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From the Editor

The first volume of the scientific journal *Echa Przeszłości* (*Echoes of the Past*), edited by historians from the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, was published in 2000, on the initiative of Professor Sławomir Kalembka, the then Director of the Institute of History and an outstanding expert in 19th century history and the history of political thought. The Editorial Board of *Echa Przeszłości* consists of Dr Witold Gieszczyński (Editor-in-Chief), Dr Jan Gancewski (Secretary), Dr hab. Norbert Kasperek and Dr hab. Roman Jurkowski. The Scientific Council comprises fifteen professors representing Polish and international research centers.

Echa Przeszłości, the flagship journal of historians from the Institute of History and International Relations at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, has already gained wide recognition. Twelve volumes of the journal have been published, and subsequent volumes are being prepared for publication. Each volume consists of the following sections: Articles and Dissertations, Documents and Materials, Problems and Discussions, Reports and Memoirs, Debates, Reviews and Overviews, and Academic Chronicle. It is journal policy to accept only high-quality original research papers and materials that have not been published elsewhere, covering all historical periods, from Antiquity to Modern Times. Contributions are published in Polish, English, Russian, German or French.

The 12th volume of *Echa Przeszłości* has a traditional structure, but it has been published in English in a hopeful attempt to establish scientific cooperation between historians from the Institute of History and International Relations at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn and representatives of international research centers throughout the European Union.

ARTICLES AND MATERIALS

Miron Wolny

PYRRHUS' RETURN TO EPIRUS AND NEOPTOLEMOS' DEATH (296 B.C.)

Having taken a thorough look at Pyrrhus' life and activity, one may conclude that the invincible hero of the Hellenistic period showed considerable inconsistency of character that ultimately made him the Don Quixote of Antiquity. Scholars have formulated discrepant judgments about Pyrrhus' political involvement, which resulted from a more or less holistic approach to his conduct or different opinions about the effects of this activity. Hence, the general assessment of Pyrrhus cannot be favorable. This is clearly visible in the conclusions formulated by J. Carcopino and the ensuing opinions¹. Detailed analyses of historical sources, where special attention was paid to the methods used by Pyrrhus to attain his political aims, undoubtedly unveil Pyrrhus' leadership skills², but at the same time depict him as a politician who resorted to rather brutal methods.

The article attempts to formulate a fresh interpretation of Pyrrhus' struggle for power during the second restoration of his reign in Epirus (297–295 B.C.). Pyrrhus first ruled in Epirus between 307–302 B.C. after he had risen to power with the support of Glaucias' Taulantians³, a measure designed to tighten the co-operation between the Epeirotes and the Ilirians.

¹ See J. Carcopino, *Pyrrhus, conquérant ou aventurier?*, in: *Profils de conquérants*, ed. J. Carcopino, Paris 1961, pp. 11–108; T. Hackens, *Why Pyrrhus, the Condotiere?*, in: *The Age of Pyrrhus. Archeology, History and Culture in Early Hellenistic Greece and Italy*. Proceedings of an international conference held at Brown University, April 8th-10th, 1988, ed. T. Hackens, D. Holloway, R. R. Holloway, G. Moucharte, Louvain-la-Neuve 1992, pp. 9–12. M. Wolny, *Współczesne badania nad Pyrrusem. Próba rekonesansu*, in: *Per Saecula. Dyplomacja – Gospodarka – Historiografia*. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Alfredowi Mierzwie w 45. rocznicę pracy naukowej, ed. A. Korytko, B. Krysztopa-Czupryńska, Olsztyn-Piotrków Trybunalski 2009, p. 206.

² P. Lévêque, *Pyrrhos*, Paris 1957, passim.

³ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 3, 5: καταγαγὼν εἰς Ἡπείρου ματὰ δυνάμεως βασιλέα κατέστησεν.

Nevertheless, Pyrrhus was not a puppet in the hands of his regents. At the time, he could have been older than suggested by contemporary biographies⁴. Regardless of the extent of his decision-making powers, Pyrrhus was not powerful enough to withstand the inner riots in Epirus. According to Pausanias, the rebellion of 302 B.C. broke out in consequence of a political provocation staged by Kassandros. At least, this is what most scholars agree on.⁵ However, other sources present a different standpoint. Plutarchus argues that it was Neoptolemos who contributed to the coup in Epirus⁶. P. Lévêque claims that this particular piece of information is merely a version of events taken from the biographer of Cheronea⁷. The said account does not contradict Pausanias' description, it simply completes his version. This is a significant clue in the history of the ensuing relationship between Neoptolemos and Pyrrhus.

After giving his support to Demerios Poliorketes and losing the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), Pyrrhus arrived in Ptolemy's court in Egypt. Backed by the Egyptian forces, Pyrrhus returned to Epirus which was ruled by Neoptolemos who had based his power on the following two factors. First of all, his power was legitimized by Kassandros. Secondly, Pyrrhus enjoyed the support of an influential aristocratic group in Epirus (οἱ κρᾶτιστοι). In return, Neoptolemos was to promote the group's political interests⁸. This is not to say that Neoptolemos' position was free of any threats. Shortly before Pyrrhus' return to Epirus, Neoptolemos had serious problems with maintaining power on account of several factors. Above all, the number of Neoptolemos' political opponents began to grow during Pyrrhus' absence from Epirus. Historical sources suggest that he was a strict ruler who had a tendency to resort to violence⁹. C. Klotzsch emphasizes that Neoptolemos exercised power in a conservative way, whereas Pyrrhus was perceived as a representative of a modern and progressive group that is euphemistically referred to as *die "jüngere" Partei* in C. Klotzsch's book¹⁰. Plutarch compares Neoptolemos' character traits to those of Alketas II who gave way to Pyrrhus during his attempts to restore his power (307–302 B.C.). Pyrrhus was supported by a political group that had an interest in the political independence of Epirus – this prospect seemed to be realistic, especially in the light of Kassandros'

⁴ See: M. Wolny, *Controversies Surrounding Pyrrhus' Birthdate*, in: *Hortus Historiae. Studies in Honour of Professor Józef Wolski on the 100th Anniversary of His Birthday*, ed. E. Dąbrowa, M. Dzielska, M. Salamon, S. Sprawski, Kraków 2010, pp. 183-189.

⁵ Paus., I, 11, 5; R. Schubert, *Geschichte des Pyrrhos*, Königsberg 1896, p. 110; C. Klotzsch, *Epeirotische Geschichte bis zum Jahre 280 v. Chr.*, Berlin 1911, p. 134; P. Garoufalas, *Pyrrhus, King of Epirus*, London 1979, p. 222.

⁶ See: H. Berve, *Neoptolemos no. 4*, RE XVI, 2, Stuttgart 1935, col. 2463; F. Sandberger, *Prosopographie zur Geschichte des Pyrrhos*, Stuttgart 1970, p. 164.

⁷ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 4, 2; P. Lévêque, *Pyrrhos*, p. 105.

⁸ Por. Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 14.

⁹ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 2.

¹⁰ C. Klotzsch, *Epeirotische Geschichte*, p. 153.

decline. The modern aristocratic group in Epirus expected Pyrrhus to safeguard their business interests. Ptolemy's court began to scrutinize the new ruler. It should be added that this issue has been thoroughly explored to support our understanding of Pyrrhus' activity, both in the Balkans and in the western part of the Mediterranean region¹¹.

On his return to Epirus, Pyrrhus was faced with a dilemma over whether he should get rid of Neoptolemos at once or strive for at least temporary agreement. Although Pyrrhus enjoyed quite high military support, his open struggle against Neoptolemos' forces was, in fact, doomed to failure since Neoptolemos was eager to look for allies in the Hellenistic world¹². The physical annihilation of Neoptolemos could have awakened a protest against Pyrrhus, as such an immediate solution would have been construed as usurpation of authority. Hence, Pyrrhus could only ascend to power by reaching a compromise. According to Plutarchus, both rulers agreed to share power in an atmosphere of friendship: *διαλύσεις ἔθετο καὶ φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ κοινωνίᾳ τῆς ἀρχῆς*¹³. This agreement was purely fictitious as neither Neoptolemos nor Pyrrhus had really intended to share power. A solution to this problem was soon found. In order to eliminate Neoptolemos, Pyrrhus engineered a complicated plot which was described by Plutarchus. Despite a rather incredible overtone, this description requires a detailed analysis, and it should not be disregarded.

The plot was organized in the town of Passaron during a religious feast to celebrate Zeus. As P. Garoufalias rightly notices, it was an annual celebration in the form of a plebiscite¹⁴. Plutarch remarks that the event made a reference to the kings of Epirus¹⁵. His opinion is not shared by the German scholar C. Klotzsch who argues that the event was unrelated to the citizens of Epirus (*Ἡπειρώταις*), instead, it was focused on the relationship between the Molossians (*σύμμαχοι τῶν Μολοσσῶν*) and their leaders¹⁶. Plutarchus' description of the celebration implies that its original aim was to consolidate the tribal community. It remains unknown whether this annual celebration was always organized in the same form. Apparently, some elements were fixed, whereas other were probably modified, depending on the circumstances. Plutarchus mentions that according to standard practice during such festivals, a sacrifice was made in honor of Zeus. Cheronea's biographer reports that during the celebrations, the leaders would take an oath before the entire community, promising to exercise their powers in accordance with legal provisions (*νόμος*). The oath was then taken by community

¹¹ G. Nenci, *Pirro, aspirazioni egemoniche ed equilibrio mediterraneo*, Torino 1953, passim.

¹² Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 2-3.

¹³ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 3.

¹⁴ P. Garoufalias, *Pyrrus King of Epirus*, p. 28.

¹⁵ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 5.

¹⁶ C. Klotzsch, *Epeirische Geschichte*, p. 32; D. Strauch, *Molossoi (Μολοσσοί)*, DNP 8, Stuttgart 2000, col. 348-349.

members who vowed to obey their leaders. This is a clear sign of limitation of royal power¹⁷. It also confirms the previous assumptions about the support given to the rulers by the society. Celebrations of the type were popular in the Greek world, and Epirus also organized such festivals even though it had undergone the Hellenization process relatively late. Xenophon writes that Spartan kings took an oath before one another every month, promising to abide by the law. A similar oath had to be taken by other subjects¹⁸. The Hellenistic world, which followed Middle Eastern traditions, also popularized the idea of validating significant events with oaths¹⁹.

At the end of the celebration, both rulers, accompanied by their close friends, would exchange valuable gifts²⁰. Gelon, Neoptolemos' faithful companion, greeted Pyrrhus with a friendly handshake and presented him with two pairs of oxen hitched up to a plow²¹. Myrtilus, Pyrrhus' cupbearer, liked the gift so much that he dared ask his ruler to give it to him²². Pyrrhus refused, but then gave the oxen to someone else, which hurt Myrtilus' feelings. Plutarch reports that Gelon was a witness to this event, and he made clever use of the resentment that had built up between Pyrrhus and his companion²³. Gelon invited Myrtilus to his table. Plutarch even suggests that Gelon's intentions were of a sexual nature, especially given the fact that the feast abounded with alcohol, Myrtilus was an incredibly charming young man, and Gelon couldn't resist the beauty of young boys. The plot was discussed in the lovers' bedroom. Gelon offered to join the group of Neoptolemos' followers, and he tried to persuade Myrtilus to poison Pyrrhus. Paradoxically, Myrtilus acted with surprising sobriety – he pretended to accept Gelon's offer with a great deal of enthusiasm, and a moment later, he informed Pyrrhus of the intended assassination attempt²⁴. Plutarchus presents this story as a fantastic psychological game between the characters, full of fast moving action. In response to this news, Pyrrhus devised an intrigue against Neoptolemos. According to Plutarch, Pyrrhus wanted to give publicity to the alleged assassination attempt. He persuaded Myrtilus to bring another conspirer from his milieu into the plot, and that man was Alexikrates, the senior cupbearer. Gelon and Myrtilus were to reveal the secret plot to Alexikrates²⁵. Gelon was misled. Neoptolemos soon learned

¹⁷ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 5; W. W. Tarn, *The New Hellenistic Kingdoms*, CAH VII, Cambridge 1954, p. 83; P. Cabanes, *L'Épire de la mort de Pyrrhos a la conquête romaine (272–167 av. J. C.)*, Paris 1976, pp. 246–247.

¹⁸ Xen., *Lac.*, XV, 7; cf. A. B. Nederlof, *Pyrrhus van Epirus*, Amsterdam 1978, p. 43.

¹⁹ E. J. Bickermann, *Hannibal's Covenant*, *AJPh* 73, 1952, p. 1 n.

²⁰ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 6; P. Garoufalas, *Pyrrus King of Epirus*, pp. 237–238.

²¹ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 7.

²² Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 7.

²³ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 8; A. B. Nederlof, *Pyrrus van Epirus*, p. 43.

²⁴ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 8–9.

²⁵ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 9.

about the assassination attempt, and the news made him so happy that he found it difficult to keep the secret.

Neoptolemos first conveyed the secret plan to his sister, Cadmeia, during a reception organized at her house²⁶. Neoptolemos was certain that nobody was listening in on their conversation – there was only one woman in the room, who appeared to be sleeping. The woman, Pheanarete²⁷, was the wife of Samon, the main administrator of the royal farm²⁸. Pheanarete was lying on a sofa, only pretending to be asleep. She heard the whole conversation, and on the following day, she revealed the secret to Antigone, Pyrrhus' wife²⁹.

Before we interpret the intrigue, we must first analyze its characters. Gelon probably descended from the Molossian tribe³⁰. The relevant epigraphic material suggests that Γέλων was a common name in Epirus³¹. In Plutarchus' report (ἄνηρ πιστός Νεωπτολέμω), Gelon is depicted as one of Neoptolemos' closest companions, therefore, we can speculate that he was one of Neoptolemos' advisors. The research on Myrtilus has confirmed source descriptions to be true³², just as it was the case with Alexikrates³³. Cadmeia (Καδμεία), in turn, is believed to be the daughter of Alexander the Molossian, although some scholars do not subscribe to this opinion³⁴. As regards Pheanarete (Φαιναρέτη), she appears as the *Molossian woman* in N. G. L. Hammond's *Onomastiokon Epeirotikon*. The question which arises at this point is – why was this woman present at the royal court? Was she a friend of Cadmeia's or a mistress of someone from the royal court? Historical sources do not give answers to these questions. Similarly to Cadmeia and Pheanarete, there are no documented references to Samon (Σάμων) in the existing body of epigraphic material³⁵.

The discussed characters' names suggest that the plot involved real people who were also witnesses at Neoptolemos' trial³⁶, which will be discussed later on. For the moment, let us analyze the credibility of the whole scheme.

²⁶ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 11.

²⁷ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 12.

²⁸ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 12.

²⁹ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 12-13.

³⁰ F. Sandberger, *Prosopographie*, p. 103.

³¹ N. G. L. Hammond, *Epirus. The Geography, the Ancient Remains, the History and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas*, Oxford 1967, p. 801 (*Onomastiokon Epeirotikon*); B. Niese, *Gelon no. 5*, RE VII, 1, Stuttgart 1910, col. 244.

³² F. Sandberger, *Prosopographie*, p. 163: *M(yrtilos). war Mundschenk odel Kellermeister am Hofe des Pyrrhos*.

³³ F. Sandberger, *Prosopographie*, p. 25: *A(lexikrates). war Obermundschenk am Hofe des Pyrrhos*.

³⁴ Por. G. N. Cross, *Epirus. A Study in Greek Constitutional Development*, Cambridge 1932, p. 106 n.

³⁵ N. G. L. Hammond, *Epirus*, p. 813 (*Onomastiokon Epeirotikon*); F. Sandberger, *Prosopographie*, p. 202.

Contemporary historians are undoubtedly familiar with the official version of events, which was promulgated to justify Neoptolemos' execution. Nevertheless, the overtone of the whole story lacks credibility. Gelon, Neoptolemos' servant, persuaded Myrtilus, Pyrrhus' cupbearer, to poison his master as he became aware of Myrtilus' resentment. The cause of the resentment, however, seemed to be too trivial to provoke such a cruel revenge. Gelon informed his master about the plot after it had been planned. Neoptolemos was overjoyed, but he was probably aware that he would pay the highest price if the plot were to backfire. Unable to control his euphoria, Neoptolemos shared the secret with his sister, and he was naive enough to think that the woman lying on the sofa was asleep and would not overhear their conversation. Myrtilus engaged another witness, Alexikrates, in the plot, and he made Gelon reveal his plan once again. It is hardly probable that this quasi-conspirative farce actually took place. It was probably devised for the needs of a fabricated trial which bore a semblance of a legal procedure, but in fact it was an effective way to eliminate Neoptolemos.

