


- Don't you know? A Pole!
- Oh, the Atlantic Charter!



THE POLISH DIGEST

ROME , OCTOBER 1944

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POLISH ARMY
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH



FOREWORD

The cartoon featured on the cover of this booklet would almost suffice as a preface. But in order to make the purpose of its publication even more clear we propose to say a few words in explanation.

The noble promulgation known as the «Atlantic Charter», which has almost been forgotten in such a short period, is for us, Poles, much more than a mere document. We were first to enter the field in defence of those principles even before they were formulated by the two great leaders of Britain and America. Now, on the eve of victory, victory even for the late-comers, the Polish nation finds itself, paradoxically enough, on the edge of the greatest disaster which has ever threatened it throughout its thousand years' history.

Cut off by Germany we nevertheless formed an integral part of Western Culture and we do not intend to be expelled from it now. Poland's eastern frontier has always been Europe's too, and to allow this frontier to be pushed westward is equivalent to the encroachment of Asia on Europe.

We believe that our cause is Europe's cause and by this selection of articles we hope to further both.

W. S.

GROWS ROL

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WHY IN ITALY?

by A.R.P.

The fact that the Second Polish Corps is taking part in the general offensive aimed at the destruction of the German military forces in Italy is something out of the ordinary. It is no commonplace event, although the participation of Polish soldiers in the fighting on almost every front in the war has become such a normal thing that the world is sometimes inclined to forget it as it forgets the everyday happenings of life.

The entry of Polish troops on the first front created in Europe by our British Allies and American friends, with active help from the French, has a deep meaning and significance which is not merely military. Why is this so, and what does it mean?

These questions did not occur to us automatically and they do not occur to the Polish soldier, whose attitude towards the war is extremely simple and firm. These questions were produced in public, and travested before world opinion by a third party in order either to compromise the Polish Army in the East, or to direct the Polish soldier's mind into different channels of thought and action. Since the beginning of the organisation of the Polish Army in the East a clamorous and insidious propaganda has endeavoured to throw a shadow on its work and efforts and to obscure its moral attitude. Why do you fight on distant continents? Would not you rather fight on another front? Nearer to your own country? Do you understand that your liberation will come from the East and

not from the West? Would not you therefore rather fight the enemy in the East than in the West? Is your place in

Italy?

These questions have not been formulated in such tentative and cautions form as we have employed here. They were put with all the brutality of the modern totalitarian style and with such shameless affrontery as to oblige the British authorities in Cairo to issue the following communique on the 24th of March:

« In view of recent report stating that the members of the Polish forces in the East commanded by Lt. Gen. Anders, who are willing to take an active part in the war against the Germans are ruthlessly persecuted, to such an extent, that thousands deserted and that more that 700 were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and that Polish workmen on Gen. Anders's orders, were shut up in Palestinian prisonsit is authoritatively stated that this report is not confirmed. »

« Except for a few deserters and criminals, whose number does not exceed what can normally be expected, the whole Polish Army is prepared to take an active part in the struggle. Two Polish divisions which were lately stationed in the Middle East, are now fighting in Italy. » The fact that the Polish soldier is fighting on the Italian front gives an eloquent answer to this propaganda, whose smoke screen will presently dissolve somewhere at the foot of Monte Cassino.

In the light of this compaign however it is perhaps necessary to remind the world of Poland's steadfastness. Possibly in this 5th year of war there is no need to remember everything that we know about Polish obstinacy an example of which is offered by the lives of almost every soldier of the 2nd Polish Corps. Owing to this war's entaglements he became prisoner of war in a country with which in September 1939 he was not at war, and afterwards transformed from a miserable prisoner into a soldier again and fights now on a crucial sector of the front against picked German military for-

mations. One must resolutely throw off cynicism and face the truth about the internal forces which push these men into battle, regardless of obstacles, hardships and the political disasters which pile up about their heads. They are not of the stuff, from which condottieri or even mercenaries are made. They are not even an army formed by regular conscription, but only a small part of a nation at war, struggling against the same enemy as the Allies, sharing the same feelings and understanding all the problems created in Poland by this war. This is clearly confirmed by the Polish underground press.

For us Poles, the part we are taking in the Italian offensive is not a meaningless demonstration. It is only one fragment of a gigantic struggle, the *Polish struggle*, conducted by us in our own interest and for our « raison d'Etat » against

an enemy who seeks our destruction.

Why do we fight in Italy, and not on other European fronts? Why does another part of our national Army wait in readiness for orders on British soil? Why does our air-force strike from Great Britain and not from another territory? Why is our navy serving side by side with the powerful Royal Navy? Why is the whole of our nation, and with it the Polish armed forces, facing Westwards rather than Eastwards in

their struggle?

It is not an accident, neither is it a coincidence that we are fighting in the West. We are — whether some people like it or not — part and parcel of the West. We are fighting among our Western Allies, because we want to maintain Poland within the limits of that culture, which is known as Western. We are on the Italian front, because, our way towards Poland, which we want to reconquer, goes also through Rome, whence since the very dawn of our history we have drawn our inspiration and the cultural models which we have endevoured to propagate further East. These cultural processes have directed our thoughts and endeavours. We

have them in our blood and they are our nature's essence as well as the trend of our history.

Our history is a long series of wars, struggles with different invaders from the East — Tartars, Muscovites, Turks, Russians — as well as wars with the German states, which always tried to profit by Poland's perpetually threatened position in order to force their will upon her.

The West however, has rarely understood the tasks we have assumed in Central Europe. When we fought the Tartars, nobody helped us. When we opposed the Teutonic Knights we had all the West against us. Our wars against Moscow in the times of Batory and Waza were ignored by Western Europe. As reward we suffered the Swedish invasion, when the whole of our country was invaded by an army which included a considerable amount of knighthood of Western Europe.

We were called upon to defend Vienna against the Turks and were then sent home empty-handed. We know what was the attitude of Western Europe towards the partitions of Poland and also what was thought of our national Insur-

rections. — Also we remeber 1920.

All this is true and can be strictly proved with the reserve however, that we ourselves bear no small part of the responsibility for these historical developments. The inconsistency of the foreign policy of old Poland, or rather the complete absence of policy, the lack of intercourse with the Western countries and the insufficient exchange of thought and men between us and them had as its result that, although members of Western civilization, we are different and it is our excessive love for so called «home-life», and our idleness, which have hampered the progress of our civilization. With all this however, it must be admitted that the faults of the West as far as we are concerned, are considerable and undoubtedly more important than our failures.

But does it result from this that we have to turn our back

on the West, break with our stubborn ambition to remain in the sphere of the culture created originally by Rome and propagated afterwards by other European centres, among which were Cracow and Warsaw included? Must we say to ourselves, that we are tired of misunderstanding and betrayal and so turn from our world-beliefs, and saying that, if the West does not want us with it, it shall have us against it, as an advanced outpost of the East, as a partner of the Russian power?

ITALIAN « QUEUE »



UNCLE JOE: What a pity that I'm last in the queue, perhaps there won't be plenty for everybody and I'm partial to that boot.

(« Łazik », No. 9, Sep. 1944).

Among the political writers and leaders of Poland in the XIXth century in particular, we had men who, either because they were opportunists, or from disgust with the West proclaimed such a thesis. It is no doubt also an accident, that in the monthly « Nowa Polska » (The New Poland) January 1944, which enjoys great popularity with certain Polish circles in London, there appeared an article of a Polish writer Ksawery Pruszynski on Margrave Wielopolski, (1) giving a tendencious though clever portrait of that stateman, as a man who exasperated and discouraged with the West became a partisan of reconciliation with the East. It is not without reason that Pruszynski, in order to explain his views, quoted the following extract from Staszic's (2) Works: « We have been abandoned by the West. It did not want us as grateful allies. It shall have us, united with the whole of the Slavonic world together with Russia, as masters. »

In the mind of some Poles this caused reactions tending to a break with the traditional trend of Polish thought, and a reorientation of the course of our development. But these conceptions never found wide support in our community. They were looked upon as symptoms of weakness or treason towards our national history, an attempt to dive into the unknown with the risk of losing ourselves in an alien and limitless environment in which our own individuality would be submerged. The alluring claim that, when by uniting ourselves with the East we should be able to master the whole block of Slavonic nations, is considered to be a naive fancy and an illusion, when realistically estimated. It is believed that those who unite themselves with forces more powerful

(2) Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826) a Polish writer and outstanding economist and politician. He was also a pioneer in education and « science of citizenship ».

⁽¹⁾ Margrave Alexander Wielopolski (1803-1877) a leading Polish statesman who played a prominent role in Polish-Russian relations in his time. He opposed the Polish insurrection against the Russian Czar in 1863. That insurrection enjoyed support of British and French democratic circles.

than themselves from reasons of weakness and because they cannot do otherwise, especially in an atmosphere of capitulation and under compulsion, are not, as a rule, in a position to develop their own powers of expansion and gradually master the forces to which they have submitted themselves.

The preservation of individuality has been the essence of Poland's efforts in peace as well as in war throughout the whole of her history. These efforts have not always been crowned with success. Some generations of Poles paid a very high price for their stubborness, but thanks to them we do

exist as a distinct community in the world.

This has not, so far, helped us much. After the first world war we had an alliance with France. Before the present war, we associated ourselves with Great Britain. We sought Allies in the West. We set ourselves a goal in this war, which is not determined by the number of kilometers which divide us from our country. To the Poland of which we dream, a Poland free and undivided, living her own life, without throught of foreign interference, the best route is not the one which appears to be the shortest. « Ex Occidente lux » — has always been our motto, although the rays of this light have not always been clear and favourable to us and we have had to struggle ourselves to win this West for Poland and to spend our own toil and sweat to keep it. That is why we are in Italy.

(« Orzeł Biały » No. 13 (103), 21 May 1944).

—Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817)
From The Act of the Rising of 1794

[«]The deliverance of Poland from the foreign soldier, the restoration and safeguarding of the integrity of her boundaries, the extirpation of all oppression and usurpation, the firm foundation of national freedom and of the independence of the Republic: such is the sacred aim of our Rising.»

THE PURPORT OF THE ANGLO-POLISH ALLIANCE

by JAN SZUŁDRZYŃSKI

The Polish-British Alliance, signed in 1939, is the basis of the present conflict. Not only it was the cornerstone of the mighty common front of the United Nations, but it was the first nucleus of a new political organization, the importance of which can only be fully realized if one thinks of Europe's political necessities. If during the visit which the Polish Foreign Secretary made to London in 1939 a real rapprochement took place between England and Poland, which until then had taken but a mild interest in each other, the political ties which arose on that occasion were not only due to a dispute for Polish-German boundaries, but to the certainty that such a difference would not limit itself to a local dispute but would rise to the proportion of a European problem.

The real political meaning of the Polish-British alliance lies therefore on this, that it arose for the defence of Europe's political structure which the Germans wanted to change according to their whim. This alliance is really a scheme for the defence of peoples' liberty aiming to prevent one of them from exercising a hegemony, detrimental to the others.

It would be difficult to find a more complete and farreaching aim than this alliance, signed by two peoples on their own free will. It includes a vast political program and, what is even more important, it has not, since 1939, an emergency character but is based on principles which are of a lasting nature, regulating the political and cultural development of Europe. The present war did not break out for a futile motive. This acknowledgement is the most important meaning of the actual war and the Anglo-Polish alliance is not a side issue, but one of its outstanding features.

The more we worry about the future of Europe, both from the political and the cultural point of view, the more we speak of the possibility of Europe becoming Bolshevik. The more closely we examine the uncertain situation prevailing in Europe in 1939, the better we understand that at the basis of the Anglo-Polish alliance there was the thought of saving Europe, our culture, our policy and our humanitarian principles.

In view of the fact that we feel so deeply the significance of our alliance with Great Britain, we believe it to have tasks of a lasting nature and that it was not inspired by the necessity of the moment. Already in 1941 we wrote in «Our Roads» of the Carpathian Brigade, recalling the old common

points existing in the Anglo-Polish policy:

« In spite of the distance separating the two countries, in spite of the many differences existing between England, which is an Isle, and Poland, deeply rooted in the most sensitive point of the European continent, the relations between the two Nations were always based on strong and lasting political bonds. These ties had their origin both in the fundamental communion of ideas on international life and in the common tendency to maintain a fair balance among the ruling Powers of Europe. And finally on the similarity of social and state ideologies which create a historical parallel between the two countries ».

Five years have elapsed since the political collaboration between England and Poland was ratified (April 1939), the significance of which stands at par with the principal historical events. On concluding their Alliance, the two countries laid the foundation for creating a community of allied peoples to which they gave a political program in which all hopes in victory and for the future of the world, are closely connected.

We, Poles, are now in a position to realize fully the purposes of our activity. In these last five years all that was expected from us has been done. We have done all that was expected from us by the great idea which was the motive power of the program. We were the first who, in 1939, put ourselves at the service of this idea and we did everything we could to carry out its principles. We have done, and we are doing all this, because we are firmly convinced that by keeping up the Anglo-Polish Alliance and by being faithful to its fundamental political ideals we serve Europe.

Yes, we Poles did everything that it was our duty to do; the Government, the Army, the refugees and, above all, the country which, more than any other European nation, did not allow any foreign influence to mislead its political conduct, which had been outlined to us by the 1939 Anglo-Po-

lish alliance.

Poland withstood the most terrible repressions, in such conditions that suggested to other occupied peoples in Europe a way out, either of a political or economic nature, aiming at coming to an understanding with the enemy to obtain even temporary advantages. The Poles did not fall for the bait. They always maintained the same attitude, assumed in 1939. This is really a great achievement which proves the political maturity of Poles and proves also a thorough understanding of the important rôle which Poland is called to play in this historical period of development of man-kind.

What is the English attitude towards the Anglo-Polish

alliance?

There is no doubt that since Russia participated in the war, the Anglo-Polish alliance has taken another meaning in the eyes of the British public opinion and has undergone some hard tests. During three years, the Alliance has gone through some alternatives, either favourable or unfavourable. More than one thing has changed since Poland, during the Conferences held in London among the Allied countries — conferences which Churchill summoned — was the first to speak on the common program of action. From the honourable place as first Ally, we have gradually turned into the « most embarassing Ally ».

Russian policy, from the outset, aimed at undermining our position in the eyes of the Allies. It is still with this object that all hints of alleged pro-fascist tendencies of the Government, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and of the various representatives of Polish political independen-

ce, are driving at.

Russian policy aims at convincing British public opinion that the Anglo-Russian rapprochement automatically eleminated Poland from the number of allied nations. Furthermore, that Poland from being politically independent, must turn into a vassal state included in the colossal policy of the Russian giant. Russia would like to deprive Poland of all political prominence as the eastern neighbour of Germany and of the right due to her as a fundamental element of Europe's political structure. Russia alone would have these rights. Under these conditions, the Anglo-Polish Alliance would, evidently, lose its original significance and importance, and would thus be completely absorbed by the Anglo-Russian Alliance.

We know for a fact that such a policy is today supported by a large part of British public opinion which, as was recognized by some impartial English writers, has not proved, during this war, to have very definite opinions and clear ideas as regards a political program. The expressions of this uncertain political atmosphere are:

1) The idea of dividing Europe in various spheres of influence, and thus put the eastern part of the Continent — including Poland — under Russian control. This idea has

already been expressed in a wellknown article published by the « Times ».

2) The well-known speech made by Churchill who hinted very plainly that at least a part of Polish territories would be handed over to Soviet Russia in payment for Russia's contribution to this war.

It is therefore clear that in both instances, the Anglo-Polish Alliance would be annulled not only in its legal form, but also — and this must be stressed — in the substance of its political idea on which lies the foundation of the reconstruction of European freedom.

Can Russia's participation in this war change the value of the Anglo-Polish Alliance signed in 1939 and annul its im-

portance so essential to Europe's requirements?

We have always said that we are convinced that Poland is a lasting ally and not a temporary one. This alliance is indispensable to England and to America's European policy, because if we want to re-establish in Europe a political structure, based on peoples' liberty and on their harmonious collaboration, this is impossible without the existence of a Polish State, perfectly independent. If we disregard this thesis, perfectly justified by geography, history and political sociology, this would lead to an instability in international relations and may provoke further catastrophes, aver more fraught with consequences.

If the importance of Poland as an independent State is not recognized, which may be suggested by an opportunism which would betray our common political program, this would not avoid any danger to Europe, but perhaps merely change its trend. If the political priority in Europe instead of falling, say for instance, on Germany should fall on Russia, there would be no free Europe! She would become a forcing-house in which the mighty political and cultural supremacy of

Asia would be prepared.

If an Englishman, for these or other reasons of temporary

political convenience, should reject the alliance with Poland, he ought to reject also his political creed which in 1939 gave rise to such an alliance. In other words he would reject the principle of a free Europe, her civilization and culture. Thus the Anglo-Polish alliance and the revival of European liberty

are closely linked. According to our point of view, we must follow the attitude suggested by the Anglo-Polish Alliance and defend its contents which are not only formal but laden with a true political value, and, in no way, allow us to lose the position which Poland rightly occupies among the Allies. In spite of temporary difficulties, we must have the feeling that we are the associates of England and act accordingly. Only an active understanding of the rôle which our people, as a fundamental element of European peace, are called to play, gives us the right to live and a place in the political world. Only by pointing out and by explaining clearly and firmly our attitude shall we be able to master the future of Poland, thus realizing the ideal upheld by our people and which has always faithfully been followed for five long years, in spite of all hardships and sacrifices.

