. For thirty years I did not go to the hammam, not a drop of water fell on my body. And indeed he was right: his skin smelled like that of an animal. He was very dirty, his face was very dark, and his beard was all matted. But as for his stomach, he ate well: do not think that he had nothing to eat. I knew from the first that he would say some nonsense, but I wanted to engage him in argument. I asked him, "You never took vozu to recite namaz? You never experienced seminal emission?" He got angry and shouted, "You are a child, do not be rude, you have no cause to talk to a lover of God so. We have reached God. You are still on the way. We do not need vozu, ghosl, namaz." At this I too got angry and cried, "Fie upon you, you have grown up and need no prayer, but Ali, whom you love, prayed in the mihrab; so he did not reach God, but you have? You have reached God but the fourth Imam did not? [Shouting:] La illah . . . haq a haq . . . la illah . . . imam va tastiqa . . . la illah . . . ! You have reached God but Musa the seventh Imam did not, he who imprisoned spent his days from morning till night praying and yet did not reach God!" At this point I saw his friends were coming to beat me, and so I left. I do not say that one cannot become a lover of Ali, but not in this way. How can one call a man a lover of Ali when he abandons prayer, jihad, Qur'an? He loves Ali who obeys the rules of Ali, and believes in the Prophet above Ali. Ali said, "I am a servant of the Prophet and like a shadow of the Prophet, I obey the Prophet." If Ali as a child recited the Qur'an, he must by that very fact have acknowledged the Prophet.

In the Masjid-e Jome Yazd library (Kitabxane Vaziri) there are almost as many polemical tracts against Sufis as against Bahais, Christians and Jews.

Sufis are not the only Muslims against whom boundaries may be drawn.¹ In nearby Shahrabak or in a place like Kuwait a decision must be made as to whether to ignore sectarian differences.² Formal Muslim polemicists are often careful to avoid calling another nominal Muslim a heretic for that would be a charge of apostasy punishable by death and requiring in the case of a group, jihad; they say rather that he misunderstands.³ The folk can afford to be less careful. In Shahrabak, the Ismailis are accused of not being proper Muslims as evidenced by their incorrect performance of prayer (they gather only to offer da'a but do not perform namaz), fasting (what use is fasting if one continues to sin otherwise; to help others and accomplish necessary social chores is surely a greater dedication to God than to sit around all through Ramazan and complain of hunger), and haj (the true haj is internal dedication, not a physical journey to Saudi Arabia). Only Jafari, says a young Iranian in the Kuwait bazaar, will go to heaven; all others including Muslims who only believe in seven imams will go to hell where they will be immersed to lip level in arak so that they will burn internally each time they open their lips; and where the sun will be so low that they will burn their arms each time they raise them. Sunni Muslims, adds a goldsmith from Luristan, have less taqvā,⁴ that is, they are less

¹ A practising darvish says there used to be seventeen xaneqahs in Yazd. Seventeen is a number like forty which means "quite a few"; both Yazd and Taft are said to have had seventeen mahalleh. The only functioning xaneqahs today are two Nimayatullahi ones which split in 1967 over the succession to the qotb.

² "Muslim is he from whose hand and tongue other Muslims are safe," runs a hadith: al-Muslimnan sale mal Muslimummem yad-i hi va lesale.

³ See Eberhardt (1970), especially the introductory chapter. Hence the important play of such words, not so much as kaffir (unbeliever), as bid'a (innovation) which can be consonant or not with the sunna (tradition) and usul (traditional sources); and as šubha (confusion), the misuse of ijtihad (interpretation), etc.

⁴ Taqvā means "piety," and Mazzaoui makes the interesting argument that when the doctrine of taqiyah was developed around the time of the greater occultation (ghaybah) of the twelfth Imam (A.D. 940) it had less to do with religious "dissimulation" than with piety, both words sharing the same Arabic tri-literal root meaning piety (1971: 49). The point here is the constant tension between the letter and the spirit of the law: the ritual haj and the internal dedication.

concerned with taking care about things that are harram and najes; we Jafari say that:

- (a) Water splashed on the ground when washing the hands or feet is najes. Why? Because a child or someone may have urinated on the ground; it dried but now is transferred by the water with all its disease bearing microbes which we call pari.
- (b) To touch a Christian or a Jew makes you najes. Why? First of all it is the sweat (tar) or wetness of the hand which is najes. A Muslim's touch is not equally najes. Why? Because a Muslim cleans himself when he goes to the toilet with water—you will agree that water gets you clean—but the Christians clean themselves with paper—that does not clean: it is dirty.
- (c) For the same reason we do not give our clothes for laundering to a non-Muslim, but the Sunni do not care.
- (d) After intercourse, one is najes until one takes a bath, a full shower from head to foot; but the Christian only washes his organ and is done. It is the sweat of sexual exertion which is najes.
- (e) To have dirty fingernails is najes, for when one eats, the pari-microbes under the nails may also be eaten.
- (f) Not to wash the hands before eating is najes.
- (g) Similarly one must keep one's mustache trimmed short so that it does not catch food when eating, and develop microbes which can be eaten along with later food.
- (h) Similarly one must wash when going to the toilet.
- (i) One must squat when urinating and not stand upright. Why? Because when you stand not all the urine comes out, and the bit remaining contains microbes which will make you ill, whereas squatting allows all the urine to exit.
- (j) One must go to the toilet before sleeping. Why? So you will sleep comfortably.
- (k) One must eat little before sleeping, e.g., if five cookies will make you full, you may eat only three.
- (l) When performing ablutions take up cool water into the nostrils three times. Why? To put to sleep the worm (kerm) in the forehead which otherwise is in turmoil and can cause headaches.
- (m) One must wear a cap on the head when going to the toilet. Why? So that the steam of the hot excreta which rises into the air does not settle on the head.
- (n) One must sleep under a tree only in the day time and never at night. Why? Because during the day the tree breathes in and so currents of oxygen are brought to you; but at night the tree exhales carbolic acid.

- (o) When you go into a W.C. step in with your left foot first so that should the malak of death, Azrail, nab you at that instant, you will fall backwards out of the W.C. and not into it. The left foot is like the reverse gear of a car, the right foot like the forward gears.
- (p) Contrarily when you enter a mosque, enter right foot first.
- (q) For fifteen minutes after eating you should lean back and rest with the right leg outstretched on top of the left, and the right hand on the chest so that your weight is on the left side. This is for the same reason as [r].
- (r) When eating one should sit with the weight on the left side so that the appendix is above the line of gravity, so that when the food goes down, it goes down the left side and not into the appendix which would make you ill. One also should keep the knees bent while eating as a mark of respect for food (ehteram-e sopreh) since food belongs to God (xorak mal-e xodadast), it is a divine gift. The most respectful position for eating is on one's haunches as in the sejده prayer position.
- (s) Circumcision is again done so urine drops will not become caught in the foreskin leading to microbes and disease.

The rationale for these purity rules has to do ostensibly with hygiene, hence the modern translation of pari (fairy) into "microbe." In a vain attempt to protest the dignity of the dirty Westerner, I objected to my friend's fourth point that Americans would after sexual intercourse shower not as a matter of religion but as a matter of hygiene. Which, he responded in triumph, proves the virtue of Islam, formulated for ignorant folk before there was any knowledge of microbes, in such a way as to get them to perform acts necessary for their health, but which could not have then been formulated in modern terms. His list of rules is by no means complete: e.g., he omitted the impurity of menstruation.¹ Nor should they be regarded as more than

¹ Ayatollah Borujerdi et al. (n.d.: 26-32) list twelve items as najes: urine, feces, sperm, corpse, blood, dog, pig, unbeliever, wine and other liquid intoxicants, beer, the sweat of sexual exertion, the sweat of an animal which eats feces or other nejasat. Not all mujtaheddin count the last two items: Ayatollah Khoi lists only the first ten, Shariatmardi skips the eleventh, and Hakim counts under the twelfth only the camel. Various qualifications are made: feces and urine of small creatures which do not have meat such as flies and mosquitoes are clean; blood of every animal with spurting blood is unclean, so that of flies, mosquitoes and fish are clean; the egg in the body of a dead hen is clean after washing; the prensinal of cheese (a starter put in milk to make cheese) in the body of a dead lamb which has eaten only milk but no grass yet is clean; the wool, hair and teeth of a

variably obeyed "ought statements:" The business of bathing after sexual intercourse leads to numerous Iranian jokes since bathing has not been something frequently available in the recent past.¹ Communal baths were not free since they involved labor to heat and run, nor were they in operation more than one or two days a week, leading to many jokes about the frequency of sexual intercourse on Thursday nights since one could combine the bathing duty the next morning with that of bathing for the Friday congregational prayer (for which a communal bath was prepared).² One essential point needs to be emphasized about the elaboration of such "purity rules," especially in the context of non-Muslim complaints of not being allowed to touch fruits, etc., in the bazaar because Muslim shopkeepers would claim they had made the entire stock najes, or of not being allowed to walk in the streets on rainy days for fear that they might splash their uncleanness onto a Muslim. This essential point the Luri goldsmith himself stressed while enthusiastically expounding that the touch of a non-Muslim was najes by placing his hand on my arm. Najes, he said, simply means impure for prayer. If you become impure, you wash and become pure and then can pray. Means of purification are water, earth, sun, fire, and for

dead animal are clean; meat and skins sold by a Muslim are presumed to be clean until shown that they were bought from an unbeliever; blood of the gums is cleansed by saliva but should not be swallowed; blood which falls into food makes the food najes and cannot be cleansed by boiling or cooking; wine and intoxicating liquids are najes but not bang or hashish.

¹ Yalman reports (1969: 53) that bathing after sexual intercourse and the full ghosl abdesti (from head to foot) provided a bone of contention between the Sunni and Alevi in the Eastern Turkish village of Ciplaklar. The Sunni accuse the Alevi of being dirty and not performing the full ghosl. The Alevi reply: "If you have a paper bag full of cucumbers and you drop one cucumber on the ground, do you need to wash all the cucumbers or only the one that fell on the ground?" Yalman notes that the popular practice for Sunni after intercourse is to get up from bed and ". . . solemnly swear his intention (niyet) to bathe when convenient; then he can return for an undisturbed sleep beside his wife."

² A riddle runs: dam dar o nam dare, dig be ŝekam dare; ma meyl be u darim, u meyl be pul dare (It has steam and water, a cauldron in its stomach; we like it, it likes money)—a hammam (bath). A proverb runs: hammam bi arak nemiŝe, ta yek sur nadehid dorost nemiŝe (A hammam without sweat is impossible, until you give a feast it will not work properly) which means approximately, you cannot get something for nothing. The greeting appropriate to one returning from a bath is afiat boŝid, also an innuendo in jokes of sex.

unbelievers conversion to Islam (see Borujerdi, et al., n.d.: 32). Those rules which are defended on hygienic grounds if not obeyed cause illness, not damnation.¹ Indeed the argument is made by many Shiites that a normal man never lives a sinless life, and that going to heaven therefore depends upon the intercession of Hussein, and for this reason it is important to mourn Hussein and ally oneself to his cause. As an iconoclastic Iranian put the litany:

Take any Iranian and ask him: do you believe that Mohammd is the chosen prophet of God? Yes, of course. Well then, who was the first to follow Mohammad? Ali. And who was the only person eligible to marry Mohammad's daughter? Ali. Right, because if Omar or someone else had been eligible, Mohammad, the tool of God, would have given her to him. So then, do you believe the children of Ali and Fatimeh were the descendants of Mohammad? Yes, of course. And Mohammad repeatedly called Hussein the apple of his eye; Hussein grew up on the lap of Mohammad. And so those who killed the children of Mohammad and of Ali must not be Muslims, or not good Muslims. All true Muslims love the children of Mohammad. And so they love Hussein who died for them, and who intercedes with God when a man dies, saying to God: look, I know he is a sinner, but he cried for me. And so the story of Hussein is told in the most tragic way that people will cry for him for their salvation.

That becoming najes is no more serious than requiring purification before praying is a striking formulation of the game-nature of purity assertions. To pursue the issue a bit, take the case of the continued refusal of some lower class Yazdi Muslims to drink the author's tea, or as a Qazvin bazaari jokingly told another researcher, "It is a good thing you visit me in my shop and not at home, because there I would have to offer you tea and then when you left I would have to break the glass from which you drank." The two cases, however, are not comparable in that the Qazvini was only joking during an amused commentary on the unclean (najes) length of the researcher's mustache: there is never any problem in a Muslim

¹ Sayyid Reza says that there are three times a male must perform ritual bathing (ghosl): after sex, after a fright, and before praying. The sweat of the first two will plug up the pores and one will thus fall ill, become yellow. Women must also bathe after menstruation. Also touch of a corpse requires a ghosl. As to not performing the proper washing before prayer (vozu, ghosl) that merely renders it inefficacious.

offering tea to a non-Muslim, since the glass can then be washed.¹ But there is an insoluble problem in the reverse case: since water is a conductor of impurity it is impossible for a non-Muslim (an impure person) to wash a glass pure. The question, however, of what happens when a Muslim does ingest something unclean, either the tea of a non-Muslim or pork or wine, is only of scholastic interest. As a practical matter, because it involves a social relation, drinking a non-Muslim's tea is a much more tense transgression than the secret imbibing of alcohol in which many Muslims indulge and which requires no special purification. Those Iranians, both conservative and progressive, to whom the question is meaningful, analyze the transformation of ritual purity rules into rules of social exclusion as an illegitimate step encouraged by xenophobic mullahs. A quite parallel step is the fear of believers that reading about other religions may weaken their faith: as an assistant finally confessed after his searching through a Jewish history had slowed and deteriorated, "I read this and will read anything gladly to help you in your work, but you know it is not something a good Muslim should read."

Historically this transformation into rules of social exclusion has taken the form of the so-called Codes of Omar. An analysis of the content of such codes reveals a protestation that Muslim claims to superiority marked in dress, housing, etc., were not being honored: that there were Armenians, Jews or Zoroastrians who presumed to dress, act, etc., as equals with Muslims. Several of the occasions on which such codes were introduced have been analyzed in Appendix 1, again revealing their status assertion character (see also Tritton 1930, and al-Ukhuwwa 1938).

¹ The transformation of the ritual paradigm into a political idiom, however, may eliminate this solution. During the 1920 Shiite rebellion against the British in the Middle Euphrates, the native Iraqis recruited by the British to suppress the rebellion, the so-called Levies or šabana, were labeled infidels, were refused food in bazaars and coffee shops, and the vessels from which they had drunk were publically broken as being so impure as to be unpurifiable. The lead in these definitions was given by the fatwa of the mujtaheddin al-Shirazi and al-Kashani that the rebellion was a jihād and those who participated in the Levies were infidels and were to be refused Muslim burial (H.A. Sahib 1954: 322-4, citing M. al-Firon's collection of the fatwa as well as A.T. Wilson's account).

The above examples show a kind of "situational reasoning" or "opportunistic manipulation" of religious categories (what is pure, what is impure). We shall continue to find this in the sections on modesty, honor and divination: while the terms of the rules (that women should be veiled, that divination is possible) are accepted "dogmatically," their application is quite situational and even experimental. One of the roles of anthropological analysis is to demythologize such usages so as to counter beliefs that they correspond to mechanically applied normative paradigms of what is pure, impure, what constitutes honor, and so on. In linguistics distinctions are drawn between rules of grammar, competence of speakers, and performance of speakers. This role of anthropological analysis corresponds to explaining the structured patterns of performance.¹

The examples offered in this section seem to be structured in the following ways:

- (1) Mutual accusation of improper religiosity for definition of communal or confessional groupings: Jafari, Sufi, Sunni, Ismaili, Alevi;
- (2) Definition of ritual cleanliness
 - (a) for prayer;
 - (b) for defining political groups (versus the infidel Levies);
 - (c) for social exclusion (the Codes of Omar).

In a sense (2c) is but a form of (1): a Zoroastrian tells of deliberately drinking water from the public barrel when he was recruited into the army; Muslim conscripts challenged him but the army officers supported his claim that he was an Iranian and entitled to the same water as other Iranian servicemen. The government is deliberately trying to establish such new social definitions. In the meantime, there are still water fountains in the cloth bazaar of Yazd (where most of the Jewish shops are) which say "Muslims Only," and the same sign is to be found in a number of barber shops; public baths have separate shower stalls for non-Muslims, and water reservoirs have separate entrances for non-Muslims.

¹ The position adopted here, of course, is that one constructs the rules of grammar through an ordering of observations of performance, and a consideration of competence (what natives discriminate as correct or proper as opposed to incorrect and improper performance). Theological guides such as Borujerdi *et al.* (n.d.) do not constitute a "grammar" but are themselves only relatively competent performances.

6.3.7. Honor and Modesty

Honor of any type everywhere is the object of social negotiations: " . . . honor felt becomes honor claimed, and honor claimed becomes honor paid" (Pitt-Rivers 1968: 503). Namus, that honor which men can lose through the misconduct of their women, has struck the attention of many observers of the Middle East. Among the Arabs, a woman's father and brother retain responsibility for her namus even after she marries; among the Black Sea Turks, however, when she marries this responsibility is her husband's (Meeker 1970). To some extent such differences may be reflections of differences in other kinds of property rights. An Awlad-e Ali woman of Egypt's Western Desert retains rights to food and shelter with her father and brother in exchange for giving up her share of inheritance and obeying their wishes; should she, and some do, not give up her inheritance or marry against their wishes, she sacrifices their protection (Mohsen 1967). Arab women who can inherit or control land (i.e., those who have no brothers, or widows of the same patrilineage as their husbands) are more controlled than others (Aswad 1967, Rosenfeld 1957, 1968, Cohen 1965: 122). Arab husbands and fathers often share responsibility for namus. Meeker sees namus as the idiom of identity of a kinship group: a group of men concerned about the namus of a group of women. Abner Cohen (1965, 1970) working with more historical data, shows how concern with namus and control of marriages among some Palestinians varies according to the economic basis of the kinship group (hamula), and this seems to find echoes elsewhere in the literature with reports of differential control of women between powerful or prestigious groups versus commoners, and with at least higher endogamy rates among the larger, more powerful, and more prestigious lineages (Rosenfeld 1957, Aswad 1967, Asad 1970, Bujra 1971, etc.).

In non-tribal (i.e., non-patrilineage organized) Iran with a bilateral, cognatic kinship system, concern with namus seems to be a good deal less than accounts of Arab lands indicate, but concern is not absent. Three recent films set the bounds of this concern:

- (a) In Nosratullah Karimi's Doroškeči there is a hilarious scene during the preparations for a circumcision. The women of the family and their female friends are in the courtyard of the house setting things up. Some of the menfolk enter sending the women scurrying

for their čadors. The camera follows one woman dashing up the stairs of the house, who in desperation to cover her hair lifts her skirt over her head exposing instead her knickers. Audiences find this minor dilemma immensely funny. Similar such minor dilemmas recur throughout the film. After the circumcision the family goes on a picnic. Picnics imply dancing, and some musicians are brought along. In order to enable the women to join the dancing, the musicians are made to turn their backs as they play, so that they cannot see. Again audiences find this amusing if not quite so funny as the first situation. Other incidents have to do with two budding romances, that between the widow Zina and her deceased sister's husband who had originally wanted to marry her rather than her sister, and between Zina's son and her sister's daughter. At one point Zina wants to show her brother-in-law something on her arm; he turns away saying, nakon, halal nistim (don't we are not mahram—see below). Zina's son, Morteza, takes her niece to the cinema, and when his younger brother inadvertently lets out where they have been, the girl's father says sarcastically to Morteza: xosh amadid (you were welcome). These and other such exchanges gain humor by the fact that while formally these people ought not to behave in such an intimate way, they in fact know each other very well and are currently living in the same house.

- (b) In Masoud Kimiai's Qaisar the conflict is explored between the traditional male duty to carry out vengeance in defense of his women, and the transference of this duty to the state judicial system. Qaisar's sister, Fatimeh, is a rape victim. She commits suicide. Her mother's brother tries to dissuade her brother Farman from attempting revenge on the grounds that killing only leads to more killing. Farman says it is a question of namus; he is killed by the two brothers of the rapist. The mother's brother tries to dissuade Qaisar from the same course. Qaisar sees no alternative but also recognizes the tragic consequences: becoming a murderer will cost him both his freedom and his fiancée. He kills the first brother and then goes to his fiancée to break their engagement, saying that it is not because he does not love her, but he has become unclean. He kills the second brother and tracks down the rapist. The police are on his trail by this time and part of the dramatic tension is whether he will be able to kill the rapist before the police catch him. The final fight scene occurs in a railroad yard just as the police arrive. Qaisar gets his quarry but is himself stabbed. The film is very well constructed with visual and musical references to Firdausi's Shahnameh carrying the theme of the necessity for heroic revenge. One might argue that the message of the film is the evil of xun-baha (blood-price), and indeed that is what middle class Iranians seem to mean when they say that the film describes life as it really exists among the lower classes of South Teheran; they identify, that is, with the mother's brother in the film. But in Abadan, for several weeks after the film was released, boys placed knives in their shoes in symbolic identification with Qaisar. "It

is the state's job to take care of such matters, but everyone approved of Qaisar's settling the score before the police took over," said one such youth.

- (c) This debate is carried one step forward in Sayyid Motalebi's Mihadgah-e Hashem. Here although the husband of the raped-and-slain woman defines the issue as one of namus, he is determined to take the rapist to the police alive. It is again a duty incumbent upon him, not the police: he reports the slaying to the police but suppresses the only identifying clues he has. But it is not incumbent upon him to exact a literal blood price. In this interpretation he is opposed by his brother-in-law and by his little boy; he is also opposed by the father and mother of the rapist and by the rapist's age-mates. In other words, he is doing what is legally correct but against social pressure from all sides. The debate is given an added psychological consideration: the rapist, a young boy, describes how it happened. The young woman at a picnic plays with her son at a shallow stream, and decides to join him in the water. No one seems to be around and she takes off her dress. No sooner done than the archetypical Iranian male appears: he advances, she retreats; he makes a pass, she resists. He takes off his belt and beats her. In his confession the boy says he had only meant to tease her but when she had clawed him so ferociously he had lost his head and beat her unmercifully. This acceptance of uncontrollable passion as extenuating the actions of a poor mortal is forcefully brought home as the slain woman's brother becomes enraged at the description and would have killed the boy on the spot had not the hero, her husband, stopped him and pointed out that his passion at the moment was not much different from what the boy was describing. This psychological consideration is a serious one for Iranians,¹ and is one the movie is not able to solve, ending instead with a somewhat facile device (see Appendix VI).

The issues defined by these three films are of three analytically distinct types:

- (1) Issues having to do with systems of justice. Here the basic question is the means of rectifying wrongs, especially when they can be formulated in terms of economic loss: the loss of labor, reproductive power and so on. A state judiciary with administrative and police backing has the means to develop a body of restitutive law as well as defining crimes against the commonweal. Without such a state system, codes of honor can provide an alternative means, especially where connected with definitions of revenge and compensation-paying groups. Where lineage organization is economically or politically central,

¹ Arabs have a period called the "boiling of the blood" immediately following a murder or rape during which the aggrieved party may take revenge without paying compensation or starting a feud. After this period (of a few days) the crime is subject to compensation negotiations, not revenge.

and therefore the control of women is also according to group decisions, the functional lineage may constitute such a compensation group. In order to spread the costs of such compensation, i.e., as insurance against the economic disaster of having to pay such compensation, large contractual units may be formed as compensation groups (I.M. Lewis 1961; Salim 1962).

- (2) Issues having to do with negotiations for and allocation of women. Here the question is the proper etiquette involved in courting women. Although marriagable women from among one's own kinfolk ought to observe the same formal rules as strangers, this may be difficult to maintain and lapses may be passed off with less concern because there are more channels of both communication and sanction than with strangers. That is, the application of rules of modesty constitute a means of communication of intention, as well as a means of assertion of status. See, for instance, Barbara Aswad's suggestive note on a Syrian-Turkish area: "A woman that marries into the lineage from a weaker group is called mukhaddara, referring to the fact that she had been kept in extreme seclusion, supposedly to the extent that no man has seen her except her father and brothers" (1967: 141). That is, a strong lineage will define its in-marrying women as mukhaddara, as well as try to insure that they do in fact behave properly.
- (3) Issues having to do with relations between the sexes. Here isawhere most of the ideological elaboration about the nature of men (rational except when aroused, easily aroused) and women (irrational, lust-arousing) occurs, and where perhaps most of the variability in behavior occurs.

These last two kinds of issues may be illustrated with the rules for veiling. People have various explanations as to why women should be veiled. Believers say it is to protect the modesty of women on the assumption that woman is a lust-arousing object to man, and should a man and a woman be left alone together intercourse will occur, an event which cannot be counted as the man's fault. Iconoclasts say that veiling stems from Mohammad, angered when an Arab offered to buy his youngest wife; from then on he had his women veiled that they not become objects of desire for other men. Veiling need not be done before men who are not potential marriage partners. Thus a man's wife, his sister, and his sister's daughter need not veil before him, but his wife's sister should. If, however, his son is present, then his sister's daughter should veil. In practice the severity with which the rule is followed varies. The terms used for relations where veiling and non-veiling are expected are harram and mahram, respectively. The former means

"forbidden" to be together without a ceremony that makes them mahram, which ceremony is usually marriage, but there is also a non-marital ceremony making persons of opposite sex mahram which might be performed, say, if a man hired a female servant.¹

Richard Antoun has made an admirable analysis of Middle Eastern modesty rules (1968b) from which, in summary, we can recapitulate the following points:

- (1) That Islamic law provides a logical framework for behavioral diversity in its categorization of acts required, recommended, permitted, disapproved, prohibited; and in its evaluation of acts in terms of degree of ethical merit (e.g., the fast of the stomach, of the tongue, of the heart).
- (2) That division of labor may militate towards different kinds of modesty observance: where village women are a necessary part of the labor force in the fields, in collecting firewood and water, etc., they cannot maintain the same seclusion as women of well-to-do urban folk.
- (3) That the organization of property rights may affect the utilization of endogamy and modesty, and that although marriage brings about a clear and definitive transfer of sexual rights, genetical rights and labor power from a woman's father to her husband, yet she may retain economic rights and inheritance rights in her father's household.
- (4) That harsh punishment (e.g., death) for transgression of modesty rules occurs only in the unusual absence of accepted solutions: prophelactic child betrothal, infibulation, cliterectomy, arranged marriage, term marriage; and post facto denial and suppression, elopment, marriage, divorce and remarriage, and legitimization of bastards.

The direction is pointed, even if the ethnography is not yet rich enough to test the hypothesis: that where the organization of property rights utilizes endogamy to a high degree (as in Abner Cohen's villages [1970]) modesty need be less pursued than where political organization depends more upon reputation than upon economic organization (where in Marx's sense "false consciousness" is more developed).

¹ Mahram is a negative of harram, but the true negative of mahram (محرم) is na-mahram (ناحرم); and the normal opposite of harram is halal.

6.3.8. Divination

Here is a clear field in which people adopt a Pascalian attitude: one knows that there are a lot of charletans and that the chances of a meaningful divination are dubious; yet the possibility of truth is sufficient at least to find out what diviners have to say. There are six professional diviners, five Muslims and one Zoroastrian, currently operating in Yazd, all of whom learned their skills in India or were taught by someone who had learned in India. Other people practice divination less formally. There are also one or two sidewalk fortune tellers. The man with the greatest reputation in the vicinity is a mullah in the town of Nain. A brief catalogue form of presentation will again be convenient: of prime interest are the falgir (diviner) whom we will call Hassan, the Nain mullah whom we will call Habibullah, the testing of the Tir-e Imam-e Abbas, the attitudes of practitioners, clients, and sceptics, and the techniques of divination.

- (a) Hassan was suprisingly open and friendly. An ancient little man of sixty-four, nearly blind, he had been born in Yazd, grew up as a baker in Rafsinjan, met a dervish in Kirman who encouraged him to become a falgir, but to learn it well in India. So he went to India where he worked for some Agha Khani Ismailis and ate better than in any other period of his life. But he decided they were not real Muslims and left them for a Sunni teacher with whom he soon also quarrelled. So he returned to Iran and worked for a while as a strong man. He gained some more occult knowledge from a man in Kirman. He became an opium addict and was once arrested while being an addict was still illegal (addicts are now licensed); the authorities were lenient because of his four wives and nine children, but he did some magic to revenge himself nonetheless: his captors were scattered from Yazd and one was even caused to kill his wife. Such magic is done by drawing pictures of the victims with swords in their hands so they may attack each other and a magic word is written between the figures; then the pictures are buried in a graveyard.

Hassan works with two dice sticks, locally called raml, or colloquially ramz, each consisting of four die strung side by side on a pin so that each has only four sides (:., .., .:, ::). He does not use the plate engraved with the zodiac and a magic square, locally called ostarlob (astrolobe) which, e.g., the Zoroastrian practitioner uses with the ramz; nor does he invoke the pari (fairies) as does the latter. Although he claims that his technique is fully explained in the many books of his library in Persian, Urdu, and Arabic, he admits to using some fairly simple rules of thumb:

e.g., when the two dice-sticks fall together, :: means bad or negative, while :: means good; :: has reference to movement, so that :: would mean to go ahead with a proposed trip, while :: would mean to wait.

A woman came to consult Hassan about an unidentified woman complaining of palpitations of the heart. Hassan asked the name of the afflicted and her mother's name. The ramz were thrown and a set speech was recited. Hassan asked if the afflicted woman had been pregnant and the child on the point of death but had survived. This was affirmed, and the information offered that another practitioner had been consulted which had led to a worsening of the condition. The cause of the palpitations was then diagnosed as fear of three people who wished harm to the afflicted, one of the three being a woman who was speaking ill of the afflicted woman to her husband. The woman affirmed that she had suspected as much but had thought only two people were involved. She then admitted that the afflicted woman was herself, and she was invited to sit next to Hassan. He took out a large knife which he held over her head while he recited a long text, near the end tapping her two knees and two shoulders with the knife. He then gave her various slips of paper with Qur'anic lines written on them: (i) seven small slips, one each to be eaten each of the next seven mornings with cold water; (ii) a larger piece with a magic square in whose sections were words of another Qur'anic verse to be soaked in rose water and the rose water so sanctified to be rubbed on the face and over the heart; (iii) a slip to be buried by the door; (iv) a rolled slip with a piece of cotton in the center to be put in the fire and the smoke to be inhaled so the smoke might reach the brain. Without encouragement, the woman said the business with the knife and recitations had already made her feel calmer. Hassan turned and said: you see, there is a story about a simple man who put his ear to the trunk of a tree, and when people asked him what he heard, he replied that a simple man with faith in God could simply understand nature and trees. So he too, Hassan, had no desire to deceive: his work was not of his own doing but God's. The woman then asked about a man. The ramz were thrown revealing that he was not at home (::), and when Hassan suggested he was in Kuwait, she concurred. She paid four tomans, but before leaving showed the pieces of paper she had been given by the other da'a nevis (literally, "writer of prayers"). Hassan dismissed the latter as ignorant, contrasting his "magic" squibbles with his own clear Qur'anic lines; he suggested she throw them into the jube, but she clung to them on the assumption that they might yet work.

Another customer was a Tafti who owned some gardens in Taft but who comes and goes on business to Bombay. He asked a series of questions for ramz throwing: should he accept the Muslim or the Zoroastrian as a partner, will the venture be profitable, will his son do better in school this year (he flunked last year: no the son will not do better because he does not study), and so on. Then Hassan wrote out some da'a to make the son study, to make the business prosper (this one was two magic squares each summing to thirty-eight

to be dipped in the water or tea of the partner), to make stomach pains go away, and several others.

- (b) Hassan, as said, is one of six such professional falgir. Another is also an opium addict; his daughter is a prostitute who having been thrown out by her husband now lives with her father. The techniques which he claims to know include minyatz-yebnatiz, apparently hypnotism (putting one to sleep so that the soul may be questioned or sent to various places), calling up the jinn with a mirror, and the astrology associated with astrolobes. He claims that the real ostad (master) of these techniques in town is yet a third practitioner. This man has a professionally decorated office, complete with metal desk on which sits a large astrolobe (the single plate described above), and book cases filled with books bearing such titles as "Rescue from Artificial Death," "Spirits" (arha), and "Mystery of Foods." The Zoroastrian practitioner has already been mentioned, an old man whose clients are similar to those of Hassan and include students anxious about exams. A sidewalk naxod falgir is a regular fixture along the main street. His technique is the simplest. He allows you to frame your question to yourself. His job is simply to separate into piles the twenty-one naxod (chick peas) randomly into three rows of three piles each which he then interprets in very general terms. My fal once came out as pictured: The top row is five for the five pure souls (Mohammad, Ali, Fatimeh, Hussein, Hassan); the second row represents a road and is a good omen for a trip; the third row represents the twelve imams. The general interpretation is whatever you are going to do is good: do it.

ILLUSTRATION 3

NAXOD FAL



- (c) The Nain mullah, Habibullah, is a much more intriguing personality. He denied at first having anything to do with ramz or da'a nevištan, but when it became obvious that I knew of his reputation, he took down his ramz sticks, some books, and there came into his eye a gleam, and a nervous excitement into his movements. There are two parts to his activity, he explained, the efficacious part being the writing out of prayers, the preliminary part, throwing the ramz, only being required when the customer is testing him and demands that he divine the problem as well as the cure. This procedure is simple: you mark down a line for each pair of dots and a dot for each single dot ($\cdot : \rightarrow \vdash$). Thus as there are two sticks one gets four houses, e.g., $\equiv \vdash \equiv \equiv$. From these one derives four more

houses by combining pairs of dots into lines, and so on until one gets sixteen houses, which then are rewritten in a second notation. He ran through this rapidly skipping steps, and then attempted to demonstrate on me, asking my name, and that of my mother, rolling the ramz and then asking a series of exploratory questions, pursuing those subjects which elicited favorable reactions (my work was not proceeding as fast as I wished, I did not know how long I should remain in Iran to finish my work) and dropping unfavorable ones (a male member of my father's family is an enemy, a fat female neighbor is in love with me); and then suggesting that he could with the ramz determine how long I should stay in Iran to complete my work in a way useful both to Iran and to America. If I agreed to abide by the ramz decision on time, he could write out a prayer to ensure success.

His stories of successful cures were primarily of madness and marital problems. He showed a white dress with a magic square and some writing on it which he has one of his patients wear periodically. She came to him as an insane young woman who had been to hospitals in Shiraz and Teheran, and who had visited various holy shrines all with negligible results. After a long series of visits to him, she is now happily married and has two children. Another cure is a woman who now is farming, so strong is she. The cause of much of this madness he analyzes as dwelling too much on one's problems. Childless people come to him and he is able through the ramz to tell which mate's fault it is and thus whether the customer should seek divorce and remarriage, or whether there is still hope for a child in the future. Another set of problems has to do with people who are afraid of sex. Reza asked him if he could believe a ramz he had taken a few days ago to determine whether his pregnant wife would deliver a boy or a girl. Habibullah said no, it is possible to tell how many children one will have, but not the sex. (The result of the ramz had been a girl.) Or Habibullah said he could also tell that someone from the age of nine to nineteen had been possessed by magic and so could not do his work properly, and he can write a prayer to rescue him.

- (d) Tir-e Imam-e Abbas consists of four arrows with metal tips with which one may detect a thief. Two people sit facing each other holding the metal ends in each hand, the other ends gently joined to the counterpart's arrows so that two wooden bars are formed. While Sureh Vay Sin is being read, an accused person places his right hand between the sticks. If he is the thief of the mentioned object the sticks will move of their own accord to pinch his hand; if he is innocent, the sticks will move further apart. The technique was tested by accusing a servant boy of stealing five tomans. One end was held by the old grandmother of the household and the other end by a girl; the result was that he had not stolen the five tomans. An engineer and a mechanic, being sceptical, wanted to test it for themselves. They first washed their hands, face and feet, and respectfully kissed the tir. A fake case of stolen keys was tried, but the result was indeterminate: the tir did not move. The two were accused of having

inadequate faith, and the grandmother took over the mechanic's end. The servant boy was again accused of stealing the five tomans. This time the tir found him guilty. So, with appeals to Hazrat-e Abbas, a third trial was made: again he was found guilty. And this time the company charged him in earnest. He became upset and eventually admitted it. The grandmother explained that even if the tir did not catch a thief, he would lose color, begin to twitch, and so on; in this case, it was clear the boy was probably a thief as all servants steal from their masters.

- (e) If experimentalism and belief characterize those who demonstrated the tir, scepticism is at least as common. In trying to find Hassan the first time, I asked directions from a man in Yazd's thieves' market. He gave the proper directions, but expressed amused scepticism at the whole business, saying that if these fellows could do what they promised, they should do so right off and not simply promise that it would be fulfilled in the future. But people will believe, and if something happens ten years later, they will credit the falgir. To stress his point he told two stories. The first was of a man taken from the water of the moat of Yazd by the king's men. (This is a well known tale, the attribution to Yazd being merely to heighten the story's immediacy.) He was brought into the king's presence and commanded to speak, who he was, what he did. He said nothing and so was put in prison. He continued to refuse to speak. So the king suggested that he be taken around the town and maybe he would see something which would bring back his speech. This was done, and when they came near Bazaar Khan, he laughed. Then later at a shoe maker's store he laughed when a customer demanded the shoe maker guarantee the shoes for three years. A third time he laughed when they passed a fortune teller. When he was returned to the king's presence, the king said if he told why he laughed in those three places he would be set free. So the man said that the first time had been because he saw some garlic on the ground while cucumbers were placed above on a shelf: it was the garlic which is good for seventy-two diseases which was just tossed on the ground, whereas ordinary cucumbers were placed above. He had laughed at the request for a three year guarantee because the buyer would die the following day. And he had laughed at the falgir because he did not know that in the ground beneath him were buried seven jars of gold. The meaning of the story, he spelled out, was the chicanery of fortune tellers. The second story was a Shah Abbas story: Shah Abbas dressed up as a dervish as was his custom to go about and find out what was going on in his realm. He came to a house where there were three thieves who invited him to join them. They decided to rob the king's treasures that night, and each boasted of his skills. One said that he never forgot a face; the next that he could understand the language of dogs; the third that when he looked at a lock it would open. Shah Abbas said: when I rub my left mustache the country falls into ruin, when I rub my right mustache the country develops. So they went to rob the king. As they came to the palace, a dog barked and he-who-understood-dog-talk reported that the dog had said the

owner of the palace was among them. The others all laughed at this nonsense. They broke in and at the safe, he-who-could-open-locks looked and it opened. So they took the valuables. Shah Abbas soon left them and sent his police to arrest them. When they arrived, he-who-never-forgot-a-face recognized him and repeated the king's boast. Shah Abbas said they could keep their loot if they promised never to rob again, which they did. The meaning of this story is that those who are in power can declare a man guilty or innocent irrespective of the merits of the case. The two stories form a contrastive pair.

A teacher regards all the various techniques of divination as psychology. Says he, he uses a form of lots to divine thieves. Once for instance a boy had stolen something. So he went out and got some straw and said they would draw, and the boy who got the longest straw would be the thief. He handed out the straws and left the room for a moment. All the straws had been of equal length. When he returned, one boy's straw was shorter than the others: the thief had tried to insure that he would not have the longest straw.

Another sceptic tells that when he was a soldier in Gilan he had rented two rooms. A neighbor was a man and his wife who did not get along, to the point that the wife wanted a divorce but the husband did not grant it. The wife made the rounds of the various da'a nevisan but without result. One day in jest, the soldier told the landlord he was a da'a nevis and the woman should come to him. The landlord took it seriously and sent her to him. He told her first to go and buy a heart of lamb and a heart of cow. While she went to do this, he worried about what to do next, but eventually decided to make use of his old school atlas. When she returned, he asked her to point to a spot on a map. He copied something out from the map which he told her to keep with her, and another bit to put in water and give her husband, and within three days they would separate. Much to his surprise, they did separate within three days, and so he gained a reputation, and he was besieged with women, whom he had to turn away.

- (f) Of the various divination techniques, the ramz and da'a, and naxod falgiri have been described. The da'a are usually written in abjad code with numbers standing for letters. Thus a telesm (talisman) given in the book Kanz al-Hussein (one of Hassan's books) for friendship is taken from Sureh Ya Sin and looks like this:

ILLUSTRATION 4

ABJAD TALISMAN

	786	
274	279	274
275	272	271
270	277	272

The 786 placed at the top of all telesm in this book stands for bismillah rahman-e rahim. Each of the letters of the alphabet are associated with a different spirit as well. Telesm may be made of magic squares or patterns formed out of the letters of a phrase such as bismillah rahman-e rahim. Another book, in Urdu, the Naqše Suleiman by Maulana Ashraf Ali Sahab Laxnavi gives many such magic squares and instructions for repetition of various Qur'anic verses, e.g., if one bathes, wears clean clothes, sits at a clean place and reads the Ayatul Qursi (God is omniscient, omnipotent . . .) and the Sureh Axlas 582 times on Sunday, 618 times on Monday, 242 times on Tuesday, 236 times on Wednesday, 1073 times on Thursday, 807 times on Friday, and 1304 times on Saturday one will have his desires fulfilled. The Sureh Ale Imran repeated 13 times a day will cancel debts. And so on. Some of the instructions involve complicated dieting and fasting sequences. Some of the symbols have mystic significance.

More common techniques are the ordinary estehareh and fal of Hafez. The latter is to take a book of Hafez' poetry and to open it at random and read the verse on the opened page, and interpret it according to what it seems to say about the future. Estehareh has to do with knowing whether a particular proposed action will be good or bad: one closes the eyes and opens the Qur'an; the beginning of the surah located at the top of the right hand page is read.

For other techniques see the brief description in Rehatsek (1889) of the twenty Muslim occult sciences.

6.3.9. Annual Religious Cycle.

The Annual Religious Cycle is a periodic-cyclical framework of dramatic time which encompasses many of the paradigmatic sets described above. It can be seen as structured around the story of Karbala. It elevates the games of purity to community-wide centrality for particular mahalleh whenever a rosa is held, for the public in general on birth and death days of the Imams when the streets and bazaars are decorated, and for the whole society for extended periods during the months of Ramazan and Moharram. It also includes games of obscenity (e.g., Id-e Omar).

The annual religious cycle is easily tabulated (Table 9) and one can see from it that the foci are the small number of eight pure souls who represent the identity of the Isnā 'Ashari: minor stress is put on Mohammad and Fatimeh who are common objects of respect to all Muslims; primary stress is placed on Ali and Hussein who represent the Shiite party; and secondary stress on Hassan, Imam Jafar (against the claims of the "Sevener Shiites" such as the Ismailis), Imam Reza, and the Twelfth Imam. This observation

TABLE 9
IRANIAN RITUAL CALENDAR

Islamic Month	Ritual Dates
Moharram	10th - Death of Hussein
Saffar	20th - <u>Arba</u> : fortieth day after the death of Hussein 27th - Death of Imam Reza 28th - Death of Imam Hassan 29th - Death of Mohammad
Rabi I	17th - Birth of Mohammad
Rabi II	
Jamad I	13th - Death of Fatimeh
Jamad II	20th - Birth of Fatimeh
Rajab	13th - Birth of Ali 27th - Id-e Mab'as: anniversary of Mohammad's selection as Prophet
Sha'ban	3rd - Birth of Hussein 15th - Birth of the Twelfth Imam
Ramazan	19th - Ali is wounded 21st - Ali's death 23rd - <u>Sab kadr</u> 27th - Ali's assassin was executed
Shavval	1st - Id-e Fitr: fast of Ramazan is broken Death of Imam Jafar Sadeq
Zilqada	11th - Birth of Imam Reza
Zilhajja	9-10th - Id-e Omar 10th - Id-e Qorban: <u>hajjis</u> sacrifice in Mecca 18th - Id-e Qadir: Ali became Caliph

gain significance when one realizes that the Islamic calendar has undergone changes analogous to those noted above for the Zoroastrian calendar: in particular there has been a substitution of attribution of days to these eight pure souls which previously had other meanings. We need not go into the early attempts to coordinate through intercalary months the solar and lunar calendars, except to note that with the abandonment of this attempt (Sureh 9), the calendar of the Arabs began to lose its seasonal character.

The Arab year had begun in autumn, as the names of the first six months indicate (the first of the two Safars now called Moharram); Ramadan referred to the heat of the summer. It has been suggested that the fast of Ramazan was modelled on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), being atonement and rededication on the anniversary of the revelation of the Qur'an, just as Yom Kippur is the anniversary of the giving of the second tablets to Moses (Gibb and Kramers 1965: 508). The Qur'an mentions the parallel (in Sureh Boga're or "The Cow") and it is born out by several similarities. According to Jewish tradition, the world was created on Rosh Hashannah which begins the ten day penance period. Similar associations of creation apply to the fifteenth of Sha'ban, the month preceding Ramazan: that on the night of the fifteenth the tree of life on whose leaves the names of the living are written is shaken and the leaves which fall are those who will die in the coming year. But for the present day Iran, the fifteenth Sha'ban is the birthday of the Twelfth Imam. The last ten days of Ramazan are days of i'tikāf, of retreat into prayer. Old congregational mosques such as at Nain and, albeit less well separated, Yazd have a special place for such prayer (i'tikāf-gah). As on the fast of Yom Kippur, this marks the period of revelation: in Muslim tradition the exact night of the giving of the Qur'an (lailat al-kadr) is not known, but it is an odd numbered night—i.e., the nineteenth, twenty-first, twenty-third, or twenty-seventh, all of which are called in Iran šab-e kadr—and it is said, by Yazdis at least, that since the Qur'an describes prayer on this night as worth more than one thousand months of prayer, were the night known, people would only pray one night a year. Islamic tradition assigns the sixth of Ramazan as the date of Imam Hussein's birthday, the seventeenth as the Battle of Badr, the nineteenth as the day of the occupation of Mecca, the twenty-first as the day both of Ali's death and that of Imam Reza, the twenty-second as the birthday of Ali, and the twenty-seventh as the night of revelation (ibid.). A glance at the Iranian calendar shows a slightly different meaning: Imam Reza died on 27 Saffar, the events of Mohammad's career are down-played and the days of i'tikāf are dedicated to the memory of Ali conjoined with the gift of revelation—the nineteenth is when Ali was wounded, the twenty-first when Ali died, and on the twenty-seventh Ali's assassin, Ibn Muljan, was executed. The twenty-seventh

is also a night to trick-or-treat called Dust Ya Ali Dust, and the twenty-ninth is royat-e halal, the night one looks for the new moon to break the fast. The first day of Shavval is Id-e Fitr, a day of feasting, but in Iran also the death memorial of Imam Jafar. The birthday of Hussein is removed from Ramazan to the third of Sha'ban.

We shall return to Ramazan, but quickly to finish the Iranian ritual cycle, the month of the haj is traditionally a celebration par excellence of the career of Mohammad, again transformed by Iranians into a preliminary to the passionate memorial of the Shiite martyrdom at Karbala. The tenth of Zilhajja is Id-e Qorban, the day when the pilgrims in Mecca make a sacrifice. A few hajjis in Iran may also make a sacrifice, but falling at the same time is Id-e Omar, the celebration of the slaying of the usurper caliph and conqueror of Iran. On the eighteenth is the celebration of the naming of Ali to the Caliphate. The first ten days of Moharram commemorate the events at Karbala up to the death of Hussein, followed by forty days mourning to the arba (fortieth) on the twentieth of Saffar, followed in quick succession at the end of the month by the deaths of Imam Reza, Imam Hassan, and the Prophet Mohammad.

The ritual year has become, remarkably, a celebration of Karbala. By filling in some of the popular commentary on the events perhaps we can convey how Karbala becomes also a paradigm of life and history in general.

We begin with Ramazan. The routine of fasting is well known: during the daylight hours no food or drink is to be ingested. The true fast is called imsak, that is, abstaining from any breaking of the fast: food, drink, sex, vomiting, putting the head under water, lustful thoughts, etc.¹ During that period each day one of the thirty parts (juz) of the Qur'an should be read in xatm groups, i.e., each person in the group reads a few lines. The day before Ramazan (piš baz) is a day of voluntary (mostahab) fasting. But each day of Ramazan is obligatory (vajeb) fasting, dispensations being given only for travellers, the sick and so on. Cynics say almost anyone can think up a reason for being excused, but for each day missed without reason,

¹ Lying also breaks the fast. To avoid this, rosaxonds who must translate sentences of the Qur'an into Persian preface their translations with words to the effect: approximately it says . . .

sixty-one days fast must be made up; ignoring the whole month without reason sets one back eighteen hundred days.¹ At dusk the fast is broken (eftar kardan); if this is done in a mosque, traditionally a date, now candy is passed around for quick energy, and a special da'a is sung before all go home for a meal. It is considered meritorious (savab dare) to invite others to share this meal. One then sleeps and wakes early in the pre-dawn (sahar). This is a good time for voluntary singing of monajot (free form praise of God) and the da'a sahar (a special prayer). A meal is eaten (sahari), and at the first sign of dawn the moazzen's call to prayer signals the beginning of the fast. One goes to the mosque for prayer after which one may return home to sleep. But as a Pakistani Sunni says, this is not the meaning of Ramazan: one should not sleep or sit around feigning hunger-caused lethargy. One should work and work hard. The fasting plus continuing one's normal work is a statement of dedication. He describes the routine in terms of deliberate discipline:

One is supposed to get up for the pre-dawn meal in time to eat and say the morning prayers which must be finished by the break of dawn. This is the time of resolution of taking upon oneself a fast during the coming day. Two extra lines are added to the morning call to prayer which say that prayer is better than sleep. Twenty superogatory rakat are added to the namaz during Ramazan, and a few other changes are made, e.g., the watar are said in congregation rather than individually as is usual. Praying in mosques is done in straight rows symbolic of discipline. In the morning one comes to the mosque and does two individual rakat (sunnat) and then waits to do two rakat in congregation (fars). Voluntary prayers for the sick and poor follow. One comes to the mosque again for midday prayers (after the sun has passed its zenith), afternoon prayers (before the sun begins to set), evening prayers (when the sun sets) and night prayers. Between the last two the fast is broken. Between the afternoon and evening prayers is a period of relaxation, for visiting friends or being with one's family. After night prayers one should sleep so one can get up for morning prayers.

Shiah do things slightly differently. The five times of prayer are grouped into three: morning, afternoon, night. What is important is that seventeen

¹ Feeding the poor, freeing a slave, and fasting for sixty-one days are kafaneh (punishments) for breaking the rules of Ramazan. For visiting a prostitute during Ramazan one should do all three. For missing a fast, one may feed a needy person.

rakat be recited. Sunni recite more daily rakat, but Shiah say that only seventeen are obligatory and the rest are voluntary. During Ramazan a special da'a is added after each namaz and there is a short da'a for each day of the month. Shiah are also less concerned to differentiate rakat into sunnat, fars, nafal, and watar.¹ There is also apparently a difference of opinion within both groups over the amount of distance one may travel without ruining one's fast: some say the fast is not ruined at all by travel, others insist that to travel is to break the fast. Clearly a possible justification for the latter opinion is that travel removes one from the self-conscious routine of discipline. But at some point these are all only matters of form, or perhaps this is an Iranian point of view--Iranians justify several other less stringent orthopraxis such as going to the Congregational Mosque for Friday noon prayer as being things which are required only when there is an Imam in the world--the theme of discipline, moral duties, and so on, emerges strongly also in Antoun's description of Ramazan among Sunni Muslims in Jordan (1968). Moral duties are important to Iranians as well, but they are carried in more diffuse parable form.

As noted above, the nights of the nineteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-third are of particular importance. On these nights one does not sleep, but spends the night in the mosque where the entire Qur'an is read in xatm, the da'a Joshan Kabir is read (the 1001 names of God in units of ten with congregational response), rosas are given, Sureh Enah or other ayeh are repeated several hundred times (count being kept on the tasbi or prayer beads), "God curse the murderers of Ali" (Allaho malan qatalata Amir ul Momenin) is repeated seven hundred or a thousand times, money is collected for the poor, namaz for three šaban-e ruz (three day-and-night

¹ Sunnat are actions in emulation of actions of the Prophet, thus in regard to prayer those rakat which are said first individually. Fars are obligatory commands of God, in regard to prayer then, the rakat said in congregation, if possible following the sunnat. Nafal are actions which the Prophet did occasionally and for which merit accrues if the believer does likewise, but no demerit if he does not. Watar are the concluding prayers in the night prayer asking forgiveness for sins committed during the day.

periods) are recited, i.e., three times seventeen rakat, these being make-up prayers for any which may have been missed during the year. Prayers, remember, on the Šab-e qadr are worth more than a thousand months of prayer. The three nights have also to do with Ali, the story of whose death is a popular subject of rosas (see Appendix III) and a contrast is often made with the death of Omar. Omar when struck by his assassin, Firuz, cried, "Grab that magian who has killed me!" Ali when struck by his assassin cried, "Oh God, most fortunate am I." The contrast is between one who saw death as the end, and one who saw it as the beginning. The story of Omar, Firuz and Ali is much discussed by Yazdis as a parable of truth versus justice:

Firuz was an Iranian artisan, a slave of an Arab who unfairly confiscated all his wages. Firuz appealed to Omar, introducing himself as a maker of many things. Omar asked what he could make for him, and Firuz replied, a mill turned by the wind. Seeing that Omar would give him no relief, Firuz made a two bladed dagger with the handle in the middle, and with this he killed Omar. When he had done this, he came running out. Ali happened to be sitting outside, and as Firuz ran past, he rose and changed his seat. When pursuers came to Ali, they asked if he had seen Firuz. Ali replied, "As long as I have been sitting in this seat, I did not see him." Having provided a temporary alibi for Firuz, Ali then advised Firuz to return to Iran and quickly take a wife. With a special prayer Ali transported Firuz to Kashan, a journey of several months. There he was welcomed and married. When the pursuers came to Kashan several months later inquiring about a certain Firuz from Iraq, they were told that there was such a man, but he had come several months ago and had married then, so it could not have been him. Firuz' windmill, then, was the wind-borne news caused by his double-bladed slaying of Omar which spread from east to west.

The moral theme is that whatever is done for the good of society is a higher value than absolute truth regardless of consequences, often expressed in the words of Saadi: dorough-e maslahat amiz behtar az rasti fetnhangiz (a well-intentioned and calming lie is better than a truth which brings calamity). Ali is the paragon of such justice:

When Ali was struck by Ibn Muljan, his assassin, on the nineteenth of Ramazan, moazzens went to announce the news from the roof-tops. A man awakened by the tumult went into the street and saw a man with his cloak over his head running and a sword swinging underneath. He challenged the man: who are you? The man replied he was in a hurry. He challenged again: did you hear that Ali is slain? The man replied he had more important things to do. To this the man jestingly replied: then of course it must be you who killed Ali. The man admitted killing Ali. At that moment the wind lifted his cloak revealing his bloody

sword. They began to wrestle and the assassin was brought before Ali. Ali asked, "Was I a bad Imam to you?" Ibn Muljan was ashamed and replied, "I was created for hell. Can anyone change my fate that I should go to heaven?" Ali ordered him detained but comforted him: "If I recover, I will free you." When Ali's sons brought him food, he ordered Ibn Muljan fed first. As he died, he ordered that Ibn Muljan be executed with one blow only, for he had been struck only one blow, and that Ibn Muljan's family not be molested.

This gentleness and justice is contrasted with the means used by Omar, i.e., force, as proof that Omar knew nothing of true Islam. It is interesting that the one night of irreverent revelry during Ramazan is the night of the twenty-seventh, the night of the death of Ibn Muljan, a pattern even more pronounced at the celebration of Omar's death.

On the night of the twenty-seventh, young boys and poor persons may put on čadors and knock on doors calling out: dust ya Ali dust. Children and poor persons are given sweets or money. But it is also a time for tricks: a rich man might dress up in a čador and go to the house of a relative; when the latter recognizes him he might go up to the roof and throw water on him. Solicitation may be done in rhyme:

<u>In xane čeqad gašange,</u>	How beautiful is this house,
<u>Hamas sarbat o gande,</u>	All of sugar and sweet drink,
<u>Imam Hussein dareš nabande.</u>	May Imam Hussein not close the door.

If the owner replies with insults, the solicitor may reply in kind:

<u>Niš kaš taxte pus(t)</u>	Go eat the skin of an animal
<u>Bexor goh-e xoruš</u>	Eat rooster shit.

If the owner does not reply, one may try:

<u>Ya arde be-tasam kon, ya bekoš</u>	Either put <u>arde</u> (a sweet from Ardekan)
<u>o xalasang kon.</u>	in my bowl or kill me and rescue me.

Or:

<u>Allah karim, haft nafarim</u>	We dear to God are seven,
<u>Midi ya berim?</u>	Will you give or shall we go?

On this night young unmarried girls may also sit in the alleys sewing and begging (pul-e šab-e bist-o-haftom).

Id-e Omar is a much more impressive affair which used to cause fights between Sunni and Shiah populations. The celebration is not fast going out of style. For about a week village women make an effigy of Omar of cloth, wood and straw. This effigy is either impaled on a pole or undignifiedly set on a donkey facing the tail. Sadeq Chubak in his short

story Omar Košťan describes the making of an unforgettable Omar in Bushire,¹ four gaz tall (a Yazdi gaz or zare = 104 cm.) which they wanted to burn at the door of a Sunni mosque:

They put two rolls of heavy woven Javanese cloth together and cutting out head and hands and feet made the form which they filled tightly with straw and stuffing and as many firecrackers as they could and sewed it up well. The youths made him a round head with stuffing and sacking. Then on his face they put sheepskin, cutting out places in the wool for his eyes, mouth, and nose, so that his whole face including even his forehead was woolly. For eyes they gave him two bowls full of explosives, and they colored around his eyelids with red lead (saranj), and in place of a nose they put the charcoal holder of a water pipe filled with feces. And for his mouth they put a donkey bag lining it in place of teeth with dried donkey turds and in each of these they stuck a firecracker. Then everyone who had used cloth . . . brought them . . . and from this pile of discards fashioned a gabba the size of Omar so that in each leg two men could hide. Now how many fireworks and explosives they put under this clothing only God knows. Finally for his head they made a turban of a number of old Yazdi čador šab and wound it around his head on which they made flower and other designs with donkey turds and finally ten persons got together and lifted Omar up from the ground and rested him against a wall so that the people could see what an amazing ghost (hayulah—a large white ghost which cries "hoo") they had created (Chubak 1966: 103-4).

In Chubak's story there is competition among the street boys (zegerd in Bushiri, or daš, the inverse of pahlavan, i.e., one who without moral strength postures and bullies) of four mahallehs to create the most impressive and frightening Omar at a time when the town was governed by a fearful Ottoman Turk (a Sunni). In Yazdi villages where the celebration was maintained until a few years ago, the makings and competition may have been less complex, but once made the effigy was taken around from house to house. At each house some poems or songs would be chanted and the householder would give something, e.g., some kerosene with which at the end the effigy would be burned. Or sometimes the effigy would be cut up and scattered instead. Occasionally a man with blackened face would stand in for Omar. The poems went like this:

Omar ke dar hamman raft
Bi long-o bi tambun raft

Omar when he went to the baths
Went without loin cloth or pants

¹ Both Bushire and Bandar Abbas used to experience frequent fights on Id-e Omar.

Osta(d) hamumi dareš kerd
Cub-e gafun kuneš kerd

The hamam keeper threw him out
And shoved a gafun (balance stick of
a scale) up his ass

Tu darvaza dareš kerd
Savar xar-e garas kerd
Masti zadim be gordas
Be rid tu gur-e mordaš.

He threw him out the gate of town
And set him upon a sick ass
And we threw vetch upon him
Shit upon his grave.

Omar ke riš-eš anieh
Dalun-e kuneš sain kanieh.

Omar whose beard is full of shit
Shoot your sling shot into his ass.

Omar Omar laan-e Omar
Sag be rieh riš-e Omar
Pa dandun-e piš-e Omar
Id-e Omar ast peste beškan

Omar, Omar, curses upon Omar,
Dog shit on his beard
Stomp on his front teeth
It is the holiday of Omar, break
pistachios¹

Az sag badtar ast peste beškan

He is worse than a dog, break pistachios.

Ey Omar sabr nakardi ta biayad
madaret

Oh Omar you did not wait for your mother

Sar-e xar ta dom-e xar konj-e
sulax-e madaret.

An ass from head to tail up your mother's
cunt.

Doxtar-e zar-e Omar
Rid be mošte pedar
Goft aya sag pedar
Vagte henna bastan ast.

Poor daughter of Omar
Shit in the palm of her father
Oh son of a bitch, cried she
It is time to bind on henna.²

A similar technique of community collection is used for Ashura (the tenth of Moharram) when an aš-e Imam Hussein is cooked. A cross of wood (šadde, alam) is made and decorated with lamps and scarves so it becomes very heavy. A strong pahlavan is selected to carry it. If he drops it, he must donate a sheep for the aš (stew). He carries it from house to house where the lines are sung:

Ešq-e Hussein o Abbas, ye(k) tikke
hizom darindaz

For the love of Hussein and Abbas,
give a piece of firewood.

Agar hizom nadari, panabodiyok
darandaz.

If you have no wood, give a
panabodi (small coin).

Panabodiyok nadari, sanariyok
darandaz.

If you have no panabodi, give a
sannar (a small coin).

Each household contributes something towards the community stew, stew which should include meat. Again a similar technique is used when a hunter kills

¹ Breaking of pistachios is poetic for snapping the fingers in joy: it is the same sound.

² It is being urged that shit be rubbed in the beard of Omar just as henna is put on the beards of celebrants.

a leopard or wolf. He goes to each house which has sheep and holding the stuffed skin sings:

Kalle gorgi omade
Tut beriz bareš
Ya mipare baret.

Wolf head has come
Give some dried mulberries for him
Else he will jump you.

The amount given should vary with the number of sheep owned and thus spared a predator.

Lest an overly aggressive impression be left of Id-e Omar, one ought to cite the two favorite rosas for that day. One is for the rosaxond to begin by saying that burning in effigy and slandering Omar is not right, for you people may be worse than Omar: you lie, you fornicate, you sin sins which perhaps he never did. Omar at times was just and did good things. Omar's sin was only that he wanted so badly to be Caliph and in pursuing that goal, he stomped on the truth of Ali (haq-e Ali zir-e pa kard). A Yazdi to whom I put the question, "Why of the three Caliphs before Ali is Omar singled out for abuse by Shiites?" replied that there were at least five reasons: (1) most of Iran was conquered during his rule; (2) he wanted to be Caliph whereas Abu Bakr is credited with humbleness and saying, "Why do you ask me, ask Ali," but the people replied, "No, you are the oldest of the clan;" (3) Omar treated the princess of Persia, Shahbanu, dishonorably, wanting to sell her as a slave (the mother of the fourth Imam); (4) Omar had the priceless carpets of the Apadana cut up (according to the story, he sent a piece to Ali, who cried at the sight, and Omar, suprised, asked why he cried, to which Ali replied, "Because you are so crazy [amaq] and unconcerned with art that you cut up these priceless treasures just for their gold fibres!"); (5) Omar ruled by force as opposed to the appointees of Ali, like Salman Farsi whom Ali appointed as governor of Khuzistan, and who when he arrived refused to accept the pompous accomodations prepared by the people but rented as the gubernatorial accomodations half a shoemaker's shop. The second favorite rosa for Id-e Omar is about the answering of prayers: there is a hadith that he whom God loves most must wait longest for an answer to a prayer. Why? Because when an evil person lifts his head in prayer, the malek and fereste (archangels and angels) urge God to answer quickly that he may put his head down. When a good person lifts his head in prayer, they urge God to take his

time that they may enjoy viewing the face. There is then a goriz to the rosa of Fatimeh wherein it is told that Omar once opened a door striking the side of Fatimeh and hurting her, at which she cursed him. Eighteen years later he died: it took eighteen years for her request to be answered.

Ramazan ends with the Id-e Fitr. The correct time for stopping the fast is important as it is harram to fast on the Id or on the first few days of Shawwal. Borujerdi gives five criteria for deciding that the new moon has been sighted. Believers usually wait until a religious leader gives the call: Allah o Akbar, Allah o Akbar, va illahlehamd. It is said that in Yazd at the time of Ayatollah Haideri, once only two men sighted the moon, a Zoroastrian and a Muslim. They were summoned and their descriptions of the position of the moon matched. The Zoroastrian was then asked what color his hat was. He said nothing, but took it off, looked at it, and only then reported its color. Thus people knew him to be trustworthy: had he responded without checking they would have been less certain. In the morning after the sighting of the moon, all Muslims are to gather behind the Imam for prayer. As the Imam is withdrawn from the world, the namaz-e Id-e Fitr may be done in smaller groups. In Yazd, Ayatollah Saduqi leads his followers out of town into the desert at the north end of Khiaban-e Pahlavi for the prayer. (Already in Qajar times Yazd's musallah was too small to hold the crowd on this occasion.) The special namaz consists of two rakat. Normally the gonut (position of palms facing heaven) is done only in the second rakat but here the gonut is done five times in the first rakat and four in the second with a special da'a: "Oh God, I pray of you today on the Id-e Fitr of Muslims, sacred to Mohammad and his family, first to bring peace to Mohammad and his family, and then that I be kept in the ways of goodness which Mohammad followed and kept out of the evils which Mohammad avoided. . . ." After this people embrace and kiss. This is the traditional time to give the charity to the poor (zakat-e fitr) that they too may enjoy festive food on the Id. This charity is an obligatory one, an amount of about three tomans for each member of the household, counted as all nun-xordi (bread eaters) in the house during Ramazan including guests. In practice people give such charity informally or through collections at the mosques.

We turn briefly and finally to Moharram. The first ten days are days of rosa, dasteh, and passion plays. It is usual each evening for neighborhood mosques to begin with a series of rosas and then led by lines of dasteh groups to go to a central mosque, usually the Masjid-e Jome. (A similar procession is held in Yazd on the thirteenth of Ramazan to the Masjid-e Mullah Ismail behind Meidan-e Khan.) More rosas are held there. During the days rosas are held in huseineyas, often covered with colorful tents decorated with green and black flags and Isfahani printed cloth. These are also the sites of the passion plays which recreate the events of Karbala and other stories which have been built into the cycle such as those of Shahbanu cited in Chapter V, of the Jewess who converts to Islam, of Abraham who is shown that the sacrifice asked of him is little compared to what will be asked of Hussein's family, etc. Collections of these plays may be found in Chodzko (1878), Pelley (1879), and Monchi-Zadeh (1967). Descriptions of the settings can be found in both the last and in Forugh (n.d.) as well as in some of the travellers' accounts. Evidence of such plays is lacking before the sixteenth century and it seems thus to be a Safavid creation. It was a sphere for creativity both on the court and village level. Monchi-Zadeh remarks that even a piece of the Aida Overture which struck Persian ears as sad was assimilated to the military decorations and martial music (1967: 26). He also describes the audience participation in the words, "Das Publikum weint und freut sich . . ." (The audience cries and enjoys itself). Yazdis still today see no contradiction between enjoying rosas and passion plays, and crying and mourning their meaning. Indeed boys still recall gleefully (what I suspect was a set of planned practical jokes) that a certain actor playing Hussein in Pusht-e Bagh, where many of the better taziehs used to be held, defecated during one of the plays in a mosque, so little time did he have between a long series of performances. The following year he played the head of Hussein brought to Yezid on a plate; the metal plate around his neck grew so hot in the desert sun that he begged for water to be poured on him. The other actors, thinking he was merely playing the part of a captive, hit him on the head at which he let out a string of curses. The crowd laughed.