Plutarch does not mention the trial, probably because his report is simplified with much attention given to stylistic expression. Cheronea's biographer mentions yet another religious celebration (θυσία) which was attended by Neoptolemos at Pyrrhus' invitation. During the feast, Neoptolemos tried to inquire about the political affiliations of the aristocracy. When it turned out that Neoptolemos could enjoy the support of the most influential aristocrats, Pyrrhus decided to eliminate his opponent. According to Plutarchus, a considerable part of the elite tried to persuade Pyrrhus to get rid of Neoptolemos and to become the only ruler in Epirus³⁷. The elimination had to be carried out quickly, so it must have taken place before 296 B.C.³⁸

Let us take another look at the group of Pyrrhus' supporters. At this point, our interpretation of Plutarch is wrought with problems relating to the semantic range of the terms used by Cheronea's biographer. Plutarchus mentions that Pyrrhus gained the support of the most highly acclaimed citizens of Epirus: τῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν τοὺς κρατίστους. This phrase obviously corresponds to οἱ κρᾶτιστοι, suggesting that the supporter group consisted of aristocrats who expected Pyrrhus to safeguard their business interests³⁹. We cannot rule out that the aristocracy gave their support to Pyrrhus because his agreement with Ptolemy I Soter had created new opportunities for eco-

³⁶ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 14; cf. P. Lévêque, *Pyrrhos*, pp. 120–121.

³⁷ Plut., *Pyrrh.*, 5, 14.

³⁸ The given date seems to have been established by way of compromise, cf. P. Lévêque, *Pyrrhos*, p. 114.

³⁹ In line with C. Klotzsch's theory, the phrase τῶν Ἡπειρωτῶν τοὺς κρατίστους did not refer to the citizens of Epirus (Ἡπειρώταις), but the association of the Molossians (σύμμαχοι τῶν Μολοσσῶν).

conomic exchange⁴⁰. The above arguments seem even more convincing when we take into account the decline of Kassandros, Neoptolemos' protector.

The elimination of Neoptolemos became a necessity for Pyrrhus. The only way he could rise to full power was by making his rule absolute. Pyrrhus had to find a legal solution to avoid riots, and all he needed was a well-crafted excuse. He devised a plot in which Neoptolemos would be charged with responsibility for an assassination attempt on Pyrrhus. The official account could have been written by Proksenus, the chronicler responsible for drafting a proper version of events⁴¹. Once again, Pyrrhus followed the example of Alexander who had gotten rid of Parmenio through a conspiracy based on suspicion. There was no room for experimentation or fondness in Pyrrhus' political activity. Neoptolemos became Pyrrhus' second (after Alketas) rival in Epirus, and he had to be eliminated in order for Pyrrhus to enjoy absolute power. Nevertheless, it soon turned out that a throne in this region of the Greek world was not enough to satisfy Pyrrhus' ambitions.

⁴⁰ S. Kondis, *New Thoughts on the Relations between Pyrrhus and Ptolemy I*, in: *The Age of Pyrrhus. Archeology, History and Culture in Early Hellenistic Greece and Italy*. Proceedings of an international conference held at Brown University, April 8th-10th, 1988, ed. T. Hackens, D. Holloway, R. R. Holloway, G. Moucharte, Louvain-la-Neuve 1992, pp. 73-82.

⁴¹ V. La Bua, *Prosseno e gli ὑπομνήματα Πύρρου*, *Terza Miscellanea Greca e Romana*. Studi Pubblicati dall'Istituto Italiano per la Storia Antica, fasc. XXI, Roma 1971, pp. 1-6

Małgorzata Chudzikowska-Wołoszyn

THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MANIFESTO OF THEODULF OF ORLEANS. A CONTRIBUTION TO A DISCUSSION ABOUT LITERATURE OF THE CAROLINGIAN ERA

It remains unknown to what extent Master Theodulf, Charlemagne's protégé, was able to escape from earthly weaknesses such as snobbery or exaltation. In view of the respect bestowed on him by the members of Aachen's academic community¹ and the monarch himself, we could venture to say that the poet separated himself from other mortals with a wall of fairylike pathos and megalomania. Yet an in-depth analysis of Theodulf's works seems to refute those observations. It suggests that Theodulf, one of the most educated academics at Charlemagne's court², an expert scholar of Latin and classic literature, an outstanding theologian and mentor, was also a master of self-discipline.

Theodulf received a well-rounded education before rising to the position of Charlemagne's indispensable advisor and intellectual dedicated to the cause. The early life of this outstanding poet and bishop remains a mystery. Theodulf's date of birth is unknown, and various researchers placed it some-

¹ Alcuin, a versatile educator and the leading promoter of education in the Kingdom of the Franks, referred to Theodulf as "the finest of men endowed with wisdom incarnate". Cf. Alcuinus, Ep. 225, in: *MGH, Epistolae, Epistolae Karolini aevi* II, p. 369.

² Frederick Raby referred to Theodulf as the finest poet of his time. According to Raby, the bishop's talent most closely matched that of Venantius Fortunatus who lived two centuries before Theodulf. Cf. F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginnings to the Close of the Middle Ages*, ed. 2, Oxford University Press 1966, p. 174. According to William Paton Ker, Theodulf's poems are not characterized by the liveliness we find in Fortunatus' work. Yet in comparison with the bishop of Poitiers, Theodulf's work enjoyed greater social esteem. Cf. W. P. Ker, *Wczesne średniowiecze. Zarys historii literatury*, translated by T. Rybowski, Wrocław 1977, p. 122.

where between 750 and 760³. This early medieval scholar of Gothic descent was born in Spain, and he fled the country in the face of the “Arab occupation”⁴. In 781, he arrived at Charlemagne’s court when the monarch’s achievements in both foreign and internal policy were at their peak.

Theodulf’s greatest strength was his perfect command of Latin which he had mastered on equal terms with his mother tongue. The Gothic poet’s Latin was undoubtedly more “alive” than the academic and schematic language used by another pioneer scholar of the Carolingian Renaissance, Alcuin of York (~735–804). For the Anglo-Saxons, the language of the Romans was a literary and “dead” set of symbols that were completely unrelated to their social development. Theodulf grew up in a country where Roman traditions were permanently rooted in the national heritage. Spain preserved many traces of its Roman past. Latin was definitely spoken in cities that cultivated their Roman traditions. The significance of Roman culture for the development of the Iberian Peninsula was rhetorically described by Pierre Riché: “Could the Roman tradition fall into oblivion in Spain, a country that had benefited immensely from Rome’s intellectual culture and reciprocated in gratitude by giving Seneca, Lucan, Quintilian and Marial to Rome?”⁵.

Theodulf’s fine education was thus a reflection on Spain’s extensive intellectual traditions. Bishopric schools were officially institutionalized in Spain already in 572⁶. In the 7th century, the royal court in Toledo was one of Europe’s most prominent intellectual centers. The monarch’s well-stocked library comprised both religious and secular works. Visigothic aristocrats were thoroughly educated in rhetoric and grammar, and the clerical culture was in full blossom already in the early 7th century. This era witnessed the rise of Isidore of Seville, one of the most learned men of the early Middle Ages (~560 – 636).

Theodulf’s knowledge and skill testify to the magnificence and significance of the “Isidorian” period. The rich traditions of his country instilled in him the enthusiasm to study the ancient masters and explore biblical and theological problems. Theodulf was an exegetist, a theologian, a moralist and a poet. He was among the great Visigothic scholars who revitalized humanistic ideals⁷.

³ The most recommended works discussing Theodulf of Orleans: F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, vol. I, ed. 2, Oxford University Press 1967, pp. 189–197; Hugh Bredin, *Alcuin (c. 735–804) and Theodulf of Orleans (died 821)*, edited by Chris Murray, in: *Key Writers on Art: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century*, Taylor & Francis Books 2003, pp. 22–28; E. Duemmler, *Theodulf carmina*, in: *MGH, Poetae I*, Berolini 1881, pp. 437–445; C. Liersch, *Die Gedichte Theodulfs, Bischofs von Orlean*, Halle 1880.

⁴ The Arab invasion of Spain began in 711.

⁵ P. Riché, *Edukacja i kultura w Europie Zachodniej (VI–VIII w.)*, translated by M. Radozycka-Paoletti, Warszawa 1995, p. 47.

⁶ The Toledo synod of 527 decided to create bishopric schools where future clerics were educated under the bishop’s supervision. Cf. P. Riche, *Edukacja i kultura w Europie Zachodniej (VI–VIII w.)*, pp. 137–138.

⁷ Cf. P. Riché, op. cit., pp. 288–289.

*De libris quos legere solebamet qualiter fabulae poetarum a philosophis mystice pertractentur*⁸, a 60-verse long poem, provides us with a deeper insight into Theodulf's intellect. The work makes numerous references to the Gothic poet's favorite readings and literary inspirations. Theodulf admits to having been influenced by the teachings of Gregory the Great, Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose and Isidore⁹. His views and general knowledge were shaped by the works of Sedulius, Arator and Fortunatus¹⁰. Prudentius, a Spanish-born philosopher, was greatly esteemed by Theodulf who referred to him as *parens*¹¹. Theodulf also admitted to a weakness for Donatus, Virgil and the "loquacious" */loquax/ Ovid*¹².

Unlike Alcuin, the Gothic scholar openly admitted his fascination with classic authors. He rejected the extreme views of Alcuin who forbade his students from reading Virgil whose works, according to Alcuin, could cast a "fatal spell" on Christian readers¹³. Theodulf resorted to allegory as formal justification for his fascination with pagan authors. In descriptions of ancient deities, he searched for ideals and symbols that he transposed onto Christian ground. This approach enabled him to freely explore the classic works of Virgil and Ovid. Frederick Raby referred to Theodulf's allegorical method of analyzing controversial literature as "exorcising the latent evil"¹⁴.

*De septem liberalibus artibus in quadam pictura depictis*¹⁵ fully asserts Theodulf's vast educational backgrounds. As it turns out, the Visigothic poet had mastered all of the seven liberated arts, and he attached the greatest importance to grammar, followed by rhetoric and dialectic which he referred to as *mater sensus*¹⁶. He also emphasized the significance of logic, ethics, physics and geometry.

Theodulf made an immense contribution to the intellectual prowess of Charlemagne's court. He was the monarch's most admired court poet and theologian. Together with Alcuin, Einhard (770–840), Angilbert (745–814), Paul the Deacon (~720 – ~790) and Paulinus of Aquileia (before 750 – ~802), he was part of the first generation of Carolingian erudites who made laborious efforts to reinstate the correct usage of Latin in liturgical rites, administration and literature¹⁷.

⁸ Theodulfus, *De libris quos legere solebamet qualiter fabulae poetarum a philosophis mystice pertractentur*, [w:] MGH, *Poetae I*, pp. 543–544.

⁹ *Ibid.*, v. 3 and 5, p. 543.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, v. 1, p. 543.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, v. 16, p. 543.

¹² *Ibid.*, v. 18, p. 543.

¹³ F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginnings to the Close of the Middle Ages*, p. 172.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

¹⁵ Theodulfus, *De septem liberalibus artibus in quadam pictura depictis*, in: MGH, *Poetae I*, pp. 544–547.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 27, p. 545.

¹⁷ Cf. E. Auerbach, *Język literacki i jego odbiorcy w późnym antyku łacińskim i średniowieczu*, translated by R. Urbański, Kraków 2006, p. 111.

The provisions of the Second Council of Nicaea (787) provided Theodulf with an excellent opportunity to demonstrate his aptitude for debating on controversial theological issues. His skills did not meet with the approval of the Franconian west. Already in 788, Charlemagne was presented with council documents which were translated from ancient Greek into Latin and imposed the worship of icons on the Christian world. Those ideas did not find fertile ground in the Carolingian empire. For the Franks, this Byzantine adoration was synonymous with idolatry. Their beliefs relating to the presentation of sacred images were rooted in the teachings of Pope Gregory I¹⁸. The Carolingian manifesto was developed over a period of four years. In 794, the debate was closed with a polemicizing treatise. Theodulf¹⁹ was presented with the honorary function of the treatise's "editor-in-chief". He brought together Carolingian theologians' deliberations into a single piece of work known as *Libri Carolini*²⁰.

Theodulf also authored many diocese statutes in the first half of the 9th century. The statutes were written once a year during clerical conventions. Those documents are an invaluable source of information about the life of Carolingian clergy, liturgical traditions and the congregation's mentality²¹. Theodulf also participated in the debate surrounding *Filioque*. Commissioned by Charlemagne, a great advocate of the theory postulating the consubstantial hypostasis of the Holy Trinity²², the poet also edited the treatise entitled *De Spiritu Sancto*²³.

In 794, Charlemagne instructed the Gothic scholar to compose an epitaph for his deceased fourth wife, Fastrada²⁴. Already then, Theodulf was

¹⁸ Gregory I (590–604) was the first to emphasize the didactic significance of images, arguing that an image is a "Bible for the poor" /*Biblia pauperum*/.

¹⁹ *Libri Carolini* was long attributed to Alcuin. The discussion regarding the treatise's true author was reopened in 1777 by Froben Forster who edited a collection of Alcuin's works. He questioned Alcuin's authorship of *Libri Carolini*. More references to the authorship of *Libri Carolini*: L. Wallach, *Diplomatic Studies in Latin and Greek Documents from the Carolingian Age*, Ithaca 1977; A. Freeman, *Theodulf of Orleans and the Libri Carolini*, "Speculum", 32/1957, pp. 663–705; P. Meyvaert, *The authorship of the Libri Carolini, Observations prompted by a recent Book*, "Revue Benedictine" 89/1979, pp. 29–57; A. Freeman, *Theodulf of Orleans: Charlemagne's Spokesman against the Second Council of Nicaea (Variorum Collected Studies Series)*, ed. P. Meyvaert, Ashgate Publishing 2003.

²⁰ The full title is: *Opus Caroli regis contra synodum*. The most recent edition of the treatise was published in 1998 and edited by Ann Freeman.

²¹ P. Riché, *Chrześcijaństwo na karolińskim Zachodzie (połowa VIII — koniec IX wieku)*, in: *Historia Chrześcijaństwa. Biskupi, mnisi i cesarze (610–1054)*, eds. G. Dagron, P. Riché, A. Vauchez, translated by A. Kuryś, Warszawa 1999, p. 559.

²² M. Żakowska, *Prawosławne widzenie dogmatu Trójcy Świętej. Filioque*, "Seminare" 24/2007.

²³ Theodulfus, *De Spiritu Sancto*, in: *PL*, col. 239–276.

²⁴ Charlemagne's marriage to his first wife, Himiltrude, was dissolved after she had given birth to their son Pepin who suffered from a spine deformity. Pepin's disability was only a pretext for dismissing Himiltrude with the aim of establishing a political alliance between Charlemagne and Desiderata, the daughter of the King of the Lombards. After annulling the marriage with Desiderata, the monarch remarried three times. In 771, he married Hildegard, in 783 – Fastrada, and in 794 – Luitgard.

called Pindar by his fellow academics in Aachen. The eloquence and pathos of the queen's epitaph²⁵ demonstrate that the author's nickname had been fully deserved. The monarch also commissioned Theodulf to write an elegy for Pope Hadrian I²⁶. He composed works in honor of the people closest to Charlemagne, which suggests that Theodulf was probably the monarch's personal poet. The literary exuberance and freedom of *Ad Carolum regem*²⁷, a poem dating back to around 796, testify to the trust vested in the poet by the king. This work is a prime example of panegyric court poetry, and it accurately depicts the monarch's private life. Theodulf composed the poem with a significant dose of humor which further asserts his friendly relations with Charlemagne.

In recognition of his service to literature, the monarch appointed Theodulf the Bishop of Orleans. Theodulf fulfilled this function with utmost diligence, and followed Charlemagne's orders to establish schools in monasteries and cathedrals. The poet ventured even further by creating schools in towns and rural areas where children from the poorest families could get free basic education under clerical supervision²⁸. The bishop's dedication earned him yet another promotion in 789 when he was entrusted with the post of the emperor's controlling officer, *missus dominicus*²⁹, and was dispatched to inspect the Province of Narbonne. This long journey prompted Theodulf to write his longest poem, *Versus Teodulfi episcopi contra iudices*³⁰, in criticism of the abuse of power, corruption and legal violations that he had encountered in the audited region.

Contra iudices is a rhetorical admonition composed in dactylic pentameter and inspired by the work of Ovid³¹, Virgil³², Prudentius³³ and Sedu-

²⁵ Theodulfus, *Epitaphium Fastradae reginae*, in: *MGH, Poetae I*, p. 483.

²⁶ He died in 796. Theodulf composed an elegy in his memory, entitled *Super sepulcrum Hadriani papae*, in: *MGH, Poetae I*, pp. 489–490.

²⁷ Theodulfus, *Ad Carolum regem*, in: *MGH*, s. 483–489.

²⁸ J. E. Raby, *A History of Christian–Latin Poetry from the Beginnings to the Close of the Middle Ages*, p. 173.

²⁹ The office of royal envoy — *missus dominicus* — was established by Charlemagne in 789. The officers inspected all administrative regions to strengthen the monarch's control over the state. The empire comprised around 30 such regions, referred to as *missatica*. Every inspection was carried out by two officers, one secular and one clerical. They received detailed instructions from the monarch in the regularly edicted *capitularia missorum*. The office of control inspector survived through the reign of Louis the Pious, and it gradually disappeared in the period of confraternity that followed his death. Local inspections ceased to take place in the kingdom of Louis the German. To limit their dependence on the monarch, the nobles made every attempt to interrupt the appointment of the inspectors.

³⁰ Theodulfus, *Versus Teodulfi episcopi contra iudices*, (later *Contra iudices*) in: *MGH, Poetae I*, pp. 493–517.