English policy has lately undergone a crisis. It requires, for many reasons, a clarification and its conduct needs to be revised. The London Conferences are actually taking place in an atmosphere where two opposite political trends are fighting each other: one is in favour of dividing Europe in different spheres of influence among the great Powers, and the other is in favour of the program set forth by the Atlantic Charter which sanctions the idea contained in the Anglo-Polish Alliance. Poland, as well as other nations, is awaiting

England to explain her attitude.

In the forthcoming deliberations the true value of the Anglo-Polish Alliance will be decided. This Alliance, it may be said, is really undergoing the decisive test.

(« Orzeł Biały » (White Eagle) No. 12 (102) of May 1944).

POLAND'S PLACE IN EUROPE

by WŁADYSŁAW BESTERMAN

(Excerpts from a speech delivered March 14, 1944 at the Women's National Press Club in Washington, DC.).

...I am to speak about my country's place in the *post-war* world, but permit me first to straighten out one very important issue concerning my country's place in the war.

There have been voices raised lately which made me believe that this war is fought for the liberation of the German people - yes, of the German people - who should be rewarded for their acceptace of Hitler and obedience to Hitler, for their unswerving readiness to fulfill every barbarity in the name of triumphant Germanism, - should be rewarded by keeping every inch of their territory and every implement of their might. However, the first victim of German aggression and the first nation to put up a fight against this aggression, Poland — a nation without a Quisling, a nation fighting in the walls of Warsaw, in Narvik, in France, in Tobruk, in the Battle of Britain, in the skies over London and in the skies over Berlin, around the Cassino Monastery right now, on the Seven Seas, and since four years in the underground, - the Polish nation should be punished for its heroism by the loss of exactly 53 percent of its national territory...

Thus is seems to me that some American writers got their formulas somewhat mixed up. They simply advocate the application of the Atlantic Charter to Germany, and the formula of "unconditional surrender" — to Poland.

Speaking about Poland's place in the post-war world, I think I had better outline the place which my country has occupied in the world for over one thousand years of Poland's recorded history.

Poland lies in the geographical and political center of Europe. It is exactly as far from Warsaw to the eastern border of Europe, the Ural Mountains, as it is to the western border of Europe, Portugal's Atlantic seashore. And it is with about the same amount of right that Portugal could claim Poland under her sphere of influence as the country reaching east and west of the Ural Mountains.

Poland, for over ten centuries closely linked with the western, Latin, Christian civilization, forms the political center of a vast stretch of territory between the Baltic, the Black and the Adriatic Seas, which, for the sake of historical truth. I will call - "the aggressors' hunting grounds". On this stretch of territory over 130 million people, exactly the population of the United States, divided into several nations: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Roumanians, Yugoslavs, Albanians, Bulgars and Greeks — live since more than ten centuries, fighting in every generation an aggression coming alternately from the West or from the East. One thousand years of recorded history knows of no aggression by Poland or by any one of those nations against either of the big, powerful Germanic or Russian neigbors. Now, we hear from very authoritative statesmen the expression of convinction that one of those big powers needs to be protected because one or another of those small nations constitutes a threat to its territory!

We all know that the seat of logic is the head. I know that logic cannot work smoothly if you stand on your head, and I know that this position is a difficult one even for acrobats-political and otherwise. So let me express very sincerely my deep conviction that the acrobatic formula of protecting

tigers — or bears — from the appetite of the sheep, is something which could come about only in times as trying for diplomacy as the ones we are witnessing now. And let us hope that this idea of onesided security for the strong will be as shortlived as possible.

* * *

In my humble opinion, security worthy of its name must be universal in character. To create real security, universal security, we must first — firmly discourage the imperialistic tendencies, and second — protect and strengthen the weak. As William Henry Chamberlain put it very recently: « It is the strong, not the weak that require restraint if a civilized warless world is gradually to emerge from the havoc and chaos of the present time ».

Could anyone be in a position to name even one war started within the last half century by a so-called small pover?

— Well, except the war between Bolivia and Paraguay —

but that was in the Western Hemisphere...

* * *

The geographical position of Poland determines her political place in Europe. I venture to think that this reality is important to be remembered right now when, by virtue of their strength and magnificent fight against the German and Japanese barbarians, the three great Powers among the United Nations are trying to shape the future world. The responsibility of these three great Powers is all the greater because — as Mr. Summer Welles so rightly stressed the other day — Europe is unfortunately not yet represented among those nations which are making plans regarding Europe's own future. The very fact that Poland, the nation largest in territory and population in the group living on the whinting ground of the aggressors wis situated in the center — both on the north-south, and the east-west lines, the very fact that Poland as far back as the XIV-th century suc-

ceeded in establishing peacefully a federation of Central European nations which endured for over four centuries, — these facts predestined Poland to the rôle of a rallying point for a Central European Federation or Union. This idea was most welcome in America. We found here most sincere encouragement and the « green light » was flashed to us in



One slip and the whole calculation is upset!

high quarters to go ahead and plan the Central European Federation. The place of Poland in this peaceful Federation was never meant to be that of a leader. No, — faithful to her five centuries old political slogan — « Free with the Free, and Equal with the Equal » — we tried to rally Central Eu-

ropean peoples under this very slogan. Unfortunately, the « green light » somehow changed into - red! - and powerful forces, apparently very powerful forces, turn logic upside down. What was meant to be the most effective protection of both the ever-warying European big Powers, was declared to be an element of insecurity. As if unity and rejection of imperialism, as if federation of small, abused, tired, tortured, mistreated, longing for freedom, peace and pursuit of happiness nations which would like to shape their future upon the American example, as if the declared will of these nations to unify, to federate and to secure once and forever peace on the continent of Europe, could have been anything elsc but a basic element of the future universal collective security! It was also the unanimously declared will of both Poland and Czechoslovakia which in 1940 and 1941 signed first drafts of the future Federation to cooperate both politically and economically with the Russian Empire. Such collaboration is as logical as it is necessary. It is simply obvious and it is the determined will of the nations concerned.

I do think that in the framework of the very desirable collaboration between the United States, Great Britain and Russia, there are means to convince the leadership of that latter great and so bitterly tried country, that federation means peace and security — I would say almost by implication. I do hope that, as soon as the three big Powers find the time has come for Europe to join in the counsels and take an active part in moulding its own future, and that as soon as a real United Nations Council sits down around a table covered with green cloth — green is the symbol of hope! — that the artificial, undeserved, obnoxious and contemptuous words

« cordon sanitaire » will be discarded, and the words « Central European Federation » will take their well deserved place of honor.

I think this is a big job to be done by America, by your Federation of 48 states, for a future federation of four, six, maybe eight European States.

* * *

Everybody in Europe counts on America. Everybody counts on American idealism. Everybody remembers that it was America that twentyfive years ago helped to free Europe from

imperialism — unfortunately, only temporarily.

Permit me to tell you a short story — true to life. You probably know that the courageous men who travel between Poland and England as liaison officers between our Government and our relentlessly fighting underground army, have several routes. I do not think I betray a secret if I tell you that most of them cross the mountains, the wild, forest-covered Carpathians between Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. A few weeks ago the liason officer who was called to London happened to be my very close and dear friend. After several hours march he reached an old lumber-jack's hut high and deep in the mountains. The old man, probably over seventy, did not know who his overnight guest was. My friend posed as a wandering lumber-jack. The two men talked long into the night — of course about the war and the postwar — exactly as in every Washington club. My friend seemed to the old backwoods-man very pessimistic. You know — frankly every Pole is that way right now...

The old lumber jack was much more optimistic, however. «You will see » — he said — « everything is going to be alright. Just wait and be patient. It will happen exactly the way it happened after the last war. We were under the Austrians, under the Germans, under the Russians, and finally — we were free. This time again Wilson will come and Wil-

son will free us as he did twenty-five years ago. Wilson will come, American will come! ».

« Well » — said my friend — « didn't you know that

Wilson is dead? ».

« Why » — said the old lumberjack — « do you believe German propaganda?!... The Germans are trying to rob our people of every hope. They are telling the people that Wilson is dead. Wilson is not dead — he lives and smokes large black cigars. And he will come and free us! ».

I think — Ladies and Gentlemen — that my friend's host knew something about America's role in the postwar world and — maybe — judging from the cigar — maybe also about Great Britain's role, too...

(« Tygodnik Polski », New York, No. 15 (67) April 9th, 1944).

OVERHEARD

While listening to the news an Englishman turns to a

Polish Corporal:

— I don't understand you Poles. Shouldn't you agree to concessions? It wouldn't be so bad for you. Anyhow, you would have your government, independence and Army. You could reconcile yourselves to having a delegate in Moscow. At worst you could become the seventeenth republic.

- O.K. Under one condition. We would like to be the

eighteenth republic.

- The eighteenth? Why???

— Because we are bound by alliance to Great Britain for life and death. If Great Britain is going to be the seventeenth republic — an hour later we'll be the eighteenth! (Verses written by Mr. A. P. Herbert, M. P. in an answer to a cartoon ridiculing the Poles in a London paper).

They fought him well, they gave him blow for blow, They fought the bully first,
When some said die, they should — do your worst!
When bigger men made treaties with the foe.

They yielded only to the front attack, When someone smugly stabbed them in the back; They fight him still, he cannot quench the flame; There is no Quisling with a Polish name.

They fight beside us — and it seems too soon
To kill a comrade with a Low cartoon.
A little « sensitive »? « Are we surprised »!
Four times partitioned, murdered, robbed, despised!

A hundred miles or so — why all the fuss? Those hundred miles did not belong to us, We can, of course, be cooler, calmer men; We're not partitioned every now and then.

No man has taken Oxford from us yet, No man says « Give us Scotland — and forget. » But if he did, I fancy we should strike The same proud poses that you so dislike.

Indeed, I wonder so severely tried,
Should we ally such patience with our pride?
It may be hard to help these loyal souls
But let us not insult them — honor the Poles!

(« Tygodnik Polski », New York, No. 12 (64), March 19th 1944).

IS THE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPE NECESSARY?

by MICHAŁ CIOŁEK

Come time ago Orzeł Biały printed a lengthy account of an article contributed to « Colliers » by Hiram Motherwell and dealing with European postwar reconstruction. Readers, unused to thinking about European problems in this way may have been surprised by the contents of this article. Only a few years ago it would have been regarded even in America as the eccentricity of a single individual; today it appears as the expression of the opinion of the younger people of his country, who aspire to exercise some influence. Its author is reputed to be an expert on such matters and a future leader of the work of reconstruction. His clear analysis, the work of an engineer, does not lack suggestiveness, particularly for those who are not acquainted with Europe. Mr. Motherwell is aware of the fact that Europe will emerge from the war in a state of semi-destruction and that, notwithstanding its great capacity for future development, it will lack the initial capital. He thinks that such capital must be granted by the greatest economic power, the United States, although he admits that a debt agreed upon under such circumstances could not be paid off, and a donation would not be unacceptable. He also suggests that help in organization might be furnished by the International Commission of the United Nations for the reschools are to be instructed in foreign administration and will construction of Europe, whose personnel in twelve American schools are to be instructed in foreign administration and will be paid in dollars. He rightly admonished his countrymen

that, if they will not take an interest in European matters, they will be facilitating the subjection of Europe by communism. He makes a mistake however, when he thinks that the European nations themselves « would look to Russia in order to learn from it how to renew the miracle performed by the Bolshevists out of the smoking ruins of Czarism »; anyway this warning is not destitute of substance and has its importance.

The cause of illusions.

For years we have been dreaming of a closer American interest in Europe; especially in its central eastern regions. Since the beginning of the war we have been watching with joy the abandonment of isolationism by America, and we regard the participation of the Army of the United States in the occupation of Germany as highly desirable; we realize the necessity of the participation of American capital in the reconstruction of Europe and in the promotion of industry in the countries « between the seas »; we consider that as a sound affair which will be profitable to both parties. How is it do be explained that Mr. Motherwell's views, which are the opposite of isolationism, arouse in our minds, instead of enthusiasm, a reaction calling for protest? How is it that we do not believe in their realization, that we are ready to oppose such a participation by America in the problems of our old Europe?

Well, Mr. Motherwell has studied European statistics; he is acquainted with its reserves of coal, petroleum and iron; he acknowledges without prejudice the organization set up by the enemy, he clearly realises the immense destruction caused by war; but evidently he has neglected the study of European « man ». He does not even show the slightest intention to comprehend him, and he does not realize that by

neglecting this important factor he causes the ideas, which he has elaborated with such care, to be as fragile as a pasteboard castle.

He does not know that the « homo oeconomicus », the human species whose conduct is based exclusively on economic terms, has never been widely developed in Europe; that this fertile simplification is conditioned by the recollection that it is merely a symbol; he does not realize that suffering caused by war, far from depriving European citizens of their longing for freedom and for rebuilding their lives, has increased their appreciation of the value of these things, which are not included in Mr. Motherwell's economic calculations, although they have been paid for with such enormous sacrifices. To this contempt of man is due his illusion that the Commission for reconstruction might obtain dictatorial powers from Europe by threatening the Continent to refuse to give any assistance. « Organization », according to appropriate conceptions introduced from abroad, is possible only in a virgin territory where human will practically does not exist, or in the territory of a vanquished enemy where such a will has been broken down and where its suppression corresponds to the conquerors' interest.

Europe has not for thousands of years been a virgin ground; and does not certainly correspond to the real interest of the United States to treat its countries as occupied enemy territory. Even the author of the article avows that his conception

will not arouse enthusiasm in Europe.

Although he considers the realization of his ideas necessary for Europe's welfare, he foresees that the man who will be placed at the head of the action of reconstruction may be referred to by the press as a despot, a car, and that he would not be shown high gratitude by the peoples that are to be rendered happy. It is certainly for this reason that Mr. Motherwell suggests the following proceedings in order to reach an agreement about the proposals for assistance. These

are to be forced upon the Axis powers through the laws of war; the governments of the occupied territories who have emigrated (the author avoids calling them allies) will in due course take a fancy to stipulate suitable agreements; we must suppose that this will happen through the well-known tactics of « allurement ». There would still remain some neutral countries; but these, being isolated, « will have so much to gain if they undergo the power of the Commission, and so much to lose in case they oppose it, that there is no doubt which way will be taken in their decision ».

A Bull in a China Shop.

But the reader might put forth this question. Would not it be romantic folly to refuse American aid which would be so necessary to save millions of men promptly, from hunger and distress only because the benefactor wants to make use of it according to his own will?

Although the economic dictatorship of the Commission is the most efficient factor for its work, although it will cease after it has fulfilled its task, although the European nations do not dispose of any well elaborated project of their own or of capable men and organized bodies, yet in view of the millions of disputes to be settled there is very little danger that Americans will permanently dominate Europe, not least because of their being so far away. Would it not be better then to resign one's precious sovereignty for sometime rather than to tolerate a long period of famine and perhaps arouse new troubles or new wars?

Mr. Motherwell protects us efficiently against such tempting doubts regarding the opportunity of American aid puting forward with full, brutal sincerity the principles according to which the Commission should rule.

The most important of these principles is to ignore politics. The author's attitude towards politics is dictated purely by hate. For instance, in order to justify the apparent absurdity of state control over the organization of the economic life of the various countries, he resorts to a demagogic pretext, by arguing that it is not the prime minister who digs coal out of the earth or drives locomotives, and that therefore he is not entitled to an opinion on the subject. Mr. Motherwell, however, forgets that the some reasoning might be used with regard to the leaders of the Commission; who also have not got to dig coal or burn it in the oven.

According to the author, the Commission should take no account of frontiers nor systems of government; it should not be concerned about anybody, it should not be bound by private or public laws. All that because of capitalism, which is opposed by the author to communism. But what is the value of such opposition if we must completely give up the legal bases on which our European civilization is based? War destruction is terrible, but it would be a capital mistake to suppose that after the war Europe will have nothing more to lose.

In the field of economics, as well in that of culture, the heirdom of thousands of years cannot allow itself to be annihilated in a few years' time, but it requires tender and expert care. The healing of war wounds must be accomplished in accordance with each nation's own tendencies, and the sooner it can be reached the easier it will be. If for a long time after the war it is made impossible for nations to recover their own life, thus making room for new subversions by external influences, such a consolidation of the negative results of war would lead to utter ruin. Mr. Motherwell evidently does not realize that this « capitalistic » conception of life is close to nihilism, which also aims at rebuilding the world ex novo, on a completely new basis, as it does not believe in the evolutionary improvement of what has been built by foregoing generations.

Let us suppose that after submitting to the sacrifices of war we agree on the successive sacrifice of submitting for some years to the administration of the Commission. What shall we get in return? What will be the aspect of cultured Europe, when it is eventually given back to the Europeans? It will be that of a monstrous productive giant. Mr. Motherwell places maximum production at the top of his graduated scale of aims and he believes that this will be possible only through a concentration of organization by means of great cartels and trusts. He therefore opposes frontiers and the individual manifestation of the will of each nation, and believes that after having accomplished the revolutionary reconstruction of the whole thus diffirentiated, in order to build up a huge production machine, the European peoples shall be neither able nor willing to go back to their own economic systems, because dismembering the new system would require too high an expense. Here lies the second danger of the scheme. A great effort will have been devoted to build up a structure which will deserve afterwards to be broken in pieces.

One may wonder whether a monopolistic organization of production is likely to guarantee superiority of efficiency. The enlargement of undertakings increases economic elasticity up to a certain limit, beyond which the heaviness of the mechanism, the difficulties of control and other factors counterbalance the advantages obtained by a more perfect division of work. Owing to electrification many industrial branches no longer require any technical concentration and aerial warfare is an argument for the dispersal of factories wherever it is possible. But the negative aspects of monopolization, such as the weakening of selection among plants and men, may set a check to progress.