Around the fifth of Moharram people begin to decorate the naxl, a huge tear-shaped wooden structure representing the casket in which Hussein's body was carried. It is draped in black cloth on which are put standards (šaddeh) of wood, iron, and cloth, large mirrors (symbols of purity), etc. On the afternoon of Ashura several hundred men lift the naxl with one or more axonds on top keeping time with cymbals and reciting poems, and to the chant of "Hussein, Hussein, Hussein" they carry the naxl some five hundred steps back and forth three times in penance for the unkindness of the people of Kufa who abandoned Hussein. In 1936 Reza Shah outlawed the carrying of the naxl, but it is still done in Mehriz and Zarch. Preceding this event of strength is a parade of floats, e.g., in Zarch 1970 it began with

Shemr (a general of Yezid) dressed in red tying up and leading away two young boys dressed in green (boys of Islam). Then a flock of black-clad children ran after a black-cloaked man with a white Arab headcloth, all clapping their hands to their heads in grief, chanting and running, kneeling and running on; they converged around a tent which first turned black (from a fire lighted inside) and then burst into flame. Dasteh groups of young men followed. Then there was a procession of decorated camels and horses carrying Yezid, Ibn Saad, Shemr, and the body of Hussein (a bloodied corpse carried across a horse). This was followed by a series of floats. A man in white (representing the Christian who tried to intervene with Yezid on behalf of Hussein) held the head of Hussein and alternatively polished it with a rag and clapped his hand to his thigh and mouth in a gesture of disbelieving grief. He came around a second time with binoculars looking off to see Hussein and with a camera which he pointed at the crowd (the Iranian view of a European). A third time he came around with two heads in a pan. Then came a man in green with a cup trying to get water (Abbas). Next came a float merely of a large pan of water (reference to the thirst of Hussein and his family, and the inhumanity of Yezid in disallowing them to quench their thirst).¹

¹ One of the more powerful and popular rosas is built around this. It is called dars-e javanmardi (lesson of generosity). Sekineh, the daughter of Hussein, asked her amu (FB) Abul Fazl to bring water for the thirsty family. He went to do this and when he came to the water he was overpowered by a desire to drink first for he also was thirsty, but he resisted the impulse, thinking that this was not the human thing to do, he must first take water to the others. As he returned with the water skin (mašk, xik) over his right arm, a soldier slashed the arm with a sword. He shifted the xik to his left arm but another soldier injured that as well. So he caught the skin with his teeth, but yet another soldier shot an arrow into it so the water ran onto the

Another float depicted Hussein's bloodied corpse, live pigeons feeding on him, and a lion mourning (either the lion of Iran or the mythical lion which at the news of impending disaster ran from India to Karbala but arrived too late to aid Hussein). This float was followed by a gang of men in white blood-stained dress and faces clapping their hands to their heads. After the carrying of the naxl, the axund and people raised their hands and prayed. Then they dispersed.

In the village of Dareh until a few years ago the traditional floats included first a forty year old man in green turban (Hussein), a thirteen year old boy (Qassem ibn Hassan), and eighteen year old boy in torn clothing (Ali ibn Hassan Sajad),¹ and then:

(1) The bazaar Sham where Hussein had come with the baby Ali Asghar (his six month old son). (2) The bridal chamber of Qassem, son of Hassan, the second Imam, and son-in-law of Hussein: Qassem married the daughter of Hussein, represented by a boy in a čador, in Karbala. (3) The bread oven of the wife of Xoli, a supporter of Yezid, represented by a boy in a čador, who became a devotee of Hussein and who one night saw a light in her bread over and found the luminous head of Hussein: she wipes his

ground. The soldiers encircled him and shot him full of arrows until he was dead.

¹ There is a special long rosa devoted to Ali ibn Hassan Sajad called xotbe, which goes as follows. When Yezid had those of Hussein's family who had not been slain brought to Sham (Kufa), Yezid ordered a speaker to go on the membar to abuse the family of Imam Ali. It was a Friday and so all the Muslims were in the mosque since by Sunni law it is obligatory to go for noon prayer to the mosque (always it is considered better to pray in congregation, but on Friday noon it is obligatory), and also according to Shiite law, when there is an Imam in the world, it is obligatory to attend. Hence this rosa takes its name from this xotbe ordered by Yezid. When the speaker had finished, young and sickly Ali ibn Hussein Sajad stood and asked for permission to climb the wooden stairs and to say some good words to the people. He did not use the word membar but merely called it wood, because membar is the place of a holy man, and this one was used for lies and thus was only wood. Yezid was reluctant but his advisors persuaded him to allow Ali to do this, saying that the boy was sick and would say something funny and they could laugh him down. So Yezid gave in, and Hazrat-e Sajad went on the membar and first gave a salavat to God, Mohammad, and the family of Mohammad. Yezid had told the Kufans that he had fought a foreign Christian army and had killed their leader. So Hazrat-e Sajad began by saying, "If you know me, fine; if not, let me introduce myself: I am the son of the Prophet, of Ali, of Fatimeh, of Khadijeh, of Hussein who was killed at Karbala by Yezid, son of the best man in Arabia and the world, son of a man who fought in war near the Prophet with two swords (i.e., Ali who had fought so mightily that his sword had broken and the Prophet had lent him his own sword)." Yezid felt that Hazrat-e Sajad would easily sway the people against

head with a handkerchief and cries out the poem: "Oh head, who are you, where did you come from . . ." (4) Reheb-e Nasrani, the white clothed Christian hermit who begs a man standing before him with a head on a stake to allow him to see it, but is refused until by a bribe he is allowed to see it; he too mourns with a poem: "Oh head who are you, what nice features you have . . ." (5) A lion and a body (šir o na'aš) but this does not represent Hussein in particular: any lion mourning any headless soldier of Hussein's army. (6) Hares and the Muslim children: Hares wearing the red of Yezid's partisans carries a whip with which he strikes the green dressed Muslim children. (7) The cradle of Ali Asghar and his nurse who sings: Ay Asghar-e bi šir-e man/ Ay tefle bi taksir-e man/ Aram-e junam lailai/ Shirin zabanam lai lai (Oh Asghar without my milk, oh child without my fault, my dear peaceful one, my dear tongue). (8) The court of Yezid: Yezid in red, a bowl before him with Hussein's head in it, a stick in his hand with which he beats the head, a wine pourer standing next to him giving him wine, and other red-clad aides around him; Yezid sings in Arabic: Allahya ayahas saghi; ader ke san va navelha (Oh wine pourer, give me wine . . .).¹ (9) A boy dressed in gold and drinking wine on a horse with many retainers around: the daughter of Yezid. (10) Harmale, the man who killed the baby Ali Asghar, is portrayed as an archer dressed in red, shooting arrows in all directions, with soldiers, trumpeters and drummers around him.

Monchi-Zadeh says that in Teheran in the 1930s on the thirteenth of Moharram the body of Hussein was carried to the Turkish Embassy. But he points out that despite the tendency to exclude Sunnis from the days' festivities, the drama is essentially a universalistic one (1967: 28).

This deserves a further comment. In Yazd too, Zoroastrians and Jews tend to stay indoors on these days. Ramazan and Moharram traditionally have been good times for religious riots. But a few Zoroastrians may go to watch:

him and so he ordered the mo'azzen to go on the roof and give the call to prayer. As he began, Allah o Akbar (God is the greatest), Sajad responded beating his chest, "I believe that firmly." The mo'azzen gave the second line: God is one and Mohammad is his helper. Sajad responded, "I believe that firmly. Yes that mo'azzen says he was the helper of God. If you say he is your grandfather you lie, but he was my grandfather. Why did you kill him?" As he spoke the Kufans became sad and the men of Yezid ashamed. Often it is the custom to turn out the lights during this recitation so that men may weep in private.

¹ There is a xotbe of Zeinab (sister of Hussein) which tells how she sat behind a curtain and heard Yezid hitting her brother's head. She complains that it seems unjust that Hussein should be so treated by the son of a slave, a reference to the fact that Yezid's grandfather, Abu Sofian, fought against Mohammad and was captured but was freed by the Prophet. A Christian is said to object to Yezid's behavior. A man says he had seen the Prophet kiss this head.

I even saw some Zoroastrian women in their distinctive dress without a covering čador which usually they would put on out of prudent respect in such a venture. A Teheran theater director even claims to have witnessed Zoroastrians taking part in a tazieh in the late 1950s (although I find this hard to believe and have found no confirmation from Yazdis). In 1970 Yazdis disallowed three of us foreigners from taking pictures of the naxl, and in 1936 Nouie Aidin had a similar experience in which the police attempted to take her camera. Iranians, however, themselves may take pictures, and numerous foreigners have also been allowed to do so. Teheranis warn foreigners away from the "fanatic" Muslims telling of an American consular official who was lynched by a mob earlier in the century. In other words, what we are dealing with is not a set of categorical rules, but a situationally dynamic set of considerations.

6.4. Summary of the Argument

A basic anthropological task is to observe how religion or ideology works on the ground as opposed to its normative ideals. In Chapter V an attempt was made to sketch out the parameters of the social functions of religion in Yazd. In this chapter an attempt was made to sketch out the parameters of religious symbolic/semantic performance. It was argued that:

- (1) Shiite talk orders itself into a relatively coherent set of statements, loosely called a "paradigm" in the sense that
 - (a) some kinds of statements are rejected (e.g., atheism, agnosticism, disbelief in the fourteen Pure Souls, the goodness of Omar, that the poetry of the Qur'an is not of matchless beauty, etc.);
 - (b) arguments can be elaborated and defended on the basis of the paradigm (e.g., proper behavior should imitate that of the Prophet and the fourteen Pure Souls because of their divine knowledge; political direction may be accorded mujtaheddin and marja taqlid because of their expertise in the study of the lives of the fourteen Pure Souls, etc.).
- (2) Various subsets of this paradigm can be isolated, loosely called "paradigmatic sets" since they form either
 - (a) spacially bounded, stylized dramatic forms: rosa-xane, hey'at-e mazhabi, zurxane, xaneqah, šabi dar avordan; or
 - (b) temporal units: annual religious cycle, Moharram, Ramazan, death rites with porseh and rosa, etc.; or
 - (c) semantic domains either defined by the uses of a word (namus, nejasat, pak) or by verbal contests (rosa, profane repartee games, la'anat).

- (3) Symbolic/semantic performances, at least in certain domains, are patterned along sociological constraints (bargaining) or purposes (social group definition: Jafari vs Sunni, Ismaili, etc., men vs women, Muslims vs non-Muslims; political group definition: Abassid vs Omayyid, Ottoman vs Safavid, infidel Levies vs true Shiite, etc.).
- (4) The symbolic/semantic performances of the paradigmatic sets and of the paradigm as a whole have a dramaturgical ordering (of space, of rhythm, of stylized form and content, and even of breathing in say the Sufi zikh) which has a dual effect (a) of contributing to the emotional/motivational appeal of participation, and (b) of maintaining the unity of the paradigm and paradigmatic sets.

CHAPTER VII

JERUSHALAYIM HA-KETANA (LITTLE JERUSALEM)¹

The Galut the Ari's Kabbalah saw as a terrible and pitiless state permeating and embittering all of Jewish life, but Galut was also the condition of the universe as a whole, even of the deity.

—G. Scholem (1971: 43)²

7.1. The Changing Community

In January 1971 there were forty-six Jewish houses or about 400 Jews³ left in Yazd, all located around the Masjid-e Jome in the old city. Jewish


¹The title "Jerushalayim Ha-Ketana" is not an infrequent appellation for a particularly old or important Jewish community (M. Shokeid 1971: 17, reporting its usage in the Moroccan High Atlas). In Qajar Iran it was applied to Yazd, Kashan, and Shiraz (Loeb 1970: 39).

²Scholem's assessment strikes me as an apt motto for Yazd Jewry, especially the recognition of embitterment and its placement within the context of cosmological explanation: it is not only Jews who have a hard and unfair lot, and the cause goes back to the instability of the very process of creation itself. A reference to Luria (Rabbi Issac Luria of Safed, 1534-72, called "Ari," "the lion") is not out of place in Persian Jewry. Not only is the thirteenth century Zohar, the fount of Kabbalism, one of the most frequently read texts in Yazd, but Ari's name (the greatest of the reworkers of Kabbalism after the Spanish expulsion) is also well known: in Shiraz, Loeb reports, although a relatively new innovation, special prayers are said on the 5 Av to commemorate his death.

³Yazdi Jewish households have about ten persons on the average, and two other modes of estimation yield figures on either side of 400. A count of twenty-three households yielded a sample population of 187, giving a total estimated population of just under 400. The Alliance Israelite Universelle maintains that an accurate estimate is given by multiplying its school population by four: in 1971-72 there were 154 students which would give an estimated total population of just over 600. As with Yazd Zoroastrian populations, precise estimation is irrelevant since sons and daughters and other immediate family who are part of the functional family economy study and work in Teheran. The 1966 Census figure is 657 and a number of families have left since then, so the 600 figure is clearly an over-estimate for 1971.


MAP 6

THE JEWISH QUARTER OF YAZD, JANUARY 1971



Synagogue - 
Jewish House •

PAHLAVI AVENUE



fortunes here have been in decline, as can be sketched rather nicely with a few employment figures. Almost all members of the active labor force are employed either in the cloth bazaar (about seventeen) or in the Jewish school (ten teachers and several other staff); five men have shops outside Bazaar Khan (the cloth bazaar), four or five are peddlers (but no longer travel beyond the suburb villages of Yazd). There is one exception to this profile: four of the younger men are engineers at the Bafq Iron Mines. Of twenty-five of these labor force members (excluding teachers and engineers) fifteen previously did other work than their current work: eight were peddlers, five weavers, one a silk spinner, and one a merchant in Baghdad. Their fathers and wives' fathers had been cloth sellers (14), peddlers (9), involved in the silk trade (11), other broker and shopkeeping (4), weavers (2), sweet-maker (1), arak distillers (2), and a meat seller (1).

The community, in other words, had been very active in the silk industry for which Yazd had been famous until the nineteenth century. In 1928 when M. Laredo visited Yazd, he spoke (Paix et Droit 1926: 9-11) of the beauty and strength of Yazd silks, but also of the fact that imported cloth, especially from Russia, were displacing domestic cloth, and that Yazd commerce and industry had been now for quite a number of years in severe crisis. Silk spinning was still a Jewish specialty but because of the decadence of the industry, artisans received only two krans a day, apprentices half to one kran a day, women and children two to three krans a week. Such salaries (work being organized by "patrons," each employing five to six spinners) were causing Jews to leave the profession en masse and seek other work, meaning primarily manual labor and peddling. Laredo says that in the two years preceding his visit two to three hundred persons had left for Palestine.¹ Another two or three hundred resided in the villages of Yazd running small provisions stores or peddling. Among the last of these to leave were the two brothers who ran such a store in Aliabad (one of the Zoroastrian villages mentioned in Chapter V) until a decade ago. Among the urban population, Laredo counted 1750 souls: 375 heads of households, 550

¹ Habib Levy gives 1845 as the date the first family left Yazd for Palestine, the family of Abu Garshu Charxtab (charxtab = spinner) who went to Safed (Levy 1954: 590).

women, 425 young men and boys, and 400 young women and girls. Occupations he counted: 24 shopkeepers, 11 distillers, 30 employers of spinners, 120 spinners (workers), 125 colporters, and the rest were miscellaneous rabbis, hairdressers, meat sellers, and unemployed. Not a soul did he wish to count as rich, but a twentieth were more or less well to do, and another twenty-fifth not in need; the rest were miserable. Of 228 houses in the community only 20-30 were presentable, the rest hovels (taudis).

When a silk spinning factory was established in Rasht, and with the introduction of synthetic silk thread, silk spinning in Yazd became completely superfluous.¹ And as general economic conditions worsened, the peddlers' Jewish identity made them increasingly vulnerable to harassment. With popular anti-Semitism fostered during World War II and with the establishment of the state of Israel, the rural areas rapidly emptied of Jews.² Even liquor selling was abandoned to the Zoroastrians. Cloth

¹There are still remnants of the silk industry. Some Zoroastrians in Taft (Sare Deh), and Muslims in Mehriz, still raise silk worms, buying the worms by the can from Rasht via traders and peddlers and selling back the cocoons; and one or two Jewish households still keep up their sorting and spinning, buying from Rasht and selling either to two Muslim shops in the Yazd bazaar or to shops in Isfahan. At 1970-71 prices, the steps are: the larvae from Mazandaran are sold for 8 tomans/can. The farmer after raising them on mulberry leaves, sells the cocoons for 15 tomans/kilo. (One Sare Deh householder usually raises about 60 kilo, which gives him the income of 900 T. or \$117.) Each kilo is boiled down to yield 750 grams, done on a commission of 25 rials/kilo. The resulting silk then sells for 225 rials/750 grams or about 28 T. per kilo. This is used as binder for thread. Or the silk may be given out for spinning silk thread, again on a commission basis of ten shahi (1/2 rial) per mescal. Again it is cooked in NaOH (keria) and this time reduced to 650 grams. It is dyed both for carpet weaving in the villages of Zarch and Mehriz, and for sewing quilts. This local silk is slightly cheaper than Rashti silk, the thread selling for 5-6 tomans/mescal depending on the quality. By far the most silk used, however, is American synthetic which comes white in three grades selling for 65, 77 and 87 tomans per $4\frac{1}{2}$ kilo box, resp. It is dyed in Yazd for 30 tomans/box, respun into thicker threads for 15 tomans/box, and woven into standard decorative trims for 60 tomans/box; the finished trim is sold for a toman/meter, which works out to 40 tomans profit per box.

²Loeb's Shirazi informants (Loeb 1970: 81) tell of being taunted during the war by Muslims saying, "Hitler is in the cameo around my neck." Ayatollah Kashani led demonstrations against the creation of the state of Israel and in 1949 the Shah even allowed the radio to be used for anti-

selling in the bazaar was apparently the one relatively lucrative and safe profession, and it is of interest that many of the Jewish shops in Bazaar Khan are owned by the shopkeepers themselves or by other Jews. In 1928 the Alliance Israelite Universelle established the Jewish school, called in Persian translation Ehtehad, and this became the second economic pillar of the community in process of withdrawal from Yazd. Today the former katkhoda of the community, while still recognized as the community's secular leader,¹ no longer makes any effort to exercise his spokesman role vis-a-vis the general public in contrast to the Secretary of the Zoroastrian Anjoman who on every possible occasion is conspicuous in public declarations of support for the monarchy.²

The opening of the Iron Mine at Bafq has provided one new source of opportunity for the richer members of the community. Four of the young men are employed there as mohandess (engineer), a position both of prestige and of real social importance as they have numerous Muslim workers under their supervision. One of the richer shopkeepers has also gone into a new

Israeli propaganda (Bayne 1968: 47). Today a youngster from the village of Bid Akhavid in the Pusht Kuh area proudly says that no Jew would be allowed to stay in his village for more than an hour; a sentiment reminiscent of the medieval writer Hamdullah Mustawfi (Nuzhat al-Qulub, c. 740/1339) who in describing the nearby town on the Shiraz-Yazd road, Abarghu, notes, "If a Jew remains in Abarghu for forty days he will die, and for this reason no Jews are to be found here; if they come here on business they must leave within forty days." But to Abarghu's discomfort, we have references to several Jews from that town, not least of which was one so prominent that he was able to intervene in Safavid times and obtain a royal stay of a persecution against the Jews of Isfahan (Bacher 1906 LI: 278, cited by Loeb, p. 258).

¹He is ceremonially visited by other members of the community on major holidays, a mark of internal community respect accorded also to the mullah and the head of the Ehtehad School. When the government has a communication for the Jewish community he is also involved, the external acknowledgement of his role, e.g., when the community was told that it must build a new wall around its cemetery for the 2500 Year Celebrations (the old wall having been destroyed by overzealous Muslim youths at the time of Nasser's death).

²Not that the Jews of Iran are any less fervent supporters of the Shah than the Zoroastrians. No Jew, said a youth considering the possibility of my being a spy for anti-Shah forces, would do anything to weaken this Shah.

line of trade: supplying the mine with machinery, and the mine personnel with gadgets such as water filters (Bafq in 1971 did not yet have municipally cleaned water). One of these families has even now invested in a new house outside the Jewish quarter perhaps to live in and perhaps for speculation;¹ and one of its daughters had begun to work for the Bank Melli in Yazd. Children of several of the better-to-do Jewish families now go to Muslim high schools in Yazd rather than being sent to Teheran. To the vast majority of Jews, the grounds of the Masjid-e Jome are off-limits: they are firmly convinced that if they attempted to enter they would be severely beaten. But now also a few of the boys attending Muslim high schools have begun to study in the library of the Masjid.

Undoubtedly, aside from these few, the Jewish community will leave Yazd completely, and these few must be regarded as part of the same process occurring with middle class Zoroastrians: reassignment after skilled training, usually in Teheran, to the provinces as part of the Teheran meritocracy, not as part of the local social structure. The rest assume that sooner or later they will leave Yazd probably for Israel, else for Teheran.²

7.2. Internal Structure

If the Muslim hostility towards the Jews plays a large role in

¹The real estate market for Jews in Yazd is anything but favorable: since any Jew selling a house is known to be leaving the country, no one will offer him a price anywhere near the market value.

²Sokhnut, the Israeli immigration agency, aids those who wish to leave, but it is often an agonizing decision. The former nurse at Ehtehad shortly before leaving, stopped me on the street to ask if I thought it a good move: she feared a new country where she could not speak the language, but she also feared remaining in Yazd where she felt surrounded by hostile Muslims. Typical is one of the poorest families with several unmarried daughters; the males in the family are peddlers. The Sokhnut representative comes to urge them to move to Israel. But the son, whose decision is obviously the crucial one, always says, "yes, maybe after the summer"; then, "after the winter" . . . He does not fear Israel, and is sure he will eventually go there. Of an uncle who is already there, he says Israel has treated him well enough: he has a steady job as a janitor; without skills he could expect no more. For himself, Israel offers no real improvement, but for his young children Israel will represent a new life; and so he will probably make the move before they are out of elementary school.

maintaining the tightly knit nature of the community, the complementary self-imposed social controls are an equally strong factor. These consist of endogamy rules, rules of purity and synagogue attendance. It is the last which is perhaps a distinctive Jewish technique. Endogamy follows the general Iranian pattern: sixteen of forty-seven counted marriages were with kin; Loeb (1970: 167-69) similarly counted 114 of 425 marriages among Shirazi Jews as kin.¹ Although Jews both in Yazd and Shiraz deny that they have a formal mehr, bridewealth and dowry and inheritance patterns are also of the general Iranian pattern.² The explication of purity rules is complex in detail, but in principle is similar to Islamic and Zoroastrian rules, both in the arbitrariness of the detail and in the use

¹Of the 16 in Yazd: FBd-6, FZd-2, MZd-1, MBd-3, MMBsd-1, MZdd-1, family untraced-2. Of the 114 in Shiraz: Bd-7, Zd-16, FBd-13, MZd-15, FZd-6, MBd-8, other-49. There is one difference between Muslim and Jewish prohibitions: uncle-niece, but not aunt-nephew marriage is permitted; the Shirazis however apparently practice both.

²In Shiraz the traditional ratio between ketubah or mohar habbtulot ("price of virgins") and the dowry was rarely more than 3:1. The ketubah price has been rising in recent times to make the ratio much larger so as to make it, it is said, effective against divorce. Daughters receive no inheritance share unless there are no sons because it is said they already received their share as dowry. (Loeb 1970: 184 ff). See also Baruch Levine (1968) on the terms for bridewealth and dowry in the cuneiform texts of Mesopotamia compared with the Talmud. There were four related terms (compare Chapter V above): (1) mhr (Heb. mohar, Arb. & Pers. mehr) or payment from groom to father of the bride; (2) mulugu or payment from father of the bride either to the groom or to the bride with right of usufruct to groom (unclear whether in the case of land the daughter would have the right to alienate such land); (3) terhata or payment from groom's family to bride's family for expenses of rearing her (viz. Pers. shir baha), possibly from the verb rehu ("to have sexual intercourse"); (4) qannu or cash tied into the sash (qannu) of the bride from the groom (Pers. cash portion of the mehr). That the Persian sedagh is a payment to the bride rather than her father in case of divorce is a parallel emphasis as that of the Talmudic ketubah which involves a pledge of support of the wife often through widowhood; a pledge of a fixed sum as settlement in case of divorce or widowhood; and a pledge that male children would inherit this if she dies while married to the husband and that female children would be raised by the husband until they married. Loeb (1970: 186) cites an unsuccessful attempt by the Chief Rabbi of Israel to institute among Iranian Jews the Qur'anic inheritance rule of 1/2 a share for daughters. Polygamy and divorce patterns are also of the pattern of Iranian Muslims. It has been

as social markers.¹ But neither Islam nor (even less) Zoroastrianism have the individual competition of skill and communally enjoined participation of the synagogue.

Not only are the various honors of reading distributed in each service through an elaborate ta'arof bargaining (Aghaye Cohen bakhavod, i.e., Mr. Cohen with honor," "No, no: Mr. Levi," etc.) or even auctioning (profits going to the upkeep of the synagogue), but both life cycle and daily, weekly, and annual routine has built into it expectations of participation. The newly married groom marks his married life on the first Sabbath by leading the service. Circumcision after the first week of life occurs in the synagogue. Small boys are encouraged to participate as fully as their knowledge allows. On Sabbath and holidays a large portion of the day may be spent in the synagogue. An additional imperative force is given to expectations of participating by the decline in size of the community: there are eleven synagogues in the community (plus the ruins of a

very easy for a man to get a divorce, much more difficult for a woman. Today a divorce is obtained through the civil courts rather than from a dayan. The new Iranian family law which requires a first wife to consent to a second wife has put a damper on polygamy, although as Loeb points out today people could afford a second wife more easily and there is an oversupply of women. He however only counted six Jews in Shiraz with more than one wife.

¹The place to start is with the tenth book of Maimonides Code, the book of cleanness (taharot), in which he attempts to order the scriptural and post-scriptural rules found in the sixth part of the Mishnah on the premises (a) that although the rules have no practical validity after the destruction of the Temple, (b) nonetheless originating in divine commands they are proper objects of study and meditation since (c) furthermore the arbitrary character of many of the rules and formulations indicates that they are intended to convey ethical or moral messages rather than being physically or magically efficacious. He notes that there is no such thing as a leprous house; similarly although corpse pollution is contagious, the contagion does not follow physical rules, viz. a series of stacked vessels held by a man the top one of which contains carrion pollutes the man and the vessel in which it is contained but not the intervening vessels; also significantly, a Gentile cannot contract pollution. As subsequent commentators note, after the destruction of the Temple these rules were used as a means of separating the Pharisees from the common Jew to vouchsafe their superior piety, but Maimonides makes it clear that the uncleanness of the common people is a fiction: cf. J. Oberman's preface to Danby's translation (Maimonides 1954).

twelfth in another quarter: Sar-e Sang, q.v. below), and in order to keep as many as possible functioning most of the men and boys of the community must participate regularly. On normal sabbaths four synagogues are generally operative, but on holidays it is attempted to hold services in all eleven, even if two or three must be used in rotation. Reading is alternatively in Persian or Hebrew, and quite apart from the drasha or sermon which may be delivered in the synagogue of the mullah on the sabbath and holidays, reading translations of passages so they may be understood properly is a frequent demand from a well versed man who through boredom or fatigue may have lapsed into a rapid mumbling or over elaborate recitation of everything printed beyond the required amounts.

Ability to participate properly serves the community as a test of outsiders, not only against those who might try to pass as a Jew for evil intent but also for those who would live on Jewish charity (kola bakdari). A first question asked of an outsider claiming to be Jewish is whether he is dati (observant) or hafshid (lax) and whether he knows TaNaK, i.e., Torah (the five books of Moses), Nevim (the additional prophetic books), and Ketovim (Hagiographa). Being dati means not only regular performance in the synagogue but keeping the purity rules of which the kašrut (dietary laws) are the most obvious markers, and serve effectively to keep Jews apart from any commensality with non-Jews. Making meat kosher provides in addition not only special jobs for shohet (ritual butcher)¹ and gasab (meat seller), but also a relatively efficient object of taxation for community revenue.² Yazdis will say to a newcomer, "We are all dati in Yazd"; but this, of course, turns out to be true only in degrees. The engineers who

¹A job which is relatively protected by the current holder, who refuses to certify any of the young men to perform his task (on which of course a portion of his income, if not a large portion, is based); the latter however often are certified in Teheran while attending the ORT vocational school.

²The early Alliance representatives used this source to reorganize the educational system. They had trouble initially determining how many school-aged children there were due to the suspicion that counting people brings them ill luck; the compromise was to have each family place an appropriate number of dates in a jar.

work in Bafq cannot observe the Sabbath, and children who go to Muslim schools must also attend on the Sabbath; and so on.

Yazdis all agree—Muslim, Zoroastrian, Jew, Bahai—that they are all fanatics (mota'asseb) about religion, that the boundaries between religious groups are sharply maintained. No group has very much good to say about any of the others.¹ One of the best educated of Yazd's 50-60 year old generation counselled me thus:

I have made a study of Zoroastrian law. I went and spent some time with one of their dasturs and even wrote a report. There is nothing of value there for you to spend so much effort. Zoroaster was not a prophet from God. Avesta is nothing. It is not interesting. They merely worship what is useful: fire, water, cow, horse. That is not religion. Islam, on the other hand, is good, but there is nothing new in it, nothing which is not taken directly from Judaism; only the religion was made a little easier. If you read the Qu'ran, it talks about nothing except the history of Israel. Mohammad was a prophet from God who came to the Arabs living off lizards and mice, who knew nothing, and gave them the Word. [If Islam says the same as Judaism, why not become Muslim since you live in a Muslim country?] No, because I have Moses who is much better. Had I nothing, Mohammad would be good. Another proof that there must be truth in Islam is that 600 million people are Muslims. As to Zoroastrians, there is not a single one who ever discovered anything, who ever created anything. Ninety-nine per cent of Jews are intelligent, but Zoroastrians are not bright. [That is not true! What about Tata, the greatest Indian industrialist?] Tata! Tata was nothing but a servant to David Sassoon: he learned everything from David Sassoon.

Relations between Zoroastrians and Jews, however, are cordial and there is a certain recognition of solidarity based on their common minority status. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, a Jewish leader remembers, there was an attempt by Muslims to stop all commerce with Jews,² but the Zoroastrians

¹Except for Bahais who ideologically are enjoined to speak well of other religious groups, but as one Bahai confided, here in Iran we must agree that Mohammad was one of the true prophets, but that is not a tenet of the faith outside Iran.

²Something successfully done in Shiraz: a boycott of dealing with Jews was effective to the point of preventing sale of bread to them for three days until the Government intervened. The police restrained Muslims from entering the Jewish Quarter, but Jews feared to leave their homes and the synagogues were closed for ten weeks. Jewish shops were kept open on Saturdays and on Shavu'ot to demonstrate lack of solidarity with Israel. SAVAK apparently also kept tabs on young Jews that there be no pro-Zionist organization (Loeb 1970: 68, 82).

continued to behave civilly. There are only a few economic and friendship relations between Jews and Zoroastrians.¹ Asked if there was much contact, the Jewish mullah said no: (a) the Zoroastrians live in an entirely different section of town and (b) they are uncircumcised ('arelim).

Opinions towards each other remain ambivalent on the level of cultural stereotype. To Jews the salient characteristic of Zoroastrians seems to be that they are not terribly bright, and jokes are told such as:²

A Jew goes to Khoramshah and a woman there wants him to do some magic to make her pregnant. He happens to be in the village again sometime later on one of his peddling rounds. Now you must understand, Khoramshahis never speak softly but always shout. So she shouts: give me my money back or make me pregnant.

Village Zoroastrians do in fact suspect the Jews of having magical powers for good or evil. The worst of these suspicions are of course the blood libel and child-stealing slurs. An informant swears that a relative was an eye-witness to discovering a child of Mehdiabad stuffed into a Jewish peddler's saddlebag. Another of his relatives, says he, will swear to having witnessed the Jewish mode of slaughter which involved cruelly

¹Since Muslim barbers will not cut non-Muslim hair, and some shops still have signs "Muslims Only," the barber in the Zoroastrian Quarter until 1971 when he emigrated to Israel was Jewish. Another old Jew is an itinerant barber who makes his rounds only in the Zoroastrian suburb villages. One or two poor Jewish women do housework for Zoroastrian households. In the recent past there was an old man who was friendly with the Zoroastrians and would get myrtle twigs from their gardens for ritual blessings. Jewish cloth peddlers service Zoroastrian suburbs but one of them says he prefers Muslim customers because they understand the bargaining: Zoroastrians if they feel cheated (and who in a bargaining situation does not) will refuse further dealings.

²This among a whole series of jokes told at a wedding in good fun: jokes about people from different parts of Iran are popular among all Iranians, and this was one of the few people came up with for Yazdis. Arabs came in for their share of tweaking: a Jew sits by a well counting 14,14, 14,14,14. . . . An Arab comes by and asks what he is doing. The Jew replies, leave me in peace, I am counting. The Arab offers him 10 tomans to tell him what it is all about. The Jew says: not less than 100. Finally the Arab gives him 100 tomans. The Jew says: look down this well. The Arab does and falls in trying to see what is down there. The Jew counts: 15,15,15,15,15. . . . But Jews do not escape their own humor either: there was an inordinately long joke about Yom Kippur and two men reading on and on in Hebrew and translating to each other while the bored ones squirm in their seats. Peddling too got its share of jokes.

pummelling the poor sheep until near death before slitting its throat. (The village butcher pooh-poohs these tales whenever they are voiced publically, since he observes the shohet regularly in the slaughterhouse.) Jews perhaps encouraged such beliefs by threatening recalcitrant customers with divine retribution if they did not pay; Jewish fortune tellers and seers did exist in the Jewish quarter earlier in the century. Indeed the belief system is one shared by Jews. Of Mullah Or, a famous Yazdi rabbi, it is told that once when a Muslim raised his hand to strike him, he caused the arm to remain paralyzed in mid-air; only when the penitent Muslim returned with the mujtahed to plead for him did Mullah Or remove the curse. A Zoroastrian recalls that his father-in-law once went to a Jew's house to buy some sheep and donkey bones for fertilizer, and was told to help himself in the basement, but was so scared he just turned and fled. Of these stories the most publically elaborated is the query, how did it come about that the Jews settled in the center of the old city while the Zoroastrians had to live outside the city walls? The legend which any Yazdi—Zoroastrian, Muslim, Bahai or Jew—will tell is as follows:

At the time of Shah Abbas the Jews lived outside of town, coming into the city each day to work. Shah Abbas, as is well known, used to disguise himself and wander among his subjects to see how his realm was faring. He thus came to Yazd on one of these trips, but was discovered by some of his enemies, the Yazd administration in those days being rebellious. He ran down into a ganat to hide. There he saw in the shadows a man washing, and asked who he was. Just a Jew. He explained his predicament. The Jew told him to stay put and not to worry. The next day he came into town with his old mother. He gave her chador to Shah Abbas and went with him out through the city gate check point pretending that the chador-wrapped figure was still his mother. For saving his life, Shah Abbas granted the Jews of Yazd any boon. They replied that the only thing they could think of was to be able to live inside the protection of the city walls. And so the Shah ordered an exchange of population.¹

¹A second version of this story says that Shah Abbas was residing in the golan xane (barracks of the citadel) where today the Jewish School stands, and where goods coming into town from the Mariamabad side used to be taxed. He dressed up as a dervish and went out into the town but was recognized by some enemies who wanted to kill him. He ran down into a ganat and followed the water course to Mariamabad which at the time was a kalemi-neshin (Jewish settlement). There he came to the house of an old Jewess and asked for lodging for the night. She was not unaware of who her guest was but she was very poor and told him she had no bedding and being

There are at least two more parts to the legendary position of Jews in Yazd: (a) their original coming to Yazd, and (b) the origin of Zoroastrianism from a leprous Jew (though this last I only heard from Jewish informants):

(a) In the time of Yazdigird I, three Jews came to Yazd from Babol (in Mazandaran, which had been the center of Persian Jewry until the persecutions of Haman). Their names were Faraj, Miriam, and Jacob. The king asked them who they were and where they were from. They responded that they were Jews, and that they abided by such and such rules (circumcision, kosher meat, etc.). The king suspected them of being spies and asked them to undergo an ordeal by fire. They asked for time to sleep and pray. Each of them had a dream about one of the others in which the person went through the fire unscathed. When they told each other about the dreams they were reassured that God would see them through the ordeal. So they presented themselves to the king. A fire was prepared and they passed the ordeal unscathed. The king was surprised and in return had three ganats constructed which still exist: Mariamabad, Jakobi, and Mullah Faraj. And Jews populated these places where they lived until the time of Shah Abbas. The ruins of their old synagogue (Sar-e Sang) is still to be seen in Jakobi.¹

(b) There was a Zoroastrian Sultan of Syria² who had leprosy. In battle his forces captured a Jewess. She learned of his disease from his vizier, and said that in her country there was a person close to God who could cure it. They went to the Prophet Eliahu Hanavi, but he replied: 'How can I cure it, I am not God.' They then consulted a student of the Prophet, Eli Shah, who assured them that divine intervention of that sort was not really necessary, and that as a student of the Prophet he knew quite well what had to be done: a bath in the Nile. The Shah began to laugh saying there were plenty of good rivers in his own country to bathe in; but his vizier pointed out that nothing could be lost by bathing in the Nile. And so they went, and lo and behold the Sultan

winter he would catch cold; but she did have a grain storage bin (tapugeli) and a bread oven (tanur) in either of which he might spend the night and not freeze. So he got into the tanur and she put a chador over the mouth. In the morning he took a chador from her and made his way back to the golam-xane. Once safe again he sent for the woman and asked in the way of return what boon she desired, and she requested the Jews be allowed to live in town.

¹Another variant has the third person's name as Yitzhak Khetk. The third of the three villages which were supposedly Jewish is Khetk (Khavidak). When someone wishes to say of a third party indirectly that he is Jewish, it is still said that he is a Mariamabadi.

²The Philistines were Zoroastrian, Goliath being the Zoroastrian pahlavan.

emerged from the Nile as clean as a baby. The Sultan then returned to Eli Shah and offered him all manner of riches which the latter refused. But Geziah, another pupil of the Prophet, who was at court at the time could not bear to see all this wealth refused, and so he followed the Sultan on the road and told him that Eli Shah had changed his mind; the Sultan willingly paid. Eli Shah being close to God himself understood what had transpired and cursed Geziah, who subsequently developed leprosy. Since by Jewish law lepers were exiled, the leprous Geziah was banished. He went to Baghdad where he taught the Zoroastrians Jewish lore and learning. He is the king known to Zoroastrians as Zohak. He married a Zoroastrian and his descendants are physically distinguishable by a genetic trait he acquired when he got leprosy: a small button of fat on the buttock. From the Jews the Zoroastrians adopted the twin minarets in front of the Yazd Masjid-e Jomeh (which, of course, was a fire temple before it became a mosque): they represent the two cypress trees which stood in front of the Temple in Jerusalem. The Zoroastrian kusti is taken from the kamerband of the Cohen Gadol's eight special garments for serving in the Holy of Holies.

One final legend is important to the position of Jews in Iran and that is the story of Sarah bat Asher, the first Israelite to come to Iran after the migration out of Mesopotamia by Abraham's family:

Sarah, the granddaughter of Jacob, chased some straying sheep into a cave and after a long run emerged near Isfahan. Exhausted she lay down to sleep and dreamt of her uncle Joseph in Egypt. She returned to tell Jacob that Joseph was not dead as her father had claimed. And Jacob, in happiness, declared the site of the dream to be a ziaratgah (pilgrimage site). In the time of Shah Abbas who had made a lot of trouble for the Jews, a Shirazi goldsmith was sitting at this ziaratgah. Shah Abbas happened to be hunting gazelle. He was engaged in a chase when suddenly the gazelle disappeared. So he came up to the goldsmith and asked if he had seen where the gazelle went. The latter replied in verse that he had been so terrified by seeing the Shah that he had not seen a gazelle. The Shah was pleased by the answer and ordered that the ziaratgah be properly rebuilt. Now every year thousands converge here to celebrate Rosh Hashannah. It is also considered good luck to cut a child's hair for the first time here; the ceremony involves throwing noql or money over his head, and sacrificing a goat, the meat being given out to the poor.

The pilgrimage points for Persian Jews included Hamadan (the tomb of Ester and Mordecai),¹ Baghdad (the tombs of Ezra and Ezekiel) and Jerusalem. Many minor pilgrimage sites existed as well: Daniel at Shuster, Zipporah at Qum, Isaiah at Isphahan, Abraham ibn Ezra at Meshed are mentioned by Loeb; Feitelson (1959) talks of more in Kurdistan. In Yazd there is in the

¹Ordered rebuilt for the 2500 Year Celebrations by H.I.M. Government.

village of Nasrabad a shrine to Eliahu Havavi; of this it is said:

There once was a downwardly mobile Jew. When he had nearly become destitute he took up peddling and made his way as best he could. One evening dead tired from a poor day's selling he came to a little hut and there he slept. He dreamt that someone came and asked him why he slept here. He replied: what do I know? The person answered: no, why are you so sad, tell me. He said then: it is nothing, that is, I was doing peddling, but now even in that my hands are empty. I left home that I might earn something, but nothing has come my way, nonetheless I have four children to feed. The spirit said to him: come I will give you a spool of thread; put it under a large cloth, and never look under the cloth again; sell lengths of thread that you pull from the spool. So for two or three years the peddler sold thread from this spool and made enough to live. He finally became very curious as to how much thread could possibly be left on the spool. When he lifted the cloth to look he saw only three short lengths left: it was finished. Some of the local Zoroastrians also believe in the efficacy of this shrine: they call it Haji Khezr Jahudi. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war vandals broke down the door and filled the little room full of trash.

This legendary and stereotyping opposition of the Jewish community to the non-Jews around them serves to mark them off quite distinctly. Their own internal explanations have already been referred to (fn. 2, p.) and are maintained by the ritual study of Jewish history: the interpretation of the bible, the zohar, and the sermons delivered by the rav or mullah.

The general outlines of the internal structure of the Jewish community do not need much elaboration for a picture of a tightly-knit community to emerge. Perhaps one ought to note in passing that "tightly-knit" does not mean undifferentiated. Loeb characterizes the stratification of the Shiraz community in three ways: (a) financially about 170 or eleven per cent of the community are on the American Joint Distribution Committee relief rolls, and 120 or eight per cent are wealthy elite to whom religious and community affairs are of little importance; (b) while the kohenim are not a corporate group they are one third of the population and include the two richest families, the head of the community (Rais-e Anjoman), the former tax collector, five of the eleven members of the Anjoman; and as the priestly line they receive token offerings at the birth of the first son,¹

¹Pidyon ha-ben ("the redemption of the son"): on the thirtieth day after birth a Cohen is invited to the home and presented with money which as a rule is returned in the form of a gift unless the Cohen is very poor.

and they have the role in the synagogue each morning, twice on the sabbath and holidays of blessing the community;¹ (c) there is an occupational ranking from corpse washers, beggars, and prostitutes to musicians² up to goldsmiths, businessmen and professionals. The Yazd community is somewhat less differentiated thanks to its small size and remnant character. Still, as noted above, there are obvious wealth and status distinctions, and an occupational ranking from peddler to shopkeeper and teacher to accountant and engineer.

7.3. External Integration

One can build a rather self-contained view of the Jewish community delineating its quite tightly-knit internal structure around the synagogue, and treating its relations with the outside in terms of administration,³

The custom is referred to Exodus 13:2 and grouped with the death of the first born in Egypt, the sacrifice of the first born of all clean animals, the offering of first fruits, and the consecration of first born sons to the priesthood (Baron 1932: 122-24).

¹With their prayer shawls (tzizit is the name used) over their heads and arms outstretched, they recite the blessing of Numbers 6:24-6. Non-kohenim (i.e., the congregation) are not supposed to look at them for they represent the šekinah (the presence of the Almighty). Afterwards they go around to the members of the congregation holding the fringe of the tzizit with their fingers and as they touch the fingers of the congregants (who then kiss their own fingers) say: titbarkhenu min hashmayim (may you be divinely blessed). The form is parallel with that for the repetition of the šema (the Jewish šahada as it were): closed fingers of the right hand are held before the eyes, again so as to concentrate on the šekinah, after which the fingers are kissed.

²Shirazi Jews are reknown musicians. Loeb suggests their low ranking is because they are ranked low by Muslims, their finances are insecure (they cannot play during Ramazan, Moharram, Shabbat, Jewish holidays, and the seven weeks of sefira and the three weeks before Tisha Ba'av), they may eat non-kosher food where they work, they might not observe the Sabbath, the dancers may be associated as or with prostitutes; their begging behavior to get jobs by playing outside a party is demeaning (Loeb 1970: 244).

³Under the Safavids there was a special divan for Jewish affairs, but under the Qajars this significantly became part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Loeb 1970: 102).

redefinition of its boundaries through persecutions,¹ and contacts with other Jewish communities.² Less clear perhaps, but at least as interesting

¹Loeb formulates his study of the Jewish community of Shiraz in the traditional minority persecution genre: "to describe the adaptation of Shirazi Jews to a hostile social environment. . . . Isolation and persecution were factors which forced Jews into marginal occupations, led to economic insecurity, prevented the formation of formal community political structures, meaningful personal relationships, corporate kin ties, and other cultural and social phenomena." It is a "culture of oppression" which is a "culture of poverty" organized for long term survival, primarily by focusing all emotional and intellectual expression within the synagogue.

Needless to say, this traditional frame of description—quite like the E. Franklin Frazier school of American Negro deprivation studies—focuses attention away from cultural forms such as the stories and songs told at weddings as being less significant than outside persecution; and it ignores the structure of day to day social interactions as somehow less solid than some ideal of "formal community political structures" or "meaningful personal ties." This is not to deny the persecution, but on the contrary to try to include it as well within the explicandum. Persecution is a phenomenon within the creation of social rank or dominance, and as such there is probably no Iranian group which has not felt itself a victim. By so viewing persecution, one need not then view periods of non-persecution as bizarre exceptions. See also S.D. Goiten (1955), esp. the essays on "The Actual and Legal Position of the Jews under Arabic Islam" and "The Economic Transformation and Communal Reorganization of the Jewish People in Islamic Times."

²Yazd was an important religious center particularly under Mullah Or Shargar and Mullah Agha Baba. The former, it is said, was one of ten brothers from Sabzevar, each of whom went to a different city. Fabulous tales are told of Mullah Or's magical powers such as that he and his brothers would retire in their separate cities at midnight to communicate with each other, and that he could use supernatural curses and blessings to manipulate men. His tomb in the Yazd cemetery is still a ziaratgah where people go to read psalms. Mullah Agha Baba who lived at the time of Fath Ali Shah was a latter day gaon receiving religious inquiries from quite distant cities. The torat of Yazd, of which there are a goodly number, were partly transcribed in Baghdad, but many were written in Yazd. One of the more famous has the haftorahs written before the corresponding torah portion; another from Hamadan is written on deerskin. Connections with other Iranian cities can be traced by the genealogies of the present residents, a number of families coming from Hamadan, others from Herat, and so on. The dialect of the Quarter, a Central Plateau dialect quite close to the Zoroastrian dialect, is thus not spoken by all members of the community: relative newcomers do not use it. Gobineau reports being questioned by Persian Jews of Kashan about Spinoza and Kant. Until the seventeenth century Iranian Jewry used a liturgical rite based on the siddur (prayer book, literally, "order" of the service) of Saadia Gaon, but one R. Abraham Mammon came from Morocco to Bokhara and persuaded the Central Asian Jews that they like himself must be

is the pulsating integration of the community into the wider society: at times it was a sharply segregated, persecuted and despised body within the larger polity (the extremes of such periods were by the economic necessity described in section 135 of Appendix III of short duration: when peddlers cannot sell, they cannot eat); but at other times relations were much freer in which the community played an explicit role in the economy and individuals rose to high office. Three general points need be kept in mind. (1) It was not a unique affair that in early Islamic times Jews along with Nestorians and Zoroastrians were important to the administration. In Persian nationalist ideology this is explained as the inability of rude Arab tribesmen to man a bureaucracy. But more reasonably, as Weber pointed out, a patrimonial bureaucracy often attempted (a historical generalization as well as a plausible structural argument) to maintain centralized authority by employing in high positions persons loyal to the monarchy rather than to local power bases, namely slaves, mercenaries, and minorities. In pre-Islamic times Jews were one of several political units to be balanced in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Their position between the aggressive Greco-Roman and Persian Empires made them vulnerable to the problems of small buffer polities: in Palestine they provided a Persian vassal, in Baghdad the institution of the Exilarch (Resh Galuta) provided an internal millet-like constituency. That there should have been a number of persecutions is not surprising. The Resh Galuta form of administration continued after the Islamic conquest at least until the Mongols, but in a sense with the post of Nasi in Baghdad until the last century. The nature of this political organization was subject to normal vicissitudes: just as we hear of Jewish communities protesting taxes or other administrative impositions of the Exilarch, so too his influence at court varied.¹ For ideological reasons we hear of other prominent Jews primarily under the II

descendants of the Spanish exiles. Soon with the inflow of printed siddurim from Warsaw and Vienna, Persian Jewry became almost completely Sephardic in rite (Adler 1898).

¹Habib Levy cites the role of a Jewess in Mohammad Shah Qajar's harem in protecting the Teheran community.

Khanids since the Il-Khanids themselves had to be Islamicized (two Jewish Grand Viziers, several Provincial Governors); but Jews, particularly in commercial towns like Baghdad often held such posts as saraf-bashi (treasurer), the most famous being the Baghdadi Sassoons. It is intriguing that, for instance, the Qavam family descended from Haji Ibrahim, the Shirazi king-maker, claims descent from the Shiraz Jewish Kalantar under the Zands.¹

(2) This relates to a second point: it is quite common for Iranian Muslims to claim Jewish rather than Zoroastrian ancestry as their pre-Islamic origin (viz. also all the Islamic groups which claimed to be bene-Israel). Not only that, but very often a claim is made with some pride that conversion to Islam occurred in the relatively recent (but un-specifiable, e.g., five to seven generations ago) past. Jews are reputed to be difficult to convert, and the conversion of a Jew as a member of the original of the three Peoples of the Book (ahl-e kitab) apparently is felt to further validate Islam.

(3) Finally one should consider the economic role of the Jews in a world where confessional lines are often made to coincide with occupational ones. It is likely that from quite early times this Levantine people played the role of traders. Where communities settled special crafts might become their responsibility such as silk spinning in Yazd or shoe making in western Anatolian (Benedict 1970). Professions like goldsmithing and peddling might very well be secondary developments of long-distance trading: peddling being a marginal occupation for the downwardly mobile, and goldsmithing something that depends upon fluctuating prices not only of mining and other sources (plunder of a defeated sultan's hoard, etc.) but of a monetary substitute. Shirazi Jews, at least in recent times, are well-known goldsmiths, but it is by no means a Jewish monopoly, and Loeb

¹Haji Ibrahim, according to Descos' account cited by Loeb (1970: 56), was himself the Jewish Kalantar. He won the throne first for Lutf Ali Khan and then after a dispute delivered Shiraz to Agha Mohammad Qajar. He became Grand Vizier and ensured the succession of Fath Ali Shah. He was assassinated by the latter but his daughter married the new Grand Vizier. His brother succeeded to the Kalantarship and took the title Qavam-ul-Mulk. It is quite possible that the Kalantar of the Jews need not be himself Jewish and Haji Ibrahim's family was Muslim, but the family does also claim Jewish descent: cf. Khanevadeh Qavam Mulk by A. Qasimi (Teheran 1950: 5). I am indebted for this last reference to Mr. Mostafa Ansari.

even tells of the failure of attempts to amalgamate the two guilds (1970: 153).¹ The role of Jews as traders seems obvious even from demographic movement: the main Jewish centers were Isfahan (the Safavid capital), Shiraz (the Zand capital), Hamadan (the Western entry of trade from Baghdad), the desert entrepots of Yazd and Kashan, the central Asian entrepots of Herat and Samarkand and Bokhara; Jews went to Bushire as it developed port facilities under Nadir Shah and the East India Co. in the eighteenth century. The Jews of Kirman, an outpost of the Yazd community, stem from the second half of the nineteenth century when Kirman commerce was being organized under British prodding. In the nineteenth century the trade of western Iran was largely funnelled through Jewish (Baghdadi and Hamadani) and Armenian hands, just as in the east the British tried to use Zoroastrian, Sikh and Hindu channels. The pattern of persecution in Safavid times remains unclear, but one wonders if it might not turn out to be similar to that partially reviewed in Chapter II for the last century: namely, it was a not particularly prosperous period (outside of the royal capitals) of economic and political competition with the Ottomans for position within world trade patterns. Jewish connections with this outside world (like Armenian connections) would make them both ideologically suspect as well as economically squeezable whenever the monarchy was hard pressed. The Jews of Baghdad seem to have been active in helping to keep the city out of Persian hands: they celebrate two local Purims in commemoration of deliverance of the city from Shah Abbas II in 1638 and from Shah Tamasp in 1733 (Sassoon 1949: 177-78).

One final cultural point ought perhaps to be made: despite relative separation the Jews of Yazd are very much Persian in folklore, customs, and belief patterns, and much of this is not specifically Persian either. If the synagogue is the religious focus which takes the place of the Zoroastrian xeirat or the Muslim rosa and communal namaz in the mosque, the

¹The issue of trust, which can be more easily controlled within the Jewish moral community, is also evidenced in the differential money-lending rates: 2-1/2 to 10% per month for Muslims versus less than 1% per month for Jews (Loeb 1970: 148).

Jews have also their own form of pilgrimage, sacrificial slaughter (kapparot),¹ charity stews,² all night xatm-Qur'an-like recitations of the entire torah and of psalms (yešua³), circumcision,⁴ wedding⁵ and death

¹Although the stress in this case is much more heavily the atonement for sins modeled on the scapegoat, rather than the covenant with God through the sacrifice of Issac as it seems to be in popular Islam. It is done primarily at weddings, on 9 Tishri, the eve of Yom Kippur, sometimes also the eve of Rosh HaShannah. A rooster is sacrificed for each male, a hen for each female, and a rooster and a hen for a pregnant woman (Issac Luria suggested two hens and a rooster would be more appropriate in the last case as the foetus might be a female), or one rooster for the whole household. The fowls should be white (Isaiah 1:18: "Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow"). A formula is repeated including the notions of ransom and of the healing power of God's word for those who repent of their transgressions. The slaughtered fowl should be given to the poor to eat, or be redeemed by monetary charity.

²Aš-e rešte or aš-e xamir (flour stew), costing about 50-100 tomans, done on occasions of vows and wishes. Also a sheep may be sacrificed and food distributed to the poor. These do not, however, appear to involve total community commensualism.

³The word is either yešiva (יָשִׁיב "sitting"), Yazdi yešua, or the Hebrew yešua (help). These occur during the nights on the forty days preceding Rosh HaShannah (selixot: reading of psalms and penitential prayers), on Shavuot and Simhat Torah (araba: reading of the entire torah), on Purim (reading of the megillah), and for death memorials (reading the Zohar, scripture, the mourner's kaddish).

⁴In Jewish tradition, this rather than the ritual of slaughter (as in Islamic tradition) is associated with the covenant between God and Man. The custom of putting ash on the foreskin is observed and is apparently a reference to the second circumcision of the children of Israel by Joshua after coming out of the desert (Joshua 5), ash representing dust and the custom of burying the foreskin "from dust to dust." Another obvious difference from Muslim custom is that the time of circumcision is fixed (the eighth day). The torah says that at the first covenant Abraham was ninety-nine and his son Ismail was thirteen (Genesis 17:25) which may perhaps account for the drift towards puberty in the time of Islamic circumcision. In Yazd it is claimed that even before the days of the hospital, Muslim children were circumcised shortly after birth. To confirm the covenant meaning of the Jewish circumcision, the father wears his phylacteries as a sign that the son will be raised to study torah. But as with Muslims there is the superstition that if a woman swallows the foreskin her next child will be male.

⁵As with Muslims there is the superstition that a rejected suitor can prevent consummation of the marriage by closing a lock. The virginity test

customs,¹ purity rules,² amulets (kameot³), superstitions and

was common in the past as with Muslims. The actual form of the marriage ceremony, of course, is different: the ceremony under a prayer shawl, the sharing of a cup of wine over which šiva broxot (seven blessings) are said, the breaking of the glass, the kappara of a white cock after waving it three times over the couple's heads, and the kappara of a goat or sheep at the entrance to the groom's house. But there are other common symbols: the bride gives the groom a sugar cone (sweetness) and the groom gives her silver coins (economic security); the feet of the groom are henna-ed in a celebration the night preceding the wedding; the feet of the bride are henna-ed in a private way the night before that; the groom and the bride are led to the hajleh (bridal chamber) with a lamp and mirror, the mirror facing them (at the threshold psalms are read). Previous to the ceremony bride and groom go to the miqvah (ritual bath) where the bride is relieved of her body hair.

¹ Again divided into units of the first week, first month, each month through the eleventh, and annual anniversaries. There is first a week of full-scale mourning (šiva) after which a visit to the grave, and return home to clean house and change into fresh clothes. Until the thirtieth day (šlošim) mourners abstain from meat, wine, sex, shaving, full work-day schedules (they must attend prayers in the house of the deceased in afternoon and evening). On the thirtieth day there is another visit to the grave and a feast. For the first year each week on adine (the day before the Sabbath) and on the night of each new month, and the eveing before a moed (holiday), one or two mullahs are paid about fifteen tomans to recite from morning until eveing, it matters not what particularly, but the favorites are the tighonim and the zohar. A yešua (reading of taillim [i.e., Yazdi for tehilim ט' ד' א' ח or psalms], tighonim, torah, mishnah, zeker-ul-rahmin) may be held in the house of the deceased by those who can afford it (involves an outlay of about a hundred tomans) on the eight days of special mourning: the seventh, fifteenth, thirtieth (and fortieth) days, (second month), fourth, eighth and eleventh months, and the year anniversary.

² Abstention from intercourse is longer among Jews: for seven days a menstruating woman is tame (unclean) and she does not cook, touch her husband or his clothing, touch Sabbath or memorial candles, or attend any religious functions. After these seven days she goes to the hammam (bath) and after an additional seven days to the miqvah (ritual bath); only then may she again engage in sex. According to the Muslim doctors at the Government hospital, this accounts for the lower frequency of cancer of the uterus among Jewish women. (They also maintain that Jews have less hereditary disease because they eat less fat, that Jews abatain from meat one day each week, and that they fast two or three days each week!)

³ The word is from the Italian cameo (gem); see the study by Schrire (1966) on Jewish amulets.

symbolism.¹

¹ For instance, the custom of selling a child to someone who has better luck if one's own children previously have been sickly or have died. See also Sassoon's short collection of Baghdadi superstitions. Some of the variations in Baghdad of things already cited in Chapters V and VI are: (a) before moving into a new house, one sends a basket with a mirror, rue, a pitcher of water, sweets; (b) to raise the intelligence of a child, take the first egg laid by a hen and write divine names on the shell and on the first day of Pentecost break it and have the child swallow its contents.

CHAPTER VIII

BAB-e BAHA (GATE OF GLORY)¹

8.1. Introduction

In the previous sections on Zoroastrians, Muslims and Jews, slightly different approaches have been adopted on the assumption that the same style of analysis or stress could be applied to each and that repetition could be avoided by using the different portions of the ethnographic display for slightly different analytic problems. In this chapter on Bahais the analytic problem will be that of the relation between religious grouping and individual belief. The Bahai communities are hierarchically organized according to a democratic election procedure,² there are community centers and a definite ritual cycle.³ But as an illegal, or unrecognized,

¹Bab means "gate" and has a tradition of usage in religious contexts as the means of communication with either internal or divine truth. The Ismailis use the word to refer to the spiritual leader who initiates others. In Bahai history, Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirazi (1821-50) declared himself the Bab in 1844. His successor, the Bahai Prophet, Mirza Hussein Ali Nur, is called Baha'u'llah or "the glory of God." Baha ("glory") in the abjad system has a value of nine: 1=ا+1=ب+5=ج+2=د. Nine is a frequently used Bahai symbolic number, viz. fn. 2.

²Voting Bahais (minimum age 21) elect members of the National Bahai Conventions which vary in size according to the size of the Bahai population: Iran's Convention currently has 171 members, Iran's 19. The Conventions elect nine members of the National Bahai Assemblies which in turn elect the nine members of the Universal House of Justice which sits for four year terms in Haifa. Yazdis elect four members of the 171 Convention delegates. Mafel rohani or Local Spiritual Assemblies (LSA) are formed wherever there are nine or more Bahais. So-called 19 Day Feasts are monthly meetings of the LSA and are tripartite: a business meeting, a spiritual reading, and a social hour. The LSA may not directly solicit funds, but members are encouraged to give, and there is a self-administered 19% "tithe" (hucuqu'llah) for those whose income is 90-100 mescals of gold above living expenses.

³The Bahai calendar consists of 19 months of 19 days each (=361 days) plus an intercalulation of four or five days between the 18th and 19th months. Like the Zoroastrian fasli and Iranian civil calendars, it begins

religious group, these community affairs are both somewhat attenuated and difficult for an outsider to attend.¹ The way Bahais operate in the wider society is contrastive, however, with the Jewish situation in that they do not withdraw their religious affairs into the privacy of their own community; since, unlike Judaism, Bahaim is a proselytizing religion the public

on the March equinox. There is a 19 day fast (sunrise to sunset) preceding the Noruz (New Year) Feast for all except pregnant and nursing women, the sick, those who must do hard work, and those under 15 or over 70. Holy days on which work is suspended commemorate crisis points in the lives of the Bab and Baha'u'llah: 21 March (the Feast of Noruz), 21 April to 2 May (Feast of Ridvan commemorating the declaration of Baha'u'llah in 1863, of which three days are rest days: the first, ninth, and twelfth), 23 May (the declaration of the Bab in 1844; also the birth of Abdul-Baha, the son and successor to Baha'u'llah); 29 May (the ascension of Baha'u'llah in 1892); 9 July (the martyrdom of the Bab in 1850); 12 November (birth of Baha'u'llah in 1817); 20 October (birth of the Bab, 1819). The repetition of the number 19 derives from the abjad value of vahid ("unity") and is the number of original disciples of the Bab together with himself.

¹Officially as an unrecognized religion, Bahais are subject to many civil disabilities ranging from ineligibility to obtain government jobs of any kind to inability to obtain birth, marriage and death certificates straightforwardly. (Marriages can be recognized after three years as common-law unions, but immediate registration can be obtained only if the ceremony is performed by a representative of one of the four recognized religions.) Regular ISA meetings are officially prohibited and require special permission or may be subject to police harassment. Informal harassment is organized by conservative Muslims with access to radio and printing facilities. Unorganized verbal abuse is common in all levels of society from university teachers to bazaaris.

Unofficially, however, the position of Bahais has improved considerably since the immediate post-Mossadeq period (cf. Appendix I, section 2.2). Since officially Bahais do not exist, a Bahai who makes nothing of his religion in public could be a Minister under the implicit assumption that he was a Muslim; this in contrast to a Jew, Zoroastrian, or Christian who by virtue of his recognized but non-Muslim status is excluded from cabinet and judicial posts. The recognition of this potentiality is the basis for the suspicions of many that various well placed people are Bahai. From the Bahai point of view, such a potentiality is not really viable and there are many Bahais who despite the disabilities insist on making it known that they are Bahai; but there are also the following considerations. A Muslim who becomes a Bahai, according to Bahaim, does so not by rejecting Islam but by gaining a deeper understanding of it. A true Bahai does not participate in politics and therefore any Minister or other politician is ipso facto not a Bahai. Bahais who participate in politics are subject to a kind of excommunication, which may be lifted upon petition when the person desists from his activity.

face of Bahatism is one of individuals arguing the case of the new faith in the hopes that listeners will convert. Indeed Iranians joke that one can always tell a Bahai by the fact that he invariably and endlessly talks about religion.

In order to understand the viability of such a public defense of what to Muslims is a heresy, and to understand the degree of hostility of Muslims, one needs to understand that Bahais form a rather large minority, much larger in any case than any of the recognized religious minorities;¹ and that while the momentum of rapid acceptance of Babism by Muslims in the mid-nineteenth century may have slowed, Bahatism is still a growing faith in Iran. In the nineteenth century there seems to be a clear relation between Persian political and economic problems on the one hand, the introduction of Western ideology, models and challenges on the other hand, and the rapid spread of Babism. While no one has yet worked out the detailed historical connections of this generally agreed upon but intuitive evaluation, the general picture is supported by the nature of the transformation from a basically religious millenarian sect concerned with the imminent coming of the Mahdi,² into a political band under Mullah Hussein Bushru'i which was crushed and repressed by Qajar politics and troops,³ and

¹At the time of the 1955 riots (see Appendix I) the Bahai antagonist Mullah Falsafi estimated the Bahai population of Iran to be about one million, or one twentieth of the population. Interior Minister Alam at the time estimated 700,000 in 500 communities of Iran. The Baha'i World 1954-63, an official Bahai publication, gives 521 organized local assemblies in Iran, plus 412 smaller groups and 338 isolated units (Baha'i Publishing Trust 1956: 1019-20). The Iran Almanac 1971 gives the figures 60,000 Bahais, 25,000 Zoroastrians, 67,000 Jews, 190,000 Armenians, 17-23,000 Assyrians, 61,000 other Catholics and Protestants (Echo of Iran 1971: 329-30).

²Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirazi, the Bab, studied with the Sheikhs in Karbala and was selected by Mullah Hussein Bushru'i to succeed Sheikh Kazim Rashti. The Sheikhs however broke with the Babis and one of their theologians, Mohammad Mamakani was among the commission which tried and condemned the Bab to death in Tabriz in 1847.

³The militant politicization emerged in several places but most centrally to Bahai self-definition was the council of the Bab's lieutenants at Behdasht where one female member, Tahiri, unveiled herself signalling Bahatism's liberation of women, and in the present context more importantly,

thence into a pacifistic faith under Baha'u'llah.¹ To the a-religious

from where Mullah Hussain Bushru'i led an armed group to make a stand at Barforush. He eventually was forced by seige and famine to sign a surrender, after which the royalist troops massacred his followers (July-August 1849). Babis then seized the citadels of Zanzan (May 1849-February 1850) and Nairiz (January 1850), but were not able to hold them. An assassination attempt on Nasraddin Shah signalled further repression of Babis and the exile from Persia of the leadership of Babis and Bahais. Commenting on a later period around 1917, the British administrator of Baluchistan, Dobbs, estimated some 70% of the Persian population to be sympathetic with Bahaism, and he laments that the power politics being played with Russia was costing Britain the support of "these democrats" (Balyuzi 1970: 31). Muslims, of course, charge that Bahaism was a tool of British policy to divide and rule Persia. Whatever uses Britain or Russia may have tried to gain from internal factions in Persia, it would seem that their support of the Qajars served by and large rather to block than to aid Bahai consolidation.

¹The split between Babism and Bahaism occurred in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Nasraddin Shah in 1852. It is agreed even by modern Bahai historians (Balyuzi 1970) that the Bab selected Mirza Yahya Nuri (Subh-i Azal) as his successor. The followers of the latter, the Babi Azalis, still exist but are few in number. In 1852 he fled Persia. His half-brother Mirza Husain Ali Nuri (Baha'u'llah) was arrested and then exiled to Baghdad. In Baghdad Baha'u'llah declared himself the referent of the Bab's words man yuzhiruhu'llah (he whom God shall manifest) and began to reformulate not only the theology and social ethics of the new faith, but to recreate the organization which was rapidly disintegrating. There were some disputes with Subh-i Azal but most Babis accepted the leadership of Baha'u'llah. At Qajar request, the Ottomans interned Baha'u'llah first in Adrianople (1864) and then in Accre (1968-92). In religious terms one might say that Baha'u'llah's succession only proves that the Bab was merely a Bab and not a prophet, for while he knew a prophet was coming, he was wrong as to who it would be. Muslim opponents use the fallibility of the Bab as proof that his claims to conveying any divine truth is nonsense. Bahai tradition however is clear in its insistence that Sayyid Ali Mohammad was no more than the John the Baptist to Baha'u'llah's Christ (a frequent Bahai analogy when talking to Christians). As to the question of the divine truth of the Bab's message, this is another clear example of the kind of situational evaluation of linguistic paradigms discussed in Chapter VI. The Sayyid apparently occasionally did make some extreme statements and may even have used the Sufi formula of achieving union or communion with God, ana'l haq (I am truth); Baha'u'llah is said to have realized his mission with the exclamation aftabam! (I am the sun). Within the Islamic paradigm any creative inspiration is also partly of divine origin. But what to a sympathetic interpretation is an acknowledgement of the omnipresence of God, to an unsympathetic one is a claim to being God; and that is the difference between islam and heresy.