³¹ Numerous references to *Amores* and *Ars amatoria*. Theodulf's rhetoric was also inspired by *Remedia amoris*, *Metamorphoses* (mainly in mythical digressions), *Fasti*, *Epistulae ex Ponto* and *Tristia*.

³² The bishop of Orleans was significantly influenced by the language of *Aeneid*, *Georgics* and *Bucolics*.

³³ Some of Theodulf's biblical digressions are based on *Cathermerinon liber*. The allegorical conflict in the judge's soul resembles that described in *Psychomachia*, (*Battle for Mansoul*).

lius³⁴. In 956 verses that list the judges' vices, the bishop of Orleans warned all corrupt assessors of infernal suffering³⁵ and encouraged them to become fully dedicated to their work. Diligent observance of duties, argued Theodulf, produces numerous rewards and leads to eternal happiness³⁶. The poem enumerates Biblical fathers and monarchs whom the author considered to be model examples of virtues for mortals. The list opens with Moses, and the poet also makes references to Samuel, Hezekiah and Josiah³⁷.

The apologetic introduction ends in verse 99. The further sequence contains a highly captivating description of the function held by Theodulf, with detailed topographic data that support the identification of the traveled route.

The Visigothic poet proudly reported that Charlemagne, "the generous and fair distributor of goods"³⁸ chose him to perform "duties of utmost caliber"³⁹. Theodulf was appointed for the office of controlling officer⁴⁰ in one of the royal districts⁴¹ in Narbonese Gaul (Galia Narbonensi). He was aided in his work by Laidrad, later the bishop of Lyon⁴².

The first city on the inspectors' long and tiresome journey was Lyon, followed by the rocky Vienne⁴³, the city of Valance⁴⁴, the estates of Avignon⁴⁵, forts in Nimes⁴⁶, Narbonne⁴⁷, Carcassonne⁴⁸, Arles⁴⁹ and Marseille⁵⁰. In each visited town, the emperor's officer encountered many people from various age groups and social classes who attempted to reach their goals through material gain⁵¹. He describes the objects presented to him with great mastery. The poem shows Theodulf to be a great art connoisseur. Although he had a general contempt for bribery, he was able to appraise the quality of the presented gifts with remarkable skill. The poem features

³⁴ References to *Carmen paschale*.

³⁵ *Contra iudices*, v. 5–6, p. 494.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 7–12, p. 494.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, v. 21–44, p. 494.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, v. 102. This is Theodulf's panegyric homage to Charlemagne. With great pathos, the poet enumerated the rivers that succumbed to the monarch's reign, among them Waal, Rhone, Meuse, Rhine, Seine, Weser, Garonne, Po, Marne, Danube and Elbe. This list set the limits of the Christian ruler's territorial domain. Cf. *Ibid.*, v. 103–106, p. 496.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, v. 100, p. 496.

⁴⁰ *Missus dominicus*

⁴¹ *Contra iudices*, v. 125–142, p. 497

⁴² *Ibid.*, v. 117, p. 496.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, v. 125, p. 497.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, v. 127, p. 497.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, v. 129, p. 497.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 131, p. 497.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, v. 137, p. 497.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, v. 141, p. 497.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, v. 146, p. 497.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, v. 151, p. 497.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, v. 163–169, p. 498.

⁵² *Ibid.*, v. 179–202, pp. 498–499.

a masterly description of ornaments on an ancient vase⁵². This mythological digression asserts Theodulf as a master of rhetoric and an expert in ancient art. With great ease and refinement, Theodulf depicts Heracles' struggle against various opponents⁵³. The antique vessel was covered with a series of mythological scenes. Theodulf's literary mastery breathed life into the portrayed figures. The scenes become dynamic, they create a sense of motion and pull the reader into the mythical world. We accompany Heracles⁵⁴ in his struggle against the merciless monster Cacus⁵⁵. Thanks to the poet's skillful form of expression, we hear the cracking of the bones broken by the hero, we shudder at the image of the conquered giant's crushed throat and ripped entrails. We suffer the tragedy of Deianira who watches her dearest Heracles die before her very eyes, wrapped in a blood-stained robe⁵⁶. The detailed account of ornaments on the antique vase brings to mind Homer's description of the shield of Achilles⁵⁷, which was later deployed by Virgil to portray the shield of Aeneas⁵⁸. Theodulf's lengthy and panoramic imagery draws upon the legacy of ancient masters, most probably Virgil and Ovid. For Polish readers, the Visigothic poet's vase creates associations with Wojski's dishware which was intricately described by Mickiewicz⁵⁹ and the cup of "concord" in Krasicki's *Monachomachia*⁶⁰.

Missus dominicus was presented with an impressive choice of bribes. Theodulf provides the readers with a long list of colorful capes⁶¹, crystal and silver cups⁶², swords, helmets, shields⁶³, Spanish hide⁶⁴, wool and linen garments, shoes and hats⁶⁵. He was also offered horses, mules, foals and oxen⁶⁶. The scale of bribery was limitless. The Bishop of Orleans condemned both those who accepted bribes as well as those who, taught by previous experience, gave them. Bribery had been common practice for centuries,

⁵³ Ibid., v. 194–199, p. 499.

⁵⁴ Scenes from the myth of Heracles adorn many ancient vases, among them the black figure lekythos from the 6th century BC depicting Heracles fighting with Triton. The image of Heracles killing Nessos is the leading motif of ornaments on the famous Nessos amphora (around 615 BC). Ancient pottery also features images of the twelve labors of Heracles, including an amphora depicting Heracles and Stymphalian birds (around 500 BC), Heracles fighting with the Lernaean hydra (black figure amphora, around 540 BC), a kalpis showing Heracles fighting with the Cretan bull (around 500-475 BC).

⁵⁵ *Contra iudices*, v. 181–188, p. 498.

⁵⁶ Ibid., v. 199, p. 499.

⁵⁷ *Iliad*, book XVIII.

⁵⁸ *Eneid*, book VIII.

⁵⁹ *Pan Tadeusz*, book XII.

⁶⁰ Song VI.

⁶¹ *Contra iudices*, v. 211, p. 499.

⁶² Ibid., v. 221, p. 499.

⁶³ Ibid., v. 236, p. 500.

⁶⁴ Ibid., v. 245, p. 500.

⁶⁵ Ibid., v. 247–248, p. 500.

⁶⁶ Ibid., v. 217, p. 499.

plunging the empire into turmoil and anarchy. Theodulf referred to bribery as an epidemic and the worst insanity⁶⁷. He instilled honest practices and ethical work principles into judges.

Theodulf advocated firmness and perseverance in action. He appealed to his readers to care for orphans, widows and the poor. In the poet's opinion, humility and prudence should be the main qualities of every juror. He conjured up scenes that were guidelines for effective and fair conflict resolution. He advised his readers how to avoid suspicious deals.

The poem is more than an appalled author's monotonous and dramatic outcry for justice. Theodulf resorted to various literary and stylistic techniques to breathe life into his work. The satirical scene depicted near verse 700 is a humorous parable. Theodulf masterly uses hyperboles to convey the heroes' grotesque and highly expressive characteristics. There is the judge's weeping wife who is unable to forgive her husband for sending away a generous donor. There is a crowd of maids who unite in grief with their greedy mistress. In conclusion, Theodulf demonstrates that a plot hatched by a woman is the ultimate trial by fire for stewards of justice. The advice dispensed to a fictional judge testifies to the author's skill of composition, and it comprises a series of suggestive arguments characteristic of cynic rhetoric⁶⁸. The bishop's tempestuous and satirical criticism occasionally takes the form of short dialogues.

In *Contra iudices*, the Bishop of Orleans paints a very suggestive picture of provincial life engulfed in lawlessness. Yet the poem is more than a rhetorical work filled with pathos. Grotesque and humor endow the poem with timeless originality. Its structure demonstrates that Theodulf had a masterly command of language which he deployed to express his individuality. The poet was able to score these achievements at a time that was not conducive to literary experiments or ambitious, pioneer ideas. In the bishop's cultural milieu, success could be achieved only through the strict observance of long-established trends⁶⁹. The poem asserts the Spanish tradition's significant contribution to Carolingian culture. Theodulf gave to the Franks something that the Anglo-Saxons could never offer. The Visigothic poet's technique was rooted in Spain's centuries-long connections with the Latin language and civilization⁷⁰.

Theodulf's period of prosperity, which commenced upon his arrival in the Kingdom of the Franks, came to an abrupt end in 814. Theodulf's tragedy began with the death of his great mentor and benefactor, Charlemagne. His successor, Louis the Pious, was not endowed with his father's artistic sensi-

⁶⁷ v. v. 255–256, p. 500: *O scelerata lues, partes diffusa per omnes, o scelus, o furor, o res truculenta nimis, (...)*.

⁶⁸ F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, pp. 194–195.

⁶⁹ W. P. Ker, *Wczesne średniowiecze. Zarys historii literatury*, p. 23.

⁷⁰ F. J. E. Raby, *A History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, p. 197.

tivity. The new king was absorbed by the chaotic situation in internal affairs which seemed to escape his control. In 818, the emperor's authority was undermined by a plot staged by his nephew, Bernard of Italy, who opposed the monarch's concept of indivisibility of the Empire. Louis the Pious issued an *Ordinatio imperii*, an imperial decree that laid out plans for an orderly succession to guarantee the unity of the Empire. The rebellion came to a bloody end and Bernard, its initiator, was sentenced to blinding. He did not survive the ordeal and died in 818. The emperor started an investigation to disclose all supporters of the rebellion. Theodulf was among the suspects, and despite attempts to assert his innocence, he was removed from the post of Bishop of Orleans and imprisoned in St. Albin's monastery in Angers⁷¹.

An avid supporter of Ovid, Theodulf also shared the great poet's dramatic fate. Eight centuries earlier, Ovid was exiled by emperor Augustus to Tomi, and he was forced to leave Rome at the peak of his popularity. A similar fate befell Theodulf who was confined to prison and oblivion in Angers. Identifying with his Roman predecessor, the poet sent a pleading letter in which muse Thalia spoke in his defense⁷². The letter was addressed to Theodulf's influential friend, Bishop Modoin of Autun.

While in banishment, Theodulf composed his best religious poem, *Gloria laus et honor*⁷³. To this day, the hymn is sung during Palm Sunday liturgy. When the ceremonious procession depicting Jesus' triumphant entry into Jerusalem approaches the gates, Theodulf's hymn of praise is intoned inside the church. The poem, composed in dactylic pentameter, is one of the finest works of Latin church hymnography.

Around 821, Louis the Pious decided to acquit the bishop of Orleans⁷⁴. Theodulf was released from Angers, and he tried to reclaim his bishopric in Orleans. There is little historical evidence indicating whether the poet was able to reach the city. Theodulf died shortly after the emperor had issued the acquitting sentence. His burial place remains unknown.

To conclude our discussion on Theodulf's work, let me once again quote

⁷¹ More references to the rebellion initiated by Bernard of Italy and Theodulf's punishment – B. Simson, *Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reichs unter Ludwig dem Frommen*, vol I, Leipzig 1874, pp. 117 and 122.

⁷² Theodulfus, *Epistola Theodulfi episcopi ad Modoinum episcopum scribens ei de exilio*, [w:] MGH, *Poetae I*, pp. 563–565.

⁷³ Theodulfus, *Gloria laus et honor*, in: MGH, *Poetae I*, pp. 558–559. The hymn for Palm Sunday (*Na procesję w Niedzielę Palmową*) was translated into Polish by A. Świderkówna, in: *Muza łacińska. Antologia poezji wczesnochrześcijańskiej i średniowiecznej (III–XIV/XV w.)*, ed. M. Starowieyski, Wrocław 2007, pp. 209–210.

⁷⁴ The Orleans legend has it that around 821, emperor Louis visited Angers on the Palm Sunday. He participated in the local procession which stopped under the tower where Theodulf was kept prisoner. The crowd and the monarch allegedly heard Theodulf's melodious voice singing *Gloria laus et honor*. Moved by the performance, Louis requested to meet the singer. The benevolent monarch set Theodulf free and absolved him of all charges. Cf. Ch. Cuissard, *Théodulfe, évêque d'Orléans, sa vie et ses œuvres*, pp. 136–137, Orlean 1892.

Frederick Raby's prominent book about the history of Christian-Latin poetry: "Theodulf's work is a reflection on the Carolingian era, and it represents the highest standard of literary achievement which, upon an in-depth analysis, may easily yield to criticism due to its limitations (...). It shows a dim half-conscious humanism struggling with the insistent temper of medievalism of the Middle Ages, a mixture of freedom and tradition, the secular and the religious. And Theodulf, the scholar and the churchman, represents the best side of his age. His poetry is not always a mere imitation. The proof of this lies in the fact that he lives again in his verses, as a noble and enlightened man"⁷⁵.

Versus Teodulfi episcopi contra iudices (a selection)⁷⁶

Iudicii callem censores prendite iusti,
 Et vestri spernant avia curva⁷⁷ pedes.
 Hoc iter ad caelum ducit, trahit illud ad umbras,
 Hoc pia vita tenet, mors habet illud hians.
 5 Ergo cavete, viri, scatebras Acerontis⁷⁸ adire,
 Quo Stix, Cociti⁷⁹ quo furor omnis inest⁸⁰.
 At, paradise, tuis nil gratius aedibus extat,
 Quo mala nulla insunt, quo bona cuncta manent.
 Si mihi mille forent centeno in gutture⁸¹ linguae,
 10 Aerea vox cunctis ferrea verba daret,
 Non possem⁸², fateor, tot promere sedis amoenae
 Gaudia, quae capiunt qui bene iura tenent.
 Sed neque poenarum percurrere monstra loquendo
 Possem, quae patitur fraudis amica cohors.
 15 Iudicio pietas, pietati industria detur,

⁷⁵ E. Raby, *A History of Christian-Latin Poetry from the Beginnings to the Close of the Middle Ages*, pp. 176–177.

⁷⁶ The original texts can be found in *MGH, Poetae I*, pp. 493–517.

⁷⁷ (...) *spernant avia curva* (...). Cf. Sedulius, *Carmen paschale I*, 300: (...) *curva per avia*, in: *PL* 19, col. 585.

⁷⁸ Acheront was one of the rivers of the Greek underworld which human souls had to cross to enter the world of the dead.

⁷⁹ Cocytus was the river of wailing in Hades. The dead who did not pay Charon, the ferryman, for the journey across the Styx would travel along the banks of Cocytus for a hundred years.

⁸⁰ Cf. Ovidius, *Amores I*, 7, 2.

⁸¹ Cf. Persius, *Satirae V*, 6. Persius lived and worked during the reign of Caligula, Claudius and Nero. His legacy comprises six satires which are sometimes quite incomprehensible, probably out of fear of Nero. Theodulf makes a reference to the fifth satire which expresses the poet's gratitude to his mentor, Cornutus. In the fifth satire, Persius condemns weakness of character and slavery to base instincts. Persius' work became popular in the Middle Ages. Cf. L. Rychlewska, *Persius*, in: *Słownik pisarzy antycznych*, ed. A. Świderkówna, pp. 351–352.

⁸² Cf. Virgil, *Aeneid VI*, 628–629: "Had I a hundred mouths, a hundred tongues, And throats of brass, inspir'd with iron lungs, I could not half those horrid crimes repeat", translated by John Dryden, www.classic.mit.edu/Virgil.aeneid.6.vi.htm.

Quo teneant nullum munera saeva locum.
 Hoc veteris clamat peragendum pagina legis,
 Nullius hoc vatam lingua beata tacet. (...).

99 Praefectura mihi fuerat⁸³ peragenda tributa
 Resque actu grandes officiumque potens.
 Nulli vi studiisque piis armisque⁸⁴ secundus
 Rex dedit hanc Carolus, primus ad omne bonum:
 Cui parent Walis⁸⁵, Rodanus⁸⁶, Mosa⁸⁷, Renus⁸⁸ et Henus⁸⁹,
 Sequana⁹⁰, Wisurgis⁹¹, Wardo⁹², Garonna⁹³, Padus⁹⁴,
 105 Rura⁹⁵, Mosella⁹⁶, Liger⁹⁷, Vultur⁹⁸, Matrona⁹⁹, Ledus¹⁰⁰,
 Hister¹⁰¹, Atax¹⁰², Gabarus¹⁰³, Olitis¹⁰⁴, Albis¹⁰⁵, Arar¹⁰⁶.
 Quo sinodus clerum, populum lex stringeret alma,
 Duxque foret cunctis regula calle suo;
 Ecclesiae sanctus matris quo cresceret ordo¹⁰⁷, (...).

117 Haeserat hac nobis Laidradus sorte sodalis,
 Cederet ut magnus hoc relevante labor.
 Noricus hunc genuit, hunc tu, Lugdune, futurum
 120 Pontificem speras relligionis ope¹⁰⁸.

⁸³ The office of the emperor's envoy, *missus dominicus*, held Theodulf in Narbonese Gaul (contemporary Languedoc and Provence) together with Laidrad, later the Bishop of Lyon.

⁸⁴ Theodulf emphasizes that he accepted the office bestowed on him by Charlemagne in accordance with every principle of fair and honest conduct. His decision, argued Theodulf, was not influenced by excessive zealousness or political pressure.