On what basis should the social income thus produced be distributed? Mr. Motherwell does not directly answer this

fundamental question. But if the end is to be the development of production, the distribution of the income will be based only upon a strong increase of productive capital. From this viewpoint the economic politics which European countries will be completed to accept after the war, will bear no distinctive mark.

Does it result from the above that, when the work of the Commission comes at an end, Polish rivers will be regulated and a complex of road-system and railway-communication be available; together with many modern industrial factories, adequate to the requirement of the country? Not in the least. The scheme for Europe provides no guarantee that Poland will have an industrialized character. It will rather be the contrary. The Western economists and politicians always stated that it would be possible to attain the best distribution of work only if agricultural countries continue to require industrial products and supply food-stuffs, raw material and workmen in exchange. We know that this was the colonial role allotted by Hitler to the countries of Central-Eastern Europe within the German vital space.

But Mr. Motherwell chooses to found his organization upon the system built up by Hitler, only substituting 2% of the employees in posts of directive. Therefore the giant created by Germans for the advantage of the German economic organization, namely 98% under German administration, would still remain alive. How will Mr. Motherwell be able to give Poland or Lithuania any possibility of development? He is so candid as to not even promise such a thing.

Without any politics.

These attractive prospects for the countries which will win the war against Germany throw much light upon the author's opposition to politics: an illogical opposition indeed, if we are to accept it to the letter. The war, notwithstanding all economic statements, is a « political » one: The European Nations have taken up arms against the tentative imposition of an external political will under the foreign name of « new order »; they began fighting in order to safeguard the freedom of having and realizing their own will, and they are still fighting this life and death struggle. But Mr. Motherwell sees in politics only an artificial hindrance to the economic development and deludes himself with the hope of a complete abolition of the political factors. As a matter of tact, he arrives at the throughly political conception which we know only too well as Paneuropa under the protection of Germany. It is not material whether the author is aware of that. It will certainly be realized by the Nations whose destiny is involved. They cannot but realize that the millions of workmen, who are to be subjected to the organization built up by the Germans for their advantage, could have just as well accepted this role from Hitler in 1939.

Mr. Motherwell intentionally ignores the political contents of his own conception, and this will account for some remarkable omissions. We do not exactly know what he means by the word « Europe »: only from the last chapter we gather that, in his opinion, the limits of the Continent are marked by the Russian Western frontiers. How is intervention from beyond those frontiers to be avoided? Which armies are to watch the Commissions work? Which armies are to remain during the fulfilment of that work? We don't

know.

Very important politically is the complete disregard of Great Britain's co-operation in the whole affair. True, the Commission is styled international by the author, but on several occasions the United States are pointed to as the only arbitrators. The economic power of the United States is indeed greater, but during the first two or three years of the war Great Britain held the first place. As regards reserves, the British effort is greater than the American, and also greater are the British sacrifices.

It is on account of this effort and these sacrifices that, at the end of the war, it will be impossible to place England on the same economic level of America. To consider England for this reason as a «small » country, a country of « limited interests » is painful from a generally human point of view. This will arouse not only melancholy astonishment in England, but also sympathetic comprehension among the Poles, whose country is often, for the very same reason, treated as a «small » country of negligible importance... Fortune is revolving its wheel...

The will and need of a distinct existence, without excluding the organic union voluntarily accepted, are so strong that Europe could not agree with Mr. Motherwell's scheme even if she were threatened with the refusal of any assistance. Should such an artificial scheme be enforced upon Europe the Continent would take the first opportunity to break it into pieces. But this would compel Europe to accomplish a very great effort and to resign the prospect of raising its

standard of life for a generation or more.

The economic life of the United States has and will have after the war plenty of raw materials and capital. This will facilitate the employment of the whole population and a high standard of welfare, provided that proper markets are available for their export. Such markets are the great desire of American statesmen. Even after the weakening of Japanese competition China will require a very long time before she once more recovers a purchasing power proportionate to her population. Europe, on the other hand, is a very important market for American goods, and even industrial development will not prevent its importance from becoming still greater. But Europe must first receive the injection rightly referred to by M. Motherwell and must appreciate its advantage through the exchange of goods across the Ocean. Europe reduced to poverty and to a painful existence based only upon its own productive capital, Europe confined to economic isolation would turn out to be a disaster not only for American

capitalists but also for the American workmen.

This state of affairs is being more and more clearly understood throughout America, and although the co-operation with trusts and cartels of a Europe « organized » by Mr. Motherwell may be very attractive, the United States, in view of the utopian character of these schemes, will not refuse co-operation to an Europe which wants to organize itself.

(Orzeł Biały », IV. No. 13 (103), May 21, 1944).

AT BERCHTESGADEN CONFERENCE



HITLER: — I can't split myself. You have got to represent me on all fronts. I shall remain as the real Fuehrer in the GHQ.

FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN POLICY

by JAN ULATOWSKI

Poland's recent acknowledgment of the provisional French Republican Government (represented by the De Gaulle Committee) and the French-Polish political discussions are the first light which has been seen for a long time in the darkness of the continental politics.

It must be emphasized that the collaboration between Frenchmen and Poles at this juncture is based on their joint struggle against the conception of the « spheres of influence ».

The European nations and their statesmen watched the evolution of the Big Powers towards the would-be « realistic » conception of the « spheres of influence » in deep silence. This silence was just as alarming as the efforts of some emigrated governments to make « bonne mine au mauvais jeu ». The Polish-French initiative interrupted the process of sliding down an inclined plane, and makes it finally clear that Europe will never capitulate.

Besides its moral significance this fact bears a farreaching political significance. The fact that the Chief of the provisional French Government declared that Poland ought to be an « important factor on maintaining peace on the eastern frontier of Germany » proves that not only the Poles among Central Europeans realize on what political constellation the restoration of the organic balance of Europe depends. France and Poland are the two main pillars which bear the weight of Europe's safety. The present war proved this negatively, by demonstrating that the weakening of these pillars (by

interior decay in France and by isolation as in Poland), threatens to ruin Europe's safety as well as Europe's balance, which still remains the fundamental factor of a peaceful world.

Five years of war ought to have convinced the Anglo-Saxons that the experiment of making European stability depend on a Russian — German equipoise — was suicide. It is assumed that this idea represented an undeclared political intention of the continental policy of the great democracies, beginning from the day Hitler came to power. A strong Germany will always undermine the continental balance, and a German-Russian conflict can never be perfectly isolated. That this policy did not lead to Britain's defeat is due to Hitler's defects, that is to pure chance. The blind reinforcing of Russia's power, a clear consequence of the first mistake, created the danger which the Americans call « the 3rd world war ». Germany and Russia are no factors on which to base a continental equilibrium. A strong Germany and a strong Russia become centres of anti-European policy and the destiny of the Anglo-Saxons is still closely bound up with the fate of Europe.

Germany lies between France and Poland. All attempts to conceal this fact by insinuating that Germany's position is between Great-Britain and Russia do but emphasize the suicidal Anglo-Saxon mistake, which decided the character of this war. If Germany is not to rise again and become a menace to the safety of Europe and the world, she ought to be weakened, whereas France and Poland must be reinforced. This is the main aim on which the newly inaugurated French-Polish collaboration is based and there is hope that

this collaboration will be lasting.

The anti-European character of Hitler's policy is revealed by his attempt to establish tyranny in Europe. Europe never has tolerated and never will tolerate tyranny. The success of Hitler's attempt would mean the end of Europe. Successfull tyranny would reduce Europe to a mere appendix of Asia and as a matter of fact any tyranny imposed on Europe must

bring the same results.

The continental order, whose pillars are France and Poland as the present war has shown, is based on the principle of organic collaboration. Na European nation can be used as a means of attaining ends outside its own vital interests. Europe's unity is a result of mutual dependence and harmony of outlook between nations. Germany misunderstood this basic condition and tried to impose her own will on Europe. This is why all her experiments in trying to unify the Continent failed. No lesson and no re-education can force Germany into more than a verbal assurance. This we can testify today. The Germans are by nature unfit to lead imperialistic policies in a big way. Creative compromises are a complete mystery to them. Their solutions are always radical: they are solving the problems by pulling them out by the roots. Their lack of patience (which argues lack of real will-power) destroys all their greater aims. No philosopher will ever be able to teach them to think « in centuries ». Organic politics, i.e. politics based on evolution are foreign to the German spirit.

Hitler brought the German defects to perfection. He finally lost the mission of his nation, indicated by Germany's geographical position, to be the unifying factor in Europe. When brought to the test Germany failed. After this war Germany will cease to be the main subject of continental policy and become its object. Any policy for Europe must be based on Franco-Polish policy. These two nations are the natural continental allies of the Anglo-Saxons whose destiny

is so strongly bound up with Europe.

Tyranny pretends that the weak should yield to the strong; the European spirit claims that the strong should give place to the weak. By denying that truth, that is by attempting to introduce tyranny into Europe, the

conception of « spheres of influence » clearly shows its anti-European character. The realism of this conception is an illusion. Its realization would mean the prolongation of an underground Europe for decades, even for centuries to come. Poland, accustomed to fight underground for generations would most probably outlast this catastrophe, but Europe would perish first. If the conception of « spheres of influence » were to be realized it would make a « Balkan kettle » of Europe, in which civil wars and revolts would not end. Germany must be defeated, but the partition of Europe would not pacify the Continent. This is why this partition is of no interest to the Anglo-Saxons, whose own safety is linked with that of the Continent.

The principle that the strong must yield to the weak would naturally be binding for Poland in those regions in which she is the strongest country; regions, the unity of which is the condition of further existence for the Polish nation as well as for all the other countries of the « Middle Zone ». Poland must go back to that traditional policy of her Renaissance, when her power was due not to tyranny but to sacrificing leadership. Today, in a totalitarian period, leadership is often understood to be greedy. But strength cannot be an aim in itself. Strength imposes duties just like nobility. Power fulfils itself not by destroying but by constructing. This is the sort of power that Poland wants and this power will be set up by her and all the other nations of the « Middle Zone ». A strong and independent « Middle Zone » will be a guarantee of security for the eastern neighbours of Germany.

If the intervention of the United Nations in Europe is to fulfil its purpose its aim must be the creation of continental security based on the Polish-French system. If Poland is to play a rôle in the system of European security she must unify the countries of the « Middle Zone ». If this unity is not to remain a mere illusion Poland must pursue a policy of sacrificing leadership. Only they who make voluntary concessions

on behalf of the weak increase their power by combined strength. This is a completely unknown principle to all Asiatics — geographical and spiritual ones; this is the principle. which, through its contrast to totalitarianism grows out of the spirit of the « Middle Zone » and which will make the conception of the « spheres of influence » a reactionary nightmare.

(« Orzeł Biały », No. 22 (112), July 23rd, 1944).

CAPABLE YOUNG WOMEN

Archbishop Godfrey visited the Polish Paderewski Hospital in Edinburgh. In the surgical ward he had a long discourse with two patients. Their names were a few kilometers long and ended with — ski. They were wives of Polish servicemen.

— « Well » — the Archbishop said at last, — « who said all that nonsence about our language being difficult? You ladies speak almost faultlessly, just perfect your accent and... — »

- « But we are Scots by birth » - they both cried!

POLAND'S PLACE IN STALINS' POLICY

by ADOLF BOCHEŃSKI

It is very difficult to judge the living statesman. There always exists the fear that the future will bring forth some unexpected event, which will completely upset our opinion about him. It is nevertheless possible to state, without any great risk, that Stalin is a great politician and chief, who may compete with the greatest political leaders of Europe in the last hundred years. The destiny of our nation and state depends for a great part on his intentions regarding us. No time should be lost in piercing the misteries of Russian politics and their intentions regarding Poland.

There exist two conflicting interpretations of the present attitude of the chief of the Russian people. The first is that Stalin is no longer to be considered an orthodox communist, and that he is no longer guided by the principles of international communism, but by the requirements of the Russian state. The second one is that the world revolution continues to be the ultimate end of his policy and that Russia serves

only as the tool to attain to this end.

Although in my own opinion the second conception is more corrent, as far as the relations between Poland and Russia are concerned the two hypothesis seem to lead to the same conclusion. During the 27 years in which the collectivist system in Russia has existed the country has undoubtedly accumulated an enormous amount of practical experience and theoretical research which is necessary for every country which intends to follow the same course. Moscow is bound to be-

come the intellectual center for every part of the world which proposes to follow the collectivist system. As in XVIth century every one who wanted to study went to Italy, in XVIIth century to France and in the second half of XIXth century to Germany, so for long after the introduction of the collectivist system it will be necessary to look to Moscow. The old aim of Russian nationalism to make Moscow the «third Rome» after the Romes of Caesar and the Pope — the new center of Europe and Asia, is thus being realized. No doubt that the wide diffusion of the collectivist system is a matter of interest for the Russia of to-day.

If the greater part of the world were to accept this system, other new centers would be created after a while which would compete with Moscow. Certainly such an evolution would require some time, but is to be expected without any doubt. It is a matter for discussion whether Russian nationalism will find its best course in the introduction of communism in Germany or in the weakening of that country by means of an exaggerated parliamentary system, which would enable it to enforce a protectorate over Germany, as was already the case in the years between 1815-1850. We do not exactly know the prevailing trends in Russian politics, and we cannot foresee whether Stalin's actual intention is the introduction of communism in Germany. It is a matter for debate. We may be sure however, that the introduction of the collectivist system in any of the countries situated between Germany and Soviet Rossia would not threaten the supremacy of Moscow, but would on the contrary enlarge the sphere of Russian cultural and political influence.

The strongest national unit in this area is undoubtedly Poland. It does not seem possible that Polish communism could be strong enough to constitute a threat against the absolute supremacy of Russia in any kind of union founded upon an alliance between the two countries. It would seem therefore to be in the interest of international collectivism as

well as of the Russian state that communism should be introduced in the group of countries between Germany and Russia.

As regards Poland the Russia's policy has oscillated for

centuries between two possible solutions. The first of them is the union of the whole of Poland with Russia. The second is the separation from Poland of the territories inhabited by White Russians, Ukrainians and maybe even some parts of ethnical Poland. In Russian opinion the first solution would be the best of all. The second solution depends on the results of a compromise with the forces situated farther to the West of Poland. Indeed Catherine the Second's policy based upon the partition of Poland was only a substitute for the more ambitious scheme to incorporate the whole of Poland in Russia. After the victorious war against Napoleon Alexander the Frist aimed again at a complete union of the two countries. Nothing less than the coalition of defeated France with England and Austria was required to save the region of Posen for Prussia and Galicia for Austria, Russia's intolerance of the Polish Kingdom which emerged from the Congress of Vienna was a symptom of the second conception — it meant that Russia intended to keep the so-called occupied territories and would more or less abandon the rest of Poland to its own destiny. The most significant feature of this phase, apart from the Wielopolski reforms, was the intention, momentarily shown by Russia during the January insurrection (1830), to evacuate the population from the Congress Kingdom. The convinction that the ethnographical unit of Poland could not in any case surrender its sphere of influence in the East was the principal reason why this conception was only partially put into effect. Communist Russia has definitely resumed the program of the annexation of all Poland to Russia.

No doubt we must admit that communist Russia can master the resistance of the Polish People by means and ways far more efficient than those available in the times of Alexander II or Nicholas I. After the unsuccessful attempt to conquer the whole of Poland in 1920 we witnessed in 1939 the compromise with Germany, which represented an enforced return to the conception of a division, and in 1944 the tendency to annex the whole of Poland to the U.S.S.R. It will be remembered that Alexander I wished for a long period to give back the so called annexation territory to the Congress Kingdom hoping thus to the agreement of the Polish people to the union of the two nations. If the whole Polish territory were to be united with Russia, the frontiers between the two States would lose their significance. It seems therefore that writers are right when they say that by a close union with Russia it would be possible to obtain some concessions relating to the frontiers. Thus the wounded man would be spared the amputation of his leg, but at the cost of his life.

Let us say once more that the incorporation of Poland in Russia would be to the advantage both of Russian nationalism and Russian communism. The political tendency aiming at such a union must be therefore taken into account. Russia has so far been prevented from realizing such an ambitious scheme by the necessity of withstanding the German army and of managing a compromise with some other forces farther to the West. The fundamental problem of Russian policy towards Poland is concerned with such a relation between the two parties as will rouse the least possible resistance among the Western Powers. We thus arrive at a further object of our considerations. If we know the ultimate aim of Soviet policy we are also in a position to consider the means which will lead to such end.

The first and most important stage in the Russian schemes relating to the territories « between the seas » must be the military occupation of those territories. Until the Soviet army has occupied the countries between Germany and Russia, no collectivist system framed on the Russian pattern will probably be able to establish itself spontaneously, even in

Yugaslavia. The realization of this stage is subject firstly to the success of the Soviet army against the Germans. Only after the military occupation of the territories referred to above shall we see the actual restoration in those countries of such conditions as will make it possible to establish a communistic system and to annex them to Russia. Difficulties will then undoubtedly arise with the great Anglo-Saxon Powers to which Soviet Russia will have to give the most serious consideration. Should public opinion in the great Anglo-Saxon Powers be distinctly against the Russian annexation of the countries « between the seas », then it is possible that Russia may be compelled to withdraw either completely or partially from those territories. Russian policy has to be conducted in such way as to deal very cautiously with the Anglo-American public opinion.