Westerner the resulting Bahai faith appears clearly to be a compromise between socially activist rationalism and some still lingering need for anchorage of faith in prophets and divine intercession. To Persians trying to legitimate to one another particular social actions, this "compromise" is an unstably dynamic and daily relevant battlefield in a milieu where ultimate justifications have always been to Islamic formulations but where such formulations, whatever their inherent elasticity, have been used repetitively to legitimate what are now seen as traditional and conservative actions in situations where social change requires new actions. The challenge for Islamic theorists is not merely to make new formulations for new social innovations (universal education, etc.¹), but to make these formulations as relevant as non-religious ones. Insofar as Bahatism was able to do both these tasks more quickly and fully than Islam it presented a powerful rational appeal to Persians. And insofar as Islam did not move rapidly even in the first task, Bahatism's ability to fulfill the second task was made easier: it provided a mediate position between Islam and a-religious formulations.

8.2. The Bahai Paradigm

Two immediate questions always arise when dealing with a new proselytizing religion: who converts and why. Both are complicated by the historical changes which the religion undergoes. As a well educated clerk puts it:

The difference between Babism and Bahatism is quite profound, different approaches for different times. Babism arose within the expectant messianicism of Islam, and the early Babis behaved as would any strong Muslim who believed the Mahdi had come: public preaching and fighting. Baha'u'llah, however, stressed like Christianity that it is better to give one's life for what one believes than to take someone else's life. Fighting was made unacceptable and the emphasis was placed on teaching: if someone does not accept your teaching you pray for him. In the early days of Babism there was gap between leaders and followers. . . . Even the Bab himself stressed his transitional leadership not simply in the rhetorical terms of 'I am the gate to the greater manifestation of God'

¹The motto on the insignia of the Sepah-e Danesh (Literacy Corps) uniform is: Talabol elm farizaton alla kolle musleman va moslemah (knowledge is compulsory for Muslim men and women). The corresponding motto for the Sepah-e Behdasht (Health Corps) is: Sar-e kar-ha tandarosti bovad (health stands at the head of all work).

but by insisting that his writings should not be published but left as they were until the next manifestation could approve or dismiss what was said in them.¹

Bahais conceive of their faith as a re-statement of eternal morality changing only those formulations which are historically contingent. A teacher put it this way:

Moses ordered hair to remain unshaven and this was right for a time when Jews were shepherds. For Moses-God understood that if you shave and are always out in the sun, you may get skin cancer.² Qualification that this applies only to shepherds were not added because rules must be kept simple. The average man cannot stop to keep track of innumerable particularistic rules. Such religious rules must be like scarecrows (metarsag) to keep one on the right path and out of trouble; and so must be changed as times and conditions change.³

On the other hand, one cannot simultaneously be a Bahai and a member of another religion: Baha'u'llah is the new prophet and manifestation of God; his dispensation superceded previous ones. To obey him is a duty, but it is in one's self interest as well: if all would follow his teachings, there would be peace and until all do so there will be war and conflict. It is that simple, and the task then is to convince everyone. To the Western rationalist who says he is willing to work for Bahai social goals (the twelve fundamental principles⁴) and to submit himself to the Bahai form of social organization, but only not to believe in the necessity of a prophet, the Iranian Bahai has no answer: a few would admit such an agnostic as a full-fledged co-worker, but most clearly intimate that something necessary and serious would be missing.

¹The Bab's codification of rules, the Bayan, is superceded by the Agdas of Baha'u'llah, which in turn is still undergoing editing and explanation under aegis of the Universal House of Justice.

²A much more popular example is the Islamic rule about the size a pond of water (70 mann is the figure quoted, but it varies) need be to be considered clean. Such a rule, say Bahais, was useful in the rude days of camel travel in the waterless desert, but today it is hygenic nonsense.

³Compare Baha'u'llah (Laheh or Tablet for Maneckji): "Prophets are like a doctor who takes the pulse of a patient and changes the prescription as the condition of the patient changes."

⁴Codified by Abdul-Baha.

It is as if for a man to be his own thinker and not need a prophet as a guide and repository of ethical conscience is simply not in the conceivable set of possibilities. To be a free thinker in the sense of not accepting certain practices or ideas of one's coreligionists is perfectly acceptable and usual, but the center of one's faith must still be the prophet however one interprets his message. One comes very close here to David Schneider's apprehension of a core-symbol: religion is something which to an Iranian simply does not make sense without a prophet. Given the notion of prophets, it then makes sense to argue about degrees of sanctity (nabi, peyghambar¹), to argue whether a given tradition is "true" or not, or who belongs to what tradition.² It is intriguing that no better defense of the prophet-term³ should seem to be readily available when atheist or materialist positions are not unknown: materialists are standard straw men in rosa-xane preachments, and the 7th Imam is supposed to have defeated a materialist with the Pascalian argument that if there is no afterlife the two of them would be equally well off, but if there were an afterlife the materialist would lose out.

¹A distinction is usually made between people who merely foresee the future (nabi) such as Solomon and David; and messengers of God (peyghambar). Another distinction is tripartite: nabi is the most inclusive meaning of prophet, rasul is less inclusive and limited to the major prophets, while ul-ulasm are those five prophets who have brought divine books (by Islamic tradition)—Noah, Mohammad, Abraham, Jesus, Moses. Isma (or freedom from error) is however strictly only applied to Mohammad, by Muslims, all the others having some serious flaw.

²For instance whether Zoroastrians can be regarded followers of Abraham. Of various Muslim officials such as the Qajar Governor of Yazd Mohammad Ali Mirza it is said that he demanded proof that Zoroastrian names appear in the Qur'an, for only if so could he apply the jezia tax, and otherwise the Zoroastrians would have to be killed. The Zoroastrians, following a suggestion in Ferdowsi, came up with the thesis that Zoroaster is the Persian name of the Prophet Abraham, for Abraham is said to be a prophet in the Qu'ran, and if not the Zoroastrians, who else would be his people?

³Kenneth Burke uses the phrase "God-term" for the rhetorical functions of divinity in religious talk.

Indeed any existence of God is known to men, points out a Bahai entrepreneur,¹ only by way of prophets:

Men cannot perceive God, but know of him, his laws, angels, spirits, etc., only through His messenger. How do we know a prophet? There are five indications² but primarily we recognize a prophet by the general technique of cognition: binary oppositions or contrasts. There are many who claim to be prophets and by comparison, we recognize who is true and who false in the same way as we recognize light: there is no such thing as darkness, God created only light but we would not recognize light without the absence of light. The understanding of day requires the contrast of night, man woman, and so on. There is no sun giving out darkness corresponding to the sun giving out light. Ahriman or Shaitun (Satan) exists only as a contrast for man to know to choose good. . . .³ We know that a prophet is true, or that any event in the world is God's choice by its/his success.

A step towards explaining this axiomatic-like status of prophets may lie in the fact that to deal with a denial of God seems easier than with a denial of prophets (but see Appendix V), for to deny God is to deny morality itself, which nobody serious does. A denial of God's existence can be handled in various ways. In the simple man's language, he who does not believe in God has no reason to refrain from murder, theft, lying, etc. A Bahai teacher is slightly more Durkheimian:

As to creation, we don't think about that but there was never a time when men did not exist, because God is a relation like that of teacher: just as there is no such thing as a teacher without students, and just as shoes imply shoemakers, so there is no God without men, and since God is eternal so there was no time when men did not exist.

¹Following Baha'u'llah: "We do not know who God is, nor where he is; we only know the prophets." (Laheh or Tablet for Maneckji).

²Eda kardan: they claim they are messengers of God; (2) rad kardan, shariat-e pish maase kardan o shariat-e jadid miavordan: they declare past laws abrogated and bring new rules; (3) esteramat kardan: they stand on their word no matter what befalls them (as opposed to ordinary men, and even the Bab who under pressure once or twice publicly recanted); (4) qalam: they bring a book which they say is not of their own composition, but is of God; (5) he could not recall. Prophets can produce miracles, but these serve as proofs only to those who witness them, and so are not one of the five.

³The argument is Abdul Baha's (Barney 1908: 301-2), not known for his logic.

This leads to a few problems: one of the twelve principles of Bahaiism is harmony between science and religion, but this seems to conflict with both evolutionary and geological theory. His answer was to include the latter theories within the notion of eternal progress:

The human soul is present in the atom, and even if there were a time when the planet Earth had no men, other worlds did.

One can press him to defeat: man has an immortal soul, immortal because it has free will to choose right and wrong; animals, trees, stones also have souls but not immortal ones, they die when they are finished (the soul of a tree is its growth). But then there is a disjunction—which science denies—between man and the rest of creation.¹ Such metaphysical debates—and this seems a crucial point—invariably end in eclectic elastic symbolism or in straightforward admission of the limits of human knowledge. As to the origins and ends of life, these we do not know.² A favorite metaphor for man's state of knowledge is the status of the foetus who will with certainty be born into life, but can know nothing about this future state until it happens. A Zoroastrian merchant sums it up in complete Durkheimian fashion:

Religion and private belief are different things. If one wants to live with people in peace, one must affirm religious statements of the community. I am a Zoroastrian and when I am with Zoroastrians I must say there is a God whether I so believe in my heart or not. Likewise, one who says he is a Christian must believe in the Bible. If you deny such statements, how can people trust you? . . . Some people believe there is another existence after this life. We cannot know, just as we cannot know where the soul comes from before birth. But in both cases, it is

¹A learned Yazdi Bahai notes that Abdul Baha is full of problems for someone with a modern education. He insisted, contradicting Baha'u'llah who had maintained there was no connection between Zoroaster and Abraham, that the former was a descendant of the latter. He further insisted that Palestine was a meeting place for all the prophets including Zoroaster, Krishna, and Buddha. In his conversations with Laura Barney, he explicitly rejected evolutionary theory (Barney 1908: 205-214). He was quite taken with Theosophy, and talked of vibration theory, the metaphysics of ether, correspondences between the five spiritual portions of man and of the universe.

²Baha'u'llah (Laheh or Tablet for Maneckji): "We do not know the first and we do not know the end. Only we know that all human beings were created by the will and wishes of God. But we do not know how God created these people and things."

the same that in life there are two paths: the path of right and the path of wrong. If one does right the world speaks well of you, writes well of you, and you feel at peace or in heaven. If you follow the bad path you become unhappy, everyone around you is unhappy and life is hell. It is this the prophets have told us: do good.

The problem is, replies a Bahai (though from another conversation), that "good words, good thoughts, and good deeds"—i.e., general morality—are not sufficient, one needs to work actively towards peace. To create unity of purpose and effort, Bahai propagandists attempt to aid people of various religious backgrounds find in Bahaism the culmination of their own symbolic paradigms:

Baha'u'llah is Christ Returned, the fifth Buddha, the Twelfth Imam, Shah Bahram Varjovand, Krishna reincarnated, and for Israel the Everlasting Lord of Hosts. [When I pointed out that the last lacks parallel status, being the name of God himself, he replied, instead of correcting it to the Messiah of the House of David, with the mirror analogy, which works equally well, and logically is a more encompassing solution:] A mirror reflecting the light of the sun can simultaneously say, "I am the sun," and "I am not the sun, but merely glass." Christ also said, "I shall return, I shall return the son of God, I shall return God. Every thousand years God sends a new manifestation.

If Bahaism is pragmatically syncretistic for wide appeal, its arguments therefore, charge opponents, are not new and have previously been rejected. Abd el Rahim Tag (1942) lists fifteen doctrines held in common with such other Islamic sects as Ismailis, Druzes, Ali-ilahi, Ahle Haq, and Horoufis: e.g., that the end of man is a pantheistic reunion with the divine, that the Qur'an must be interpreted allegorically or esoterically (batin) and not literally or exoterically (zahir), that there is no resurrection of the body, paradise or hell, but that paradise is understanding (hence also acceptance of the new faith) and hell ignorance, etc. E.G. Browne (1918: 325-39) similarly summarizes the thirty heresies with which Mohammad Taqi Hamadani in 1908 charged the Bahais, including the four cardinal heresies ash-Shahristani had identified as the signs of extreme Shiism (ghulat): tanasukh (metempsychosis), hulul (incarnation), raj'at (return), and bada (that God may change his intention). Yet despite the existence of a traditional fund of counter arguments for almost any Islamic style argument put forth, in an Islamic country such style of argumentation can be effective. Thus a proof of the Bab's mission is claimed to be the beauty of his Arabic, parallel with the Muslim claim that the Qur'an's divine origin is

evidenced in its matchless poetry.¹ Another proof of the new faith is the stories of confident and joyful martyrdom in explicit comparison to the Shiite Karbella, e.g., in the slaying of the seven Bahais recounted in Appendix I, section 1.2, Mullah Ali was the third to die:

The executioner first cut the neck muscles on either side of his wind pipe to allow him a final word before the wind pipe was cut. As the blood flowed down his beard, he caught it in his cupped hands and showed it to the crowd crying, "Look at this blood by which I swear to the truth of my faith. Hazrat-e Shahid [Hussein ibn Ali] farmudeh, 'Halmin naserin yansurin; man nemiguyam halmin naserin yansurin; man miguyam halmin naserin yansurin." The line is a pun on the word naserin which in the first repetition means helper (komak konandeh), i.e., Hussein at Karbella cried, "Is there no one to come and help me!"; and in the second repetition it means witness (negardar), i.e., Mullah Ali cries, "I need no one to help me, I want you to look and comprehend." And the Shiah think that the person in the universe who suffered most (was most mazlum) was Hussein! [Compare the Shiite story of the difference between the deaths of Ali and Omar cited in Chapter VI.] Then there is the famous story of Mirza Suleiman Khan in Teheran who had eighteen candles bored into his skin and himself took a knife and put in the nineteenth so that the total should equal vahid (unity), and then sang and danced to the truth.

Other forms of proof which find a response in Iranian culture are demonstrations by divine retribution upon Bahai enemies and predictions through dreaming. The executioner of Mullah Ali above soon developed a worm infested boil (zaxm) on his neck of which he painfully died. A less momentous but nonetheless exemplary case of "retribution" is that of the door of a walled garden belonging to a Yazdi Bahai villager:

Two years ago a man burned down the wooden door to his garden. K. knew who did it, but the latter would not admit it. K. would ask him, 'Do you believe in God?' 'Yes.' 'You say you did not do it?' 'No.' 'All right, go on!' But that same month the man had an auto accident, running into a utility pole for which he had to pay 1000 tomans (\$130) damage, and his daughter lost an eye in an accident while on her way to a Muslim shrine. Bahai QED: God is just. It turns out that the cause of the burning of the door was not simple anti-Bahaism but that this man had owned a brick kiln near the gardens and K. had complained four times

¹This claim has always been received with ridicule by Muslims who delight in pointing out the Bab's faulty grammar. To this apparently Babis developed the defense that revelation need not be bound by grammar, indeed liberates the oppression of fossilized grammar (Browne 1918: 326). But in general Bahais probably received the criticism with as much receptivity as Muslims the disbelief of Jews and Christians in the perfection of Qu'ranic poetry.

to the Governor's office, the Mayor's office, and the police that the smoke was harmful to both humans and plants. The man had eventually been forced to relocate the kiln some six kilometers further out of town.

Dreaming forms one of the standard elements in conversion stories.

(a) Jamshid and Noshiravan were two of the twenty-five Zoroastrian families who were converted at the same time in the village of Husseinabad-e Yazd by Mullah Bahram. They decided they wanted to see either Baha'u'llah or Abdul Baha in person and so they pilgrimaged to Haifa. They had prepared some questions but in the presence of Abdul Baha they could not speak. The latter seeing they were farmers ordered them to cut down a large tree and remove the roots. When they saw the tree they estimated the job would take nine to ten days. On the third night as they slept they dreamt of a storm and heard a voice. When they awoke the tree had been uprooted. They took this as a divine sign and became true believers. Abdul Baha allowed them to remain in Haifa nineteen days and then gave them directions of how to return to Iran, Jamshid decided to take another route instead. After some time they ran out of food, and while his companions went to get provisions at a village, Jamshid was robbed and roughed up, but escaped death. All agreed this was for failing to obey Abdul Baha's directions. Two generations later a prosperous young businessman of the family decided to marry. The date happened to coincide with the death anniversary of Abdul Baha. He invited not only his own family (Zoroastrian) but his mother's family (Bahai). His maternal uncle advised him of the significance of the date, but he refused to change it. That uncle refused to attend and forbade his children. A son disobeyed and a few days later was killed in an accident involving a car and a camel. The groom subsequently had a son who contracted cancer and despite hospitalization in Germany died. The groom himself also soon died, significantly on the anniversary of Abdul Baha's death.

(b) A fifty-year-old Mashadi of a family of akhunds responds to the question of how he became a Bahai by saying "through a series of dreams." At age nine he dreamt he was alone on the desert and he came to an ancient building. Going inside he saw a man being cut up on the chest by a group of men. He asked why and was told, "He is your God, and if you stay, you too must be cut up." So he ran, but then he thought: if this is happening to my God, I do not want to be free. So he returned. At the pain of the torture he awoke. Twelve years later, aged twenty-one, he went to a Bahai friend's house to wish him a happy Noruz, and there on the wall he saw a picture which he recognized as the tortured God of his earlier dream. His Bahai friends informed him it was Shoghi Effendi, the Guardian of the Faith. He then began to read about Bahaism. Previously he had refused to hear anything about Bahaism. He then had a third dream: he saw his grandfather who asked, "Why are you unhappy?" And he replied, "I think I am a Bahai." The grandfather told him not to worry and gave him a book to read, a book by Baha'u'llah. He woke up determined to be a Bahai.

(c) A grey haired little old lady in Yazd tells about her conversion thus. She married a Bahai and was bothered by the constant religious conflict around her, one person arguing for this faith, another for that. The Bahai argument struck her as saying nothing bad and being intellectually sound. One night she dreamt the moon was approaching her and the sun followed behind, and then the moon disappeared leaving the sun shining in its full brilliance. In the morning she consulted a dream analyst and eventually she settled on the interpretation that it was a sign that the Bahai message was correct.

This use of dreaming is, of course, not particularly Islamic, but rather part of the Iranian culture at large as already described in the preceding chapters. More obviously Islamic is, for instance, the form of Bahai prayer¹ modeled on the Islamic namaz.²

But while all these elements of Islam and general Iranian culture make the transition to Bahaiism smoother and more familiar, a powerful appeal is also made to rationalism in contrast to the alleged blind traditional acceptance of the competing religions. Particularly among converts from Zoroastrianism is it said that the dasturs could not explain why things were done, but insisted nonetheless on blind obedience:

(a) A Yazdi Zoroastrian now resident in Bombay tells of his conversion: He went to Firuz Bahram High School in Teheran and being Zoroastrian attended the religion class for Zoroastrians. One day a Bahai friend asked if he understood what he was memorizing. He replied no, and agreed that he should. When the next day he demanded explanations, he was beaten. The Muslim instructor at the school heard of this and invited

¹There are three forms of individual daily prayer: a longer prayer which if recited in the proper spirit need be said only once; a shorter prayer to be repeated thrice; and for the very busy, a short sentence to be said at noon.

²You must be clean in body and clothes or else the prayer is not acceptable. While washing the hands and face there is a formula to recite asking for aid to keep one's hands from doing wrong and one's face from looking elsewhere than towards the divine light. The formal prayer then begins facing Accre where Baha'u'llah is buried as the Muslims face the Kaaba: stand erect, palms up, prostration (sejdeh), stand up, palms up, three times say Allah Abha (equivalent to the Islamic Allaho Akbar) raising and lowering the hands, put hands on knees, stand up and bring up palms and three times say "Allah o azamo min kole azim" (There is none greater than God), prostration, kneel with hands on knee, stand and say three times Allah Abha, bend with hands on knee, stand and three times say Allah Abha. For missing prayers there are prescribed formulae to be added afterwards.

him to his Qur'an class promising full explanations there. He went and soon became the number one student in the Qur'an class. For this he was rebuked by the Zoroastrian Anjoman. Then his Bahai friend came and said, "What is this that you have become Muslim? Religion is not a shirt you change everyday, today you are Muslim, tomorrow Jewish, the next day Christian!" And he explained the Bahai tenet that all religions have the same eternal message, only the civil rules of life must change with the times. When the boy now announced to his mother that he had become a Bahai, she threw him out of the house crying, "You Muslim! From today on the mother's milk I gave you from my breast has run dry!" And so he emigrated to Bombay where his father was living.

(b) A fanatic Muslim woman from Abadeh had two sons who were Bahai. For a long time she resisted conversion. One Ramazan she heard a mullah declare from the membar that anyone who had become a Bahai, his mother had slept with strangers and he is not the child of his father. The woman, enraged at this slur, immediately broke her fast in the house of her granddaughter declaring she had become Bahai. She went to the axond and told him, "For years I resisted becoming Bahai, but you have converted me."

(c) Mirza Golpayegani who taught at Cairo's Al-Azhar University told of his conversion in the following terms. He had been a fanatic Muslim, proud of his learning. He went to Rey one day and his horse threw a shoe. The blacksmith while shoeing the horse began, "I see from your turban that you are a learned man; tell me, I have heard a hadith that every drop of rain is brought to the ground by an angel, is it true?" "Yes." The man worked for a while and then said, "Another hadith I have also heard is that in a house where there are dogs, angels are not to be found, is it true?" "Yes." "Well, put the two hadith together: how can that be?" Golpayegani was surprised and angry at having so been bested by a simple blacksmith, but he accepted a copy of The Book of Certitude (proofs of the Bab's mission written by Baha'u'llah before declaring his own mission). Ten years of reading and debate it took before Golpayegani converted, but then it was for good.

A descendant of a Zoroastrian convert to Bahaism attributes a large role to Bahaism in introducing into Zoroastrianism burial, giving up of the nošveh or barešnum ablution ceremonies (his grandmother died of pneumonia during these purification rites after a miscarriage in the cold of winter), giving up the separation of menstruating women, making religion intelligible, etc. The appeal among Iranian Zoroastrians was undeniably enormous: there is practically no family without Bahai members. Among Muslims, Bahais credit themselves with raising the level of critical inquiry, of promoting (if not yet very successfully) female liberation, of undermining belief in nejasat, and so on. Among Jews, Bahaism had an appeal primarily in western

Iran, but the Yazd community experienced only a few converts, and only one remains in Yazd, an old man with a Jewish second wife.

What emerges from this section are two generalizations: (1) it is striking how much religious argumentation is carried on in quite stereotyped form: even the metaphors used by missionizing individuals are usually directly traceable to Abdul Baha, Baha'u'llah, and the Bab, and from them back into standard Islamic lore;¹ (2) the source of religious change therefore must be sought, as suggested by the Zoroastrian merchant cited above, not in the internal dialectic of ideas but in historical sociology.

¹The mirror image is a popular one from at least the seventh century on. It is used for that stage of the soul after having achieved unity with God when the soul mirrors heavenly beauties in itself: viz., the seventh century Christian sect of Mesallyane and the Nestorian Issac of Nineveh (Morony 1972: 138). Rumi in his Masnavi repeatedly uses the mirror as an image for the purified heart: a Sufi gains spiritual knowledge by purifying the heart so it becomes a mirror, and the Perfect Man is referred to as the Universal Mirror. Rumi refers to the hadith: al-mu'minu mir'atu 'l-mu'min (The believer is the mirror of the believer), i.e., all believers are brothers and in sympathy with one another, and hence, one can see one's own moral attitudes reflected, as it were, in the suitably responsive attitude of others (C.E. Wilson 1910: 10). The Agha Khan (1954: 175) credits Imam Hussein with a slightly different twist: explaining the doctrine of God and the universe by analogy with the sun and its reflection in a pool—it is an image but a poor one.

There is an obvious connection between the mirror and water, both in the form of a reflecting pool and in the form of purifying tears. Weeping is a common pious exercise: Middle Iranian and Soghdian texts require weeping along with prayer for expiating sins; the neo-Babylonian kings wept ritually in atonement for the sins of the year; Nestorian monks used tears to purify the body; St. Ephrem and Issac of Nineveh exhort its use; in the Qur'an (17: 109; 19: 58) weeping is associated with the prostrations of Christian piety; the early Muslims included weeping ascetics, the so-called bakka'un of Basra and Kufa (Morony 1972: 137). And until the present in rosa and tazieh weeping is the sign of a true believer. Rumi repeatedly refers to weeping as a means of purification, viz., his story of the death of Sheikh Ahmad (Rumi 1910: 41).

The popular Bahai image of the soul as a tear drop from heaven which evaporates at death is a clear elaboration of these symbolic uses of water and the mirror and (divine) light. The form of water as a tear is especially clear, since tearing is associated with the eye (vision, understanding). The popular explanation of decorating the naxl for Moharram with mirrors is that mirrors are a symbol of purity. The purity is that of Hussein (whose coffin

8.3. Bahai Development in Yazd

Of the development of Bahaiism among Yazdi Muslims, I know little more than what can be read in Nabil-i-a'zam (1932), Tahir Malmiri (1342 A.H./1924), and the reports of the C.M.S. missionaries, namely the recitation of martyrs. Yazd seems to have been swept into the Babi enthusiasm immediately upon the proclamation of the Bab's mission (1844) and it caused there the same outraged commotion among the defenders of Islam as it had in Shiraz. Mullah Sadegh who was forced to leave Shiraz for his modification of the call to prayer to include a reference to the Bab,¹ came to Yazd where his preaching so stirred up the crowd that he had to be rescued from physical harm by the mujtahed Hussein Azghardi. The king, Mohammad Shah Qajar, deputed Sayyid Yahya Darabi, who maintained a house in Yazd, to investigate the Babi enthusiasm in Shiraz: before going to interview the Bab, the Sayyid spoke of his mission to test the Bab from the membar in Yazd; he returned from Shiraz a missionary for the new faith. Just before his martyrdom² in the Nairiz insurrection ten days before the Bab was shot in Tabriz

is represented by the naxl) and perhaps also reflects that of the true believers who are mourning his death, and by this crying, purifying themselves.

¹On the same pattern as the Shiite modification including a reference to Ali.

²One of the more frequently retold of Babi martyrdoms. Sayyid Yahya was skinned and the skin stuffed with straw and dispatched to Nasraddin Shah. Some four hundred men were decapitated. Their women's heads were shaved, and the women placed on unsaddled camels (camels are hard enough to ride as is) and given each a head on a pike to carry. The procession went to Shiraz first. The town was decorated and the Governor, Prince Firuz, together with the Kalantar Qavam (grandfather of Princess Ashraf's husband) presided. The Kalantar is supposed to have turned to the Governor and remarked, "Only one thing is missing: were the town illuminated, the procession would be just like the procession when Imam Hussein was killed and the women taken to Sham." This shocked the Governor, who reacted by visiting the prisoners in their caravanserai. There he saw an old man and asked him to recant and he could go free. The old man replied, "My name is Mullah Abdullah. I was the Imam Jome of Nairiz. I am ninety years old. You see those three heads over there? They are my newly wedded sons. You see those three women over there?"

(1850), he had stirred up Yazd once again with his preaching. Two general points may perhaps be suggested about the religious and sociological milieu. Regarding the religious milieu, it was one of emotional mystic and messianic expectation in which proofs of divinity were expected to display the wondrous: beauty of language, dreams coming true, beatitude of suffering pain, etc. Yazd had been for twelve years the residence of Sheikh Ahmad Ahsa'i and the Sheikh wrote most of his works there.¹ Regarding the sociological milieu, it was one of economic distress, political turmoil,² and of engagement with the colonial empires. It is interesting that many Bahais and Bahai converts should have come from the ranks of the Muslim axonds and the relatively well-to-do. Note the approval which the Bahsi reformation received among European commentators: Gobineau, Renan, Curzon, Browne. The builder of the first Bahai temple—in Ishkabad—was a Yazdi, Ostad Ali Akbar Ne'emar, who lost his life with eighty-three others in the Yazd massacres of 1903; there apparently was a fair sized Yazdi-Bahai trading network for a short period in the Caucasus and Turkestan. The Russian agent in Yazd was for a while a Bahai.

They are my daughters-in-law. The Governor of Nairiz also wanted me to recant: he called me into his office and told me that unless I did, I would be sorry. I told him I would not. He had my three sons sit in my lap while he decapitated them. And you ask me to recant!" From Shiraz the procession went to Abadeh by which time the heads were so putrified they had to be buried.

¹The founder of the Sheikhis. The Sheikhis are noted for their concern about the imminent return of the Mahdi. They argued that the Mahdi would be born and not re-emerge out of a well, and that final resurrection and judgment will be of the soul, not the body. Sheikh Ahmad is supposed to have commented on the mosque in Shiraz patterned after that of Mecca that its builder had an unconscious intuition that Shiraz would have a similar status some day as Mecca.

²Only a few years earlier in 1840 the Agha Khan I, based in Kirman and Shahrabak, had been defeated in a series of military skirmishes with the central government, and had moved his Imamate to India. That parallels exist between a number of Ismaili and Bahai theological interpretations has already been suggested.

A little more may be pieced together of the development of Baháism among Yazdi Zoroastrians. The first conversion was in the 1880s, a textile merchant named Kei Khosrow Khodadad who had a shop in Kashan. But more important was his apprentice, Mullah Bahram, surnamed by Abdul Baha "Akhtar Khavari" (the star rising in the east), who was instrumental in bringing many Zoroastrians to the Bahai faith. He himself became an important member of the large merchant firm of Shiraz and Yazd, Iranian. Together with a cousin of the Bab he founded the village of Mehdiabad-e Homeh, called colloquially still Ghulabad (place of ghouls) as it was when it was still only desert. His activities did not please the Zoroastrian dasturs, and when his fourteen year old daughter died of diphtheria, permission was refused to place her in the daxme:

It was a hot summer and the body began to putrefy. The priests collected a band of men to guard the daxme and insure the corpse was not placed there. Three leaders of the Zoroastrian community-- Kei Khosrow (the merchant who built the Khosrovi school), his brother Goodarz, and the Kalantar Dinyar--interceded. The dasturs Namdar and Tirandaz were obstinate, charging that not only was the corpse the daughter of a Bahai but she was probably not even a virgin. Incensed, Goodarz is said to have drawn out his mule whip and shouting that they might have doubts about the virginity of the corpse, but he knew for certain about the lack of chastity of their (the dasturs') daughters, and he rode to the daxmes challenging anyone to oppose his order to place the girl in the daxme. He prevailed and even forced the dasturs to read the funeral service. It is further said, incidentally, as an indication of the split between the educated elite and the dasturs, that as they began to recite, Goodarz challenged them to explain what they were reading, but they (as they are not supposed to chat while reciting) merely kept reading.

The relation between the Zoroastrian elite and Baháism is still the subject of bitter controversy. Some like the family of Akhtar Khavari and part of the Aidun family (co-founders of Yazd's second textile mill) were open Bahais. Others were sympathizers, seeing Baháism as an Islamic reformation to be encouraged as part of Iran's modernization, although not particularly among Zoroastrians whose modernization was already proceeding internally among the Parsees. Maneckji Hataria, who apparently had wide religious interests, being received in some Sufi circles as a darvish, visited Baha'ullah in Baghdad. The latter wrote a "tablet" in response to his questions cited already above under the name Laheh, and Maneckji also commissioned

Mirza Abdul Fazl Golpayegani to write a history of Bahatism. Maneckji's successor, Ardeshir, is also said to have been sympathetic to Bahatism. The controversy reaches its peak of bitterness when the case of Ostad Master Khodabaksh is raised; most agree that he himself was not a Bahai but his descendants are. The assassination of this Yazdi, Bombay trained, teacher and reformer apparently had implications for a variety of conflicts within the community. The political implications have already been touched upon in Chapter III. The implications for the authority of the dasturs is further brought out in an incident forty days before his assassination:

Mirza Siavosh, a well known Zoroastrian-Bahai, wished to marry his daughter to his brother's son. The dasturs refused to perform the ceremony or issue a marriage certificate. Another Zoroastrian-Bahai, Firuz, then went to the mujtahed; the latter after suitable bribing agreed to invest Firuz with the authority to perform the marriage if he could demonstrate competence. Firuz got a number of Zoroastrians, including Master Khodabaksh to testify on his behalf. Firuz then performed the marriage. The dasturs formed a committee and hired an assassin to shoot Firuz. The assassin was the only Zoroastrian member of the gendarmerie, and although he failed to successfully kill Firuz he was retained to assassinate Khodabaksh shortly thereafter. Firuz learned from the servant of the mujtahed that before the assassination attempt, the dasturs had also gone to the mujtahed, bribe in hand, to ask permission to impose death retribution on Zoroastrian apostates to Bahatism. The mujtahed is characteristically supposed to have responded: it is immaterial since from the Islamic point of view both Zoroastrians and Bahais are dogs. Master Khodabaksh confronted the dasturs at the next Anjoman meeting about their visit to the mujtahed. He had also crossed the Zoroastrian Parliamentary representative. A month and a half later he was dead.

What is to be learned from these stories is the following. (1) As far as Zoroastrian development is concerned, Bahatism was one of several potent forces which fostered rapid liberalization. The English and Parsi influence was a second such force, and the Christian mission in Yazd did have success with a number of Zoroastrians.¹ But in Iran as opposed to India, Bahatism because it was grounded in the culture and because of the political conditions of Iran seems to have provided the greater vehicle.

¹Today all except one family of Yazdi Christians are of Zoroastrian origin. This does not, however, indicate a greater success than with Muslims. Rather it is easier for a Zoroastrian convert than a Muslim convert to live in Yazd. The Muslim-Christians of whom the most prominent is the Taft-born Bishop of Iran, have all left.

It seems to be the case that (a) few Parsees ever became Bahai—the Bahai ISA in Bombay is largely Yazdi and largely of Zoroastrian descent; (b) there seems to be not an Iranian Zoroastrian family which does not have Bahai relatives. (2) As far as Bahai development goes, the marriage and burial problems cited indicate a set of legal harrassments still unsolved today. Legally there is no such thing as a Bahai marriage in Iran, and so Bahais rely on a symbiosis with their former communities attempting to have Zoroastrian or Muslim weddings when possible as well as Bahai weddings. Burial is now done in Bahai graveyards called golestan ("rose garden"). The first golestan in Yazd was made outside of town just below the Zoroastrian daxmes; the Zoroastrians objected to the authorities and it was removed. Today the Zoroastrians have their own graveyard there, called aramgah ("place of quiet"). But until the institution of graveyards, Zoroastrians who objected to the daxme had themselves interred in a golestan. The main golestan is in Mehdiabad (Ghulabad) next to which is the small Christian cemetery donated by the same Bahai who donated the land for the golestan.

Today there are some one hundred Bahai families in Yazd. They are kept track of by their Muslim opponents, and harrassed when feasible, the last major incident being the riots of 1956 (Appendix I). But regular gatherings are still officially prohibited. A Muslim lad remembers that the first Literacy Corpsman (Sepah-e Danesh) to come to his village was cursed as a Bahai by the children and so tormented that he spent most of his tour of duty away from the village:

They would wash his pens before handling them as if najes, and cry: tu pir-e Babi! (Up the Babi saint). They would dialogue: pir-et goidam (I fucked your saint); pirishun nakon, javanishun bekon! (do not fuck his old ones, fuck his young ones [pir - 1. old man; 2. saint]). Or they chanted:¹

¹Again (cf. Ch. VI) note, the point of these chants is not the obscenity of the language alone, but the rhyming variations; points accrue for new variations and better rhymes, although the basic pattern may remain simple, e.g., a triplet with an invariable final line:

<u>In dalle por az barut</u>	This box is full of gunpowder
<u>kir-e Mahmada-e Harut</u>	The cock of M.H. (a bandit)
<u>bar kos-e zan-e Babi</u>	Up the cunt of the Babi woman

But the couplet beginning the triplet is infinitely variable: in hos por-e ab (this pool is full of water). . . .

Abbas Effendi koshtanesh
Be ab-e sende shoshtanesh
Xabar bordand be Iran
Hame goftand be kirun
Xabar bordand be Ardekun
Hame goftand be zardekun
Abbas Effendi che Pir Lavandi
Ham kos kesh o ham dayus o
zan lavandi

Abbas Effendi, kill him
Wash (his corpse) with excrement
They brought the news to Iran
All said on my cock
They brought the news to Ardekan
All said on my carrot (cock)
Abbas Effendi, what a saintly whore
Cunt proferer, also pimp, also his
wife's a whore

Given that the abuse is not limited to village children (still today a Bahai teacher in a Meybod public school may not use the common tea glasses in the teacher's room), life is not easy for Bahais.¹ Until 1935 when Reza Shah closed them, Bahais had their own schools: three in Yazd and thirty-six in Iran, of which the Tarbiyat High School in Teheran was quite well regarded. Migration from Yazd follows the pattern of their respective Muslim and Zoroastrian backgrounds: a follow-up of a picture taken in 1933 of 42 Bahai women in one of the Yazd villages reveals the following current distribution. Five of these women were of Muslim background and all remained in Yazd; of their 18 children 13 remained, 2 went to Pakistan, and 3 to Teheran. But of the 37 Zoroastrian-Bahai women only nine stayed in Yazd, 15 left for Pakistan, 3 for India, 6 for Teheran, and 4 elsewhere in Iran; and of their 114 children only 12 remain in Yazd, 40 are in Pakistan, 11 in India, 21 in Teheran, 15 elsewhere in Iran, and 15 elsewhere abroad. The marriage pattern reveals a similar dynamic: 14 of these 114 latter children

¹I did not establish exactly when the following incidents occurred; it was said "about five years ago" which might place them at the time of the protests against the White Revolution (1963). The stories are all from the same village. A Muslim became a Bahai. A relative, Hassan, laid claim to his property. The convert then gave power of attorney to a Zoroastrian-Bahai, Jamshid, and left for India. The latter went to court and received a judgment affirming his control against Hassan's claim. Hassan then tried to plant some opium in Jamshid's house planning to then call the police, but Jamshid caught him, beat him and tied him up. Jamshid then together with the kakhdia went to fetch the police. When the police came, Hassan claimed innocence, that he had been walking along when for no reason he had been attacked and bound up. The Muslim friends of Hassan swore to kill Jamshid and the kakhdia and for some time the police had to guard their house day and night. Several other incidents then occurred. The Bahai operator of the neighborhood electricity generator was sought, and he spent several days in hiding. A Bahai watchmaker was seized with the demand for the return of a non-existent watch, but was released unharmed when the women of the neighborhood began to intervene and raise a ruckus. And the inhabitant of the convert's house was also harrassed.

married outside the Zoroastrian community (either a Jew, Muslim, Christian, or a non-Zoroastrian Bahai) and of the thirty-seven Zoroastrian-Bahai women themselves only four did not marry Zoroastrian-Bahais. Marriage patterns are recognized by Christian missionaries, as well as Bahais, to be one of the most tenacious forms of continued separation within the convert community, but when Bahais emigrate abroad their genealogies do indicate a more complete acceptance of the injunction to use marriage as a way to bring new people into the faith.

8.4. Individual Belief and Social Constraints

The argument of this chapter so far has proceeded by pointing out that Bahais are aggressive witnesses for their faith who attempt through rational debate to win over new converts, but that the arguments used are fairly well stereotyped, and that therefore, perhaps, the arguments used are at least to some degree selected by the requirements of the social game being played. We shall pursue the argument in this final section by leaving aside Bahaism per se and looking at the way several individuals present their beliefs. We also interpolate into this section some conversion stories because these stories—myth or truth, they contain both—are presentations of the Muslim/non-Muslim boundary, and because conversion prima facie has to do with individual decisions (even if coerced) about belief and behavior. As the two paranthetical remarks indicate the subject is not obviously simple and requires constant critical evaluation.

8.4.1. "Behruz Irani"

Behruz now lives in Bombay where he is active in Bahai affairs as well as an effective official within his professional organization. He is a descendant of Murzeban-e Sohrab who built Mobarake (Ch. III above). As a young man he was placed in charge of some road building near Yazd. One day with some of his co-workers he decided to visit the Shrine of Imam Reza in Meshed. He was discovered. His friends covered for him claiming that he was a Muslim. He was asked to recite the shahada as proof. News of this got back to Yazd, and when he returned a reception awaited him. He was made to give speeches at rosas denouncing Zoroastrianism and Bahaism. He was also given a Muslim wife and made to leave his Zoroastrian one. Word of his predicament got back to his father in Bombay who arranged through various connections his escape to Bombay. Since then he has visited Iran on several occasions. The first time he returned to his Yazdi village there was again an attempt to

force a public demonstration that he was Muslim; he had to flee by night. Years later when he returned again he first sent a message to find out if it was safe, but by then interest in him as a cause célèbre had dissipated. One of his trips to Iran was in connection with the Parsi-Irani plan to establish a model agricultural settlement for Zoroastrians either near Persepolis or in Khuzistan near Dezful. The settlement was to be a utopian social experiment with free medical, educational, insurance and other social services. The Shah and his cabinet withdrew their support when they saw how progressive relative to the rest of Iran it would appear, fearing it would cause unrest.

Of Iran, Behruz says he likes the country and the people. He retains his citizenship. But he despairs of life in Iran as long as there is no serious attempt to allow democracy. He contrasts the situation in India and marvels at his own lobbying successes on behalf of his industry: "Just think, I am a foreigner, a man of little standing, and yet I can do all this. In Iran what could I do? There my response would be of necessity the snivelling 'bicharam, che kar konam' (hapless me, what can I do)." In Bombay he has to deal with a corrupt administrative structure and he tells of how long it took him to get building materials for his house because he refused to pay off various people and of how he did manage in the end to get the house built. He is fond of saying, "In India, one is free, for that I love India." As a Bahai or even as a Zoroastrian, that Iran is not free is symbolized to him by Article 58 of the Iranian constitution.

Behruz's story contains two related points of importance. The first is the theme of the chapter that there is a direct relation between the form of expressions (bicharam, che kar konam) and social opportunities. This is to say no more than that language does serve to communicate; but what is communicated is often misunderstood, and the point here is that the so frequent denigration of Middle Eastern peasants and workers by referring to their "fatalistic" phrase gesmat (it is fate) is a misunderstanding. It is not that they are particularly fatalistic, but that they are communicating the limits of their power. To say philosophically that an occurrence is fate, that to have married one's particular wife, for instance, was written on one's forehead (sarnevash), does not contradict pragmatic free will or calculation of self interest.

The second point of Behruz' story has to do with conversion. His is one of a large series of conversion stories all of which turn upon some initial symbolic Muslim action on the part of a non-Muslim, and then upon the sociological sanctions applied by the Muslim community to enforce further Islamic behavior and commitment. It is told of Behruz's ancestor

Murzban Sohrab that a Muslim came to him with a piece of paper and requested, "I am illiterate, please read this to me." Murzeban, however, smelled a trick and read it through first, and seeing it to be the shahada refused. Of women, the story is more common that somehow a girl would be seduced, or perhaps even given a drug to make her amenable to suggestion, and quickly married to a Muslim. As the mullah replied to Maneckji (Ch. III) such means may be dubious, but once a Muslim, one may not ask how she became Muslim, and she is then subject to the sanctions against apostasy should she return to her original faith. There is however a caveat to be registered: these are stories told by non-Muslims. And in at least one case, I have been able to cross-check through several informants, the story of drugging is accepted to be a post-facto justification when the woman's marriage soured and she wished she had never entered into it (Case b below). That Muslims are zealous of making converts there is no doubt: I too have been promised the most beautiful virgin to wed, a house, money, and a civic parade with illuminations, decorations and a white stallion to ride.¹ Such promises and relief from feelings of harassment have undoubtedly made more conversions to Islam than the blazen tricks so bitterly described by non-Muslims. Six cases of conversion are offered below. The first is another version of what happened to Behruz Irani.

(a) Behruz began to dig a ganat, but however much money he spent he did not find water. So he looked around for someone to help fund him, and he found a financial partner is a ganadi (confectioner). Behruz went to visit his partner quite frequently, and became friendly with the daughter. Behruz, despite having already a wife and children, was found one day by the ganadi kissing the girl. Behruz thinking fast, said, "Don't worry, I'll marry her." "But you are Zoroastrian." "So, I will become Muslim." And so he did. Not only did he become Muslim, but he became a rosa-xond and was so good he would draw crowds. One day he announced he would go on pilgrimage to Meshed. He left and went to Meshed but from there continued on to India where he became a Bahai and sent back for his Zoroastrian wife. He fears to return and when he does it is for very brief periods and he pays certain people to stay away from him.

(b) Shirin for some reason had no suitors. She did some contract work for a goldsmith making thin gold chains. The courier, a Muslim boy, proposed to her on condition she become Muslim, and to encourage her he

¹When towards the end of my stay, a European wife of an Iranian engineer became Muslim in Yazd, it was an occasion of quiet celebration among the religious Muslims, and she was sent a deluxe edition of the Qu'ran.

paid her more than normal commission. She replied that she preferred being a spinster to becoming Muslim. A Muslim neighbor woman was a friend of both the boy and Shirin and decided to facilitate the match. She invited both to visit her. As soon as Shirin entered she bolted the door, immediately putting Shirin's reputation in jeopardy. Shirin's mother and sister came to see her there and she protested that she had not become Muslim, but that she could not return for if she did not marry the boy people would forever speak ill of her, and no one would marry her for sure. The marriage after a while became unhappy, and the sister usually elides the story by saying that Shirin had been temporarily deranged having been administered a drug.

(c) A somewhat similar case is a much more recent one. A Zoroastrian girl became friendly with a Muslim Sepah-e Danesh (Literacy Corpsman) and went to stay in the house of the local mullah. She said she like the boy and wanted to become his wife since he was better than any of the local Zoroastrian boys. The family asked if they found a better Zoroastrian boy would she marry him, and she agreed. They did, and she remains Zoroastrian living in Teheran. Again, the normal version of this story is that she was forcibly abducted and that the police had to be called to release her from the mullah.

(d) Golgardan was a beautiful Zoroastrian girl. In those days, so the story goes, one who gave three successive "yes" answers, became Muslim. She one day was carrying some plums on her head to her house and some Muslim boys followed her. They knocked on her door till she answered it. Are you Golgardan? Yes? Were you carrying plums on your head just now? Yes. Are you the daughter of Esfendiar? Yes. They grabbed her saying she had become Muslim and took her to the house of a mullah. There she cried for forty days until she died. The Muslim boys then returned to her house, where they caught one of her brothers and told him that as their convert had died, he must take her place. The intent was to get at the family wealth. The boy said, no matter what you do I will not become Muslim. The Muslim boys became incensed and took twine which they tied onto his genitals and dragged him to the fire temple where he died. Now they approached the father and told him that his daughter having become Muslim he must give them her inheritance. He said she had not become Muslim but they had killed her. But as they threatened him he asked for a day to consider. In that day he made all his property religious vaqf. The Muslims respected this and left in disgust. For such reasons almost all Zoroastrian property was vaqf.

(e) Old Darius says that he nearly became Muslim during the hard times when there was no water in the village. He supported himself then by working for a Muslim. The latter kept telling him how much he could improve his life if he became Muslim. So eventually they struck a deal: he would convert if the Muslim would give him both his garden and his only daughter. At the last minute the Muslim refused to give the daughter and the deal fell through. Although Darius is a relatively knowledgeable Zoroastrian—he leads prayers at seasonal gahambars—he also is somewhat eclectic in his beliefs sacrificing goats occasionally to Hazrat-e Abbas that his arthritic pains might lessen.

(f) Two young men are said to have quietly become Muslim recently, the one to marry a Muslim girl, the other because he was sick of being harassed on his job about his religion. To non-Muslims, however, he says he is Zoroastrian, and claims to be proud that he has been able to stick out his job despite harassment, while others have gone away to Teheran or into other work.

8.4.2. "Mehereban"

Mehreban lives in Yazd, although he spent a number of years in India. He would, he says, have been much happier had his ancestors converted to Islam since then he could say whenever the subject of religion is raised, "Go on, talk about something more practical than religion." But because he is a Zoroastrian he is frightened and pricks up his ears when religion is discussed: it is forced on him and so he wants to know what it is all about. Reacting to a conversation he and I had with a Bahai in the course of which the latter had used the metaphor of the womb (see 8.2) to express agnosticism about the afterlife, Mehreban complained of evasion: "I do not want to know his opinion. I want to know the truth. You can get 1000 different opinions from 1000 different people, but I want to know what the religion says: where the soul goes after death, and why one man is born blind or rich while another is not. But he only said he did not know. If a religion is true it must have answers. I want to know if Bahaism says anything new."

Mehreban plays a game of honesty with himself: he tries to always do what he has said he would do, to live up to, as he puts it, the ideal of the Indian sadhu. It is a difficult game to always abide by and he is quite disturbed that no one else seems to be very interested in strict honesty. Of the Zoroastrian reputation for honesty he says, "Of course we are honest in our dealing with Muslims: that is a matter of fear, not honesty. If we do not pay they will beat us up." The butcher extends credit to Zoroastrians more than to Muslims because he knows he can collect. A Muslim bought a garden from Jehambaksh and then decided it was too expensive and wanted back his 900 toman downpayment; he came to beat up Jehambaksh but when told he was a Zoroastrian he said, "Oh in that case, I'll wait, he'll pay," and he did. But when Zoroastrians can get away with not paying they do: when Mehreban's uncle returned after his father's death, various people came with outstanding debts. A Muslim sent note after note which were ignored claiming thirty-five tomans; but when he showed up in person ready to fight, he was paid immediately. On the other hand a Jew showed up claiming fifty tomans; he was given fifteen tomans and told to go away. An old Muslim woman claimed twenty tomans; she was given one toman and warned not to complain to anyone. A fellow Zoroastrian put in a claim but was never paid. Payment is made to him one fears.

Religion is basically one's backing: were I to convert it would not be to Bahaism, he says, but to Christianity since then no one would dare to touch me. How, for instance, can you tell the religious apart? Well, if someone hits me and a second man tells me to forget it, the man

who hit me is Muslim; if I hit someone and ten people take my side, that someone is Jewish; if I hit someone and ten people attack me, that someone is Muslim; if I don't dare hit someone he is Christian.

His game of truth has a kind of elasticity, which however is different from conscious white lies. He quite agrees in the story of Ali and the killing of Omar by Firuz that Ali did not lie when he said as long as I have been sitting here I saw nobody (Ch. VI above). But he relies for moral justification on the promise of God that if you tell the truth, He (God) will remove all bad consequences. Thus Mehreban refuses to condone the white lie of telling a heart attack victim who asks about his wife that she is well when she has just suffered an accident. On the other hand playing off literal truth versus implication again finds approval for him in the story of the Zoroastrian given one last wish before being killed by an Arab: he asked for a glass of water which was given him; he said, "You will kill me before I can finish drinking this"; the Arab denied this; the Zoroastrian made him swear to it and then threw the water on the ground claiming his freedom; the mullah supported the Zoroastrian's claim and he was released. This use of one's wits can also change fate. (Mehreban was one of those who emphatically agreed with a survey question: adam mitavanad xodesh sarneveshtra avaz konad? A man can himself change his fate?) In this context he cites the following story about the Prophet Moses. Musa (Moses) came upon a man who since his day of birth had been suffering misfortune. The man asked Musa to ask God (Musa being the one Prophet who habitually kibbitzed with God) if he was always to suffer. Musa did so. God said that the man had lived forty years and would live yet another twenty, but only one of those twenty would be a year of good fortune. When the man heard this he begged Musa to ask God to make that one year the current year. God agreed and when Musa returned, the man said: yes, my son was sick and this morning he got well, I found a groom for my daughter, my wife has become healthy, and already I have found a job and am feeling much healthier. During the year the man earned much money and used his good fortune to help others, did much charity work, and prayed to God. The year ended and things still went well. A half year went by, then another. Musa eventually asked God: have you forgotten, already now two years have passed. No, replied God, in that one year he did all the things which earned him good fortune for the remaining nineteen. [Then God told a lie, since being omniscient he knew what the man would do?] No, because it is written in the Avesta that God puts into man's hands the choice to do good or evil with their consequences.

In his beliefs Mehreban is pragmatically eclectic. He prays before pictures of Zoroaster and Jesus and the Virgin Mary. Of the Zoroastrian fire at times he argues as if it were a mystic fire which is the true fire: the true fire can be seen only by those who have faith; it unlike the material fire in the temple requires no fuel. But at other times he speaks of the true fire as having supernatural but physical properties: it was seen coming down from the sky and it alit in a cypress tree whence it was taken into the fire temple; it then left the fire temple and today it is said to be in the fire temple of Zeinabad.

He believes in the conditions necessitating a yasht dowre daxme (see Ch. V), yet he is well aware of the tricks people have played on others by that means. Purity observances such as the segregation of menstruating women and the bareshnum he finds to be superstitious and not worth maintaining, but he is scrupulous about death memorial customs. Of dreaming he is convinced that it provides a medium of communication with God and with souls in the next world, but he is very much aware of the difficulties of distinguishing a true dream from one caused by worry or overeating. Of fortune tellers he is convinced that there are such techniques and was quite disappointed when he took me to one and saw from what the man told me about myself that it was 80% wrong.

Mehreban is a case of a gullible but not unintelligent man who behaves about religion much as he does when buying and selling: accurate information is hard to come by and most results are negotiable. If you want to invest in a piece of land it does not suffice to ask the seller his price: you must know the conditions under which he obtained the land (he bought it a price x and so it is unreasonable for him to sell at less than $x+z$; he got it at discount price $x-y$ in a deal with the mayor in exchange for a promise to supply water to the city's new boulevard median strip, and so the title may be insecure, but the presence of water may increase the value), the plans for the area (to be developed as an industrial estate is what the city planning office wants, to be subdivided for housing is what the governor wants, etc.), the nature of the market (he is selling to all; he is giving lower prices to people with certain kinds of commitments), etc. If it takes constant querrying and cross-checking to find out about land, how much more so then about religious truth? Certain things are obvious like the expectations of other members of the community, the implications of generosity for social living, etc. Other things are not obvious (what happens to the soul) and all that is plausible cannot be rejected out of hand.

8.4.3. "Abbas Momeni"

Abbas is a religiously well-educated young man, very conservative politically as well as religiously. He received a high school education in the Ta'alimat-e Islam school of Yazd (a compromise between the old religious schools and the new Government schools, founded by Haj Asheikh Abbas Ali Islami and administered under the Ministry of Education). His father was a village craftsman before moving to Yazd; his father-in-law is

also a craftsman but not of the same guild; his elder brother is a bazaari. His religious knowledge is deeper than most, yet listening to him one has the feeling of watching paradigms being played expertly but without firm sociological grounding: that is, we have a learner (a young man after all) competently applying what he has learned from role models without having gone through the experiences of the latter. Thus, for instance, although of village descent (not landlord), he finds Land Reform and the White Revolution to be simply a fraud:

The farmers have become poor. Before with arbabs, most of whom were good men, the farmers had security, and if they needed money, they could get it from the arbab without interest, whereas now they must pay for it. As to the argument that the arbabs were not modernizing agriculture, they were only beginning on that road when it was taken out of their hands.

One of the areas where it is clearest that the Government is anti-Islamic is in its efforts to liberate women:

Their place is in the home. Islam says that women should learn and be educated, but above all they must be good mothers. I have had several school teachers offered to me in marriage, but people I respect advised me not to take such offers for it could only lead to unhappiness.

He identifies with the conservative religious leaders, at present with Khomeini whom he cites in support of his criticism of the White Revolution as a fraud and an attack on Islam, of the extravagances of the Shah's coronations and the two thousand five hundred year celebrations as a sin in the midst of poverty in Seistan and Baluchistan, and of the Shah for accepting Israeli aid since Jews are the enemies of Islam (and for this reason worse than Christians). The Shah, he quotes Jalal Al-e Ahmad, is a xar dar pust-e šir (a donkey in a lion's skin),¹ and the whole history of the Pahlavi dynasty is of a piece with the previous Qajar kings. Khomeini merely has taken up the mantle of previous defenders of true Muslims:

(a) Mirza Shirazi who issued the fatwa at the time of the Tobacco Protest against smoking, comparing the habit to waging war against the Twelfth Imam.

¹The Persian tale is that a donkey was tired of being an ass and put on a lion's skin in which he scared villagers, but when he wanted to roar, all that came out was "hee-haw" and he was exposed for what he was.

(b) Asad Mohammad Kazem Yazdi who refused to approve the Constitution likening it to ripping off the čador from people's wives. Only later [i.e., under Reza Shah] did people come to understand how literally correct he had been. When Mozaffar-ed-din Shah visited him in Nejad, he served the king left-overs, telling him not only that, "Slave or king, you are but a slave of God to me and no better than anyone else," but also that the king's mustache was too long and ugly to Muslim eyes.

(c) Abdul Karim Yazdi who built the Hose Elmiye Qum, and who was released from Reza Shah's prison by Hussein Borujerdi's ultimatum.

If in part, Abbas' political opinions come from such leaders rather than from his own experience (e.g., farmers are less secure now), yet they form a coherent style of argument. Knowledge ultimately is immanent and passed through chains of authority (prophets, Imams, religiously learned men) rather than being experimental:

Take the rules that it is bad to shave the cheeks, to allow the beard to grow longer than a fuzz, to let the hair grow long over the neck, or the mustache to grow long. These are rules to be obeyed because they were handed down from the Prophet and the Prophet is an agent or medium of God. Although he is willing to accept the rationalization that a long mustache is bad because it may catch food and become dirty and thus unhealthy, this argument is superfluous (ezafe) and not necessary to his belief. Obviously the same argument does not apply to long hair if one takes a bath everyday. It is rather like the question, "What is the purpose of prayer?" To that question, he replied, it is almost impossible to give an answer (mošgel began, nemiše). And when pressed (mošgel, bale, vali aslan nemiše?), he answered, "It is difficult: all we know is that the Prophet told us that this is what God wanted." That God wanted us to pray seventeen rakat a day is not in the Qur'an but we know that Mohammad himself did so and said to do so. It is an authentic hadith. Authenticity is made certain by the number of good people who witness [a combination of ethical proof and democratic election of truth], that is, say, of twenty people present among the followers of Mohammad, nineteen attest to the verity of a tradition, and through a chain of chroniclers it is preserved and eventually codified in the four great collections of hadith. In precisely the same mode of ethical proof Abbas is forever trying to demonstrate to me by citing Christian authors and professors. When I attempt to tell him that it is not a writer's religion but his demonstrations that sway my acceptance, he responds by querying my belief in religion. And since there seems to be a weakness here, he presses the advantage to cite Christian authors who say not merely that Islam is good, but that it is the best, and who cite absurdities of Christianity. Abbas' naive or unintentional double standard of interpretation at this point becomes appalling. How can it be, as the Bible says, that Jacob wrestled with God? This is to commit a materialist fallacy: the Qur'an says that God has no material body. My counter that it is no different than saying

that God told the Qur'an to Mohammad caused Abbas some pause; and when I suggested that Jacob might have wrestled with God in a dream and that this could mean with his own conscience, Abbas abandoned the example, saying that could I find him the verse and chapter that it was a dream he would concede the point. His next example was that wine is the blood of Christ. I countered with the phrase that Ali is the "Lion of God" (in Persian šir-e xoda, or in Arabic asadullah), first teasing him: baba, musulman boyad rastgu bošand; Ali šir-e? šir-e! čera intowr dorugh migand? (hey mate, Muslims are supposed to tell the truth; Ali was a lion? a lion! Why do they tell such lies?); and then appealing to his critical faculties by saying that Iranians have a reputation for being able to understand manifold meanings of a sentence and are not only limited to the most literal. Why be so sophisticated in understanding Islamic metaphors, but so naive in not understanding Christian ones? Just as the tazieh or rosa is a call to remember Hussein and to contemplate how and why he died, so too calling the wine the blood of Christ is a way of asking people to remember the crucifixion. Abbas' response was that he did not think wine appropriate to asking people to think: wine makes people sluggish. A sip of wine would have that effect? Yes. Have you ever drunk a little wine? No, never. And yet earlier in the evening, he had defined happiness as being in the open air with green trees, a girl-- sighe to make it halal--and wine, of which three elements, he had sighed, only wine is Islamically harram. Again while the notion is charming, it is clear he used it because it was a traditional image; it required no creativity on his part. His second response was to ask rhetorically how one can say that bread becomes the body of Christ. Qur'an and science are compatible. He rejects the idea that the two might refer to separate spheres; and presumably the Bible should be the same. The Qur'an is scientific: (a) it says that even the unbeliever will eventually come to agree that the earth was created by the Big Bang Theory, and (b) that the earth was first gaseous (dud, literally "smoke") which then solidified, and that (c) life came from an alag [علق] (which he explained has two meanings, "dried blood" which used to be the standard understanding, and "an aqueous spermatozoidal creature").

8.5. Summary of the Argument

Many other individual cases could be sketched in greater or lesser detail: some people have thought things through more than others, some people have a more thorough religious education than others, people with conflicting opinions can be found in the same religious tradition, people with similar and identical opinions can be found in different religious traditions. The three cases of Behruz Irani, Mehreban, and Abbas Momeni, together with Appendices II and V, footnote 2 on page 176, the experimentalism of the Tir-e Abbas and other divining accounts in section 6.3.8, and

the native comments on religion in section 8.2, should provide a fair variety of individual approaches to religious interpretation. The degree to which people rely on stereotyped arguments, manipulating them to suit the moment¹ without much concern for over-all consistency remains striking and provides the obverse side to the elastic interpretability of ideological statements argued in Chapter I. To answer the question who converts/believes and why, three interrelated generalizations seem worth suggesting:

(1) varied individual opinions are of less importance than that the individual acknowledge the public ritual demands; (2) doctrinal arguments are of less importance as beliefs than as symbolic ordering devices, as ways of obtaining public consent for social activity; (3) conversion occurs most often for reasons of wishing to join new social collectivities or to order one's public activities by different rules, rather than for reasons of logical truth.²

An ethnographic basis for the third point can be laid in the following dual way: a positive set of instances in support of this point can be made by an analysis of conversions (for conversions to Bahaism not enough information is available other than the kinds of stories already presented, but for conversions to Christianity a strong case can be made); a so-far negative instance in support of the point is the attempt by the Pahlavi Dynasty to substitute for Islamic public rituals Iranian nationalist ones.

The task of the next and final chapter will be to explore further the interrelated issues of belief, paradigm manipulation, meaning creation

¹What I have in mind by "manipulation" are such examples as this non-Iranian one: a Palestinian and an Algerian were discussing "O Calcutta" and the former was declaiming how people went to see it only out of purient interest. The latter listened for a while and then said, "But Ahmad, the human body is beautiful, it too is art." The declamation stopped, and a bemused smile appeared: finessed.

²A locus classicus for this kind of argument is Evans-Pritchard's work on Azande witchcraft where he points out that only certain categories of people are subject to witchcraft accusation. See Abner Cohen's more recent attempt to analyze a blood feud and a marriage dispute in these terms (1965: 68-94). More generally, of course, these questions go back at least to Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Durkheim.

and decay, in an attempt (a) to open up the "collective representation" position so far reached so as to account for flexibility and change, creativity and innovation, and (b) to provide a more structured, yet dynamic, picture of procedures of (rules for) manipulating paradigms, symbols, and meaning.

PART III
PERSIAN SULPHUR

CHAPTER IX
POWERS OF IMAGINATION

از شیر مرغ تا جان آدمیزاد
From hen's milk to the human soul.

9.1. Introduction

Intuitively one speaks of Iran Westernizing, of the Islamic culture on the defensive, and of the suppression of revolutionary (especially Tudeh) ideology; or more generally one speaks of the modernization of Iran. Some of the dynamics and organizational aspects of these issues have been treated historiographically in Part I and ethnographically in Part II, focusing on economic, political, and religious development, including points of dramatic competition from gaming¹ (Chapter VI) to rioting (Appendix I). In this final chapter attention will be directed to the formation of the ideology and symbols in terms of which these developments are expressed. The search here is for a method of analyzing the symbolic elements which have been seeded in the preceding chapters: myths, dreams, rituals, but also the repetition of themes, identifications, symbols and even phrases in Persian discourse. Throughout the thesis and especially in Part II one finds members of different religious groups using the same sorts of arguments and in Chapter VIII attention is directed towards the usage by individuals of "culturally given" arguments, symbols and phrases. The search here is also for a method of analyzing the means by which creation of meaning for modernizing purposes occurs. One new set of data will be introduced to aid this search: contemporary short stories and films.

During the Constitutionalist agitations an artistic revolution began in Iran. Poets began to invest old verse forms with political themes and

¹ Shabih [شبیہ] is the Persian equivalent to Latin ludus, French jeu, German Spiel, English play. Shabih dar avordan (to dramatize) is used for the Passion Plays, paralleling the Passion Plays of Christianity, especially non-liturgical ones such as the fourteenth century English Corpus Christi cycles. Shabih bazi is "to mimic" or play charades.

social criticism. In 1921 Sayyid Mohammad Ali Jamalzadeh put out his call for a transition from poetry and other old literary forms to short stories and novellas written in simple colloquial language. He used as his motto a couplet from the poet Farokhi:

<u>Fasaneh gozašt kohan šod hadis</u>	Old myths have worn out: the story of
<u>Eskendar,</u>	Alexander,
<u>Soxan navar ke no-ra halavati</u>	Word strings which are new are hence-
<u>ast digar.</u>	forth sweeter.

The introduction of the film provided another new medium and by 1969-71 a "new wave" of film-making was acknowledged by the award of an international (Cannes) prize to Daryoush Mehdiouye's Gav. These two "artistic revolutions" are important for two reasons. First each was and continues to be a self-conscious attempt to establish a dialogue not only about but also internal to Persian society: that is, not as a political or sociological commentary but as a means of formulating images through which changing Persian life could be comprehended and integrated. The most dramatic evidence of this function was the string of suicides touched off by the publication of Sadegh Hedayat's Buf-e Kur and by his suicide. Secondly, each "artistic revolution" constitutes to some extent a more efficient mode of communication reaching greater proportions of the Persian population with a greater amount of information.

I am no doubt particularly struck by such evaluations, coming as I did to Iran from a period in my own society of such rapid change that one commentator has called the past decade one of "culture storm" (Nieburg 1973) in the course of which the media, especially television, and the theater of everyday life were raised to guiding perceptual frames: where Anwar Sadat called off a war with Israel (1971) because the violent birth of Bangla Desh had stolen the limelight, and where Abbie Hoffman left condemnation of police brutality at the 1968 Democratic Convention to the liberals while he "applauded the police performance" (Nieburg 1973: 190).

"My society" and "Persian society" overlap: villagers in provincial Iran listen to radios even if they do not yet have TV, and so they know with greater or lesser comprehension of the same international actors as do I. A Turkoman complained after the earthquake of 1970 that the Iranian

radio was minimizing casualties but the more sympathetic B.B.C. was giving accurate estimates. "My society" and "Persian society" overlap in other ways as well: Persian villagers have their wells drilled by machines made in Ohio, their sons have degrees from Harvard and Berkeley, my parents have Persian carpets on their floors, and so on. But "my society" and "Persian society" also differ greatly as the defense attorney for Sharon King pled in her 1971 show trial:

. . . that there was nothing extraordinary in Miss King's participation [in] rallies and picketing against the Iranian Government in America. The prosecution should bear in mind that Miss King was an American and consequently of a different frame of mind . . . motivated by her particular way of thinking produced in American society [and so defense attorney Dr. Niabati] asked the court not to judge the defendant from the point of view of an Iranian (Kayhan International, 14 November 1971, p. 3).