⁸⁵ Waal.

⁸⁶ Rhone.

⁸⁷ Meuse.

⁸⁸ Rhein.

⁸⁹ Inn.

⁹⁰ Seine.

⁹¹ Weser.

⁹² Gard.

⁹³ Garonne.

⁹⁴ Po.

⁹⁵ Ruhr.

⁹⁶ Moselle.

⁹⁷ Loire.

⁹⁸ Volturno.

⁹⁹ Marne.

¹⁰⁰ Lez.

¹⁰¹ Danube.

¹⁰² Aude.

¹⁰³ Gave de Pau.

¹⁰⁴ Lot.

¹⁰⁵ Elbe.

¹⁰⁶ Arar.

¹⁰⁷ Theodulf emphasizes Charlemagne's universal power. The King of the Franks headed a theocratic state, and he had full legislative powers, including religious. The emperor attempted to exercise control over church organization and doctrine. Theodulf thus wrote: "Let Charlemagne convene synods with the clergy and formulate just laws with the people".

Arte cluit, sensuque viget, virtute redundat;
 Cui vita ad superam transitus ista manet.
 Iam, Lugdune¹⁰⁹, tuis celsis post terga relictis
 Moenibus, adgredimur, causa quod optat, iter.
 125 Saxosa petimus constructam in valle Viennam¹¹⁰,
 Quam scopoli inde artant, hinc premit amnis hians.
 Inde Valentinis¹¹¹ terris urbique iacenti,
 Rupee, nos dedimus, hinc, Morenate¹¹², tibi.
 Post et Arausinas¹¹³ terras et Avennica¹¹⁴ rura
 130 Tangimus et fines, quos tenuere Getae¹¹⁵.
 Inde Nemausiacas sensim properamus ad arces¹¹⁶,
 Quo spatiosa urbs est resque operosa satis. (...).

 163 Magna cetervatim nos contio saepe frequentat,
 Aetas quod dicat sexus et omnis habet,
 Parvulus¹¹⁷, annosus, iuvenis, pater, innuba, celebs,
 Maior, ephoebus, anus, masque, marita, minor.
 Quid moror?¹¹⁸ Instanter promittit munera plebes,
 Quodque cupit factum, si dabit, esse putat.
 Hoc animi murum tormento frangere certant,
 170 Ariete quo tali mens male pulsa ruat.
 Hic et cristallum et gemmas promittit Eoas¹¹⁹,
 Si faciam, alterius ut potiatur agris.
 Iste gravi numero nummos fert divitis auri,
 Quos Arabum sermo sive character arat,
 175 Aut quos argento Latius stilus inprimit albo,
 Si tamen adquirat predia, rura, domos.
 Clam nostrum quidam submissa voce ministrum
 Evocat, ista sonat verba sonanda mihi:
 180 Cui pura et vena et non leve pondus inest,
 Quo caelata patent scelerum vestigia Caci¹²¹,

¹⁰⁸ Having completed the mission, Laidrad became the Bishop of Lyon.

¹⁰⁹ Lyon is the first of the towns mentioned by Theodulf. It was the inspectors' meeting point and the first stop on their journey.

¹¹⁰ Vienne – all towns listed by Theodulf are situated in Provence in the region of Rhone-Alps and the Cote d'Azur. This was the former region of Narbonese Gaul.

¹¹¹ Valence.

¹¹² Mornas.

¹¹³ Orange.

¹¹⁴ Avignon.

¹¹⁵ "The borderlands under Goth control" – easternmost territory inspected by Theodulf along the Pyrenees.

¹¹⁶ *Nemausiacas arces* – castles of Nimes.

¹¹⁷ This begins the presentation of Theodulf's patents.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* XIII, 531: *Quid moror* (...). "Why do I delay the cleansing of your wound?", translation: <http://www.romansonline.com/>

¹¹⁹ *Gemmas Eoas* – "Eastern pearls"

¹²⁰ Epic retardation – description of an ancient vase presented as a bribe.

Tabo et stipitibus ora solute virum;
 Ferrati scopoli variae seu signa rapinae,
 Humano et pecudum sanguine tactus ager.
 185 Quo furor Hercules Vulcanidis ossa retundit,
 Ille fero patrios ructat ab ore focos;
 Quoque genu stomachum seu calcibus ilia rumpit,
 Flumifluum clava guttur et ora quatit.
 Illic rupe cava videas procedure tauros,
 190 Et pavitare iterum post sua terga trahi.
 Hoc in parte cava planus cui circulus ore est,
 Nec nimium latus signa minuta gerens,
 Perculit ut geminos infans Trintius angues¹²²,
 Ordine sunt etiam gesta notata decem.
 195 At pars exterior crebro usu rasa politur,
 Effigiesque perit adtenuata vetus,
 Quo Alcides¹²³, Calidonque¹²⁴ amnis, Nessusque biformis¹²⁵
 Certant pro specie, Deianira, tua.
 Inlita Neseo feralis sanguine vestis¹²⁶
 200 Cernitur et miseri fata pavenda Lichae¹²⁷.
 Perdit et Anteus dura inter brachia vitam¹²⁸,
 Qui solito sterni more vetatur humo.

¹²¹ Cacus was a fire- and smoke-breathing monster in Roman mythology. Cf. V. Zamarowsky, *Encyklopedia mitologii antycznej*, translated by J. Illg, L. Spyrka, J. Wania, Warszawa 2006, p. 234. Theodulf makes a reference to Cacus' character in Virgil's *Aeneid*. Cf. Virgil, *Aeneid*, VIII, v. 193-: "(...)T was once a robber's den, inclos'd around, With living stone, and deep beneath the ground. The monster Cacus, more than half a beast, This hold, impervious to the sun, possess'd. The pavement ever foul with human gore; Heads, and their mangled members, hung the door. Vulcan this plague begot; and, like his sire, Black clouds he belch'd, and flakes of livid fire", translated by John Dryden, www.classic.mit.edu/Virgil.aeneid.8.viii.htm.

¹²² Df. Ovidius, *Ars amatoria* I, 187.

¹²³ Heracles was originally given the name Alcides after his grandfather. It was only later that he became known as Heracles in an attempt to mollify Hera. Cf. V. Zamarowsky, *Encyklopedia mitologii antycznej*, p. 188.

¹²⁴ In Calydon, Heracles found a wife, Deianira, daughter of king Oeneus. He had to compete for her with Achelou, the patron god of rivers. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹²⁵ Centaur Nessos, the ferryman on the river Euenos, was shot by Heracles' arrow. Theodulf draws upon Ovid. Cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, IX, 119-.

¹²⁶ Cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, IX, 154: "His garment, in the reeking purple dy'd", translated by Sir Samuel Garth, John Dryden, www.classic.mit.edu/Ovid/metam.html. Dying Nessus gives Deianira his blood-stained robe, assuring her that it would seal her husband's eternal love for her.

¹²⁷ Lichas –Heracles' friend and servant. Acting on Deianira's orders, he gave Nessus' blood-stained robe to Heracles. The gift turned out to be a lethal trap and the centaur's revenge. Heracles died a long and painful death, but he had murdered Lichas before he died.

¹²⁸ The giant Antheus guarded the road to the garden of Hesperides from which Hercules was to fetch three golden apples. This was the last task given to Hercules by Eurystheus, the king of Tiryns. The giant drew his strength from his mother, Gaia. To recover his energy, he had to lie down on the ground. Heracles lifted him up and the giant, deprived of his strength, was killed by Heracles' powerful grip. Cf. V. Zamarowsky, *Encyklopedia mitologii antycznej*, p. 192.

Hoc ego sum domino – dominum me forte vocabat –
Laturus, votis si favet ille meis.

- 205 Pars numerosa subest populi, matrum atque virorum,
Infantum, iuvenum, sexu ab utroque simul:
Quos pater et genetrix sub libertatis honore
Liquere, ex illo libera turba manent.
Quorum si cartas vitiem, vase ille vetusto,
210 His ego, tu donis mox potiere meis.¹²⁹
Alter ait: 'Mihi sunt vario fucata colore¹²⁹
Pallia, quae misit, ut puto, torvus Arabs. (...)'

226 Alter ait 'dabimus, quae rogo si dederis.
Vitibus atque oleis, herbis ornatus et hortis,
Inriguus patris est morte relictus ager.

Inde mihi partes fratresque sororque requirunt,
230 Consorte hunc nullo solus habere velim.
Voti compos ero, tibi si mea vota placebunt,
Quae do si capias, quae rogo, rite dabis.'

Subripere ille lares socii cupit, iste novales,
Ambo aliena quidem hic tenet, ille cupit.
235 Alter ut adquirat, ne perdat aduritur alter,
Iste ensem et galeam, hic dare scuta parat.

Res patris unus habet, frater cupit alter habere,
Et dare vult mulos alter, et alter equos.
Haec pars dives opum, pars instat cetera plebis,

- 240 Quod quaerant omnes, quodque querantur habent.
Sed nec eis deerat dandi tamen apta voluntas,
Diversis unus viribus usus erat.

Magna ut maiores, sic promunt parva minores,
Dum fore quae cupiunt hac sibi sorte putant.

- 245 Iste tuo dictas de nomine, Cordoba, pelles¹³⁰,
Hic niveas, alter protrahit inde rubras.
Linea qui potis est, qui non, fert lanea dona,
Tagmen et hic capitis, hic pedis, ille manus.
Quo facies humore levi palmasque solemus
Tergere, quis dandum textile munus habet. (...).

255 O scelerata lues, partes diffusa per omnes,
O scelus, o furor, o res truculenta nimis.

Quae sibi captivum totum male vindicat orbem,
Nec deest, qui det, nec qui male capta ferat.

Flectere sic properant me, nec tamen esse puterent
260 Talem, ni talis ante fuisset ibi.

Nemo in aquis apros, in silvis squamea dona,

¹²⁹ Cf. Vergilius, *Liber Georgicon*, IV, 335. "Fleeces with deep rich hues of the sea's own emerald dyed", *The Georgics of Virgil*, translated by Arthur S. Way, London: Macmillan and Co., 1912.

¹³⁰ Spanish hide was a luxury good.

Inque rogos undis, in face quaerit aquas. (...).

283 Haec ego pertractans sumebam parva libenter,
 Quae non saeva manus, cara sed illa dabat¹³¹ :
 Scilicet arboreos fructus hortique virentis,
 Ova, merum¹³², panes, cornipedumque cibos.
 Sumpsimus et teneros pullos, modicasque volucres,
 Corpora sunt quarum parva, sed apta cibis.
 O felix omnis virtus, discretio si quam
 290 Virtutum nutrix temperat, ornate, alit. (...).

337 Te si forte furor pervasit pestis avarae,
 Stet ratio et docili sic tibi voce canat:
¹³³ Cerne, quod altitronus temet speculetur ab alto,
 340 Quaeque facis summa singula mente notet.
 Qui iudex testisque simul, vindexque malorum est,
 Qui dare digna bonis scit, mala sive malis.' (...).

383 Ad fora fors quaeris veniendi tempus et horam?
 Accipe consilium, 'mane venito', meum¹³⁴.
 385 Perque diem totum non te labor iste gravabit,
 Hinc seges est maior, quo mage quisquis arat¹³⁵.
 Qui legem ut caperet, ieiunia magna peregit,
 Fertur in hoc actu continuasse dies. (...).

389 Vidi ego censores ad iuris munia tardos¹³⁶,
 Munera, nam fateor, ad capienda citos.
 Hora adsunt quinta¹³⁷, norunt descendere nona¹³⁸,
 Tertia¹³⁹ si adducat, sexta¹⁴⁰ reducit eos.
 Nam dare si debent, nona; si prendere, prima¹⁴¹
 Adsunt, estque citus, qui modo serus erat. (...).
 399 Crapula vitetur semper, plus tempore eodem,

¹³¹ Not every gift should be interpreted as a bribe. Theodulf admits to having accepted "kind" and "small" donations comprising fruit, eggs, wine, bread, chickens and horse feed. He emphasized, however, that any gifts of the kind must be received with honor and constraint.

¹³² *Merum, i* – pure wine, not diluted with water.

¹³³ Theodulf's warning. The culprit will not avoid punishment because *altitronus Deus* will pass judgment on everyone after death.

¹³⁴ Cf. Ovidius, *Remedia amoris* 292.

¹³⁵ Theodulf's "golden principle of effectiveness and productivity" – "arrive in the morning and the work will not daunt you, the yield is greater where more is sown"

¹³⁶ A list of public officers' "standard abuses of power" – tardiness for work, leaving the workplace, drunkenness and lack of determination in action.

¹³⁷ Hour from sunrise. The fifth hour was around 10 a.m. in the summer and 11 a.m. in the winter.

¹³⁸ Between 2 and 4 p.m. CET.

¹³⁹ Around 10 a.m.

¹⁴⁰ Noon.

¹⁴¹ The first hour after sunrise.

Quo pia iustitiae lora regenda manent.
 Nam qui se nimiis epulis somnoque¹⁴² sepelit,
 Corporis atque animae vim sibi demit hebes:
 Cum venit ad causas nudatus acumine sensus,
 Marcidus et segnis et sine mente sedet. (...).

449 'Discite iustitiam¹⁴³, caelestia discite iussa,
 Quae pater altitronus sancxit ab axe poli:
 Hanc dues, hanc vates, hanc leges, hanc quoque princeps
 Percensent, haec vis pectora nostra regat.
 Si nos illa regat, populos tunc rite regemus,
 Mens bene cuncta regit, quam deus ipse regit.' (...).

629 Debilis, invalidus, puer, aeger, anusve, senexve
 Si veniant, fer opem his miserando piam¹⁴⁴.
 Fac, sedeat, qui stare nequit, qui surgere prende,
 Cui cor voxque tremit, pesve manusve, iuva.
 Deiectum verbis releva, sedato minacem,
 Qui timet, huic vires; qui furit, adde metum¹⁴⁵.
 635 Turbas et lites multarum et prelia vocum
 Acri perstringes voce sonoque gravi:
 Anseribus raucis, cornicibus atque nigellis,
 Qui, ut recinant omnes, mos solet esse, simul.
 Ni taceant, inpono minas, tamen usque caveto,
 640 Ad fera ne faciles sint tibi verba manus¹⁴⁶. (...).

941 Debita qui semper tibimet laxanda precaris¹⁴⁷,
 Hoc inopi facito, quod petis ipse deo,
 Ne tua si miserum levet indulgentia nullum,
 Cum petis hanc, eius destituaris ope.
 945 Sic dum conservo contempnit parcere servus,
 Iram in se iusti mox revocabit eri.
 Parcere, mortalis, mortalibus ergo parato,
 Cum quis naturae lex manet una tibi,
 Quisque tuo dispar si sit per prospera cursus¹⁴⁸,
 950 Ortus et occasus qui tibi, par et eis.

¹⁴² Cf. Virgil, *Aeneid* II, 265: "(...) oppress'd with sleep and wine", translated by John Dryden, www.classic.mit.edu/Virgil/aenid.mb.txt.

¹⁴³ Filled with pathos and drama, this admonition is modeled on Virgil's *Aeneid* VI, 620: "Learn righteousness, and dread th' avenging deities", translated by John Dryden, www.classic.mit.edu/Virgil/aenid.mb.txt.

¹⁴⁴ Altruism should be the main quality characteristic of a judge.

¹⁴⁵ Guardians of the law should be kind, yet decisive. "Weak ones should be strengthened. Dangerous judges should be tamed, while a healthy dose of doubt should be instilled in those who are presumptuous."

¹⁴⁶ Above all, a judge should not act impetuously. Physical violence is the biggest vice. According to Theodulf, it is not hands, but words that should prove the speaker's point.

¹⁴⁷ Justice is guided by faith and prayer.

¹⁴⁸ Judges should not overestimate their earthly powers. "We all fall subjects to the same

Fons sacer hos tecum beat, inlinit unguen avitum,
Atque agni saciat hos caro sive cruor.
Ut pro te vitae est, pro his quoque mortuus auctor,
Quemque et pro meritis ad sua dona vocat.
955 Hic submittantur transacti carbasa libri,
Litore in hoc teneat anchora iacta ratem¹⁴⁹.

law.”

¹⁴⁹ “Part of my task is left: part of the labor’s done. Moor my boat here to the anchor chains”, translated by A.S. Kline, 2001, www.poetryintranslation.com. Theodulf ends his work with a reference to Ovid’s *Ars amatoria*, cf. I, 772.

Irena Makarczyk

BISHOP MIKOŁAJ SZYSZKOWSKI 'S REPORT TO THE HOLY SEE ABOUT THE STATE OF THE WARMIA DIOCESE IN 1640

In 1585, Pope Sixtus V placed bishops under the obligation to regularly visit the tombs of the Apostles and give written reports on the state of their dioceses. Those reports constitute a highly valuable and authentic source for researchers investigating history of the Catholic church. The frequency of reporting duties was determined by the distance separating a given diocese from Rome. Polish bishops visited the Apostolic See (*visitatio liminum*) and reported on the state of their congregation (*relatio status*¹) to the Roman Congregation every four years. Not all members of the clergy observed those duties promptly, but the surviving reports deliver a detailed account of dynamic changes taking place in the diocese over the centuries.