The present situation may be described as follows: the English and Americans think almost unanimously that the Eastern areas of the Polish Republic ought to fall to Russia: but they are not prepared to accept the idea of Russia incorporating the whole Polish territory. We shall not take now into consideration the reasons for which public opinion in those countries is against Poland in the question of the areas on the borders of Russia (Kresy). We have here to do with a tragic misunderstanding. The prevailing opinion in England and America is that most of the inhabitants of our Eastern territories really wish to become a part of Russia. As a matter of fact the contrary is the case. Our civil propaganda and the inert policy of our minorities are responsible seems that this circumstance is the very key to the understandfor the origin of some of the false ideas entertained in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

But should at present the Soviet Union distinctly state that it wishes to incorporate the whole of Poland and to establish a communist system in it it would arouse such a strong reaction that all its plans would probably end in nothing. It ing of the Soviet policy towards Poland: This policy is clearly shown by the methods adopted by Russia in 1939 and 1940 towards the Baltic Countries. The outstanding features of this policy were a gradual activity, a slow penetration, the preliminary smothering of the differences existing between the decided supporters of the union with Russia and the supporters of good relations without any implication of political and social union with the U.S.S.R. It will be remembered that Russia did not proceed to any immediate annexation of the Baltic Countries; the Soviet Union was at first content with the formation of some coalition governments formed only in part by acknoledged communists and for the other part by the representatives of the so called « democracies ».

When about 1930, the first Negro entered the French cabinet, the German comic papers published some caricatures showing the probable composition of French cabinets in future years. In 1930 many bearded and moustached Whites were to be seen with only one Negro among them. In 1945 already a half of the cabinet was black and only the other half was white. Eventually in 1950 there was one moustached

White and all the others were Negroes.

A similar process is being undergone by the countries which are to be incorporated by Russia: The advantage of such a method is that during the transition period well informed people have time enough to hide themselves safely or

to fly away.

The Union of « Patriots » in Moscow shows by its composition that Marshal Stalin expects to adopt the same political method towards Poland: Among the leading personalities of the Union there are two that can by no means be suspected of sharing communistic ideas, namely, prof. Jacob Parnas and Mr. Andreas Witos.

The composition of the "Patriots" seems to show that the Russian Government are eager to impress upon public opinion the conviction that they do not wish to force a communist system on Poland; but the government prepared by them must be very similar to the Russian one.

The information available about the conditions existing in colonel Berling's divisions are intended to the same end. The emphasis placed on religious elements, on the functions of chaplains and so on, aim at establishing throughout the world the conviction that Berling's divisions are not to be considered as a communist army, but as a Polish army anxious to be on a friendly footing with Soviet Russia. Confusion may thus be set up in the public opinion of the Western countries which will facilitate a slow acquiescence in the evolution of Poland towards union with Russia.

A further stage in the endevour toward this end would be some form of union between the legal Polish government in London and the decided supporters of the annexation of Poland to Russia. Should such union prove to be unobtainable doubts could be suggested as to whether the Polish government in London really represents Poland; but, of course, for the realization of these schemes it would be more desirable that the government should first include certain supporters of the Soviets and afterwards gradually eliminate all bourgeois elements by means of the same methods adopted in the Balkans. A similar process may be observed in Marshal Tito's government. Although the principal positions are controlled by communists, the government is not a purely communist one. It is probable that after some time a uniform composition will be arrived at. The conclusion of this political process will no doubt be a properly elected Constituent Assembly which will unanimously decide upon the annexation of one state to the other.

It is quite unnecessary to remark that this scheme is carried out, a clear comprehension of the situation will be difficult for a stranger. The loss of Polish independence will come to pass so slowly and gradually that it will be really difficult to make out at what moment one ought to feel indignant.

In short, the whole programme could be carried out without any strong opposition from the Western Powers.

We must now consider the ways to hinder the execution

of this scheme.

First of all, we must react against any confusion in the composition of the government and against the blunting of the distinct limits between communists and supporters of the union with Russia on one hand, and true Poles on the other. The blunting of these limits is one of the principal aims of Soviet policy. What matters here is public opinion in the Anglo Saxon countries. In case the Russian political manoevre proves successful, the public opinion in those countries will no longer be able to have a clear perception of the Polish claims and of the dangers which threaten Poland. It produces a contrary effect. There is only one way to enable the Anglo-Saxon countries to have a clear perception of what is going on in Poland, and that is to keep Poland distinctly separated from the U.S.S.R. as well as from the few Poles who are ready to surrender to Russia: Only thus will the Russian policy be unable to attain its end, that is the incorporation of Poland without any political adventure and any scandal which might shock foreign consciences.

We must clearly realize that our political prospects rest to a great extent on the conduct of Great Britain and the United States. It is therefore essentially important to convince our allies that we are endeavouring with all our strength to assist them in the struggle against Germany and that Russian statements that there exists a Polish group favourable to « fascism » is mere nonsense. Mr. Romer expressed the truth very well when he said that such military successes as the battle by Cassino have a very favourable influence on our international position. We must bear in mind that in our present war against Germany we are striving not only for our Western frontiers but also for our Oriental territories.

Lastly, if we want our political aspirations to receive inter-

national consideration, we must place them on a more universal plane. The interests of the Polish Nation are far more important and valuable to us than to the strangers to whom we are addressing ourselves. They only care to see whether the claims of the Polish Nation are consistent with their interests; the question whether such claims are consistent with the Polish interests is not so very material for them.

our own case we should also raise the case of such neighbour-It is therefore of great importance that while supporting our own case we should also raise the case of neighbouring countries as they are in a similar or even worse position; the Baltic States, for instance, and in general the States « between the two seas ». Not only the government but each of us is concerned in these problems and it is quite correct to say that each soldier in foreign lands is an ambassador of his country.

(« Orzeł Biały », No. 17 (107), June 18th, 1944).

THE BALLAD OF MR. CHURCHILL

by KAZIMIERZ WIERZYŃSKI

(translated from Polish by Zuzanna Wieniawa-Dlugoszowska)

I.

There is a street in Warsaw they have called Churchill Street.

The name, carved by despair, in hearts forever will burn,

The whole town goes there at dawning, when lights and

[shadows meet,

Soldiers - to wait for battle, mothers - for their dead sons'

Soldiers - to wait for battle, mothers - for their dead sons return.

There is a street of Honor, in that defeated town
Keeping guard at the entrance, a ghost or a hero stands,
Watching for planes from England, after the sun goes down,
Watching for sailing warships, for men with arms in their
[hands.

2.

They flew higher, always higher, Above mist, and clouds and rain, They saw glory, they saw fire, They never came back again.

Their ashes fell on your island, What are ashes in a fight? Every morning white and silent Showed them Poland in the light. In your graveyards you can see them, In straight rows they calmly lie, This is war and this is freedom, You can fight, and you can die.

There they will stay forever, Blood-soaked, earth bound, lying deep, Finished danger and endeavor, They have flown, and now they sleep.

They've been sleeping for a year, And every grave understands, And every grave wants to hear, If someone still calls them friends.

They've been sleeping since September, Listening to wind and dew, Is there someone who remembers, Is there someone who is true.

Those who lie listening there, Those who first began the fight, Will still fight when you despair. It's their custom, it's their right.

3.

Infantry is in God's keeping,
In damp ditches fighting, sleeping
Through the Autumn long and cold.
Over Europe tanks are crawling,
Leave your home when freedom's calling,
As your fathers did of old.

He had heard right from the start: Help is coming, don't lose heart, You have allies in this war. He fought, dying and surrounded Even when retreat was sounded In France and in Singapore.

Under skies that knew no pity, At the gates of some strange city, He fell, giving all he had. So that war might have a meaning, So that sin might find redeeming For the living and the dead.

He goes under stars and sun, When there's fighting to he done, And dies well, if die he must. They are old friends death and he, From my country to your sea They have shared blood and dust.

Death is a fair price to pay,
For new hope, for harvest day,
For the end of endless night.
He knows, and has always known
That to see the Polish dawn
He must die and he must fight.

Even fields that we call ours,
White fields, rich in fruit and flowers,
Cry for vengeance bearing wheat.
Every Pole who lives and hears
Will give blood and sweat and tears,
But will not accept defeat.

Against all the earthly powers, For your freedom and for ours, He will carry on the fight. If you need him, he'll remember We've been allies since September. It's his custom, it's his right.

4

When a convoy wound its northern way With help for Russia in Russia's dark day, Alarm was sounded, and flares sent flying. Ships changed their courses to engage the foe. In that convoy, as perhaps you know, There were Poles fighting and dying.

Did our sailor carrying out orders, Recount his grudges, and define new borders Did he discourse about pacts and conditions? Or did he fire when orders were given, Forgiving more than could be forgiven, And waisting no ammunition.

Guns kept on cackling in the foreign night, Men lost their limbs, and men lost their sight, Moans of the crippled were all you could hear. A wounded sailor lying with the rest, With a last effort tourned towards the west, And whispered: Poland is near.

There were two doctors, and I wonder why Have doctors for men who wanted to die, Knowing death was their only inalienable right. The sounds of battle tore the air again. Make way, dead friends, make way, gentlemen, For those who live and who fight.

The dead were buried under Russian stones, Northern earth piled above the white bones Of men who came to help their fighting brothers, Performing deeds which no one else would dare. Outcasts and paupers, still ready to share Their shreds of freedom with others.

Those who were living washed the decks of blood, Leaned at the reeling, and wondering stood. When would they sail the ocean again? And would their destiny be always the same, To fight lost battles in their honor's name. And were they fighting in vain?

And when they sailed on their unknown way, They heard below deck a mouth organ play About fields and orchards lying in the sun, About wheats and wind rustling a sweet song. When would they return? The way is so long, So much remains to be done.

5.

There is a street in Warsaw they have called Churchill Street. A mother stands there now, helpless, her dead son at her feet. Sharp frost sets on his body, sharp wind obscures her sight, How can I warm you, help you, is there no end to the night? There is no place for your body, death has been raging five years. The grave of every sailor killed in the north—is here. How can I hide you, save you, keep you until the end? Over every soldier and sailor a helpless mother stands. Over those who left in the night, and before sunlight fell down, A ballad lingers, and whispers and wanders around the town.

6.

Sir, there's one thing you cannot do Though the world knows you to be brave, Strong and determined. Even you Cannot destroy the faith we have.

You have been called upon to steer To safety the ship of state, Not to give up what you hold dear, Not to resign and liquidate.

Did our soldiers, our nation, Choose to fight, dying where they stand, To lose through foreign negotiation Half our people, half the land?

Perhaps someone, somewhere, some day, Might cheat you, giving black for white, Through blood and tears make their way In triumph. Yes, we know they might.

But if it happens, do not try
To call eternal evil: good,
Do not explain and justify.
Talk about peace and brotherhood.

Three times in a hundred years
Poles took up arms in hopeless fight,
Trusting a better day was near.
Such was their custom, and their right.

We have fought against alien might Alone, not very long ago, And shall we now give up the fight, Shall we change our customs now?

We ask no price before we die, We want no barter and no pay, Our land is where the white fields lie, And ripen in the heat of day.

We did not follow your fighting way, Die in Tobruk and die in France, To have our own walls rock and sway To make room for a foreign dance.

So do not tell your countrymen Long peace will come after this war, For if a wrong is done again Bloodshed and strife must start once more.

What lies ahead is not yet clear, We cannot tell what fate will bring. Let us return to town, and hear A ballad the unconquered sing.

7.

There is a street in Warsaw they have called Churchill Street. Freedom stands at the entrance, fighting despair and defeat.

8.

There is a street in Warsaw they have called Street of Pride. It goes through ruins of glory, it hears the calls of the dead The ghetto cries out from darkness: this name cannot be denied To proud bones that like watch-dogs at freedom's feet are laid.

9.

On the street of honor simple men lead their simple lives. They're soldiers

They wait for battle
And sharpen, sharpen their knives.

(« Tygodnik Polski », New York, No. 14 (66), April 2nd, 1944).

FAIR PLAY

I mmediately after liberation of Cherbourg it was publicly stated that the military authorities had handed the civil administration of the French cities over to the French auhorities. It is certainly natural that, as it becomes possible, the proper authorities — in this case the French ones — should begin to exercise their functions. It neither thwarts nor delays further military operations, but is, on the contrary, of considerable help. It is also patent that those who are best acquainted with the local environment and its possibilities are best suited to use them in favour of war activities. There is above all an immediate proof of the truth that by fighting for liberty we reinstate it everywhere!

And yet to us Poles this obvious and indisputable point of view sugests many thoughts. We think about our own country and about the way the same problems are treated there. The difference which occurs in this respect between France and Poland is striking. So is the lack of logic in the paradoxical situation which exists on these two war fronts.

Whatever might be our attitude towards the « French Committee of National Liberation » transformed recently into France's provisional Government, we must point out that the Polish governement possesses at least as sound a legal basis. Whatever our opinion may be about the opposition put up by the French nation against the Germans, we must admit that a legal and constitutional French government concluded an armistice with the Germans and passed out of the war

afterwards playing the rôle of an obedient satellite of the German Reich. We do not write this in order to reproach the French or to diminish the importance of the part they will probably be playing in post-war Europe. We only want to point out the difference which exists from the legal point of view between France, which officially capitulated, and Poland whose authorities never broke off the war with Germany.

We make this statement in order to bring out clearly difference that exists between the liberation of France which capitulated and that of Poland, which has been the most faithful and the most self sacrificing Ally of the Western world

in this war

Independently of the Polish-Soviet misunderstandings as regards boundaries we must state that all Polish territories which were recovered from the Germans should have been immediately handed over to the Polish administration, at least to the civil Polish administration because, even if the problem of the boundaries is solved only after the war is ended, it must be admitted that until that time Poland must keep her prewar limits.

Since the authorities of Fighting France are not France's constitutional government, governments of other countries might make some reservations with regard to the legal foundations on which these authorities are supposed to be based, whereas no one can question the legal basis on which the authority of the Polish President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces is founded. And yet, these provisional French authorities immediately receive the control and administration of the reconquered French territory, whereas in Poland, not only military rule, but also the civil administration is exercised by Foreign Troops of Occupation, even on territories recovered a long time ago.

Once again Poland is invaded, this time by the Soviet

troops entering from the East and from the North.

In the light of Cherbourg's example, and in the light of

the above mentioned comparison we must claim rather than beg that Polands' sovereign right be respected in every part of Poland from which the Germans have been expelled, and that whereever it is possible the Polish administration be reinstalled as speedily as possible.

This problem must be elucidated and settled not only for the common interest of nations fighting against the Germans, but because it is an Elementary Act of International Honesty whereby the truthfulness and loyalty of cobelligerant nations

will be demonstrated.

(« Gazeta Polska », Jerusalem, No. 158 (901) July 7th, 1944).

« WELL INFORMED »

The always «well informed» communistic London newspaper the « Daily Worker » writes:

« Poland was ruled by a military clique assisted by Fascist terrorists. Peasants and workmen earned their daily bread by denouncing their leaders to the police. »

How many leaders they must have had, to provide bread

and work for them all, for several years!

LWOW AND WILNO

BASTIONS OF THE POLISH NATIONALITY

In the life of peoples and states there are certain natural rights which cannot be left out of any reckoning and which cannot be forgotten or misinterpreted. To trample on these rights would be criminal. Could anybody doubt that the soul of the French Bretons belongs to the great French family? Long ago England struggled with France for the possession of Normandy until England was obliged to recognise that the Normans, who after some centuries of life on the British Islands had become English had by living for the same period of time on French soil become French and represented one people with the native French population, though of different origin. Alsatians and Lorrainers have struggled for the right to belong to the French fatherland. To break the spiritual union between Englishmen, Welshmen and Scotchmen would mean doing an injury to the body of what has become a single people, composed of three races bound together by centuries of history.

As in the past, so to-day Poland has its racial problems. For centuries we have struggled against German pressure on our west borders, on our Baltic coast and in valley of the Oder.

For years we have struggled for the Polish strain in Silesians, Pomeranians and Kashubes.

In the East we have struggled for the Polish race in the Czerwinsk (1) area which for centuries past has been linked with the history of Poland.

⁽¹⁾ Better known as Galicia.

The population of this country has increased in number and in prosperity thanks to the Polish government; and though war has frequently raged on the east borders the country has lived in peace thanks to the watchfulness of the Polish soldier. In this land, so abundantly impregnated with the blood of Polish knighthood and of Polish sons there arose very early a bastion of the Polish nationality: LWOW. During the last war the Czar of Russia tried to take this country into his possession despite the will of the population who had a different western civilization, a different language, a different religion, and a different mentality. On the opposite border - in the north: rises the second bastion: WILNO, the cradle of a great European federation though originally divided by wrangles and disputes. It was the Polish who brought this beautiful land nearer to western civilization, as it had done with the Czerwinsk Area. It was the Polish people who came to the Lithuanians with the cross — as a sign of love, and with bread and salt — symbol of fraternity.

In this land the union of the peoples grew strong for some centuries, the same kind of union as the one between Bretons and French or between English, Welsh and Scotch. This union was broken by the Czar of Russia. From Wilno the light of Polish culture spread over all the country, over other lands in the far east, and even over Poland.

In the period of insurrections this country struggled with Warsaw for the liberty of the Nation, for the independence of the whole state, Lwow and Wilno included. The last insurrection (1863) lasted longer here than in the rest of the country because the number of pitchforks to arm the patriots was larger here than elsewhere.

In this land were born Kosciuszko, Mickiewicz, Traugutt and Pilsudski.

This land holds the tombs of the greatest Polish patriots and for this reason it competes with the Czerwinsk Area, where the graves of the youngest soldiers — almost children

— of the new Poland, are to be found. Peace must be built on mutual understanding and on harmony among peoples. The time when dynasties did what they wished with countries is over. Since then humanity has taken a big step foward towards a more idealistic interpretation of the will and destiny even of the smallest peoples which inhabit this planet.

(« Gazeta Polska », Jerusalem, No. 146 (889), June 23rd, 1944).