The plea was not sufficient and Sharon King was convicted of "anti-state activities" but acquitted of "espionage." The trial itself partook of "both societies" in more ways than through the persons of its participants: the American consul was invited as a nod towards the American umbrella, and Miss King was deported back to America. A Yazdi friend pointed out the newspaper headlines on the trial to me, remarking that this proved there were spies about and I could not blame people if they suspected me to be a spy.

The issue of boundaries between "my society" and "Persian society" poses a methodological question in the interpretation of symbolic usage: as a participant in Persia, my production of Persian sentences falls somewhere between those of our rigid categories: analyst and native. So too do my interpretations for Americans of Persian expressions based on my experience in Iran. Unlike the linguist, I cannot test my interpretations by asking a native to accept them. Or can I? Take for instance the following review of the film Gav:

Gav (Cow) is a paradigm for a kind of insanity not uncommon in Iran stemming from an excess of emotional attachment.¹ Done in an episodic

¹ E.g., in Yazd a man who lost his child wandered about telling people he wanted to cut off his penis; another who went beserk first, perhaps as a reflection of the community's treatment of him, added to it an insane jealousy of his wife, accusing his father of being her lover; in the film Doroshky-či a son goes mad with memories of his deceased father.

and almost surrealistic technique, the film is best described as a meditation on a cow. It is neither a sacred cow, nor a political cow. But it is an object of intense concentration. Were it a sacred cow, its owner, for it is he who does the concentration most intensely, might be required to so ponder upon bovine qualities that he might assimilate them as his own. That is the way (tarigat) saints are to be revered, and the cow is a symbol of the goodness of civilization. In the Zoroastrian pantheon, the cow is one of the more significant of the creations of Ormazd, and in the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi the cow Birmaya is instrumental in saving the life of Fereydun and is therefore killed by Zohak, one of the arch-evil characters. In the legend of Pire Banu (Ch. V) the cow asked to give milk for the Sascarian Princess kicks over the bucket. She is Zoroastrian and so eventually saved from the Arabs, but of a corrupt oppressive dynasty and so not entitled to comport? Fereydun then has his mace made with a buffalo head top, and Sufi maces are still made in the shape of cows' heads. In Zoroastrian ritual, the symbols of ultimate purity are taken from a pure white bull. Were this a political cow, on the other hand, it might claim kinship with the cow of Veramin donated to the peasants by the Near East Foundation one day in 1947 and returned the next day in the interests of not angering the local gay-band (caretaker and renter of cows) who objected to invasion of his economic turf. As it is, the cow is merely a milch cow belonging to a peasant in a village so poor that the village as a whole rejoices to have a cow. A cow, after all, if it also works in the field, is one fifth of the harvest, a doubling of income for the peasants who own it.¹

The plot is simple: the cow dies. Actually it is murdered, but the point is that it is dead. And its owner? You might intellectualize and say he goes mad. But in the film he becomes a cow—not one with four feet and a tail, but one whose visage, behavior, and articulation take on definite bovine features. In traditional folklore a diy (devil) may have bovine features: such is the stuff of which possession is made.

If not a political cow, maybe a Veramin cow nonetheless; for, Heshmat Ala'i who made the Near East Foundation cow an academic symbol, spoke of a fear psychosis, a fear to stand up for one's rights, and he commented on the then proposed first Seven Year Plan:

Such fear psychosis cannot be cured by American loans. The most precious export commodity the US has to offer is not its money wealth, but its revolutionary society in which individuals take their chances, express opposition to authority when and if they want to, and feel no dread of punishment if their experiment fails (Ala'i 1948: 147).

¹The traditional formula for division of the harvest is in five portions, a portion to the supplier of land, seed, water, animal power, labor. This varied however and other formulae for division also exist depending on the type of crop and land.

Such a Veramin cow has other animal, canine in particular, relations in modern Persian mythology. The sag velgard, the "abandoned dog," forever looking for a master, was placed by Hedayat¹ in Veramin, not far on either side from ruins of an earlier Iran when pre-Islamic compassion did not shy from the dog as unclean. And in the Aras River to the north is set another animal fable, a fish this time. A juvenile fish, befitting an educational story for children, wants to explore the world. His family and friends turn against him, feeling he is rejecting their love, and they stigmatize him as a heretic; but, cries he, there must be a world beyond, another way of life than just swimming around this pond. And so he swims over the rapids to land in another pond, and another equally narrow-minded society, this one of tadpoles who find the little fish very ugly. Actually it was not the fish who was swimming in the Aras River, but the author, Samad Behrangi; and so perhaps it is not a children's story after all.²

Gav is a meditation on becoming a cow, however politically one invests it (presumably running on a continuum from the belief that peasants are cows or that peasants succumb easily to Oriental fatalism, to the belief that peasants are trapped and not allowed to leave the barn). The themes of insanity, of withdrawal from human interaction and transformations with animal-like characteristics due to the evils of life beyond the individual's control are common ones in modern Persian literature.

I have not tried this "review" of Gav out on any Iranians. I would not be surprised if it were acceptable for reasons (standard identifications) which may become clearer in the pages to follow.

The problem is one which Roman Jakobson identified in a slightly different context (1960) when he drew a distinction between the poetic, referential and other functions of language. The poetic function is achieved by repeated statements of equivalence, so that, for instance "cocktails" may refer to plumage as well as drinks (1960: 376). This multiplication of identifications "imparts to poetry its thoroughgoing

¹Sadeq Hedayat's story Sag-e Velgard has been translated into German by Rudolph Gelpke (1961).

²Why were you swimming in the Aras River in Esfand (mid-February)? responded his friends to the Government declaration that Samad Behrangi died in the icy stream. By 1972 Behrangi was once again rehabilitated. The University of Teheran had an exhibition of his work, and book stores were openly hawking his books including Mahi Siah Kuchilu (Little Black Fish) with the encouragement: buy now before they go out of print and are banned once again. I am told by an Iranian living in the U.S. that the original title was Mahi Germez Kuchilu (Little Red Fish).

symbolic, multiplex, polysemic essence" (1960: 370). The poetic function is not limited to poetry, and Jakobson notes with regard to fairy tales:

The supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous . . . cogently exposed in the preambles to fairy tales of various peoples, for instance, in the usual exordium of the Majorca storytellers: Aixo era y no era (It was and it was not) (1953: 371).

(Persian tales begin: yeki bud, yeki na bud, hic kas gher az xoda na bud, or "there was one, there was none, there was no one other than God.") If multiplicity of identification creates symbols, at the other pole, as pointed out by Roy Wagner is the lexical signifier or sign. Wagner suggests three principles of how things take on meaning:

- (a) Because their signification is based on definition alone, and is otherwise arbitrary,¹ lexical signifiers, as well as the classificatory systems built upon them, can embody only a tautological meaning.
- (b) Non-tautological meaning can only be produced through the innovative extension of signifiers into metaphors,² that is, the formation of symbols whose content with the element signified is supplemented by a relation of similarity, or analogy with that element.
- (c) The continual formation of metaphors has the effect of bringing 'established' signifiers into new meaningful relations, of 'extending' them, but the continued use or repetition of any particular metaphor leads to its 'decay' into a lexical signifier (1972: 5-6).

We have thus three terms: lexical signifier (defined relation), metaphor (relation through some kind of similarity or analogy), and symbol (multiple metaphoric identifications). Within a given text, it is easy enough to be certain about the explicitness of identifications. The problem arises when one is dealing with unbounded texts, either social discourse in general, or placing texts in their broader contexts.

In the following pages we will begin with the new data set—

¹"In referential language the connection between signans and signatum is overwhelmingly based on their codified contiguity, which is often confusingly labeled 'arbitrariness of the verbal sign'" (Jakobson 1960: 372).

²He defines metaphors as any of the rhetorical forms (metonym, simile, etc.) based on relations of similarity or analogy.

contemporary short stories and films—before turning back to the myths, rituals and other symbolic materials seeded in the preceding pages. Contemporary literary creations provide a particularly good access to questions of meaning both because one can begin with bounded, self-contained texts, and because one can control the issue of individual creativity. As to creativity, one can recognize here that while the creator is an individual (i.e., there is no nebulously gradual process of bringing symbolization into adjustment with social forms), that the creation is intersubjectively understandable, but that it may be understood by individuals quite differently without the intersubjectivity breaking down, and that the creator's own understanding of the creation is not privileged quite precisely because he uses intersubjective categories in the process of creation. The individual can create new categories (viz. Orwell's double think, Freud's ego, etc.) but not ex nihilo.

9.2. Bounded Texts

Let us begin with a clear case of a bounded text, Bozorg Alavi's well-known short story Sarbaz-e Surbi (The Tin Soldier) published in 1943. (See precis in Appendix VI). Jan Rypka compared it to the miniature painting of classical Persian poetry, and Alavi himself said he spent half a year filing and polishing the story. The technique is a popular one: a combination Rashamon and mirror reflection. That is:

- (a) the story is pieced together by the confluence of four subjective views of the same reality;
- (b) key symbols and sequences are repeated in slightly different contexts and from slightly different points of view as the vehicle for carrying forward the plot.

The formalism of the technique is made explicit to the point of using the mathematical signs + and = at one juncture where the narrator objects that

Poets always describe full moon nights as beautiful. All love idylls and lyrical voices = fluttering locks + river banks + moonshine. But they forget that under other conditions the moon-lit night can be ugly. Moonshine + women who cost ten shahi + the donkey-sore who come back out of the city into the villages with syphillis = disgrace and misery.

But this is just an incidental clue. It is the repetition of symbols and phrases which form two sets of explicit identifications and provide the

building blocks of the formal geometry of the story. In the first and central set, there are two named and two unnamed elements: tin soldier, 10 shahi, and what I will name "formal role" and "illness." Their repetition and metaphoric identifications can be written out in ten equations which almost by themselves tell the story of F. and Koukab. (See Table 11)

Although these ten equations refer primarily to the lives of Koukab and F., the narrator and Amin-Agha (F.'s sister) are also tied into this internal or first set of symbols. The narrator begins by contrasting his formal education in school with the informal learning by observation on the bus. It is the former which cost him ten years and thus is identified with the 10 shahi theme. Although as a passenger on the bus he obviously must pay 10 shahi, this remains implicit, and in fact, like the greater and unspecified amount of money he gives Koukab (a humanistic, personal, non-formal act), his informal education involves much more than 10 shahi: four bus rides a day, two bus rides for this particular story, plus several non-bus trips, visits and other interactions. That is, both his act of kindness to Koukab and his bus education are formal variants on the 10 shahi theme. Amin-Agha is also brought into the story with the humanistic attempt to solve F.'s illness: this is both her motivation for visiting her brother and the narrator's interest in seeking her out, both non-10 shahi relationships.

The second or external set of symbols are those of opium (wine and arak are substituted in one place), coughing and the time units. The illness of F. develops over five years since the narrator first met him; five years is also the time that the narrator has been riding the bus and learning. That is, their lives are inverted, the one falling into illness, the other transcending his own daily acts and learning about the world of others. Two years elapse between the narrator seeing F. on the bus and going to visit him, bringing opium as a gift from a friend in the finance ministry. Two years (1 + 1) also are the times Koukab and F. live together. Two bus trips for the narrator bound his story. Opium and coughing are used as formal "curtains" between "scenes" of the story. The narrator's reflections on moonshine also serves this function, as well as making the point that what is beautiful in some circumstances is ugly in other circumstances, which observation is reversed in the case of opium

TABLE 11

TIN SOLDIER

Identification	Explanation/Use
(1) tin soldier = 10 shahi	A tin soldier costs ten shahi.
(2) tin soldier = life	When Koukab loses her tin soldier she says it is her life. When F. struggles to make the wooden soldier he says he succeeds at the expense of his life.
(2a) loss of tin soldier = "illness"	
(3) "formal role" = 10 shahi	Bus passengers are called "10 shahi." A whore costs "10 shahi." When the narrator gives money to Koukab, it is several notes, i.e., both not the stereotyped amount and more than 10 shahi.
(4) tin soldier = Koukab's husband	She says it is a talisman to remind her of her soldier husband.
(5) tin soldier = F.'s father	F. says it takes on the shape of his father's face when he cuts a soldier out of wood. Earlier he refers to the kind of wood his father is cut from. He blames equally his father and Koukab's tin soldier for his misfortunes.
(6) = (2a) Koukab - tin soldier = Koukab's illness	
(7) Koukab + Koukab's illness = F.'s illness	F. goes crazy trying to solve Koukab's illness, involving both his fixation on the tin soldier and his identification of Koukab with his mother.
(8) = (5 + 7) Koukab + F.'s father = F.'s illness	F. attributes his illness both to the affair with Koukab and to his father.
(9) F.'s mother + F.'s father = F.'s illness	His upbringing, he says, moulded his fate.
(10) Koukab = F.'s Mother.	F. reiterates he loves Koukab like his mother; he loves his mother more than anything.

respectively). At the end of the story Golnas is playing the same melody on the same guitar to a male admirer and Fereydun is the outsider, half-relative.

The internal transformations have to do with illusion (Ferangis' dreaming, Fereydun's melancholia and dreaming)—illusion, that is, a combination of reality elements in an abnormal or changed combination (a tapestry which once triggered merriment now causes shivers, etc.). Music, it may be suggested (an outside identification), is presented in counterpoint to illusion: it is an integrative a-rational harmony whereas illusion is a dynamic re-interpretation. That is, it is part of the harmonious well-being in the initial state; it indicates the coherence of dreaming in the transitional states; and it indicates coherence in the final state. The music is always the same—the Homayun melody—it does not change.

Briefly, the story falls into four steps:

The first is a description of the idyll of perfection: the playing of the guitar, the dog Meshki asleep under the table, and an owl occasionally hooting from the trees outside. The idyll is brought to a close by the clock striking nine: Fereydun stops playing and Golnas leaves. One has learned that Fereydun is a small landowner in Veramin and has recently returned from Switzerland. He has successfully applied his learning to increase his agricultural yields five fold. There is only one minor disagreement between Fereydun and Ferangis: she believes in the soul and afterlife, he does not.

Two external identifications may be supplied here, but they are not necessary: the owl in Persia is a symbol of death; nine is the abjad value of yahid or mystical "unity." As to the dog, its usage will become clearer in the next section, but Meshki is obviously (like the music) part of the description of contentment.

The striking of the clock not only signals the completion of the idyll but also signals its breaking up: (a) the party breaks up; (b) Ferangis breaks into a sweat, presses her hand to her heart, and bites her teeth together. Her illness brings out the conflict between Fereydun and Ferangis, he worrying about her medicine, she resigned to fate, he complaining about the old wives tales instilled in Persians from childhood on, she objecting to his blind imitation of things Western. Ferangis cites to him his French book on occultism, to which he retorts that not every nonsense written by a Frenchman need be believed. At 9:30 they stop arguing and go up to bed. At 10:00 the lights are out, and all are asleep except the owl who calls from time to time.

The third section describes Ferangis' death two months later. First her physical symptoms and pain are described. Then she has a dream

signalling her death in explicit terms. She cries out: "The sun, where is the sun? Always night, terrible night . . . look at the shadows of the trees on the wall . . . the moon is out . . . the owl screams . . . open the doors . . . break down the walls. It is enough . . . no, I have no one . . . Let's play the guitar. . . ." She regains consciousness to tell Fereydun she is dying and reaffirm her faith in the next world. We learn later that she died at 7:10. Fereydun falls into severe melancholia and is taken after a couple of weeks to Teheran.

The final section describes Fereydun's return to Veramin. Nastaran Badshi, the father's sister of Golnas, tells him of the fear of the haunted house which has caused the gardener and the servant, Hassan, to flee; and of the Homayun melody at night. The dog has died. Everything is changed for Fereydun: the house which had given him pleasure is now full of terrors. A tapestry of Solomon with funny devils which once had amused him, now gives him the chills. A cat startles him. In Ferangis' room he nearly screams in fear when he suddenly sees the clock says 7:10. He falls asleep thinking of Nastaran Badshi's fears of bewitchment, his book on European occultism, and Ferangis' last words about the next world. He dreams he is in a dirty club in Marseilles. Ferangis walks in with a barefoot Arab. They laugh and point at Fereydun who jumps up. The Arab draws his knife, grabs someone by the collar and cuts off his head. Blood drips from the head, and it gives off terrible laughter. Three policemen enter and take the disturbers of the peace away. Fereydun is left alone with Ferangis. She picks up a guitar and cries. Fereydun wakes up in a sweat to the sound of the Homayun Melody. He tiptoes toward the sound, breaks into a room to find Golnas playing to a man. He laughs, goes mad.

To analyze the dreams and melacholic perceptions is a simple matter of sets of oppositions:

- (a) In Ferangis' dream the sun and closed doors (of well-ordered "culture" in Levi-Strauss' terms) is contrasted with night, shadows, the owl, and breaking out (into the trees where the owl is).
- (b) Returning to his house in Veramin, Fereydun finds all things which once were pleasurable now terrifying: house, tapestry, cat, clock.
- (c) And in his dream Ferangis is no longer his: she comes in with an Arab, and even when the Arab is removed, she cries when she tries to play the guitar: the melody has passed from her (and Fereydun) to Golnas.

The steps of the transformation for Ferangis and Fereydun are parallel as indicated in Table 12.

So much for explicit identifications. One is free, of course, to puzzle further over the message and symbols. One may find in it a parable of the struggle between Westernizing innovation and the established cultural patterns: Fereydun's European education in agriculture makes his farming successful, but he goes mad and the irrational religious beliefs carry

TABLE 12
VERAMIN NIGHTS

Steps	Ferangis	Fereydun
normality	Ferangis plays music.	Fereydun enjoys music as part of his world of perfection.
illness	Ferangis suffers ailments.	Fereydun suffers ailment (melancholia) through destruction of his happiness (Ferangis).
illusion	Ferangis dreams.	Fereydun undergoes illusions. He dreams and discovers Golnas, puncturing the illusion (haunting) which had begun to infect him as well as others.
abnormality	Ferangis dies.	Fereydun goes mad.

on.¹ The story obviously reflects Hedayat's frustration at the failures of political initiative to create a new Iran. Another way to spin out the symbolism in the story is to consider the names of the characters. If there is obvious symbolism in the owl and in the hours of evening (7:10, 9:00, 10:00) when the veil of night/death is rung down, then perhaps one should consider that Fereydun is the epic (Shahnameh) hero who saved Iran from the Semitic arch-fiend Zohak who required children's brains to be fed the two snakes growing from his shoulders. The Arab of Fereydun's dream fits Zohak nicely and thus reaffirms the identification of Islam as keeping Iran backward.

9.3. Texts and Contexts

In this section the context from which identifications may be made will be slightly expanded to include contemporary "traditions" or groups of texts. Two such sets or "traditions" will be presented: a group of short

¹ It is Hedayat who makes this evaluation when he ends in the lines: "All thought the jinn had possessed [Fereydun]. He had however gone mad." And Fereydun remarks to Ferangis, ". . . good and bad in men has nothing to do with religion and belief. All evil comes from the religious people. All religious wars and crusades are the work of religion."

stories to which the two already presented belong, and a group of films. A story by Sadeq Chubak will be arbitrarily taken as the one for which identifications will be sought. And then for the films, the issue of namus (honor) will serve as an introductory heuristic thread.

9.3.1. Mardi dar Qafas (Man in a Cage)¹

The technique in this story is to juxtapose a series of "cages," or descriptions of men and animals in bounded areas, unfolding like a series of snap-shots over time. The elements of the "cage" are rearranged in each snap-shot so as to yield symbolic pregnancy in similar manner as the ten shahi in Alavi's Sarbaz-e Surbi. The identifications of the symbols and of the arrangement of the "cages" do not strike the reader as new or innovative; on the contrary, the story is like a new prism of familiar associations. Many of these associations are old standard identifications, e.g., cage = prison = life in this world.² They are used by other short story writers as well, and indeed one might characterize much of Iranian short story writing as bricolage, as re-creation with the odds and ends of old folk-lore. This particular story, however, reverberates not only with standard folkloric associations, but with themes already re-arranged by other short story writers, and Sadeq Hedayat in particular. It is true that Chubak was a follower of Hedayat, but the point here is not imitation, but rather dialogue: these writers are attempting to capture on paper a sense of Persian life, and so it is quite proper and no surprise that they should comment, as it were, upon each other's identifications. It is in this sense that they collectively form a "tradition."

Already in the first "cage" or scene of Mardi dar Qafas one has cause to remember at least five of Hedayat's stories:

¹ Translated into German by Gelpke (1961) under the title "Der Aristokrat und das Tier."

² Even in conversation, I found quite a resistance to altering the old poetic identification of prison (zندان) with this world, and rose garden (گولستان) with the next world. The poet Bahar, early in this century, tried at least to make the identity one of tyranny versus political freedom in his tasnif "Bird of Dawn" (مورغ-ه Sahar).

Sayyid Hassan Khan is in that stage half way between dream and waking. Not wishing to wake he falls back into a light slumber in which he has the illusion of timeless forgetting and the warmth of a suckling at the breast. To wake is nausea, but his attempt to put off waking is sufficient exertion to banish sleep. He is fifty, born in Lahore, left leg amputated, right arm lame, his wife dead only three months after marrying her. His life, in other words, has been one disaster after another, and yet he is damned to life. He has buried himself alive in his father's house with only a bitch and a servant. The bitch, Rasu, and his opium are his only consolations, and only thinking of them gives him enough courage to open his eyes.

Compare Hedayat's stories:

Sag-e Velgard: Pat also falls into hallucinatory escape from the harshness of reality, and also dreams of the warmth of suckling. Shabha-ye Veramin is also built around the theme of a man buried alive in his house after his wife has died. Zende Bi-gur (Buried Alive) is about a would-be suicide who seems condemned to failure, damned to life. Bun Bast (Cul-de-Sac) is also about a man who withdraws from life into opium and memory: the structure of that story is quite similar to Mardi dar Qafas as will become clearer. Mardi ke Nafsaš-ra Košt (The Man Who Killed his Soul) is about a man who wanted to lead an ascetic Sufi life, but finds his spiritual master actually engages in sin and magic.

The dynamism of the story is provided through Sayyid Hassan's relationship with Rasu. Rasu replaces Sudabeh, his deceased wife, in his affections, but this is an unnatural relationship and the resolution of its tension provides the plot:

Rasu shares his bed as did Sudabeh. Each morning after he opens his eyes, S. Hassan goes through a ritual of looking at the pictures on the wall, first that which was Sudabeh's favorite, then others associated with the past (Zohak, Omar Khayam, Abraham and Ismail); only then does Rasu come to be caressed. S. Hassan caresses Rasu's nose and ear in a sexual way, caressing her with his lame hand; he had similarly worn his artificial leg only on his wedding day with Sudabeh.

Rasu is contrasted with Sudabeh's canary: unlike a canary, the dog has feelings and emotions and can express her intelligence. The identification with Pat, Hedayat's sag-e velgard, is made more direct by the European breed names: Pat is a Scottish terrier, Rasu is an Irish setter. S. Hassan, on the other hand, is compared with the rat who watches him as he defecates and who feeds on his excrement: both are parasites who know not and thank not the source of their being, and whose natural acts are shameful. This theme of man and animal (the permutations of consciousness) provides the tension of the story: some male dogs appear outside the compound, and

Rasu becomes excited and indicates her desire to be let out. S. Hassan does not wish to lose her. He had sworn after Sudabeh's death never to let his affections fixate on anything again, but he had found Rasu as a new born pup and could not leave her to die. He had shared his opium and stories with her and now she like his family and like Sudabeh was to be taken from him. All these disasters are parallel: his family was wiped out in India by cholera and he had withdrawn from life into depression; he married Sudabeh and was restored to brief happiness but she died after three months of diphtheria; again he withdrew with only Rasu as comfort and she now was in heat. Compare Hedayat's Bun Bast: Sharif and Mohsen are good friends; Mohsen drowns and Sharif withdraws from life; Mohsen's look-alike son appears and Sharif is happy again, but two weeks later the son drowns and Sharif leaves home to disappear into the rain.¹ S. Hassan finally realizes that he has already lost Rasu and so painfully on crutches crosses over to the garden gate, observing that he is half dead. He lets in one dog and collapses as it begins to rain and the dogs copulate.

Rasu is thus released from an unnatural prison. Her opium den prison with S. Hassan is like Pat's (the sag velgard) prison in Veramin. The cage or prison theme is the same, but the elements are re-arranged. For it is sexual passion and coupling in a garden which destroys Pat's world. In this sense Pat is much more like S. Hassan's canary which S. Hassan attempts to free from the captivity of its cage, only to recognize too late (he cannot recapture it) that the canary is too domesticated, is confused and cannot fly properly. The canary's cage now swings "like a hanged man whose soul has gone." Man and animal (S. Hassan and the canary) are contrapunctal: the domesticated animal is forced into the wilderness, the social man is withdrawn into isolation, but true release from their proper worlds can only mean death. Like Pat, S. Hassan does not know why those in whom he has placed his affection have been taken from him.

The theme in other words remains the same: life is hell for reasons beyond one's control. This can take various forms and transformations,

¹ The same dual or mirrored structure occurs also in Hedayat's Sag-e Velgard: Pat is happy; his master is taken from him and he is plunged into misery; another man appears briefly and Pat is happy again, but the man leaves without him; Pat runs after in despair and drops dead of exhaustion.

but certain identifications remain stable: opium, hallucination and death are pleasant escapes; they are however also unnatural and only worsen the harshness of life when one fails to maintain forgetfulness. S. Hassan has a knife he stole many years ago and towards which he has a love-hate attachment: it upsets him and he wants to throw it away so he can put his guilty memory out of mind, but he never does (never can).

TABLE 13
SHORT STORY TRANSFORMATIONS

Short Story	Natural	Transforming Medium	Unnatural
<u>Shabhaye Veramin</u>	Fereydun & Ferangis	illness	Fereydun withdrawn and mad
<u>Sag-e Velgard</u>	Pat & his master	sexual passion	Pat as a <u>jube</u> dog
<u>Bun Bast</u>	Sharif & Mohsen, Majid	drowning	Sharif withdrawn into opium den
<u>Mardi dar Qafas</u>	Rasu with dogs	opium & enclosure	Rasu with S. Hassan
	Hassan & family, Sudabeh	cholera diphtheria	S. Hassan withdrawn into opium den
	canary in cage	Hassan freeing himself of attachments	canary free

The theme is transparently political, but pessimistic: it maintains a critical attitude towards the status quo, but it does not arouse. It does maintain a potential for arousal when conditions allow. It is not so far from a description such as that of Hamid Rahnamah's "Rain" to clariant political poetry of the Constitutional and Tudeh eras such as expressed in Lahuti's "Kremlin":

. . . poor creatures with grey faces, children with dishevelled hair, and with tattered blouses that barely concealed the half of their naked, parched little bodies. Like drowned rats, they were sitting or lying down in odd corners of the Avenue. . . . [chadored women] wore the

chador because it served to hide their nakedness . . . Like lizards which move in and out of the folds of a rose bush, they crept in and out among the pretty women passing by . . . [Rain begins to fall in a drizzle] falling on the pretty young girls as the dew falls on the petals of a rose [but falling on poor little Fateh soaking her hair and drenching her blouse] (translation by Law 1949: 226-27).

How long wilt thou shed tears over the throne of Noshiravan
Oh heart, study the hidden secrets in the palace of the Kremlin
This palace which thou seest smiling has wept long
Over the corpses of the oppressed
Woe to the owl of war and its inauspicious hooting
May its wind-pipe be broken forever! (translation by Rahman 1955:92).

9.3.2. Qaisar (Caesar); Agha-ye Holu (Mr. Obtuse)

The three films Qaisar, Mihadgah-e Hashem, and Droshky-či have already been discussed in section 6.3.7 with reference to honor and modesty. Here attention is redirected to the technique of meaning creation, and two more films will be introduced to probe the greater flexibility with which films have dealt with the same basic themes as just considered via short stories.

Qaisar, it will be recalled (see Appendix VI), is the story of a brother who revenges his sister's rape and suicide and his brother's death. Four frames of reference are blended to achieve symbolic pregnancy (in the sense defined above for ten shahi). (a) The most obvious set of meanings are the moral dilemmas of defending one's namus and upholding the law of leaving justice to the police and courts. (Alternative reactions of the middle class and youths in Abadan were noted in section 6.3.7.) (b) The tone of moral imperative is carried by references to the epic heroism of the Shahnameh. Pictures of pahlavans are constantly on the walls shadowing Qaisar like his fravashi (spirit of duty). Each time he sights a quarry, he bends down and pulls up his shoe-backs (casual Persian walking is on turned-down backs), the martial drum and chain percussion of the zurxane wells up, and he makes his kill in the straight-forward, no-nonsense Zoroastrian mode of battling Evil.

Life, however, is not as simple as literal ethical honesty would demand. Qaisar and the other characters are well aware of their tragic

position, and this understanding is carried (c) by Islamic imagery, as well as (d) structurally. It is a question of namus, says Farman (a Persian as opposed to Arabic name, meaning "command"), Qaisar's brother, implying there is no way of ignoring the issue even if revenge will only lead to counter-killing. Qaisar immediately recognizes that his sister's death is also his own social death: "I have no more work in this world" he says. He cannot run away; he is unclean (najes); he cannot marry. The various references to praying in the imam-zadeh also underline the immutable imperatives which have overtaken the mortal actors. Structurally the message is made by having all the actors comprise a small social universe which completely falls apart: the rapist is the brother of Fatimeh's best friend; Rahim, the brother of the rapist is a business associate of Qaisar's would-be father-in-law, and apparently also a butcher like Farman. As the death of Fatimeh means the death of her brothers, so their death means the death of their mother. Even the one inter-family bond, Qaisar's engagement, is ruptured: Qaisar may sit with his fiancée for they are mahram as they have eaten sweets together (i.e., were formally engaged); but now such ritual bonds will be broken: "I know I am sinning, I know I am unclean." The Islamic elements meld well. It is apt that the raped girl is called Fatimeh, the daughter of the Prophet and symbol of the Islamic community's namus. And if in a sense the arak which Qaisar drinks before going to find Mansur (the rapist) is the haram intoxicant of the pre-Islamic Shahnameh warriors, it is aptly symbolic of the dissolution of this micro-umma (Islamic community) both because it is a breaking of Islamic rules, and because in Sufi symbolism intoxicants transport us out of this world (perhaps to enlightenment, but in any case to the realm of divine immutability).

Qaisar in other words is constructed in part as a self-contained text like Alavi's Sarbaz-e Surbi; but not quite to the same extent. Outside identifications are required, but most of them are standard identifications (Islamic and Shahnameh terms which have "decayed" into "lexical signifiers" in Wagner's sense). What need be done to protect namus is also a familiar issue, dealt with by other films and so tying Qaisar into an artistic tradition along that axis as well.

The debate in this tradition is carried forward in Mihadgah-e Hashem as described in section 6.3.7 (See also Appendix VI). Many of the same elements are present as in Qaisar. Again the social universe is a small interrelated one; the rapist is the son of the aggrieved husband's (Qadam) best friend (Hashem) and Qadam's old sweetheart whom he left to Hashem (to wed) out of friendship. Again religious imagery is used: the Moharram shirt, the uncleanness of Hashem's house. These formal religious signs this time play the role of strict ethics as did the Shahnameh theme in Qaisar. But the drama of moral dilemma and tragedy is implicit in the Islamic notions of justice such as discussed in the parable of Ali and Firuz and the death of Omar (section 6.3.9) and this receives heavy emphasis in the film. First of all there is the respect Middle Easterners pay to passion (the rapist's excuse; the reaction of the victim's brother).¹ Secondly there is Hashem's plea that this is his only child and he can have no more; he offers everything he owns in exchange for his son's life (and the continuation of his line). And then thirdly there is the bond of friendship which while not stronger than the trust of namus is stronger than love. The theme of sacrificing one's love for the happiness of a friend (as Qadam did for Hashem) is an old one, the locus classicus being the love for Shirin of both Khosrow and Farhad.² A modern version of the Khosrow and Farhad story is in Sayyid Motalebi's (director of Mihadgah-e Hashem) film Kuche Mardha (Boys of the Alley): Ali defends his

¹Although Iranians say abusively of Arabs that they have the biggest penises in the world and their minds are completely ruled by the desires of their penises, they like Arabs defend Islam for not requiring unnatural suppression of desires. One of the many jokes for instance that Iranians love to tell about Arabs is that the reason Arab armies invariably lose skirmishes with the Israelis is that the Israelis send girls out to fight without blouses and the Arabs get so excited that they cannot fire their guns. Iranians admit also to sexual preoccupations, but more toward homosexuality: Arabha kos-dust-and; Iraniha kun-dust-and; and they joke that once an Iranian tried to usurp the leadership of the Sufi order of long penises: he went to see the incumbent leader (in Baghdad, of course) and the latter asked permission to loosen his collar to speak more comfortably; the Iranian left in shame.

²Shirin, a lovely Median princess, attracts the eye of the Persian commander, Khosrow. Khosrow is saved from any angry Median mob by Farhad,

friend Hassan, despite suspicions of Hassan's guilt, against a claim of blood-revenge by a murdered man's nephew, even though he had just given up his beloved to Hassan. Hassan eventually learns of Ali's love and refuses to go through with the marriage. He is killed as Ali finds out that he (Hassan) is indeed innocent.

These psychological and social themes—uncontrollable passion, friendship for better or worse, compulsion of moral duty and justice—all seem to revolve around a search for security in a world where no ties seem inherently stable. These themes are similar to those in the short stories discussed above: the feeling that although individuals act consciously and with free will, events to a large extent remain beyond their control. What films can do much more fully and efficiently than short stories is show how people learn and adjust: it is social interaction which is beyond any one actor's control, and through that interaction both actor and situation are transformed. It is possible in a carefully controlled film like Gav to achieve the same abstract symbolism as in the short stories we have been considering. The film medium however is inherently more adapted to portraying actions, borrowing a sculptural metaphor, "in the round." A greater degree of realism and immediacy can be achieved more easily. Two of the best films of 1970-71 for ethnographic purposes—Droshky-chi and Agha-ye Holu--utilize humor--the juxtaposition of rules in slightly inappropriate or novel situations--to engage the audience in an exercise of considering alternative cultural procedures and coping with change.

In the film Droshky-chi the vehicle for this humorous juxtaposition is established through a relatively traditional situation: a widow (Zena) and her widower brother-in-law (Baba) wish to pick up a twenty-five-year-old

Shirin's intended. Khosrow and Farhad thus strike up a strong bond of friendship, neither realizing that they love the same girl. Shirin and Farhad know that Khosrow is Persian, but not that he is the Governor of Media. Khosrow enjoys playing a game, demanding that if he is not to take revenge on the rebellious Medes, Shirin must marry him, thinking that when she finds out that the Governor is the lad she only knows as Khosrow she will be overjoyed. The Medean Queen agrees despite Shirin's tears. Farhad in despair goes off to find his friend Khosrow. When he finds out who Khosrow is he demands to be sent far away to carve out the imperial tomb. Khosrow, perplexed, agrees to whatever his friend desires. When he finds out that he has stolen Farhad's sweetheart, he summons Farhad to marry her, but Farhad dies of exhaustion and heartbreak before all can be set aright, and Shirin follows him.

courtship and marry. The widow's son (Morteza) objects to his father's place being usurped by Baba, and Zena's brother (Akbar) objects to the widower. Akbar objected to Baba twenty-five years ago because he was a droshky-driver; today he objects to Baba because he wants Morteza to marry his daughter and not Baba's daughter. Since Zena's husband and Baba, being brothers, jointly owned the house, the two half families live separately together in the house. This contradiction of intimacy (cousinship, sharing the toilet, etc.) and yet distance (modesty rules, etc.) sets up a series of situations in which Persian behavioral rules break down. The main conflict (between Morteza and Baba) is sustained by the inability of any of the actors to achieve his initial desires without the cooperation of the others. Morteza has sufficient power to prevent the marriage of Zena and Baba: they want his blessing, but towards the end of the film they also fear to embrace in his presence after he has tried to poison them all. On the other hand Morteza lacks the power to prevent Baba from usurping his father's place in the affections of Zena and his younger brother. Akbar uses Morteza's antagonism to Baba to try to wean him away from Baba's daughter in the hopes Morteza will marry his daughter. Through the daily interaction Morteza is finally broken of his fixation on his father and after the climactic crisis of nearly poisoning and then burning them all, he pushes Zena and Baba back into each other's arms. All ends happily but he is changed, they are changed, and a new family solidarity replaces those disrupted at the beginning of the film by his father's death.

In Agha-ye Holu on the other hand, the vehicle for the juxtaposition is the coming to Teheran of a rural hick who attempts to use high-flown proper Persian forms in the big city with predictable humorous consequences in the hustle bustle of a modern impolite town. The credits begin with Victorian curliques and cherubs as a frame in which the destructible gentle protagonist is frame by frame stripped of his clothes until he is left covering his bare chest dressed only in his pajama bottoms; and the credits end with a large hat--Reza Shah imposed Western hat--plopped down upon him. Of the many misidentifications and improper responses made by Agha-ye Holu, the central one is falling in love with a whore. This of course works out badly, and the film ends with him back on the bus leaving Teheran; but this

time his seat mate is more of a hick than he, and he has left his copy of Hafez back in the whore-house. Like Hedayat's Shabhaye Veramin, this film is a parable of the confrontation of tradition and modernity. But while Hedayat's story is a pessimistic judgement stated in literary terms, Daryoush Mehdiouye (also the director of Gav) gives a more realistic portrayal in Aghaye Holu of the conflict, the failures, but also the learning and change.

These films and others could be analyzed in greater detail, but this much will perhaps suffice for the present purpose. So far this chapter has attempted two things: (a) to explore a simple theory or mechanism of meaning creation which depends on the direction of attention to single, dual or multiple identifications; and (b) to explore the theme in Persian art and discourse of the oppression of the individual by forces beyond his control. By viewing this theme from a variety of sources one can at least push back this apprehension of the illegitimacy of the status quo one step beyond its simple minded attribution to Shiism of which commentators on Iran are so fond. All three of the short story writers we have reviewed are avowed atheists or at least opponents of the repressive shackles of religion. The theme remains the same as if only the idiom has changed from the religious one of the past to the existentialist one of the present. The apprehension of illegitimacy is furthermore not an unrelieved pessimism: the Constitutional and Tudeh periods were ones of nationalistic hope, and as the films of the last few years show, the present period is one of subdued optimistic adjustment to prosperity. The question remains as to the relation between this reiterated identification of illegitimacy and the creation of consciousness in the political sense.

The second half of this chapter will attempt to make more explicit the answer presented implicitly in the previous chapters by reviewing (a) the creation of religious paradigms particularly through the adjustment of the religious calendars and their identifications with themes of persecution (the Arab invasion for the Zoroastrians, the Battle of Karbella for the Muslims, the Exodus from Egypt for the Jews); (b) the politicization of oppression/persecution themes when taken up by organized groups or by leadership segments in the elite under conditions of economic dislocation and weakened political control.

9.4. Religious Calendars and Other Sociological Charters

In Chapters V and VI attention was drawn to the alteration of religious meaning which ritual dates have undergone in the Zoroastrian and Shiite calendars. It was suggested that there was an integrative "drift" (a rationalization, in Weber's terms) towards a "paradigmatic" unity. That is, particularly in the Shiite case, the ritual year was transformed into a cyclical re-living of the Karbella legend. But also in the Zoroastrian case, attempts to interpret rites and customs have over time led to a systematization around the theme of oppression after the Arab conquest: e.g., the explanation of the use of daxmes, the explanation of pilgrimage sites, the explanation of the differentiation of the community (the origin of the Parsis) all revolve around the implications of the fall of the Zoroastrian imperium. Just as for the Shiites normative Islam is defined by what was done by the Prophet and Imam Ali before Karbella, so for Zoroastrians norms of ritual and festival are referred to pre-Islamic times. The fact that over the last three centuries the Parsis rather than the Iranis have been the bearers of Zoroastrian High Tradition gives this formation of a systematized paradigm a somewhat more disjointed appearance than the Shiite case: thus one's attention is immediately drawn to the differences in calendar, custom and interpretation between Iranis and Parsis. This kind of "disjunction" provides both the elements for and the evidence of systematizing adjustment, and the historian finds such disjunction in all traditions. Attention was drawn to the systematization of the Bibi Shahbanu legend (Ch. V). Mary Boyce (1970) has given detailed consideration also to the disjunctions in the Zoroastrian calendar prior to the modern Shehenshahi-Qadmi split going back to adjustments in Sassanian and Achaemenian times; and J.B. Segal (1963), among others, has similarly reviewed the evidence for the Jewish calendar.

A full demonstration that these "paradigms" (viz. Wagner's "ideologies") are formed according to the theory of meaning creation presented above would require detailed chronological investigations the data for which are only partially extant. What has been presented however should serve to suggest that meaning may be encoded through sequential identifications not only "synchronically" by a creative artist, but also socially over time.

The example of calendars introduces a second point. Near Eastern calendars with the exception of the now wholly lunar Islamic one are coordinated by and are used to calculate the agricultural and pastoral seasons. Thus in both Zoroastrian and Jewish calendars one finds two New Years, one around the time of the fall harvest and winter sowing, and one at the time of the spring harvest. These decay, gradually fall out of phase, lose meaning, and must be recreated. Reform may be discordant and begins a gradual process of harmonization, which if successful results in revitalization, but if unsuccessful or incomplete appears disjunctive or disharmonic. Thus in Mary Boyce's reconstruction, the Sassanian kings introduced five extra days into the previous 360-day calendar to re-adjust it to the seasons. Because the previous calendar had various ritual significations (memorial days for communion with ancestors, etc.) the reform was not easily assimilated, and the two imperatives of maintaining ritual links and obeying the king's forces caused the duplication of ritual dates and their eventual extension into five day rites (the gahambars), a process not unlike the duplication of dates described in Chapter V for the contemporary Zoroastrian community. Today this Sassanian reform with its adjustments seems relatively harmonious and "traditional" although to the systematic scholar it is full of tell-tale incongruities, contradictions, and illogical patchwork.

Similarly the Jewish calendar presents similar historical patchwork. In Ezekiel's proposals for a theocratic state (never implemented), a rationalized calendar is included which would make Pesach and Sukkot parallel spring and autumn initiations.¹ In Segal's reconstruction the function of seasonal new year coordination acts like poles around which rituals cluster. The contemporary festivals of Rosh HaShannah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, and Simhas Torah are a "splintering" of the Autumn New Year, while Purim, Pesach and Shavuot are a "splintering" of the Spring New Year. The causes of the "splintering" have to do with sociological changes (e.g., the

¹Viz. the Sassanian Mehregan and NoRuz when the king would hold public audiences. Rosh HaShannah was associated also with the ascension to the throne of the king and the blowing of trumpets. Under the Hashmoneans and in Ezekiel's proposals the King was the chief celebrant at the spring rites as well.

centralization of rites under the Hashmonean kings and the decentralization again under the vassalage to Rome with a corresponding loss in function for Pesach of providing a means of census for military conscription and taxation), as well as with the elaboration of ritual drama in itself (e.g., the introduction of Purim in the second century B.C. on the night of the full moon of Adar, the last month of the year, when it was announced with trumpets whether or not the year was embolismic and thus when preparations for Pesach would begin¹). Segal is quite good in pointing out parallels with other Near Eastern Traditions (or inversely the Jewish exemplification of Near Eastern patterns) in which the New Year's days are dramatic occasions for recitation of creation legends (both of cosmological and communal origins²) and for mimetic rites. The Exodus from Egypt, thus, he points out, has been historicized to refer to a time perhaps at the death of the first-born son of Ramses II, but may be more fundamentally an elaboration of the common Near Eastern New Year motif of going forth from the houses and towns into the fields and open country (viz. the Persian sizdah custom, Ch. V), often expressed in the martial terms of the going forth of the hosts (viz. both the Zoroastrian theme of going forth to fight the battle for Good, and the arrival in spring of a new martial campaign season).³ Segal suggests further that the motif of haste (to escape Pharaoh's troops)

¹The association of Purim with the drawing of lots deciding men's fates before the new year parallels similar associations with Rosh HaShannah preceding Yom Kippur, and for Muslims with 15 Shaaban preceding Ramadan.

²The cycle of reading the Torah which opens with creation is begun on Simhas Torah; and a triennial cycle is begun on the first Sabbath of Nissan; Pesach is the occasion for reciting a story of the creation of the post-Exodus community.

³Moses requested Pharaoh to permit the Israelites to go out in the desert for a 3 day hag (Ex. 5:3) and they then go forth as a military host to live in tents. In autumn there are similar rites: going out to live in booths associated also with the vine harvest (as well as wandering forty years in the desert) and the sending out of the scapegoat. Segal cites as parallel the Egyptian and Hittite ritual battles, the Babylonian battle and running contest at the New Year, and the (later) 'ifadah of the Muslim haj when the pilgrims run to Muzdalifa and Mina (Segal 1963: 174).

may be also a mimetic one of speeding the regeneration of life, and intriguingly he points out Pesach features which may fit into a very neat rite de passage schema: seven days of preliminal purification, selection of the sacrificial goat on the 3rd day of this large seven-day period,¹ liminal rites of manipulating blood² and of commensuality of ritually clean foods,³ and post liminal periods of seven days (Pesach Week and the wheat sheaf waving rite) and seven weeks (Shavuot).

In other words, what Segal's account suggests much more fully but consonant with Boyce's account, is that calendars can gain in religious and symbolic pregnancy when their dates simultaneously have agricultural, historico-legendary and ethico-exemplary meanings (i.e., multiplication of identifications). The question as to why the Shah cannot easily invest his calendar with similar pregnancy from the top has to do with a rejection of identifications, an insistence that, e.g., the 28 Mordad is only the date on which the Shah was returned to his throne and nothing more. And this leads back to the point with which we began in Ch. I that sociological organization is necessary to an understanding of collective meaning creation. We can now reconsider a number of the social charter legends

¹Pesach is on the 14-15th day of Nissan; the goat is selected on the 10th: 15 minus 7 = 8; day 8 + 9 + 10 = 3 day period. Seven and three are common ritual periods: the 3 and 7 day full mourning periods, the 7 days from birth to circumcision, the 7 days festival after marriage, 7 days for purifying warriors, lepers, sanctifying priests, altars, etc. Viz. also on the Muslim haj the tawaf seven times around the Kaaba of which the first 3 are done running (Segal 1963: 175-79; 145).

²Smearing versus sprinkling being the modes of dealing with less and more sacred or impure objects, resp. Viz. rituals for purifying lepers, sending out the scapegoat and the ritual of the red heifer.

³Again Segal suggests that the association of unleavened bread with the haste of flight is a historicization, and that more fundamentally leaven is not as pure as unleavened bread, that leavening and fermentation are metaphors of decay and contamination. Leaven could not be placed on the altar nor could it be eaten by priests within the sanctuary. Plutarch says that the Flumen Dialis was not allowed to eat leaven because "it springs from corruption," and a similar use is made in the Babylonian Talmud of hames (leaven) to mean "become degenerate." Segal adduces other purity rules of the Pesach meal: the rules concerning the selection of the sacrifice, its method of cooking, the prohibition against breaking its bones, the disposal of its remains, and possibly the significance of the bitter herbs (moror) (Segal 1963: 166-173).

presented in Part II and summarized in Table 14. They gain their pregnancy not only by being "explanations" of group differentiation, but by simultaneously being plays upon standard plots, themes and symbols. That to many Teheranis they may be merely folkloristic curiosities is also part of the point that symbolic pregnancy is a dynamic quality derivative from the number of significations understood.

The twenty-nine legends listed in Table 14 have all been presented in preceding chapters and emphasis was placed there on their structural similarities such as the tripartite character of the shrine myths Nos. 5-15 (original legend, rediscovery legend, confirming stories of cures). The other shrine myths (18, 20, 27, 28) fit into the same pattern except their location was not lost and so did not have to be rediscovered; thus they have only a dual structure of original myth plus confirmation stories. Viewed as a group, the twenty-nine stories have other similarities, and in a number of ways seem to be transformations of one another. The Sarah bat Asher story is inverted with respect to the Zoroastrian shrine stories in that the original legend is one of being guided to finding lost sheep rather than a story of group antagonism; instead the Shah Abbas half of the story provides this group differentiation (terrified Jew vs gaming Shah). The Shah Abbas stories (17, 19, 20) take the form of shrine confirmation stories in which men are saved or aided by divine intercession (or Shah Abbas intercession). The legends of rituals (23-26, 29) also have this form. Other such formal similarities occur: the transport of Firuz (4) and of Bibi Shah Banu (5) from danger in Iraq to safety along the Iranian central desert (Kashan, Rey); such celestial transport (4, 5) and subterranean transport (6-11, 14, 15, 19, 20); following a deer to the shrine (10, 20); following sheep (20, 7); parallels between the Rosato Shahadah and Shahadah Yazd; etc.

But more interesting than these formal characteristics is the way in which the legends taken together present the cross-cutting categorizations of Persians. Legend Nos. 5-15 basically have the same plot, yet the identifications of the protagonists and antagonists range from complete inversion (6-10 versus 15) to a series of intermediate steps. Thus in No. 5 Bibi Shahbanu, is at the same time Zoroastrian, Shiite, and Persian and the

TABLE 14
SOCIAL GROUPING LEGENDS

Confessional Grouping	Groups Contrasted	Chapter
1. <u>Shahnameh</u> of Ferdausi	Persian vs Turk & Arab	
2. Battle of Karbella, <u>Rosato Shahadah</u>	Shiah vs Sunni	6.1; 6.3.1; 6.3.9
3. Salman Farsi*	Persian/Shiah vs Arab/Sunni (*also Sufi vs non-Sufi)	5.3
4. Ali and Firuz		6.3.9
5. Bibi Shahbanu		5.3
6. Pir-e Banu		5.3
7. Pir-e Sabz (Hayat Banu; Chak Chak)	Persian/Zoroastrian vs Arab/Muslim	5.3
8. Pir-e Herisht (Gohar Banu)		5.3
9. Pir-e Naraki (Naz Banu)		5.3
10. Pir-e Narestuneh (Ardeshir)		5.3
11. Seti Pir	Zoroastrian vs Muslim	5.3
12. Sultan Shahadah	Persian vs Arab	5.3
13. Shahzadeh Fazel	Zoroastrian vs Muslim	5.3
14. Sheikh Qanab	Shiah vs Ummayads	5.3
15. Ghar Bibi, Bibi Darmanda, <u>et al.</u>	Muslims vs Zoroastrians	5.3
16. <u>Shahadat-e Yazd</u>	Bahai vs Muslim	
<u>Local Level Grouping</u>		
17. Shah Abbas & origin of Nasrabad	King & Zoroastrian minority vs Muslims	5.2.1
18. Sheikh-e Panhan	Zoroastrians vs bureaucracy	5.3.7
19. Shah Abbas & origin Jewish Quarter	King & Jewish minority vs Muslims	7
20. Sarah bat Asher & Shah Abbas	Jews vs Persians	7
21. Yezdigird and origin of Jews in Yazd	Jews vs Yazdis	7
22. Zoroastrian-Jewish ancestor Geziah-Zohak	Jews vs Zoroastrians	7

TABLE 14 --Continued

Confessional Grouping	Groups Contrasted	Chapter
<u>Interpersonal Psychotherapy</u>		
23. Mosghel Geshah		5
24. Bibi Seshambe		5
25. Bibi Shah Pari		5
26. Pir-e Vameru		5
27. Eliahu Hanavi		7
28. Ziaratgah-e Mullah Or		7
29. Abraham and Ismail/Issac		5

antagonists are the Ummayad Sunni; in No. 14 the Zoroastrian and Persian identifications are dropped and the conflict is merely between the sons of Abbas (Arab Shiite) versus the Ummayads (Arab/Syrian Sunni); in Nos. 12 and 13 the protagonist is identified as alternatively (not simultaneously) Zoroastrian or Shiite, and recognition is maintained that both groups claim the shrine; the same claim is made with regard to the shrine at Meshed, but the Shiite claim has excluded the Zoroastrian one (11) as it has also with regard to the Yazd Masjid-e Jome.¹ The rich ambiguity of the Persian-Arab and Zoroastrian-Muslim identifications is paralleled in the Jewish-Zoroastrian legends: though most commentators on the Shahnameh identify Zohak, the Semite demon, with Arabs, many Zoroastrians are not sure that the identification should not rather be with Jews; to this Jews have the answer of legend No. 22 in which the identification is affirmed but in such a way as puts any stigma back in Zoroastrian hands.

If it is true that both legend utilization and ritual utilization (e.g., Zoroastrian xeirat, Muslim fidyah and rosa, Jewish kappara;

¹It is popularly recognized that before it become a mosque, the site of the Masjid was a fire temple; but this assertion is taken as an insult by some Muslims. In any case, Zoroastrians do not have access to the mosque normally.

pilgrimages: ziarat, haj, hag, 'umrah; etc.) are similar, and if furthermore it is difficult to draw the geographical boundaries of such usages (e.g., "Persian culture"), then we may conclude by viewing such usages as identifications made in the dialectical flux of history. That is, when one wants to say that Islam and Zoroastrianism are opposed any of legends 6-11 can be invoked, but when one wants to say that Muslims and Zoroastrians are brothers legend 5 can be invoked to the effect that, as a boy at the shrine of legend 12 put it, Zoroastrians are our in-laws. "When one wants to say" depends then not on the nature of language or cultural symbols, but on the apprehension of social possibilities. When life seems oppressive Hedayat can turn to modern metaphoric use the tale of the mystical bird who sings the story of Karbella while shedding tears of blood (Se Qatre Xun); when the revolution seems possible Lahuti can openly sing of the Kremlin in place of Ctesiphon.¹ The question is, in one of its more controversial forms, why did Bahaism fail, or why is Bahaism succeeding? Why it failed must be answered in the political terms of Ch. 2: its leadership was decimated and exiled, it was beset with internal quarrels, it had little outside support (it was the manipulated, not a manipulator). Not everyone agrees it failed: in subtler form than a political movement its ideas (re-identifications) are still a creative force in the making of modern Iran. Similarly although one tends to be sceptical that the Shah can introduce his nationalist rituals as stable symbols, it is not clear that through the events which may occur during their celebration they may not eventually gain stability in the same way that the Sassanian kings managed to introduce the calendar reforms discussed earlier.

One learns from such questions that the tissue of culture is a delicate, living thing. That it is in essence "living" or dynamic means that it can be pinned down to simple crystallized meanings only in bounded texts. What seems to represent the most essential or meaningful elements of a culture are probably symbols or symbolic concatenations (cosmologies, ideologies, crosses, crescents, fires, etc.). If this is not to be a

¹Lahuti's Kremlin is modeled on Khaqani's qasida on the ruins of Ctesiphon.

tautology, it implies that symbolic intensity (multiplication of identifications) correlates with stability. This would seem to make sense: mutual reinforcement and interrelation should lead to increased staying power. Stability in this sense seems to be greatest in works of art where all or most of this reinforcement is internal (what was called "explicit identifications" in the analysis of Alavi's Sarbaz-e Surbi). But symbols are subject to decay and recreation sometimes with a relatively great velocity (viz. the now almost universal association of the Star of David as a sign of Judaism: it is a nineteenth century invention).

A second implication would seem to be that it often may be easier for scholars looking back to see such reinforcing symbolic interconnections of things which participants experience as partial. Thus Geertz' airborne Moroccan with his Quran in one hand and whiskey in the other seems to Geertz to be explicable only as a compartmentalization; in a few centuries, should Geertz' tale maintain its classic status, perhaps someone will argue that in this mystic text whiskey, Qurans and airplanes are all metaphors of transport to enlightenment, and that by "compartmentalization" Saint Clifford only meant they were different techniques (ziker). By the reverse side of the same logic, because scholars insist on tracing antecedents, integration, congruence, etc., things which appear as discordant bricolage to the scholar seem like "workable" (not necessarily optimal, yet necessary: "that's the way we do it," "it's our custom") harmony to the actors in praxis.

9.5. Symbolic Power and Its Limitations

This "liquid" nature of symbols and culture does not mean that symbolic formations merely follow social contingencies: symbols have a partial autonomy and serve as immediate guides for action. The formulation introduced casually in Chapter I still seems apt, that symbols are "analogue" operators. Information about this world gets coded (selection of important bits versus noise occurs) and these codes are then processed and acted upon: while there is "correspondence" between code and what is coded, it need not be a one-to-one image reflection.

Major examples which support this position have been the discussions

of rituals such as the yasht dowre daxme (to aid solving of economic and interpersonal conflict) or the Shah Pari and evil eye rites, the discussion of the ritual calendars (to coordinate agriculture, food redistribution, etc.), the discussion of dreams (to resolve individual conflict over social location, etc.), and the discussion of legends (to define social groups). One might include also such ritualized rebellions as the Sudan Mahdi's jihad and modelling of his government on the khalifas of early Islam (Holt 1958), the reformulation of the Safavid revolt in Shiite terms (Mazaoui 1966), or the Abbasid revolt in selective Shiite terms (Shaban 1970). In all three cases religious formulations aided political mobilization, but such formulation was not necessarily prior to revolt (the Safavid case) nor the cause of revolt.

Perhaps a clear example is Max Weber's discussion of music as subject both internally to rationalization (development of scales, improvement of instruments, etc.), and externally to sociological contingencies of changing patronage of kinds of instruments or music forms (symphonies require different kinds of support than do ballads).

Following Weber's lead, one might suggest that symbolic change should be accounted for not in terms of (or not only in terms of) loss of use for cultural tools as sociological changes occur, but rather in terms of the introduction of new symbolic operators as new modes or levels of integration occur which cannot be handled adequately by old symbols. Thus just as ballads may be sung in Carnegie Hall, so one cannot argue that there is any necessary reason for the xeirat or yasht dowre daxme to become obsolete. Rather one may argue that in a village economy such rituals perform multiple functions (resolution of conflict, respect for the dead and inspiration for cosmological speculation, reaffirmation of solidarity of a kindred, support of the priesthood, circulation of wealth) many of which are better performed other ways in a state economy (salaried priests, increased monetary liquidity, courts and village councils). And a national mode of integration requires symbolic operators different from such local level coordinators of action as xeirats.

Change in Iran is obvious and can perhaps be schematized in three steps for Yazd:

- (a) a mercantile and peasant economy (silk, cotton) embedded in a patrimonial system with royal monopolies on major sectors of production;
- (b) a mercantile and peasant economy together with a nascent urban industrialization (textiles) embedded in a colonial system (England, Russia);
- (c) a state economy bidding through nationalized industry (petroleum) and central planning for a place in the world economy of multinational corporations.

Xeirats and similar local level operators may be sufficient for (a). Rosas and religious paradigms such as invoked by the Mahdi of the Sudan and the Iranian Mujtaheddin at the same time served for (b). Today, for (c), both forms are not obsolete, but are encompassed by larger scale operations. Zoroastrianism is being invoked not as a village religion (a), not as a missionary religion (b), but as a symbol of Iranian nationalism: that genius which was able to withstand and absorb the Turanian, Greek, Arab and European invasions. Thus also the title: Zoroastrian Iran between Myth and Praxis.

APPENDIX I
RELIGIOUS RIOTS

APPENDIX I
RELIGIOUS RIOTS

This appendix makes no attempt to document every religious riot in the historical record. It is sufficient to review as many as provide the pattern which would fit other cases as well. Little attention is given here to rioting against Armenians, Nestorians, and Sunni Muslims quite simply as a function of the geographic focus of the field research on Yazd and central Iran where these groups are little represented (aside from the Armenians of Julfa-Isfahan). The object of the review is to provide as succinctly as possible the historical data on which the comments of Chapter II were partially based, and to present a prime case for the discussion of mythological processes. This latter intent revolves around the observation that however intermittent or constant religious persecution may be, what is abstracted by the participants is an ideographic representation of the processes involved: not an analysis of the political forces, but an unanalyzed recognition of their continuing operation. Such analysis is important to an understanding of the myths; otherwise, to the outsider, the myths appear as J.H. Davies, British Consul in Krman, commented in 1928, and as countless others have agreed:

Into the vacuum caused by their own lack of political ideas and ability resentment against foreigners rushes in as a plausible explanation of their own past failures and present difficulties. . . . If there is a riot in the bazaar, if the Government decides that the popular candidate should not succeed in the election, if there is an earthquake, it is all put down to the machinations of the British (FO 416/81 [1928: 136]¹).

Consul Davies suggests that this causes only slight anti-British feeling since (1) on the Iranian model of life, if intrigue is possible, and it is rarely not possible, it is incredible that it should not be exploited; (2) Iranians have no initiative of their own over which to feel thwarted. An angry nationalist, writing at the end of the Mossadeq experiment, viewed the situation quite differently:

The European, who sees the many beggars, shakes his head and thinks: A lazy people! No, a patient people, which only reluctantly realizes that one must fight for his bread when he cannot work for it. That, however, the people have begun to realize this is signalled by the numerous peasant revolts of the post war years, and the ever stronger growing demand of the working masses for land reform (Alavi 1955: 36).

¹ Citations of this form are to: Great Britain, Public Records Office, Confidential Reports, Foreign Office series 416. So as not to break up the text needlessly this shortened notation will be used, and further references given at the end of the Appendix.

Alavi points out that the peasants of Mazandaran celebrated the ousting of Reza Shah by burning his palaces and houses, but that while this was a protest against real wrongs, constructive action required organization. The history of both the labor movement and the peasant movement is the history not merely of developing tactics and organization to achieve goals (e.g., the forcing by peasant revolts in Gilan of Qavam-us-Sultaneh in 1946 to accept the principle of a maximum 15% return on harvests to landowners, or the forcing in 1942 by successful strikes in Isfahan and Mazandaran factories of an eight hour day, sick pay, more sanitary conditions, and provision of work clothes), but is a constant struggle against repression and destruction of organization and leadership. The British were not above using armed Arabs to disrupt the 1946 oil workers strike in Abadan for higher pay, nor was the Iranian Government above destroying the records and headquarters of the United Trade Unions before the visit of International Labor Organization commission led by Louis Saillant later the same year, not to mention the arrest, murder or exile of labor leaders from Hejazi in 1921 to the communist inspired Tudeh leaders in the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, taken as a whole, the period since 1945 has been a history of the successful substitution by the Government of Government-controlled labor syndicates for autonomous unions. Given this continuous destruction of articulate protest, it is not surprising that protest should take the form of inarticulate riots.

In the following mass of detail what is important to note is (1) the relation (projective-reflective, demonstrative-publicity seeking, retaliatory-scape-goating, or however one eventually attempts to formulate it) between real sources of discontent and the aggressive behavior; (2) the form of the aggressive behavior, especially the fact that while it is often irrational (symbolic¹ rather than instrumental, self-destructive, aimed at objects who cannot alter the sources of discontent) it is (a) patterned (note especially the fire-fly dance in the public spaces of Yazd in section 1.2, and the demands for subordinate separation in section 1.5, and the differences when dealing with Bahais or Europeans or Jews or Zoroastrians or Ismailis); (b) selective amid the emotionalism (the failure to touch Dr. White in section 1.1; the disinterest in the wife of Haji Halabisaz and the regulation of dealing with women to women, also in 1.1; the respect shown for Jewish ritual objects in 1.5; and so on); and (c) intentionally utilized, if not instigated with deliberate timed planning (not only the Atabegi Azam's post facto usage of the 1901 riots in 1.5 but the operation of the clerical and gubernatorial networks to maximize political pay-off).

The discussion is organized as follows:

1. Qajar Period
- 1.1. June 1903 Bahai Massacre in Yazd
- 1.2. Ritual Slaughter of Yazd Bahais in 1892

¹ The burning of Bahai bodies throughout and the fear of Muslim bodies being burned in the Bushire Plague Riots; the calling of the Shah a dog, of parading a dog with the name tag of the Shah in Tabriz, the calling a slain dog, "Husseini," in the Meshed riot of 1839.

- 1.3. Bushire Plague Riots of 1899
 - 1.4. Aqa Nejafi versus the Church Missionary Society; Yazd
 - 1.5. Riots against Jews
 - 1.6. Zoroastrian Troubles
 - 1.7. Ismailis
 - 1.8. Commentary: Segmentary Minority-Foreigner Alliances
2. Pahlavi Period
 - 2.1. Hat and Veil Riots of 1935-36
 - 2.2. 1955 Bahai Riots
 - 2.3. 1963
 - 2.4. The 1970s

1. Qajar Period

1.1. June 1903 Bahai Massacres in Yazd

1.1.1. Background

This was one of a series of anti-Bahai riots within a larger continuing series of religious riots. In 1901 two Bahai peasants of Abarghu, a town on the Shiraz-Yazd road, had been trapped into an admission of their faith and at the order of the local leading ulema, in consultation with Aqa Nejafi (of whom more below) of Isfahan, these two were led around town, their hair was cut off, goat skins were nailed to their heads, they were beaten to death, and finally their bodies were burned with kercsene. During Ramazan 1903, Muslims in Rasht disinterred the body of a sayyid who had been a contractor for transport on the Rasht road and was suspected of being Bahai. His body was thrown out of the Muslim graveyard to the dogs and several Bahai families were attacked. The Bahais appealed to the Russian legation for protection. A month later in Isfahan, on the 27 May, Aqa Nejafi had a Bahai money changer beaten for his heresy. Rumors of intended massacring of Bahais led to some six hundred of them taking refuge in the compound of the Acting Russian Consul. A written guarantee of their safety from the Governor, Zil-us-Sultan, did not give them enough confidence to leave. On May 28, a mob threatened to force entry and to kill them. The Acting Russian Consul declaring his own life to be in danger succeeded in getting Zil-us-Sultan to convince Aqa Nejafi to disperse the mob. The Consul then turned out the Bahais, several of whom were roughed up over the next few days. On 3 June two brothers were accused of being Bahai by a mullah who owed them money: a mob killed them, mutilated the bodies which they dragged through the bazaars and finally burned with kerosene. In nearby Nejafabad several more Bahais were killed. Both the Russian and British Legations protested. Zil-us-Sultan replied that atrocities also occurred in Europe; but the Grand Vizier took a more serious view, suspecting a conspiracy led by his political opponents in Karbala and Nejaf. The mujtaheddin of these religious cities had been sending messages to the Shah protesting employment of Europeans in the administration, reorganization of finances under European control, contraction of Russian loans, and spread of Bahaism. The Grand Vizier on at least one occasion prevented such messages from reaching the Shah, but another which did get through had the intended effect of postponing planned reform. The British tried to

exploit the situation to prevent Persia from going to Russia for further loans: both the adventurer Sheikh Abdullah Ali Reshdi-Herati and an official political agent, an Indian Shiah, Mirza Mohammad Hussein, were used to encourage the mujtaheddin. In Teheran, the British Minister, Sir Arthur Harding, was suggesting to the Grand Vizier that Great Britain might help him by bringing her influence to bear on the mujtaheddin: he reported to the Marquess of Landsdowne:

I think he saw the threat veiled by this friendly hint and offer of help. . . . the line which I indicated may be well worth following up, as it is one which will enable us whilst appearing to support the Persian Government against fanatical demands inconsistent with its duties as a civilized Administration, to strengthen the opposition of the ulema, of which the Shah stands in great dread, to any further concessions to Russia (FO 416/14 [1903: 47]).