The focus of this article is on the diocese of Warmia (Ermland). Similarly to other Polish congregations, Warmia's bishops visited the Holy See every four years to give an account of the state of their dioceses. The reports submitted in the 17th and the 18th century according to the norms imposed by Pope Sixtus V have been discussed by Professor Alojzy Szorc². His accounts indicate that the first written statement had been delivered by Bishop Piotr Tylicki in 1604, and more than 20 reports documenting the state of affairs in Warmia's dioceses have survived to this date. Several texts have been published³, and some were subjected to a detailed analysis⁴. A captivat-

¹ This matter is discussed at length by T. Długosz, *Biskupia visitatio liminum*, Collectanea Theologica, 1933.

² A. Szorc, *Relacje biskupów warmińskich XVII i XVIII wieku do Rzymu o stanie diecezji*, "Studia Warmińskie", vol. 5, 1968, pp. 201–239.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ J. Obłąk, *Życie kościelne na Warmii w świetle "Relatio status" biskupa Wacława Leszczyńskiego z r. 1657*, "Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne", No. 6, 1960, vol. 3, pp. 5–31. See also:

ing account of 15th century Warmia has also been preserved. On 23 January 1432, Cardinal Franciszek Condolomario, prefect of the Roman Congregation, presented Bishop Franciszek Kuhschmalz (1424–1457) with a written statement indicating that Warmia canon Jan Wichard (Heilsberg)⁵ had presented Rome with a report on the diocese's affairs⁶. At the time, bishops were under obligation to deliver their reports every two years (*singulis biennis*), counting from Pentecost. The report covered a period of two years ending on Pentecost in 1431. It constitutes proof that written statements had been submitted already before Sixtus V's papal bull, but they were probably delivered sporadically and not by all dioceses, therefore an official declaration was issued in the 16th century to regulate the matter. No other historical documents suggesting that Warmia's bishops had submitted regular written reports before the 16th century have survived to this date.

As regards the communication that followed in the successive centuries, Professor Szorc discusses a report of 1640 which is one of the longest and most captivating documents of the type. This historical record will be analyzed in greater depth in this article. It was authored by Bishop Mikołaj Szyszkowski who was appointed to the Warmia diocese in 1633 after his predecessor, Jan Olbracht Waza, bishop of Warmia from 1621 to 1633, had been promoted to the Cracow bishopric⁷. Szyszkowski assumed his post in the spring of 1634 under highly unfavorable circumstances. The first Swedish war had been waged on his territory in 1626–1629 with devastating consequences for Warmia. The Swedish invaders plundered and inflicted vast damage on the region. The years that directly followed the war were a bleak period. The truce with Sweden remained in force until 1635, and the political situation after its expiry remained unclear. An armed solution to the conflict, anticipated by both parties, raised the greatest fears. In the period of armistice, Braniewo, the largest town in Warmia, remained under Swedish control. Szyszkowski had to undertake an immense effort to raise Warmia from the ruins. He carried out the reconstruction project in collaboration with the chapter during his ecclesiastical appointment of ten years. Warmia's economy and religious order had to be restored, and Szyszkowski made an outstanding contribution to this diocese. He was a wealthy man who donated private funds to the revival effort. There was not a single church in Warmia

I. Makarczyk, *Relacja biskupa Michała Radziejowskiego do Rzymu z 1685 r. o stanie diecezji*, in: *Życie codzienne na dawnych ziemiach pruskich. Ziemie pruskie w oczach polskich i obcych*, collective work, ed. S. Achremczyk, Olsztyn 2006, pp. 81–98 (contains the text of the statement).

⁵ For biographical information, refer to *Słownik biograficzny kapituły warmińskiej*, Olsztyn 1996, p. 274.

⁶ *Codex Diplomaticus Warmiensis*, vol. 4, No. 397A, pp. 442–443.

⁷ For updated biographical information on both bishops, refer to: D. Bogdan, *Jan Albert Waza (1612–1634) biskup warmiński w latach 1621–1633*, in: *Poczet biskupów warmińskich*, ed. S. Achremczyk, Olsztyn 2008, pp. 223–228; idem, *Mikołaj Szyszkowski (ok. 1590–1643) biskup warmiński w latach 1633–1643*, in: idem, pp. 229–242.

that did not benefit from the bishop's generosity. He purchased paraments and liturgical vestments, he financed the reconstruction of war-damaged churches and the erection of new shrines⁸. His most notable contribution was the construction of a Baroque pilgrim's church in Stoczek in 1639–1641. The shrine was financed entirely out of the bishop's private funds, and it became the seat of Bernadine monks in Barczewo. Szyszkowski built the bishop's palace in Frombork, and he donated substantial amounts to the reconstruction of the Frombork cathedral which was severely damaged and plundered during the war. The bishop's efforts brought about the revival of Braniewo's high schools – the Jesuit college and the seminary. Szyszkowski also spared no expense on secular buildings, mostly bishop's castles in Reszel, Jeziorany and Lidzbark. The economic affairs of both domain were discussed by Warmia's regional council (sejmik) which convened eight times during the bishop's 10-year reign. The relations with Ducal Prussia concerning trade, the prices of craft services, the rules governing the flight and extradition of peasantry were regulated by a national act adopted by Warmia and the Duchy of Prussia in January 1637 in Iławka Pruska. The same year also witnessed the establishment of the Warmian-Prussian border along the Vistula Lagoon. Those accomplishments fully assert Warmia bishop's reputation of a keen manager and effective organizer.

In 1637, Szyszkowski performed a general inspection of his diocese to assess the extent of damage wrought by the Swedish war. He used the resulting information to compile a report for the Holy See in 1640. The previous written account of the state of the Warmia diocese dates back to 1624. It was delivered by Bishop Jan Olbracht Waza who was bound by the quadrennial reporting obligation, therefore his reign should have been covered by two or even three reports, the last falling in 1633. Documented sources indicate that Waza had observed this duty only once. The period that separates the two bishops' reports indicates that the Holy See had no insight into Warmia's affairs for 16 years. Szyszkowski was keen on observing his reporting duties, but he was not entirely successful in his efforts. According to the prescribed quadrennial intervals, the thirteenth report was due in 1637. Szyszkowski did not submit the document that year, but he had no intentions of ignoring his duties, and he asked the Congregation to prolong the deadline. The reply was probably much delayed, and it was only in early 1639 that the bishop dispatched canon Przeclaw Szemborowski on a mission to Rome⁹. The Roman Congregation sent out an official document on 18 July

⁸ His efforts are described in greater detail in: J. Obłak, *Działalność biskupów warmińskich w zakresie sztuki w połowie XVII wieku*, Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne, vol. 11, book 4, pp. 51–86.

⁹ This fact was recorded in the minutes of the chapter meeting of 18 August 1639: "Ad instantiam illustrissimi unanimi consensu delatum est admodum reverendo domino Preclao Szemborowski canonico et confratri nostro eunti Romam nomine celsitudinis suae ad visitanda limina Apostolorum" – Archive of the Warmia Archdiocese in Olsztyn (AAWO), AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 32.

1639 which granted a prolongation for one year. The bishop diligently satisfied the requirement in 1640.

The decision to set out on a pilgrimage to Rome was made in August 1640. Szyszkowski had no intentions of making the visit in person, and he dispatched his envoy to the Holy See, a measure that was allowed under canonical legislation. As previously, the Warmia diocese was represented by Przeclaw Szemborowski¹⁰. As the bishop's chancellor and one of his most trusted aides, Szemborowski assisted Szyszkowski in trips to the meetings of the Prussian council and the Sejm, and he often represented the chapter before the bishop¹¹. Szemborowski was an educated man with doctoral degrees in law awarded by the universities of Cracow and Bologna. His qualifications and accomplishments made him the most suitable candidate for Warmia's envoy to Rome.

Szemborowski's journey to Rome took several months. The canon was obliged to take permanent residence in the cathedral, and the Warmia chapter strictly adhered to this principle. Szemborowski would be deprived of his income in the period of absence. He traveled on a mission to Rome on the bishop's orders, and the chapter generally never declined the principal's requests. Canons who were required to vacate the post for longer periods of time were presented with a set of assignments, and they had to represent the chapter's interest on the mission to give it a semblance of business travel. This was also the case in 1640. The chapter instructed Szemborowski to take care of three matters in Rome. He was to audit the accounts of a scholarship fund started by Warmia canon Jan Preuck, he was to acquire a papal brief (at the bishop's expense) confirming the chapter's former right and privilege to freely choose its bishop, and he was to request permanent "privileged" status for the high altar in the cathedral with a plenary indulgence for the deceased¹². Szemborowski departed for Rome in August 1640. He attended his last chapter session on 8 August¹³, and he left Frombork four days later¹⁴.

¹⁰ This information is provided by the minutes of the chapter's meeting of 8 August 1640. The relevant entry states that in the presence of canons: "[...] recitate sunt littere ab illustrissimo ac reverendissimo domino episcopo evocantes admodum reverendum dominum Preclaum Szemborowski canonicum et confratrem nostrum itineri Romano destinatum. Eadem facultas, instante illustrissimo, antea in actis de anno 1639 die 18 Augusti in generali capitulo expressa, quae sic incipit: «Ad instantiam illustrissimi», admodum reverendi domini confratri nostro data, confirmatur in omnibus punctis et clausulis, ablegaturque ad iter prosequendum cum benedictione, quae a nobis ipsi uberime ex charitate fraterna non ficta elargitur" – Olsztyn, AAWO, AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 52.

¹¹ For biographical information, refer to: T. Oracki, *Słownik biograficzny Warmii, Prus Książęcych i Ziemi Malborskiej od połowy XV do końca XVIII wieku*, vol. 2, Olsztyn 1988, p. 175; *Słownik biograficzny kapituły warmińskiej*, Olsztyn 1996, pp. 246–247, biographical information by A. Kopiczko.

¹² AAWO, AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 32.

¹³ Ibidem, col. 52.

¹⁴ The exact date of his departure follows from the minutes of the chapter's meeting stating that on 12 August, Szemborowski would be granted 30 days of paid leave, *ibidem*.

Szyszkowski's report on the state of Warmia's diocese, drafted in Lidzbark on 26 August 1640, was addressed directly to the Pope in the following inscription: "Sanctissime ac Beatissime in Christo Pater, Domine Domine clementissime". The entire report comprises more than thirty pages¹⁵, and it contains accessory documents, including Szyszkowski's authorization for Szemborowski (*mandatum procurae*)¹⁶, the bishop's letters to the Pope and cardinals, written confirmation of Szemborowski's visitation to the Apostolic tombs and a draft of the Congregation's reply to Szyszkowski. The title page features the Congregation's annotation: "Relatio status Ecclesiae Varmiensis pro decimo quarto quadriennio", with "1640. WARM. 4" written in the margin. The number "4" denotes the quadrennial reporting duty.

The reports dispatched from Warmia are very similar in content and structure. Historical information is combined with recent news. The reports would begin with an outline of the diocese's history, and they would proceed to describe the main churches, i.e. the Frombork cathedral and the collegiate church in Dobre Miasto, the cathedral and collegiate chapters, the parochial network, monasteries, pilgrimage sites, education as well as charitable institutions such as shelters and hospitals. Szyszkowski's report adheres to the same model. Before delivering the status report, he justified his inability to undertake the *visitatio liminum* in person. The bishop offered several reasons to explain his absence, including his duties of senator and president of the Prussian provinces, fears of military invasion from Sweden and the threat to the Catholic church posed by the heretic state of Ducal Prussia. The bishop also suffered from various health problems that led to his premature death only three years later.

The main body of the report begins with several important dates in the history of Warmia's diocese. In his statement, Szyszkowski went back to the time when Konrad Mazowiecki had brought the Teutonic Knights to the Chełmno region to protect Christians against the attacks staged by Prussia's pagan tribes and to Christianize the latter. The bishop also reminisced about the establishment of dioceses on conquered territories in Prussia. He wrote that Wilhelm of Modena, the papal legate, had founded four bishoprics in Culm, Pomesania, Sambia and Warmia in 1234. Two-thirds of their territory were placed under secular rule of the Teutonic Knights in compensation for the conquest of Prussia, while one-third was awarded as benefices for the bishops. Church control over the four dioceses was exercised by their respec-

¹⁵ Archivum Secretum Vaticanum, Archivum Congregationis Consilii, Relationes Varmienses, col. 466, 469–477, 510–514.

¹⁶ The letter of authorization had to be drafted by a notary public in the presence of witnesses, and the notary's powers had to be confirmed by the bishop. Szemborowski's authorization was issued by Walenty Lüdicius, notary public of Lidzbark, in the presence of two witnesses: Piotr Domisławski, canon of the collegiate chapter in Dobre Miasto, and Wojciech Białobrzski, the bishop's secretary. The powers conferred to the notary by the Holy See were confirmed by Bishop Szyszkowski.

tive bishops. In successive parts of his report, Szyszkowski addressed two very important matters, namely Warmia diocese's metropolitan status and the choice of the diocese's bishop. The information provided in the report is not highly accurate. The bishop wrote that Warmia had been exempt from the suffraganship of the Archbishopric of Riga, and it was placed under the direct supervision of the Pope from the beginning of its existence. The first theories claiming Warmia's direct subordination to the Holy See appeared only when Riga was dissolved in 1566 because Warmia was reluctant to be placed under the control of the Archdiocese of Gniezno and participate in its synods. Those arguments were cited to account for the fact that the diocese had been founded and endowed with rents (*fundata et dotata*) by the Pope, and Szyszkowski was probably referring to the above when writing about the exemption¹⁷. As regards the choice of bishop, Szyszkowski wrote that he had been initially appointed by Rome, then by the chapter, and when Warmia was incorporated into Poland – the bishop was elected by the chapter from among four canons proposed by the king. It should be noted that only the first bishop, Anzelm, had been appointed by the Holy See. In the light of recent research and Professor Szorc's findings, Warmia's chapter had never been fully free to appoint its bishop¹⁸. The choice of bishop was first dictated by the great Teutonic masters, and beginning with Warmia's incorporation into Poland in 1466, it became a privilege of the Polish king. Beginning in 1466, the chapter's powers were limited to the group of candidates proposed by the monarch. In the section discussing Warmia's history, Szyszkowski also made a reference to 1525 when the Monastic State of the Teutonic Knights had been secularized during the Protestant Reformation and replaced by the Duchy of Prussia. Warmia lost most of its territory (controlled by the Teutonic Knights) to the new state. The sources of Szyszkowski's historical accounts remain unknown. Various scholars have suggested the chronicles of Warmia, and in matters related to the political and religious system in Warmia, the bishop was probably aided by one of the canons. In the section dedicated to current affairs, the bishop reported mostly on the damages wrought by the first Swedish war. He mentioned that nearly a century earlier, Warmia had had a suffragan bishop who received a benefice in Kiwity¹⁹. Suffragans were not appointed ever after, and bishops reigned over the diocese single-handedly. Szyszkowski had a curious relationship with Michał Działyński who had been appointed suffragan bishop in 1624, i.e. during the reign of Jan Ol-

¹⁷ As discussed by: J. Obłąk, *Egzempcja diecezji warmińskiej i jej obrona za biskupa Szyszkowskiego*, "Polonia Sacra", No. 7, 1955, p. 133. See also: R. Bodański, *Dzieje walki diecezji warmińskiej o niezależność od synodów metropolii gnieźnieńskiej 1563–1728*, "Studia Warmińskie", vol. 19, 1982, pp. 157–164.

¹⁸ A. Szorc, *Wybór biskupa warmińskiego przez kapitułę warmińską w teorii i praktyce*, in: *Warmińska Kapituła Katedralna. Dzieje i wybitni przedstawiciele*, collective work, eds. A. Kopiczko, J. Jezierski, Z. Żywica, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 233–255.

¹⁹ His name was Jan Wilde, and he held the office in 1499–1532.

bracht Waza. Szyszkowski referred to Działyński as a person who had been assigned to young Waza by Rome, rather than as his suffragan. When the adolescent Jan Olbracht Waza had been placed in charge of the Warmia diocese in 1621, the Holy See appointed Działyński the diocese's administrator (*in spiritualibus*) and the co-administrator of the dominion together with Jan Olbracht Waza. Upon the request of King Zygmunt III Waza, Działyński was appointed titular bishop of Hippo three years later. He was ordained, he performed a suffragan's duties, therefore, he deserved to be recognized as a fully-fledged auxiliary bishop. Szyszkowski's account of Działyński's position in the church remains unexplained, yet even more surprisingly, the bishop never solicited his suffragan's services. Perhaps he looked to Działyński not as his assistant but as Waza's bishop. After Szyszkowski had assumed his post in Warmia, Działyński became more active in the Frombork chapter. He administered the capitular chamber of Pieniężno in 1635-1638 and the capitular chamber of Frombork in 1640-1642. It is possible that there existed a certain degree of animosity between Szyszkowski and Działyński, both of whom competed for the Warmia diocese after Jan Olbracht Waza had departed for the Cracow bishopric. Those are only presumptions, nonetheless, Działyński did limit the extent of his canonical work under Szyszkowski's reign. He was able to resume that activity only after the bishop's death when the chapter elected him the diocese's administrator *sede vacante*²⁰.