[«] In Poland, war has made men equal in sacrifice, suffering, resistance and fighting. When we liberate Poland we shall all have an equal right to freedom, work and education ».

[—]General Wladyslaw Sikorski (1881-1943), Speaking to a labor delegation in Detroit, Michigan, December, 1942.

SABOTAGING THE OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES AND SABOTAGING PEACE

From Stresemann to Hitler and back.

It is often said that the Germans have forgotten nothing and have learned nothing. This might be true if it were reduced to its proper proportions. The fact is that Germans have forgotten nothing, but for that very reason, contrary to the other nations who are inclined to forget, they remember the course followed by events and manage to learn their lesson and thereby improve their methods. What they have not learned, and will never learn, is that every German represents one individual only and not a figure which gives value to a number of noughts placed behind it.

In no country in the world has the historian so much to say as in Germany. The analysis of the past is for the German nothing else but a collection of means to gain his ends for

the future.

The unchangeable German Policy.

The following is suggested to us by items of news which have appeared in the Press and have passed almost unnoticed. These items of news deserve to be thoroughly underlined because they refer to the younger generation of Germans. Twenty six years ago, when the first World War was drawing to a close, the German Press began to devote ever growing space to the problems inherent in education in general and in school problems in particlar. It is a strange fact that humanitarian ideals of peace and international collaboration were being

preached at the very moment when official propaganda was trumpeting conquest and victory to the young generation of Germans. Today Hitler's Press is again anxious about the future of the younger generation.

Anxiety concerning spiritual elite.

A solution of this problem should have been found long ago to judge by the instructions issued by Hitler, Baldur von Schirach and others, but instead... strange words appear in Goebbels' « Das Reich » and in the « Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung », the mouthpiece of the German General Staff. These papers insist on the fact that the Nation's spiritual elite is gradually disappearing and that the new recruits cannot be compared with the old ones, either as regards their number or their courage. That is how the alarmed German professors express themselves; those very same professors, who, up to a short while ago, supported the « Wehrwissenschaft » (« military science ») which was considered to be the only science worthy of a German.

The Younger Generation Speaks.

Goebbels, a great master of lies and suppression of the truth, printed in his weekly paper « Das Reich » letters received by young heroes at the front which are full of grievances against the « deep solitude » into which they have been thrown during these years of hard fighting. One can see that something is breaking loose in German psychology. The system of shortening the road which leads to mature manhood and of basing the entire system of education on warlike activity, is not well accepted by the younger generation of the Junkers and Hitlerian State. The General Staff goes even further and condemns the lack of sound and concrete studies, asking that the attitude taken up by the younger generation towards war work should be revised.

It is asserted that it is necessary to fight for the young people's future in the same way as for military objectives. On the one hand then we see young people who show open disgust for war and are overtaken by a sense of emptiness and dispondency. They are conscious of the fact that their country has been defeated ant that they are not properly prepared to meet the consequences of this defeat.

On the other hand, according to responsible authorities, we have confirmation of this frame of mind in the official anxiety to transform soldiers who are physically strong, but have few brains, into strong-minded individuals, full of initiative and good economic specialists.

At the same time on the 1st of April, on Hitler's instructions, the whole male population of Germany began « volun-

tary drilling exercises ». To what end?

In April last a meeting took place in a German city of all the Mayors and Chiefs of the S.S., presided over by Himmler. The chiefs of the Security Service, Kaltenbrunner, and of the Territorial Administration Fiehler, were also present. With this meeting the decentralization of the Reich was supposed to begin, with the purpose of rendering easier the defence of each separate Province of the Country in case of a collapse in the system of communications caused by enemy invasion.

But is defence the real and only purpose? It is doubtful. British democracy was able to base its defence system on the « Home Guard » i.e.: the armed population. The Germans only created their « Landwehr » in 1942 and it is badly armed and low in numbers, the task entrusted to it being mainly that of a police force.

It is very doubtful whether the S.S. will allow the entire population to be armed, despite their spirit of subordination and their fanaticism. The real purpose of the measures taken

must therefore be a quite different one.

Very few people paid attention to the modest item of news revealing that in the two « Ordensbürgen » (training-schools for young Fuehrers) a few hundred students and young officers are undergoing a systematical training in methods of sabotage and political conspiracy. In this little item of news an explanation may be found of the latest instructions for « defence » as well as of all that has been said about the « antimilitarist » campaign. It would be a mistake to try to distinguish between the ideas set forth by the Junkers and those attributed to the SS. No, we find ourselves face to face with a well prepared plan for a long-term policy of activity.

Peace is a conception unknown to the German. In 1935, when the Reich was preparing to launch new attacks, the « Deutsche Wehr » wrote quite openly « war is the secret master of our country and peace only represents an armistice

period between two wars. »

There is no reason to suppose that the chiefs of the SS or even those Generals who use a different language from an enemy radio-station would revolt against war, but rather against the slackness of their leaders. When as a result of the disappointment caused not by the war, but by the failure of the Nazi leaders, the «general strike» of the defeated army breaks out, or to use the other words, there is a «German Revolution», then the new war to win the peace will begin.

In politics it is power that triumphs. But if power is wanting it is possible to fight against an idea. These words were spoken by the winner of the Nobel prize for peace, Dr. Stresemann, in a speech delivered during a meeting of the German People's Party, held in Berlin on November 29th 1924. The German Peace Leader's theory was adopted in full by the Nazis. « Comrade » Dietrich is not fighting for the « grandeur of Germany » but like William II for European

Culture and Civilization, and even for the « Seid umschlungen Ihr Millionen » of the Jew-Free-Mason Schiller. « We must all learn to become European ». This was the order given in 1923 by Von Buelow (« Der Versailler Voelkerbund » page 335) and it will serve as a lead for tomorrow German pedagogues.

These « Neo-Europeans », armed with German technical science, will according to the plans of the General Staff, be the cornestone of German economic reconstruction after the war. They will become goods for export, offered by a new Stresemann to Europe which has been deprived by the SS

of all intellectual vigour.

When this species of dumping floods a Europe which has been economically ruined another People's Party will proclaim as it did 25 years ago, that the German population « has the right to collaborate in the spiritual and moral education of peoples which have an inferior degree of culture and civilization ». This is a thesis which was proclaimed in Leipzig on October 19th 1919 and we know only too well — in 1944 — what these words mean when spoken by a German.

This will only be one part of the plan to prepare for

another war.

Under the disguise of Pacifists.

While Stresemann was gluing little wings to the little angels of peace represented by the Junkers of the various German Embassies, acts of subotage were multiplied in the Rhineland and in Ruhr in order to disorganize the economy and administration of the country, and so paralise the function of the Occupation Authorities.

At the same time in Germany the blows inflicted by the Black Reichswehr, the volleys of the Freikorps and the truncheons of the Stahlhelm destroyed all that might have constitued a basis for a real peace policy. Thus a colossal military

conspiracy, operated by the « liquidated » General Staff, kept in their hands the Social-Democratic Ebert Cabinet, as well as the industrial enterprises of Stinnes and Krupps which were to be the arsenals of the new armaments.

It would be wiser not to forget that the first part of the sabotage activity aimed aigainst the peace plan, i.e. the struggle against occupation, is today a question of principle much more important for the Germans than in the year 1918-1919. It is no longer a question of this or that piece of territory, but of the sovereignty of the whole Reich.

The victory of the Allies would only mean the defeat of the present German Army, until such time as Germany is capable of organizing a new Army. Occupation, however, would mean the complete elimination of such a possibility

and the collapse of German imperialism.

After the last war the economic bankruptcy which followed the occupation of the western Ruhr only meant a pause in all the plans to sabotage the peace. Should the occupation of the Reich take place now, the first thing which the Germans would try to do would be to disorganize the regime imposed by the occupation authorities. This would constitute the first and most efficient condition for the re-birth of German im-

perialism.

Although the sabotaging of peace after the first World War was really effective it had its weak points. Especially at the beginning it needed not only a uniform plan, but also a centre from which orders could be issued and plans elaborated. Those who had been excluded from economic and social life of the country were not, psychologically speaking, ready to take any action. Only a clear manifestation of the social consequences of the war, especially the collapse of the middle classes and the intelligentsia, created a kind of bond for the reconstruction of those powerful elements capable of assuming the government of the country.

Underground Forces.

After this war the situation will be quite different. To-day there certainly exists a centre for the organization of sabotage, disguised under another name, which will look after the activities of its members who belonged to the Hitler-Jugend and the SS. These members are undoubtedly undergoing a special training and will act according to pre-established plans, to carry out particular tasks, either of political or of a military nature. Those who belong to these organizations are destined afterwards to be the leaders of those groups of citizens whom the Reich, after its defeat, intends to eliminate from the public life of the country. These cathegories will be made up by members of the SS, the Gestapo, Party officials etc. These people, incapable of leading a normal life and threatened by the justice of the European peoples, will try to find their way out in the struggle against the justice represented by the occupation authorities. The younger generation of Germans who for a long time past have been trained to commit every sort of depraved crime, and who have been prepared to fight a partisan guerilla in the event of Germany's defeat, will form the basis of all activities for sabotaging peace. Already in 1938 Dr. Schramm, told the young Germans during a meeting that was held at Tilsitt, that « the bullets of your rifles must whizz everywhere and the whole world be plunged in chaos before the holy and eternal Reich collapses ». This kind of people will attempt anything. For them such actions as « Schlageters » will be like mere child's play.

The first aim will be the disorganization of the Regime of the Occupation Authorities.

This will probably take place not so much through attempts against military forces and perhaps not even through individual acts of terrorism, as through the destruction of supplies and communications, as well as through the disorganization of the economic and administrative life of the

country. The end in view will be always the same: to cause chaos everywhere and create such conditions that the occupation will become an absurdity and the occupation authorities be compelled to give up any idea of mastering the situation without the help of the Germans themselves.

Hidden Centres of Sabotage.

Hidden centres of sabotage will be left behind by the Germans in the countries already liberated. They will have at their disposal groups of «Volksdeutsche» and war criminals; they will exploit the terrible destruction and the confusion deliberately left behind by the Germans in their withdrawal; they will hinder every sort of national reconstruction

and the building up of Europe's economic system.

If they succeed in rendering the occupation inefficient and disorganize all European reconstruction works, the moment will then come when a vast development of the activities of the partisans, carried beyond German boundaries, will compell Europe to give up all idea of guaranteeing a lasting peace to the world. In this way the Germans will have once more perfect freedom to act as they want to. Then the day will perhaps come for the full realization of Mahraun's fantastic plans. Mahraun, the Grand Master of the Order of the Young Germans, had twenty years ago foreseen the change over from sabotage and a defensive guerilla into offensive action and a great nationalistic uprising of Germany and Communist Russia against Europe.

The road towards deceit.

Sabotage and guerilla will have, apart from their own particular duties, also other tasks to carry out. In 1918, the socialist Ebert, who in his heart was always an imperialist and in perfect agreement with the Junker Groener, blackmailed the Allies by threatening a Communist revolution,

and thus achieved the maintainance of the Reichswehr; in other words the opportunity to organize the future army of Hitler.

The democratic Government of the Fourth Reich, by exploiting its ostensible peace policy, and the « free German » General Seidlitz, by identifying himself with the moral policy of all free nations, will work in such a way as to allow some new Stresemann to save Prussian militarism as the only power upon which Europe's peace and democracy can depend.

This will only be the beginning. Just as the Social Democrate Schoepflin did at Weimar in 1919, the members of the new Cabinet of the Fourth Reich will complain like true « good Germans » that it was a « cruel irony of fate » which gave the « most powerfull military power of the world the humiliating rôle of a police force ». If it is not the Social Democracy as in 1920, it will be some other pacifist Party which will arise before the world to deplore the reactionary character of the Reichswehr and to ask the re-organization of another « people's army », raised by compulsory conscription to guarantee democracy and the peace of the world. When Europe, moved by a « feeling of justice » recognizes that the Germans have equal rights with the rest (if in the meantime they have not already grasped such rights themselves), then History will repeat itself from Stresemann to Hitler.

It is of no consequence whether Stresemann Number 2 is getting ready for his new duties in London or in any other capital of the Allied nations, or whether he is the aide-de-camp of one of these « independent » generals, or is serving his ap-

prenticeship at an Ordensburg.

The agreements signed with Germany may be different from those of 1918, and other people may carry out the negociations, but the duty allotted to them will not change, neither will Germany's aims alter.

Nazist dreams? Complaints of pessimists of Fifth column? Not at all. It will be simply the resume of plans which are actually ready, written in a clear hand in both the old and the modern history of Germany. Bismarck used to say that the only diplomatic camouflage he ever used was to publish his real plans so that nobody would pay any attention to them until such time as they were actually carried out.

Hitler might have said the same thing. Today we shrug our shoulders before the « dreams » and « impotent threats » of the leaders of the German revenge of the future. We ought, instead to be greatly concerned in what « those other Germans » (Gen. Seydlitz & Co) say, because they will constitute the screen behind which the real predestined leaders of the German soul are making their preparations.

(« Gazeta Polska », Jerusalem, No. 156 (899), July 3rd, 1944).

THE SAME METHODS ARE STILL IN FORCE

Have the Baltic Republics, i.e. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, a right to live as independent states?

The former President of the Estonian Republic, Augustus Rei, has just written a book on the question which was pu-

blished in Stockholm by the Baltic Committee.

In it the former President describes in chronological order the events which took place from Autumn 1939 up to the Spring of 1940.

He writes chiefly about Estonia, but at the same time he introduces facts which are connected with the fate of Lithua-

nia and Latvia.

From these authentic statements; made by a man belonging to the highest hierarchy of the State, it appears obvious that the methods used in 1939 and 1940 to deprive these countries of their independence were the same as those being now enforced.

The Soviet Union, while making one statement after the other about its wish to maintain good neighbourly relations with the « mighty Republics of her western frontiers », has carried out political and technical manoeuvres which completely destroyed all possibility of collaboration with these countries. As a matter of fact by these moves she « folded in her affectionate arms » all her neighbours.

As was to be expected, before these moves began « free patriots » started activities in each of these Republics with the avowed intention of creating conditions of security but in reality their aim was to work for the benefit of Soviet Russia.

As human nature finds it easier to remember things that happened long ago than those which have occured recently it will be advisable to give a resumé in chronological order of the most important dates in the story.

In September 1939 the three Baltic States signed a Pact of friendship with Soviet Russia. By this Pact the Soviets obtained permission to use a number of ports in the three Baltic Republics as naval bases and at the same time, to keep garrisons at the most strategically important points in these States. They also obtained the use of certain airports.

The Soviet Government stated in a formal declaration that in no case would Soviet Russia violate the sovereignty of the Baltic States, neither would she try to influence their economic and political life.

On June 21st, riots broke out in the streets of Tallinn and by a queer coincidence the same thing happened in Riga and Kaunas on the same day. Russian soldiers and sailors took part in the Tallinn riots.

They had their bases at that port. The Russian battleship, « Marat » at anchor in that port, pointed her guns at the city.

That same day the Governments of the three Baltic States were reconstructed according to the wishes of Moscow.

Estonia's Cabinet was a sort of compromise, under the leadership of Prime Minister Vares. The Prime Minister of Lithuania became a journalist, a certain Paleckis, and that of Latvia was Professor Kirchenstein.

The three Governments simultaneously sent a declaration to Moscow in which they emphasized their feelings of deep friendship and good neighbourliness towards Russia, while the explanations given by them to their respective populations were that it was absolutely necessary to obtain Russia's confidence and good will.

During that period the Presidents of Estonia and Latvia

continued their activities as the same constitutional form still existed in both countries, but the President of Lithuania, Smetona, left the country when Soviet troops entered it.

On July 6th 1940 the Estonian Government decreed Parliamentary elections in order that the Cabinet of Prime Minister Vares might show that it was carrying out the wishes

of the people.

Though, according to the Estonian Statute, the elections proclaimed on July 6th could only take place on August 10th, it was decided to fix them for July 14th. At the same time, a revision of the voting system was introduced, so that a vote could be recorded by means of a substitute.

A Soviet observer was sent to each of the three Baltic States on the occasion of the elections. Zdanov was sent to Tallinn, Wyszynski to Riga and Dekanozov to Kaunas, and during the election the programme of the Communist party was made known. This program aimed at close collaboration with the 22 representatives of the other political groups which together formed a Party known under the name of « Block of the Working Classes ». At the same time, Blocks of coalition among the parties were created in the three Baltic countries.

There was no difference whatever in their political programmes or, to be more exact, the only difference was that each program was written in the language of the country

in which it was published.

Theoretically those belonging to other Parties which were not members of the Block could take part in the elections as candidates but these candidates were afterwards rejected by the electoral commission, because in their programmes they affirmed the principle of freedom of the press, free speech and free assembly, on the ground that such freedom might be used to the detriment of the people and of the Nation.

Instead, on July 14th 1940, day of the elections, an official

declaration issued by the Estonian Government stated that « all rumours of a proposal to establish a Soviet Regime in the Sovereign Territory of the Estonian Republic were false ». A similar official declaration was published on the same day in the official Journal of the Latvian Republic.

On July 21st, 1940, the opening of the Latvian and Lithuanian Parliaments took place. At the opening meeting it was decided that the two Republics would join Soviet Russia. The following day the same decision was taken by the new Estonian Parliament. In Estonia, as in Lithuania and Latvia, not all the new members of the Parliament were ready to give up the independence of their Country so lightly. However strong pressure was placed on them by using the same system of which the Lithuanian Minister to Stockholm, Itnas J. Scheynius wrote in 1940. The Lithuanian Minister then stated that the deputies of the Lithuanian Parliament had received a communication, according to which they would be « shot » if they did not vote for Soviet Russia. This statement was recently confirmed by the Social Democratic Mayor of Kaunas, Dr. A. Garmus, who was a member of the Lithuanian Parliament elected by the Block of the Working Classes in the summer of 1940.