Meanwhile other riots were also occurring during 1903. There were bread riots in Meshed which the unpaid soldiers refused to put down. The trouble was attributed to collusion between Russian buyers and two rich merchants, the Rais-ut-Tajer and the Moaven-ut-Tajer: i.e., withholding grain from the local market to make profits in the foreign trade. In Tabriz riots at first directed at destroying Armenian liquor shops turned into demonstrations against the new tariff schedules, Belgian customs officials, the Russian road concession, and European influence. The Crown Prince was implicated, being suspected of pique over not obtaining a loan from the local Belgian Customs officer. Mujtahed Mirza Hassan Aqa was charged with leading the disturbances; and the speculation in the bazaar was that should there be further troubles, Russia might step in with troops to assure order which might cause the Sultan of Turkey to declare a jihad and overthrow the Qajars. In Isfahan attempts continued to intimidate people from visiting the Anglican missionaries. In Teheran during Moharram there were attempts to stir up anti-Christian activity by circulating obscene attacks on Islam ostensibly printed by Christians in Cairo. Solidarity of the clergy against the Government was demonstrated towards the end of the year, when the Ain-ed-Dowleh routinely arrested participants of a public brawl; the brawl was between two rival religious madressehs, and the mullahs refused to hold public prayers in the mosques or perform other functions until the forty detainees were released. And finally 1903 was a year of tribal raids: Lurs raided villages of the Bakhtiari chiefs near Dezful, repulsed a Bakhtiari counter-attack, and then devastated the countryside, carrying off livestock and burning crops; Kurds raided into the Urmi area in May; and the Shahsevand raided around Ardebil and into Russian territory.

1.1.2. Events of the Yazd Massacre

The months preceding June of 1903 had been months of great missionary activity in Yazd on the part of Bahais (Taheri 1923: 80). Shortly after the May-June anti-Bahai riots of Isfahan, Sayyid Ibrahim, a new imam jome, arrived in Yazd from Kerballa by way of Isfahan. Before he arrived rumor spread that he was bringing with him orders to kill

Bahais. He denied this but at the same time spoke to the people of seeing Bahais killed in Isfahan, and he praised the Isfahanis for being religious and unquestioning. By contrast, he said, the Yazdis were irreligious and always asking questions rather than obeying. He spoke against allowing Bahaim to spread. The next day he hinted that he did indeed have an order to kill Bahais given by Sayyid Mohammad Kazam Hojat-ul-Islam, but he refused to show it. The following day was the 17 Rabi'a-avval and the first day of the Id-e Molid.¹ He went to his roof and began to sing monajot (religious songs of praise), and the people gathered, and gradually they became aroused, and they went to seize Bahais. And so, according to Taheri, began a number of processions in which a man would be seized and would be beaten and mutilated as the crowd took him to the Imam Jome. Things obviously got out of hand, and Taheri relates that the Imam Jome protested to the crowd that he did not intend them to bring him people in such condition; he would take the wounded men into his house away from the crowd. Still the crowd brought more men and looted Bahai houses. The accounts of the Church Missionary Society (Anglican) missionaries tell of hearing of the first death on June 15, several others in Yazd being wounded, and simultaneous disturbances breaking out in nearby Ardekan and Taft. On June 17 two more were killed; and more deaths were reported on the 23rd. On the 26th a mullah successfully prevented the arrest of a criminal who had taken bast in an imanzadeh. The mob encouraged by this defiance of the Government, killed twelve Bahais and dragged their mutilated bodies through the streets, and then began looting Bahai houses, an activity the Government troops and Governor's servants joined. Terrified Bahais sought refuge at the Christian Mission. Two of the men so admitted were being sought by the mob which had gathered around the castle demanding their death. At this point, the missionaries made the hard decision that should the mob learn of their presence in the mission and come and demand the men, they would have to give them up. The missionaries were unsure of their own safety under such circumstances, although Dr. White, who had attended the first Bahai casualty, had done so in the presence of the mob without being touched. In Taheri's emotional account of the death of Haji Mirza Halabisaz (1923: 95-110), it is the man the crowd is after, and although they mercilessly his wife when she threw herself on his body, they did so only until they could tear her off, and they left her taking only the husband. Only later did the women return to finish off the woman. Miss Biggs is impressed by the ferocity with which the women attacked a Bahai woman "beating her and biting her about the hands and face—I assure you these people become like beasts of prey in the fanaticism" (CMS G2/PE 05/1903 #119²). The mob did come to the Mission Quarter but they made no attempt to search the Mission itself. When night fell,

¹ Taheri's dates seem confused. The details of his description fit that of the missionaries, but the year he gives as 61 (Bahai Dispensation) which would be 1905 instead of 1903. In 1905 there were a few incidents but not killings of Bahais. Again, Id-e Molid, the birthday of the Prophet, which falls on 17 Rabi'a avval by the Shiite reckoning was in autumn 1903, not June (Ramazan being March-April that year); Taheri gives the 7th instead of 17th as the date of the Id. Singing of monajot on rooves is common for Ramazan.

² CMS citations are explained at end of the Appendix.

the two men were packed off towards the village cluster of Mehriz where they would have met their death but for the intervention of an armed sayyid who ordered that they be sent back to Yazd for trial and execution. The next day, the Governor ordered that all suspected Bahais be brought to him for trial and punishment. His failure to execute the first one brought to him led to further rioting, and several more Bahais were dispatched by the mob. On Sunday, the 28th, the Governor attempted to appease the mob by blowing one Bahai from a cannon and having another's throat slit. The town finally quieted at the news that troops were being sent from Isfahan and Teheran. The troops were not in fact sent when Aqa Nejafi offered to come to Teheran and explain his actions; he feared that the quartering of troops in Isfahan would raise prices and turn people against him. (There was also a rumor that the funds borrowed from the Russian bank to pay these troops had already been appropriated by the Shah for a hunting trip.) Some ninety to a hundred Bahais had been killed in and around Yazd. Aqa Nejafi had attempted unsuccessfully to start similar riots in Sultanabad, Qazvin, Shiraz, and Teheran. The four mujtaheds of Karbala and Nejaf sent telegrams disavowing the anti-Christian and anti-European agitations in Tabriz (see section 1.1.1.) but approving the Bahai killings in Isfahan and Yazd. The Governor of Yazd expelled the Imam Jome back to Karbala, and another prominent mullah, Ahmad Mullah Hassan, to Mehriz. He had one sayyid beaten for having insulted him, but feared to order other punishments in Yazd, suspecting that the soldiers would not remain loyal. He did fine several villages and raze the houses of some village offenders. In August Bahais were still very insecure, and in Isfahan quiet extortion from rich Bahais continued long after the disturbances.

1.1.3. Commentary

From the vantage point of Teheran, the Bahai massacre of Yazd was part of a wider pattern. The national government under the leadership of the Grand Vizier (Sadri Azam or Atabegi Azam), in severe financial straits, contemplated (a) a new Russian loan despite strong British diplomatic objection, although the reason for the Russian entanglement, of which otherwise an independent Persian would steer clear, was the failure of the English market to support a loan in the wake of losses due to the Tobacco Regie depreciation in 1893 (i.e., the issue for compensation payments to the cancelled Syndicate; see 1.2.1) and the subsequent Russian loans of 1900 and 1902 involved clauses limiting Persia's freedom to contract loans elsewhere; (b) a financial reorganization of land taxes and tariffs opposed by vested interests of the landowning (including cleric) and merchant classes. Bread riots were already common due to the storage for speculation of grain by the landed classes producing artificial shortages, e.g., the Teheran riots of 1899 and 1900, the Isfahan riots of 1897, 1898, 1899, etc.¹ Anti-Western disturbances were becoming common, the menace

¹ Famines and low agricultural productivity, of course, were also a constant problem. There were severe famines in 1860/61, 1869/72, 1879/80,

being much more serious than replacement of native elites by outside forces engendering clerical jealousy: the pressure of British and Russian diplomacy to secure rationalization of sources of income so loans could be repaid, which loans were gambling counters in efforts to secure commercial advantages—specifically markets in the case of Russia, and transport advantage in the case of England—represented threats to the deteriorating circulation of wealth (the system of non-productive dissipation through buying of offices, permanent pensions, etc.) on which the upper classes lived. Objections to upsetting these sources of income were effective in this fragile political system to stop reform. The paradoxical result was that the Westerners, who theoretically represented liberal modernization, attempted to bolster the system with loans and pressure and threats against the conservative reaction, leaving the reactionaries to campaign for the destruction of the Government in the names of Islam and constitutional democracy. Minorities were allies to the Europeans which increased justified anger against them as supporters of the unjust system; but this did not prevent the European powers from using local power resources as pressures on the Persian Government. Thus the British were quite capable of advocating the unleashing of reactionary disturbances to frighten the Sadri Azam from a Russian loan. During the 1903 tariff negotiations, when Britain was attempting to gain equal treatment with the Russians, Sir Arthur Harding wrote to the Marquess of Landsdowne:

We could probably bring about disturbances in the south which would greatly embarrass the Persian Government, if our people objected to paying the new duties. I shall hint such a possibility to the Grand Vizier when I next see him (FO 416/12 [1903: 95]).

Riots often turned against minority groups which were easier to attack than their European patrons: Jews suffered in Shiraz and Teheran, Armenians were usually only threatened in the cities but villages were ransacked in Kurdistan, and occasionally Europeans were also threatened (missionaries in Isfahan, Belgian customs officials in Tabriz, merchants in Teheran). Of all, Bahais were the most vulnerable, being the least tightly allied to European interest groups, and being culpable in addition to aiding and abetting foreigners, to heresy, a capital crime in Islam.

About one hundred Bahais were killed during the riots of July 1903 in Yazd. Taheri's chronicle, Tarix-e Shahadat-e Yazd, gives the details of the sufferings of a large number of the Yazdi martyrs over the first three quarters of a century of Bahai history. What the Shahadat-e Yazd however fails to make clear is the power situation of Yazd: it was clearly

and 1915/17; years such as 1909/10 also approached famine conditions. A descriptive account of the 1869/72 famine can be found in Brittlebank (1873). Comparative price lists can be found in Migeod (1956) and the Alliance Israelite records. Bozorg Alavi (1955: 56) estimates that about a tenth of Iran's population emigrated during the 1869/72 crisis, and that emigration at the end of the nineteenth century was some two hundred thousand per year.

admitted by the mujtaheddin that they were advocating the killing of Bahais as a demonstration of their power against the corrupt governmental system. They tried lectures, and sent letters and telegrams to the Shah itemizing their discontents: spread of Bahaism, increasing numbers of Europeans in the administration, contracting of foreign loans and the misuse of the funds so that the only result was the increase of foreign control, and the flight of gold from Iran. When their letters got through and seemed to get a favorable response, the mujteheddin were capable of counselling patience: a letter from the four great mujtaheddin (Mohammad Hussein, son of Mirza Khalil Teherani; Mohammad Kazem Khorassani; Mujtahed Sharabiani; Aljani Mohammad Hassan Mamakani) was sent to the ulema of Persia saying: (1) foreigners are under the protection of the Government and Islam; (2) although selling liquor is against the Quran, this is a matter for the state to deal with; (3) suppression of Bahaism is also a Government matter. On the other hand, when they got no response, they were quite capable of inciting riots, making threats—Mujtahed Sharabiani is cited in the FO records as saying that if their demands were not met, "We will remove the present dog [Shah] and put another dog in his place" (FO 416/14 [1903: 176])—and using fatwas of impurity and excommunication. Not only were tobacco and tatum declared unclean during the Tobacco Regie protests of 1891-92, but tariffs in 1903 were declared unclean because they provided a duty on wine and spirits instead of outlawing them, and the Atabegi Azam was excommunicated on the 14 September 1903. This excommunication may perhaps be reproduced to give a flavor of the times:

Let it not be concealed from the whole of the people of Islam, especially those dwelling in Persia, that the supremacy of unbelief and the ascendancy of strangers over the noble people of Islam, and the giving of license to the Babi sect, which has gone astray, may God desert them! the distribution of forbidden things and the permission to sell spirits in Persia has reached such a pitch that it is not possible [for us] to stop it or to consider [how it can be removed] and is increasing day by day. Whatever we could devise to remove this evil we saw proved of no avail; and this also has been proved and established to us, that all these evils are due to the first personage of the Persian Government, Mirza Ali Asghar Khan Sadr Azam, and that the King of Islam, His Majesty Muzaffer-ed-Din, the Shahenshah of Persia—may his kingdom be everlasting!—has always had, the utmost respect for the faith, and care for his subjects, and the greatest regard for the protection of the limitations of Moslems, and that all these evils have been brought upon that Holy One [the Shah] by this person, the traitor to the faith and the State of Islam. We have seen no remedy but to express what was in our mind. Therefore, in accordance with the dictates of the "Shar" and keeping to Islamic ordinances, which are particularly incumbent upon each individual Musulman, we have denounced his personal baseness, ingrained infidelity, and religious heresy, in order that all Musulmans and true believers should know that from now henceforth it is not allowable to touch Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, and to obey his injunctions and prohibitions is like obedience to Jibt and Taghoot [heathen idols or demons] and such a person will be grouped [on the day of Judgment] among the company of

the helpers of Yezid ibn Moavieh [the murderer of the Khalif Hossein]; see God's word: "He will not give unbelievers ascendancy over believers." "Oh our God! we complain to Thee in the absence of our prophet and leader." Signed and sealed by Mohammad Sharabiani, Mohammad Kazem Khorasani, Mohammad Hassan Mamakani, the son of Mirza Khalil; 21 Jemadi us Sani 1321 (FO 416/15 [1904: 242]) [emphasis added].

A similar excommunication was prepared upon the Shah should this one prove ineffective. It so happened that Ali Asghar Khan stepped down from the premiership the same day the excommunication was served upon him.

The fact that the mujtaheddin were particularly concerned about the Russian loans, and that at this stage the Bahais were allied to the Russians more closely than to the English as they had been earlier, made the Bahais that much more vulnerable. In fact, the Russian agent in Yazd, who made his escape at the first sign of trouble, was a Bahai. The troops sympathized with the agitation, leaving the Governor of Yazd in a rather weak position. Despite their privileged position, the English missionaries decided that if they were put under similar pressures as the Governor, i.e., if the mob entered their Mission, they would make no further attempt to shelter the Bahais who had sought their protection. It is difficult to judge now the chances an accused man would have had had he denounced his religion, for although we have Miss Biggs' description of serenity in waiting for martyrdom, she describes others far from serene, and Napier Malcolm cites a Christian killed as a Bahai. Furthermore, Bahais seem to have been more open in those days than today, and their chances of getting away with dissimulation would not have been great. The escape offered to them was not simply cursing the Bab as the Shahadat Yazd puts it, but to become practicing Muslims, something which can be enforced in a close-knit communal group (as was discussed in the conversion stories in Chapter VIII).

1.2. Ritual Slaughter of Yazdi Bahais in 1891

1.2.1. Background

If one looks at Haji Mohammad Taheri Malamameri's Tarix-e Shahadat-e Yazd which chronicles the early Bahai martyrs of Yazd, one finds that deaths occurred irregularly: 1850, 1852, an isolated case in 1868, 1892, 1903. To anyone familiar with modern Persian history, these dates ring bells of general protest disturbances against the Government. This correlation has long been noted, and is usually labelled to credit Bahaim as a catalyst, reflection, or carrier of agitation for social change. But the focus ought perhaps rather to be the Islamic reaction to social exigencies. The deaths of 1850 were those of Sayyid Yahya Darabi—who passed through Yazd entrusted by the Royal Court to test the Bab and returned to preach the new faith—and Mullah Abdullah Yazdi, both of whom died with some four hundred others in the Meyriz insurrection of that year. The deaths of 1852 were part of the wide-spread assaults on Babis following the attempt to assassinate Nasraddin Shah by three Babis. Three Babis were killed in Yazd, all in orderly fashion: the first was arrested by the Navab (a member of standing in the local gentry),



fined eight tomans, and released on his own recognizance pending instructions from Teheran which, when they arrived, were executed by blowing him from a cannon in the Husseineya Shahzadeh Fazel; the second was executed in the same manner at the same place; the third had a somewhat less decorous end—by stoning—but still under the presiding order of the Navab. In the following forty years the only recorded death was of a preacher and doctor, by poisoned tea at the hands of one Haji Rasul, apparently of the gentry class, who also attempted unsuccessfully to bludgeon to death a second Babi, a rich man of the village Mehrjad. The other incidents of this forty year period were primarily cases of extortion of money by arresting rich Bahais and allowing them to buy their freedom. Taheri, the author, says that an order was given for his death by the ulema of Manshad (a village of the mountains to the southeast of Yazd) and that he hid in various Zoroastrian houses in Yazd for three months, eventually leaving for Fars; but this was only after he had successfully defeated the ulema in several lengthy debates which were held quite openly, and, after all, he was able to return to Yazd. Only in 1891 at the time of the nation-wide Tobacco Regie Protests was there a new series of Bahai deaths, and they were begun in a quite remarkable ritualistic fashion.

The Tobacco Protests of 1891-92 against which background this ritual slaughter takes place has been summarized in general fashion a number of times, and the reader is referred to those accounts (Feuvrier n.d.: Chapter V; Browne 1910: Chapter II; Lambton 1965a; Keddie 1966). The important points are (1) that the Government attempted to raise funds by granting a fifty year concession to a British Syndicate for a return of £ 15,000 per annum plus a share of the profits; (2) that there was considerable concern in the marketing centers of Shiraz, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Meshed that Persian middlemen would lose their livelihood; (3) that these two concerns were translated into religio-political idiom by a network of religious leaders in the atabat, in Isfahan where Aqa Nejafi and his brother Mohammad Ali were the first to declare tobacco unclean, in Shiraz where Haji Mirza Hassan Shirazi was made responsible for the formal fatwa disallowing smoking, and in Teheran where Mirza Hassan Ashtiari was the receiver of communications from the Shah such as the order after the Regie had been called off that Mirza Hassan resume public smoking or leave Teheran, which led to the final series of riots in the affair. Both the Pan-Islamic movement of Sayyid Jamal-ud-Din and the Russians were involved in the general discontent but only as contributing factors; e.g., Mirza Mohammad Reza who assassinated Nasruddin Shah in 1896 and who was a leader in the 1891-92 Tobacco Regie Protests, had connections with Sayyid Jamal-ud-Din. In Tabriz the Armenian bishop was blackmailed by threat of a Moharram jihad massacre if he did not take a public stand against the Regie (Lambton 1965a: 133).

1.2.2. Events

Seven men lost their lives in the dramatic portion. It began when two of the seven were beaten from coming into the Masjid-e Mir Chak Mak on the evening of 23 Ramazan 1308 A.H. (May 2, 1891). They were seized as

MAP 7
1892 RIOTS AGAINST BAHAIS



bazaars
modern avenues



site of a Bahai
martyrdom

Bahis and imprisoned, and upon payment of a ransom released. Zil-us-Sultan, Governor of Isfahan, had meanwhile heard of the affair and instructed his brother Jelal-ud-Dowleh, the Governor of Yazd, to keep the Bahais locked up. The motive is analyzed in a letter from Abdul Baha to E.G. Browne as due to complicity of the Zil-us-Sultan in intrigues with a close friend who was accused of stirring up trouble and of being an associate of Sayyid Jamal-ud-Din and Malcolm Khan; Abdul Baha accuses this group of intriguers of attempting to use Bahais as a cover for their own activities (see the extracts of the letter in Balyuzi 1970: 102). The two men were re-arrested and with them five companions. Jelal-ud-Dowleh asked Mohammad Taghi, son of Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Sabzevari, what to do with the prisoners, what the opinion of the ulema was. The death penalty was suggested. Attempts were made to get the Bahais to recant, and when this failed, a telegram was sent to the Zil-us-Sultan who concurred with the death sentence. A final test of their sincerity as Bahais was made in the hidden presence of the several ulema who were to issue the death warrant: Sheikh Hassan-e Sabzevari, Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Sabzevari, Mirza Sayyid Ali Mudarris, Mullah Hassan Ardekani, Mullah Hussein Ardekani. On the morning of the ninth of Shavval (May 18), each was killed after being given a final chance to recant.

The procession went as follows. Ali Asghar, 19, was strangled presumably between the castle and the bazaars. Jews were made to drag the body by ropes tied to the ankles through the bazaar to Meidan-e Khan. There, after the Governor had seated himself on the roof of the shops edging the square, Mehdi Khavidak, 60, had his throat slit; his belly was then ripped open, stones were thrown at his corpse which was finally burned. A procession then went to Husseineya Shahzadeh Fazel where Ali, 30, was decapitated, the head put on a spear and the corpse stoned. The procession went on to the Masjid-e Mirza Abdul Karim where Ali Sabzevari, 45, was dismembered with a spade and burned. The next stop was Bazaar-e Sadri where an unnamed forty-two year old Bahai was killed. They then returned to Meidan-e Khan where first Ali Asghar, 24, was decapitated, and then Hassan, 21, was attacked by people with knives, his body cut open, intestines pulled out, and heart and lungs detached which with his head were brought before the Governor. After the Governor rewarded his servant and Mullah Mohammad Taqi with gifts, the head and lungs were nailed to a tree in Kuche Ab-e Taft and the people threw stones at them. The Jews were then ordered by the Governor to take the corpses for disposal in a well near the Kushk gate. Shops were closed, and feasting proclaimed with lights, singing and dancing, sweets and tea (the standard celebration paraphernalia). Even Bahai shopkeepers were forced to join in the evening's celebration. Several others were also killed in the days that followed, but of them Taheri only tells their names and mode of death: shot, shot and burned, etc. The accounts collected in Browne (1918) tell of the arrest of Haji Mullah Mohammad Ibrahim and his secret murder despite the attempted intercession by the "Dutch merchants" (sic). Agha Hussein, a silk merchant, had £150 worth of silk confiscated, and money was extorted also from others.

1.3. The Bushire Plague Riots of 1899

1.3.1. Events

On May 29 a case resembling plague was seen by Assistant Surgeon to the British Residency at Bushire, and his diagnosis was confirmed by the Russian doctor. As there was plague in Bombay, Sir Mortimer Durand was immediately informed in Teheran, and he notified the Sadr Azam. By June 5 the Acting Governor of Bushire had been empowered to follow the recommendations of the European doctors. He submitted the proposals first, however, to the local ulema, and they rejected them. Stories began to circulate that the European doctors wanted to poison the natives. The Governor's office notified the Sadr Azam that careful checking had revealed no plague. Under the circumstances, the British could only establish a quarantine for arrivals by sea, but could not themselves initiate any sanitary measures in the town. Russian doctors were deployed at Shiraz, Bushire, and Kirman to support the British effort. In town the struggle over implementation of sanitary measures—burning old clothes, exposing goods, detention in quarantine—deteriorated until rioting broke out. Foreign doctors were prevented from examining cases. The Acting Governor pleaded inability to act without financial support. The Sadr Azam agreed to sanitary measures but was reluctant to spend money; he agreed, for instance, to buy a disinfecting stove, but then never authorized its purchase. Meanwhile the Acting Governor reportedly told a gathering of merchants at a prayer meeting that the government was being coerced by the foreign doctors and that they should appeal to the Shah. On July 24 rioters threw stones at the British Residency and berated the Europeans. The rioters sent messages to Shiraz and Isfahan asking for coordinated demonstrations against the plague measures. The bazaar remained closed until the fifth of August when 100 tofangchi (riflemen) reinforcements arrived. Aside from the religious leaders of the riots, the rioters were supplied with food and supplies by a leading merchant, the head of the Bushire Trading Company, who supplied the inflammatory information that the Europeans wanted to examine the women and burn the dead bodies. This merchant, Mohammad Sherif, had capitalized his Trading Company by issuing bank notes. The English claimed that this was an illegal infringement upon the Imperial Bank of Persia's concession for issuing notes, and were pressuring the Persian Government to have such illegal notes withdrawn. At the British request, Mohammad Sherif also had been imprisoned once and fined by the Governor of Bushire for involvement in a case of fraud. He was furthermore on good terms with Prince Dabija, the Russian Consul at Isfahan who had given him an order to build a Russian Consulate at Bushire. This same Prince Dabija came to Bushire during the plague troubles and refused to submit to the quarantine.

In Teheran Sir M. Durand described his end of the proceedings as a series of meetings in which telegrams were read from the Government to Bushire to carry out sanitary measures, and from Bushire to Teheran that there was no plague. Finally Haji Zein-ul-Abedin was

sent to investigate. He made five incisive observations: (1) the quarantine for arrivals was selective, only Persians being detained, but neither Europeans nor ships' crews; (2) several people died in quarantine—one of diarrhea, one of broken ribs, another of diarrhea whose friends secretly buried him and substituted another for him (without the doctor finding out!) for fear of having to spend another ten days in quarantine—; (3) one of the suspected cases of plague was probably siphilis, and the mullahs when pressed admitted to seeing cases of bubos from which some died and some recovered; (4) the Russian doctor was vocal about the poor quarantine procedures; (5) the natives feared the European doctors due to the sanitary measures and thus brought to them only ordinary cases but no the very ill. The British responded to the major first charge by saying that they were following the Venice Convention whereby in European ports quarantine was relaxed for first and second class passengers who could be presumed to come in for re-examination if so requested. It was agreed that under Persian circumstances, the facilities must be improved and all be treated alike.

1.3.2. Commentary

The vectors of conflict are quite obvious. There is fear due to ignorance about the sanitation measures, which is manipulated (rumors of examining women, burning the dead, poisoning people) by (a) ulema who object to European power above their own, and by (b) merchants whose business (capital raised by issuing bank notes) is being threatened by British pressure to have their notes withdrawn. The fear is given force by the unfortunate circumstances that there is discrimination against Persians in quarantine, and several people have died in quarantine. The riots are fanned by the head of the Bushire Trading Company whose capital base is threatened by the British, who has suffered loss of money and freedom at British hands, and who is allied with Russian interests to obtain a Gulf port. This is occurring at the time when discussions are taking place about the Imperial Bank (which is British) securing control over all southern customs ports as security for further loans to the Persian Government. (The British are concerned to control all southern customs so that there will not be diversion of trade and customs revenue into other hands.) Thus while the Russians are serious about the sanitation measures—they deploy doctors—they cannot resist having their Isfahan Consul undercut British authority and point up the quarantine discrimination by refusing (he has armed escorts) to submit to quarantine, on his way to undermine British influence in Bakhtiari country.

What is of immediate interest to us is the role of the Islamic institution and its response to Europeans as an object of protest. Not only were ulema involved in leading the riots, but the sanitation measures were submitted to them for approval, and prayer meetings were the natural forum for protests speeches. While the protesters could verbally insult Europeans and stone European buildings, they

would not dare killings as they would with Bahais. The pattern holds true in the agitations against the missionaries in Isfahan, European merchants in Teheran, and the Belgian customs officials, already cited (1.1.1), in Tabriz. Jews as an object of protest fall into yet a third pattern.

1.4. Aqa Nejafi versus the Church Missionary Society; Yazd

1.4.1. Events

In 1893 the C.M.S. was requested by the Governor of Isfahan to close its dispensary. The reason given was that wine was being sold on the premises (not true). A variety of factors were involved: there was a disgruntled former employee who threatened to rouse up the mullahs, the Jesuits engaged in some intrigues against their rival, the C.M.S., and Aqa Nejafi was beginning to exert more influence than he had before. In regard to the last, a meeting was reported of mullahs who came to the conclusion that when the dispensary was first opened, Aqa Nejafi should have been given one thousand tomans plus some gold and silver watches to distribute to other mullahs. In 1894 Miss Bird after visiting a patient was insulted and threatened with a ducking either in the river or in the open sewers by twenty men; her patient was also threatened. She lodged a complaint and demanded reparations. The mullahs lodged a counter complaint that she was preaching, reading and distributing the Gospel. The Governor asked the C.M.S. to drop the matter. The C.M.S. said that since the complaint was public knowledge to drop it would constitute serious loss of face, but that a public apology would be acceptable. The Governor said he could not be held responsible for possible Ramazan violence if Aqa Nejafi were crossed. The British Ambassador in Teheran counselled the missionaries to dampen their ardor inasmuch as missionary work among Muslims was illegal, something the American missionaries had accepted in 1880. The C.M.S. replied that to do so would constitute disobedience to Christ. That summer there were bread riots and reports of starvation, suicide and the killing and bastinadoing of riot leaders (mainly female). Miss Bird opened a new dispensary in the Jewish Quarter. Muslim religious students locked her out, and a campaign of intimidation was launched against her clients: an old man was beaten and made to sign that under penalty of death he would not come again to her; a woman was fined for attending bible class; a former female pish-namaz was expelled from her village for professing Christianity, etc. Meanwhile Aqa Nejafi was engaged in a tussle with the Governor over the Christian convert Sekineh to whom the Governor had given refuge. Aqa Nejafi wanted to try her. The Governor responded that she was not in her right mind and could not come out of his harem. The Governor and Aqa Nejafi were not always at odds: in 1898 both of them were publically cursed for hoarding grain for speculation and thereby causing an artificial famine in a year of good harvests. (The same was going on in Tabriz and Teheran; for the bread riots of the following year, 1899, see section 1.5 below).

European troubles in Yazd followed a similar pattern. In November 1905, for instance, the missionary school had to be temporarily closed, when during Ramazan the Rev. Boyland expelled a boy for circulating

indecent poetry in the school. The ulema began to speak against Europeans in general (this is the period of Constitutional agitations, see 1.5 below) and the C.M.S. in particular, charging that the missionaries were teaching the boys to curse the Prophet, and threatening to beat till near death any boy who continued to attend the school. Intervention by the Governor allowed the school to continue. The following May, Mr. Wirth, an agent of Messrs. Ziegler, struck a boy in the bazaar injuring him. Compensation was offered but refused. A notice was posted in the bazaar that unless he left town at once, he would have to be killed. He left.

1.4.2. Commentary

Shadowing of visitors to missionaries and occasional attempts to intimidate such visitors has continued to the present by such groups as the Fedayin Islam. Never, however, has a missionary been harmed. Since the show of Bahai world strength in 1955 there has been a change to similar tactics by opponents of Bahais. Lists of suspected Bahais are kept, people attending Bahai meetings are observed and casually informed that they are under observation.

1.5. Riots against Jews

1.5.1. Events

The most famous riot against Jews in the Qajar Period occurred in Mashad, the city of the eighth Imam, Imam Reza, at the height of Moharram mourning in 1839. A leprous Jewess sought the advice of a Muslim hakim who told her to bathe her afflicted hand in the warm blood of a dog. She hired a Muslim boy to kill the dog and there followed a dispute over his wage. He spread the rumor that on this most holy day of the death of Imam Hussein, the Jews had killed a dog which they called Hussein. From the Imam Reza Mosque an angry crowd moved towards the Jewish Quarter, firing the synagogue, killing thirty-two Jews and compelling the rest under pain of death to become jadid-ul-islam, new converts to Islam. Characteristically, the ritual objects—books, prayer shawls, phylacteries—were not destroyed, but are said to be still safeguarded in the Shrine. Many of the jadid left Mashad to become open Jews elsewhere. Those who went to Herat became subject eighteen years later to deportation and incarceration near Mashad when Herat was taken by Persia in 1856. Those who remained in Mashad maintained a dual existence as outward Muslims and secret Jews, not a unique form of existence for jadid. The most remarkable of the several accounts of the Mashad riot was inscribed in the month Sivan, two months after the riot, in a prayer book printed in Amsterdam in 1787 and with an earlier inscription chronicling the movement of its owners from Dalman to Qazvin before coming to Mashad. The Mashad community, in fact, had been founded only in 1734 in a political move by Nadir Shah to break the prohibition against non-Shiites from living in this shrine city. The inscription ended with the words:

Now we have no hope other than, first the grace of the Almighty, secondly the arrival of the Messiah, thirdly the arrival of the

British [emphasis added] who will keep us alive, treat us compassionately and save us from this exile in Ishmael (Ben-Zvi 1957: 96).

A subsequent riot occurred against this community on the pretext (undoubtedly true, but we are not told why the public secret lost its secrecy) that a šohet (Jewish butcher) was still slaughtering poultry according to Jewish ritual. The community managed to survive the sixty odd years until the arrival in Persia of the Jewish philanthropic organizations, the Alliance Israelite and the Anglo-Jewish Society of London. Today a portion of the community still identifies itself around the Haji Adoniyahu Synagogue in Jerusalem.

In the years that follow few details are recorded of the occasional killings and semi-legal impositions of discrimination. In 1865 the Jews of Persia sent their first appeal for help to the newly formed (1860) Alliance Israelite Universelle, and the latter in the following year successfully enlisted the aid of the French and British ambassadors to have arrested and to have reparations demanded from six perpetrators of riots in Barforush, where eighteen Jews lost their lives, two by burning alive. The condition of Persian Jews achieved the distinction of being considered the worst in the world, not excepting even Rumania. In the 1873 Bulletin de l'Alliance comparisons are made with the time of Ashuweros (whose arch-fiend minister Haman is still ritually berated in the celebration of Purim, a joyous ritual of survival compared for curious Shiah by Persian Jews as a Jewish Id-e Omar,¹ and whose heroes, Ester and Mordecai, are supposed to be buried in Hamadan²). 1873 was the year Nasraddin Shah made his first voyage to Europe and there he was bombarded with petitions by the Jewish communities of London, Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople; as well as with efforts on behalf of the Zoroastrians of Iran. The petition of the Anglo-Jewish Association, for instance, listed eight specific grievances:

- (1) That an entire community of Jews may be held responsible for crimes or misdemeanors committed by its individual members.
- (2) That the oath of a Jew is not received in the Courts of Justice.
- (3) That a Jew converted to a Mohammedan religion can claim to be the solé inheritor of family property, to the exclusion of all relatives who have not changed their religion.
- (4) That in many towns the Jew is prohibited from keeping a shop in the bazaars.
- (5) That the rights of conscience are violated by the exemption from legal pains and penalties which is offered to the Jew on condition of his embracing the Mohammedan faith.
- (6) That besides the legal taxes, the local authorities levy arbitrary exactions on the Jews.

¹ In North Africa Jewish communities even burned an effigy of Haman, quite like the Persian Id-e Omar.

² Restoration of this very Islamic-style mausoleum was ordered by H.I.M. Government for the 2500 Year Celebrations. The Jews of Yazd were similarly ordered to rebuild their cemetary wall which had been knocked down by Muslim boys at the time of Nasser's death.

(7) That although the Jew has the nominal right of appeal to a superior Court of Justice, he cannot exercise such right; for he stands so much in fear of the vengeance of the inferior tribunal that he dare not incur the risk of appealing. (8) That the life of a Jew is not sufficiently protected by the law, inasmuch as the murderer of a Jew can purchase immunity by the payment of a fine (Bulletin de l'Alliance Israelite Universelle, 1873 [2]: 98).

The Shah feebly ordered on behalf of the various minorities, at various times, and this was confirmed by new firmans by his successors, that new converts to Islam did not gain the right to all their parents' possessions to the exclusion of non-Islamic heirs. In 1925, Jewish Member of Parliament, Haim, was still raising this problem in connection that time with troubles in Isfahan.

In the 1890s we begin to get fuller reports. In Isfahan in 1889 Jews were accused of beating up a Muslim judge and of taking wine into a mosque. The riots continued for several days until the Governor, Zil-us-Sultan, restored order. In 1890 there was a violent reaction in Hamadan to the renewal of the 1880 royal firman that jadid-ul-islam were not entitled to all their parents' property. Mullah Abdullah issued a twenty two point guideline for Jewish-Muslim relations:

- (1) It is forbidden to Jews to leave their houses when it rains or snows.
- (2) Jewesses are to keep their faces uncovered in public.
- (3) They must wear an izar (veil) of two colors.
- (4) The men may not wear nice clothes, and are to wear only blue cotton cloth.
- (5) They may not wear shoes.
- (6) All Jews are to wear a red piece of cloth on their chest.
- (7) A Jew may never take a step before a Muslim in public.
- (8) He may not talk loudly with a Muslim.
- (9) A Jewish creditor of a Muslim must reclaim his loan in a trembling and respectful tone.
- (10) If a Muslim insults a Jew, the latter must bow his head and keep silent.
- (11) A Jew who buys meat must wrap it and keep it hidden in regard for Muslims.
- (12) He is forbidden to construct a pretty building.
- (13) He is forbidden to have a house as high as his neighboring Muslim.
- (14) He may not white-wash his rooms with lime.
- (15) The entrance to his house must be ugly.
- (16) The Jew may not slip into his coat, he must content himself with wearing it over his arms.
- (17) He is forbidden to cut his beard or trim it with scissors.
- (18) Jews may not leave town or take the air of the countryside.
- (19) Jewish doctors may not ride a horse.
- (20) A Jew suspected of having drunk brandy may not be in the street; if he appears, he shall immediately be put to death.
- (21) Marriages of Jews must be celebrated in the greatest mystery so that no one else knows what is transpiring.
- (22) Jews are not allowed to consume good fruits (Leven 1911: 377).

Rioters demanded Jewish death or conversion. When Government troops arrived and summoned Mullah Abdullah to Teheran, he was given a triumphal send-off by the populace, and his successor, Mullah Abdul Medjid had Rabbi Abraham Jakub beaten to death for not wearing the red patch, and Jewish women were

forced to go unveiled and subject to abuse for their honorless appearance. In 1897 in Teheran Mullah Rihan Allah also tried to enforce that the Jews wear distinctive markings, but French and English intercession elicited a royal firman preventing this. The same year the Grand Vizier intervened in Tuserkan on the issues of forced conversion and inheritance. In 1897-98 Sayyid Nurullah, the brother of Sayyid Nejafi (see section 1.1.1), after turning part of a Jewish cemetery in Isfahan into a garden, ordered Muslims not to deal with Jews, neither to sell them food nor to buy from these people whose main occupation was colporterage; for more than three months Jews could not venture into the bazaar without receiving blows.

1899 was a third year of bread riots (see 1.4.1). The wheat harvest again was not at fault: it had not been a poor year although the rice crop in Gilan failed due to drought. Rather the scarcity which sent prices doubling and trebling was attributed to grain speculation by landowners, especially those to whom crown lands had been alienated, which lands had previously supplied granaries in the chief towns. The greatest offenders were presumed to be the Asaf-ed-Dowleh (the Governor of Teheran), the Imam Jome of Teheran, and the Comander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Government had levied an embargo on the export of wheat which functioned to keep the export trade in the hands of such important personages as could bribe customs officials discretely. At the same time M. Naus attempted to raise the customs revenue by applying to native merchants the same rates as foreign merchants had to pay: an increase of almost three fold. The bazaars in Tabriz closed and there were riots. In Azarbaijan the new Governor and the Crown Prince competed to collect grain for temporary cheap distributions to gain political support among the populace. The starvation rates of bread soon had their effect on the Teheran retail trade, and petty merchants of piece goods prevailed upon the local power structure to close all Jewish competitors, and upon the ulema to declare it illegal for Jewish peddlers to sell to Muslim houses. A crowd of women publically insulted the Shah. When riots broke out, the soldiers sided with the populace, and a promise of lower prices was obtained. Instead the riots caused a fall of the Sadri Azam (Grand Vizier) and consolidation of power by the wheat speculating faction of the Court. Prices did not go down. At this point the populace threatened to burn European shops to draw attention to their plight. The European Legations took the hint and lobbied with the Persian Government until supplies of wheat were increased. Agitation however did not cease: there was still the problem of M. Naus' increase of customs, and during the year 1900 merchants and ulema groups organized protests. In Shiraz merchants took up a collection to support demonstrations. Plans were made for coordinated bazaar closings in Bushire, Shiraz, and Isfahan. The ulema in Isfahan telegraphed a merchant in Kirman to communicate to Nejaf that the Europeans were oppressing the merchants. Business in Yazd was reported almost at a standstill. There was a flare up in Isfahan of Aqa Nejafi's feud against the C.M.S. and in Hamadan there was preaching against Bahais. Against this background came another Ramazan riot issuing from the Teheran bazaar under the leadership of a disreputable mullah who had been expelled from Meshed and Karbala. He preached against wealthy mullahs, persons without beards, wine-selling Armenians and Jews. The FO Monthly Summary for January 1901 comments on the rampage of some two thousand people through the Jewish quarter in which nobody was seriously

injured, and the goods stolen were largely owned by Muslim merchants given out on commission to Jewish peddlers:

A serious disturbance took place in the bazaars, raised by a mullah named Sheikh Ibrahim . . . Preaching in the mosques, he incited his hearers to attack the shops where wine and arak is sold; these shops are chiefly owned by Armenians. The rioters, however, turned their attention to the Jews, the Armenians being largely under Russian protection. A good many of the Jews' shops were looted, and some damage done to the school of the Alliance Francaise. The Jews as usual applied to the British Legation for redress" (FO 416/5 [1901: 74]).

The greatest pay-off was that received by the Atabegi Azam (Grand Vizier) who managed to convince the Shah that the riot was an effort to discredit him, and so convinced the Shah to exile from Teheran three prominent opponents.

The next set of riots of interest are those of the 1905-10 period (see Browne [1910] on the Constitutional Period). Troubles in Shiraz had been building for some time, not only over national issues such as customs, usage of crown lands and so on, but also due to the instability of local power struggles. The Alliance representative Shouker described the situation in summer 1905 as a struggle between two factions, that of the Prince-Governor, Salar-us-Sultaneh, son of Mozaffar-ud-Din Shah, and that of the Qavam-ul-Mulk, a leader of the Arab tribes. The Jews, he noted, belonged to the former faction. From time to time, such religious leaders as Sayyid Abdul Hussein Lari and Sheikh Zakariyeh played an unstabilizing role. The Qashqai leader, Sowlet-ud-Dowleh, was another force called upon to exert influence on occasion. For instance, in 1909 the British reports describe Shiraz as being in an anarchy paralyzed by division amid Shirazi fears that the Sheikh Zakariyeh would enter Shiraz and create havoc as he had been doing in the provincial towns. In Darab he had destroyed the Jewish Quarter, and in Neyriz he had burned alive two Babis and made the local Sheikh-ul-Islam be led around the bazaar with a bit in his mouth for refusing to acknowledge the authority of the Sayyid Abdul Hussein Lari. The paralyzed factions in Shiraz at that point were those of the brother of the recently assassinated Qavam-ul-Mulk, Nasr-ed-Dowleh, and that of his enemy, the Sowlet-ud-Dowleh. The Sheikh Zakariyeh and the Sayyid Abdul Hussein Lari were claiming the title of Nationalists.¹ Meanwhile the Bakhtiari Khan, Samsam-es-Sultaneh, was attempting to persuade the Sowlet-ud-Dowleh to actively join the Nationalist cause. The point is simply that the factions of this period, and particularly the role of religious

¹ Lari raised a revolt in eastern Fars in 1909 posing as a constitutionalist. He issued his own postage stamps in Lar where he killed, among others, seventy-two members of the Girashi family. He himself died in 1923 but his son carried on his jihad against Bahais killing fourteen in 1926 amid the election intrigues of that year.

leaders, are not to be assigned in any simple dichotomous progressive versus reactionary or popular versus royalist way.

Beginning in February 1905 the Alliance Israelite began receiving urgent telegrams such as:

TERRIBLES PERSECUTIONS PRIERE ENVOYER RENS NOUS PROTEGER (7 March 1905). 6000 LIVES ISRAELITES UNSAFE HELP SAVE TWO ALREADY KILLED GREAT ANXIETY HELPLESS REPLY QUICK (10 March 1905). POUR L'AMOUR DE DIEU INTERVENEZ MONSIEUR SCHOUKER VENDU MEUBLES QUITTE SCHIRAZ SOMMES PERDU NE LE LAISSEZ PARTIR TELEGRAFIEZ SUITE (16 August 1905).

The troubles beginning already in 1904 continued through 1905 when in June we have the following incident described. A Jewish dancer returning from a festival near midnight and still in costume,¹ greeted a Muslim priest who returned the greeting, not realizing that the greeter had been a Jew. His servant pointed out the mistake, for while a Jew had to greet all Muslims, and indeed to initiate the greeting exchange, a Muslim was not obliged to reply. That is, the relationship was asymmetrical with the Jew in a non-voluntary submissive role. The priest, feeling himself taken in by a deliberate deception became enraged. The Jew fled, but the Muslim servants of his evening's employer stood their ground in his defence. The priest outnumbered, swore revenge and complained to the influential mullah, Aqa Mirza Ibrahim, who demanded that Jews henceforth wear distinguishing caps. On two separate days but related incidents Jews were beaten up when they went to the bazaar; and when they received assurances of protection from the Prince-Governor through the intercession of the British Consul, Mirza Ibrahim closed the bazaar. A rumor was then circulated that the director of the Jewish school had given a Qur'an to his students. The Prince-Governor immediately forestalled a popular reaction by promising an inquiry and punishment for the Jews should the rumor prove true. Nonetheless on November 16, several thousand persons marched on the Jewish Quarter. The Governor, forewarned, sent the Cossacks who fired on the mob, killing three and injuring others. In the fracas, Jewish stores and houses were looted and destroyed. The troubles continued and for several months Jews were unable to leave their Quarter or homes "sans peine d'etre assasines."

In December 1905 the Shah granted some concessions to the Nationalists and the ulema, who had taken bast in the Shah Abdul Azim shrine, returned to Teheran. The following spring new disturbances over forcible Government attempts to collect new taxes on wheat, meat, sugar and other necessities as well as a new sales tax led to the ulema taking bast in the Masjid-e Jome, and then leaving Teheran "for Karbala" although they only went as far as Qum, while merchants and lesser ulema took bast in the British Legation. On August 9, 1906, the Shah signed an agreement encompassing not only a National Assembly, but enforcement of ecclesiastical laws,

¹ One of the ethno-specific occupations in Shiraz was that singers and dancers were Jews.

amnesty and indemnity to victims of the agitations. On December 30, the Shah signed the new Constitution passed by the Assembly. For the moment, at least in Teheran, things seemed to be improving for the Jews: the Alliance was of the opinion that while the ulema were indifferent to the Jews, the Assembly was well disposed towards them, especially as they had subscribed to the new National Bank. The disturbances of 1907 (the "counter-revolution") proved such speculations to be premature. In Fars it was a year of migration. Thirty Jews in Shiraz gave up on Persia and left for Jerusalem. Seventy Jews in Lar, given the choice of conversion or exile, chose the latter and arrived destitute in Shiraz, where M. Lahana was warned by the ulema that affording aid to such people had caused the forced departure of a previous Alliance representative. The three hundred member community in Djarum was blockaded in their Quarter, a couple of Jews were also killed, and the three hundred member community in Naubendegan was forced to pay additional taxes. In December, a letter describes Shiraz as "a place of death," the Constitutionalists having taken refuge in the Shah Cheragh shrine, the Qavamists occupying the Government palaces, and the Jewish colporters again unable to leave their houses for two months, the military even having to intervene to allow the Jews water. A similar blockading of Jews in their Quarter occurred also in Isfahan: by religious decree they were disallowed to peddle in a twelve kilometer radius from Isfahan, it was demanded that they wear distinguishing clothes and that Jewish schools be closed.

In the Hammadan-Kirmanshah area of Western Iran, there is a constant series of incidents and disturbances throughout this period, with Jews under double jeopardy as many of them had become Bahais. There is a constant problem of killings, repeated references to an increase of trouble during Moharram, and a repeated desperate reference to the fidelity of the Jews to the Qajars who should therefore protect them better. Many of the Muslim complaints strike a note of petty desires to insult: in 1903 during Moharram a Jewish youngster "fut accusé d'avoir regardé avec insistance une femme de mauvaises moeurs non loin d'une mosques;" and in 1908 a Haji roused popular anger at the Jews when they objected to his using part of their cemetery on which to build a house. In 1909 occurred the riot mentioned in Chapter II (the reference to religious leaders decrying riots started by rough-neck sayyids). A Jewish convert to Christianity, a shopkeeper, beat his servant, a young sayyid. The boy went home, ate dinner, slept, got up the next morning, fainted several times, and died. Two Persian doctors and an English medical aide attended and told the relatives that the cause of death was a heart attack unrelated to the beating. The brothers of the deceased filed no complaint. Some sayyids forbade burial and had the body carried around town, inflaming passions. The next day they threatened the Governor with a riot unless he executed the Jewish Christian. The Governor ordered immediate execution. Looting then commenced in which the Governor's troops partook. At the insistence of the British and Russian consuls the Governor protected the Alliance School, but a large part of the Jewish Quarter was systematically stripped of everything including doors and windows. No Jews were killed outright but several died of wounds. After things quieted down, the leading mullah spoke out against the riot, and there was an astounding display of practical Muslim sympathy: food and

clothing were sent to the Jews and a committee was formed to return property. Even during the height of the rioting, many Jews owed their lives to protection by Muslims who stood armed between them and the mob, and who sheltered them in their homes. The Governor said he had ordered the execution without trial to prevent a riot. Eleven days later a picture of the Bab was found among the stolen property and the bazaar became excited. The Jews took refuge in the Turkish and British Consulates. Again the leading mullah stepped in with personal assurances of their safety, had them escorted back to their homes.

In 1910 there was a riot in Senneh with an unsuccessful attempt by the Jewish women to invoke ritual symbols as protection. A wealthy Jew, Daoud Koulouri, was dragged into a mosque and threatened with death unless he converted, on the grounds that he had had intercourse with a Muslim woman, a charge apparently supplied by a Jewish jadid-ul-islam who had quarrelled with him. After twice refusing, and twice being wounded, he agreed, but the ulema refused to accept him; and so he was dragged into the courtyard and killed, after which his body was rolled back to his house as a crowd gathered. The house was then looted. His relatives fled, but the women, braving stones and insults, held up holy books to make the Muslims reconsider; this however was without result. Eventually some fifty soldiers chased out the mob and guarded the Quarter day and night.

1.5.2. Commentary

The pattern which emerges is an interesting composite one. As peddlers, Jews partook of the obvious dislike consumers have for middlemen. The organizer of the cooperative store in Eshk Kuh, a village of the Shahr-babak area behind Yazd, speaks with open pleasure of driving out of business the small shopkeepers of Shahrbabak. Thus one is not surprised to find villagers beating up Jewish peddlers as happened in Remun-e Isfahan in 1925, or the recurrent demand that Muslims not buy from Jews, as Sayyid Sharif again attempted to enforce in Shiraz in 1925. There is, however, also a much broader element in this last demand to sever commercial relations: it is connected with the whole series of demands such as Mullah Abdullah issued in 1880 based on the so-called "Covenants of Omar" which constitute an attempt to make certain the subordinate role of non-Muslims whatever their occupation. Again such demands often are also counters in a political struggle which has little to do with Jews per se, such as the demands of the ulema during the 1922 riot against the Jewish Quarter of Teheran not only that the Alliance school be moved into the Jewish Quarter or better yet be closed, not only that Jews be expelled from both bazaar and Government jobs, but also that Persian laws be remade according to the Qur'an. Many of the riots are analyzed by people at the time as victories of the clergy against the central government. Again one is not surprised that a number of the riots were direct causes of Jewish emigration from Persia: from Mashad in 1839, from Shiraz in 1907, from Teheran in 1922. What is more intriguing is what seems to be a need in nationalist movements to reduce diversity within the population: it appears to be hard to give a role to minorities. David Frazer's image (1910: 17) of people running amok

stabbing Parsis to celebrate victory, in his tone of humorous disbelief befitting a Constitutional Movement which happened inspite of itself is, in fact, a recurrent problem when one considers the fate of Armenians in the Ataturk revolution, that of Jews, Assyrians and Armenians in the establishment of the state of Iraq, and even perhaps that of Copts in the Nasser revolution. Again, in 1936, while Nazi influence had an (enduring) influence in heightening Iranian anti-Jewish feeling, it was not only Jews who were being squeezed out of jobs: a Government regulation laid down the guideline that no agency should have more than 10% Jewish or 10% Armenian employees, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was asked to reduce the number of such employees so that there would be a labor force of 80% "true Iranians."

1.6. Zoroastrian Troubles

Of riots against Zoroastrians we know much less. Most of the Zoroastrian complaints fit into the pattern of discrimination we have described for Jews, and which holds true for Armenians and Assyrians, of the "Omar Covenant" type. Napier Malcolm's classic account will suffice (1905: 45-52):

Up to 1895 there was a strong prohibition upon eyeglasses and spectacles; up to 1885 they were prevented from wearing rings; their girdles had to be made of rough canvass, but after 1885 any white material was permitted. Up to 1896 the Parsis were obliged to twist their turbans instead of folding them. Up to about 1898 only brown, grey, and yellow were allowed for the gaba or arkhalug (body garments), but after that all colors were permitted except blue, black, bright red or green. There was also prohibition against white stockings and up to about 1880 they had to wear tight knickers, self-coloured, instead of trousers. Up to 1881 all Zoroastrians had to walk in town, and even in the desert they had to dismount if they met a big Musulman. There were other similar dress restrictions too numerous and trifling to mention. Then the houses of both the Parsis and the Jews, with the surrounding walls, had to be built so low that the top could be reached by a Musulman with his hand extended; they might, however, dig down below the level of the road. The walls had to be splashed with white round the door. Double doors, the common form of Persian door, were forbidden, also rooms containing three or more windows. Bad-girs were still forbidden to the Parsis while we were in Yazd, but in 1900 one of the bigger merchants gave a large present to the Governor and to the chief mujtahid to be allowed to build one. Upper rooms were also forbidden.

Up to about 1860 Parsis could not engage in trade. They used to hide things in their cellar rooms and sell them secretly. They can now trade in the caravanserais or hostelrys, but not in the bazaars, nor may they trade in linen or drapery. Up to 1870 they were not permitted to have a school for their children.

The amount of jaziya, or tax upon infidels, differed according to the wealth of the individual Parsi but it was never less than two tomans . . . Even now when money has much depreciated it represents a labourer's wage for ten days. The money had to be paid on the spot . . . The man was not even allowed to go home and fetch the money, but was at once beaten until it was given. About 1865 a farrash collecting this tax tied a man to a dog and gave a blow to each in turn.

About 1891 a mujtahid caught a Zoroastrian merchant wearing white stockings in one of the public squares of the town. He ordered the man to be beaten and the stockings taken off. About 1860 a man of seventy went to the bazaars in white trousers of rough canvass. They hit him about a good deal, took off his trousers and sent him home with them under his arm.

. . . as the Jews had to wear a patch on the gaba or coat, the mujtahids in about 1880 tried to make the Parsis wear an obvious patch on the shirt. Muhammad Hassan Khan was then Governor and Mullah Bahram of Khurramshar, a Parsi, asked him to arrange that his people should have three days' respite to get the patches ready. During these three days the Parsi women set to work, and made a neat embroidered border round the neck and opening of the shirt. This the Parsis exhibited as the required patch; and as it was very obvious, and was certainly an insertion, there was really nothing more to be said. In Yezd a small score like this counts for more than does a firman of the Shah.

In the reign of the late Shah Nasiru'din, Manukji Limji, a British Parsi from India, was for a long while in Teheran as Parsi representative. Almost all the Parsi disabilities were withdrawn, the jaziya, the clothes restrictions, the riding restrictions, and those with regard to houses, but the law of inheritance was not altered, according to which a Parsi who has become a Musulman takes precedence of his Zoroastrian brothers and sisters. The jaziya was actually remitted and also some of the restrictions as to houses, but the rest of the firman was a dead letter.

In 1898 the present Shah, Muzaffaru'din, gave a firman to Dinyar, the present Qalantar of the Parsi Anjoman or Committee revoking all the remaining Parsi disabilities, and also declaring it unlawful to use fraud or deception in making conversions of Parsis to Islam. This firman does not appear to have had any effect at all.

About 1883, after the firman of Nasiru'din Shah had been promulgated, one of the Parsis, Rustami Ardishiri Dinyar, built in Kucha Biyuk, one of the villages near Yezd, a house with an upper room slightly above the height to which the Parsis used to be limited. He heard that the Musulmans were going to kill him, so he fled by night to Teheran. They killed another Parsi Tirandaz in mistake for him, but did not destroy the house.

So the great difficulty was not to get the law improved, but rather to get it enforced. When Manukji was at Yezd about 1870 two Parsis

were attacked by two Musulmans outside the town, and one was killed, the other being terribly wounded as they had tried to cut off his head. The Governor brought the criminals to Yezd but did nothing to them. Manukji then got leave to take them to Teheran. The Prime Minister, however, told him that no Musulman would be killed for a Zardushti, or Zoroastrian, and that they would only be bastinadoed. About this time Manukji inquired whether it was true that the blood-price of a Zardushti was to be seven tomans. He got back the official reply that it was to be a little over.

About 1885 a Seyid, that is, a descendant of Muhammad, killed a Zardushti woman in Yezd. Ibrahim Qalil Khan took him, and, by order of the Zillu's Sultan, Prince Governor of Isfahan, and elder brother of the Shah, killed him before daybreak. When the Mohammadan mullas heard of it in the morning, they gave orders for a general slaughter of the Parsis. Many of the Parsis were injured but none killed. Then in 1899 the Shamu'l Mulk, at the commencement of his governorship of Yezd killed a Musulman servant of the Mushiru'l Mamalik for a criminal assault upon a Zoroastrian woman. This man was not a Seyid which made the matter more simple. . . . Isfandiar, the Parsi schoolmaster at Taft, and Salamat, another Parsi, were killed by two lutis (roughs) without reason. One of the lutis was a seyid. Both were sent to Teheran, but a mujtahid sought the release of the seyid and he was back in Taft soon . . .

Of these discriminations, that considered most serious is, as with Jews, over inheritance falling to jadid-ul-islam. The Zoroastrians did manage to adapt the Muslim religious endowment (vaqf) system for their own use, and they claim that generally Muslims respected such vaqf when they would not respect private property. There are two other common types of complaint: stealing women, and economic extortion. Stealing women, also a minor complaint among Jews, is phrased as either the physical abduction of a girl or seduction. Several instances which could be checked turned out to be voluntary (seduction) on the part of the girl, and Yazdi Jews point out the fear of an uneducated girl in a society where boys have had greater access to education, Teheran and the wider world, that her choice will be only between spinsterhood or marrying a Muslim. On the other hand, there are cases even in the very recent past of girls being taken to the houses of ulema under circumstances from which they are, at least subsequently, happy to be released. Thus only a few years ago a Zoroastrian girl of Rahmatabad was released by the police, taken to Teheran by the Zoroastrian Anjoman, and is now married there to a Zoroastrian. The favorite story among Zoroastrians, however, is of the Jewess who was abducted and married to a Muslim; she put on a show of pleasure and was rewarded by the Muslim community, happy to have a convert, with a fair amount of jewelry; at the first opportunity she absconded with the jewelry to Israel. In 1909 the British vice-Consul at Yazd reported cases of forcible conversion of Zoroastrian girls to Islam which led to the temporary closing of the Parsi Girls School since the girls feared to leave their homes.

The economic complaint is that which we have already seen with regard to rich Bahais. In the years 1907-09, for instance, Yazd was plagued with groups of brigands. In December of 1908 fourteen robberies on the roads to Yazd were recorded and trade consequently slowed to a trickle. The protection of the roads was farmed out to various contractors such as Khosrow Khan, who both previously and subsequently, turned to brigandry himself, or to members of the gentry (Mushir-ul-Mamalek, Sadr-ul-Ulema, Mohammad Taghi Khan) who tried unsuccessfully to hire men at half pay and meanwhile left the roads unguarded. Brigands thus could roam more or less at will. In May of 1909 no less than sixteen villages and several caravans were looted. One of the favorite tricks was to visit wealthy Zoroastrians and relieve them of household goods and money. In 1908 a party from Taft raided a Parsi village carrying off three men for ransom, the rest of the villagers fleeing for protection to Yazd. The British contemplated their own security with some concern: in reporting that a Muslim shot and wounded the Zoroastrian wine merchant Bahram Gushtasp, the vice-Consul noted that the Governor was unable to supply even one guard for the Imperial Bank of Persia's branch in Yazd. Two years later in May 1909 a Zoroastrian wine merchant was publically murdered, the assassin escaping capture by taking bast. The same month a youth, extorting money from Parsis stabbed an old man who had already given him money. In August Yazd was periodically cut off by large bands of Arabs presumed to belong to Qavam-ul-Mulk's tribes. We have a delightful account by Miss Brighty, who was robbed on her way back to Yazd from the summer resort village, Dehbala, in the mountains to the south, of the political curiosity of the robbers about England's system of government. In September, village Parsis continued to be mistreated and had to come into the city for protection. Many also left for India, seventy-one leaving in one week of that September. Again at the end of the month, three men of Qassemabad were seized for ransom, the village was plundered and people were beaten causing them to seek refuge at the British vice-Consulate until October 19 when a new Governor arrived, the strong Bakhtiari Khan, Salar-i Jang, who restored order. These are, however, not riots in the sense we have been describing, but are rather what in north India would be called dacoity.

One must remember that even in 1905 Napier Malcolm evaluated the overall Zoroastrian condition in the following terms. (1) They were intelligent and industrious, and had become wealthy in Yazd. In Teheran the financier Arbab Jamshid was probably more able to influence the Persian Government than the Parsis of India. (2) The Zoroastrians credit the spread of the Bahai faith with increasing their own freedom. So much was this connection felt to be true that during the 1903 Bahai massacre, there was talk of including the Zoroastrians; this was stopped by the mullahs presumably since Zoroastrians were, as Bahais were not, direct proteges of the British. And most importantly, in reporting an incident of an Isfahani provocateur, Malcolm notes (3):

. . . the so-called fanaticism of Yazd was two-thirds of it non-religious in character. There was an element of turbulency, produced by a series of weak governors; there was a real religious element; and there was an element of insularity, utterly unconnected with creed and doctrine (1905: 52).

The incident he referred to—and it provides a counter example to the ease of stirring up a riot, something which is rarely recorded in the historical accounts—was of an Isfahani sayyid who came to preach against painted trays, bank-notes, and Bibles. Yazdis gave him the cold shoulder.

1.7. Ismailis

In 1909 Major Sykes reported on the interesting case of the murder of Ismailis in the Nishapur area. It is interesting not only in the light of the persecution felt by Ismailis in the Yazd, i.e., Shahrabak, area, and in the light of the strained theological relations between the Nizari Ismailis and the Jafari Shiah, but also in the light of Algar's recent speculations (1969) about the British-Nizari relations at the time of the transfer of the Imamate to India. The instigator of the affair was an Ismaili convert to Jafari Shiism. He suggested to the minor muftahed and ardent Constitutionalist, Moin-ul-Ghuruba, that they seize some land owned by the Ismailis on which tithes were paid to the Agha Khan, i.e., alienated from Persia. Moin-ul-Ghuruba thereupon summoned the caretaker of this land, Mullah Suleiman, and some other Ismailis to defend their faith. Moin-ul-Ghuruba went to Dizbad near Nishapur, where, joined by Haji Mohammad Bagher Darrudi and the Governor of Darrud, he tortured the Ismailis and destroyed their house of worship. He did the same then in Kasimabad. Mullah Suleiman and four other Ismaili leaders were taken to Darrud and sentenced to death. The Governor of Darrud and Mohammad Bagher notified the Governor of Nishapur and requested him to lend his executioner. He refused not only to send an executioner, but to involve himself in any way with the affair. So Moin-ul-Gharuba gave Haji Mohammad Bagher the permission to execute, which he did. The corpses were treated obscenely. When the Ismailis petitioned the Governor of Nishapur to be allowed to remove the corpses, he demanded money. They refused but other Ismaili prisoners had to pay him to gain their freedom. Major Sykes, then Consul in Mashad, hearing of the affair, put into motion the machinery of the British Legation to strongly protest to the Persian Government such treatment of followers of the Agha Khan, a British citizen. The Persian Government pleaded that it was too weak to execute the two ulema involved (Moin-ul-Ghuruba and one Sheikh Aqa) without the permission of Nejaf, but Moin-ul-Ghuruba would be exiled to the atabat. The Governor of Darrud was dismissed and Mohammad Bagher imprisoned, but the British request that the Governor of Nishapur also be dismissed was declined. Compensation was settled by four bond issues amounting to 14,500 tomans over four years. The Ismailis of the area, needless to say, continued to be annoyed by their Jafari neighbors.

Algar's note (1969) in fact has nothing to do with this incident other than to reinforce the point that like the other minorities, the Ismailis utilized British patronage. Algar raises the issue that it is likely that the skirmishes between Hassan Ali Shah, the first Agha Khan, and the Qajars, which led to his exile in India, constituted a real challenge to Qajar authority in an area of prime interest to Great Britain. And in fact, Jafai Shiah in Yazd today remember Hassan Ali Shah for being

a religio-political "opponent of Iran." Ismailis in Iran today have evolved the thesis that the issue of dispute was over women and marriage. When Hassan Ali Shah's father Shah Khalilullah was assassinated in Yazd in 1817, Fath Ali Shah gave his daughter, Sarv-i Jahan Khanom, to the Agha Khan. It is suggested that the Court subsequently desired, for political reasons of tying the powerful Imamate to the royal line, a daughter of the Agha Khan to complete the exchange. The Ismailis refused both on the grounds of status—the intended groom was not even the crown prince—and on the grounds that Ismailis receive but do not give women. But the forty-second Ismaili Imam, Hassan Beg, who moved the Imamate from Mahallat to Shahrabak at the time of Nadir Shah, gave his daughter in marriage to the son of Shahrokh Afshar, who ruled the Kirman region after the death of Nadir Shah. The son of this marriage became Governor of Kirman under Karim Khan Zand, and was the father of Shah Khalilullah.

Shah Khalilullah's death in Yazd also falls under the riot category we are considering, but seems to have been of purely local causation and is only of interest inasmuch as it is now agreed by Jafari Shiah of Yazd that he was killed by a decision of the ulema. In fact, what seems to have happened is simply that there was a dispute between the servants of the Imam and some shopkeepers. The servants retired to the house of the Imam (the street bearing his name still exists) without resolving the dispute. The shopkeepers in a band led by one Mullah Hussein followed and in the ensuing fracas the house was invaded and the Imam assassinated. In this case, the Governor of Yazd and the Shah immediately moved to appease the victim's family, although Mullah Hussein received only mild punishment: he was bastinadoed and his beard plucked out.

1.8. Commentary: Segmentary Minority-Foreigner Alliances

A recurrent Shiite complaint was of foreign domination. We have noted that this was a very real economic problem. There was also a clear relation between minorities and foreigners, and among minorities. But it would be a serious mistake to concede to the Shiite fear that they were an isolated group under attack from all sides. We need not belabor the connection between the foreign legations and the minorities: diplomatic protection was afforded the latter by the former based partly on legalities of citizenship (many Zoroastrians and Ismailis were British Citizens, the Jewish philanthropic organizations were French and English organizations, the Russians used the relation between Persian and Russian Armenians and also attempted to convert them and Assyrians to the Russian Orthodox Church whose missionaries stood in the same relation to them as did the C.M.S. to England and the Presbyterian Mission to the U.S.), and partly on economic symbiosis (Sykes when he attempted to establish a marketing route from Kirman to Quetta cited the Zoroastrian community of both places as an important advantage; the Indo-European Telegraph utilized many Zoroastrians and Armenians discriminating against Muslims; much of the trade in Western Iran [Basra-Baghdad-Kirmanshah-Hamadan] was handled by Baghdadi Jews; Zoroastrians were similarly drawn to the Shiraz and Bandar Abbas trade routes; Armenians were well placed to mediate between the

borders to English controlled Iraq and India, as well as to Russia).