Szyszkowski proceeded to describe the current state of affairs as well as the history of the diocese's chapters, the cathedral chapter in Frombork and the collegiate chapter in Dobrze Miasto. He mentioned Warmia's first bishop, Anzelm, and the cathedral chapter founded by the bishop in Braniewo in 1260 upon Rome's approval. The bishop erected a cathedral in Braniewo, but the shrine was damaged before completion by Prussian tribes during numerous uprisings. During the reign of Bishop Henryk Fleming, the chapter was transferred to a safer location in Frombork where a new, magnificent shrine was erected on a hill. Curias were built to provide housing for canon priests, and the bishop's residence, known as the Ferber palace, was erected at a later date. According to Szyszkowski's report, the chapter comprised 16 canons. It initially consisted of 24 canonries, but successive popes had reduced their number to the original 16. This information requires some clarification. The document issued in 1277 to restore and revise the act of 1260 erecting the Warmia chapter indicated that sufficient funding had been available to build 16 canonries. With time, as the chapter generated more revenues, the number of canonries was to be increased to 24. The decision to erect additional eight canonries was made by Bishop Jan Stryprock in a document dated 24 February 1363. They comprised four medium-sized buildings and four small canonries. In a letter dispatched from Avignon on

²⁰ The appointment took place during the chapter's meeting of 13 February 1643 – AAWO, AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 116.

3 November 1372, Pope Gregory XI instructed Stryprock to equate the incomes of the eight canonries with those of the original 16 canonries, but this was never accomplished due to a shortage of funding. In 1410–1411, the minor canonries demanded an equation of incomes in a series of legal suits instituted in Rome. To put an end to the dispute in Warmia's chapter, on 27 April 1426, Pope Martin V annulled the eight minor canonries, reinstating their number to the original 16²¹. Szyszkowski also reported that four of the 16 existing canon priests had been awarded the rank of prelate (provost, dean, curator and cantor).

The bishop went on to discuss the principles of making appointments to canon benefices falling vacant in papal months (odd months) and capitular months (even months). He wrote that in observing its daily duties, the chapter was guided by the statutes approved by papal legate Franciszek Commendone in 1572. Szyszkowski listed the four prelates' duties, he described the matters placed on the agenda of chapter meetings and the financial sanctions imposed on canons who had failed to take residence in the cathedral. The bishop gave an account of liturgical order on weekdays and holidays, German language sermons delivered on Sundays and holidays, the canons' duties in the cathedral and vicars who said mass during a canon priest's absence at his altar. Szyszkowski also provided an important piece of information relating to Frombork's congregation. Only the residents of the cathedral hill were the cathedral's parishioners, while Frombork's inhabitants attended St. Nicholas' parish church.

In his account of the state of affairs in the cathedral and the chapter, the bishop focused mostly on the damage wrought by the first Swedish war. The cathedral had been plundered of altars, the organ, bells, the clock, liturgical vessels and vestments, even holy relics. Canon curias and the bishop's palace had been destroyed, and Frombork had been occupied by the Swedish army. Canon priests left Frombork, and only two or three vicars had remained behind, taking residence near the cathedral. The war prevented Szyszkowski from conducting the ingress ceremony in the cathedral in 1634. The bishop performed the ceremony only on 31 October 1636 after Frombork had been returned to Poland under the truce of 1635. He stayed in Frombork for several days to inspect the cathedral and the chapters. Szyszkowski instructed the cathedral to supplement the number of vicars and bring them under one roof. He ordained changes in the cathedral choir, and he requested that Corpus Christi processions be held in a more ceremonious manner. The bishop revisited the Frombork cathedral in March 1639, shortly before drafting his report for Rome. He gave out several orders, including for the appointment of the cathedral's first Polish priest (St. George's chapel)²². Szysz-

²¹ The relevant documents can be found in: *Codex diplomaticus Warmiensis*, vol. 2, No. 339, pp. 348–349; No. 468, pp. 473–474; No. 470, pp. 475–482.

²² The orders were recorded in the minutes of the chapter's meeting – AAWO, AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 21–24.

kowski was greatly impressed by the fact that canon priests had personally contributed to the reconstruction of the cathedral and the curias. The bishop also made generous donations to the undertaking. By the time the report on the state of the diocese was delivered in 1640, much had been done by the bishop and his chapter to restore the cathedral to its former glory, to reconstruct curias, the bishop's palace, and to begin the construction of the vicars' residence. The bishop and the chapter spent more than 70,000 zloty on the reconstruction project. In the report, Szyszkowski also made a reference to an issue that had been frequently addressed by Rome, namely the establishment of a benefice for a chapter theologian. The matter had to be approached very cautiously in order not to offend the chapter or the pope. A new benefice would lower the canons' income, but on the other hand, writing to the Pope that the cathedral had no need for a theologian would be a serious blunder. Szyszkowski wrote that he expected detailed instructions from the Pope, adding that the chapter had "many men educated in earthly and heavenly sciences". Five canons had been awarded doctorates in theology, and all priests had completed a three-year university course.

The following part of the report discusses the collegiate chapter in Dobre Miasto. The description is rather brief, and the bishop focused most of his attention on the liturgical order in the collegiate. He mentioned that the collegiate chapter had not been destroyed by the Swedish army, and that it was well equipped with liturgical paraments. The only damage was inflicted on the chapel opposite to the city gate. The bishop noted that the collegiate chapter comprised 12 canon priests, two of whom had been awarded prelate ranks of provost and dean. Seven priests were fellow canons who resided in the chapter and were remunerated by it accordingly. The remaining five priests were honorary canons who could be nominated for the chapter by the bishop in the event of a vacancy. Szyszkowski concluded this part of the report with a brief description of the two prelates' duties.

The cathedral and the collegiate church were the important shrines in a diocese. They open the list in the bishop's report, but Szyszkowski also devoted a long passage to other churches and parishes in Warmia. During the reign of Albert of Prussia at the time of the Protestant Reformation, Warmia lost 77 parishes to the Duchy of Prussia which were incorporated into the Lutheran church. According to the report, Warmia's diocese consisted of 93 parishes at the time the report had been written²³. Szyszkowski opened the list with deaneries seated in the parishes of Braniewo, Frombork, Pieniężno, Orneta, Jeziorany, Reszel, Barczewo, Olsztyn and Lidzbark. He mentioned that all churches were brick structures, and they were provided with sufficient quantities of liturgical paraments, excluding the shrine in Orneta which had been plundered by the Swedes. Those churches were

²³ This number probably accounts for other churches in the parish, as the diocese usually consisted of around 80 parishes.

administered by deans who were assisted in their daily duties by vicars. Municipal parishes were congregations of 2,000-3,000 people. The bishop gave a lengthy account of the liturgical order throughout the year, the delivered teachings and the catechization of children and adults. As regards rural parishes, Szyszkowski mentioned that they were congregations of 300 to 600 members, that village churches were built of brick or timber framing, they were equipped with liturgical paraments in sufficient quantities, and that their liturgical order and catechization efforts resembled those of municipal parishes. The bishop also wrote about the massive damages inflicted by the Swedish war and the difficult situation of villagers who were unable to fulfill their duties to the church.

The report also describes the situation of the Catholic parish in the Protestant Königsberg. The church was built in 1614-1616 with the support of Warmia's Bishop Szymon Rudnicki and King Zygmunt III Waza²⁴. The duke of Prussia was the secular head of the church, and he made annual donations of 1,000 zloty to support its operations. Church jurisdiction was exercised by the bishop of Warmia. Szyszkowski gave an account of the church's liturgical order and the sermons delivered in German, Polish and Lithuanian. In successive parts of the report, the bishop made yet another reference to the state of the Catholic faith in Königsberg. He expressed his regrets that the Elector of Brandenburg had failed to respond to the harassment against the Catholics from Königsberg's authorities and members of the local community. To back his claim, Szyszkowski pointed to the elector's indifference to the construction of a Calvinist church next to a Catholic shrine. The bishop referred to it spitefully as "the synagogue". Szyszkowski was also concerned about the growing popularity of Calvinism in the Duchy of Prussia. His fears were raised by the fact that the religion received the support of the elector and the ducal court who demonstrated a somewhat discriminating attitude towards Lutheranism, the official religion of Ducal Prussia. The elector was hoping to equate the status of the two denominations, but his intentions did not receive public support since the predominant majority of Duchy's nobility had been opposed to Calvinism. Szyszkowski wrote that in an effort to overcome the nobility's attitude, the elector gave priority to members of the Calvinist congregation during nomination for public offices. The bishop reported on the elector's strategy to King Władysław IV, and in his report to Rome, he expressed his belief that the matter had been discussed by the king and the elector two years earlier during a meeting in Grodno. Szyszkowski was appalled by the construction of a Calvinist shrine next to a Catholic church in Königsberg. He referred to

²⁴ The history of the Catholic parish in Königsberg is discussed by: A. Szorc, *Dzieje parafii katolickiej w Królewcu 1614–1650*, Studia Warmińskie, 1995, vol. 32, pp. 129–183; idem, *Dzieje parafii katolickiej w Królewcu 1650–1780*, "Mragowskie Studia Humanistyczne", 2005/2006, vol. 5/6, pp. 36–92.

it twice in his report, but he also expressed his hopes that the Polish king, an experienced protector of the Catholic faith, would prevent the project from being completed. Szyszkowski considered both Lutheranism and Calvinism to be heretical denominations. He was less opposed to Lutheranism, and regarded Calvinism as a much greater threat for the Catholic Warmia.

The following shrine described in Szyszkowski was St. Nicholas' church in Elbląg, a royal city found within the Warmia diocese, but outside the limits of the Warmia dominium. Bishops were unable to exercise secular power over Lutherans in Elbląg. Szyszkowski made a reference to the situation before the Protestant Reformation when the Elbląg deanery had comprised eight parish churches. During the reformation, the shrines, including St. Nicholas' church in Elbląg, had been taken over by the Protestants. Warmia's successive bishops made efforts to recover those churches, and this goal was accomplished by Bishop Rudnicki with the vast support of King Zygmunt III Waza²⁵. Szyszkowski wrote that there were no Catholics among Elbląg's permanent inhabitants, and the congregation of St. Nicholas consisted mostly of Polish merchants. He noted that the parish had not demonstrated any growth tendencies. The last two churches described by the bishop were pilgrim sanctuaries. The first was a church in Święta Lipka, situated close to the border of the Warmia bishopric in the Duchy of Prussia. The original chapel with the miracle-working figure of the Holy Mary had been destroyed by the Protestants a century earlier, and the site was acquired by royal secretary Stefan Sadorski in 1619²⁶. He financed the construction of a new chapel which he then donated to Warmia's chapter together with the land. The chapter had entrusted the chapel to the Jesuits in Reszel. Szyszkowski wrote that the site had been visited by numerous pilgrims, including Protestant. The other center of the Holy Mary cult and a popular pilgrimage site was Stoczek where Szyszkowski had replaced a small chapel with a new church, placing it in the care of Bernadine monks in Barczewo.

Having discussed the status in Warmia's churches and parishes, Szyszkowski proceeded to describe the situation of secular and monastic clergy based on the findings of a general inspection of his diocese that had been performed in 1637. The diocese suffered from a shortage of priests, many of whom had been killed during the Swedish war. The war had also inflicted a blow on the morale of the surviving clergy. The bishop noted that addiction to alcohol and concubinage had been frequent vices of Warmia's priests. Szyszkowski attempted to remedy those problems during his inspection. He gave fatherly reprimand to some priests, he transferred selected members of the clergy to different parishes, and he removed the worst transgressors

²⁵ For more information on the recovery effort, refer to: *Rywalizacja katolików z luteranami o kościół św. Mikołaja w Elblągu 1520-1621. Źródła do dziejów reformacji w Prusach Królewskich*, collected and edited by A. Szorc, Olsztyn 2002, p. 537.

²⁶ The chapel's history is discussed by: A. Szorc, *Stefan Sadorski (1581-1640) fundator Świętej Lipki*, Olsztyn 1996.

from office. In an effort to fill the depleted ranks of the clergy, the bishop attempted to revive the seminary in Braniewo. In his description of monastic clergy, Szyszkowski gave an overview of selected facts from their history in Warmia's diocese. Braniewo was the seat of a Franciscan monastery which had grown deserted in the mid 16th century due to the shortage of candidates. In 1565, Warmia's bishop Cardinal Stanisław Hozjusz placed the monastery in the hands of the Jesuits who opened a college in Braniewo, ran the diocese's seminary and initiated a papal seminar (Papal Aluminate). The former Franciscan monastery in Barczewo had been entrusted to the Bernadine monks by Warmia's bishop, Cardinal Andrzej Batory. In 1632, the Jesuits took residence in the former Augustinian monastery and church in Reszel. With time, the Jesuit house was transformed into a college, and the monks performed missionary work along the border with the Duchy of Prussia. The Jesuits also initiated a vast number of parochial missions. According to Szyszkowski, their work had resulted in many conversions, and it increased the number of parishioners attending mass and taking communion at Easter. A different situation was encountered in Elbląg where the deserted Dominican monastery had been adapted by the Protestants for welfare purposes. A similar fate had befallen the deserted Bridgettine convent in Elbląg. The bishop's report pointed to the absence of female monasteries in the Warmia diocese which hosted only congregations of pious women, sisters of St. Catherine, in Braniewo, Lidzbark, Orneta and Reszel. In their work, the sisters were guided by the statutes of the church, they educated girls and they earned their own living. The sisters of St. Catherine did not have their own chapels, and they attended parish churches. All monasteries and religious congregations received financial and material support from Warmia's bishop.

Secular parishioners were the last social group discussed in Szyszkowski's report. The bishop's description paints a rather grim picture of the secular community. Its members were characterized by a very low level of religious awareness. Occult practices, devil worshiping, blasphemy, failure to observe fasting periods, drunkenness, rape and crime were frequently encountered. This state of affairs created favorable ground for the infidels whose number had grown after the Swedish war. In line with the regulations imposed by Bishop Kromer, infidels were allowed to give their services to the diocese for up to three months, but due to the population drop caused by the war and the plague, many of them stayed on for longer periods of time and popularized their religious beliefs. Szyszkowski made attempts to put an end to this situation, and during inspections of the diocese, he appealed to members of the congregation to improve their conduct. In the report for the Holy See, the bishop described the positive outcomes of his work, including pilgrimages to Święta Lipka and Stoczek as well as 80 conversions to Catholicism. Szyszkowski praised the community of Braniewo. Although the town had been occupied by the enemy for the longest period of time, its people

remained faithful to their religion, save for one resident. This piece of information concludes the bishop's account of the state of Warmia's diocese in 1640.

In the final part of the report, Szyszkowski made several requests to the Holy See. He asked for holy relics as Warmia's artifacts had been largely plundered by the Swedish army. The bishop also requested permission to fill a vacant canonry in a papal month. The remaining requests were to be presented in person by the bishop's envoy to Rome, Przeclaw Szemborowski. Historical evidence indicates that Szemborowski reached Rome and took care of all matters relatively quickly. Already on 10 November 1640, the Congregation formally approved Szyszkowski's report, implying that the document had been delivered and read by that date. A member of the Congregation instructed his office to issue a written reply to the bishop of Warmia in which he commanded Szyszkowski for the zeal with which he had performed his ecclesiastical work. He assured the bishop that the Congregation would lobby for the Pope's permission to fill a vacant canonry in Warmia's chapter in a papal month, and that it would bring up the matter of procuring new relics for the Frombork cathedral and other churches in the diocese.

Szemborowski returned to Warmia after nine months, and he attended the chapter's meeting on 6 May 1641. Szyszkowski's letter concerning Szemborowski was read at the meeting, suggesting that the envoy had visited the bishop immediately after his return. The envoy's journey back from Rome had been less fortunate. The objects carried by Szemborowski to Warmia had been confiscated in Ferrara and placed under arrest²⁷. The envoy's trunks were filled with relics, religious paintings and ornaments for the Frombork cathedral. At the bishop's request, the chapter allowed Szemborowski to travel to Ferrera to reclaim those possessions. The outcome of his journey will not be investigated in this paper, it should only be noted that Szemborowski did not travel to Ferrara in 1641 or 1642 as he attended all chapter meetings during those two years. The envoy reported on the remaining assignments that had been entrusted to him in Rome during a chapter meeting of 25 May 1641²⁸. Despite many efforts, he was unable to obtain a permanent "privileged" status for the high altar in the cathedral. The privilege had been granted only for a period of ten years. Szemborowski had successfully audited the accounts of Jan Preuck's scholarship fund.

Bishop Mikołaj Szyszkowski's report on the state of Warmia's diocese of 1640 and the accompanying events provide researchers with an in-depth insight into the history of the Catholic church in Warmia. This paper discusses only the general facts outlined by the report, and it does not extract detailed information which could be used in research studies focusing on various aspects of Warmia's history.

²⁷ AAWO, AK, Acta Cap. 6, col. 77.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, col. 79.

