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The Polish Ministry of Information, Stratton House, Stratton Street, London W.C.
August 29th 1944.

This is to inform you that the following article appeared in the Aug 29th issue of the "News Chronicle".

WARSAW CRISIS IS THREAT TO ALLIED UNITY.

By Vernon Bartlett.

A situation has arisen over the Poles in Warsaw which may have even graver consequences than the massacre of several thousand Polish Patriots. The British and Americans have recently made urgent requests that the air shuttle service between Italy and Russia, which has enabled them to give such valuable and timely aid to the Soviet armies, should be developed so that they could send supplies to Warsaw.

Their requests have been refused in Moscow. They are nevertheless sending help to the Poles in their capital. But, without the use of Russian air-fields the help is much smaller and the risk to our pilots is very much greater than would otherwise be the case.

The Russians themselves have broadcast promises of help. But these promises are accompanied by threats to court-martial the leaders of the Warsaw revolt, although it is costing the Germans considerable casualties. How has this unhappy dispute come about? The Polish Government here in London undoubtedly bears a heavy responsibility because it left to "Gen. Bor" the choice of the moment for the insurrection. This, therefore, began without prior consultation with the British, Soviet or American Governments. This unilateral action was almost more than foolish. By taking it some of the members of the Polish Government doubtless hoped that their compatriots would liberate Warsaw in exactly the same way as the French have liberated Paris. Others hoped that this evidence of the strength of the resistance movement under his control would strengthen the hand of M. Mikolajczyk, the Prime Minister, who was on his way to Moscow. But the Russians not unaturally resented military action which might lead to German troop movements unsuited to their own plans. Still more, they objected to its political implications. It deepened their suspicion that the Polish Government in London was seeking to forestall them. Ill-advised and unjust insinuations from many anti-communist sources that the Russians have purposely refrained from relieving Warsaw have also greatly angered Moscow. In these circumstances the Russians appear to have forgotten their own frequent appeals to the Poles to revolt and to have misinterpreted the stimulating effect upon the inhabitants of Warsaw of the distant sound of the Russian guns. Unless these differences can be removed there will be three consequences, all unfortunate for the United Nations. One is that thousands of Poles who have gallantly resisted the Germans for five years will be killed.

/ to be continued/.



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/page 2 continued, "News Chronicle"/.


Secondly, Polish distrust of the Soviet Union will be immeasurably deepened, for even Poles who are genuinely friendly to Russia would not easily forget the martyrdom of Warsaw.

There is no reason at all to doubt that Marshal Stalin genuinely desires a strong and friendly Poland; he would have been assured of it had the Soviet Government at least facilitated the dispatch by the other Allies of supplies to the Polish capital. Thirdly, Mr. Churchill has so often claimed as his ally anybody who was killing Germans that he could not be expected to read of the Polish revolt without experiencing a strong desire to help the men who have organised it.

Were he prevented from doing so the relations between the three major allies would inevitably be strained just at the time when the approach of the armistice makes their co-operation more than ever desirable.

The Polish Ministry of Information.

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