It is true that minorities generally found themselves to be natural allies against the Jafari majority. Thus it is not at all surprising to find the Bishop Stuart on his way to reconnoiter Yazd as a possible mission site being warmly received by the Zoroastrians in 1896, or the Zoroastrian merchant Gudarz Mehreban giving the C.M.S. free the caravanserai and house for which the Tobacco Regie had unsuccessfully bid. That the Bishop was a European is significant: undoubtedly inter-minority cooperation was facilitated in the context of European patronage. But even in that context inter-minority alliance is not to be conceptualized as a political bloc in constant opposition to the Shiite majority, but rather as a classic example of the dynamic relationship which in anthropology has been given the technical name "segmentation." Segmentation, needless to say, operates also within the Shiite majority. There were Muslims allied with minority interests: e.g., in 1900 when the mullah Haji Mirza Hassan attempted to incite the Teheran guilds against the Jews, he was opposed by the mullah Haji Aqa Mohammad. Inversely, minorities took part in progressive politics of the Constitutionals: Gudarz Mehreban refused to give his caravanserai to the Tobacco Regie under any circumstances, Arbab Jamshid supplied funds to the Nationalists, the Jews contributed to the National Bank, the Armenian Sefrem Khan was one of the leaders of the coup against Mohammad Ali Shah.¹ The jelling and dissolution of alliances can only be specified in situational context. Thus while on the one hand Bahaism constituted an ally for Judaism and Zoroastrianism against Shiah domination, yet Bahaism was also a serious threat to the Jewish and Zoroastrian communities. This is still a touchy issue when one discusses the assassination of the Zoroastrian educator Ostad Master Khodabaksh: Zoroastrian-Bahis are convinced that he was a Bahai, Zoroastrians are equally certain that what he advocated was that if Muslims became Bahai, life for everyone would become easier. For the Jews of Hamadan there was not only the problem that when there were riots against Bahais, their Jewish-Bahai relatives would come to them for protection and thus jeopardize their own lives, but also unlike conversion to Christianity in Europe where assimilated Jews still felt an obligation to help their Jewish brethren, Bahais argued that Jewish-Bahais need not contribute to taxes imposed on the Jewish community as a corporate body. Yet the Bahais wanted rabbis to perform mixed marriages. This is in fact a good case: Jews are allied to the Qajars for the protection of law against the erratic religious government by Shiite mullahs, yet the two often have opposed economic interests; Jews are similarly allied to Bahaism in its drive for reforming society, but opposed to its missionary activity directed at themselves; and Jews might be allied with Shiites on economic grounds and opposed along religious issues. Jewish and Christian relations in Isfahan were similar. Missionaries provided Jews with aid but were at the same time looking for converts. There is an interesting correspondence between the

¹ For Armenians stronger lines of division emerged after the 1915 massacre of a million and a half in Turkish Armenia. Previously they had been called the millet sadika (loyal community) of the Ottomans, but the Turko-Russian struggle for Armenia and the tragedy at Turkish hands meant an

Rev. W. St. Clair Tisdall and M. Brasseur. The Rev. Tisdall appeals to Brasseur that his Jewish converts want their sons circumcised by Jewish mullahs, and want to partake in both Jewish social and ceremonial life. After all, they believe in all of Judaism simply adding as well a belief in Christ. It is not like Europe where confession is free, and one could dismiss them as hypocrites, for here persecution is real. Christian Jews remain part of the synagogue and community, paying fees of the synagogue, tax on meat, and so on. M. Brasseur responds that the Jewish mullahs, while they do perform circumcision for Muslims occasionally, do so without religious blessings, and object to performing religious circumcision on non-Jews, especially renegades, for after all, what the Reverend suggests is to legitimize conversion from Judaism which it is M. Brasseur's and the mullah's purpose to oppose (A.I.U. Archives I.C.2 [1913: no. 629/13]).

2. The Pahlavi Period

2.1. The Mashad Hat Protest of 1935

2.1.1. Background

One of the great external symbols of modernity for Middle Easterners is dress. Attaturk's abolition of the fez was almost as great an event as his abolition of the caliphate. Reza Shah began his campaign to modernize Iranian dress from the beginning of his rule. At first he only poked fun at those around him who did not adopt the Pahlavi cap and morning coat. Such humor was not always received lightly: when he visited Kirman in 1931 he made fun of Arbab Sorushian, the leader of the Zoroastrian community, for wearing his Pahlavi hat as though he were not accustomed to wearing such headgear and for his excessively baggy trousers, but he desisted when Arbab Kei Khosrow, the Zoroastrian Member of Parliament, intervened with the plea that the Zoroastrians were all His Majesty's loyal and humble servants (FO 416/88 [1931: 3]). The pace of change gained a brief stimulus from the visit in 1928 of the Afghan king and his Queen who appeared in the streets unveiled:

It is only a few months ago that, on Friday afternoon, Persian ladies were not allowed to walk on the same side of the principal street in Teheran as men; now all that has gone by the board, Persian ladies are allowed to go to cafes with their menfolk and sit at the same table; they are allowed to go to cinemas and theatres, though there they have a section of the hall refused to them. They may drive with men in a motor car, motor bus or carriage, and are free to sit where they like in these vehicles, unlike the ancient trams of Teheran where still a part of the tram is divided off for the accomodation of women (FO 416/83 [1928: 114]).

extension in Iran where the Armenians allied with the Russians in Azarbaijan against the Turkish devil. They thus seemed of dubious loyalty to the Iranian nationalists who viewed Russian advances with alarm. Armenians and Jews, wrote Dr. Afshar in 1927, are forever excluded from the nation of Iran.

In June 1935 the Pahlavi hat passed away to be replaced by the European hat and pressures also intensified for women to abandon the veil. Nouie Aidin, the former C.M.S. schoolmistress in Yazd, still remembers how peasants attempted to fashion western hats out of tins to comply with the new dress decree. Soldiers were sent out to collect and cut up the old caps; in the villages the caps were collected and burned in the bakers' ovens. The Mashad massacre of 1935 helped keep the protest against unveiling women from reaching more violent proportions. At first pressures to unveil were limited to newspaper propaganda, lectures and the unveiling of school girls. In Fars a protest by Sheikh Jafar Mahalati and Sheikh Sayyid Nureddin elicited a sharp rebuke that they be punished: their pensions from vaqf funds were cut off. Towards the end of 1935 the press began printing photographs of unveiled women and the police began to order veiled women to leave the main streets and public places such as cafes and cinemas. The great symbolic date followed on January 8 when the Shah was accompanied by wife and daughter, both unveiled, to open the new Ecole normale primaire and speeches were made on the emancipation of women. Complaints at the speed with which the unveiling was being pursued and the hardships imposed by having to buy new wardrobes during the winter fell on deaf ears, and such complaints are even supposed to have contributed to the dismissal of Feroughi as Prime Minister in 1936. The municipalities were supposed to provide aid to poor women unable to afford clothes enough to keep warm without their cadors; in Tabriz, women who tried to avail themselves of this provision were ejected by the police. Parties were organized at which Government officials, and increasingly others, were required to bring their wives unveiled. These parties were not happy affairs: Urquart described a party at Golhak as "pathetic," with much weeping, hiding of the face with the hands and lapels, and men and women huddling apart. Another party in Tabriz he describes how the women tried to cover their faces with coat collars and scarves "looking forth with one eye as of old; but with their charshabs had gone their assurance and dignity" (FO 416/94 [1936: 63]). Compulsory invitations to appear with their wives unveiled at the latter party were sent to fourteen ulema. The tension and potential for violence rose, but the ulema were given respite and the moment passed. Urquart described the dilemma of the ulema:

There is much talk of how the various mullahs wept over this rape of Islamic tradition, and people are enjoying with a morbid horror and indignation definitely cautious, the prospect of some of the religious leaders dying of grief and strain, or else committing suicide. In this connection, it is rumoured that a sayyid, prominent at Khoi, in resisting the orders to unveil was arrested, shaved and sent home wearing a European hat, and that he was found dead in bed on the following morning. . . . Men of mark are openly discussing their dilemma. If they do not publically comply with the Shah's orders they will suffer penalties which, as is now being suggested, may even include death for some. If they do comply, they fear that, if the Shah were to die or lose control, the mob would rise and massacre them (FO 416/94 [1936: 52]).

Female teachers had to unveil to retain their jobs. They suffered being spit at and having rotten fruit thrown at them. Veiled women were denied entry to hospitals, public baths, cinemas, or protection of the police. The public

blamed Attaturk and the rumor was widespread that the mid-winter enforcement was because Attaturk was to visit Iran in the spring and he had told the Shah that he would not come unless the men were hatted and the women unveiled.

2.1.2. Mashad Disturbances of 1935

On the twentieth anniversary of the bombing of the Imam Reza Shrine by the Russians, a rosaxond named Bahlul ascended the membar and delivered a preachment including abuse of the Shah and local officials, a demand for recension of the orders about male headgear and female emancipation, and a demand for reduced taxation. Bahlul was followed by Nevab Ihtisham who snatched off his official Shrine servant's headgear and ripped it up. Other Shrine officials did the same. Police arrived and were greeted with insults and missles. More soldiers arrived: two hundred infantry and fifty cavalry blocked off further entry to the Shrine. The next morning the troops attempted to clear the Shrine. As Consul Day reported it, "A fracas occurred during which the general officer commanding was pushed into a water channel. He appears to have lost control of himself and ordered machine gun fire to be opened." The official death count was thirty-two: eighteen immediately and fourteen of wounds received. Appalled at what he had just done inside the Holy Shrine, Sartip Iraj Khan withdrew his forces. Teheran was notified. The Shah berated the local authorities for their handling of the situation, and ordered the Shrine to be cleared by persuasion, failing which by sticks and rifle butts, and only failing that by bayonets. During the three days these consultations required, crowds gathered beating their breasts to the chant, "Hussein protect us from this Shah." Villagers began to come into town armed with sticks, sickles, shovels, and daggers. The bazaar closed. The garrison, largely in sympathy with the populace was disarmed and confined to barracks, with the exception of one detachment. This detachment was given a feast and at 2:00 a.m. on the fourth night, forced the door of the Shrine, and opening machine gun fire, cleared the Shrine. Officially twenty-eight were killed. Unofficial sources said one hundred twenty-eight were buried in trenches prepared before the event. Eight hundred were arrested and flogged. Armed troops thereafter became a common sight in Mashad. Blame for the event was subsequently pinned on Asadi, the mutawalli-bashi (caretaker of the Shrine) who after torture, confessed and was executed.

2.1.3. Commentary

It was the hat which was symbolic but the issues involved were much broader. Consul Day analyzed it at the time as a consequence of the tightening dictatorship, tightening both in the political and economic senses. Accounts of the way Reza Shah personally made people tremble form a whole genre of Persian anecdote. Neville Butler described a visit to Ramsar:

Prior to the Shah's visit, hotel managers were decorating and re-decorating their rooms; their gardeners were planting trees and even running with their large watering cans in hardly Iranian fashion. The Shah arrived; all except the earth quaked, and it had torn from

it by the Imperia order the trees so lately planted. Then the Shah passed back to Shahsavar. A sigh of relief and exhaustion followed, activity collapsed and Persia returned to its khalian (FO 416/94 [1936: 137]).

But the system was much more elaborate than a single man. In Mashad officials were being dismissed, not by their immediate superiors, but by direct orders from Teheran: informers were at work. The officials, consequently themselves became more rigid: tax officials might still accept bribes, but they also collected full Government dues for fear otherwise their own heads would roll. But the economic squeeze was a much more pervasive affair than merely enforcement of tax laws. Since 1931 the Government began to experiment with state monopolies on foreign trade. Foreign exchange became tight and merchants found little place to invest their local currency except in government monopolies. Customs sheds were full of goods which could not be released for lack of foreign exchange. The income from the monopolies was used to finance state expenditures of which one of the largest items, the army, was non-productive, and the second, the railroad, was a capital investment for the future. Refusing to contract new foreign loans, new money sources were sought in new taxes, and the printing press. The taxation fell heavily on the poorer classes. Millspaugh's eighteenth Quarterly report gives the sources of tax revenue as half from customs, one third from direct taxes on land and property, of which half was paid by the cultivator, one sixth from the tax on opium and tobacco. The 1928 surtax on tea and sugar remained inelastic. In the mid-thirties the road tax on motor vehicles was replaced with a tax on petrol and kerosene; and a tax on agricultural products payable on entry into markets replaced the difficult to collect land tax. Both changes are from progressive to regressive taxes. Note circulation increased three and a half-fold in 1933-37. The cost of living rose. The ulema lost their large revenue source in serving as civil registrars, when this was made a Government activity. There was a recognition of economic progress and considerable pride in its occurring without foreign loans. Private investment was partially redirected from mercantile to industrial activity, although much of it also went into land speculation to avoid being coopted by Government controlled activities. The railroad eventually did restructure the flow of some goods: no longer was there a need to buy oil from Russia, as it could now be distributed to the northern provinces from Iran's own southern fields, etc. Yet real discontent was undeniable from the sources outlined above. An increase in petty crime seemed to correlate with the heavy taxation on the laboring classes. A newly educated and Westernized youth found themselves without jobs yet insisting on a more expensive life style.

One need not rely on such indirect indices of discontent. Telegrams and petitions were addressed to the Shah. According to Consul Daly, the crowd which gathered in the Shrine did so under the impression that the tomb of the eighth Imam would be "the one place, short of heaven, a Shiite would think himself free from violence:"

They felt that their agitation was "constitutional" or at least sanctioned by age-long custom, and that the method selected—that of airing their grievances in the Shrine—could not fail to attract the personal attention of His Majesty the Shah and to result in alleviation of their troubles. There was no determined threat to the present regime (FO 416/94 [1936: 18]).

The situation in Kirmanshah as described by Consul Gault confirms Daly's opinion. Kirmanshah, like Mashad, was a border entrepot and lived to an even larger extent on smuggling, a natural result of the trade monopolies program. Teheran attempted to check the amount of smuggling: a new Chief of Police was appointed. He arrested one of the largest smugglers plus fifty other implicated traders. The investigations led to the recall of the Governor and suspicion fell upon the commander of the garrison. With normal business slowing to a standstill, the order came introducing the European hat and desiring unveiling. Rumor brought the news that Tabriz reaction to the orders had been to consult Sheikh Abdul Karim in Qum, and that when the Sheikh equivocated he had been exiled by the Government. This was followed by the news of Mashad. Sheikh Bahlul was well thought of in Kirmanshah, and as to the execution of Asadi, Consul Daly wrote that it was a clear case of the Government using the ulema as a scapegoat: "No Iranian in East Iran, not even Asadi's enemies, and he had many, believe that he had any hand in the disturbances" (FO 416/94 [1936: 18]). Discontent was dramatically expressed by many merchants taking down the obligatory pictures of the Shah from their walls. Economic constraints did not loosen. On the contrary, the Government wheat monopoly announced new unfavorable prices. Then half the bakers shops were forcibly closed and the price of bread rose 20%. The speculation was that these wheat and bread moves were done so that the Shah could sell wheat from his own Shahabad estates at enhanced prices.

Nor was the hat a symbol only of economic conflict. Other religious practices were also under attack. When Reza Shah visited Kirman in 1931, he asked the ulema who came to greet him, what their work was. They replied that they prayed for him. That was not good enough, he snapped, they should render service to Islam, and to make people weep in rosaxanes was no such service. Reza Shah not only attempted to curtail the Moharram mourning celebrations, requiring police permits for breast beating in public and prohibiting rosas and prayer recitation in public, but he consciously tried to substitute a joyous mode of public ritual. His birthday was to be one such new public ritual, and was to be celebrated with a karavan-i shadi (procession of joy), in contrast to the flagellation processions of Shiism or the carrying of the naxl (the huge tear-shaped wooden "coffin" of Hussein which requires several hundred men to lift) which was theoretically banned forevermore in Yazd in 1936.

2.2. The 1955-56 Bahai Riots

2.2.1. Events

The 1955 Bahai Riots in some ways are crucial to understanding the dynamics of post-war Iran. The standard Iranian explanation is that

Mossadegh was overthrown by a royalist-right wing alliance, and that in the immediate years following, the rightist religious fanatics exercised a power that could be ignored only at risk: the Shah had no room to maneuver until he could reconsolidate the monarchy. He was, after all, young and very unsure of himself, as well as being in a politically weak position. Such a hydraulic theory of politics (where one pressure is removed, another pops up) has some truth but little explanatory power. A year later new Bahai riots broke out, seven people were killed near Yazd. A New York Times reporter observed then that the majority of Iranians were "dumbfounded" by the international reaction against the 1955 events, and that the educated were "ashamed." Both responses are, given the history of religious riots we have reviewed, understandable; neither is perspicacious. At the trial of the 1956 incident, forty-four villagers were indicted, twenty-three were dismissed for lack of evidence, and twenty-one were sentenced to prison terms of seven months to four years. The facts given are meagre: the accused were villagers from two villages; the victims were six men and a pregnant woman (who reportedly was split in half with a hatchet) of the seven household village of Saxvid, a village of prosperous land-owning Bahais; the weapons were a hatchet, a shovel, clubs and stones (Kayhan, 17 Mordad 1334, p. 7; New York Times 1956: J1 10, 17:3). The most interesting sentence in the short London Times dispatch of 9 July, cited by the New York Times, reads:

Throughout the proceedings the Teheran court refrained from discussing the religious passions lurking behind the crime, although both the prosecution and the defense tried on several occasions to introduce them into their arguments.

That is an indictment not of the judge, who acted properly, but of Iranian political thought. Religion has been made into a residual boogey-man, too dangerous to discuss because it might explode. Much more relevant, at least, in the same indirect way as religious dim-wittedness, are probably (given the paucity of facts): (a) the economic prostration of Iran during the war and at the time of Mossadegh's overthrow; (b) the relative prosperity of the particular Bahai victims; (c) the elevation of passions during Ramazan.

The single most dramatic feature of the 1955 events was the seizure of the Hazrat-ul-Qods (the Bahai Temple) by the military governor of Teheran, General Timur Bakhtiar, and the pictures of him and of Mullah Mohammad Taghi Falsafi supervising the stripping of its dome of the beautiful tile work. Fifteen years later, an American, who really did not know, stopped a passer-by and asked what the interesting building across the street was; the Iranian spat on the sidewalk and walked on; the American had to ask another to learn it was the Bahai Temple. Again the facts are few. During Ramazan 1955 an anti-Bahai campaign was launched by one Mullah Mohammad Taghi Falsafi, a gifted orator and much sought after rosaxond. In 1970 he was invited to Yazd to deliver a series of ten lectures in Meidan-e Shah, and he drew an audience of several thousand each night.

During Ramazan 1955 Falsafi went each noon to the Kuys Mosque in Teheran to deliver a radio broadcast lecture. He began presumably (it would be of interest to have the transcripts) with the standard Shiite meditation

on the fate of Islam, the betrayal of Ali and of Hussein—Ali whose stabbing and death mark two of the holiest nights of Ramazan, and Hussein, the story of whose martyrdom at Karbala provides the traditional framework of such preachments; and betrayal, the focal emotion of guilt reflecting upon people who sit and do nothing, now as then, to protect Islam from such ravages. Falsafi then, according to Bahai accounts, urged his listeners to rise against false religions, and in particular against Bahaism as an enemy of Islam. Eventually, according to the New York Times reports, he charged that Bahais had a plan to overthrow the monarchy in the spring of 1956 and to establish a Bahai regime in Iran. Bahaism was a spreading cancer which already claimed a million of Iran's fifteen or twenty million people. He appealed to the Shah to ban Bahaism, to dismiss all Bahais from Government jobs, and to turn the Bahai Temple into a mosque. What the exact sequence of events thereafter was is not clear, except that on 7 May, the Hazrat-ul-Qods was seized by the Army, on 17 May Minister of the Interior Assadullah Alam announced to the Majlis suppression of Bahaism whose membership he estimated at seven hundred thousand in five hundred communities of Iran. In the following two weeks at the order of General Bakhtiar, the tiles of the Hazrat-ul-Qods were removed and replaced with a tin roofing. Pictures are extant of Bakhtiar, Falsafi, and other Iranian leaders pick-axe in hand. According to the New York Times, this was the climax of the period of violence, and whatever the implications politically or morally, this symbolic act quieted the violence at least in Teheran. According to the Bahai account, however, the May 17 announcement of Alam

. . . was followed by an orgy of senseless murder, rape, pillage, and destruction. . . . The dome of the Haziratu'l-Quds in Tihiran was demolished; the House of the Bab was twice desecrated and severely damaged; Baha'u'llah's ancestral home at Takur was occupied; the house of the Bab's uncle was razed to the ground; shops and farms were plundered; crops burned; livestock destroyed; bodies of Bahais disinterred in the cemeteries and mutilated; private homes broken into, damaged and looted; adults execrated and beaten; young women abducted and forced to marry Muslims; children mocked, reviled, beaten and expelled from schools; boycott by butchers and bakers was imposed on hapless villagers; young girls were raped; families murdered; Government employees dismissed and all manner of pressure brought upon the believers to recant their faith (Baha'i Publishing Trust 1970: 292).

On September 18, the American Bahais appealed to Dag Hammarskjold and the affair was raised by U.N. officials both with Foreign Minister Abdullah Entezam and with his brother, the Ambassador to the U.S., Nasrollah Entezam. But in effect until the present is the legal fiction that Bahais do not exist. Neither the 1956 nor the 1966 national censuses have categories for Bahais. The National Oil Company advertises daily in the newspapers for technical personnel listing publically as a requirement of employment that the applicant be one of the four recognized religions (Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism). To put on any Government application under "religion" the word Bahai is to achieve immediate ineligibility. Bahai marriages, births and deaths cannot be legally registered. Meetings are proscribed. Only the religious fatwa against drinking Pepsi Cola (a Bahai franchise) is losing popular support: the Pepsi group of soft-drinks (Pepsi,

Canada, Seven-Up) far out-paces in distribution its rivals, Coka Cola (Armenian) and O-So (Jewish). The official attitude is still that of the Iranian delegate to the 1950 Geneva Conference of International Non-Governmental Organizations. Mrs. Timurtash (daughter of the former Prime Minister) reporting on invitations to join the United Nations, the Honorary President of which was the Shah of Iran, was asked by Mrs. Mottahedeh, the Bahai delegate, why Bahais, the largest minority in Iran had not been invited. Mrs. Timurtash gave three different reasons:

- (1) There are only three minorities in Iran—Jews, Zoroastrians and Christians—and all are treated well and have Parliamentary representation: "We do not consider the Bahais a minority, but look upon them just as ourselves." (2) "There are no Bahais in Iran."
- (3) Bahais are merely a sect of Islam (Baha'i Publishing Trust 1956: 604).

In 1956 renewed appeals were made to the U.N. In 1957 the buildings seized by the Government were returned, although the sect remained outlawed. In 1970 violent verbal abuse of Bahais could be elicited from college educated people on down at the mere mention of the name; the same is not true of Jew, Christian or Zoroastrian, although these groups may be abused in private. But perhaps the most interesting phenomenon is that any successful person, not merely the Shah or Prime Minister Hoveyda or other Cabinet Members, is certain to be accused by someone of being Bahai.

2.2.2. Commentary

To make sense of these few facts is not easy. One may perhaps begin with the observation that the events cited did not occur in a vacuum. The neutralization of political opponents of the Government which had been in progress since Mossadegh's overthrow in August 1953 (celebrated in Iran as 28 Mordad Day) was still going on. At the same time as the Hazrat-ul-Qods dome was being dismantled, General Bakhtiar arrested five more former associates of Mossadegh including a former Minister (B. Kazemi) and a former Speaker of the Majlis (A. Moazemi). Two months earlier, Dr. Morteza Yazdi, a Tudeh founder and former Minister of Health, was sentenced to death, one of about thirty to be executed of more than six hundred accused of conspiracy against the Zahedi Government. The preceding month, on April 6, the Zahedi Government fell: "for reasons of health," General Zahedi retired, but the substitution of Hossein Ala was seen as a strengthening of the Shah's position. And finally, the following November a thirty-two year old religious fanatic named Mozafar Ali Zalghadad said he had "decided to begin a fight against infidels because I feel the Islamic rules are not being properly carried out." He went to the Shah Mosque where upon sighting Ala, he cried, "Why are there so many prostitutes in the city?" and he fired at the Prime Minister. He missed and so with better aim threw his pistol at Ala. Ala, very interestingly as will become clear, was attending a funeral ceremony for Majlis Deputy Mostafa Kashani, son of Ayatollah Abolghassem Kashani. The military authorities immediately issued an order to exterminate the Fedayan Islam, blamed for the attack on Ala as well as for the assassination in the same mosque in 1951 of Prime Minister General Ali Razmara (and in 1946 the nationalist Ahmad Kasravi). On November 20 and December 1, Mullah Navab Safavi and Abdul Hossein Vahedi, chief and

Lieutenant leaders of the Fedayan Islam were apprehended, the latter being killed as he tried to escape.

To place these latter events in perspective, one needs to review the activities of the Zahedi Government, which forcibly took over the Government in support of the Shah from Mossadegh on 19 August 1953. By July of that year Mossadegh was bankrupt: he lacked sufficient rials to pay the state payroll. The Abadan refinery had been shutdown since July 1951 when the British imposed a commercial blockade in retaliation for the breakdown of talks over compensation for Iranian nationalization of the oil industry. The tasks of the Zahedi Government therefore were (1) to re-establish order, i.e., (a) neutralize pro-Mossadegh opponents and (b) elect a Parliament which would support (2) economic recovery through (a) re-establishing the oil-rentier income, and (b) long-term American financed and advised development plans. The economic objectives were put on a solid footing by American emergency grants-in-aid of more than one hundred million dollars the first twelve months (and eventually more than seven hundred million dollars) until such time as agreement over oil with Britain could be formalized and the in-flow of oil revenue could be resumed. These relations with Britain were initiated first by re-opening the Embassy in London (January 1954) and having Parliament vote confidence in the Government which was negotiating the new oil pact (September 1954). This last feat was done only at the price of considerable turbulence during the 1954 elections.

These elections read like a comic opera, but like all real life comic operas, one that was deadly serious. The senario opened with a Government announcement that the elections were to be postponed on account of bad weather: there was heavy snow and rain in the north and east of the country. No one took this reason seriously: the Government simply had not had time to select its candidates and sideline its opponents. Dr. Allahyar Saleh of the Iran Party found upon returning from the U.S. that he would not be allowed to go to Kashan where he was running. Rounding up Mossadegh supporters continued: Darius Foruhar (leader of the Pan-Iran Party) and Karim Por Shirazi (editor of the pro-Mossadegh weekly Shuresh) were arressed on January 2. The elections were begun on a staggered schedule. On the eve of the three day elections in Teheran, Mostafa Kashani, son of Ayatollah Sayyid Abolghassem Kashani, was arrested. His father began a verbal duel, calling the elections rigged and the Government a dictatorship which was "throwing the country back into the claws of foreigners" (February 1). Riots spread from the shoemaker section of the Teheran Bazaar (February 2). People were arrested for shouting, "Long live Mossadegh, death to Zahedi." The troops opened fire and at least one person was killed. The University of Teheran was closed. Shaaban "Bimokh" ("the brainless") Jafari, the wrestler whose role in the royalist restoration riots of the preceeding summer gained him royal patronage (and the zurxane at the City Park in Central Teheran which is still a tourist attraction) went with his followers to polling places in a limosine and jeeps to beat up opposition pamphleteers. Bimokh's victims were then arrested.¹ Pro-Mossadegh ex-Majlis deputy Ahmad Akhgar was

¹ Kenneth Love reported: "Shaban was most helpful and most embarrassing during the Senate elections early this month. He drove from one

arrested. Interior Minister General Jahanbani commented on Ayatollah Kashani's charges in a radio broadcast: "Wicked demagogues are poisoning the minds of the people here and there by saying that the elections are not free and that the Government is interfering. Government interference is limited to the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of relevant regulations" (February 1). Voting ended (February 3) and an announcement was made that the Majlis would not be asked to ratify any oil agreement with Britain (February 4) but that at a subsequent date only a vote of confidence would be sought. University students protested the unveiling of a statue of the Shah near the University of Teheran gates on the fifth anniversary of an attempt on his life (February 6). The Zolfaghari family was charged with intimidating voters in the Zanjan constituency. Their sin apparently was that two of the Zolfaghari brothers had followed Mossadegh's leadership in the previous Majlis, and that if they could be eliminated Zahedi intimates could take their seats.² Subsequent elections for the lower house deputies (March 8 to 10) did not arouse much enthusiasm and voting was light. Shaaban Jafari continued to demonstrate his affection for the Shah. Three other Nazi-styled groups performed similar duties: the black shirted Sumka led by Dr. Munsheezadeh, the grey-shirted and "Afrika Korps" capped Arya Party, and the tan-shirted Fedayan Shah. Troops dispersed demonstrators on Khiaban Naderi and south of the University while Shaaban's men knifed a number of voters near the Sepahsalar Mosque when "some of the younger and more foolhardy shouted 'Mossadegh will be victorious.'" Police and Army hospitals would not supply tallies of admissions, nor would doctors at the civilian Sina Hospital say whether victims of election disturbances had been treated, pointing out that "any victims of these disturbances must be reported to the police who more than likely would arrest them." The Kayhan newspaper reported that "Mr. Shaban Jafari and a group of his colleagues inspected the polling places and found the situation comparatively quiet."

polling place to another administering terrible beatings to the opposition electioneers, or if he suspected them of being communists, shaving their heads. The admiring police, who got in a few kicks and punches themselves, promptly arrested his astonished, shorn or unconscious victims. He is expected to play a similar role in the forthcoming Majlis (lower house) elections here. . . . Ardeshir Zahedi, son of Premier Fazlollah Zahedi, added, "I know Shaban is a little rough, but we like him because he is against the Communists" (New York Times 1954: F7, 6:1).

² Kenneth Love reported that brothers Mahmud and Mostafa were imprisoned on charges of using weapons to intimidate voters. The infraction was against martial law, the charge being use of weapons to disturb the peace. "The two brothers ran first and second . . . winning two of the three seats in the Zanjan constituency. The other candidates in order of placement were Ahmad Afkhami Zamindar, a friend of the Zolfaghari, who won the third seat; Nasr and Mohammad Zolfaghari, two other brothers who helped paralyze the last Majlis by resigning in accordance with then Premier Mohammad Mossadegh's wishes. Majd Ziali, a relative by marriage of Mme. Zahedi, and Nasrullah Moghadam, a brother of Mostafa Moghadam, who hid General Zahedi in his home from Dr. Mossadegh's troops before the August 19 uprising." Elimination of

The elections successfully concluded, the larger business of purifying the political arena could be continued. Economic policy was first secured. An oil agreement was made, and the Government passed the vote of confidence test. American consultants were hired to develop a long term development program. Financing for the five year plan was obtained from the I.B.R.D. and the Import-Export Bank. The Point Four Program was credited with weaning the people away from communism, and began very necessary health and sanitation programs. Meanwhile political personnel continued to be sorted. Hossein Fatemi, Mossadegh's Foreign Minister, was captured in March. Mossadegh himself was allowed to appeal his conviction and he went on a hunger strike. The prosecution accused him of secretly eating cookies and sweets. His conviction was upheld. In January, six months after Mossadegh's overthrow, General Bakhtiar boasted of having reduced the card-carrying membership of the Tudeh Party from thirty to twenty thousand. Some thirty-one hundred persons had been arrested or exiled to Kharg Island; most were released, that is, all but five hundred eighty. By June ex-communists were publishing their recantations in the newspapers. In August a monument was erected to mark the anniversary of Mossadegh's overthrow: the smiting of a dragon. In September a large-scale communist plot was exposed to the public. As in similar successful public shows later (the most recent being the televised press conferences after the killing of General Bakhtiar in 1970 and the infiltration of his five member central committee in Baghdad by three Iranian security officers) emphasis was placed on rounding up operations that had been going on for a number of years, and on supplying as many pieces of information damaging to the accused as possible without concern for mutual contradiction. This was a communist espionage ring of some six hundred army officers, all card-carrying Tudeh members. For twelve years the spies had been infiltrating the army, police and gendarmerie, and had within the last month (sic) "obtained detailed information of the strength and disposition of the entire Iranian armed forces." They had financed themselves by embezzling funds from the National Bank and the National Railroads which organizations they had also infiltrated. They had obtained vital security positions in the post-Mossadegh reshuffle "that put them in a position to assassinate on a moment's notice virtually every key figure in the present regime. . . . The ring was equally able to . . . furnish information that would insure immediate success for a Russian air borne descent. . . . The information obtained so far from seized documents does not indicate the organization planned any specific action at any time" (New York Times 1954: S 11, 1:3). Of the first three hundred to be arrested at least, non was above the rank of colonel, and one, a Major Javad Bahrami, committed suicide—he had received a medal from the Shah for his part in the royalist uprising which overthrew Mossadegh.

of the Zofagharis would nominate Zamindar, Ziali and Moghadam. Brother Nasr was arrested on February 28. The Zolfaghari clan, twelve brothers headed by Sultan Mohammad, administered more than eleven hundred villages in southern Azarbaijan with a population of some five hundred thousand. The administrative center is Zanzan (with a population of fifty thousand) known for manufacturing knives. In 1946 the Zolfagharis commanded a private army which they led against the Pishevari Azarbaijan Government.

Because of "persistent popular doubts" that all the arrested officers belonged to the ring, the Government offered proof to relatives in the form of signed confessions. Government agents at the same time expressed bewilderment at the discovery that some of those arrested were unaware their acts aided the U.S.S.R. After a six year search with a standing reward of two hundred thousand rials, the printing plant of the semi-monthly Tudeh paper, Mardom, was found in the cellar of a Davoudieh village house six miles from Teheran. Despite seizure of the presses, Mardom continued to appear, albeit irregularly.

By October instead of public demonstrations pro-Mossadegh, anti-Mossadegh demonstrations became more frequent. The former Mossadegh Minister of Justice was attacked. Fifty teachers were dismissed for being pro-communist. Fatemi was sentenced to death despite an earlier promise of pardon. Arrests and communist scare tactics continued throughout 1955. In January 1956 Ayatollah Kashani was arrested (his son, remember, had been arrested the previous January and had died the following November) in connection with the 1951 Razmara assassination and the current campaign against the Fedayan Islam. When Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, the U.S.S.R. stepped up its propaganda campaign against Iran becoming a Western satellite. This only helped the Government to intensify its own internal use of anti-communism. A Soviet spy ring was uncovered: a Russian diplomat was expelled and his Iranian military associate arrested; another Iranian confessed to spying for the Russians for ten years. By October of 1956 the Shah felt secure enough to pardon sixty-four political prisoners and six months later one hundred nineteen more. By December of 1956 Iran was being described by Ala to his American patrons as stable and free of communism.

None of this explains the Bahai riots, but it does suggest that there is a relation between political repression and religious protest of a riot form. It would be of interest to know more about Falsafi's political background. But it is in any case easier for any number of rosaxonds to inspire anger by playing on the theme of unjust realities destroying a defenceless Islam "unless you dear listener do something" than for a religious right-wing political organization such as the Fedayan Islam to escape political censure. The connection in this case is the suggestion by some Iranians that allowing anti-Bahai riots was a way for a weak Government to gain public acquiescence in curbing the Fedayan Islam.

2.3. The Riots of 1963

Of the disturbances of the post-Mossadegh era, the riots of 1963 are the most often cited. They occurred during the suspension of parliamentary government used by the Shah to impose his White Revolution. Although the Shah pinned the blame for the riots on the "black reaction" of the Islamic ulema, the "red agitation" of the National Front, and the subversive intriguing of Nasser and the United Arab Republic, things were not quite so straightforward. The struggle for political control has already been discussed in Chapter II and references have been made to the disturbances of 1963. Here we will try to collect the scattered information into some kind of coherent picture. Although in a sense 1963 signals the victory of the

Shah in demonstrating his attainment of secure control, in 1963 this had yet to be made evident to the people, and that was accomplished by the decisive crushing of the riots with tanks and planes, a demonstration which few in Iran have forgotten.

1963 was the third year of a depression: high unemployment and a low level of investment (indicating a low level of confidence in the country's economy). The Central Bank reported an increase in savings deposits of 45% and in long term deposits of 80%. Capital goods purchases from abroad dropped from \$193 million to \$150 million. Disturbances had been intermittent since the 1960 elections. After the red purges of the 1950s, described in the preceeding section of this Appendix, and the establishment of such institutions of control as SAVAK and the High Council of Asnaf (both in 1957), the Shah was attempting in the 1960 elections to create a docile two party system. (There is no need to deride this as shameless mockery: as was pointed out, to create a stable system of control, the Shah needed some institutional means of aggregating popular demands for communication upwards, a means of channeling new ideas and disagreements in legitimate ways. Though with hindsight it seems an unlikely experiment, a two party system is probably what the Shah's American patrons were urging.) Things got out of hand from the Shah's point of view and the elections were cancelled, the only elections in Iran's history to have been totally annulled on grounds of "procedural irregularities." New elections were held, the details of which are recorded by Kaviani. Teheran was divided into ten wards, each under seven police and fourteen army officers. Statistical results of the three day voting appeared as follows. The first day voting was light, the newspapers reporting not more than twenty voters at each of the eighty polling stations (which yields some sixteen hundred votes). Several days later, when these ballot boxes were opened, the number of votes had grown to seventy-six hundred and fifty. The official count (Kaviani cites the report in the magazine Roshan Fekr, Bahman 1339 [February 1961]) of the five or six thousand voters over three days was sixty-five thousand, which even if accepted constitutes only about a twenty percent turn-out of the estimated three hundred thousand eligible voters. Even Hafez Farmayan, whose chronicle of the 1960s attempts to place events in their best light, comments that "indifference to the elections in Teheran was supreme," and notes that the official count of votes was down thirty-three thousand from the first elections (Farmayan 1971). A month later some thirty-one cities still had not held their elections.

The students of the University of Teheran and members of the National Front used the initiative the Shah had provided by annulling the previous elections to demand annulment of these as well, since they had been carried out with the same techniques, only Sharaf-Imami replacing Eqbal as head of the Government ticket. Such idealism was forcibly suppressed, and the students and teachers, led by Mohammad Darakhshesh, not wishing to lose the slight leverage of the moment, struck for higher pay for teachers. The soldiers opened fire killing one teacher and wounding several. Sharaf-Imami was replaced by Amini. In May the parliament was dissolved at Amini's request so that land reform could be put into effect without the opposition of the landowner dominated Majlis. Ashraf's account of the two groups of ulema who had since 1960 opposed the Shah has already been cited.

Behbehani and Borujerdi first opposed all land reform and then when that was no longer possible, in 1960 Bebehani opposed the inclusion of religious endowments (i.e., the vast lands of the Imam Reza Shrine). Borujerdi died in 1961 and Khomeini became the center of the religious opposition.

Protests continued. The National Front called a mass demonstration to commemorate the return of Mossadegh to power in 1952; they were met with tanks and troops. In January 1962 there were student demonstrations beginning with the protests at the National Teachers Training College over reduced scholarships, further inflamed by the political expulsion of three students from the Dar ul-Fonun. When the University of Teheran students joined the demonstrations, the troops literally invaded, not only the campus, but even the University hospital, beating and raping. The Chancellor, Dr. Farhad, in a now celebrated letter, announcing his resignation, cited unheard of "cruelty, sadism, atrocity, and vandalism." Immediately there was also a round-up of opposition politicians of all kinds. The affair was eventually pinned on General Bakhtiar and he was exiled. In 1961, as a move to pacify protests against repression, Bakhtiar had been one of several officials dismissed, he from the chiefship of SAVAK, for failing to prevent the political commotion surrounding the 1960 elections. With Bakhtiar taking the blame, the Shah tried to coopt another element of the opposition, the National Front, by sending Alam to them to ask for their counsel. Their response was a set of public demands which they knew the Shah would not meet, and to call a congress just before the Shah's Rural Cooperative Conference in which the Shah was denounced for his authoritarianism, this in January 1963.

This was on the eve of the referendum to confirm the White Revolution. The previous three months had seen an intensification of opposition among the ulema as well, this time over the Local Council Election Bill. Ashraf cites among protest messages to the Shah during November: telegrams from Ayatollahs Shariatmardi and Golpayegani; a declaration of one hundred thirty-two ulema; a declaration of twenty-six ulema of Teheran; a declaration of religious associations of Meshed and a letter of Ayatollah Milani; and a declaration of ten ulema of Qum. They protested the granting of women the right to vote, and the omission of any mention in the bill of Islam or the Qur'an. The Shah's referendum was scheduled for the 28th of January. There were demonstrations on the 22nd, and Khomeini was arrested for the second time, the first time having been during the preceding November. At Noruz (March 21 and 22) demonstrations flared up again: in Tabriz, Qum, Teheran, Shiraz, and Mashad. Hundreds were killed in Tabriz and Qum. In Shiraz the fighting was billed by the royalists as a different kind of problem: pacifying the tribes. In Qum the religious schools were invaded by the troops helping to coalesce opposition around Khomeini. In April there were further demonstrations and the Shah attacked the ulema as black reactionaries. In May Minister of Agriculture Arsanjani, the driving force behind a swift and vigorous reform, resigned in protests against the foot-dragging of Behnia and Alam, who argued that there were not sufficient funds to pursue a vigorous rural cooperative program. Fighting in Fars continued and fifty government troops were killed, another forty-nine injured. May-June was Moharram. The authorities waited until the end of the holy days and then early in the morning of June 4 arrested, for the third time, Ayatollah

Khomeini. By mid-morning massive demonstrations were in progress in Teheran, Qum, Veramin, Shiraz, and Mashad. For three days the demonstrations went on. It is alleged that the government hired hooligans to set fires in public buildings to justify the shoot-to-kill order. One of the buildings burned out was Shaaban Jafari's zurxane, but it is not clear if this was in popular fury against his role in earlier pro-Shah mob actions, or if it was just another sacrifice for his beloved Shah. The zurxane was rebuilt the following summer with Government funds. With the shoot-to-kill order, thousands were massacred, an event symbolized in popular memory with the image of thousands of black shirted marchers enroute from Qum to Teheran being strafed by air force planes. In Teheran twenty were killed the first day, and a thousand injured. SAVAK chief Pakravan blamed Nasser of Egypt, apparently linking this to the demand of the demonstrators that Iran break her de facto relations with Israel. On the fifth, a New York Times dispatch reports, "When the firing stopped and the smoke cleared away, the rioters were gone. The Bazaar area looked as if a tornado had hit it." On the sixth, troops blocked off the public cemeteries to supervise burials and insure that they did not turn into demonstrations. Meanwhile other troops repulsed white shrouded attackers at the radio station; a U.S. military jeep was stoned as it went by the University of Teheran, and the Iran-America Student Center was damaged. It was on the sixth that Alam gave the shoot-to-kill order, according to the New York Times after eighty-six had been officially counted as dead in Teheran and twelve in Qum. On the seventh Alam spoke of a plot against the Shah, and on the eighth the Shah criticised the rioters for (1) destroying private property because this was against the principles of Islam, and (2) taking money from Sunnis to stir up disorder (an apparent reference to Nasser). On the tenth, Jafar Behbehani, son of Ayatollah Mohammad Behbehani was arrested for leafleting for a general strike. On the eleventh, the Shah made his charges against Nasser explicit, calling the latter's government "corrupt, vain, subversive, and based on deceit," and pledged that elections would be held as scheduled at the end of the summer and that women would vote. Fighting around Shiraz continued, and the tribes even captured Shiraz International Airport before being subdued. Arrests followed. Zonis comments, "The last four months of 1963 took on the character of a mass round-up of opposition politicians throughout Iran" (1971: 75): more than two hundred fifty were arrested, and arrests continued throughout 1965 and 1966, especially after the assassination of Premier Mansur in January 1965, and the attempt on the life of the Shah in April 1965. When Mossadegh died in 1967 so many people wanted to print condolence notices in the papers that this was banned. There was a major student strike that year.

The elections, however, were held. First the opposition was put out of action. Khomeini was detained a fourth time just before the elections. He was finally exiled when in October 1964 he attacked the Majlis bill to grant diplomatic immunity to American soldiers in Iran. When the Shah was asked about such tightly controlled elections, Jay Walz of the New York Times quotes him as responding, "So what? Was it not better that this organization do it than that it be done by politicians for their own purposes? For the first time we have elected a Majlis and a Senate truly representing the people not the landlords. We have twelve workers in the National Assembly [of two hundred] and some farmers and members of guilds. And for the first time

women voted and women were elected to some seats . . . We cannot allow anything to interrupt the discipline needed to effect the revolution demanded by the people. . . . We would not have them [reforms] were it not for the King. The people might demand them, but who but their King could bring reforms to them?"

This is also by and large what the Shah's American advisors have also thought. Georgiana Stevens writing a decade earlier for Foreign Policy said: "Iran's situation illustrates the ironic fact that democratic forms adopted prematurely in an underdeveloped country with a largely illiterate population are likely to delay social progress. . . . It appears unlikely, for example, that real reforms can come in Iran without the exercise of some arbitrary power on the part of the Shah and his ministers" (Stevens 1951).

2.4. The 1970s

By the end of the sixties, it appeared as if the opposition in Iran had been fairly well suppressed and as if Iran had embarked on an era of economic prosperity. Journalistic accounts by outside observers like Peter Avery (1968), Alfred Friendly (1969), and a special issue of The Economist (1970) were describing Iran in glowing terms, with only an occasional query as to the reality of the apparent quiescence. The Second Asian International Trade Fair was held in Teheran in October 1969, an industrial exposition the following year, an investment conference with thirty-five American business executives in May of 1970, and in October 1971 the celebrations of two and a half millenia of continuous monarchy. These formed the framework of a very carefully staged public relations effort to attract investment capital to bolster and expand Iran's economic growth. The occasional reports of student strikes, guerrilla activities, and so on, seemed discordant with this general air of well being. One might well speculate that the Government was deliberately concerned to manage the news not only as a means of controlling the Iranian population, but equally to present as rosy a picture as possible to potential investors. Speeches of Premier Hoveyda and the Shah constantly stressed the stability and growth of Iran; similar phrases are to be found in the U.S. Commerce Department's Foreign Economic Trends report on Iran (1969). (See the reflection of this concern that potentially damaging information not leak out in footnote 2, page 141 above). Cracks in this facade began to surface with some regularity in the early seventies. Some of the sequence of events are as follows.

In March 1970 was the bus fare strike (see pages 44-45 above): students led the demonstrations against bus fares being raised as unfair to the lower classes. Some were killed, many arrested. All of the political connections remain unclear. Demonstrations had begun at Teheran's Aryamehr Polytechnic and spread to other universities. Demonstrations around other issues were to break out later in the year again, and troops remained around the University of Teheran throughout 1971.

In May 1970 the thirty-five American business executives were welcomed to Iran with much fanfare and with the background support of a U.S. Commerce

Department industrial exposition. A Teheran mujtahed, Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Reza Sa'idi, apparently denounced the conference as a selling of Iran into the hands of foreigners. Algar, relying on the publications of the National Front in America and the Freedom Movement in Exile (groups hostile to the Shah) gives the following account (1972: 250-52). Sa'idi was arrested and tortured to death in the Qizil Qala prison by the gradual crushing of his skull and the introduction of boiling water into his intestines. A student at Teheran's Polytechnic, Nikda'udi, also a protester against the conference, suffered a similar fate. Algar cites a report by Dr. Hans Heldmann, professor of criminology at Frankfort University, on his trip in behalf of Amnesty International. Sa'idi's death led to demonstrations in Qum. The Government banned memorial services, but a meeting was held nonetheless in the Ghiyati Mosque where Sa'idi had been imam, and two of the speakers there were arrested: Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taliqani was soon released, but Dr. Abbas Shaybani was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment by a military court (sentencing occurred in October 1970). In the press conferences of December 1970 the Government tried to throw doubt on these reports in the organs of the Confederation of Iranian Students: Dr. Hans Heldmann was identified by the Government as a German communist who serves as legal counsel for the Confederation and who described in London upon his return from Iran the grave of Qorban Shir Mohammad; the latter was brought out of detention during these series of press conferences as were several others said to have been tortured to death. (see the accounts of the press conferences in the Teheran Journal, 29 December 1970, p. 1 and 12; Kayhan International, 29 December 1970, p. 3; Kayhan International, 2 January 1971, p. 1).

On June 1, 1970, Mohsen Hakim, the marja taqlid (source of imitation) died and the newspapers and bazaars were full of signs of mourning. The Shah sent letters of condolence to Ayatollahs Khunsari and Shariatmardi, but specifically not to the leader of the religious opposition, Ayatollah Khomeini. Shariatmardi responded with declarations of loyalty to the Shah for which he was rewarded by demonstrations in front of his house, and forty-eight ulema sent letters of condolence to Khomeini. Some of these ulema were subsequently arrested and exiled to Zabul (Algar 1972: 252).

During the spring, General Teimur Bakhtiar was killed by SAVAK agents in Iraq, and his possessions in Iran were sold off. The summer was a period of official political campaigning leading up to the elections of September 1970 (see page 41).

In December 1970 two dramas occurred: there was a student strike at the University of Teheran, and the Government began its dramatic disclosure through a series of televised press conferences of a plot against it by agents of General Bakhtiar. The student strike was passed off as stirred up by agitators belonging to this plot. One of the slogans of the students was "Long live Khomeini." Eighteen of forty-five people arrested in connection with the plot were sentenced on 31 December to terms ranging from three years to life. Eleven of these eighteen were students, and all but one were under thirty years of age (Kayhan International, 2 January 1971, p. 1). Among the enemies indicted in the plot were Bakhtiar himself, the Chinese Communists, the Iraqi Baathists, the Tudeh Party, the Iranian

Confederation of Students, and the oil industry.

The month of the haj was January-February 1971 and in Mecca a message from Ayatollah Khomeini was circulated among the pilgrims which said, "Anyone who organizes or participates in these [2500 Year] festivals is a traitor to Islam and the Iranian nation" (Algar 1972: 253). During the following summer preceding the festivals, there were various "bank raids, attacks on police posts and explosions" and an attempt to kidnap Prince Shahram, the nephew of the Shah; some six hundred to a thousand people were taken into protective custody (The Economist, 9 October 1971, p. 41). The two and a half millennial celebrations were held in October 1971 with tight security including the requiring of travel permits for all near the festivities.

In November 1971 was the trial of Mrs. Sharon King (see p. 374), and an attempt to kidnap the American ambassador, Douglas McArthur II. Eleven persons were finally tried and sentenced on June 10, 1973 for the kidnapping attempt: six were sentenced to death, the others drew prison terms.

1972 brought reports of more political trials and torture: nineteen persons were executed as guerrillas between January and March, ten others given life sentences, and a total of one hundred forty-three were under indictment. French lawyers Christian Bourguet, representing the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, and Henri Libertalis and Nuri Albala, representing Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of the Rights of Man and the International Secretariat of Catholic Jurists, all reported serious indications of torture and procedural irregularities. The Iranian Government disallowed foreign journalists from further attendance, and the Shah angrily told German reporters, "We can neither accept any outsider's interference in our domestic affairs, nor gratuitous criticism which is not only far from the truth, but indeed contrary to the truth" (The Washington Post, 12 March 1972, p. A6; ibid., 13 March 1972, p. A10). In the spring of 1972 an attempt was made on the life of U.S. Air Force Brig. General Harold Price, and in May 1972 President Nixon's visit provided a symbolic occasion for a series of bomb explosions.

In February 1973 the announcement of a two billion dollar arms purchase from the United States (including laser-guided "smart bombs") coincided with university student demonstrations in Teheran. Between June 1972 and June 1973 some two hundred guerrillas were tried and one hundred eighteen executed. On June 2, 1973 Lt. Col. Lewis L. Hawkins was successfully assassinated. Journalistic analyses attributed the assassination to groups opposed to the military build-up, the increase American presence (military advisors scheduled to increase from three hundred odd to eleven hundred; the new Ambassador Helms being a former C.I.A. director), and the authoritarianism of the Imperial Government. Arrested guerrillas tended to be well-educated young men variously linked to pro-Moscow, pro-Maoist, or Islamic fundamentalist groups, but ideological unity and commitment seemed to be less marked than opposition to authoritarianism. (The Washington Post, 6 June 1973, p. A24; ibid., 3 June 1973; The Chicago Tribune, 3 June 1973, p. 1; ibid., 11 June 1973, sec. 1, p. 7).

3. Note on Sources

Most of the information in sections 1.1. through 2.1. comes from the printed Confidential Reports in the Public Records Office. There are two sets of numbers which can be used to identify items. The original file numbers look like: E5071/2556/34; these numbers are not cited here. Printed extracts from these files were circulated for official use and these are bound in volumes the series number of which is FO 416, volume numbers running from 1 to 99. The volumes are both paginated and items numbered. The citation form used here is: series/volume [date: page], e.g., FO 416/81 [1928: 136].

Two other archival sets are also cited: those of the Church Missionary Society, and the Alliance Israelite Universelle. The C.M.S. archives contain three series of materials for Persia, a series of letters from London to Persia, a series of letters from Persia to London, and a series of preces of the latter which contains abstracts of all the letters plus an index. The latter two series are both coded identically G 2 PE/03 - 05.

The A.I.U. archives are coded with a file number (Roman numeral), a bundle number (capital letter), a folder number (Arabic numeral), date, and item accession number: I.C.2 [1913: no. 629/13].

Newspaper citations follow the form of the newspaper name, date, month, year and page, with a slight variation for New York Times citations which follows the form of the New York Times Index: year: month abbreviation and date, page: column.

APPENDIX II

PARSI VOICES

APPENDIX II

PARSI VOICES

The purpose of this Appendix is to contrast two general styles of religious rhetoric: liberal and orthodox. It would be possible to do a complete intellectual history of the Parsis over the past century. The materials exist, though much of it is in Gujurati. The early Parsi newspapers devoted much of their space to religious disputes, and a study of these papers has been done by Dr. Ratan Marshall in a dissertation submitted to the University of Bombay (in Gujurati). The papers themselves exist, of particular interest: the Jame Jamshid, Samachand, and Kaisar Hind. In English, for the reformers, are the writings of Dastur Dr. Dhalla, the publications of the Rahanu Maye Mazdeyashni Sabha, the popular explanations of T.R. Sethna, etc. A collection of Parsi theosophical writings has been made by N.F. Bilimoria (c. 1896). For Ilm-e Khshnoom, the two basic expositions are those of P.S. Masani (1917) and S.F. Chiniwalla (1942), and others range from Dastur Dabu's more tempered explanations of Zoroastrianism to Hormusji S. Spencer's zealously eclectic essays on the Aryan Cycle, reincarnation, etc. Current contributions from all sides can be found in popular form in the journal Parsiiana. For our purposes the succinctest method is to contrast opinions on similar subjects, leaving the reader to recognize how one individual might combine pieces from each side of the dichotomy. Three brief examples are offered at the end.

ILM-e KHSNNOOM

1) On the Age of the Texts

From the Zoroastrian point of view, all the texts were written in the same age though in different styles. We do not concur that the linguistic differences represent changes over time (Masani 1917: 15). "The division of Avesta Scriptures into the Gathas and the Later Avesta is very objectionable and offensive and it is merely a speculation resulting from the so-called 'linguistic basis'" (Masani 1917: 1). Strong exception is taken to the suggestion of Dhalla et al. that the change from the Gathas to the Later Avesta is a retrograde step in which the ideals recede into ritualism and

LIBERAL RATIONALIST

On linguistic grounds the Gathas predate the Pahlavi texts: their language is very close to that of the Vedas. The Vendidad is apparently a Pahlavi reconstruction of the nineteenth Nask of the earlier twenty-one Avestan Nasks destroyed by Alexander. Later Pahlavi texts show a degeneration from Zoroaster's elevated ethical reforms: increasing ritualism, personification of moral principles, and superstition. The age of the Avestan texts (Gathas) is still open to historical debate: between 600 and 6000 B.C. The Vendidad is from the

the historic Zoroaster into super-human myth (Masani 1917: 18).

To make the distinction between Gatha and later Avesta is an attempt to deny validity to Zoroastrian rituals: Dhalla "wants . . . to preach proselytism . . . and a Zoroastrian religion which is quite convenient and suitable to the worldly ways . . . a religion without prayers, without beliefs, without angels, without archangels, without heaven, without hell, and lastly without conscience (Masani 1917: 25).

. Sassanian Period; Shayast la shayast, Saddar, Bundahishn, and Dinkard are post-Sassanian (ninth century A.D.); the Rivayats are letters exchanged between Iran and India in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.

2) On the Person and Role of Zoroaster

Zoroaster was an advanced soul (Masani 1917: 51). "The word Zarathustra denotes an Eternal Immortal Power, a Yazata, and also denotes an Emissary of the same who appears once every 81,000 years, i.e., Daregho-Khadata in the human form" (Chiniwalla 1942: 27).

"Zoroastrian Religion has never been a 'Religion of reforms.' It is the entire Law of the universe called Daena in the Avesta. . . . Zoroastrianism is nothing but the Natural Law of Evolution or Unfoldment of the Soul . . . and this universal law inculcates the Government of the Moral Order of the universe by Ahura Mazda helped by the archangels and angels that are intelligence working in various capacities" (Masani 1917: 37)..

Paoiryō-tkaesha of the Avesta are not "of primitive faith" who converted to Zoroastrianism but were "the first or advanced souls in the faithful practices of devotion." Zoroaster is himself referred to in the Farvardin Yasht as paoiryō-tkaesha. The adoption of Zoroastrianism by King Vishtaspa and other paoiryō-tkaesha souls of the time was never conversion or change as it is understood at present from the profession of one established religion to that of an-

. Zoroaster was a reformer transforming old Aryan tribal polytheism into an ethical monotheism. He was associated with agricultural sedentarization in a period when nomadic raiding from the Asiatic steppes was a severe problem, and hence his stress on the moral goodness of cultivation.

For those who are uncomfortable with the notion of a prophet, Zoroaster may be conceived as the first great philosopher.

other but it was simply an adoption . . .
of system where there was formerly . . .
no organization of their belief
The Paoiryo-tkaesha people were . . .
Yazdan-parast or God-worshippers no . . .
doubt and Zoroaster . . . only . . .
pointed out the straight path. . . ." . . .
(Masani 1917: 51-54).

3) On Proselytism

If Zoroastrianism had been meant for
all men, there would be only one
race of men and there would be no
other established form of religion
(Masani 1917: 59). The exhortations
to leave infidelity and join the
Good Religion are not calls for
proselytism but for men to apply
themselves to the law of cosmic
evolution (Masani 1917: 68).

Historical cases of proselytism
if they occurred were due to wise-
acres such as today Dhalla who think
they know better.

Zoroastrianism is meant only for
advanced souls near the goal of
spiritual progress. The different
religions are for different souls in
different stages of their develop-
ment (Masani 1917: 77-78).

Obviously for the religion to have
started, Zoroaster had to make con-
verts. In the Gathas he makes ap-
peals for the allegiance of all men.
His first convert was Shah Gushtasp
according to the traditional legend.
We have records in Sassanian times of
High Priests boasting of the converts
made and heretics rooted out. The
rivayats from medieval Iran support
the notion that making converts is a
meritorious activity, and indicate
that they only refrain because the
Muslims would kill them. Similar
reasons of preserving the community
so as not to be absorbed by the
Indian masses encouraged the Parsis
to keep apart. But there are cases
of investing non-Parsi born persons
with the sedreh-kusti in India.

4) On Parsi Exclusiveness and Disallowance of Non-Parsis into Fire Temples

Exclusiveness of Zoroastrians is
based on "the subtlest laws of mag-
netic purity" (Masani 1917: 95).
There are four classes: aethornan
(priest), ratheshtar (warrior),
vastryosh (farmer), hutkhsh (artisan).
According to the laws of magnetic
purity the aethornan kept aloof from
the other classes; and so should
Zoroastrians from non-Zoroastrians.
The mingling of races is said by the
Dinkard, and confirmed by modern
scientists such as Darwin, Spencer,
and Le Bon, to lead to imbecility and
sterility (Masani 1917: 96; Vimadalal
1910).

That non-Parsis may not enter fire-
temples is merely a custom that over
time has rigidified into a taboo.
Such a taboo is not maintained in
Iran. Even here there is nothing to
prevent a non-Parsi from entering by
ruse: a former Hindu Governor of
Bombay dressed up as a Parsi and went
into a fire temple; no one was the
wiser. (People would be very upset
if someone were caught doing this.)

Each human being gives off a magnetic aura and only that of the Jupiter aspect is pure to the fire. The Jupiter aspect is the characteristic of Zoroastrians; that of Muslims is Saturn, of Christians Mars. So even if these latter took the nahn purification they would still pollute the fire and therefore they may not be let into the fire temple (Dastur Nadirshah Sena of Surat, personal communication, 1971).

5) On Ritual and Prayer

Zoroastrian rituals are "spiritoscientific processes producing grand, practical results in the unseen world, and are based on an entirely scientific understanding of the subtle and unsee laws of nature" (Masani 1917: 126). The progress of the soul depends upon the purity of body and mind so as to be able to respond to higher vibrations; bareshnum is for purification of the aura or personal magnetism. The priest being a practioner of high physical and mental purity, makes use of such natural laws as khastra (thermo-electric-magnetic forces), staota (subtle colors and vibrations), mantra (sound vibrations which place words in harmony with the celestial music), barej (thermal energy of fire), etc., to create a magnet with which he can forward vibrations to the unseen world and communicate with the yazatas or angels.

"The Avesta was never a living language of ordinary everyday use. In fact it has not been a language for the use of social communication. It is framed for producing the vibration effect according to the rules of sound" (Masani 1917: 272).

"It was meaningless to mumble an unintelligible gibberish which neither the priest himself nor the laymen understood. . . . No amount of such formulas would affect the character of the devotees and ennoble their thoughts. A prayer that had no subjective value was no prayer. It failed to awaken any ethical fervour, for a truly devout prayer should spur the spirit within to a higher life. . . . The orthodox vehemently retorted that the Avestan language was divine . . . possessed inherent magical efficacy . . . quite independent of the motives of the one who recited them" (Dhalla, cited by Masani 1917: 272).

Purity prescriptions "have been exaggerated so much beyond the limits of physical possibility that one begins to wonder whether the authori-

- ties responsible for their author-
- ship ever meant that they should
- be executed . . . the penalty of
- ten thousand stripes of each of two
- different kinds of whips for the
- murder of a water dog (the otter)
- and the fantastically enormous
- amount of penances required for the
- atonement of this most heinous
- crime . . . " The rationale of
- purity observances has shifted from
- demons to pseudo-scientific appeals
- to electricity and magnetism (Mehta
- 1944).

Vegetarianism is implied by rules against nasu (pollution), protection of animals and unfoldment of the soul. There are no references to animal slaughter or sacrifice in the Avesta. Gav (cow) does not only mean beef, but also creation. Yasna from which many Zoroastrian prayers are taken refers not to "sacrifice" but to the exchange relations with the Absolute; the purpose of the prayers is to free one from the materialism of the flesh and self-seekingness (druj, xodparasti) and unite one with the eternal in the state of khaetvadatha. Those priests who have attained this state of khaetvadatha were the Magians; Magian being a stage of the progress of the soul and khaetvadatha a state of union with the Absolute about which little is known from the texts except that it has something to do with the unfolding of the principles of masculinity and femininity

- Magi may refer to the priests of the
- Medes as opposed to the Persians.
- Khaetvadatha is one of the many obscure
- words in the Avesta, meaning apparent-
- ly something like "communion with
- God;" it was earlier wrongly trans-
- lated as "next-of-kin marriage" from
- the cue of Greco-Roman writers who
- attributed such a custom to the
- Persians.

The esoteric knowledge is maintained by advanced souls or Saheb-e Delan, from del meaning "heart:" "Head-learning is a mere receptacle of water, which remains stagnant, compared with the knowledge of the heart, which is an ocean unfathomable. . . . The developed heart synchronously beats with the Ahunavar Music of Ahura Mazda and His

Nature is called Daena . . . " .
(Chiniwalla 1942: 6-10). These Saheb .
Delan lived isolated and secluded in .
Mr. Demavand protected by talismanic .
rings (karsh). There about two .
thousand of them, seventy-two of whom .
are of the highest rank called Magi .
and their leader is called Srashovaraz.
(Chiniwalla 1942: 1-3). .

Masani (1917: 368) points out that also the Bible recognizes the laws of magnetic purity. He cites the parable in St. Mark 5 of the woman who touched Jesus and was cured as proof of the terrible effect of a menstruating woman: immediately her blood dried up and Jesus feeling that virtue had left him turned about in the crowd and cried, "Who touched my clothes?" Contrast the popular use of this story by Christian preachers who see in it the message: it was not I, Jesus, who cured you, but your own faith.

A Parsi villager comments with a simple unpretentious philosophy of religion: Zoroastrianism will die because it is run on a commercial basis. Priests work like a business. But it is something worth not abandoning even if there is no real interest in reform. We do not understand what the priest does. I am not religious. I do not say daily prayers. But religion is important to man. It is the vehicle of morality. I just do not believe that to base ethics on man's own code has the same effect as to believe that there is supernatural power which takes the credit for good events. And it is from this that Parsis have a reputation for honesty and charity—now all that is gone. Parsis are no longer honest as before. I do not believe in a place called heaven. The body is just chemicals like a battery: when it dies the light goes out. But man does not live by bread alone, one must feed the mind as well, for if the mind is starved, the body too is affected.

A young Surat Parsi, a biology student and pharmaceuticals salesman, who wants to allow conversion to Zoroastrianism because he wants to marry a Muslim girl, explained, "The fire is not a god, but a symbol of the divine. Zoroastrianism springs from scientific strivings." I responded, "Either, or: either fire is a god and a sacred substance which can be disturbed and you have to be hygienic to not defile him; or the fire is a symbol and white dress is also only a symbol of purity and has nothing to do with clinical hygiene." The distinction escaped him, and he continued to review similar "hygienic" customs: "We take special baths (he is in favor of nirang); religion tells us that if we stick our fingers in our mouth they are dirty and we may not touch other things." I responded, failing to realize the difference in direction of the pollution: "Now look, any American mother will tell her child not to stick his fingers in his mouth because it is not clean, but that has nothing to do with religion." (In the one case it is saliva, the separated portion of the human body—like hair and nail parings—which is dirty; in the other it is bacteria of the environment which is not wanted in the mouth.) To this he characteristically replied: "Americans are more scientifically advanced, Indians do such things by habit of religion."

A Parsi homeopath commenting on the principles of Zoroastrianism (ashem vohu . . . , i.e., purity and uprighteousness is the best virtue: only he is happy who makes others happy; hukmata . . . , i.e., good words, good thoughts, good deeds, as opposed to doshmata . . . bad words bad thoughts, bad deeds), said: "The difference between my personal religion and Zoroastrianism is this. I am not an atheist but as a philosopher accepting the principle that everything has a cause, the theory falls apart if one insists on a First Cause, for who caused the causer? I had a dream in which the solution came: God is not God, He only exists in the thoughts of men. There is no unique objective God. I do say this in my lectures: it is like sowing seed, if the ground is fertile, it will take root; if not the seed will die."

APPENDIX III

ROSAS

APPENDIX III

ROSAS

Rosas during Ramazan are particularly interesting as they combine the stories of the two great figures of Shiism: Ali and Hussein. It was Ali who was killed during Ramazan, and so it is Ali who is the subject of many short rosa texts during this month; but it is Hussein whose martyrdom carries the form of the rosa and so through the goriz the two are linked. I give below four rosas delivered in one of the two local mosques of Nasrabad turning the focus in the first three upon Ali and then in the fourth upon the goriz. Then I give a full rosa speech delivered by Maneqebi on Ali's Birthday to show the full form.

(1) Axond H. 20 Ramazan 1971

Bismillah-e Rahman-e Rahim. . . . Send salavat to Mohammad and his family and especially to the 12th Imam. Someone asked Ali: "Are you better or was Adam?" Ali answered: "Speaking well of oneself is not a good thing, but as it is my habit to answer correctly whatever is asked of me, I will respond!" Ali was always ready to answer questions. Omar (the second Caliph) once asked him how it was that he was so quick with answers to even the most difficult questions that he never had to stop to think about the answer. Ali asked him: "How many feet do you have?" Omar said: "Two." Ali said: "Two, why did you not stop to think about the answer? There was no need, and so too for me there is no need."

"Yes," said Ali, "I am better than Adam. God told Adam that he might eat of all the fruits of Eden with the single exception of wheat, but Adam ate the gol-e shaitun (devil's flower) and left. But I was never told not to eat wheat and yet I have refrained from eating wheat and filling myself with bread." (Ali lived like a poor man so no one could be jealous of him on material grounds.) And Adam was thrown out of Eden, and it is said that for 100 years or 1000 years he cried. God knows how much has been written about the generosity of Ali and his self-abstention from wheat.

Next Ali was asked who is better: "You or the Prophet Noah?" "I." "Why?" "People annoyed Noah very much and he became angry and cursed them and as a result God sent the Flood. But I have not cursed although I have suffered greater annoyances than Noah." A person saw Ali put his head in a well and cry; and when he asked Ali why, Ali responded that he was so unhappy at the foolishness of his people. Ali was full of knowledge but the people did not take advantage, and followed rather such people as Omar.