Sławomir Augusiewicz

THE COMPOSITION
OF THE BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIAN MILITARY
AID IN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TURKEY
IN 1672–1675

At the turn of the 1660s and the 1670s, the Ukraine found itself on the brink of war with Turkey, and this situation prompted Poland to reinforce its military forces. In the face of armed conflict, attempts were made to rely on the provisions of the Wehlau-Bromberg Treaty of 1657 under which the Duke of Prussia, Elector of Brandenburg, was under obligation to dispatch 1,500 soldiers in military aid to Poland. The efforts of the Polish diplomats and the political aspects of the issue during a period of tension in Polish-Brandenburg relations have been discussed by Andrzej Kamiński¹. After 1672, changes in Brandenburg-Prussia's European policies addressing the Empire and France forced the Elector to focus military efforts on the Rhein and Alsace. While the dispatch of soldiers against Turkey was of secondary importance from the strategic point of view, Frederick William's promise to give military aid against the Sublime Porte was the focal point of the political scheme engaged in by the House of Hohenzollern. Brandenburg-Prussian auxiliary corps were dispatched to Poland in 1672 and 1674–1675, and the second consignment fought in the Podole region, as discussed in detail by Polish researchers². The process of corps formation has been thoroughly researched in German sources, suggesting that Brandenburg forces were of rather insignificant combat value. This paper discusses the composition of both the planned corps as well as the forces that were actually dispatched to aid the Polish king's army.

¹ A. Kamiński, *Polska a Brandenburgia – Prusy w drugiej połowie XVII wieku. Dzieje polityczne*, Poznań 2002.

² M. Wagner, *Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676*, Zabrze 2009, vol. I, p. 292, vol. II, p. 81.

Poland made the first attempts to solicit Brandenburg's help in the Ukraine already in 1667, but it was not until 1671 that its pleas brought the anticipated results. As a result of Wojciech Opacki's negotiations with the Elector's commissioners in Kongsberg, the Duchy of Prussia began preparations for forming aid troops³. On 28 August 1671, Frederick William ordered⁴ the formation of an auxiliary corps under the command of Colonel Hans (Johann) Adam von Schöning⁵. The corps was to be composed of 1000 foot soldiers from the following regiments:

– Duke Karl Emil (Kurprinz)⁶, four companies: Leibkompanie under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Ludicke Ernst von Schöning, Colonel

³ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin – Dahlem, XX Hauptabteilung, Etats Ministerium, k. 111a, No. 42 k. 46-; A. Kamiński, op. cit., pp. 56–57.

⁴ C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee vom 15 Jahrhundert bis 1914*, vol. I, Osnabrück 1967, p. 221.

⁵ Hans (Johann) Adam von Schöning 1641 – 28 August 1696). In the 1660s, he was the rittmeister of a company in Johann Georg von Anhalt – Dessau's cavalry regiment. He commanded Bogusław Radziwiłł's infantry regiment (formerly Jonas Casimir zu Eulenburg's regiment) from 3 June 1668, and after his death – Karl Emil's (Kurprinz) regiment (from January 1670). He fought in the French war in 1672. Promoted to the rank of Colonel in 1676 (according to other sources, he received his promotion on 13 January 1670), Major-General on 12 May 1678, Lieutenant-General on 5 March 1684, Field Marshal and Commander of the Spandau Fortress at the end of his military career in the Brandenburg army. He assumed the post of Stralsund governor in 1678, and was appointed governor of Berlin on 31 December 1684: G.A.Mülverstedt, *Die brandenburgische Kriegsmacht unter dem Grossen Kurfürsten*, Magdeburg 1888, pp. 176–178, 422; G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des von Jonas Kasimir Freiherrn zu Eulenburg im Jahre 1655 begründeten Regiments zu Fuß. Fortsetzung II: 1670–1697*, Mitteilungen der Literarischen Gesellschaft Masovia, Bd. XVI, 1910, p. 127; G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des Freiherrlich Eulenburgischen, seit 1667 fürstlich Radziwiłłischen Regiments zu Fuß. Fortsetzung 1658 – 1669*, Mitteilungen der Literarischen Gesellschaft Masovia, Bd. XV, 1910, pp. 199–200; A.C. Ölsnitz, *Geschichte des königlich – preussischen Ersten Infanterie – Regiments seit seiner Stifung im Jahre 1619 bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin 1855, p. 119.

⁶ The regiment was formed in October 1655 under the command of, in chronological order: Jonas Casimir zu Eulenburg (died on 11 May 1667), from 18 May 1667 – Bogusław Radziwiłł (died on 31 December 1669), from 12 January 1670 – Karl Emil (died on 27 November 1674), from 7 December 1674 – Hans Adam von Schöning, later transformed to Infanterie – Regiment No. 2. Commanders: Lieutenant Colonel Wolff Dietrich von Wilmsdorff, Fabian von und zu Massenbach (from June 1658), Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich von Dönhoff (from 18 May 1667 to 2 June 1668), Lieutenant Colonel Hans Adam von Schöning (from 3 June 1668, regiment commander from November 1674). According to a head count of October 1667, the regiment was composed of four companies led by: Captain Stefan Weise (promoted to major in 1668), Lieutenant Colonel Dönhoff, Captain Georg Friedrich zu Eulenburg, Captain Hans Georg von Auerswaldt. After supplementation pursuant to the order of 27 June 1672, in August, the regiment comprised eight companies, 1000 men, including 680 privates. In June 1672, Captain Eulenburg and Captain Auerswald were dismissed, and their companies were placed under the command of Capitan (Major?) Weise and Captain Heide (from Westphalia). According to resource allocation documents of August 1672, the remaining companies were commanded by: Captain-Lieutenant Ludicke Ernst von Schöning (Johann Adam's cousin, Lieutenant Colonel and commander of the Elector's Leibkompanie from 1686), Captain Benedikt

Schöning, Capitan Georg Friedrich von Eulenburg and Captain Hans G. von Auerswald;

– Colonel Friedrich von Dönhoff⁷, four companies under the command of Colonel Dönhoff, Lieutenant-Colonel Heino Heinrich von Flemming, Major Ernst Ludwig von Möhlen, Captain Adolf von Houwald⁸;

Steffen (Lieutenant Colonel, Peitz commander in 1678, Pilawa commander in 1679), Captain Brünneck (formerly an officer in the Danish army), Captain von der Necke (from Westphalia, probably Friedrich Adolf, born in 1646, killed in a battle with the Swedish army in Courland on 7 February in the rank of cavalry major, promoted to the rank of major in Schöning's regiment in 1677 in Szczecin), Captain Schultzen (Scholten, in 1684 – major and company commander in the infantry regiment of Courland prince Alexander, fought with the Polish army as Lieutenant Colonel and regiment commander of auxiliary corps in the campaign against Turkey, killed on 10 June 1688 in the battle of Slankament in Hungary). In July 1672, the regiment crossed the Pilawa River to reach Kolobrzeg and Halberstadt. G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des Freiherrlich Eulenburgischen, seit 1667 fürstlich Radziwillischen Regiments zu Fuß*, pp. 195–200; G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des von Jonas Kasimir Freiherrn zu Eulenburgi im Jahre 1655 begründeten Regiments zu Fuß*, pp. 128–135; G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 114–115, 186–188, 382 – 384; G. Gieraths, *Die Kampfhandlungen der brandenburgisch – preussischen Armee 1626 – 1807. Ein Quellenhndbuch*, Veröffentlichungen der historischen Kommission zu Berlin beim Friedrich – Meinecke – Institut der Freien Universität Berlin, Bd. 8, Quellenwerke, Bd. 3, Berlin 1964, pp. 19–22; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740. Formation und Stärke*, in: *Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres hrsg. vom Grossen Generalstabe*, Bd. II, Heft 7, Berlin 1905, p. 12; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, hrsg. C. Jany, w: *Urkundliche Beiträge und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Preussischen Heeres hrsg. vom Grossen Generalstabe*, Bd. II, Heft 8, Berlin 1905, p. 27; A.C. Ölsnitz, p. 119.

⁷ Created in 1656 under the capitulation statement of 20 December 1656. From 20 December 1655 until the end of May 1668, he reported to Colonel, later Major-General, Bogislav von Schwerin, Lieutenant Colonel von Arnim, and from 1657 – Ulrich von Bonin. From 2 June 1668 (or 24 June 1668), the regiment was placed under the command of Colonel Friedrich von Dönhoff, and it initially comprised eight companies. Under the order of 20 August 1671, it was divided into two separate units led by Colonel Dönhoff and Colonel Heino Heinrich von Flemming. Under Frederick William's rescript of 27 June 1672, Karl Emil's regiment was supplemented with soldiers from Dönhoff's unit. According to A.C. Ölsnitz's monograph of the regiment (pp. 126–130), the regiment was split up only in August 1672 before the march to Poland. Friedrich von Dönhoff (24 November 1639 – 26 February 1696), son of Pernaugovernor Magnus Ernst, commanded Radziwiłł's infantry regiment from 18 May 1667, the infantry regiment (formerly Schwerin's regiment) from 2 June 1668. He was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General on 5 March 1684, the highest military advising officer from 20 September 1689, governor and commander of Klaipeda (from 1678 or 1685). Regiment's monograph: A.C. Ölsnitz, *Geschichte des königlich – preussischen Ersten Infanterie – Regiments seit seiner Stiftung im Jahre 1619 bis zur Gegenwart*, Berlin 1855. cf.: G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 176–179, 193, 351, 427–429. G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des von Jonas Kasimir Freiherrn zu Eulenburgi im Jahre 1655 begründeten Regiments zu Fuß*, p. 120; G. Gieraths, op. cit., pp. 7–11; Abel P. v., *Stammliste der königlich preussischen Armee. Auf Grund amtliches Materials bearbeitet von ...*, Berlin 1905, pp. 21–25; G. Voigt, *Deutschlands Heere bis 1918. Ursprung und Entwicklung der einzelnen Formationen*, hrsg. D. Bradley, H. Bleckwenn, Bd. I, *Die Garde- und die Grenadier – Regimenter 1–12 der preussischen Armee*, Osnabrück 1980, pp. 433–464; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 12.

⁸ In July 1672, Houwald was killed in a duel against Boguslaw von Podewils. His company was placed under the command of Lieutenant Captain Balthasar Bernhard von Brünneck, A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 127.

- Colonel Levin von Nolde, two companies under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kaspar Christof von Klitzing and Captain Patrik Hamilton (former Prussian Guard companies)⁹,
- Infantry company under the command of Rittmeister Dietrich Ragotzki¹⁰,
- 100 Dragoons from the company of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilhelm von Block¹¹,
- Dragoon squadron of Field Marshal Georg von Derfflinger (300 men) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Marwitz¹².

⁹ According to selected sources, the Prussian Guard (*preussische Garde*) came into existence in 1619. It was created by Captain Pierre de la Cave (the Guard's commander from 1652 to February 1669) under the capitulation statement of 1 June 1641. On 1 February 1669, Colonel Levin von Nolde became the commander of the Prussian Guard stationing in Königsberg and Pilawa. At the beginning of 1672, the guard comprised two companies led by Captain Caspar Christoph von Klitzing and Patrik Hamilton, and it was expanded to three companies by the end of the year. According to *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729* (p. 16), both companies were annexed to Heino Heinrich von Flemming's regiment in 1672. The regiment's records of August 1672 list only one company from the former Guard – Hamilton's unit. After Nolde's death, the Prussian Guard was adjoined to Schöning's regiment. Levin von Nolde (20 October 1621 – 21 April 1682) was a colonel and a commander from 3 March 1668, and he later became the governor of Klaipėda. According to Frederick William's rescript of 16 May 1670, Nolde commanded an infantry regiment that could be identified with the Prussian "garde". He was also in charge of the Klaipėda garrison of two companies. G.A.Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 85–99, 350 and 351; G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des von Jonas Kasimir Freiherrn zu Eulenburg im Jahre 1655 begründeten Regiments zu Fuß*, p. 130; G. Gieraths, op. cit., pp. 3–6; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 14–16, 21; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 12; A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁰ In 1657, the company was adjoined to the Prussian army as a Leibkompanie (company of drabant guards) in Bogusław Radziwiłł's infantry regiment, and it joined Prince Frederick's infantry regiment in 1670. In the military allocation document of 1671, it was listed as Prince Frederick's company. Dietrich Ragotzki (or Ragutzki, died in 1679), was a lieutenant in the guard's infantry regiment in 1657, Lieutenant Capitan in the Leibkompanie of Radziwiłł's infantry regiment in 1666, major and commander of the Prussian *Trabantengarde*, Lieutenant Colonel and commander of an infantry regiment from 1679. G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., p. 387. G. Sommerfeldt, *Geschichte des von Jonas Kasimir Freiherrn zu Eulenburg im Jahre 1655 begründeten Regiments zu Fuß* p. 129; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, p. 82.

¹¹ Bogusława Radziwiłł's former Dragoon regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eberhard Puttkamer fought in the battles of Warsaw (28–30 July 1656) and Prostki (8 October 1656). In September 1657, it was placed in the service of the Brandenburg army. In March 1658, the regiment was placed in the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm von Block. After 1664, it was reduced to a single company, listed in Prussian army records of 1670 and 1671. The allocation document of 1672 lists Block's 2 Dragoon companies. In 1673, they were joined by two new companies to create a squadron under the command of Major Lange. In 1674, the unit was split between the regiments of Colonel Bodo von Schlieben (Lange's and von Krohn's companies) and Colonel Caspar von Hohendorff (Kalau von Hofe's Leibkompanies). Wilhelm von Block, Lieutenant Colonel as of 1658, was listed as colonel in older publications, but his military patent was not documented. He was dismissed in June 1674. GStAPK, XX HA, Ostpreussische Folianten 839/3, k. 49–61; *ibidem*, OsF 831, k. 174; G.A.Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 57–59, 349; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 48; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, p. 132; M. Nagielski, *Warszawa 1656*, 2nd ed., Warszawa 2009, p. 287; S. Augustowicz, *Prostki 1656*, Warszawa 2001, p. 206.

¹² Georg Friedrich von Waldeck's former Dragoon regiment was reduced to a single company and placed under Derfflinger's command in 1660. In 1663, Frederick William dispatched 300 Dragoons under Derfflinger's command to aid the emperor in the war against Turkey. In 1672, the squadron of 400 Dragoons fought against France. G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 164–168; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 130–131.

Due to the delayed formation of the corps, Hetman Jan Sobieski's victory against the Cossacks and Tatars in the Ukraine as well as the demands formulated by Prussia in return for its military aid, Poland chose not to sign the ultimate understanding¹³. On 2 October 1671, the Prussian corps' march out to Poland was cancelled¹⁴.

The plans to expand the Prussian consignment and form a new corps, entrusted to General Joachim Ernst von Görztke in January 1672, never materialized. The new corps were to be composed of 1,500 soldiers, including 500 Dragoons¹⁵. Changes in Brandenburg's French policies prompted Frederick William to focus his military efforts on the protection of threatened estates on the Rhein: in Kleve, Mark and Ravensberg. This goal was to be achieved primarily with the involvement of the Elector's army which was expanded in 1672. Brandenburg diplomats were hoping to limit Prussia's military obligations towards Poland, to reduce the size of auxiliary corps and upkeep costs borne by Frederick William. In an understanding signed on 16 May 1672 in Berlin by the Elector's representative Lorenz Christoph von Somnitz and King Michał Wiśniowiecki's envoy Wojciech Opacki, the king was presented with a choice: Brandenburg would supply only 500 Dragoons and pay for their upkeep for six months or 1,000 foot soldiers that would be maintained at the Elector's expense for only two months¹⁶.

In an order of 25 March 1672, Frederick William decreed the formation of a corps composed of three squadrons with soldiers selected from the regiments commanded by Karl Emil, Dönhoff (500 each), Nolde (250) and Block's Dragoons¹⁷. The war with France and the Elector's decision to concentrate troops on the Rhein led to successive changes in the corps' composition. Duke Karl Emil's regiment under Schöning's command was supplemented with the best soldiers from the remaining Prussian regiments (including 250 men from Dönhoff's regiment), and it was dispatched across the Piława River in mid July 1672 to join Hohenzollern's forces. On 29 July, the corps was placed under the command of Friedrich von Dönhoff. In the spring, each company of his regiment was expanded by another 42 soldiers¹⁸. In May, the regiment comprised 1,008 men in eight companies¹⁹:

- Leibkompanie under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Wilhelm von Löser;
- Colonel Heino Heinrich von Flemming;

¹³ A. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁴ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge von 1671–1688*, Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, hrsg. von Großen Generalstabe, Bd. I, Hft. 5, Berlin 1884, p. 3.

¹⁵ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge von 1601 bis 1700*, bearb. T. Mörner, Berlin 1867, pp. 363–364; A. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁷ C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 222; G.A. Mülverstedt, op.cit. p. 193; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 5.

¹⁸ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, s. 5–6; A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., pp. 126–127.

¹⁹ A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 129

- Lieutenant-Colonel Ernst Ludwig von Möhlen;
- Lieutenant-Colonel von Rummel;
- Major Patrick von Hamilton;
- Major Melchior von Flanß;
- Captain Balthasar Bernhard von Brünneck;
- Captain Kessner;

In August, Flemming's, Rummel's, Hamilton's and Kessner's companies were separated from the regiment and placed under Flemming's command as a squadron²⁰. On 30 August, Dönhoff was ordered to march out. Several days earlier, he had been instructed by Frederick William to obey only the orders given by the king and both crown hetmans. The corps was to follow the Royal Guard, and it was next in line to receive quarters. Dönhoff would be equal in rank to other German officers. The corps was not to be split up into smaller divisions²¹.