On October 1st 1940, Commissar Molotov made a speech during a meeting of the Council of Commissars of the People. In the course of this speech he said that the « Baltic Countries had proceeded to the free Parliamentary elections according to the democratic laws ». On this occasion the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Nations had made a choice of their representatives, who had unanimously declared that they were in favour of giving a Soviet Regime to their respective Countries and were in favour of their being annexed to the Soviet Union.

Political events in the three Baltic countries developed even more rapidly than in the animated film cartoons where at least the stories do not pretend to be serious. Declarations of compromises made by the Governments of the Baltic Republics and the friendly declarations of the Soviet Government followed one another like toasts during a banquet, but unlike the animated cartoons, the story had no « happy anding », and those who spoke so cordially as hosts were bitterly disappointed.

Biol. Jas. Biuletyn Zołnierza APW », Palestine-Egypt, May 19th, 1944).

HERE AND THERE

We are living in a very complicated epoch, full of intricacies and contradictions. On the one hand the Polish Forces in Italy gain brilliant victories, snatch Italian towns from the Germans and destroy the man-power of our eternal enemy, on the other our own soil has become a battle ground for Germany and Russia. Our hearts tremble with anxiety for the fate of our cities and villages, for the fate of their inhabitants, and for the political future of our country. These truths are so clear and well known that there is no need to talk about them in undertones. The soldier who is fighting at Monte Cassino or Ancona for the cause of Poland and the freedom of all nations posesses the right and has the obligation to care for Wilno or Lwòw, to show sollicitude for his own country; for the Polish nation.

In this connection let us establish certain indisputable facts. It is certain that there is no question of recovering the independence of Poland and of reconstructing the Polish State so long as the Germans are not definitively defeated; for the Germans have determined to delete the Polish State from the map of Europe and are still trying to realize this aim by the most monstrous means. Our struggle and our victories in Italy — and in every spot where Polish Forces are fighting — are an inestimable contribution to the common victory of the Allied Nations. By destroying the German divisions on Gustav line or on the Adriatic coast we help to wipe out the

reserves of the invaders who hold a considerable part of Polish territory in their grasp.

Our struggle and our victories in foreign countries remind all the world — friends and foes alike — of the fact that Poland has been fighting without interruption since September 1939 as an active and generous partner of the anti-German coalition. We are carrying on this struggle in particularly difficult circumstances, and therefore we are entitled to be considered as a most generous ally.

Our victories contribute to raise the morale of our country which has now maintained its stubborn opposition to the invaders for 5 years and which was able to create an underground force struggling to achieve full independence for the country and to guarantee its boundaries. It appears from the reports which come from Poland that our battles in Italy exercise a fortifying influence on the Polish people and on the underground forces particularly in the present difficult and troubled epoch.

We must repeat that these intricate problems of course absorb the thoughts and the feelings of all Poles, and of all Polish soldiers, not only of those of us here in Italy.

Considering the world which may arise from present turmoil, and looking at the war effort of the western allies, our

companions in arms, we say to ourselves:

We cannot believe that the world is bleeding only in order that one dictatorship may be replaced by another, that certain tendencies may be replaced by the same tendencies labelled with other colours. This atrocious war may have a meaning if it procures for the fighting nations real freedom and safety in exchange for all the bloodshed and the destruction of so many monuments of our civilisation.

We cannot admit that these truths which are so very clear to us who are directly threatened, are not perceived as well by the other nations, which may to morrow or after to-morrow have to face the same question as ourselves: « To be or not to be » if they persist in neglecting this danger.

Therefore in spite of all these alarming questionmarks and the gloomy contradictions of the day we are optimistic.

Mankind must gain this war on all fronts and in every sphere.

(« Dziennik Zołnierza APW », No. 106 (225), July 21st, 1944).

-Stanislaw Thugutt (1873-1941) (
Why Am I A Democrat? » (1929)

[«] In Poland the instinct of liberty among the people is equal to the instinct of hatred toward those who have suppressed it. »

GRUNWALD

It is rare that any anniversary has such a deep significance in relation to the events of the day as has this year's anniversary of the battle of Grunwald. This battle was fought by the Poles 534 years ago aginst the German invaders from the west. The real importance of this battle can only be estimated when viewed in the perspective of centuries. The collapse of the Order of the Knights of the Cross, which in these days attained its maximum power, stopped Germany's triumphant march towards the east so thoroughly that she was only able to recover hel full dynamic strength in these days of terrifying war.

It was no pure accident that the armies fighting in this battle under the command of King Władysław Jagiełlo, armies which decided the victorious issue included not only men from the Polish kingdom, but also from the Great Duchy of Lithuania, which covered in these days territories reaching much farther than the actual borders of the Polish and Lithuanian Republics. German war-cries were answered by Polish, Lithuanian und Ruthenian counter-cheers. The battle of Grunwold created for the first time a union of free nations which sacrificed their blood for a common cause. The result was the Jegiellonic Federation, later known as the Po-

lish Republic.

Today, after 500 years, the same historical problems arise before the nations living between the Baltic and the Black Sea. They have to defend the homes of Slav peoples and their neighbours' territories, neighbours bound to them by centuries of history. These nations, united in the Kingdom of Poland under the Jagiellonic dynasty, used for ages together to defend their common western and eastern borderline. The battle of Grunwald was not only a defeat of the Germanic world, but also marks the date of political collaboration between the nations living « between the Seas ». We must not forget that in the period preceding this famous battle various intrigues had been employed to divide Poland and Lithuania in order to weaken them and profit by their dissunion.

We recall one of the salient historical facts of the battle. At Grunwald a regiment of St. George took part on German side. This regiment was formed by knights and crusaders of various western nationalities. Doubtless there were men amongst them looking for adventure and gain through war, but the greater part of them were soldiers who went into battle in the belief, that they were fighting for the fulfilment of a mission of civilization by converting pagan barbarians to Christianity. Only after these battles did the western nations understand and convince themselves that we were fighting not for our interest only but also in their defence. Today, when we hear anti-Polish propaganda broadcast by the Germans (and not only by the Germans, since fate has given us various neighbours, who reach out after our eternal goods) and when we see some of the fruits of this propaganda we think of the regiment «St. George» and the rôle it played in the battle of Grunwald.

We are a strong nation, hardened by historical experience. Since the battle of Grunwald we have passed through many stages and varying phases. We have been both on top and under the wheels of the car of history. But with God's help we always rose again, held fast through all defeats and disaster and in despite of all still march on! Today, here on

the soil of Italy, we are taking our revenge against the Germans for the sad month of September.

There is one thing the Poles never forget, nor forgot, nor ever will forget: the duty to fight. One must always fight for his own rights and for the execution of the laws, even when it seems that everything is against him. When the horizon of events is cloudy, one must live by the light of that faith which illuminates our spirits. There are no « definite » defeats nor « definite » victories. Even the victory at Grunwald did not bring eternal security against German invasion to us. There is only one stable guarantee for the continual welfare of a nation, and this is the faith in the righteousness of its cause and the will to fight for it under any circumstances, without caring about the efforts or counting the sacrifices.

(« Dziennik Zołnierza APW », No. 100 (219), July 15th, 1944).

DOUBLE FACED GERMANY

by TADEUSZ PNIEWSKI

In September 1939 Polish cavalry was charging German I tanks. This was a glaring example of the proportion of forces and of the military preparation of Poland and Germany. To-day conditions are changed. We are perfectly well armed and trained, but we still continue to charge desperately and to fight our way to victory. On the slopes of Monte Cairo the dismounted Uhlans attacked the German defences with stones and iron rods. What passion and fanaticism is shown in these acts which are superior even to the ferocity of German elite troops. The most passionate craving for liberty is linked with an ardent desire to avenge long suffered injustice. We judge Germans differently from our companions in arms the British, Americans, New Zealanders and Indians. These rather consider the Germans as heroical adversaries and treat them as if the war were a big sporting event. But to us who knew them fairly well before and now have come to know them still better, their veneer of Kultur carries no charm, any more than their musical talents or their literary accomplishments. We know only too well that the terrible situation of our Country is not an invention of our propaganda. We know that even to-day on the eve of Germany's downfall millions of Germans continue to be fanatics and will feel the same after the disaster; millions brought up in the doctrines of Hitler, in the worship of sacrifice and in contempt of everything that is not German.

The German captain who stabbed a Polish stretcherbearer

after he had dressed his wounds was one of those fanatics; and Germans with this same mentality are taken prisoner in ever increasing numbers. To-day when they are being led to the prisoners' camps they smile, delighted to be safe, but to-morrow they will return to Germany, and will become « decent » Germans again and endeavour to make their late enemies forget their dual character of Europeans and barbarians, civilised people and savages, decent people and rascals. They will be Germans, good Germans just like « my friend Hans » to whom one of the prisoners is so strikingly similar.

* * *

Hans Von B. is often called « Janek ». He even likes this Polish way of spelling his Christian name. He goes to school in one of the Western cities of Poland, and lives in a Polish family wanting to learn the language. He lives almost exclusively in Polish society and seems to enjoy it. Cheerful, devoid of German stiffness, he soon acquires Polish ways and shares our interests and entertainments. He is really charming, cultivated, well read, musical and kindhearted, and everybody wants to help him. I myself helped him in preparing for his examination in history and Polish literature. After the examination we enjoy ourselves according to the Polish custom. Hans flirts only with Polish girls, and later on he joins a military college. He becomes an excellent officer, feels perfectly happy in our army and loves the regiment in which he serves. Sometimes I talk to him about politics. He admits that Poznan province is Polish and that we have accomplished a great deal there. I feel that it is possible to get on with him and that he really likes to live in our atmosphere.

Sometimes however, Hans becomes a changed man. In the company of two or three Germans he talks a different language and it is impossible for us to understand one another. His arguments are devoid of logic, and no discussion is possible. Nothing remains but a sense of overbearing domination.

Even if it is a casual gathering Hans the good fellow, disappears and only the German « über alles » remains.

Many years before September 1939 I lost all trace of Hans though I was told that he was somewhere busy with his estate. Some of my friends met him after the September campaign in Poznan, in German uniform. He denied all help to the family with whom he had lived in his school days and also to the parents of the girl of whom he used to be so fond. This family was turned out of door to face winter and misery because Hans wanted their apartment. It was war, there was no Poland any more and the lodging is comfortable and he knows it well. In Cracow at the railway station a second encounter occurred. An officier called Staszek and an intimate friend of Hans had just been stopped and was having to face the inquisitive examination of two Gestapo officials who were on guard over the exit from the station. He succeeded in getting out and was already in the street, when he suddenly met a German officer...

Hans! They only exchanged a few words, the terribly stupid questions which pass under these circumstances; « What news? » and parted again in haste. Staszek was arrested after a few hundred yards futher on. His documents were of no use. It was Hans (the decent German) who put him into prison. I have no further news of him, but I have no illusions left about him. He is just the same sort of « good German » as the neighbour of my cousin Von Waldek who in time of peace was a pleasant companion at meetings, and shooting parties and seemed to be a tolerant German, speaking Polish and so kind and agreeble that we felt bound to help him when he was in trouble with the agrarian reform. This same Waldek would not admit to his presence the wife of my cousin who wanted to ask for his intervention; her husband though not active politically was arrested and executed. Part of his estate was annexd by Waldek, his good neighbour.

In Plotsk, according to a local German paper, a Polish

lady Mrs. Anna Cz. was sentenced to a fine of a thousand marks or three months arrest because her dog was alleged to have provoked and ill-treated the dog of a German official Mr. Richard Kunatz. « It seems evident », stated the verdict, « that the accused had brought up her dog to hate everything German »!

We do not know this German judge, but we suppose that he is highly cultivated man, an amateur of music and literature, and that he can be at the same time a good fellow and a madly fanatical German. This Polish lady who was sentenced for such a trifle was to him just as interior as her dog was inferior to the German dog.

I lived for many years amid the Germans and I came to know them pretty well but I did not find more than two really « good Germans ». One of them was a tailor, who lived for many years in London, the second one was born and brought

up in Lodz...

* * *

From the photographs of the German prisoners of war recently captured in Italy the hard set and fanatical faces of the youngest soldiers of the «Reich» look out at us. There are millions of those soldiers already fighting or preparing to fight. To uproot and extinguish that fanaticism which has been kindled in the very heart of Europe—bare military victory would not suffice. A knowledge and understanding of things European are absolutely necessary. The German fanaticism must be confronted with the idea of freedom offered to all countries alike.

It is a tragic paradox that the « European Fortress » is being defended by the Germans who — even if they live in the verv centre of Europe — in their spirit, their innermost being are non-Europeans. It is also a sad truth that they who bring liberty to Europe neither know nor understand her properly. If after this war all the evil which we are now fighting

is not to rise again, if the principles in the defence of which this war was started are not to be broken again — European peace must be made the common responsibility of all states, and the smaller nations must *not* be degraded to the rôle of a mere audience at the concert of the big powers.

At Allied Head Quarters a special department is already at work to settle the political conditions of the continent. It is chiefly composed of American, Canadian and English delegates. There are no delegates of the continental nations, and in the list of the nations that are included in this section, there is no mention of Poland. And yet our Eastern frontiers have always been and still are the Eastern frontiers of Europe, and it is an undoubted fact that we have a better knowledge of the Germans than anybody else, and the policy of « appeasement » did not come from us!

The German fanatics, whether fighting men or prisoners of war, are the living examples of the lack of knowledge of European affaires on the part of those who decided the conditions of peace after the first world war; and Germany is and will continue to be a dangerous powder magazine easy to set fire to by other than German hands.

(« Parada », Cairo, No. 12 (31), June 1944).

THE SAME PROBLEMS SEEN FROM THE GERMAN SIDE

by STANISLAW KOWALSKI

From time to time, after every great German disaster, and after every period of intense bombing of the Reich, the attention of hundreds of millions turn with interest and optimism towards Germany hoping to see her ready to explode internally and prepare the way for the anti-Nazi revolution.

Today however the German enigma in its innermost essence does not only reside in the sphere of military events. The problem of the Germany of to-day lies in the fact that national socialism is a philosophical doctrine which contains also an eschatological idea or final answer to mankind's questions. We used to laugh at German tanks and guns, we used to ridicule and disregard the obvious fact of Nazism as a philosophical idea, possessing its own metaphysics, but the price, which we now have to pay for our laughter seems to be exceedingly high.

Nazism considers itself the best recipe for a new world order, that has as yet been brought forward for humanity. If national socialism had to fall, the German ideologists and with them the whole of the German community would think that the world had no more reason to exist, and in particular that the Germans would have no reason to live. This creed leads the Germans to sacrifice — if necessary — everything, even half of the population, to maintain hitlerism in existence.

In these last years, when German defeat seemed to become more and more evident Nazi leaders have declared that if defeat threatened the German Reich, they would reduce

the whole world to rack and ruin. The plenipotentiary of the German Reich for human reserves, Sauckel, when addressing an audience in Cracow in June 1943 said « We will fight and in the worst case we will fight until the complete defeat of Europe is accomplished. But before the Germans admit themselves defeated, not one stone will remain upon the other in this country or in the whole of Europe » (« New Warsaw Courier » 19th June 1943).

The development of the international situation has greatly helped the Germans to realise this idea. Just when they seemed to be facing an inevitable defeat, unexpected assistance came to their help. This war which started on ideological and military grounds swung to political ones. The opposing and troublesome elements of this contest begun to run into each other, to collide with one another. When it became apparent that Germany's opponents intended by the same war and at the same stroke not only to win the military contest but also reform the world and accomplish a social revolution (whose essence they didn't grant beforehand) a great chance presented itself to the Germans by the end of the fourth and at the beginning of the fifth year of this struggle, which they are about to lose.

The military reckoning of the Germans.

In the spring of 1943, the Germans, in a state of acute tension and holding the fruits of a successful totalitarian mobilisation had to decide what tactics they should adopt as re-

gards the Eastern as well as the internal front.

From May to November last year (I consider this period to be a decisive one for the status of the Germany of today, because everything that is now happening there is a consequence of these six months) three important events happened which caused a definite German decision as regards all the sectors of the war they were waging. One of them was the

defeat of Italy, or rather a greater phenomenon, marked in the sphere of military events by a *tendency* of the axis' satelites on the Eastern front to detach themselves.

The realisation by the Germans of the scarcity of human reserves induced them to change their military plans as regards their warfare against Russia and they gave up, although with great regret, their intention to pursue the Soviet Army even to the Ural mountains to annihilate it. To achieve this goal they decided to wage a defensive war instead, and reconciling themselves to the idea that Russia could not be defeated even by the occupation of Moscow and Leningrad, they decided that her military power should be crushed by thousands of obstacles strewn on the huge territory they then occupied.

This new conception of warfare for application on the Eastern front was based in the German mind on two factors: the diagnosis of Soviets weakening and the idea of a grinding

machine.

According to the German general staff estimate, Russia is still in possession of considerable strength, but a characteristic feature of it is, that this power derives from a supernormal work of men and material. In this respect, Russia is believed to be in a still worse situation because of her ambitions reaching much further than the mere fact of a military victory. According to the German estimate Russia is in possession of sufficient strength to drive out the Germans from the Russian territory, but this strength is not sufficient for the accomplishment of the Soviet's political plans, and as the Soviets are compelled to realise these political plans their strength is therefore submitted to a continual drainage. The Soviet's resources are forced and men and machinery are exhausted and overworked. This diagnosis led the Germans to infer that they will be able at a certain moment to inflict a death blow to Soviet Russia caught in the meshes of her own ambitions and weakened by her exertions.