But the world has not changed and it is always the knowledgeable who could give guidance who sit home alone ignored while others govern.¹ Ali was then asked who is better: "You or Abraham?" "I."

"Why?" "Because Abraham asked of God that God show him how he would make bodies come alive on Judgment Day? God responded, 'O first believe; do you not have faith?' 'Yes, but still I would like to know; after all, it is a problem: if we come with a tractor and dig up a graveyard for a new building, how do the dead become resurrected?' God said to Abraham: 'Take four hens and pound them in a mortar so that they are well mixed together; then separate the mixture into four parts and put each part on a different mountain top and watch how they fly away. That is how I will do it. It is too bad I cannot explain Resurrection (Qiyamat) to you, but you cannot imagine it: think of a meeting of 20,000, of 100,000, but Resurrection is nothing so small! It consists of all the created from the beginning.'" There is a Hadis of the fourth Imam that were a pregnant woman shown the sight of Resurrection she would immediately go into labor. Father will talk to son saying, I gave you food, bought you clothing, and so on; husband to wife; wife to husband; brother to brother. "But," said Ali, "Qasam vallah (by God) I believe implicitly in God and have no need to test him!" Ali must have been speaking sincerely for an oath taken in the name of God which is a lie requires in expiation a three day fast or the buying of clothes for three needy people. Ali said, "This is nothing, even should God test me, my faith would never decline or rise."

Ali was asked then: "Are you better or Jesus?" "I." "Why?" "Because when Mariam was in labor, God told her to leave the mosque for it was a holy place and not a place for bearing children; but when my mother was going into labor she went to the Kaaba which opened and she went into the crack and the Kaaba closed behind her. When Jesus was born his mother had to go out, when I was born my mother was welcomed in." Ali was asked, "Who is better: you or Mohammad, the Last Prophet?" "I am only the slave of Mohammad and that is enough."

Zeinab one day saw the broken head of her father (Ali) and another day she saw the bloody body of Hussein (her brother) in Karbella. [The following song is a favorite at the mention of Zeinab's name:]

Setam nadidah zani dar jahan
mogabel-e Zeinab
Nasuxt hic deli dar zamaneh
chun del-e Zeinab
Nabud shad delash az gham-e
zamaneh zamini
Be ab-e gham besereshtand
guyia gel-e Zeinab

There is no woman in the world who has
suffered more than Zeinab
No heart has been burned like the
heart of Zeinab
Never in her life was her heart free
of sorrow
Perhaps Zeinab was moulded out of mud
and the water of sadness.

¹This was pointed out to me by Iranians as a potentially dangerous political statement.

Now I would like to talk about Ali Akbar (son of Hussein). I do not remember but either Zeinab or his mother Leyla came to view his body at Karbella. Some writers say Leyla was in Karbella but others say she was not. I think it was his ame (FZ) Zeinab who came to see his forehead split open and to her he said good-bye forever.

Goft ey baba delam ra xun makon
Zadah-e Leila mera majnun
In biabun jay-e xab-e naz nist

Iman az sayad o tirandaz nist

Xiz ta baba azin sahra ravim
Ru besuye xeimeh-e Leyla ravim.

She cried, baba don't tear my heart
Son of Leyla, don't make me go crazy
This desert is not a place for peace-
ful sleep

For it is not without hunters and
archers

Stand up and let's leave this desert
Let's go to the tent of Leyla.

(2) Akhund R., 20 Ramazan 1971

Ali was the best Muslim, the truest believer, the best prayer reciter, the best fighter, the first to fight the Kaffirs at the age of sixteen and no pahlavan could best him; the most generous; the one about whom the Sureh Halatah is written; the poorest of the poor; the most just. He forewarned people of his death. He asked Hassan how many days have passed since the new moon, and Hassan said thirteen; he asked Hussein how many days remain and Hussein said seventeen. Ali said, I hope that it will be the world's worst people who color our beards with blood: my death is near. This year when you go on the Haj I will not be with you; so ask of me everything you want before I disappear from your sight and before I know the heavens better than the earth. Sad to say, a foolish man asked him how many hairs were in his beard. Ali said it will be a lot of work for you to sit and count each hair, and if I tell you, you may say, no, you lie; but there are about as many as there are jinn who will lead you to ill fortune; and this man was Saad Vakas whose son fought with Hussein at Karbella. Ali gave out the news that Ibn Muljan would kill him, and the Muslims asked permission to kill Ibn Muljan first, but Ali refused saying revenge before the event is not proper. Ali went to the mosque and there found Ibn Muljan sleeping on his stomach, and Ali told him not to sleep on his stomach: sleep on your back like the Prophet, or on your right side like the Imams, or on your left side like the governors, but now get up and desist from the business you intend. And while Ali prayed, Ibn Muljan struck him on the head and he fell into the mihrab and he took dirt from the mihrab to put on the wound.

[Goriz:] And Zeinab, his daughter, saw him dying. Now I do not know if this was more difficult for Zeinab or when she saw the killing of Ali Akbar at Karbella (her brother's son). . . .

(3) Axond X., 19 Ramazan 1971

Ali the night before he was stabbed went on the roof to sing monajot.¹ He sang to the stars and the moon that they should intensify their light because he himself was leaving the world. He knew that he was to be killed on the morrow and he warned his family. His daughter pleaded with him: daddy do not go tomorrow. He responded: what is that? One cannot stop death. It is imperative that I go. Even an animal tried to block his path as he left the house in the morning. Also his kambarband got caught in the door and his robe fell open; as he retied it, he remarked to himself: Ali, you must be dressed and ready when you are called. Ali went to the mosque and there he found Ibn Muljan (his assassin) sleeping on his stomach. A person should not sleep on his stomach. He told Ibn Muljan not to sleep so, for such sleep is sleep shayatin. He further told Ibn Muljan: if I wished I could say what you have hidden (i.e., a sword) under your clothes. They both then stood for prayer. At the second sejdeh (prostration) Ibn Muljan struck Ali in exactly the same place as the sword of Amr ibn Abdavud had struck.² And Ali fell into the mihrab and the mihrab

¹Monajot, literally, "whisperings," is an individual prayer, as opposed to da'a which are prayers recited in congregation.

²Amr ibn Abdavud was an unbeliever pahlavan in the Battle of the Moat who challenged any Muslim to single combat. Mohammad asked for volunteers, and only Ali, then sixteen, responded. Mohammad denied Ali permission. But when no one else answered Amr ibn Abdavud's second and third challenges, Ali was allowed to fight. Ali advanced on foot. Amr ibn Abdavud was mounted. Ali said: now, look I am a child and you are a grown man; is it right that I should be on foot while you are mounted? Amr ibn Abdavud grew angry, dismounted, and even killed his mount. In the ensuing fight he split Ali's skull. Ali retired to the side of the Prophet who put some spittle on the wound and tied it up with his own turban. Ali then returned to the fight. Who are you? challenged Amr ibn Abdavud. Who are you? returned Ali. I am Amr ibn Abdavud the greatest of the pahlavans. And I am Ali. Eh? how so: after the blow I dealt you which should have split a mountain in two. In the renewed fight Ali felled Amr ibn Abdavud. The custom was to sit on the chest of a fallen opponent so as to cut off his head. Ali sat on Amr's chest; Amr spit in his face, and Ali became angry. He got up and walked around for a while and then again sat on Amr's chest. Amr cried why did you not finish me off the first time? Ali replied: that time you spit in my face and I became angry: I would have killed you to revenge my own anger rather than for the honor of Islam, and so I arose to walk off and cool my anger. And then Ali cut off the head and brought it to Mohammad. Amr is supposed to have made several requests of Ali to spare his life: this Ali refused to do unless Amr became Muslim: and he asked that Ali not, as was custom, strip his body of sword and other adornments, and this Ali agreed to. Amr's sister came to his body and said that had the slayer been anyone but Ali she would have cried, but since he had not dishonored the body she would not. In war Islam recognizes no such thing as an unfair trick. Some say that Ali employed a ruse to fell Amr: He asked him if he had tied on his waist band securely and Amr looked.

filled with his blood. Ali took the dirt of the mihrab to put on his wound. [AyeH:] We created you from dirt.¹ And Jibrail filled the air with the cries that Ali has been killed.² (Song: a doctor was brought but it was too late.) Hussein cried, and Hassan cried, and Zeinab cried; but Ali told Zeinab not to cry [= goriz be Karbella]. . . .

(4) Akhond R., 18 October 1971

Rules of conduct for the approaching Ramazan. If you are a Muslim, then do not smoke and do not eat during the fast. If you are not a Muslim, then nothing. If however peshe laghat zadeh (a mosquito bites you, an idiom for being indisposed but not seriously) so that you cannot fast, break your fast in such a private way that others do not notice. For instance if at noon you are cooking food, do it so that the smell of food does not go over into your neighbor's compound. During Ramazan if you have family who are not doing well, make a special effort to help them. Give affection to orphans: for patting the head of an orphan God will send you a thousand hassaneh (goodnesses) for head hair so patted.

Sar-e be xarab-e Sham bezanim (let us turn our attention to the ruins of Sham-Kufa) where many were orphaned. All the children went to sleep after much crying and querying about Hussein. They cried so much that they fell asleep of exhaustion. But one girl, aged three, did not fall asleep. She cried:

¹The meaning given here for Ali's putting dirt on his wound (i.e., from dust to dust) is also the meaning that Ali gives for the namaz positions: the first sejdeh represents "from dust we are created"; the sitting up, which is supposed to include a pause resting on one's haunches, represents life; the second sejdeh is then "and to dust we return"; the concluding rising to one's feet represents the final Judgment Day.

²The story is that when Ibn Muljan ran through the kuches a man and a woman were sleeping and the woman heard Jibrail's cries that Ali was killed. She roused her husband who went into the kuche just as Ibn Muljan was hurrying past. He asked the fleeing man why he was hurrying away from the mosque at such a time, and jokingly suggested that the only reason could be that he was the murderer. Ibn Muljan admitted it and the wind lifted his cloak to reveal the bloody knife. They wrestled and Ibn Muljan was brought to the mosque. There Ali asked Ibn Muljan if he was really such a bad Imam, and Ibn Muljan, embarrassed, exclaimed that God had created him for hell. Ali told him not to be upset and if he lived he would certainly be set free. When it became clear that Ali would not live, he remarked that it was too bad that for the sake of Islam, Ibn Muljan had to be killed, for he himself would have liked to release him. Each time food or drink was brought, Ali requested that Ibn Muljan be served first.

Ame magar har ke sefar raft bar
nemigarde? Migar sham-e
gariban sahar nemigardad,
Ame?

Tuli nakashi دوباره گریه
konan az xab parid
Ame pedaram digar koja raft?
Amad ze safar, digar chera
raft?

Man bi-adabi nakar-e budam
Rose del-e xish minemudam
Farmidand in bacce bebasho dar
alam-e dide.

Natunestand aramesh konand.
Narchahr shodand tabaghe sar
pushide jelo-e begzarand
Sar-e borido be sina gereft.

Ame (FZ) whoever goes on a trip, does he not return? For the traveller does morning after the evening meal never come?

It was not long that she again awoke from sleep crying
Ame, where did my father go again? He returned from his travels, why did he go again?

I was not rude to him.
I was telling the secret of my heart. They understood now that she had dreamt of her father while sleeping. They could not quiet her. They were forced to place before her the covered head of her father. She took the head and clasped it to her chest.

And she cried [in song:]

Baba dami be kolba-ye ahzan
xosh amadid
Ay sar be sar keshiye az siran
xosh amadid
Dar in xarab-e jami zananim dar
be dar
Ne sham-e na cheragh, na samon
xosh amadid
Un Manzareh un shaabra larzehye
ba chashme deletun bebinid

Father at this moment in this sad cottage, welcome.
Oh head you are most welcome to see the captives.
In this broken gathering of women without anyone
No candle have we, nor light, nothing, welcome.
Look at that view of the night for a moment with the eye of your heart.

A child, a girl of three years at the edge of these ruins . . . dark, grasping her father's head to her chest. I hope that your house not be without father in the season of fatherhood (i.e., while children are young and cannot support themselves). [Again in song:]

Pedar ba un hame mehre nahani
Chera emshab be man namerabani
Chera xomushi ey babe kubaram
Nemiporsi chera ahwal-e zaram
Pedar bad az to mehnatha kashidam
Piadeh dar biabanha davidam
Ham in jurike sar-e pedar-ra
mibusid-o ashk mirixt
Ye vaxti ham aram shod
Be gamaneshun in tefl ghash karde
Vaxti dast be badanesh gozashtan
didand

Oh father with all that love in your body
Why tonight are you so unkind to me?
Why are you silent, oh father
You do not ask me why I feel so bad
Father I suffer for you
I run on foot in the desert
While thus kissing her father's head and shedding tears
Finally she became quiet
They thought she had fainted
When they touched her body they found she was dead

Sallallah-hu aleikem ya mazlum
ya abba abdullah
Az moassesin mostamein xedmat
konan gabul befarmaid
Men nabi-ye va ahle

Blessings upon the oppressed father
of Abdullah, Hussein
May the efforts of the donor and
listeners of this rosa be accepted
To the Prophet and his family

- (5) Maneqebi's Rosa in the house of Ayatullah Milani in Mashad on the birthday of Ali 1391 (September 4, 1971)

Opening: Vastianto be ezelete vashaneh va jal barut min kol-e movastaehu. . . . (I trust in the Lord of Glory. . . .) Send a
Salavat: salavat to Mohammad who was skillful both in politics and in philosophy, the friend of God; and to his family who are clean and the selected of God and deserving of respect. Divine curses upon their enemies and those who usurped their truth (haq) [i.e., Abu Bakr, Osman, Omar, Yezid, etc.].

God says in his holy book, 'I selected some guides to direct the people according to my orders, and I instructed that the people do good deeds, pray, give zakot, and worship me.'

Prayer: I pray we may have health and good fortune under the
(da'a) shadow (zir-e sayeh) of the twelfth Imam. May God keep us from
Salavat: evil. Send a salavat to Mohammad. May God help us to be lucky
Prayer: in the shadow of the Quran, and may God end the problem of the
Jews and Israel and of the Islamic cities [i.e., countries, but also veiled reference to Israelis in Iran] and may he cure the
Salavat: Muslim ills. Send a salavat to Mohammad. Would that we all be in
Salavat: the tomb of Imam Ali; please send him a salavat.

occasion I am pleased to be so lucky that I am able to be here in Mashad near the holy tomb of Imam Reza and can say Happy Birthday to the first Imam to you here, oh twelfth Imam! I am pleased to be in an assembly of the respected Ayatullah Milani. And I wish that I may be particularly respectful in my speech (arz-e adab) towards Imam Ali.

in praise of Ali If you want to talk about Ali, you must divide the Quran and Hadis into two parts. Thus God divided his work into two parts: halq (making, creating) and amm (ordering); creating and ordering are unique to God. [In Arabic]: Oh God, Lord of the World, you can give the Kingdom to whom you wish; you can either endow a person with lordship or you can dishonor him by your hand; you are omnipotent. One day like today Imam Ali was born and happily I am able to say Happy Birthday to you here. When there was nothing but God, before there were mountains, rivers, etc. God wanted to show his glory, and so he created the holy lights of the Prophet and his Imams. [An Arabic poem about the 14 moasum: Mhd, Ali, Fatimeh, Hassan, Hussein and the other imams.] The 14 moasum are a preface to the book of creation. God made them of light. [Some sentences from the Ziarat-e Jomea.]

All we can say about you 14 moasum is that you were the lights of God and the beautiful candles of him. You were beautiful butterflies at the candle of God. God sent you to the world that we might use your light. Today is the day that Ali, the lightest-brightest star of a sky of imamate came to the world. Ali came into the world to burn himself like a candle and we can use his light. This he did and he was killed in the mihrab. You heard from the previous speaker that Ali read the Quran in infancy even before Mohammad gave it to the people and that is true, and I can prove it easily (sabet kardan). When one of the friends of the Prophet, Jabir ibn Abdullah, asked about the birthday of Ali, the Prophet replied, "Oh Jabir, you asked me about the birthday of one of the best persons in the world. Not only his birthday, not only his birth week, not only his birth month have barakat for me, even the birth year of Ali is full of barakat for me. When Ali was born I heard Happy Birthday wishes from everything in the world, stones, trees, etc.; and I was told oh Mohammad, he is your friend." And many historians testify that after the birth of Ali, Mohammad became more energetic in his activity. Mohammad says that the first thing created by God was my light and the light of Ali, Fatimeh, Hussein and the 14 moasum. The Prophet and Ali were always together; their way was the same even to the point that both died at the age of sixty-three. But we must remember that the Prophet always was the principal, and Ali the shadow; the Prophet the teacher, Ali the student. Nonetheless he was a student who never left his teacher like the shadow of the principal was he.

Prayer: Thanks be to the religious group who have gathered in the house of Ayatullah Milani and have come to celebrate the happy birthday. We pray for them and for all the ayatullah of Islam.

on the enemies of Islam The enemies of Islam, people and their writings, are trying to destroy Islam and make them badbaxt. The al-beit (family of Mohammad) have become foreign in our society (qarib shode-and). [Sound of people crying.] The enemies of Islam write and distribute books saying that they do not believe in such and such things; they write so and give no proofs, yet the people tend to believe what they read. My listeners, be afraid of your beliefs, for it is possible for the enemy to change them. Oh 8th Imam, we have none better than you: please keep our ideas (aqide) true, especially help us keep our faith at the point of death that we may die Muslim. We wish to die with your love. It is true that these enemies are serving us, but really they want to finish our ideas and are wolves in sheep's clothing. But this is our own fault: one of these faults is my silence and the silence of people like myself.

in praise of imams All the prophets were not imama (pishvah), only some. For instance, Abraham who dealt with many religious problems and even obeyed God to the point of killing his own son, before God told him he was an imam. [From the ziarat-e 8th imam:] Ashat o anake

tashado maqami va tasmao kalami va tarodo salami. [I believe you can see me and hear me and you will answer my salavat to you.] Whether one believes the imams are dead or still living makes no difference. There is a hadis of the 8th Imam that the Imamate is more important than being a prophet. By God, you cannot deal with religious problems if you divorce the Quran and the sons of Ali [i.e., the 12 Imams]. You can't deal with this difficult book without a teacher. A Christian Islamicist wrote a letter to a friend of mine, and the latter sent it to me, and I will make a speech in response at the Orientalist's Congress. This letter is about why this, why that, and so on in Islam. I will answer all these questions in the Congress. But most of these questions are about the evils in the time of Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman. That Islamicist collected these problems and labels them problems of Islam. He calls the politics of Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman Islam! But I will point out that this is not correct, there is a distinction to be drawn. I wrote a reply letter and sent it to my friend that he might translate it and send it to this Christian Islamicist. I must introduce Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman, Movieh, Yezid to him properly because he only knows Omari Islam; he does not know about true Islam (Islam-e haqiqe). I must tell him that we do not believe in the Islam of Abu Bakr, Osman and Omar. We believe that Ali was the leader of Islam. We believe that Hussein was the leader of freedom lovers, of Islam, and was killed in the way of Islam. We believe in the religion for which Musa, son of Jafar, was incarcerated. We believe that the 8th Imam came from Medina to Tus to introduce that religion to the people of Iran. Alas we seem to be unable to tell our beliefs to the world as well as the Sunnis; for they are closer. Even though the sweat is coming to my brow, and I am speaking forcefully, no one outside this assembly can hear me. The big mullahs of the Sunnis send representatives to other countries, but we do not. By God, if you separate Ali from Islam, it is not a religion. Even so, we are sad at the taking of Arab land by dishonorers (nange bashariat?). How can we watch while enemies are taking the ground of our Muslim brothers. While there might be an occasion when I might kiss a Christian's hand, that would not mean I give up the Quran for the Anjil. When I must stand together with a Christian I must be polite to him; but when alone I laugh at him. Sad to say, Sunnis keep their beliefs more firmly than we do. But it is Shiism which is true, and Shias more readily are leaving their faith. [crying.] Foreigners spray our youths with a spray of disbelief like a mosquito spray (sampashi). Bring your children out to the harram and teach them ziarat and religion. I did that: I took my two children the harram and asked Imam Reza to help them and put them in his care. I have taken much trouble over the Hadis Seklane (which relates of the two important things: Quran and the Imams) in which the Sunnis do not believe, and although I have read more than 500 books by Sunni authors, I do not believe them. I have heard that in Teheran an association is being formed by some enemies to stand up and speak against the reading of hadis of Ali in religious gatherings. Soon you will

on
Chris-
tians
and
Sunnis

and
Israel
and
Chris-
tians

not be able to read hadis and poems about Ali. This despite the existence of the Al-Ghadir of Alameh Amini (a disproof of Sunnism built entirely of Sunni Hadis). Remember there was a time when no one was allowed to appeal to the name of Ali. [e.g., in the time of Hajaz.] Three hundred and sixty important Sunnis were in the Ghadir gathering when the Prophet said that after him should come Ali. It is an honor that I am able to tell the Hadis of Ghadir transmitted who by who, seventy-two different ways. A old time important sheikh said that we should collect the Hadis of Ali and make banners of them and for this 300 Shias were killed. No one can defend the mistakes of Omar, Abu Bakr, etc., and the enemies of Islam, especially the Christians are trying to destroy true Islam by arguing over Omari Islam. Unfortunately, Omari Islam cannot withstand Christianity or any other religion because it is very weak and full of mistakes, but Shiism can, Imam Jafar Sadeq can. If one takes Ali out of Islam it is like taking the soul out of a body. The Quran is very important, but it requires a teacher. God says in the Quran, 'Oh Prophet, introduce Ali!'¹

goris

Forgive me for having caused you trouble. I see many people standing in the alley to hear. When Ali saw the Prophet in infancy he began to recite from the torat, anjil, zabur (of Abraham), and quran. In what school had Ali studied these holy books?—in the school of which the Prophet was the teacher and Ali the student. The Prophet kissed the lips of Ali. I want to complete my speech in the name of Hussein. Ali read the Quran, and the Prophet kissed his lips; Hussein read the Quran and the enemy beat his head with a stick.

Pa-mem-
bari:

A child of Hussein asked his ame 'where is my Father? Is he on a trip; when will he return?' Yezid heard his question and ordered the father's head to be brought to the child. The child cried to his ame, oh ame, come here, my father has returned.

The speech is interesting for several things: (1) it is the speech of a well known membari, on an important occasion in a prestige location; and was recorded by listeners giving it a wider distribution than the average speech; (2) it demonstrates well the form of such speeches: invocation, prayers, salavat, goriz ("running away": the comparison with Hussein at the end), rosa; of particular interest is that the rosa is done not by the speaker but pa-membari, i.e., by a member of the audience who stands and sings as the speech is finished—this custom is becoming relatively infrequent; (3) it's content demonstrates the confused defensiveness of conservative Shiism; (4) it's delivery (cf. tape) demonstrates the emotionalism of the genre, and its headline style rather than sharp argumentation.

¹The name of Ali is not mentioned. The reference is only: "Ya ayah ha rasul balex ma'alek va enlam balaghte fama balloghte resolatak." (Oh Prophet tell the People what we have ordered you to say; if you do not do so you will not have completed your Prophethood.)

APPENDIX IV
JEWISH RITUAL CYCLE

APPENDIX IV
JEWISH RITUAL CYCLE¹

Shabbat (Sabbath) - A day of rest, good food, and prayer. Much of the day is spent in the synagogue and a drasha (sermon) may be delivered in the afternoon. Two sabbath candles are lighted for each married woman on Friday evening in the homes. Hot water standing over raisins for several hours makes a poor man's substitute for wine for blessings.

Rosh Hodesh (New Moon) - Special prayers; a feast in the houses of the recently deceased; community kappara. Some people observe a twelve-hour fast.

Pesach "mo-ed" (Passover)—15-22 Nisan (March/April) - Eight day moed (holiday) but the middle four (Yazdi minimoed, Heb. khol ha-moed) days are regular work days. Preparations begin after Purim: cleaning of utensils; leavened foods eaten up or thrown away; matza (unleavened bread) prepared from wheat specially purchased just after Sukkot (must contain less than 7 grams of salt per 660 pounds of flour; traditionally baked in not more than 1-1/2 kilo of dough at a time). Yazd is known for its matza. The day before Pesach the first-born son fasts. On the first two evenings the seder is dramatically read: at the words "this is the bread of affliction" all recite the verses holding a tray on their shoulders like slaves; at the dayenu prayer every one beats each other with leeks in memory of the lashes received by the slaves. The second evening before the seder all go to the synagogue for the sfira (counting and blessing of the forty-nine days until Shavuot).

Yom Ha'azma'ut (Israeli Independence)—5 'Iyyar (April/May)—day of picnic.

Lag Ba'omer (May) - 33rd count of omer commemorating the cessation of a plague on the students of R. Akiba in the second century A.D.

Shavuot or moed-e gol—6 and 7 Sivan (May/June) - Commemorating the giving of the torah and offering of first fruits. All night

¹A compilation from Loeb's observations in Shiraz (Loeb 1970) and my own in Yazd.

yeshua marks the first evening usually in the house of a recently deceased person. Synagogue is full on the first day for the reading of the ten commandments.

Shiva Asar B'tammuz—17 Tammuz (July) - fast commemorating the breaching of the walls of Jerusalem by the Romans: begin three week period of mourning, no weddings or festivals and the men refrain from shaving.

5 Av (July/August) - Prayers commemorating the death of the Ari (Issac Luria).

Tisha B'Av (zaqarun)—9 Av—Fast day for the destruction of the Temple: chanting of dirges, reading the Book of Lamentations, a misped (funeral oration) is given in the dark with the lights out blaming the Jews themselves for the destruction of the Temple. Reading of the story of Hannah and her seven sons and the Book of Job. A good day for beggars. In the afternoon after minkha prayers, kapparot (animal sacrifices as sin offering, the meat being distributed to the poor: from the first of Av til the 9th no meat slaughtered in the community).

Selikhot (Yazdi, saliot)—1 Elul to 10 Tishre (August/September)—The forty days before Yom Kippur are days of fasting (sunrise to sunset). [Compare with Muslim Ramazan: fasting during the day, selikhot at night.] Penitential prayers each morning either at midnight or from 3:00 A.M. to 6:00 A.M.

Rosh Hashannah—1-2 Tishre—Pilgrimage to Sarah bat Asher (Isfahan), blowing of the shofar (rams horn); in accordance with the Baghdadi rite special order of blessings over dates, black-eyed peas, leeks, beets, squash, pomegranates, apples and honey, lungs and head of sheep, fowl and fish.

Zum Gdalya "barabar kippur"—3 Tishre—Fast in memory of the death of the Governor of Judea in the sixth century B.C. Shirazis think it is a practice fast for Yom Kippur.

Yom Kippur—10 Tishre (Sept./Oct.)—Full twenty-four hour fast. The evening before Yom Kippur a shohet (ritual butcher) goes from house to house to perform kappara, slaughtering a rooster or hen for each male or female, resp., after passing it over the head of the member of the household while reciting the verses of Atonement. The pious do the kappara at 3:00 A.M. just before the selikhot and mix the blood with ashes and recited the blessing haddam b'afar. After shakharit (morning prayers) the men take turns sitting in "courts" of three judges to free each other from vows, curses, evil and evil eye, reciting Hattarat ndarim and Hattarat glalot according to the Sefardic rite. Each male removes his shirt,

faces the wall and leans against the wall with his right hand over his left and thirty-nine lashes are lightly bestowed on his back for the 40 makkot or lashes given for violation of religious law in ancient Israel. After minkha (afternoon prayers) the men go to migva (ritual bath), immersing themselves three times. A festive meal of chicken is then eaten. At arvit (evening prayers) a large number of ritual honors are auctioned. Fast is ended at dusk with the blowing of the shofar.

Sukkot—15-21 Tishre (Sept./Oct.)—Eight day moed (holiday) but the middle four (Yazdi minimoed, Heb. Khol ha-moed) are regular work days. The day after Yom Kippur begin building the sukka (hut) with willow branches (bid bandan) in memory of the forty years in the desert; nails may not be used as with the Temple. Esrog is imported from Bam or Israel. Lulov is fashioned with myrtle and palm leaves. There is a superstition that if a space is left in the roof and sunlight falls on someone it is a sign he has been an evil doer. After evening services on the eve of sukkot the family retires to the sukka for the evening meal. As on Pesach stories of how things came to be from the Kitab-e Masiot are told. Morning services begin around 5:00 A.M. The lulov and esrog are taken around to each male for blessing and recitation of the shehekheyonu, after the leader of the service has performed the ritual of waving off evil by pointing them three times in the six directions.

Shmini Azeret/Simhat Torah—22-23 Tishre—As on Shavuot an araba (ארבע) or reading of the torah from beginning to end begins after evening prayers and continues until morning when one goes to the synagogue for morning prayers. The torah reading cycle begins on the second day and every male present is called to the torah. Picnics.

Medak or moed qatan—2 Heshvan (Oct/Nov)—A Shirazi celebration of deliverance on the date of the death of the apostate Jew Abul Hassan Lari who initiated persecutions at Bushire in 1903.

Khannuka—25 Kislev—3 Tevet (Dec./Jan.)—Commemorates the rebellion of the Maccabees (second century B.C.). Candles are lighted each night, set for each male in the house. Blessings are said over the fruit of trees (pomegranates, apples, plums, peaches, walnuts, mulberries, almonds, etc.). If a person is engaged he may take some halva to the house of his future bride.

Shovavim - Acronym of Hebrew names of the first six weekly Torah readings

from Exodus: a fast for lewd though (qeri). Men are supposed to fast on the first day of the first week, the second day of the second week and so on plus the second and fifth day of the second and fifth weeks.

Asara B'Tevet (10 Tevet)—Jan.—Fast for the seige of Jerusalem.

Tu Bshvat—15 Shvat (Jan-Feb)—New Year for trees; eating of fruits.

7 Adar (Feb/Mar)—Death of Moses (a new innovation).

Ta'anit Ester—13 Adar (Feb/Mar)—Fast of Esther.

Purim—14 Adar (Feb/Mar)—Yeshua reading of the megilla (Book of Esther). Explosive capped devices are struck on the floor at the name of Haman. If a person is engaged he may take some halva to the house of his future bride. In Shiraz at 2:00 A.M. a son-in-law takes his family to his wife's father's house for a feast, which is supposed to be the time of night when Esther went to speak to the king. Around 5:00 A.M. the children go into the kuches to shoot off fireworks and burn an effigy of Haman and the Muslim children join in thinking it to be Omar.

APPENDIX V

MOBHASSEH RAJEB-E XODA

(DIDACTIC DEBATE ABOUT GOD)

APPENDIX V

MOBAHASSEH RAJEB-E KODA (DIDACTIC DEBATE ABOUT GOD)

The following conversation with a Muslim Yazdi high school graduate on the existence of God illustrates the sharp contrast between accepting a substantive proposition (that God exists) as a premise for further argument, and a totally analytic probing of what any proposition may refer to. The conversation was initiated by the high school graduate with the intention of getting the anthropologist to confirm the premise.

He (the high school graduate) began with two common "proofs:" (a) analogy with the maker of material objects ("A table is made by a carpenter, a kettle by a coppersmith . . . then who made man?") and with the invisibility of electricity when turned off and only latent in the wires ("Just because we cannot see God does not mean he does not exist"); (b) the cures of the blind and lame at the Shrine of Imam Reza ("Supernatural cures imply supernatural power, i.e., God"). I suggested the power of psychological suggestion to explain the shrine cures. He insisted on the smallness and imperfectness of the brain God gave us, so that we cannot understand everything, but he refused to consider, of course, the implication that possibly the construction of "God" by this brain is itself one of the imperfections. He says that God gave us eyes to see with, a nose to smell with, and so on; if there was no God and no heaven and hell, why would he have given us these nervous sensing devices? I could not get him to see that if the clause "If there were no God" is a premise, then the following question is no longer possible. Each way I tried to suggest this, he would object, "But there is a God." After all, it is written in the Qur'an; it is also written in the Torah and Anjil [Old and New Testaments]. Going to the moon was already written in the Qur'an. I tried to counter this with the Daedalus story as an example of people who did not believe in God already speculating about space travel and flying: this is nothing requiring divine inspiration or omniscient foretelling. He objected that all is written in the Qur'an with also cautions about what is useful and what is to be avoided, couched in the language of religious prohibition (harram): Mohammad was illiterate and did not know about microbes; today we know the causative relations between alcohol and illnesses such as heart disease; our explanations have gotten better but the Qur'anic rule that wine is harram is confirmed as valid. I countered that studies of wine drinking among the French in moderation show that wine is good for the heart. This he rejected as nonsense. I then countered with the hypothetical nonsense book that I write and bring to a totally illiterate people who know nothing other than that Christians and Muslims have a heavenly book and are materially more advanced than they; they accept the book and revere it as they would a magical device; their children gain education and begin to interpret and make sense out of the sacred writings, and gradually what began as nonsense achieves the reality of being true. How can we today know that this was not also

the history of the Qur'an [the question which Kierkegaard rightly answered by saying there is only the leap to faith, no proof]. He did not give the Kierkegaardian answer [which is one not uncommon reply] but said that it is not only written in the Qur'an but also in the Torah and Anjil. Ok, I replied, but many axonds say that the Torah and Anjil are falsified versions. Well, he said, these axonds have lived only forty years or so and have no information and they lie. Fine, I said, any one of us can study the question from birth to death, and we have no means of determining the truth or accuracy of the question. But, said he, the Qur'an was dictated to Mohammad by the malek [archangels] and so is true.

APPENDIX VI
SHORT STORIES AND FILMS

APPENDIX VI

SHORT STORIES AND FILMS

Preces of the following films and short stories are given:

1. Short Stories

- 1.1. Sarbaz-e Surbi (Tin Soldier) by Bozorg Alavi (1943)
- 1.2. Sag-e Velgard (Abandoned Dog) by Sadeq Hedayat (1942)
- 1.3. Bun Bast (Cul de Sac) by Sadeq Hedayat (1942)

2. Films

- 2.1. Gav (Cow). Director: Dariush Mehrju'i. Camera: Fereydun Ghaonalu. Music: Hormuz Farhat. Lead Actors: Azat Ali Antezami, Ali Nazirian, Jafar Vali, Jamshid Mashaykhi.
- 2.2. Qaisar (Caesar). Director: Masud Kimiai. Producer: Abbas Shabaviz. Music: Esfendiar Monfaredzadeh. Lead Actors: Behruz Vosughi (Qaisar), Naser Malek Motii (Farman), Mashaykhi (Qaisar's dai), Puri Banayi (Qaisar's fiancée).
- 2.3. Aghaye Holu (Mr. Obtuse). Director: Dariush Mehrju'i. Camera: Hushang Baharlon. Lead Actors: Ali Nasiran (Aghaye Holu), Fakhri Khvash (the prostitute), Ezatollah Entezami (both the real estate man and the tea house keeper), E. Navid, Keshvari.
- 2.4. Mihadgah-e Hashem. Director: Sayyid Motalebi. Lead Actor: Fardin.
- 2.5. Droshky-chi (Droshky Driver). Director: Nosratullah Karimi. Lead Actors: Nosratullah Karimi (title role), Shahla, Masud Assadullah.

1. Short Stories

- 1.1. Sarbaz-e Surbi (Tin Soldier) by Bozorg Alavi (1943)

The narrator begins by telling us that for five years now he rides the bus at least four times a day from Sepah Square to Shapur, and that (a) this is more of an education than his ten years in school; (b) he notices that to the conductor and driver all passengers alike are referred to as ten shahi fares.

One day on the bus he sees a woman playing with a tin soldier, and next to her an old friend, F., an opium addict and tin soldier maker. The narrator worked for the Office of Opium Control, but got sick and lost his job for a while; he earns thirty-five tomans or seven hundred ten shahis. It is two years between seeing F. and going to visit him. And all told, it is five years since they met in Kaserun and travelled together to Bushire where F. wanted to stay for only a month.

F. begins to tell his story to the narrator-visitor by asking what the narrator would like to hear: where shall I begin? With the day I was born? [He is to repeat the theme that he was damned from the day he was born.] How it was at home? [He is to blame part of his "illness" on the upbringing his father and mother gave him.] of what wood his father was cut? [Here it is just idiomatic, but later he is to actually fashion out of wood a tin soldier which has his father's face.] That he loved his mother more than anything? He breaks off to smoke his opium. And then he recalls his life from meeting the narrator to his problems due to his upbringing, how he lived in Bushire with his boss (now in jail for smuggling opium) who introduced him to wine and arak. The boss had a domestic named Koukab. Koukab had bound herself for a year since her husband in Shiraz had been drafted into the army, and before going had divorced her one time [i.e., the first of the three permissible times to divorce and remarry]. Now the year was up and she asked F. to get her a bus for her return to Shiraz.

Again F. breaks off in a cloud of opium smoke, and reflects that thus began his tale with Koukab, that he was damned from the first day of his life, that his fate was due to his parents' upbringing and not to any choice of his own. He coughs: "But I digress." He got Koukab the ticket but returned to find her not ready to leave. She had lost her tin soldier which she considered a talisman and so whose loss was a bad omen. "For ten shahi," F. told her, "you can buy a new tin soldier." It was a toy she had bought for her boss' child, but the child had cut his hand on it, and so its mother had taken the toy away. Koukab took it back, hurt. She replied to F. that no, she could not buy another, for it was her life; it was as if she had lost her husband; she could not go back to Shiraz until she found it. And so Koukab stayed on as F.'s domestic; she was like, he says, his mother. F. tells Koukab that he must return to his office in Teheran, and if she likes, he will take her with him. She refuses since she cannot leave without the tin soldier. F. stays, and so passes a year, during which he becomes obsessed with the tin soldier. F. has a dream in which an officer attacks his mother while his father looks on passively. F. fails to find a substitute tin soldier in any shop which will satisfy Koukab; so he tried to make one. This did not work either. Then he thought that maybe the tin soldier never existed and so he must make one from scratch. He tried to cut one from wood but instead of taking on a warlike, fearsome visage, it comes out like the face of his father. Finally he produces a soldier "at the expense of my life" and late one night he slips it into Koukab's bundle. The next morning Koukab has disappeared. F.'s tale ends here with a coughing spasm and refusal to tell the narrator more.

The narrator wants to find Koukab, thinking that he can break his friend's obsession by bringing her to him. He learns that one woman does occasionally visit F., but this turns out to be F.'s sister, Amin Agha. She has never married, went on the haj, and is a Qur'an teacher for girls. [F. also recited Qur'an for his boss in Bushire.] She confirms F.'s story about his childhood: that of six children, F. was his mother's favorite, but his father was forever finding fault with him. The mother died, and

the father remarried, after which father and son fought, the son leaving forever. Amin Agha describes F.'s sickness which he brought back from Bushire: he gets up in the middle of the night and goes through everything resembling a bundle [i.e., Koukab's bundle] throwing things about; in the morning he remembers nothing.

The narrator searches for Koukab in South Teheran. The formalism of Alavi's technique is made explicit: he says that poets always describe full moon nights as beautiful in which all love idylls and lyrical voices = fluttering locks + river banks + moonshine. But they forget that under other conditions the moon-lit night can be ugly. Moonshine + women who cost ten shahi + donkey sore ones who come back out of the city into the villages with syphilis = disgrace and misery. The whores in South Teheran in the pale moonlight, wrapped in their black chadors look like running blood against the walls [an echo of Hedayat's Se Qatre Xun?]. They invite him to come along, asking for ten shahi in advance.

Koukab spends her nights on the round from Ferdowsi Park, from the Tamadon Cinema, to Shah Square and to the train station. [Amin Agha spends her nights going from the Agha graveyard to the Pakapok Square. The narrator has his round from Sepah Square to Shapur.] Koukab now tells her story. She will not go back even to visit that insane F. He told her he loved her like his mother, but when she told him he should then marry her, he just laughed. As to the tin soldier, she bought that as a talisman, as a reminder of her husband who was a soldier. But all what F. tells about what happened when she lost the tin soldier was a trick on his part to keep her tied to him. Finally one night she saw him put a naked unformed wild toy soldier in her bundle; and finally the next morning she fled to Shiraz only to find that her husband had remarried. She lived with a chauffeur for a while and came with him to Teheran. F. found her and took her back. Again a year passed with F. telling her that he loved her as his mother, she telling him to marry her, and he refusing on the grounds that one cannot marry one's mother. She ran away a couple of times but he always found her and brought her back. Finally she came home one night to find F. burning everything in the apartment. A neighbor man took her in for the night, which so enraged F. that he wanted to kill the man; this time she fled for good.

The narrator gives Koukab some money: several banknotes [i.e., not ten shahi, but more than ten shahi]. And he takes her to a friend's house. The next day is very cold, and snow has fallen [like the rain in Hedayat's Bun Bast and Chubak's Mardi dar Qafas]. He goes to his friend's house to find it all closed up. So he gets on his bus. The people on the bus talk of a funeral, of a woman strangled during the night. The bus passes a man who wants a ride, and the conductor shouts to the driver to stop for the ten shahi. The man bangs his suitcase against the step of the bus and it falls open spilling tin soldiers out. The bus drives on with the conductor cursing the man, "Get lost you piece of filth, don't think you can harm the people here."

1.2. Sag-e Velgard (Abandoned Dog) by Sadeq Hedayat (1942)

The story opens with a description of the square in the village of Veramin where there is a bakery, a butcher, a pharmacy, two coffee houses, and a barber. Everyone and everything is prostrated by the heat. The only movement is the dust rising from an occasional passing car. It is late afternoon, time of the first breeze of the evening shadows. Under a large plane tree two boys are eating a milk rice sweet and melon seeds. Nearby is the famed thirteenth century Mongol tomb tower. Mud moves sluggishly in the gutter channel (jube). There is a whimper of a dog.

The dog is a scottish terrier with a straw yellow muzzle [color of Zoroastrian clothing imposed as the mark of outcasting?] and black spotted legs from wading through puddles. The eyes betray such human-like intelligence that one would think there is a human soul, something eternal which flutters through the midnight of his being. Recognition of this soul comes not from his looks or color but something more primordial: a gaze like the bewilderment of a gazelle which is not only like men but which exhibits the same gaze. He has lamb eyes full of sorrow and pain and waiting.

The dog is tormented by the Veramin setting: the baker, butcher and chauffers have nothing for him but kicks and curses; the milk rice selling boys throw stones at him: a stone for each whimper and a curse for a louder cry. They curse him as an unclean outcast. They thought they were doing nothing unusually unkind, for their religion taught them that dogs were unclean.

The dog, Pat, is chased by the milk rice boys and he escapes into a quiet alley leading to the tomb tower. He is hungry and settles into the coolness of a water channel. His tongue hangs out, his head rests on his paws. Half awake, half asleep he looks out at the green crops. All his sinews ache. The coolness of the channel with its varied smells of old shoes and so on lull him into memories. Looking at the green fields through these shadow-pictures he hears the instinctive call of his Scottish father who grew up in freedom, but his body rebels against any movement to run and jump in the fields. He sinks into memory: once he had duties and rights. He came when his master called, He avoided other people and animals, He was to play with his master's child. Certain other people were to be treated as friends. But now these rules were lifted and life was reduced to taking a bit to eat from piles of waste in trembling, for which he was struck and his only defense was to whimper. It was two winters now since he was condemned to this hell. The smell of milk rice evokes memories of his mother and of playing with his brother, of the warmth of his mother's milk, and of playing with his master's child. Then one day his mother and brother were taken away, but still his life was good.

One day in Autumn his master with two friends got into the car and took Pat along. They came to Veramin, and while they were looking at the tomb tower, Pat was driven wild by the smell of a bitch. He followed her

into a garden. He heard his master call but stayed with the bitch. He was thrown out of the garden by a man, and the entrance was blocked up by stones. He tried to find his master following his vague sent's here and there. Night came and he was awakened by his own whimpering and hunger. He went to the baker who gave him a bit of warm bread and held out his hand. When Pat went up to him, the baker slipped off his collar and then kicked him. The collar was hung up outside the shop (to sell), and the butcher washed his hands three times. When life becomes too unbearable Pat escapes into memory. He is prepared to give up his life in exchange for a little kindness.

One day a man drives up in a car. He pats Pat on the head and shares some food with Pat. Why, Pat does not understand: he no longer has a collar which can be taken away. The man goes to look at the tomb tower. Pat follows and waits by the gate. When the man comes back to his car, Pat is determined not to lose him, not to let this new master get away, but he is still too well trained to jump into the car without invitation. He comes up to the door and looks at the man expectantly. But the man drives off. Pat runs after the car. They leave Veramin behind. Several times Pat nearly catches up to the car speeding across the desert. Suddenly in front of his eyes Pat sees only black; he has a heart attack and drops of exhaustion. It is just before sundown. Three hungry vultures circle overhead. They appeared only to carry away Pat's greenish-blue sheep eyes in their beaks.

1.3. Bun Bast (Cul-de-Sac) by Sadeq Hedayat (1942)

Forty-three year old Sharif returns to Abadeh after twenty-two years. He is head of the finance department, having risen through the ranks from clerk to bookkeeper to assistant accountant to his present job. He had left Abadeh at age twelve to study in Teheran. He socializes little with other Abadeh people; when he is finished at the office he goes home to his opium and photograph albums. He has a servant who knows exactly how he likes things.

One day a young man appears who is the spitting image of his old friend Mohsen. It turns out that the young man is Mohsen's son, Majid. Mohsen and Sharif had been good friends as young men and had gone on vacation together to the Caspian. One day Mohsen drowned while swimming and Sharif could only watch helplessly. Sharif takes Majid under his wing and suddenly life seems beautiful again. He and Majid play backgammon together as he used to with Mohsen. He becomes friendly and sociable. One day two weeks later, while Sharif is in the office, Majid drowns in the house pool. The servant comes to tell Sharif who rushes home. Rain begins to fall and create ripples in the pool reminiscent of the waves of the Caspian. Sharif vanishes into the rain leaving home and all else behind.

2. Films

2.1. Gav (Cow).

The film opens with white written credits against a negative of a cow and man walking neck in arm against a black background. There are some loose shots of a dog sleeping, two old men watching, and people coming to look. All this is shot in silence. There is then a vignette of a man being hung with bells, his face being blackened, a pointed hat put on his head, tin cans tied on his feet, and boys bring fire brands and the children and villagers chase him laughing. He falls and is pushed into the village pool, and they splash water at him. A young man wearing a military cap (henceforth called M.C.) keeps him in the pool with a stick. A man comes into the square and demands to know what is going on and who gave permission. Someone assumes responsibility and the gaiety continues.

The next scene is the man coming with his cow over the pasture to a pool where he washes the cow, hugging and playing with it. He uses his coat to dry the cow. He looks up and sees three men outlined against the sky on the hill above. He takes his cow and leaves coming into the village where he finds the katkoda and others sitting on a porch by the pool, one man playing a guitar-like instrument. He ties up the cow and accepts a chapok. He tells of the three threatening men: the baluria. One man complains that he has lost three sheep to them already and something must be done. M.C. laughs at him, jeering what will he do? The cow owner, Mashtasam, takes his cow home for milking. At night he sleeps in the stable watching the cow eat, playing with her and even eating her fodder.

There follow some more disjointed mood setting shots of the scarecrow by the pool (used in the gaiety earlier); a man going through the kuches who hands a woman a dead chicken and drops down through an opening; two boys eating breakfast watch two men running through the kuches; a man washes at the pool; an old woman sits on her roof looking maliciously down at a young woman gazing out of a window until the latter closes it; the old woman watches Mashtasam leave the village; the moazen gives the call to prayer; two men shoot a bird with a sling shot. All of a sudden a woman, Mashtasam's wife, comes running to the village pool screaming and mourning. The moazen breaks his call and people come running. She faints. They give her smelling salts, and cry "Ya Ali!" and "Bismillah rahman-e rahim." She moans, "Badbaxt shodam, bichareh shodam" (I have become unfortunate, I have become helpless). Finally they get her to speak and she says that the cow is dead. [Mashtasam had gone out of the village to collect fodder leaving the cow in the safety of the village so the baluria would not take it from him; the two men running through the kuches early in the morning perhaps were the assassins.] The people go to look and find the cow lying in the barn with a pool of blood by its neck. Various suggestions of how it happened are made: evil eye, snake, baluria. The people sit by the communal pool to decide how to handle Mashtasam when he returns. Ali Nazirian suggests they not tell Mashtasam that his cow has died. M.C. mocks him and says he will know: he will see the cow is not there. Katkoda, a

feeble character, agrees wanting to support Nazirian: he is right, he will see the cow is not there. M.C. is a disagreeable bully: when Mashtasam's wife was mourning and crying, "Che kar konam" (what can I do), he replied, "Hich kar (nothing) can be done until Judgment Day." They decide to bury the cow and follow Nazirian's suggestion. Someone suggests they at least skin it first, but Nazirian points out that the skin is also harram since the cow was not slaughtered properly. They drag the animal to a well by the pool and dump the cow in it, then filling the well with dirt. Having finished, M.C. points out that the village idiot will, of course, tell Mashtasam. Nazirian tries to impress on the idiot not to tell. M.C. turns to the idiot and says, "When Mashtasam returns you will tell him won't you?" The idiot gives a grunt which M.C. interprets for the assembly as a slow "arreh" (yes).

Two old women go to a storage place and take out some alam (standards) with the hand of Abbas on top. There is a procession of these dark figures. M.C. and the man who lost three sheep meanwhile seat the idiot on a tabot (death casket) and tie his leg to a mill stone and leave him. The women continue their procession over the open land. Two men leave the village at night. There seems to be a kind of rosa with banners and a procession back. A man is left sitting on guard for the return of Mashtasam. Night comes.

In the morning Mashtasam returns. M.C. in a tree yells he should go to his house, there is news. His approach is signalled by the sentinel. As he goes through the village, people disappear behind closed shutters, behind walls. He goes home and has tea. He asks if his cow has been watered. No answer. He goes for water, scattering children who have gathered at the door. As he is getting water from the pool, Nazirian comes to him. He says he is getting water for the cow and when he drops a new trinket to put around the cow's neck, it is too much for Nazirian who attempts to stop his progress back to the house, and tells him the cow is lost. Mashtasam drops the pail of water and collapses into a crouch. Suddenly he is up on his feet moving quickly towards the house, the whole village following. He stops in the courtyard and cries, "Gav-e man ke dar nemire!" (My cow does not go wandering!). His wife cries into her hankerchief and runs into the house. The idiot is shown coming into the village carrying a twenty liter gasoline tin. M.C. sling shots him and they join the crowd. Mashtasam says again, "My cow does not wander." Later the men find him brooding on his roof. He pointedly says to Nazirian, "Why did you lie to me?" Nazirian is taken aback, but another man rescues him, saying, "We did not lie." Mashtasam says, "No, my cow is here. She did not go out. She is there [pointing across the open land]." One of the men queries, "If your cow is there, why are you here? What will the cow do if it becomes thirsty?" Mashtasam answers that if she becomes thirsty, she will return home. Screams in the night bring the villagers to Mashtasam's barn where they find him running around bellowing. In the morning they come again to inquire after him and his wife says he is worse, and now only gives bovine noises. They find him at the fodder stall munching at the fodder. There is no answer to their greetings. They try telling him that his cow has been found. He turns towards them chewing grass and then turns away. This takes them aback and they are a bit afraid. He says, "Man

Mashtasam nistam, man gav-e Mashtasam-am" (I am not Mashtasam, I am the cow of Mashtasam). They plead with him not to say such things. "You are our Mashtasam, do not say such things." Mashtasam sits up and insists he is the cow, and looking up says Mashtasam is up there protecting him. Someone asks, "Well, then, where are your horns?" He begins to bang his head against the wall, and they quickly capitulate. Nazirian then tries to tell him the truth that the cow died and they buried it. The people leave. Nazirian asks if he can bring anything. Water, water.

There is a by-play in another house between a girl who is after a young man, and the young man who hearing the cow cries wants to go investigate. She finally allows him to go when he promises to send his sister to negotiate betrothal. At night the three baluria come into the village and come to the stable. They are seen and the villagers begin gathering weapons. The baluria find Mashtasam: che ajab! gav nist, xodesh-e (how strange, it is not the cow but he himself). They are cornered by the villagers and chased out. The villagers seat Mashtasam and an old woman puts a pin on him and dabs him with a prayer from her beggars bowl, and goes around sprinkling all. The men moan, "Ya Allah." Mashtasam rises and walks slowly. Meanwhile the idiot is trying to run away from an auftabe tied on to his ankle, the children teasing him. Mashtasam has the wide-eyed attention of all as he begins to run and then plows head-first into a wall.

On Thursday afternoon, people go to the graveyard to say the fateah. The men gather in a spot and Nazirian suggests they take Mashtasam into town to see a doctor. A man asks, "Will he be able to explain to Mashtasam that he is not a cow?" "At least," replies Nazirian, "doctors know more what to do." They try gently to walk Mashtasam out of the barn, but at the door he becomes violent and rushes back in picking up a yoke and swinging it violently. He falls and the others jump him and tie him up. Two men on each end of the rope then drag him with a third man prodding behind out of the village to the chant of "Ya Ali!" It rains hard. In the rain the three baluria watch. Mashtasam begins to be hard to drag. Nazirian gives his rope end to the katkhoda and takes up the position of the third man. He begins to beat Mashtasam and screams, "You animal!" The other men restrain him. As they look at each other in despair, Mashtasam bolts, slips and rolls down a hill, falling face first into a puddle.

Meanwhile back in the village there are preparations for the wedding: the bride's face is being cleaned of facial hair with a string, and women beat on tamburines (arabun). As Nazirian comes back into the village, a character who is forever at a tiny window shouts, "So you did not take him to the city?" The bride's hair is combed. Nazirian takes off with a horse and cart.

2.2. Qaisar

The credits are given against tatoes of old kings and knights, an eagle with talons spread, an eagle lifting a cherub; an upside down version of the last with a knife in the hand of the cherub at the throat of the

eagle. The music throughout has a tambak percussion from the zurxane, and the pahlavan theme is reinforced several times with pictures of pahlavans in the background.

The film begins with the screaming siren of an ambulance racing through the streets to a hospital. A girl is taken out on a stretcher and an old woman and an old man follow her into the hospital corridors until she is taken into an emergency room and they collapse on a bench. The old woman, the mother, cries out her grief: what will she tell the girl's brother? Another girl in the waiting room tries somewhat ineffectually to be sympathetic and calming. The victim's elder brother, Farman, a butcher, enters, and the old man tells him what has happened. The nurse comes out to tell them that they have been too late, the girl is dead. They all cry. The butcher tells the old man, his dai (mother's brother), to take the mother home, and he will go close his shop and follow. The nurse then gives them a piece of paper found on the girl. As the butcher leaves the hospital a girl runs up to him, and then into the hospital to help the old man take the mother home.

At home the illiterate old woman gives the note to her brother to read, and the old man reads. As he realizes the import of the suicide note he stops reading out loud. There are a series of flashbacks describing how Fatimeh, the dead girl, went to her friend Badri's house to study and there was attacked by her friend's big brother Mansur. The butcher arrives and learns of this development. He runs to a chest and gets a knife. His mother pleads not to go like this, pleading that first jelou-e peyghambar qasm xordi (to vow or pray before the Prophet). His dai takes the knife from him, but he leaves. He heads for the bazaar where he finds Mansur and engages him in a fight, but Mansur has two brothers with him who kill Farman, and drag his body up to the roof of a hamam.

A train comes in from Abadan and we see Qaisar, whose name has been on everyone's lips, get up out of sleep and leave the train. The theme song with the tambak percussion is played, and he is shown walking down the platform with his shoe-backs turned down. He arrives home and cheerfully calls out for his mother and Fati: "Fati, come see what I have brought for you." The house is silent and eventually he sees his dai all disheveled come out and flatly say, "Xosh amadid" (Welcome). Qaisar asks, "Chera injuri shodi?" (Why have you become so?) Look what I brought Fati, where is she?" The old man buries his face in the cloth and cries. Qaisar sees his mother through a window also in tears. It dawns on him that Fatimeh is dead, and he squats head in hand. Qaisar's fiancée comes in and tells that she has been to the imamzadeh, and that she had a dream in which she saw the contentment of the other world. The dai asks Qaisar when he will return to Abadan to his work, reminding him that he had plans to buy a car. Qaisar says he has no work in this world any more. The dai tries to head him off saying that if he tries to kill the murderer, he will be killed in turn. Qaisar orders them all not to reveal that Fatimeh has been violated, and he goes out. He first goes to his brother's shop and sees it closed. He then goes to a tea house and sits with some friends where he learns some bits of information, specifically that Karim is at the hammam, and of his brother's

death. He leaves, with tambak percussion and music welling up, shots of pahlavans on the background walls, and he pulls up the backs of his shoes. In the hammam he undresses and takes a knife with him. He spots Karim and when the latter goes into a shower stall, he follows him in, and in the noise of the water kills him. He leaves quickly. The police arrive to take the body and complain that there should be trouble here. Qaisar goes home. No one responds to his greeting. He asks why they are so quiet. In response his dai only raises a copy of Firdausi's Shahnameh, and asks, "Did you kill Karim?" "Yes." "Batel shod? (Is the account void? Have you finished?) "No: there are two more."

Qaisar next goes to the house of his fiancée and asks to speak to her father, Abbas. Abbas is not there yet, but he sits and talks to the girl, for as she points out they are mahram as they have eaten sweets together (i.e., they have been formally engaged). He tells her that he wishes to inform the family that he cannot marry her. This, he points out, has nothing to do with his love for her, but he has become unclean and will not involve a pure girl such as herself. Matters are now out of his hand. Abbas enters saying he is planning to go to Kuwait to buy some things with Karim's brother who is at the slaughterhouse. At this news, Qaisar again pulls up the backs of his shoes and proceeds to the slaughterhouse where he finds and kills his mark. He goes through the kuches back home, where in the courtyard he talks to the maid of his old promise to take her to Mashad. His mother is out, and his dai tells him a letter has come from Abadan that he should return to work. Qaisar undresses revealing his bloody state. The old man asks if it was Mansur. No, Rayim. The old man argues with him, saying his mother has been fasting these last three days, that he is young and hot headed and should take the advice of an older man, and relates an experience of his own. Qaisar puts on fresh clothes and leaves going to the imamzadeh and there he prays: "I know I am sinning; I cannot marry a pure girl, please make her reconciled and give her happiness." We next see him with the maid in a train, presumably returning from Mashad. Returning home, he finds the door locked, and so he goes to his fiancée's house and there finds his dai to learn that his mother has died. All cry. The dai pathetically relates that they washed the body but it became dark and they could not bury it. He learns from Abbas that Mansur is scared for his life and also angry about the killing of his brothers, and that a certain dancer at the nightclub Ferdows knows where to find him.

At the graveyard the next day two detectives appear to take Qaisar as soon as the ceremony is over. Qaisar arrives late. He cries on the shoulder of his fiancée, and sees the detectives. He feigns a fainting spell and two friends carry him out. He runs off before the detectives realize they have lost their man. He made a date with his girl to meet on the morrow at three. They meet and talk. She wants to run away with him and start over somewhere. He says he is tired, that he would like to do this and live in peace like other people, but that this makes a man small and he will not do so. Perhaps he will turn himself in. He goes to an Armenian delicatessen, and drinks some arak before going to the Club Ferdows. He tells the dancer that he is from Ahwaz and has brought some money from his father for Mansur, his father having gone to Mecca and wanting to divide up a joint holding some friends had together. She tells

him Mansur is working for the railway and that on the morrow they should go together. She invites him to sleep with her which he does, and gets her to let him go to the rail yards before her. There he pulls up the backs of his shoes and chases his man. The police arrive. He catches Mansur, but it is Mansur who stabs him and then runs. Mansur runs into the police and doubles back towards a grinning Qaisar. He tries to edge past the felled Qaisar, but Qaisar rises and manages to stab him. Qaisar just has time to climb through a train to the other side, but the police shoot him in the leg. He painfully makes it to another train and goes in to hide and collapse in a dining car. The police take their time, knowing he cannot get away, come and find him.

2.3. Aghaye Holu

The credits begin with Victorian curliques and cherubs as a frame-work in which the destructible gentle protagonist is frame by frame stripped of his clothes until he is left covering his bare chest dressed only in his pajama bottoms, and the credits end with a large Western-style hat plopped over him. The film opens with the protagonist leaving his village on a Mihan Tour bus, saying good-bye to his family, and practicing his oratorical, elmi (learned, high-flown) and taarofi (polite) Persian. He leaves the bus at the stop in Teheran with effusive taarof towards his seat mate. He gets off the bus holding the inevitable boxes of sweets for gifts, and an umbrella which goes with his pin striped suit and hat. He stands for a while bewildered by the swirling crowd. Two porters begin to fight in front of him, and so he tries to step between them still holding all his belongings, and he gets knocked unceremoniously on his tail. While he is collecting himself on the ground, someone runs off with his suitcase. He attempts in his high flown Persian to place a complaint at the desk of the bus station, but no one has time for him, and when he insists on making a nuisance of himself, they throw him out. And so slowly he makes his way along the street, asking for a guest-house, the owner of which he knows. He goes on and on getting more and more tired, his eyes widening at the displays of skin on the newsstands and the displays of women's underwear in the shops. Eventually he finds the guest house, only to learn that his introduction is in vain, as the man has sold out and gone elsewhere. He however takes a room and sits and polishes his new shoes, listening to the radio, and saying "Ba, ba, ba" to the language of the female speaker. He then goes to bed, but cannot sleep because of sounds of love making next door. So he takes out his volume of Hafez. Eventually the love making stops and he can go to sleep. To sleep, perchance to dream: a blonde appears in his dream and tries to seduce him, taking his book away. He wakes up looking into the rays of the rising sun, painfully aware of his seminal emission. He hurries to a nearby hammam in jacket and pyjamas, explaining when he returns to the hotel for breakfast that the trip had been very dusty and so he had to clean up. The hotel keeper had done him the favor in the meantime of finding the address of the erstwhile owner. And so he sets off in search of this man. At the address he learns the man has gone out to Karaj and will not return for a couple of hours, and so he goes exploring. He sees some hair dryers in a window and stares at them until

the homosexual owner of the shop invites him in. He asks about the prices completely oblivious of the shop clerk's advances. The next shop he is attracted to is a tailor's, in the window of which is a magnificent bridal gown. He goes in and twice begins a high flown introduction, each time the owner breaking off to scream uncouthly at an assistant. He turns to leave but the owner solicitously grabs him by the arm. He explains he wants to know the price of the bridal gown in the window, and when the owner begins to congratulate him on his betrothal, he takes the rhetoric as something to be answered in rhetorical kind. Meanwhile there is a young woman trying on a dress and not being very modest about it. She flirts with the tailor. Aghaye Holu is dumbstruck and this as he introspects turns into love. The tailor has the dress brought down and asks the size of his betrothed. Aghaye Holu, in a daze, says she is about the size of the young woman, which leads to the latter modelling the dress. She packs up to leave, and Aghaye Holu, not aware of what he is doing, makes a down payment on the dress. She goes out, but quickly returns asking the tailor to call her a cab as she is getting too much annoyance from the young men on the street. He does so but in the delay, Aghaye Holu manages to offer his services to accompany the lady. They walk and he buys her some fruit. She does the bargaining at which he is inept. When they have to cross the street, he runs across in terror. She gets into a karaye (cab which takes several passengers on a fixed route) and leaves him but tells him when she will return to the tailor's on the next day.

Aghaye Holu goes to find his friend, the former owner of the hotel, and finds him engaged in an argument with a business partner. As always Aghaye Holu's high-flown Persian contrasts with theirs. They hit on a plan and take him along on a trip into the desert outside Teheran. They rendezvous with another car, and have Aghaye Holu take a tape measure out. They have brought him along to witness a shady real estate deal. He refuses to sign anything. The deal falls through, his friends are exposed, and they beat him up leaving him in the desert.

Aghaye Holu finds his way back into town, and after having had his suit cleaned finds his way back to the tailor for the rendezvous with his new found love. This time she takes him "home" to meet "daddy" and he presents her with perfume. The place is a whore house and drinking cafe. He, of course, does not notice anything. She has a narcissic young lover who makes himself quite clear to Aghaye Holu, but the latter does not understand the message. The owner of the cafe invites him to spend the night, and he accepts, again not understanding what is meant. When the girl comes in and places herself at his disposal, he is coy and stays away from despoiling her honor. In fact, he attempts to find the owner and beg off from the invitation but as the latter cannot be roused (from a drunken stupor) he returns to the room where the girl has fallen asleep. He pulls her chador down over her immodestly displayed legs and falls asleep at the foot of the bed sitting on the floor with an arm propped up on the bed. She laughs at this when she gets up, and puts his hat on his head. She goes out for her ablutions, and when he comes out he cannot find the cafe owner. So he sits and smokes a water pipe, reads his book, and attempts several times to say hello to the girl. She does not respond. He follows

her to a pool in which she paddles her feet, and they make up. He wins a wishbone contest but he promises her to buy the turquoise ring which would have been hers had she won. He is bold enough to hold her hand but quickly withdraws when she tries to kiss him. He goes out and not only buys her the turquoise and gold ring, but clothes and the bridal dress. He then asks for her hand from the cafe owner, who finds it his task to point out that he is not her father, and that she only works here. So Aghaye Holu proposes to her directly, and she unhappily says that she cannot leave. Evening comes and the cafe fills, and her young lover comes. Aghaye Holu presses his proposal and is beaten up by the lover for his pains. Not only that but he, of course, has to pay for his stay. Sadly he leaves, and the movie ends with him back on the bus leaving Teheran. Out of his bag drops a flower garland, which a little girl picks up and presents to him, a reminder of what he has just been through. This time his seat mate is more of a hick than he. He has left his Hafez in the cafe.

2.4. Mihadgah-e Hashem.

The credits are against the background of a girl running through the woods. She runs into an arm. Her look of fear fades into love and she ducks under the arm of a laughing Qadam (played by Fardin), and she runs to a stream where a little boy is playing with a branch. She grabs the boy and the branch and they laughingly pretend to shoot Qadam. Qadam pretends to be wounded and to fall dead. Parts of this are done in slow motion. The film then begins by running through the sequence again from the top in normal motion. The three are a happy family. Wife and son play Indian dancing around the slain father. Qadam moves and they run off: the boy followed by his mother chased by his father. Qadam catches his wife and kisses her until the boy notices. Then Qadam takes a turkey and goes off leaving mother and child to play.

The idyllic prologue is followed by the tragedy which establishes the plot. Qadam goes off to enter his turkey in a turkey fight. His wife takes the boy into the stream bathing. She gets wet and decides to take off her dress. No sooner does she do so than the archetypical Iranian male appears to rape her and leave her dead. Thus the plot: not only is there a murder but also someone's namus must be revenged. This portion of the film is done in a droll parallelism of flashing back and forth between the turkey fight where Qadam urges on his entry, and the use of a belt by the rapist on his victim after she has resisted screaming and clawing, and leaving a welt on his chest. Fardin cries, "Bezanesh!" (Strike!) and the belt comes down on his wife. We are not shown the face of the rapist, but only a mustachioed outline with lots of hair. Identification clues are two: the scratches on the rapist's chest, and the belt which he leaves behind. The boy runs to tell Fardin, who leaves the turkey fight but comes too late.