In order to increase this terrible exertion, the German

staff transformed the whole of Russian territory between the Polish Eastern border and the farthest limits of their territorial conquests into a gigantic grinding machine, which was to grind and crush the Soviet military power. Every sector of this territory bristled with obstacles and traps, the towns and railway junctions were turned into strongholds, the river shores, marshes and lake-zones into powerful fortifications. During the whole of 1943 year and until today, we have witnessed this huge grinding machine in action, though not the whole of the German strength on the Eastern front has been used, for they kept absolutely undisturbed reserves for the final tasks.

For the Germans an unfavourable consequence of such a plan is the psychological fact of leading a defensive action as well as the material consequences of a retreat. Unfavourable factors for the Soviets (combined with the positive psychological factor of gaining ground and pressing forward) are the gigantic cost of continual attack and the difficulties of supplying a front which becomes more and more distant from its industrial bases.

When considering these problems from the German side, we must remember however, that adoption of this conception gives them great advantages: an undoubted shortening of the front line, a considerable shortening of supply routes, an important condensation of troops in connection with the defended territory where every kilometre of retreat means an increased number of soldiers able to defend the remaining kilometres. We must also take into consideration the important fact, that when retreating towards the Polish border, the German soldier begins to feel himself in a more familiar land-scape and not in an apocalyptic one. The winter in Poland is no longer « the white hell of the Russian winter ».

It is easy to understand that such a plan, the most hazardous that can be conceived, must if it is to be successful stop at certain place and at a certain time, in order to enable the final offensive manoeuvre to take over the action of the « grinding machine » and it is obvious that the Germans believe that such a time and such a place will come.

The psychological aspect of German reckoning.

I am one of those journalists who stubbornly assert that the Germans in the course of this war more than once were very near to breaking point. The possibility of continuing the struggle or the decision to give it up depends on two factors: the material possibility of continuing the fighting and in the psychological sphere — faith that this struggle has got a purpose and a possibility of success. During the year 1943 the Germans were twice very near to breaking up: the first time after Italy's capitulation and the second in the period between the bombing of Hamburg and Berlin. Before the terrified Germans were twice very near to breaking up: the first time and this is the second of the three factors which had a decisive influence upon Germany's political line in this last period.

In both the cases mentioned above, Germany was not threatened directly by a break down but the bad-news brought home to the German people a sudden realisation of the utter hopelessness of their general situation repressed until then in their collective subcoscience. In the case of Italy as well as in that of the large-scale bombing, the German community shocked by these disasters suddenly understood that Germany was surrounded by a ring of enemies from which they could not possibly extricate themselves, and yet as happened after the disaster of Stalingrad, after these two periods of temporary break-down, Germany succeeded in recovering. What was it that helped her to do so?

It must not be believed that the Germans are a nation of conscious suicides... neither can it be thought that being a nation of murderers they are lacking in the ability of reckoning and in political realism. The German generals are not complete idiots, as one might sometimes think when reading the Allied press commentaries. At the beginning of the last year, a strong conflict existed between Hitler and the generals, and Hitler had by no means the stronger side in this quarrel. If really there had been no more hope for Germany in the conduct of this war, ways would have been found to neutralise Hitler and his eschatology — the Germans would have capitulated.

The appointment of Himmler as minister of Interior of the German Reich may not mean that the internal front is about to crack and that it must be propped up by machine guns, but it undoubtedly does mean the wish to prepare the country for a new task. It is Himmler's rôle to teach the German nation to wait patiently regardless of what may happen, and this has been agreed upon by both Hitler and the German generals. Wait, but not for a victory. The German press in July last had a different tone to that of January 1944. It is now more self assured and the German arrogance again makes its appearance.

In 1943 besides Italy's capitulation and the big scale bombings certain changes took place in the Allied attitude to-

wards the war.

From 1933 and particularly from 1939 the Germans perpetrated the wildest crimes and the German nation approved them and rejoiced in them, but knew they were crimes, because not long before they had belonged to a moral civilisation. These crimes were: attacks on the weak, breaking of treaties, deportation of people, expropriation without indemnity, murder, concentration camps, political pressure backed by the use of firearms, blackmail to obtain « voluntary » renunciations etc. As long as they were victorious and stronger than « the moralists » nothing mattered, but when adversity came, the spectre of their crimes appeared to the Germans in the shape of fear. The realisation that the European for-

tress is girded by an iron ring which is tightening more and more added to the knowledge of the crimes committed and created in Germany, at certain moments, an atmosphere of panic and a psychology of looking for individual safety. Every major military disaster would prompt the Germans to break down because of the simultaneous understanding that the whole world is against them backed by its terrifying force of moral righteousness.

It is probable that were it not for the changes which occurred in the camp fighting against the Germans in 1943,

the guns might now be silent on the European front.

Help came at first in the sphere of moral break down. The anti-German party ceased to talk about justice and liberty, the war aims ceased to be defined merely as liberation of the German oppressed nations, there appeared supplements — corrections of boundaries; changes in the political structure of occupied national states, spheres of influence and « the big four », which was tempered down afterwards to « the

big three ».

The most serious world's newspaper, the London « Times » wrote that the international world organisation could only be based on force, and that, for this force's sake, a lot of actual prerogatives; resulting from the self-governement of particular nations must be sacrificed. In the wavering German mind then arose a doubt, that perhaps Hitler and his executioners, with all the wrong they have perpetrated, were not criminals, if others, so righteous, were talking about the same things, as if they were not crimes. Perhaps indeed, everything that Hitler and his acolytes did reflects only an universal idea of this epoch's phenomenon.

Soon help came also in the political sphere. It has been very rapidly realised in Germany, that the war aims of the particular partners were by no means the same and that each one of them is pursuing its own policy in conflict not only with the above mentioned moral principles, but directly

aiming at the most material and wordly interests of other big partners. Thus suddenly when the situation seemed completely hopeless to the Germans a great idea came to them. They were about to lose the war on the military plane, they might win it politically. Because of this hope Hitler was not discharged and the generals entered into a further compromise with him about this division of their respective roles: the war conducted by the military authorities, the internal front and production held by the Party. Germany now needs the good offices of the national socialistic party more than at any time during these past eleven years.

The Germans are deciphering the political situation.

It is bad from the military point of view to be in a « European fortress », but such a position gives great possibilities of observation. Whatever might be said about Germany's difficult military position, it must be admitted however, that she is in possession of the best observation post and that in this respect she is more favoured then her opponents. It is to be seen whether with their proverbial psychological skill the Germans will be able to take advantage of it.

They are in the centre of a gigantic struggle, which embraces the entire globe. One of her great opponents, Soviet Russia has been strictly isolated until the war. Isolated in both directions: The Russians knew nothing about the world, and the world knew nothing about Russia. Since the war started, this strict isolation did not, as a matter of fact, change: the world gets acquainted with Russia in Kuibyshev or Moscow by observation from the Embassies' windows only, the Russians know the world from the articles published in « Pravda ». Russia during this war months was more cut off from the western states than was Poland though occupied: She lives cut off by 25 years of complete isolation not only on

one, but on several fighting fronts. And by the round-about way, by the threads of convoys, less news is coming in about Russia, than the occidentals would have liked.

None of the Gestapo officials were present, of course, at the secret talks in Moscow and Tehran; but the official communiques issued after these two conferences are very well



« In bed we cry ».

(Zdzisław Czermariski in "Tygodnik Polski", New York) No. 13 (65).

known in Germany. It would seem to the Germans that, when comparing these communiques' texts with the reality which is taking shape on the European territory after their publication, they know more than is necessary. It is sufficient according to them to observe closely the behaviour of the communist Soviet agents and to read the publications they distribute in order to know exactly what decisions were agreed upon in Teheran and what the attitude of each big partner is towards them.

There is one problem of this war which already begins to appear in print in German political publications and which for a long time must have played on political German thought. This is the German conviction that Soviet Russia took over in totality the German program as regards the final aims and methods of the war.

German political literature considers that as regards Russia this war must be divided in two distinct phases — the first: a defensive war until Stalingrad, the second: an imperialistic one after that time. The signatory of the « friendship treaty » of the 23st of August 1929 knows it and proclaims cynically, that Russia's political dream has been to stir up international trouble in order to throw one nation against the other so that the Soviets will enter the fighting arena only when the others are exhausted by continual bleeding. The Germans claim the merit of having greatly complicated the Soviet's designs, and to have almost frustrated them. They now say that helped by British and American war material, the Soviets have been able to outlast this complicated period and are now resolutely entering the path, which has been always their dream, of dictating their will to an exhausted world. It must be admitted, that many Soviet's steps on the international arena, as well as the communist party's publications give an air of likelihood to these German assertions. With astonishing nonchalance Soviet Russia helps German work. Goebbels has only to reprint Soviet official enunciations, or the underground communist pamphlets without having to change as much as a comma. As a matter of fact he is using these reprints lavishly, even in photographic reproductions!...

In German publications one can find clear hints that Soviet Russia is willing to achieve a career at the juncture of international integration, which characterises our epoch: she will conquer the whole of Eurasia as a basis for world domination. The Germans cynically admit that they nourished this intention themselves, but they took it - and this is where lies their cynicism — in order to save civilization from an inavoidable integration process. There is a special relish in reading to-day about the German press attacking the designs of the Soviet, which two or three years ago were their own designs, for instance the domination of Europe as far as the French sea-shores, and the whole of the Baltic sea, the establishment of strong bases on the Mediterranean, the striking of deep roots into the Arab world, the arousing the greatest possible ferment in India and the sowing of dissension between Great Britain and the United States besides the liquidation of the British Empire.

There is in this thunder-storm the fury of failure, but also of a hope. The Germans know, from having experienced it upon their own skin, at what point the occidental powers saw the danger, when they themselves were leading the integration game and now, recognizing in all Soviet political strokes their own recent plans — they are waiting not without satisfaction for the moment when the civilized occidental states will become aware of being in danger for the second time.

The German thesis is that Soviet Russia pressed by the Lend—and—Lease bill concludes agreements and treaties, but that they are only steps towards the realization of her own egoistic designs. The German journalists are claiming that Great Britain and United States hypnotised by the mirage of international collaboration readily accept every surrender in

favour of the Soviets, but the German politicians know that this is not so. They know what certain compromises hitherto made look like in the eyes of the conquered nations of Europe. They know that to put reality on its head instead of on its feet, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, may succeed for two months, but no longer, and certainly not when there are too many of these political contortions going on.

Poland's partition, Poland in whose defence this war was begun, is nonsense which can be defended in the columns of a Sunday press, but the weight of which cannot be borne by school history-books, written for a country which is willing to live honorably. All the pressure exercised upon the Government of fighting Poland and insistence upon surrendering half of Poland's territory, while there exists no possibility of seeking a common people's consent — are crimes against democratic principles, after the perpetration of which, even the mere word « democracy » can no longer be pronounced.

I think that the German politicians, will presently rub their hands from sheer delight. Russia has caused them a lot of very unpleasant surprises, but it would now appear that she is their great hope. Let's wait and see...

The situation will presently be such, that the preponderant part of the war effort in Germany will rely on propaganda, and it may be added, that Goebbels' efforts, (where

the German people are concerned) are successful...

It is worth remembering, that in politics everything that the German propaganda has foretold for the last 2 years seems to have come true. The changes in Russian political aims and those of the Anglo-Saxons, as regards the European countries, are a proof of this.

Goebbels won the greatest victory at any time by propaganda, when he succeeded in explaining the situation to the Germans because every German has been lead to believe that

this war not only desirable; but also inevitable.

The development of the Polish question had a bewildering influence on the average German citizen's mind. It must be remembered, that during four and a half years, Poland has been represented to the Germans as the people for the sake of whose defence all war calamities started, and as the only country in Europe who was inflamed by a blind and stubborn love for Great Britain. Poland, to the enraged German mind, grew into a symbol of every disaster which fell upon Germany. Poland appears to every German as an alter ego of hateful England and is at the same time a symbol and emblem of this war. And yet her Allies are calmly ready to cut into the living body of Poland. Before that, under the influence of violent bombings several Germans thought that perhaps the Allies were right. Now, with the example of Poland before them, however disgusted with the Nazi regime, they are drawing the conclusion that everything is a great swindle and that, if that is so, it is perhaps better not to exchange an evil with which one is already acquainted for one which is unknown.

So Goebbels is right when he says that this is the end of the world.

It remains only to last, in order to outlast.

Immediate profits.

Such appears to be the main chance upon which the Germans are now rebuilding all their hopes. But beside the main profit, the Germans are drawing some small immediate ones from this situation.

After the last world-war — while the chief criminal was spared — the main weight was born by the German satellites Hungary and Turkey. Since the last war however, a progress has been made in this respect and it is possible that this time the satellites too will be punished. But history's best joke, from the German point of view is, that the war expenses will

have to be paid by one of liberty's most gallant defenders. And after it by the countries that instilled into their life the purest democratic ideas like Finland, Lettonia, Estonia, Lithuania. The cynical Nazi executioners chuckle and shout with delight: «Na, na, jetzt versteht du was die demokratische Welt bedeutet? ».

Another profit: weakening of underground movement. The underground movement in Europe has reached huge proportions. If its sole purpose had been opposition to the Germans, the damage to Germany would be everywhere as important as it actually is in Poland.

But it appears, that a part of this movement is preoccupied with other purposes, namely with political propaganda on behalf of one of the Allies. In certain countries the underground movement begins to be more interested in internal dissensions and opposing party fractions, thus completely for-

getting the Germans.

The third profit: settlement of certain problems, that the Germans are unable to carry out by themselves. A dream of the whole of political German thought during the nineteenth century, as well as now, is to reduce in number the Polish nation, in order that the Polish state may never exceed the size of a « Saison Staat ». From this point of view deportation by the Soviet of 2.000.000 Poles and Polish citizens into concentration camps which means a practical dying out - has been unusual good fortune for the Germans. From the same point of view chipping off half of Poland is a wonderful action, for which a military decoration, an award with swords or even the highest class diamond one, is not a sufficient reward. From the same point of view as well, a demarcation line with administration, following in fact the example set by its own achievements in the year 1939-1941, will very thoroughly comb the Poles out of this area. During the one and a half years of former occupation the Soviet administration swept out two million Poles, how much more will it be able to sweep away as far as the Ural mountains or the Arctic Circle during the three or four years that will pass until peace conference?...

The fourth profit: pulling down of others to the same moral level. The Germans perpetrated an enormous amount of crimes. The wildest ones in history. Although they don't mind it at all, they know however that they committed crimes. A criminal does not like to be alone and feels happier in company. Besides the fighting on the front line, there is another asset, invisible combat between the Germans and the Soviets, which has to prove that the Soviet's totalitarianism perpetrated the same crimes as the Germans did, while the whole world closed its eyes to the former. That is why the Katyn forest has been such a good find for the Germans and it has been necessary for the Russians to disclaim it.

For the same reason they are holding and exploiting to the last another trump; which is the keeping in Russia of hundreds of thousands of Poles who are homeless and without any juridical protection, with no possibility even of receiving food-parcels from abroad. Especially terrifying is the fate of Polish children deported in Russia. Hundreds of thousands of these children died from hunger and cold in terrible conditions, according to the statement of a Polish Bishop, who visited the concentration camps for the Poles in Soviet Russia. One hears incessantly the following leit-theme repeated by German propaganda: wonderful will be your boasted relief and liberation from force and fear, if, at present, you are unable to free one and half million Poles, who remain and are still alive in Soviet concentration camps or give them bread and clothing.

The fifth profit: absolving Germany from invading Poland and re-partition. A first class crime, which has been weighing very heavily on Germany has been her assault on Poland and Poland's partition. This has been the representative charge, and summarised all the others. Now there exists a plan (for

Poland's partition) and a beginning of its realisation in the midst of the United Nations camp. Without engaging other aspects of the same problem, one must admit that it is discharging Germany from a very heavy charge. It is giving her absolution.

All this brings to memory analogies and similarities in the final stages of the last world war and suggests implications parallel to it. It seems to me however that these analogies are superficial and the symptoms which at that time meant the end of German resistance, do not now indicate such a thing.

The difference lies in the fact that, at that time, the Germans had lost all hope, but now they have regained it. The situation in the summer 1918 resembled that of the summer 1943. But, when Germany found herself almost at the bottom

in autumn 1943, came a rescue.

Bombing is indeed terrifying. Every few days in Berlin at night time a real hell is breaking loose. It is, I believe, much worse than it was in London in 1941. Let us imagine only and try to understand that in Berlin bombings release not only terror, but also a state known very well by the Londoners when people found themselves suddenly beyond every attachment for one's home, comfort and food and came into touch with final realities. If, in this state of mind, the human community is convinced that it is fighting for the right cause, it hardens itself and wins. The German propaganda is doing its utmost in order to saturate the German mind with the creed that Germany is fighting for the greatest thing in human history.

It would seem to be apparent that common sense dictates not to help or to make probable this perfidious imposture.

As for myself, I cannot fail to be sad when I think that a great criminal obtained an anexpected help from the side from which he should have had only blows. I cannot fail to be sad when I think that this war might have been already over and I cannot, without grief, think about those people

for whom it means many more months of suffering, hunger and persecution, and also about these thousands, hundreds of thousands perhaps even millions who will have to die when storming a fortress, which got reinforced and the necessity for its most stubborn defence was suddenly confirmed.

It should be good to remember always that the possibility of continuing the fighting depends upon two factors: the military strength and the moral one. One supports the other. It would have been much easier and would have require far fewer losses to defeat the Germans who had lost all hope than the Germans who are taking their great chance. In this event it will most probably be necessary to conquer the fortress yard by yard, when in addition the conquered nations, natural Allies of the storming side, are weakened by the brutal extinguishing of their most justifiable hopes.

The Germans might have been vanquished relatively quickly only if all belligerant nations, Soviet Russia included, had enclosed the European fortress into a tight ring, not only of iron but also of moral justice. This moral righteousness when combined with the modern war material is a tremendous weapon. The war material without justice is a much

more disappointing tool of victory.

This fact has been already proved right in this war.

(« Myśl Polska » (Polish Thought) No. 65, London, February 1944).

AMERICA IN DEFENSE OF POLAND

Complete emancipation.

Throughout her entire history Poland stood out as a bul-wark of freedom, a haven of the oppressed and a defender of Christianity. Unfortunately for the world she fell victim to the conspiring Nazi hordes and today, though helpless in that she has temporarily lost her freedom, she is not without hope. She was not abandoned. — Eternal is the hope within her breast which will materialize in the near future when her complete emancipation is brought about by her own and the combined arms of her allies. Poland will march triumphantly with other democratic nations making historic contributions on her journey eternal.

Speaker of the House of Representatives Rayurn. Wisconsin.

America's pledge to Poland.

As my words cannot be interpreted as an effort to please Polish constituents, of whom I have all too few, I want to say in all impartiality that it would be a tragedy if the border dispute between great and powerfull Russia and brave but weaker Poland, were settled on any other basis than that which is just and right.

Are the United States, Great Britain, and Russia going to act in accordance with their loud and incessant promises of political morality, or are they not? In 1941 Soviet Russia

signed an agreement with the Polish Government in London, an agreement in which the British Government participated, saying that all treaties between Russia and Germany relative to Poland were invalid. The British and American Governments both declared that they would recognize no territorial changes made in Poland since August 31, 1939. In other words the three great powers are pledged to restore the frontiers of the Republic of Poland, exactly as they were at the time of Hitler's unprovoked aggression.

Congressman Gearhardt. California.

We owe as much to Poland as we owe to Russia.

The least that we can do is to stand by Poland who voluntarily made the greatest sacrifice of any democratic nation in the world in an effort to stop that aggression that threatened the extinction of all democracy. If we, of all the people in the world, fail to stand by Poland, and fail to keep the pledge of preserving her integrity, then a military victory in the war will be empty indeed, for the very principles for which we fought it shall have been dragged in the mire.

The time has come for plain speaking and plain dealing. This question will not wait until the war is over. It must be settled now. Russia is still dependent upon us and could yet be defeated if we were to withdraw that support. Certainly

we owe as much to Poland as we do to Russia.

Congressman Maas. Minnesota.

Poland's blood, sweat and tears.

While none among us dares make specific promises for the pattern of the post-war world when hard realities shall have been resolved in the light of undisclosed circumstance, yet we can cling tenaciously to this pattern to which our war aims and our peace hopes are dedicated and we can expect our high leadership to unfailingly reassert this pattern whenever it seems to be assailed. If and when silence is broken in another capital, it is no longer enjoined upon our own. Peace opinions do not reside on a one-way street. Except as we faithfully preserve the ideal now, there is small hope for the reality here-after. I commend this comment to all concerned before it is too late.

Sacrificial Poland has earned this consideration. Poland has paid for it in blood and sweat and tears. This World War No. 2 started in defense of the free Polish Republic. It would be a travesty if it should end in any other destiny.

Senator Vandenberg.

(from « Tygodnik Polski » No. 22 (74), New York).

A DEFENCE FROM UNEXPECTED QUARTERS

(Field-Marshal MOLTKE on Poland)

I.

The chief concern of our times is how to liberate Germany from the Prussian spirit of barbarism and agression. Who could be more competent to judge in this matter than Field-Marshal Moltke himself, whose advice for dealing with Prussia more valuable and practical? He writes: «Either Prussia had to become Polish or Poland had to become Prussian ». This formula is as good now as it was a century ago. The quotations from Moltke which follow are contained in the «Letters on Polish Affairs » by Charles Sarolea (Oliver & Boyd, London, 1922), Sixth Letter.

In the introduction to this most interesting book, G. K. Chesterton writes: I judged the Poles by their enemies. And I found it was an almost unfailing truth that their enemies were the enemies of magnanimity and manhood. If a man loved slavery, if he loved usury, if he loved terrorism and all the trampled mire of materialistic politics, I have always found that he added to these affections the passion of hatred of Poland. She could be judged in the light of that hatred;

and the judgement has proved to be right.

...But the chief source of the prejudice was Prussia and that low type of imperialism which she spread in Europe. In a world of many remaining evils and bewilderments, we may safely say that this imperialism will pollute it no more. The virtues that thrive with Poland are pushing their way to

the surface — the virtues of the peasant and the patriot. By all the instincts of historical imagination we know when those virtues are set free, and a fresh hope has come into the world. Poland can now grow to the great in something more than tragedy. And it is probable that the eyes of her children's children, looking across the very eastern battlefield where the crowned vultures are as dead as their carrion, will follow higher and higher into the sky the flight of the Silver Eagle.

Extracts from « Letters on Polish Affairs ».

...It may be of interest to English students to turn to a strange book on Poland which was written and published in 1832 by Field-Marshall von Moltke. It is called « Darstellung der Inneren Verhaeltnisse und des Gesellschaftlichen Zustandes in Polen ». (« An Exposition of Internal and Social Conditions in Poland »). The book is now almost forgotten, yet it remains to this day a most illuminating interpretation of Polish history and a most penetrating analysis of Polish character. Moltke wrote it when public opinion in Europe had been roused against Russian atrocities, when he himself was still under the influence of his Danish upbringing, when he was fresh from writing a romance, when the rule of blood and iron had not yet become supreme in Prussia.

Moltke's tribute to the qualities of the Polish people are all the more convincing because they are entirely involuntary. He wrote his book, not as a plea for Poland, but as an argu-

ment in favour of the Prussian State.

The chief interest of Moltke's book is that it provides us with a reply to all the anti-Polish commonplaces of the present-day historical literature. There is not one of the recent accusations against the Polish people which is not answered in the suggestive pages of the old Field-Marshal. And it is

indeed both piquant and paradoxical that it should have been left to the Prussian « Genius of War » to undertake an Apology for Poland, and to correct our misconceptions and prejudices about them.

Our first and common misconception is that Poland was a survival of a feudal age, that it was ruled by magnates whose tyranny reproduces that of mediaeval chieftains. Moltke has been one of the first to explode that historical heresy and to prove in the Polish Republic there was no kind of the feudal

superiority or of feudal dependence.

"No Polish noble was the vassal of a superior lord — the meanest of them appeared at the diet in the full enjoyment of a power which belonged to all without distinction. It is here that we find the fundamental difference between the Polish Constitution and the Feudal States of the West and the despotism of the East ». « The mutual relations of the nobles were based upon perfect equality among all and on as much independence for the individual as was compatible therewith ». (Moltke ii., p. 66).

II.

Our second misconception is that Poland was an oligarchic State. Moltke clearly saw that Poland was essentially a democracy, more democratic indeed than any other contemporary State; that it was a Republic where the authority of the King or of the aristocracy had been surrendered to some three hundred thousand personalities (Moltke, ii., p. 66); where the sense of equality was so tyrannical that the will of one citizen was sufficient to paralyse the action of the State. As a Polish philosopher Mr. Lutoslawski has said, — in the eighteenth century the number of full citizens in Poland was about 14 per cent., of the inhabitants, while in England half a century later, the electors formed less than 2 per cent of the population.

A third accusation which was already made against the Poles a hundred years ago, is that they are an aggressive, a militarist, and imperialistic people. Moltke admits, of course, that they were a military people for the simple reason that they had always to be ready to defend their independence against the foreign invador. But he does not admit that they were militarist or aggressive.

« An offensive war was contrary to the constitution and rendered almost impossible by the organisation of the state. It was illegal for the nobles to be kept under arms for more than three weeks, or for them to be led more than three hours march across the frontier ». « When the example of her neighbours forced Poland to establish a standing army, it was not placed under the immediate control of the King. He appointed a royal Field-Marshal for Poland and one for Lithuania, but he could not deprive them of office. A definite portion of the subsidies were voted by each diet ». (Moltke, ii., p. 83).

« Poland is the only European State which down to the sixteenth century possessed no military force, except that of its armed and mounted nobles ». « An admirable peculiarity of this warlike ability was the simplicity of their habits. They lived the greater part of the year on their estates; there they spent their income, practised an extensive hospitality, and remained at a distance from, and independent of, the Court. The wealth, which the noble obtained from his subjects, returned to them again. A few benches, tables and carpets formed the furniture of the richest palatine. The women did not care for luxury... Good armour and excellent horses formed the sole splendour of the men ». (Moltke, ii., p. 74).

IV.

A fourth grievance which is constantly adduced against Poles, is that they are a clerical and intolerant people. Their alleged intolerance was indeed a pretext for the interference both of Russia and Prussia. It was in the name of the « dissidents » or nonconformists and in order to defend freedom of conscience that Catherine yclept the Great and the Liberal, claimed the right of intervention in the affairs of Poland. And so well was the Anti-Polish propaganda organised that all the Liberal philosophers from Voltaire to Diderot applauded and approved the policy of the Russian and Prussian tyrants. As Moltke tells us, the commonplace about the Polish intolerance was a monstrous one.

"The ancient Poles were very tolerant. They took no part in the religious wars, which devastated Europe in the sixteenth century. Calvinists, Lutherans, Greeks, Schismaties, Mohammedans long lived peacefully in their midst. The Poles actually forced their Kings to swear that they would tolerate all sects ». (Moltke, ii., p. 75).

V.

Closely related with the accusation of intolerance is the accusation of Anti-Semitism. Again and again the Polish people have been accused of organising pogroms against the Jews. The truth is that Poland, as Moltke informs us, was justly called the « Promised Land » of the Jews. In 1096 the Jews fled to Poland, where at that time there was more religious tolerance than in the rest of Europe.

Poland certainly was then, and remained for centuries, the only country which offered a refuge to the persecuted Israelites, and if there is such a thing as national and historical gratitude, the Jewish people are under an eternal debt of gratitude

to the Polish people.

« The Jews had their own diet, every province sent deputies to Warsaw, where they formed a great assembly and elected their own Marshal, whose appointment was confirmed by the Polish Government. In short, next to the nobles, the Jews formed the most influential and powerful class in their country ». (Moltke, ii., p. 94 & 105).

A sixth accusation against the Poles is that they are servile people, and that owing to the tyranny of the landed magnates the peasants were reduced, and are still reduced, to the condition of serfs. The real truth is of course, that in no country does the peasantry play a more important part in Government than in Poland. The Polish parliament to-day is largely a parliament of small-holders. The Prime Minister M. Vitos, is himself a peasant. And so it was in the past. The fact that there was no such serfdom in Poland as existed in Russia and Prussia is admitted by Moltke.

« The peasant did not belong to the lord, he could not be sold. The estate might pass into other hands, but the peasant was not obliged to leave his farm. The fact that he could possess land prevented him from ever becoming a mere serf ». « The peasant was well off, he could raise money on his property and had regular tribunals... He enjoyed the possession of home and land... The Polish peasant enjoyed these privileges at a time when villeinage existed in all the rest of Europe ». (Moltke, ii., p. 93).

VII.

We come to a seventh misconception about Poland. As compared with Western Europe, Poland is often represented by its enemies to be a semi-barbarous country.

Very different is the conclusion of Moltke. He informs us that already in the fifteenth century, Poland was « one of

the most civilised States in Europe ».

« The rapid development of their states and their increasing subordination to the will of their rulers, allowed them to act with growing unity. The admirable qualities of Poland's citizens enabled it, however, to maintain an influence, in spite of the primitive simplicity of its laws, the unlimited respect paid to the privileges of the individual, and the necessarily slow development of the State ». « We may add that the Poland of the fifteenth century was one of the most civilised States of Europe. It is true that the virtues of the citizens had much to atone for in the badly organised Constitution of the Republic, so that moral qualities had to supply the place of good laws ». (Moltke, ii., p. 76).

VIII.

But perhaps of all the prejudicies against Poland, the most universally accepted is that they are people of reactionaries. It is amusing to note that it is the very opposite accusation which is brought forward by Moltke. In his opinion, the weakness of Poland is that it is not like good old Prussia, that it has always been too ready to believe in the new-fangled notions of liberty and democracy. And the judgement of Moltke is right. It may be said of the old Polish Constitution that it has anticipated by three or four hundred years the most modern ideals of democratic government.

With the honesty of a soldier, Moltke tells us that Poland fell, not mainly because of the shortcomings of her citizens but because of the fatality of her geographical position and

especially because of the ambitions of her neighbours.

"The conquest of Poland was the aim of the rulers of Russia and this Republic, one of the oldest of Europeans States, discovered with terror that it lay between the two newest monarchies of the continent, and that its geographical position was an obstacle to their further development ». (Moltke, ii., p. 122).

« The position of Poland made it a stumbling block to two powerful neighbours, who had in the last centuries made immense progress and whose rapid development was certain to bring abour their own ruin or to annihilate all obstacles ». (Moltke, ii., p. 134).

In one of the most illuminative passages of the book, the Prussian Field-Marshal admits with cynical frankness that independence of Poland is incompatible with the power of Prussia. « After the Polish Republic surrendered the shores of the Black Sea to Russia, henceforth all her rivers and all her highways ran through Prussia. Prussia cut it off from the sea and from the world. The Vistula was the last artery of the Republic, and Prussia was in the possession of the mouth of that river. In fact one does not see how Poland could live as an independent State apart from Prussia. No one would maintain that this indepedence could be secured by the mere possession of Danzig or by the freedom of the Vistula. Woe to the nation whose life depends on a piece of paper in which it does not find a safeguard of its old strength! In one word sooner or later, either Prussia had to become Polish or Poland had to become Prussian ». (Moltke, ii., p. 135).

« Fas est et ab hoste doceri ».

NOTE: Helmuth Carl Count von Moltke, Prussian Field Marshal called « the Silent ». He began his career in the Danish army and in 1822 entered Prussian Service. From 1834-1839 he was in Turkish service. Scholar, courtier and a master of military strategy he played an important part in the war with Denmark and was largely responsible for the Prussian success in the war with Austria 1866. In the Franco-Prussian war he was responsible for the French capitulation at Sedan and the investment of Paris by the Prussians 1870-71. Died in 1891.

In the book « A Straight Deal or The Ancient Grudge » by Owen Wister (The Mac Millan Company, New York, 1920), the author dealing mainly with Anglo-American relations mentions Germany occasionally and as a striking example of German « Kultur » he quotes the German song of hatred of Poland:

« Should Silesia become Polish:
Then, oh God, may children perish, like beasts, in their mothers womb.
Then lame their Polish feet and their hands, oh God!
Let them be crippled and blind their eyes.
Smite them with dumbness and madness, both men and women... »

"Then Thou, Almighty one, send Thy lightnings!
Let dwelling and cottages become ashes in the heat of fire.
Let the people in hords burn and drown with wife and child.
May their seed be trampled under our feet;
May we kill great and small in the lust of joy.
May we plunge our daggers in their bodies,
May Poland reek in the glow of fire and ashes ».

(Chapt. iv., p. 51 and chapt.xvii., p. 274). This book was published in 1920!

AMERICAN WRITER ABOUT WANDA WASILEWSKA

The famous American author of the bestseller «Washington Waltz» Helen Lombard, wife of Gen. Charles Lombard, French military attaché to Washington and at present attached to Gen. de Gaulle's H. Q. dedicated one of her well known humorous stories to Mrs. «Colonel» Wanda Wasilewska. Here it is:

The period of stuffed shirt diplomacy is admittedly over and short cuts are no longer frowned upon. These are days of personalized government. The informal creation of new governmental set-ups by individuals who claim to represent this or that idea or force is in vogue. For sheer disdain of all the accepted rules of diplomatic intercourse, however, nothing equals the situation existing between the Polish government in exile and the Soviet government.

Their diplomatic intercourse has reached the fireside level for Madame Colonel Wanda Wasilewska, Chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots with headquarters in Moscow, speaks in the name of the Polish people in the daytime but in the evening she reverts to the role of the wife of a high Soviet official, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Kor-

nejczuk.

The U.S.S.R. has made certain territorial demands on Poland. The demands were accompanied by some uncomplimentary remarks about the character and outlook of the individuals who compose the government in exile. The diplomatic attack is nothing new in our times. But for one government to make demands of another government, which the first

government maintains is no government at all, is a diplomatic

oddity.

Field Marshal Stalin has informed the Polish government in London that it has neither to accept nor reject the U.S.S.R. proposals because it is not representative of the Polish people. The Soviet government, according to a recent announcement, is extending its generous offer and friedship directly to the Polish people. As the Poles are unable at the moment to respond directly to the generous offer, another diplomatic oddity has been produced for the occasion.

Madame Colonel Wanda Wasilewska, has answered Marshal Stalin's demands. In a radio address from Moscow she has most graciously accepted them in the name of Poland.

Madame Colonel Wanda Wasilewska is a Pole but she has been a citizen of the Soviet Union since 1939. She wears the uniform of colonel in the Red Army as proof of the high esteem in which she is held by the Russian government. It is reported she is a devoted and dutiful wife. She cooks her husband's dinner and attends to his welfare and well being.

It is easily understandable that with the best intentions in the world Colonel Wasilewska might one day become confused in her dual role and forget whether she is speaking for the mute Polish people or whether she is the wife of the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. who is responsible to Marshal Stalin for the successful termination—from the Soviet point of view—of the current Russian-Polish tangle.