The next section of the film fills in some intricacies of the conflict. There is a brief scene at the mosque where Qadam is the chief mourner, at which we are introduced to his wife's brother and are not sure if he is not the murderer. There follows a scene in Qadam's house in which he puts the

boy to bed with a bed time story of broken friendship at which the child cries. Qadam has informed the police but leaves out the two clues he has. In the morning he puts on a black Moharram shirt and the boy brings him a naked knife. Qadam tells the child that such things are not for little boys, but the boy says, "I know you are going after Mommy's murderer and you may need this." Qadam says he has no intention of killing anyone, and sends the boy to put the knife away. As he leaves he sees the knife on a table and takes it. The child, peeking through a curtain, smiles. Qadam leaves the house. The wife's brother enters and calls for Qadam. The boy tells him that a Moharram shirt has been laid out for him, and also describes the murderer and says his father has an idea who it is. This description comes after the wife's brother (Safat) sees a doll which the boy has stripped, decapitated, and placed a mustache on the head. As Safat goes in to put on the shirt, the boy stones the head. Safat goes to a tea house where he meets Qadam and they have words, the outcome of which is that Safat says, "If I have killed your wife, it is my sister I killed, and here is a knife, kill me." It is not clear whether he is a true brother or only a close friend, but this is of little importance. Qadam points out that it is not a question simply of avenging a killing, but of namus.

The search for the murderer begins. Qadam and Safat swear to search together. They board an Export bus, and arriving in town, they proceed directly to the bazaar where they ask for the house of Hashem. They are directed to a hammam. When he comes into the public section for a massage, Hashem greets Qadam affectionately. Qadam does not reciprocate, but when Safat attempts to stab Hashem from behind, Qadam stops him, for in the tussel Hashem's shoulder towel falls off and reveals his chest clean. Hashem is told what has happened and pointedly asked to whom he gave the belt which is the mate to Qadam's own belt and were symbols of friendship between the two. Hashem remembers giving it to his son reluctantly after much begging by the latter; and so he says in an unconvincing voice that he lost it. Qadam says, "O.K. but we may find the thief of your belt before you see him." They then go to a dyer's and Safat rips open a suspect's shirt: he is clean and they leave without explanation. They walk through the kuches. A man comes up some steps and Safat asks if he may see his chest, and rips open the man's shirt. He too is clean, and they leave him standing suprised. Finally they come to a cafe filled with young boisterous men. They are challenged when they press their way in, particularly by a cocksure youngster, who being smaller than Qadam, Qadam easily pushes around. In the tussle, the boy's shirt opens and reveals the sought for scratches. There follows a chase to the young man's house. This is the son of Hashem. Hashem's wife is an old flame of Qadam whom Qadam had given up out of friendship for Hashem.

Hashem comes back to his house from the hammam. The house is decorated with blag flags for a rosa. He screams for his son. The son is not there, but his wife answers and he tells her to take down the flags for this is not a house clean for a rosa, it is a house of sin (musiat-kar xane). The son comes running in and begs his father to save him. When the knock comes, Hashem is indecisive, but then orders his wife to open the door. Before she can do so, Qadam kicks it in. Qadam asks Hashem's

permission to take the boy to the police. Hashem grants this, but his wife intervenes and he reverses himself, reminding Qadam of an old friendship debt that he is now cashing in. Qadam leaves. Later the wife secretly visits Qadam in his hotel but he does not accept her appeals. He then goes to the mosque to pray. She comes in to pray, and he leaves. Hashem tries a sneak attack on Qadam, but is caught and this clears all accounts. As Qadam and Safat walk through the kuches, the age mates of the murderer jump them, but are beaten off, and one is captured and under Safat's rough handling tells where the murderer has gone to hide: at the house of his mistress. They find him there. The young wife has also already come there. Qadam leaves the three (mistress, wife, Safat) in the courtyard while he goes alone into the attached oil press and dyeing factory and catches the murderer. The others hear a cry and assume Qadam has killed him, but Qadam appears in the door with the murderer in tow. The mistress smiles, the wife is relieved, and Safat is upset. Qadam tries to lead the boy out, but in the kuche he encounters a blockade of Hashem and the boy's age mates. They retreat into the house to wait out the night. It is a tense foursome: the murderer tied up and fearing for his life at the hand of Safat; Safat waiting for Qadam to fall asleep; Qadam trying to prevent Safat from killing the boy; and the mistress. From outside the house, the age mates call in to the boy not to worry, they will set him free. Hashem makes an appeal to talk to Qadam. The boy is frightened to be left alone with Safat, but Qadam makes Safat agree not to kill him until he returns, saying that when he married Safat's sister, he had received a trust, a trust which had been broken through no fault of his own, but one he wanted to handle his own way. Hashem makes various appeals to Qadam, including giving him all his wealth including several caravanserais, including the revelation that he can have no more children, and a reference to a girl which incenses Qadam. No deal is struck.

During the night the boy confesses to Qadam, saying that his intention had been to tease the woman, but when she had clawed him so ferociously, he had lost his head and beaten her. This Iranian acceptance of uncontrollable passion as extenuating the actions of any mortal is forcefully brought home as Safat becomes enraged at the description and would have killed the boy then and there had Qadam not stopped him and pointed out that his passion at the moment was not much different than what the boy was describing.

In the morning, Qadam leads the boy out. Safat leaves their side saying he will have no part in turning the boy over to the police. Qadam is still faced with Hashem and the boys, but convinces them to let him pass. The companion of the night of the murder follows them on the roof looking for a chance to jump them, but is incapacitated by Safat after he cries out his part in the murder. As Safat runs down to confront Qadam with this development, the rapist makes a bid to escape and runs up onto a roof. There he is caught by Qadam, Safat and Hashem. Hashem makes a final bid in the name of the justice of God. Qadam leaves the final decision up to Safat, who finally but too late agrees, too late because the boy fearing Safat's vengeance makes another break and falls off the roof to his death.

2.5. Droshky-chi (Droshky Driver)

The credits are written in white chalk on droshky equipment with a graveyard mourning scene in the background. The camera focuses on a group of mourning women sitting on the ground wrapped in black chadors: the widow Zena, her sister's daughter, her brother's wife, and a couple others. The men are then shown: the elder bereaved son (Morteza), his mother's brother, the husband of his mother's sister, and the mechanic Mahmud Agha. The bereaved son expresses his grief with open weeping and throwing himself about. He is comforted by two of the men, and his dumb, ugly doxtar-dai (mother's brother's daughter) throws water in his face as a helpful gesture, which establishes also her intelligence. The Qur'an reader comes to be paid with his assistant, and the mother's sister's husband of Morteza, Baba, haggles over the amount, but Morteza is more generous.

Morteza and Baba are next shown riding in the droshky into the bazaar. Morteza is clutching a framed picture of his father, and stops at a shop whence Baba sends him for some bread. Baba tells the shopkeeper to set the account aside and from now on he will pay it.

The scene switches to the house of the two brothers (Baba and Zena's husband). The widow is shown disrobing to bathe in the courtyard pool (she keeps on her underwear). For the time being only her sister's daughter is in the house. Baba is shown coming down the kuche. Outside the house Hassan (Morteza's little brother) and a friend are playing. Baba comes up from behind and gives Hassan a playful poke in the ribs. He gives the boys some sugar candy (nabot) in exchange for Hassan calling him "baba." Hassan and Baba go into the house, Hassan going in first and suprising his mother in the pool. She dashes for the bushes and her chador with the help of her niece. The latter scolds Hassan for coming in without saying, "Ya Ali!" to announce himself. The former scolds the latter for not having latched the door. Baba, however, is stopped, and he in turn stops Morteza who just arrives, until the women are ready. Morteza and Baba then enter a room, Morteza placing the picture of his father on a shelf. Baba gives a bag of nuts to Hassan to take to his mother with the message that they are from Baba. Morteza objects that he is not their father. Baba quotes a line of poetry that too much worrying about a matter will make you insane and make you have dreams.

At the funeral dinner, Morteza does not sit with the others who immediately dig into the food when Baba declares the meal open. There is only an occasional xoda biamorza (God rest his soul) from the feasters. One old man instructs his neighbor to forget the water and to stuff in the meat before it disappears. Morteza stands and stares at his father's photo, and it changes aspect before his eyes: the picture is of a middle-aged man with mustache in a khaki uniform; it becomes the jowled face of the older man just before his death, and then it takes on wings and floats up about the ceiling. Baba rescues Morteza from this reverie and makes him sit and eat. Baba says something to Akbar (Zena's brother) about having acquired two sons, and Akbar, directing his response to Morteza, establishes his

claim to family leadership by pointing out that when Morteza wants to marry, it is his dai he should approach.

A poetic ride in the droshky follows, Baba driving, and Zina in back. She is objecting that it is too soon to talk of their love, while he points out that the mandatory period of three months and eleven days is ended today. He takes out his riding crop on which he has notched the days, now adding day eleven. He offers her some nuts and waxes eloquent about the past, recalling how twenty-five years ago he had wanted to wed her, but Akbar would not allow her to marry a droshky driver. The exchange is in poetic refrain. He says, "Sobh-e tabestun bud, yad-ete? Pushte bom mixabidid, yad-ete?" (It was a summer morn, do you recall? You slept on the roof, do you recall?), to which she responds, "Arreh, yadame" (Yes, I recall).

Next we see Morteza, his doxtar-xale (mother's sister's daughter), and Hassan walking past a cinema; they agree to return to it. As the ticket line forms, we see Baba and Zina in line, Baba in front and Zina behind, and a few young men behind her. The young men press up against Zina. Baba pulls her towards himself several times to impress a distance but each move only brings the young men forward as well. The young man immediately behind her is the real offender, and his friend tells him to desist for she is probably Baba's wife. The young man says the assumption is not valid and again moves up against her. Baba gets mad and places her in front of him, telling the young man that he should respect an elder who could be his father. The young man pushes him out of line on the grounds that his place behind Zina is being usurped. The two males assume aggressive postures, but at this point Zina sees Morteza and the children returning and persuades Baba to leave. The youngsters get in line. The girl says, "Hey is that not my father and your mother going down the street?" But Morteza does not see.

At home Zina and Baba have tea and nuts. She wants to show him something on her arm, but he turns away saying, "Don't: halal nistim." The kids then come in. Baba greets Hassan with a joyful, "Esme man chi-e?" (What is my name?), and receiving the response "Baba" gives him some nuts. Morteza is greeted with the special heartiness reserved for those in sympathy-desiring roles. He absently takes some proffered nuts, but immediately crosses to the shelf and demands to know why the picture of his father has disappeared. He addresses the question to his mother who pleads ignorance. Baba says he took it to be fixed up, and Morteza should come and eat. He tries to make light of spending seventy tomans for having a picture framed, but this does not amuse Morteza. So Baba asks the children, "You did not go to the graveyard (sar-e xak)?" The girl, to prevent Hassan from spilling the beans, calls him to sit by her, which he does, but in doing so says, "Nemigam koja raftim" (I won't say where we went). Zina stifles a smile, and Morteza quickly says, "We went to the cinema." Baba responds sarcastically, "Xosh amadid" (You were welcome). The ritual of giving some nuts to Hassan in exchange for calling him "Baba" is gone through, and Baba's daughter leaves. Baba takes the opportunity to remonstrate with Morteza about taking his daughter to the cinema without being engaged. Morteza reverses the roles by offering Baba some nuts.

Zina and Morteza each spend a restless night. The next morning before Morteza gets up, Zina and Baba try to sell the dead man's effects to a peddler. Morteza comes out just as Baba gets the dead man's picture. Morteza, thinking the picture has come back takes it from him joyfully, and then is drawn to the bargaining at the door. He steps to prevent the peddler from taking his father's old clothes. There is a tug of war, but eventually Morteza is pacified into taking the picture and a shirt as a memento, and the rest is sold for twenty-five tomans.

The next scene is at the garage where Mahmud Agha works: he is slapped by a customer and snifles through the scene. Baba's daughter comes to take Morteza home. On the way, she breaks the news that her father wants to marry his mother. She tries to break it slowly by first telling him that Baba wants to remarry. He finds this inappropriate. She points out Baba is only forty-six. Morteza queries her acceptance of bringing another woman into the house. She demurs that it is an outsider, and says she is very happy. It is someone he knows very well: his mother. He steps on the accelerator. She tells him that Baba is waiting to talk to him in a tea house, but he goes first to his dai who plys him with arak. Akbar tries to interest Morteza in his own daughter and has her bring tea. There is a brilliant comic scene in which the girl's mother places a glass of tea on a tray in her daughter's hands and forces her to smile. The girl does not make it out of the kitchen before dropping the first glass. With the second glass she makes it to the men, but drops it on Morteza's foot. She is wearing a white chador wrapped around her waist and over her head, revealing her from waist to face.

Morteza goes to the tea house where Baba is talking to two old cronies. In the background Susan is singing "Gonah-e Man Nist" (It is not my Sin). When Morteza enters, Baba leaves his friends and sits with Morteza against the wall. Morteza is unfriendly and finally accuses Baba of his intention to marry Zina. Baba denies it, and says it was his daughter's idea, and he had merely agreed to take a second wife if she so strongly wished. At one point Baba says he has assumed the place of Morteza's father, to which Morteza violently responds, "You are not my father. My father was a man." They finally make up and go home together telling each other jokes. In the meantime, Hassan is chatting with the two women and touches his mother's sister's daughter's necklace and is chased off for being so bold. He runs out into the street and immediately heralds the arrival of the two men. At dinner there is an argument about sleeping arrangements. Morteza wants to sleep in the courtyard. His mother says in summer he always sleeps on the roof, and that is the place for men. Morteza leaves in a huff. Baba flirts with Zina. His daughter comes to the door and observes them with amusement, and acts as their guard, shouting "Aghaye Morteza!" when the latter enters with a bedroll. She goes to help him spread it out. There is a humorous reversal, when Baba demands she not whisper to Morteza but speak up, rebuking her to tears. Morteza comes to her comfort. Hassan butts in and receives a severe twist on the ear for his pains. Zina comes to Hassan's protection and Baba abuses Morteza.

In his sleep Morteza sees Baba with horns. He dreams that Baba has thrown him down and has taken off down a road with Zina who sheds her chador revealing herself in a white neglige, and then that Zina and Baba are riding in the droshky while he is running behind grunting like an animal. He wakes up only to have further hallucinations of Baba arising from his bedroll on the balcony and throwing a grenade at him, and then coming down the steps and beating him in a wrestling match. Morteza runs to Zina and wakes her asking the time. The whole house is up by now. When he goes to wash his face, Baba's daughter comes to him and they steal off together amid caresses to the roof. Baba is up and follows their progress, but before following them goes to Zina. He takes her up the stairs to see what the kids are doing, and uses the narrowness of the stairs as an excuse to imitate their hugging. He remarks that this is one thing that elders can learn from children. He and Zina descend and half-way down he has an attack of back pain and gets her to administer a rubbing ointment. Meanwhile his daughter has disengaged from Morteza's embrace protesting that she fears her father will find out, and then blood will flow (xun-ra miaufte). (Both women are wearing chadors.)

A ride in the droshky follows with Baba, his daughter, and Morteza in the back together. The subject of Morteza marrying Baba's daughter is discussed as is the shir baha. Again Morteza reacts violently and negatively to Baba's assertion of being his ersatz father, but Baba points out that should Morteza marry his daughter, he will at least be his true father-in-law.

Hassan's circumcision provides an interlude. Hassan goes around the courtyard where the women are preparing for the festivities, crying and pleading that he is afraid. His dai's wife tells him, "You will become a man, you will get a wife, and have children." All the women treat it as a joyful event. Baba arrives with the musicians and circumcisor. Their arrival throws the un-chador-ed women into a scramble for their chadors. The wife of Akbar in her haste to cover her hair throws her skirt up over her head. Hassan finally in desperation runs. He is chased by Morteza and the mechanic Mahmud. They catch him and carryin him struggling to the evilly grinning circumcisor. Baba stops this, telling them to let him go, and advising Hassan not to be afraid, takes him under his own power there. Hassan protests that if it must be done, he will do it himself, and suddenly breaks away, running up to the roof and threatens to throw himself off. Morteza goes to catch him if he falls. In backing away from the menacing adults who are now primarily worried about his falling, Hassan does fall off the roof, but is caught by Morteza who carries him kicking to be circumcised which is expedited despite his squirming and screaming. The foreskin is handed to the waiting women who receive it with jubilation.

Following the circumcision is a picnic, held below a mulberry tree. Baba brings out some arak and when the food is served, he and Morteza turn their backs for some "men's talk." Hassan perks up at the phrase and asks if he can join. Baba shoos him away, saying he is yet a child. Hassan objects that any child who is circumcised becomes a man, which causes general laughter. Zina objects to the arak imbibing pair that Morteza is also a child and will always be a child to her. Hassan regains the upmanship by tagging her objection also as sour grapes, asking if shee too has

been circumcised. Three musicians are brought. Mahmud becomes emotional at the song being played, and must leave. His girl is sent to cheer him up. The song is changed and they return clapping. It is time for dancing. Baba solves the modesty problem by having the musicians turn their backs to the celebrants. His daughter drops her chador and dances. Baba sings to Zina, who responds with flirtatious eyes, until Morteza notices and makes her cover up with her chador. Morteza sings to his dancing cousin, and as she finishes he grabs her to seat her next to him. Mahmud's girl dances. Baba then dances and surreptitiously slips a mulberry into Zina's mouth while his daughter turns Morteza's head. Morteza notices some boys watching and clapping in rhythm from a distance. He takes off after them. They run and he is restrained. The couples then separate, leaving Hassan the odd man out. Morteza and his cousin tell Hassan to go off to his mother. Baba and Zina shoo him off to Mahmud. Mahmud and his girl shoo him off again to Morteza who tries to escape in a tree, but Hassan notices their shadows. So all pack to leave, the women retrieving their chadors.

We return in the next scene to the conflict between the various kin groups. Akbar has his daughter offer some sweets to Morteza. Morteza refuses. The sweets sit. Hassan helps himself. Zina scolds him and Morteza carries him off by the ears. Akbar and Baba come close to blows, and Baba says with respect to an alliance between himself and Akbar's family (i.e., Zina): "Even if you put a marriage ring right before me, I would not stick my finger in it." There are mutual recriminations about the two young female rivals for Morteza's hand.

At night Morteza goes up on the roof and calls down through the chimney to the sleeping Zina, pretending to be the voice of her dead husband. She runs out screaming, and Morteza falls off the roof, ending up in the hospital. When Baba's daughter visits him, they discuss the confusions which would result from being both cousin and spouse and in-law sibling, and the multiple confusions for their children. Meanwhile Baba is in a lawyer's office selling his horse and droshty for twelve thousand toman, and buying a taxi. He takes the opportunity to ask if it is permissible for both a father and a daughter to marry a mother and a son.

A buyer comes to look at the house. The family brings up past events in their lives associated with the house to boost its value, but the sentiments deteriorate into such attachment that Zina begins a general refusal to sell, and the buyer leaves in disgust. The next scene finds Baba trying to knock down a wall Morteza has built dividing the house and courtyard into two parts. Baba screams that Morteza's mind has cracked, for one thing there is only one toilet. Morteza responds in equal heat that either the house is sold and the proceeds split, or a wall is to go up.

Two brief interludes follow. Baba is shown at a draft center where he is excused from military service, and then asks if he cannot be put back into the lottery. Then Baba sees Akbar on the street and offers him a ride in his taxi. Akbar refuses and says that although a droshty driver may change his clothes, he remains a droshty driver, and walks off. Baba cries, he did not even say goodbye, and shouts abuses after him.

In the divided house at meal time each family is on its own side. Baba insists on playing at full volume Susan's record, "Gonah-e Man Nist," a song which Morteza despises. Baba plays it over and over. Morteza picks up a radio and tunes in some march music. Hassan picks up the radio and changes the station until he picks up Susan's "Gonah-e Man Nist." Morteza gives Hassan a good whack for this. Hassan cries in his mother's lap that he likes the song. Morteza responds that he is not to like it. On the other side, Baba has run out of sugar, and he tells his daughter to borrow some. She finally must obey but gets him to first turn down the record player. As soon as he has the sugar, Baba turns the volume back up, and to add insult to injury tosses some qand (cone or cube sugar) back over the wall. Later Baba has put the Susan record on again. Zina comes out with the trash, and the two meet. At the sound of Morteza, Zina retires, and Baba climbs over the wall to use the toilet. He leans under the wall and has his daughter fill the aftabe with water from his own side. He then monopolizes the toilet. Morteza comes down wanting to use the toilet but contents himself talking to his cousin. Hassan comes down in great urgency and finally relieves himself in the bushes. Baba comes out and gives Hassan a nut in exchange for being called "Baba." Morteza makes Hassan spit it out, and slaps him for accepting. Baba comes to Hassan's defence, and goes and puts Susan's "Gonah-e Man Nist" on again. Morteza gets upset and fights with his mother over tea, and storms over to Baba hurling abuses at the droshky-chi, to each of which Baba corrects him: taxi-chi. Zina meanwhile comforts Hassan and confirms that his father will not return; he pleases her by saying that he likes Baba even more.

Back at the garage, Morteza and friends think up a way to wean Zina away from Baba: they will get him drunk with girls and arak and have Zina see this. They do so, and Zina is turned off. Her brother drives the car which brings her to observe the scene. The next day, Morteza withdraws all objections to Baba and agrees the wall can come down. He leaves with his cousin. Baba calls to Zina but she does not respond. When Hassan tells her Baba is calling, he twists his ear. Baba shoos Hassan off to play and goes to woo Zina, but she will not respond. He asks for some water. She takes a bowl of water and pours it out on the ground before him. He tries the aching back gambit, but she gives him no sympathy and tells him of seeing him with the girls and drunk. He is struck with remorse, and she leaves for her brother's house. Hassan finds Baba sitting on the ground and rouses him. Baba says he has done something bad. Hassan says whenever he does bad, then he tries to make up by being helpful, following after people, being repentant, and so on, and he is forgiven. This revives Baba and they head off for Akbar's.

Meanwhile Akbar has received a call from Morteza that the trick on Zina has worked and that he is coming over. Akbar is jubilant thinking that now he will be able to marry his own daughter to Morteza, and he gets his womenfolk ready for Morteza's arrival. He is disappointed to see that Morteza has come with Baba's daughter, and when Zina arrives later Akbar's wife receives her coldly. Akbar remonstrates with Morteza that he thought he would become his son-in-law, and thus the trick is revealed to Zina. Morteza rejects Akbar's daughter and talks wildly of killing them all. Baba's

daughter tries to calm him but he pushes her away. He leaves. Baba enters to find his daughter crying. He is greeted cordially. Zina, Hassan, Akbar, Baba, and Baba's daughter sit in a semi-circle to discuss the family problem, while Akbar's wife sits distainfully in the background. Meanwhile Morteza buys some rat poison, and with the mechanic Mahmud he begins to drink heavily. Mahmud at one point complains about how much is being consumed, but Morteza wants to drink more. Baba's daughter comes and tries to persuade him to come home to celebrate the agg of Zina and Baba. He assures her he will come. First he goes to the grave of his father. He pays a man to water the grave. In drunken self-pity he walks home, but he is not so drunk that when he sees a little boy crying he does not stop to help. The boy has been thrown out by his mother's lover. Morteza picks up the boy in his arms to carry him home. Out comes a huge man whom Morteza allows to pass. The boy is then welcomed back by his mother.

Back home Hassan is riding Baba like a horse. The bell rings. Zina answers and lets Morteza in, embracing him. She notices tears in his eyes. He excuses himself to wash his hands and uses the time to put poison in the abgusht. When he enters the room there are emotional greetings. Hassan asks if from now on when he says "Baba" he will be hit, and Morteza says no; Baba says all that is past. Zina rises to get the abgusht, but Morteza pushes his way abruptly to bring it himself. As Baba's daughter prepares it, Morteza embraces his mother, who misunderstands it as a repentant embrace. He stares at her and when she asks, "Why do you look at me like that?" he breaks away. Morteza sees a vision of his cousin in bridal clothes, and is relieved to see her only blow and not taste the abgusht. Zina takes it, but Baba says, "No, it is the job of the daughter of the house." Morteza again sees her in bridal clothes. He can stand it no more, and knocks the spoon from her hand, grabbing the bowls of abgusht and throwing them away. In the process he kicks over the fire and the curtains ignite. He tries to crack open his own skull with the gand hatchet. Baba fights him calling him insane and an ass. Zina is saved and as she is brought out Morteza is allowed to help her out into the courtyard. She sits next to Baba, while Morteza returns into the smokey house for Hassan. The latter comes out calling, "Nane, Baba," and at the last looks fearfully at Morteza. Morteza caresses him. The last scene shows Zina tiredly leaning against an equally exhausted Baba. As Morteza comes up they pull apart and look at him in total submission, but he gently pushes them back together, for which his cousin embraces him.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abrahamian, Ervand V.
1969a The Crowd in the Persian Revolution. *Iranian Studies* 2(4):128-50.
1969b The Social Bases of Iranian Politics: The Tudeh Party 1941-53.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.
1970 Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudeh and the Firqah-i
Dimokrat. *International Journal of the Middle East Studies* 1(4):291-
316.
- Abrahams, Roger D.
1970 *Deep Down in the Jungle*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Adler, Elkan N.
1898 The Persian Jews: Their Books and their Ritual. *The Jewish
Quarterly Review* 10:584-625.
- Afshar, Iraj.
1348/1970 *Yadegarhaye Yazd*. Teheran: Anjoman Melli.
- Agha Khan.
1954 *The Memoirs of the Agha Khan*. London: Cassell.
- Ajami, Ismail.
1969 Social Classes, Family Demographic Characteristics, and Mobility
in Three Iranian Villages: A Pilot Study. *Sociologia Ruralis* 9(1):
62-71.
- Alavi, Bozorg.
1955 *Kämpfendes Iran*. Berlin: Diete Verlag.
1960 *Die Weisse Mauer*. Berlin: Rütten und Loening.
- Ala'i, Heshmat.
1948 How Not to Develop a Backward Country. *Fortune* 38(2):76-77, 145-47.
- Alexander, Henry Jacob.
1973 The Culture of Middle Class Family Life in Kingston, Jamaica.
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Algar, Hamid.
1969a Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
1969b The Revolt of the Agha Khan Mahallati and the Transference of the
Ismaili Imamate to India. *Studia Islamica* 29:55-81.
1970 An Introduction to Freemasonry in Iran. *Middle Eastern Studies*
6(3):276-96.
1972 The Oppositional Role of the Ulema in Twentieth Century Iran. *In*
Scholars, Saints and Sufis. N.R. Keddie, Ed. Berkeley: University
of California Press.

- Alliance Israelite Universelle.
1860-1913 Bulletin de l'Alliance Israelite Universelle. Paris: l'A.I.U.
1921-44 Paix et Droit. Paris: l'A.I.U.
1944-50 Cahiers. Paris: l'A.I.U.
- Amini, Ali.
1932 L'Institution du Monopole du Commerce Extérieur en Perse. Paris: Librairie Arthur Rousseau.
- Antoun, Richard T.
1968a The Social Significance of Ramadan in an Arab Village. The Muslim World 58(1):36-42, 59(2):95-104.
1968b On the Modesty of Women in Arab Muslim Villages. American Anthropologist 70(4):671-97.
- Arbabi, Firuzande.
1349/1970 Aserar-e Ajib-e Qal'e Eskelethaye Zardosthian Dar Yazd. Roshan Fekr 863(18 Khordad): 10-11, 57.
- Arberry, Arthur.
1964 The Koran Interpreted. London: Oxford University Press.
- Aresteh, A. Reza.
1961 The Social Role of the Zurkhana (House of Strength) in Iranian Urban Communities in the Nineteenth Century. Der Islam 37:256-59.
- Asad, Talal.
1970 The Kababish Arabs. New York: Praeger.
- Ashraf, Ahmad.
1971 Iran: Imperialism, Class and Modernization From Above. Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for Social Research.
- Aswad, Barbara.
1967 Key and Peripheral Roles of Noble Women in a Middle Eastern Plains Village. Anthropological Quarterly 40(3):139-52.
- Atai, Mansur.
1965 Economic Report on Agriculture in the Isfahan and Yazd Areas. Tahqiqat Eqtesadi 3(9-10):69-152.
- Avery, Peter.
1968 Iran 1964-68: The Mood of Growing Confidence. The World Today November: 453-66.
- Ayati, Abul Hossein.
1317/1938 Atash Kadeh Yazdan. Yazd: Gol Bahar Press.
- Ayoub, Victor F.
1965 Conflict Resolution and Social Reorganization in a Lebanese Village. Human Organization 24:11-17.
- Baer, Gabriel.
1969 Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1970 Guilds in Middle Eastern History. In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. M.A. Cook, Ed. London: Oxford University Press.

Baha'i Publishing Trust.

1956 The Baha'i World 1950-54. Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing Trust.

1970 The Baha'i World 1954-63. Ramat Gan: Universal House of Justice.

Baldwin, George.

1967 Planning and Development in Iran. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Baljon, J.M.S.

1968 Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960). Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Balsara, Pestanji Phirozshah.

1936a The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 1936. Bombay: Jehangir B. Karani's Sons.

1936b Ancient Iran: Its Contribution to Human Progress. Bombay: Iran League.

1963 Highlights of Parsi History. Bombay: P.H. Raman.

Balyuzi, H.M.

1970 Edward Granville Browne and the Baha'i Faith. London: George Ronald.

Bana, H.R.

1966 Ancient Fire Temples. In Peshotanji Marker Memorial Volume. Bombay: Adabi Press.

Banani, Amin.

1961 The Modernization of Iran 1921-41. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bank Markazi Iran.

1346/1968 The Iran Revised Cost of Living Index (1338 = 100). Teheran.

Baron, Joseph Louis.

1932 Death in Jewish Folk Religion. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.

Barney, Laura C.

1908 Some Answered Questions. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tuebner and Company.

Bartsch, William.

1971 The Industrial Labor Force of Iran. The Middle East Journal 25(1): 27-43.

Bayne, E.A.

1965 Iran. In Four Ways of Politics. New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc.

1968 Persian Kingship in Transition. New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc.

Benedict, Peter.

1970 Ula: An Anatolian Town. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.

Benjamin, S.G.W.

1886 Persia and the Persians. Boston: Ticknor and Company.

- Ben Zvi, Itzhak.
1957 The Exiled and the Redeemed. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America.
- Bharier, Julian.
1971 Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970. London: Oxford University Press.
- Bharucha, Perin.
1968 The Fire Worshippers. Bombay: Strand Book Club.
- Bhathena, B.N.
1944 Kisse-Sanjan, A Palpable Falsehood. Bombay.
- Bilmoria, Nasarvanji F., Ed.
n.d. [c. 1896] Zoroastrianism in the Light of Theosophy. Bombay: Theosophical Publishing Society.
- Binder, Leonard.
1962 Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society. Berkeley: University of California.
1966 The Proofs of Islam: Religion and Politics in Iran. In Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Bloomfield, Lady.
1940 The Chosen Highway. London: The Baha'i Publishing Trust.
- Bode, Dastur Framroze.
1960 Man, Soul, Immortality in Zoroastrianism. Bombay.
- Borujerdi, Hussein, et al.
n.d. Tozihol Masa'al Mohasha. Qum.
- Bowman, James.
1964a Haptoglobin and Transferrin Differences in some Iranian Populations. Nature 201(4914):88.
1964b Comments on Abnormal Erythrocytes and Malaria. American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 13(1):159-61.
1967 Hemoglobin, Glucose-6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase, Phosphogluconate Dehydrogenase and Adenylate Kinase Polymorphism in Moslems in Iran. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 27(2):119-24.
- Bowman, James, and D.G. Walker.
1959 Glutathione Stability of the Rythrocytes in Iranians. Nature 184(1325).
1961 Virtual Absence of Glutathione Instability of the Erythrocytes Among Armenians in Iran. Nature 191 (4785):221-2.
1963 The Origin of Glucose-6-Phosphate Dehydrogenase Deficiency in Iran: Theoretical Considerations. Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Human Genetics. Roma: Istituto Gregorio Mendel.
- Boyce, Mary.
1957 Some Reflections on Zurvanism. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 19(2):304-16.
1966a The Fire Temples of Kerman. Acta Orientalia 30:51-73.
1966b Atash-Zohr and Ab-Zohr. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 3-4: 100-118.

Boyce, Mary.

- 1967a The Zoroastrian Villages of the Jupar Range. In Festschrift für Wilhelm Eilers. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- 1967b Bibi Shahbanu and the Lady of Pars. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 30(1):30-44.
- 1968a On the Sacred Fires of the Zoroastrians. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 31(1):52-68.
- 1968b The Pious Foundations of the Zoroastrians. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 31(2):270-89.
- 1968c The Letter of Tansar. Roma: Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- 1969a On Mithra's Part in Zoroastrianism. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 32(1):10-34.
- 1969b Some Aspects of Local Farming in a Zoroastrian Village of Yazd. Persica 4:121-40.
- 1969c Maneckji Limji Hataria in Iran. In K.R. Cama Oriental Institute Golden Jubilee Volume. Bombay: Cama Oriental Institute.
- 1970a Zoroaster the Priest. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 33(1):22-38.
- 1970b On the Calendar of Zoroastrian Feasts. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 33(2):513-39.
- 1971 Zoroastrianism. In Historia Religionum, Volume II. C.J. Bleeker and G. Widengren, Ed. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Boyce, Mary, and Firoze Kotwal.

- 1971 Zoroastrian Baj and Dron. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 34(1-2):56-73, 298-313.

Brittlebank, William.

- 1873 Persia During the Famine. London.

Browne, Edward G.

- 1893 A Year Among the Persians. London: Adams and Charles Black.
- 1910 The Persian Revolution 1905-1909. London: Cambridge University Press.
- 1918 Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion. London: Cambridge University Press.

Bryan, William.

- 1957 The Economics of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin.

Bulsara, Jal Feeroze.

- 1935 Parsi Charity Relief and Communal Amelioration. Bombay: Parsi Panchayat.

Bujra, A.

- 1971 The Politics of Stratification. London: Oxford University Press.

Chiniwalla, Framroze Sorabji.

- 1942 Essential Origins of Zoroastrianism. Bombay: The Parsi Vegetarian and Temperance Society.

Chodzko, Aleksander.

- 1878 Théâtre Persan, Choix de Téaziés ou Drames. Paris: Librairie de la Société Asiatique de Paris.

- Chubak, Sadeq.
1961 *Der Aristokrat und das Tier*. R. Gelpke, Transl. St. Gallen: Tschudy-Verlag.
1966 *Cherax-e Axer*. Teheran: M.H. Elmi and Sons.
- Church Missionary Society.
1893-1921 *Letters to and from Persia*. Archival Files: G2 PE/03-05 Series.
- Clarke, John I.
1963 *The Iranian City of Shiraz*. Research Paper Series No. 7. University of Durham: Department of Geography.
- Cohen, Abner.
1965 *Arab Border Villages in Israel*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
1970 *The Politics of Marriage in Changing Middle Eastern Stratification Systems*. In *Essays in Comparative Social Stratification*. L. Plotnicov and A. Tuden, Ed. Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press.
- Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research.
1952 *Partizanship and Communication Behavior in Iran*. New York: Columbia University (mimeo).
- Commissariat, M.S.
1935 *Studies in the History of Gujurat*. Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co.
- Cooper, Nasarvanji Maneckji.
1901 *The Modern Parsis*. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, and Company.
- Cottam, Richard W.
1964 *Nationalism in Iran*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Cromstedt, Catherine.
1969 *Report to the Government of Iran on the Development of Handicrafts (Handloom Weaving)*. Geneva: International Labor Office.
- Dabu, Dastur Khurshed.
1959 *Message of Zarathustra*. Bombay: New Book Company.
- Darmesteter, James.
1887 *Parsi-ism: Its Place in History*. Bombay: Voice of India.
1925 *Persia, A Historical and Literary Sketch*. In *Persia and Parsis*, Part I. G.K. Nariman, Ed. Bombay: Iran League.
- Das Gupta, Ashin.
1967 *The Crisis at Surat 1730-32*. *Bengal Past and Present*. 86(2): 148-62.
- Davar, Dinsha Dhanjibhai.
1908 *Judgment on the Parsi Panchayat Case in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay*. Bombay: Bombay Gazette.
- Davar, Firoze Cowasji.
1953 *Iran and Its Culture*. Bombay: New Book Company.
- Davar, Sohrab P.
1949 *The History of the Parsi Panchayat of Bombay*. Bombay: New Book, Ltd.

- Davis, Natalie Zemon.
1972 The Rites of Violence: Religious Riots in Sixteenth Century France. Paper Delivered at the Newberry Library Renaissance Conference, May 1972 (mimeo).
- Desai, G.J.
1968 Surat Under the Britishers. Ph.D. Dissertation, Sardar Patel University.
- Desai, Sapur Fereidun.
1940 Parsis and Eugenics. Bombay: The Modi Printing Press.
1948 A Community at the Cross-Road. Bombay: New Book Company.
1964 Statistics of World Zoroastrians With Special Reference to Indian Zoroastrians. In The Second World Zoroastrian Congress Report, Part II. Bombay: Godrej Press.
n.d. Depopulation Amidst Explosion: A Case Study of the Parsi Community (mimeo).
- Dhabhar, Ervad Bamanji Nusserwanji.
1932 The Persian Rivayats. Bombay: K.R. Cama Oriental Institute.
- Dhalla, M.N.
1922 Zoroastrian Civilization. London: Oxford University Press.
1938 History of Zoroastrianism. Bombay: K.R. Cama Oriental Institute.
- Donaldson, Bess Allen.
1938 The Wild Rue. London: Luzac and Company.
- Douglas, Mary.
1970 Natural Symbols. New York: Pantheon.
- Drower, E.S.
1956 Water into Wine. London: John Murray.
- Dubash, S.E.
1906 Zoroastrian Sanitary Code. Bombay.
- Duchesne-Guillemin, Jacques.
1952 The Hymns of Zarathustra. London: John Murray, Ltd.
1956 The Western Response to Zoroaster. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1966a Symbols and Values in Zoroastrianism. New York: Harper and Row.
1966b Zoroaster. Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrian Literature. In The Encyclopedia Britannica. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Durkheim, Emile.
1933 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press.
- Eberhard, W.
1967 Settlement and Change in Asia. Hongkong: University of Hongkong.
- Eberhardt, Elke.
1970 Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safaviden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften. Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag.
- Edwardes, Stephen Meredyth.
1923 Kharshedji Rustamji Cama 1831-1909, A Memoir. London: Oxford University Press.

- Elgood, Cyril.
1957 A Medical History of Persia and the Eastern Caliphate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eliade, Mircea.
1969 The Quest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- English, Paul.
1966 City and Village in Iran: Settlement and Ecology in the Kirman Basin. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E.
1937 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Farmayon, Hafez.
1968 The Forces of Modernization in Nineteenth Century Iran. In Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East. W. Polk and R. Chambers, Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1971 Politics in the 1960s. In Iran Faces the Seventies. E. Yar-Shater, Ed. New York: Praeger.
- Feitelson, D.
1959 Aspects of the Social Life of the Kurdish Jews. Jewish Journal of Sociology 1(2):201-16.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig.
1957 The Essence of Christianity. George Eliot, Transl. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Fevrier, Joannes.
n.d. Trois Ans á la Cour de Perse. Paris: F. Juven.
- Fischer, M.M.J.
1969a Religion and Social Change Among the Zoroastrians of Iran. Research Proposal. University of Chicago: Department of Anthropology (mimeo).
1969b Opposite Sets and Selected Masques from a Rural Jamaica Point of View. M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago.
- Fischer, Peter, and Gerhard Kortum.
1967 Kahrizak: Sozialgeographische Dorfmonographie einer Qanat-Oase bei Teheran. Geographische Rundschau 19(6):201-9.
- Fitter, Kaikhosrow Ardeshir.
1951 The Post Sassanian Parsi Immigration into India. In Professor Poure Davoud Memorial Volume. Bombay: Iran League.
- Forugh, Mehdi.
n.d. A Comparative Study of Abraham's Sacrifice in Persian Passion Plays and Western Mystery Plays. Teheran: Ministry of Culture and Art.
- Frachtenberg, Leo Joachim.
1911 Allusions to Witchcraft and Other Primitive Beliefs in the Zoroastrian Literature. In Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume. Bombay: Fort Printing Press.

- Fraser, David.
1910 Persia and Turkey in Revolt. London: William Blackwood and Sons.
- Frieden, Ray A., and Bruce Mann.
1971 An Urban Model for Non-Overdeveloped Nations: A Case Study of Kerman, Iran. Teheran: Ministry of the Interior (typescript).
- Friendly, Alfred.
1969a Shah's Reforms Attract Even Iranian Dissidents. The Washington Post 15 June: A16.
1969b Iran Needs Oil Earnings to Fill Vacuum in Gulf. The Washington Post 16 June: A12.
1969c Iran's Industrial Progress Rests on Huge Oil Reserves. The Washington Post 17 June: A13.
- Gable, Richard W.
1959 Government and Administration in Iran. University of Southern California: School of Public Administration (mimeo).
- Gass, William.
1972 The Doomed in their Sinking. The New York Review of Books 18 May: 3-4.
- Geertz, Clifford.
1961 Studies in Peasant Life. In Biennial Review of Anthropology. B.J. Siegel, Ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1963 Agricultural Involution. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1968 Islam Observed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1972 Comment. In Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East. R.T. Antoun and I. Harik, Ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Geldner, Karl Friedrich.
1911 Zend-Avesta. Zoroaster. In Encyclopedia Britannica. New York: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Gelpke, Rudolph.
1961 Persische Meistererzähler der Gegenwart. Zürich: Manesse Verlag.
1962 Die Iranische Prosaliteratur im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- Gerth, H., and C. Mills, Ed.
1946 Essays From Max Weber. New York: Oxford.
- Gharatchehdaghi, Cyrus.
1967 Distribution of Land in Veramin. Opladen: C.W. Leske Verlag.
- Gibb, H.A.R., and J.H. Kramers.
1961 Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Glamann, Kristof.
1958 Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Goiten, S.D.
1955 Jews and Arabs. New York: Schocken.
1970 Minority Self-Rule and Government Control. Studia Islamica 31: 101-16.

- Goldziher, Ignaz.
1967 Muslim Studies, Volume I. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Goodenough, Ward H.
1949 Comments on the Question of Incestuous Marriage in Old Iran. American Anthropologist 51:326-8.
- Gray, Louis.
1912 Festivals and Fasts (Iranian). Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics 5:872-5.
- Great Britain, Public Records Office.
1899-1941 Confidential Reports (Series FO 416/1-99).
- Greenfield, James.
1904 Die Verfassung des Persischen Staates. Berlin: Franz Vahlen.
- Gropp, Gerd.
1969 Die Funktion des Feuertempels der Zoroaster. Archeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran 2:147-75.
- Haim, Suleiman.
1956 Persian-English Proverbs. Teheran: Beroukhim Booksellers.
1969 The One Volume Persian-English Dictionary. Teheran: Beroukhim.
- Hakim, Mohsen Tabatabai.
n.d. Tozi'ul Masa'al. Teheran: Chapxane Haideri.
- Halle, Louis J.
1967 The Cold War as History. New York: Harper and Row.
- Hataria, Maneckji Limji.
1866 Iran Deshna Garib Zartoshtian Halat Sudhalwa Sarv Astarela Tarem Katani Upaj Nipajno Aheval. Bombay.
n.d. Correspondence of the Persian Zoroastrian Amelioration Fund and Maneckji Hataria. Bombay.
- Hambly, Gavin.
1964 An Introduction to the Economic Organization of Early Qajar Iran. Iran 2:69-81.
- Hedayat, Sadeq.
1960 Die Prophetentochter. E. Fichtner und W. Sundermann, Transl. Berlin: Rütten und Loening.
- Hempel, Carl G.
1959 The Logic of Functional Analysis. In Symposium on Sociological Theory. L. Gross, Ed. New York: Harper and Row.
- Henning, Walter Bruno.
1951 Zoroaster, Politician or Witch-Doctor? London: Oxford U. Press.
- Herzfeld, Ernst.
1936a Die Religion der Achaemeniden. Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 113(1):21-41.
1936b The Iranian Religion at the time of Darius and Xerxes. University of Chicago: Oriental Institute (pamphlet).
1947 Zoroaster and his World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Huckriede, R., M. Kürsten, and H. Venzlaff.
1962 Zur Geologie des Gebietes Zwischen Kerman und Sagand (Iran).
Hannover: Bundesanstalt für Bodenforschung.
- India, Government of.
1971 Parsis of Greater Bombay. Census of India 1961. Volume X,
Part X(1-D). Bombay: Government Central Press.
- Iran, Government of.
1332/1953 Farhang-e Geographiye Iran. Teheran: Imperial Army Printers.
1345/1967 National Census of Population and Housing: November 1966.
Teheran: Plan Organization, Statistical Center.
1346/1968 Report on the Results of the Annual Industry Survey. Teheran:
Ministry of Economics.
1969 Village Gazetteer. Volume 8: Esfahan Ostan. Teheran: Plan
Organization, Statistical Center.
- Iran League.
1936 Dokhma: A Scientific Method of Disposal of the Dead Among
Zoroastrians. Bombay: Iran League.
- Irani, Dinsha J.
1939 Our Beautiful Navjote Ceremony. Bombay: Jehangir B. Karani Sons.
- Jackson, A.V. Williams.
1899 Ormazd or the Ancient Persian Idea of God. The Monist 9(2):161-78.
1906 Persia Past and Present. New York: Macmillan.
1928 Zoroastrian Studies. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jakobson, Roman.
1960 Linguistics and Poetics. In Style in Language. T.A. Sebeok, Ed.
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
- Jeejeebhoy, J.R.B.
1953 Communal Discipline Among the Bombay Parsis in Olden Times. In
M.P. Khareghat Memorial Volume. R.P. Masani, Ed. Bombay: Shahnameh
Press.
- Jettmar, Karl.
1967 The Middle Asiatic Heritage of Dardistan Islamic Collective Tombs
in Punyal and Their Background. East and West 17(1):59-83.
- Jhabvala, N.H.
n.d. Law of Marriage and Divorce in India. Bombay: D.B. Taraporevalla
Sons.
- Jussawalla, D.J., W. Haenszel, V.A. Deshpande, and M.V. Natekar.
1968 Cancer Incidence in Greater Bombay: Assessment of the Cancer Risk
by Age. The British Journal of Cancer 12:623-36.
1970 Differences Observed in the Site Incidence of Cancer Between the
Parsi Community and the Total Population of Greater Bombay: A
Critical Appraisal. The British Journal of Cancer 14:56-66.
- Kalali, Manuchehr (Interviewed by A. Taheri).
1971 Treading on Uncharted Path. Kayhan International 11 November: 4.

- Kanga, Kavasji Edalji.
1876 Extracts from the Narrative of Mon. Anquetil Duperron's Travels in India. Bombay: Commercial Press.
- Karaka, Dosabhai Framji.
1884 History of the Parsis. London: Macmillan.
- Karanja, B.K.
1970 More of an Indian. Bombay: Sindhu Publications.
- Kashefi Vaez, Mullah Hussein.
1349/1971 Rosato Shahada. Teheran: Chapxane Islami.
- Kateb, Ahmad ibn Hussein.
1966 Tarix-e Jadid-e Yazd. Teheran: Farhange Iran Zamin.
- Katrak, Jamshid Cawasji.
1941 Oriental Treasures. Bombay.
- Kaviani, Bijan.
1963 Das Problem demokratischer Wahlen in Iran. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tübingen.
- Kazemi, Kazem.
1343/1965 Naqshe Pahlavan va Nazate Ayari. Teheran: Chapxane Bank Melli.
- Keddie, Nikki R.
1966 Religion and Rebellion in Iran. London: Frank Cass.
1968 The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform. Journal of Contemporary History 3:69-91.
- Kendall, K.W.
1968 Personality Development in an Iranian Village. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington.
- Kennedy, Robert E.
1962 The Protestant Ethic and the Parsis. American Journal of Sociology 68:11-20.
- Khaze, Ardeshir.
1333/1955 Tarixche Elahabad Rustaq. Bombay: Qaderi Press.
- Khuri, Fuad I.
1968 Etiquette of Bargaining in the Middle East. American Anthropologist 70(4):698-706.
1972 Chiah and Ghobeire. (Unpublished Manuscript).
- Lamb, Helen.
1959 The Indian Merchant. In Traditional India. M. Singer, Ed. Philadelphia: The American Folklore Society.
- Lambton, Ann K.S.
1944 Persia. Royal Central Asian Journal 31(1):8-22.
1953 Landlord and Peasant in Persia. London: Oxford University Press.
1954a Islamic Society in Persia. Inaugural Lecture. London: University of London.
1954b Persian Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1962 The Merchant in Medieval Islam. In A Locust's Leg. W.B. Henning and E. Yar-Shater, Ed. London: Percy Lund, Humphries and Company.

- Lambton, Ann K.S.
1965a The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution. *Studia Islamica* 22: 119-57, 23:71-91.
1965b Some Reflections on the Question of Rural Development and Land Reform in Iran. *Tahqiqat Eqtesadi* 3(9-10):3-9.
1967 The Case of Haji Nur Al-Din 1823-47: A Study in Land Tenure. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 30(1):54.
1969 The Persian Land Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Langerudi, Mohammad Mehdi Taj.
1348/1970 *Goftar-e Vaez*. Teheran: Khazar.
- Lapidus, Ira.
1967 *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Law, H.D., Ed.
1949 *Persian Writers. Life and Letters* 63(148):196-270.
- Le Strange, G.
1905 *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*. London: Frank Cass.
- Leven, Narcissa.
1911 *Cinquante Ans d'Histoire l'Alliance Israelite Universelle (1860-1910)*. Volume I. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan.
1920 *Cinquante Ans d'Histoire l'Alliance Israelite Universelle (1860-1910)*. Volume II. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan.
- Levine, Baruch.
1968 *Mulqum/Melug: the Origins of a Talmudic Legal Institution*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 88(2):271-85.
- Levy, Habib.
1954 *Tarix Jahud Iran*. Teheran: Beroukhim.
- Lewis, Bernard.
1970 *Race and Color in Islam*. *Encounter* 35(2):18-36.
- Lewis, I.M.
1961 *Pastoral Democracy*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Loeb, Laurence D.
1970 *The Jews of Southwest Iran: A Study of Cultural Persistence*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.
- London Chamber of Commerce.
1970 *Iran: A Market Report*. London: London Chamber of Commerce.
- Maclean, H.W.
1904 *Report on the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Persia*. London: Board of Trade.
- Maimonides, Moses.
1954 *The Book of Cleanness*. H. Danby, Transl. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Malabari, Behramji M.
1884 *Gujurat and the Gujuratis*. Bombay: Education Society Press.

- Malcolm, Napier.
1903 Development of Schoolwork in a Persian Town. In Church Missionary Society Archives G2 PE 05:87.
1905 Five Years in a Persian Town. London: John Murray.
- Manockjee Cursetjee [Pseudonym: Q. in the Corner].
1860 The Parsee Punchayat, Its Rise, Its Fall and The Causes that Led to the Same. Bombay: L.M. D'Souaz's Press.
- Masani, Phiroze Shapurji.
1917 Zoroastrianism, Ancient and Modern. Bombay.
- Masse, Henri.
1954 Persian Beliefs and Customs. New Haven: H.R.A.F.
- Massignon, Louis.
1955 Salman Pak and the Spiritual Beginnings of Iranian Islam. J.M. Unvala, Transl. Bombay.
- Mazzaoui, Michel.
1966 Shiism and the Rise of the Safavids. Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University.
1971 Shiism in the Medieval Safavid and Qajar Periods: A Study in Ithna-'Ashari Continuity. In Iran: Continuity and Variety. P.J. Chelkowski, Ed. New York: New York University Press.
- Meeker, Michael.
1970 The Black Sea Turks: A Study of Honor, Descent and Marriage. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Mehrji Rana, Rustomji Jamaspi.
1899 The Genealogy of the Naosari Parsi Priests. London: Horsley Brothers.
- Mehr, Farhang.
1348/1969 Sham-e Zartoshtian dar Engelab-e Mashrutiat-e Iran. Isfahan: University of Isfahan.
- Mehta, Hoshang Pherozshah.
1944 Iranian Ideas of Impurity. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Bombay.
- Menant, Delphine.
1912 Parsis. In Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. J. Hastings, Ed. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.
1913 Gabars. In Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. J. Hastings, Ed. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.
1964 Cezane's Doubt. In Sense and Nonsense. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Migeod, Heinz Georg.
1956 Über die persische Gesellschaft unter Nasiru'd-Din Shah 1848-96. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Göttingen.
- Minochehr-Homji, N.D.
1960 Certain Aspects of Social Philosophy as Found in the Sacred Books of the Zoroastrians. M.A. Thesis, University of Bombay.

- Mistry, Maneck Pheroze.
1967 Report of the Survey of Gujurat Parsis (Rural). Bombay: Parsi PUNCHAYAT.
- Modi, Jivanji Jamshedji.
1887 Das religiöse System der Parsen. Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft 2:92-110.
1904 Zoroastrian Priesthood—Navar and Maratib. Zartosht 1(2):88-94.
1905 A Few Events in the Early History of the Parsis and their Dates. Zartosht 1(3):234-50, 1(4):281-99.
1908 King Solomon's Temple and the Ancient Persians. Bombay: Fort Printing Press.
1913 Masonic Papers. Bombay: Fort Printing Press.
1916 Anquetil du Perron and Dastur Darab. Bombay: Times of India Press.
1922a Memorial Papers. Bombay: Fort Printing Press.
1922b The Religious Ceremonies and Customs of the Parsis. Bombay: British India Press.
1927 Asiatic Papers. Part III. Bombay: British India Press.
1930 Dastur Kaikobad Mahyar's Petition and Laudatory Poem. Bombay: Fort Press.
1932 K.R. Cama. Bombay: K.R. Cama Oriental Institute.
- Mohammad-Nejad, Hassan.
1970 Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of the Iranian National Front. Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University.
- Monchi-Zadeh, Davoud.
1967 Ta'ziya, Das Persische Passionsspiel. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell.
- Morton, Frederic.
1962 The Rothschilds. New York: Atheneum.
- Mottahedeh, Mildred.
1956 Report of Baha'i Activities in Relation to the United Nations. In The Baha'i World 1950-54. Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing Trust.
- Murzban, M.M.
1917 The Parsees in India. Bombay.
- Mustawfi, Hamdullah.
1336/1958 Nuzhat al-Qulub. Mohammad Dabir Siaghi, Ed. Teheran: Kitabxane Tahvari.
- Nabil-i-A'zam, Mohammad Zarandi.
1932 The Dawn Breakers. Shoghi Effendi, Transl. New York: Baha'i Publishing Committee.
- Nader, Laura.
1965 Choice in Legal Procedure: Shiah Moslem and Mexican Zapotec. American Anthropologist 67:394-99.
- Naik, Mahesh.
1968 Surat, A Study in Urban Geography. M.A. Thesis, University of Baroda.

- Nargolvala, S.D.
1969 Zoroastrians of Iran. *The Realist* 3(4):16-20.
- Nariman, G.K.
n.d. Writings of G.K. Nariman. Bombay: R.B. Paymaster.
1925 Persia and Parsis. Bombay: Iran League.
- Nasikwala, Byramsha D.
1944 Kisseh-i-Sanjan or the Supposed Landing of the Parsis in Sanjan.
In Bhatena.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein.
1964a Three Muslim Sages. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1964b An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
1966 Ideals and Realities of Islam. London: Allen and Unwin.
1967 Islamic Studies. Beirut: Librairie du Liban.
1968a The Encounter of Man and Nature. London: Allen and Unwin.
1968b Science and Civilization in Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
1968c Man in the Universe: Permanence Amid Change. *Studies in
Comparative Religion* 2(4).
1968d Revelation, Intellect and Reason in the Qur'an. *Journal of the
Regional Cultural Institute* 1(3):60-64.
- Nauroji, Rev. Dhanjibhai.
1890 A Short Account of the Parsis. Paisley: J. and R. Parlane.
1909 From Zoroaster to Christ. London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier.
- Niebuhr, H. Richard.
1929 The Social Sources of Denominationalism. New York: Henry Holt.
- Nieburg, H.L.
1973 Culture Storm. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich.
1966 Also Sprach Zarathustra. München: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag.
- Nirumand, Bahman.
1969 Iran: The New Imperialism in Action. New York: Monthly Review.
- Olsern, P. Bjørn, and P. Nørregaard Rasmussen.
1962 Development and Planning in Iran. (Typescript.)
- Padwick, Constance E.
1961 Muslim Devotions. London: S.P.C.K.
- Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza.
1960 Mission for My Country. London: Hutchinson.
1967 The White Revolution. Teheran: Kayhan Press.
- Patell, Bomanjee Byramjee.
1876 The Parsi Patells of Bombay. Bombay.
- Pavry, Jal Dastur Cursetji.
1926 The Zoroastrian Doctrine of a Future Life. New York: Columbia
University Press.

- Pelly, Lewis.
1879 The Miracle Play of Hassan and Hossein. London: W.H. Allen.
- Pirnia, Hossein.
1945 A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions of Iran. Teheran: Economic Information Bureau.
- Pissurlencar, Panduranga, and S.B. D'Silva.
1936 Portuguese Records on Rustam Maneck. Nova Goa: Sadanand.
- Pithawalla, Maneck B.
1960 A Zoroastrian Catechism. Karachi.
1961 Introducing Zoroastrianism. Bombay: Jame Jamshid Press.
- Pitt-Rivers, Julian.
1968 Honor. In International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan and Free Press.
- Potter, Dalton.
1955 The Bazaar Merchant. In Social Forces in the Middle East. S.N. Fisher, Ed. Ithica: Cornell University Press.
- Preece, J.R.
1894 Report for the Years 1892-93 and 1893-94 on the Trade Etc. of the Consular District of Ispahan. In Diplomatic and Consular Reports On Trade and Finance. Parliamentary Papers. No. 4376. Great Britain. Public Records Office. Series FO 60/563.
- Rahman, Munibur.
1955 Post Revolution Persian Verse. Aligarh: Institute of Islamic Studies.
- Ramsey, Ian.
1969 Hell. In Talk of God. London: Macmillan.
- Rana, Framjee A.
1934 Parsi Law. Bombay: Jame Jamshid.
- Randall, John Herman, Jr.
1948 The Churches and the Liberal Tradition. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 256:148-64.
- Ranina, Jehangir M.
1961 Essential Principles of Zoroastrianism. Bombay.
- Ramazani, R.K.
1964 Church and State in Modernizing Society: the Case of Iran. American Behavioral Scientist 4:26-28.
- Rehatsek, E.
1889 On a Descriptive Alphabetical List of Twenty Occult Sciences of the Muslims. Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay 1(7):415-23.
- Ricoeur, Paul.
1969 Religion, Atheism, and Faith. In The Religious Significance of Atheism. A. MacIntyre and P. Ricoeur. New York: Columbia University.

- Röhrborn, Klaus Michael.
1966 Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Company.
- Rosenfeld, H.
1957 An Analysis of Marriage and Marriage Statistics for a Moslem
and Christian Arab Village. *International Archives of Ethnography*
48(1):32-62.
1967 The Contradictions between Property, Kinship and Power as
Reflected in the Marriage System of an Arab Village. *In*
Contributions to Mediterranean Sociology. J. Peristiany, Ed.
The Hague: Moulton.
1968 Change, Barriers to Change and Contradictions in the Arab
Village Family. *American Anthropologist* 70(4):732-52.
- Rotblat, Howard.
1972 Stability and Change in an Iranian Provincial Bazaar (Qazvin).
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Royko, Mike.
1971 *The Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago*. New York: E.P. Dutton.
- Rumi, Jalalu'd-Din.
1910 *The Masnavi by Jalalu'd-Din Rumi*. Book II. E.C. Wilson, Transl.
London: Probsthain and Company.
- Rustomjee, Framroz.
1964 *Zoroastrian Ceremonies for the Disposal of the Dead and Towers of
Silence of the Parsis*. Columbo.
1969 *The Doctrine of Reincarnation*. Columbo.
- Sahib, Hatim Abdul.
1954 *Social Psychological Analysis of Arab Nationalist Movement in Iraq*.
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Salim, S.M.
1962 *Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates*. London: Athlone.
- Samuel, Shellim.
1963 *A Treatise on the Origin and Early History of the Beni-Israel of
Maharashtra State*. Bombay: Iyer and Iyer.
- Sanjana, Darab Dastur Peshotan.
1888 *Next of Kin Marriages in Old Iran*. London: Trübner.
- Sassoon, David Solomon.
1949 *A History of the Jews in Baghdad*. London: Letchworth.
- Scholem, Gershom.
1965 *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
1971 *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish
Spirituality*. New York: Schocken.
- Schweitzer, Günther.
1972 *Tabriz und der Tabrizier Bazaar*. *Erdkunde* 26(1):32-46.

- Seervai, K.N., and B.P. Patel.
1899 Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency. Bombay: Times of India.
- Segal, Judah Benzion.
1963 The Hebrew Passover From the Earliest Times to A.D. 70. London: Oxford University Press.
- Sekar, C. Chandra.
1968 Some Aspects of Parsi Demography. Human Biology 20(2):47-89.
- Seth, Jacob Mesrobian.
1937 Armenians in India. Calcutta.
- Sethna, T.R.
1966 The Teachings of Zarathustra. Karachi: D.T. Sethna.
n.d. Khordeh Avesta. Karachi: Inter Service Press.
- Shah, Buddhishchandra V.
1954 The Godavara Parsis: A Socio-Economic Study of A Rural Community in South Gujarat. Surat: The Godavara Parsi Anjuman Trust.
- Shahmardan, Rashid.
1330 A.Y./1960 Farzanegan Zartoshti. Teheran: Chapxane Rasti.
1336 A.Y./1966 Parasteshkade Zartoshtian. Bombay: Sazeman Javan Zartoshti.
- Shoghi Effendi.
1957 God Passes By. Wilmette: Baha'i Publishing Trust.
- Shokeid, Moshe.
1971 The Dual Heritage. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Singh, Khushwant.
1959 I Shall Not Hear the Nightingale. Bombay: I.B.H. Printers.
- Singh, O.P.
1968-69 The English Trade at Surat in the Late Seventeenth Century.
In The Quarterly Review of Historical Studies 8(4):37-47.
- Slobin, Mark.
1970 Persian Folksong Texts from Afghan Badakhshan. Iranian Studies 3(2):104-14.
- Slotkin, J.S.
1947 On a Possible Lack of Incest Regulations in Old Iran. American Anthropologist 49: 612.
1949 Reply to Goodenough. American Anthropologist 51:531-2.
- Smith, Raymond T.
1968 Interview Guide for the University of Chicago Family Study in Jamaica. (Typescript)
- Smith, W. Robertson.
1903 Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia. London: A.C. Black.
- Sorushian, Jamshid.
1956 Farhang-e Behdin. Teheran: University of Teheran Printers.
- Spiro, Melford.
1966 Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation. In Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. M. Banton, Ed. London: Tavistock.

- Spooner, Brian J.
1966 Iranian Kinship and Marriage. *Iran* 4: 51-59.
- Stevens, Georgiana.
1951 Reform and Power Politics in Iran. *Foreign Policy* 26(19):214-24.
- Sykes, Ella.
1910 *Persia and Its People*. London: Methuen.
- Sykes, Percy M.
1902 *Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran*. London: John Murray.
- Tag, Abd-el-Rahim.
1942 *Le Babisme et l'Islam*. Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence.
- Taheri Malameri, Haji Mohammad.
1342/1923 *Tarix Shahada Yazd*. Cairo.
- Tapper, Nancy Starr.
1968 *The Role of Women in Selected Pastoral Islamic Societies*. M.A. Thesis, University of London.
- Taraporewala, I.J.S.
1953 Main Currents of Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought. *Indo-Iranica* 6(4): 1-27.
- Teheran, University of. Faculty of Economics Research Group.
1970 A Study of the Rural Economic Problems of Sistan and Baluchistan. *Tahqiqat-e Eqtesadi* 7(19-20):140-211.
- Thaiss, Gus.
1971 Religion and Social Change: Bazar as a Case History. *In* *Iran Faces the Seventies*. E. Yar-Shater, Ed. New York: Praeger.
1972 Religious Symbolism and Social Change: The Drama of Husain. *In* *Scholars, Saints and Sufis*. N.R. Keddie, Ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Trietsch, Davis.
1910 *Handbuch über die Wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse Marokkos und Persiens sowie Ihrer Nachbargebiete*. Berlin: Gea Verlag.
- Tritton, A.S.
1930 *The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects*. London: Frank Cass.
- Troeltsch, Ernst.
1931 *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Tschubak, Sadegh.
1961 *Der Aristokrat und das Tier*. R. Gelpke, Transl. St. Gallen: Tschudy-Verlag.
- ibn al-Ukhuwwa [Diya' al-Din Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Qurashi al-Shafi'i].
1938 *Ma'alim al-Qurba Fi Ahkam al-Hisba*. Reuben Levy, Ed. E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, Number XII. London: Luzac.

- United States, Department of Commerce.
1969 Foreign Economic Trends: Iran. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- United States, Department of State. Office of Public Affairs.
1952 Iran: Point of World Interest. Department of State Publication Number 4628. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- United States, Office of Strategic Services. Research and Analysis Branch, Psychology Division and Near Eastern Section.
1942 Short Guide to Iran. Report No. 61 (mimeo).
- United States, Operations Mission to Iran.
1960 Population and Labor Force of Iran. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Vielle, Paul.
1967 Birth and Death in an Islamic Society. Diogenes 101-27.
- Vimadalal, Jehangir J.
1910 Mr. Vimadalal and the Juddin Question. A Series of Articles Reprinted from the Oriental Review. Bombay: Crown Press.
- Wadia, Ardaser Sorabjee.
1924 The Message of Zoroaster. London: J.M. Dent and Sons.
- Wadia, K.J.B.
1931 Fifty Years of Theosophy in Bombay. Adyar, Madras: Theosophical Publishing House.
- Wadia, P.A.
1949 Parsis Ere the Shadows Thicken. Bombay: Karnatak Press.
- Wagner, Roy.
1972 Habu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Watson, Robert Grant.
1866 History of Persia. London: Smith, Elder and Company.
- Weber, Max.
1930 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: George Allen and Unwin.
1946 The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism. In Essays From Max Weber. H. Gerth and C. Mills, Ed. New York: Oxford.
1958 The Religion of India. Glencoe: Free Press.
1964 Kirchen und Sekten in Nordamerika. In Max Weber: Sociologie, Weltgeschichtliche Analysen, Politik. Stuttgart: Kröner.
1968 Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press.
- Wertheim, W.F.
1964 Religion, Bureaucracy and Economic Growth. In Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology.
- Willis, C.J.
1893 In the Land of the Lion and Sun, or Modern Persia. London: Ward, Lock and Bowden.

- Wilson, Bryan R., Ed.
1967 Patterns of Sectarianism. London: Heinemann.
- Wilson, C.E.
1910 The Masnavi by Jalalu'd-Din Rumi: Commentary. London: Probsthain and Company.
- Wilson, John.
1843 The Parsi Religion, Unfolded, Refuted, and Contrasted with Christianity. Bombay: American Mission Press.
- Wolf, Linda.
1964 Anthropological Interviewing in Chicago. American Kinship Projects Monography No. 1. Chicago. (Mimeo.)
- Wright, Wilford S.
1965 Lead and Zinc in Iran. Teheran: U.S.A.I.D.
- Yalman, O. Nur.
1969 Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey. Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 10(1):41-60.
- Yule, Henry.
1903 The Book of Marco Polo. London: John Murray.
- Zabih, Sepehr.
1966 The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Zaehner, R.C.
1955a Zurvan, A Zoroastrian Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1955b Postscript to Zurvan. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 17(2):232-49.
1961 The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism. New York: Putnam.
- de Zayas, Farishta G.
1960 The Law and Philosophy of Zakat. Damascus: Al-Jadidah Printing Press.
- Zonis, Marvin.
1968 Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran. Comparative Political Studies 1(3):351-71.
1970a Iran. In Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East. T.Y. Ismael, Ed. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press.
1970b Review of E.A. Bayne's Persian Kingship in Transition. Middle East Journal 24(1):98-99.
1971a The Political Elite of Iran. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
1971b Iran. In The Middle East, A Handbook. M. Adams, Ed. London: Anthony Blond.
- Zoroastrian Anjoman of Teheran.
n.d. Ain-nameh Zartoshtian. Teheran: Chapxane Rasti.