According to a head count in Szczytno of 8-10 September, the corps was composed of²²:

- Dönhoff's regiment – four companies, 500 men,
- Flemming's squadron – four companies, 500 men²³,
- Lieutenant-Colonel Block's Dragoon squadron – four companies of 500 men each²⁴. Every unit was to be supplemented by soldiers from Nolde's regiment²⁵. Both infantry regiments comprised 40 Dragoons each.

²⁰ A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 130.

²¹ A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 128.

²² C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 222; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 5–6; O. Osten – Sacken, *Preussens Heer von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Bd. I, *Die alte Armee*, Berlin 1911, p. 73; A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 125, 127.

²³ Colonel Flemming's squadron (more often referred to as a squadron than a regiment) was created from four companies separated from Dönhoff's regiment. According to C. Jany (*Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 222), it was supplemented with soldiers from Nolde's regiment (Hamilton's company). The division took place in August 1672 before the regiment's march to Poland, and it continued until the end of August 1673 (Frederick William's order of 25 August 1673). The squadron was divided again in 1674 when an additional unit was allocated to Flemming. In 1674, the squadron was dispatched to Germany, and in the summer of 1675, it fought against the Swedish army. Under the order of 29 August 1675, it was combined into a single regiment with Dönhoff's unit. Heino Heinrich von Flemming (8 May 1632 – 28 February 1706) was a major in Schwerin's regiment from 29 September 1663 (according to selected sources – from 24 September 1664), Lieutenant Colonel and regiment commander from 1664. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel on 28 August 1671 (according to selected sources – on 25 April 1672). In 1680, he became the General Field Marshal, High Steward of Hinterpommern and Berlin governor. A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., pp. 112, 126, 129–135; G.A.Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 176–178, 192–194, 382–384. C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 222; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 10; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 16, 21; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 12.

²⁴ G.A.Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 57 – 59; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 49; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 133–134

²⁵ According to Curt Jany, both companies in Levin von Nolde's regiment were adjoined to Fleming's regiment, *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, p. 16; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 12.

The condition of the corps was less than satisfactory with high rates of disease and desertion. In an effort to improve the combat value of Kurprinz's regiment dispatched to the Reich, it was supplemented with the best soldiers from the remaining units who were exchanged for less experienced and weakly armed men. Dönhoff petitioned for an improvised corps comprising selected infantry soldiers from the guard of Prussian envoy Duke Ernst Bogislav von Croy, Dönhoff's own regiment, Nolde's unit, garrisons in Piława, Klaipeda and Friedrichsburg, Block's and Colonel Bodo von Schlieben's Dragoons. The project never took off because Prussia was afraid that by evacuating the best troops to Poland, it would weaken its defenses²⁶.

On 12 September, the corps marched out from Szczytno, and having crossed Chorzele, Przasnysz and Węgrów, it arrived at the Polish camp near Lublin on 18 or 21 October²⁷. Prussian military aid came much too late as by that time, Poland and Turkey had already signed the Peace Treaty of Buczacz. The situation was tense, and there were fears that the corps could be used in an internal conflict between King Michał and the opposition, but Dönhoff made every attempt to avoid political involvement. Under the pretext of Poland's failure to observe the terms of contract relating to the upkeep of the corps, the Colonel ordered his troops back. Decimated by disease and desertion, the corps finally reached Prussia in December 1672²⁸. In January 1673, it was only 552 men strong²⁹.

The problem of military aid to Poland resurfaced in 1673 when the king's envoy Szcześny Morsztyn attempted to solicit Frederick William's assistance during a visit to Berlin³⁰. Similarly to the previous year, the process of forming and dispatching an auxiliary corps to aid the crown army was significantly delayed, and it was never completed³¹. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued, and the Prussian army's involvement in the war against Turkey was combined with the principal aim of supporting Frederick William's son, Karl Emil, in the upcoming elections after the death of Michał Wiśniowiecki. On 23 January 1674, the Elector undertook to dispatch a corps comprising 1,000 foot soldiers and 1200 Dragoons³². In the end, the size of the troops was significantly reduced.

On 19 March 1674, the Elector gave orders to form a corps of 1,200 Dragoons³³. It would comprise two Dragoon regiments of six companies each

²⁶ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 5–6.

²⁷ According to A.C. Ölsnitz (op. cit., p. 130), he arrived in Lublin on 18 October, according to G. Lehman, (*Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, o. 7) on 21 October. Cf. A. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 58.

²⁸ C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee* p. 222; A. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 58–59.

²⁹ A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., p. 131.

³⁰ A. Kamiński, op. cit., p. 59.

³¹ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 9–10; A.C. Ölsnitz, op. cit., pp. 131–132.

³² A. Kamiński, op. cit., pp. 89–103.

³³ C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee* p. 222,

under the command of Colonel Caspar von Hohendorff³⁴ and Colonel Bodo von Schlieben³⁵. The corps was created under the order of 16 April 1674, and it was adjoined to the Dragoon squadron that had been dissolved after Block's resignation. Schlieben's squadron was expanded to include the companies of Captain Lange and Captain Krohn, and Captain Kalau von Hofe's Leibkompanie was placed under Hohendorff's command³⁶. To create 12 companies of 100 men each, they were additionally supplemented with soldiers from the remaining units and garrisons in the Duchy of Prussia³⁷.

The corps formation process was prolonged until mid July 1674. Its composition was finally approved on 18 July, comprising 44 command staff in both regiments, 528 officers and personnel members in the command of 12 companies and 986 soldiers³⁸.

After the head count in Bartoszyce of 24 July, the corps marched out to the Polish border. The troops crossed the border on 2 August near Dąbrówno where they were intercepted by Polish commissioner Jan Chądzyński. The corps arrived at the camp near Lviv on 18 October. During the march, both commanders, Hohendorff and Schlieben, complained about the Poles' hostile attitudes. The two colonels also found it difficult to reach a mutual agreement, and from mid-August, their troops marched separately³⁹.

The Brandenburg corps participated in the siege of Bar on 11–18 November 1674, after which they occupied Braclaw, Niemirów, Kalnik (23 November – 16 December) and Raszków (10 January 1675)⁴⁰. The campaign was difficult, supplies were poor, and both Hohendorff and Schlieben suffered great losses in battle and due to disease. The Swedish advancement

³⁴ Caspar von Hohendorff held the post of Obersterwachtmeister and company commander in the guard's infantry regiment in 1655; commander of the Dragoon guard from 4 September 1657, promoted to the rank of colonel on 2 June 1658, commander of a Dragoon company in 1660, commander of the Dragoon regiment from 16 April 1674. G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., p. 249; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 15; 131, 134; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 50.

³⁵ Bodo von Schlieben (9 February 1638 – 19 March 1676), commander of a Dragoon company in 1664, colonel from 1669, commander of two Dragoon companies in 1672–1673; from 1673, commander of a squadron comprising three companies after a merger with Joachim Ernst von Görtzke's company. The Dragoon regiment, which was to be adjoined by two companies from Block's squadron, capitulated on 13 April 1674. After returning from Poland in 1675, Schlieben was dispatched to Brandenburg. He fought against the Swedish army in Pomerania. Schlieben was a commander of Wolin from 1675. After his death, the regiment was placed under Görtzke's command. Mülverstedt, op. cit., pp. 410–411; *Die Dessauer Stammliste von 1729*, pp. 134–135; C. Jany, *Die alte Armee von 1655 bis 1740*, p. 50.

³⁶ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 11.

³⁷ C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 223; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 11.

³⁸ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 12–13.

³⁹ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 13–14.

⁴⁰ G. Gieraths, op. cit., pp. 4, 8, 20, G.A. Mülverstedt, op. cit., p. 25; C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 223; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 14–15.

into Brandenburg forced the Elector to withdraw the troops from Poland. The official order was issued on 10 January 1675, but Sobieski refused to release the corps without the assurance that Prussian military aid would return in the spring. Sobieski also demanded that minimum 100 soldiers were left stationing with the Polish army. The Brandenburgs finally began their retreat on 9 February⁴¹.

In late April, the troops crossed the Prussian border near Bogusze and Prostki, and the corps' 273 remaining soldiers were stationed in the area of Elk⁴².

⁴¹ [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, pp. 15 – 17; A. Kamiński, op. cit., pp. 123–124.

⁴² C. Jany, *Geschichte der preussischen Armee*, p. 223; G.A.Mülverstedt, op. cit., p. 249; [G. Lehmann], *Brandenburgisch – polnische Türkenzüge*, p. 17.

Barbara Krysztopa-Czupryńska

BRITISH DIPLOMAT GEORGE WOODWARD AND DIARCHY IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH AFTER THE DEATH OF AUGUSTUS II¹

The succession to the Polish throne stirred the interest of Europe's largest monarchies already during Augustus II's reign over the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The British were not indifferent to the question of succession, either. George Woodward, appointed resident to the Wettin court in Warsaw and Dresden by the King of Britain George II in late 1728, was secretly instructed to collaborate with the Swedish and French ministers at the court in promoting the interests of Stanisław Leszczyński, father-in-law to Louis XV of France. Their mission was to make Leszczyński a popular figure with the Polish-Lithuanian nobles, and Woodward was to remain officially neutral. The British were of the opinion that open support for Leszczyński would do him more harm than good². In mid 1731, Woodward was allowed a brief holiday in England to take care of private matters³. He returned to Augustus II's court in the spring of 1732⁴ as envoy extraordinary with clear instructions to abandon the support campaign for Stanisław. This sudden change of orders reflected a turn in British foreign policy which

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² National Archives ("NA"), State Papers ("SP") 88/35, secret instructions for G. Woodward, Windsor, 22 October 1728 o.s. In this article, letters and documents that had been dispatched from Great Britain are dated in accordance with the Julian calendar (old style, "o.s."), while the correspondence from Warsaw – according to the Georgian calendar (new style).

³ NA, SP 88/39, G. Woodward to Harrington, Dresden, 21 July 1731, f. 71.

⁴ He arrived in Dresden on 26 April 1732, and a month later, he was already residing in Warsaw. NA, SP 88/40, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Dresden 29 April 1732, f. 56; *ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw 24 May 1732, f. 64.

aimed to break off the alliance with France⁵, formed in 1717, and establish closer contacts with Austria. The warmer relations between the courts of London and Vienna resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Vienna on 16 March 1731 under which Emperor Charles VI agreed to wind up the Ostend Company in return for George II's support for the Pragmatic Sanction enabling the emperor's daughter, Maria Theresa⁶, to inherit the Austrian throne. The collapse of the British-French alliance⁷ also led to changes in Woodward's instructions regarding the French minister accredited in August II's court, Antoine-Felixe de Monti⁸. George II's envoy was to closely scrutinize the French diplomat's actions and plans which were "opposite to those attempts towards a Reconciliation with the Court of Vienna, which We have charged you with"⁹. Woodward was to vest his trust completely in Dutch minister Carel Rumpf and collaborate with him in all matters relating to the Warsaw-Dresden court¹⁰. The British envoy was instructed to keep a low profile, monitor the situation carefully and report his findings to London or, during George II's travels, to Hanover. Woodward's principals were interested in the attitudes and actions of Augustus II's subjects in both countries under his rule. They were also keen on eliciting more information about the plans of foreign ministers accredited by the House of Wettin¹¹. William Stanhope, Baron Harrington and Secretary of State for the Northern Department, advised Woodward to exercise great caution even in matters relating to the Protestant cause in Poland, although support for the Protestant community was the priority objective of the British envoy's mission.

Woodward informed Harrington of Augustus II's death (1 February 1733) in a letter dated 3 February 1733 in which he requested further instructions¹². While waiting for new orders, Woodward made every attempt to represent the British king in a foreign court to the best of his ability. When offering his condolences to Primate Teodor Potocki on the death of

⁵ Great Britain, the United Provinces and France signed the Triple Alliance at the Hague on 4 January 1717. *An honest diplomat at the Hague; the private letters of Horatio Walpole, 1715–1716*, ed. J. J. Murray, Bloomington 1955, p. 363.

⁶ NA, SP 88/38, Harrington to L. Schaub, Whitehall, 26 March 1731 o.s. Text of the treaty in *English Historical Documents, 1714–1783*, ed. D. B. Horn, M. Ransome, London-New York 1996, pp. 917–921.

⁷ Ref.: P. Napierała, *Germain Louis Chavelin i rozbrat pomiędzy Francją a Wielką Brytanią, 1727–1737*, in *Szpiegostwo, wywiad, państwo*, ed. C. Taracha, Lublin 2009, pp. 45–65.

⁸ For more information on France's policy towards Poland-Lithuania at the time, refer to E. Rostworowski, *O polską koronę. Polityka Francji w latach 1725–1733*, Wrocław-Kraków 1958.

⁹ NA, SP 88/40, instructions for G. Woodward, St. James 29 February 1731/2 o.s., f. 8v.

¹⁰ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 16 May 1732 o.s., f. 62.

¹¹ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 30 May 1732 o.s., f. 66–67, Hanover 20/31 July 1732 o.s., f. 105–106, Hanover 6/17 August 1732, f. 124.

¹² NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 3 February 1733, f. 19–20. In letters forwarded at the beginning of the year, Woodward informed Harrington of the Polish king's deteriorating health. Ref.: ibidem, f. 1v-etc.

Augustus II, he assured him that the news had greatly saddened George II who remained a faithful friend of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He attempted to give accurate reports about the situation in Poland to the ministers in London. His reporting duties were not easy as regards the matter of greatest interest to the British, namely the question of succession to the Polish throne and the candidates who enjoyed the greatest support in the Polish-Lithuanian state. A week after the king's death, Woodward was only able to establish that at least a dozen nobles were willing to reach for the crown, that Stanisław Leszczyński had many supporters, and that the intentions of the deceased monarch's son remained unknown¹³. In a letter to Under-Secretary of State George Tilson, Woodward expressed his dismay over the fact that order and peace had been preserved in Warsaw despite the political tension and the tumultuous arrival of constituents for the Diet (Sejm) that had gone into session on 26 January 1733. He observed that instead of competing for posts and jobs, the nobles had united in a common effort for the good of their country¹⁴.

The first letters that arrived from London after Augustus' death did not contain any instructions. Harrington promised to dispatch orders as soon as "the King has had time to consult his Allies, and take his Resolution upon that important Event"¹⁵. He assured Woodward that George II was thoroughly satisfied with his efforts¹⁶.

Fresh instructions and new letters of accreditation¹⁷ reached Woodward only on 18 April. The envoy was to assure the Polish nobility that it was George II's hope that the new monarch would be chosen in genuinely free elections, that he would guarantee their liberties, rights and privileges while remaining neutral enough not to stir any fears in the neighboring monarchies. Woodward was to cooperate with the tsarina's and the emperor's ministers, but he was forbidden from supporting or opposing any candidates to the Polish crown. His actions were to be carefully balanced to ensure that they did not offend France nor the French party in Poland. The British diplomat was instructed to express firm opposition only against the Pretend-

¹³ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 7 February 1733, f. 23–25, 14 February 1733, f. 30–31v.

¹⁴ Ibidem, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 7 February 1733, f. 26–26v. In the same letter, the envoy wrote with distaste about a ball organized by Russian minister Frederich Casimir von Löwenwolde on the day of King Augustus' death. The event commemorated the third anniversary of Tsarina Anna's reign, and although it attracted few guests, the revelry continued into the small hours. Löwenwolde claimed that he had been unaware of the monarch's death, but Woodward assured Tilson that this was a blatant lie – the British envoy was one of the guests who had personally excused himself from the ball on account of the tragic event. Ibidem, f. 26v–27v.

¹⁵ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 13 February 1732/3 o.s., f. 28–28v.

¹⁶ Ibidem and 2 March 1732/3 o.s., f. 40–40v.

¹⁷ Ibidem, letters of accreditation to G. Woodward for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 9 March 1732/3 o.s., f. 52–53.

er, James Francis Edward Stuart. Woodward was naturally encouraged to protect the Protestant community in Poland-Lithuania¹⁸. The new letters did not urge the envoy to become excessively involved in local affairs, and they actually cooled his enthusiasm for political activity as no such inclinations were displayed by Robert Walpole, the First Lord of the Treasury responsible for British policy¹⁹. Woodward was aware that a neutral stance would be most beneficial for England. He argued with Edward Weston, Under-Secretary of State for the Northern Department, that any attempts to support either party without massive financial aid would be fruitless²⁰. In his successive letters, Harrington advised Woodward to keep a similarly low profile, to diligently observe the situation and regularly report his findings to the British court. The secretary of state was particularly interested in the moves of French ambassador A.-F. de Monti²¹ and his success in promoting Stanisław Leszczyński's candidacy to the Polish throne²².

In short, Woodward was instructed to exercise self-restraint and forward detailed reports about the political situation in Poland. This was not an easy task because the British envoy was frequently inquired about George II's political preferences. Woodward would answer diplomatically that his principal's main concern was for universal peace and conciliation²³. Polish and Lithuanian senators attempted to convince the British envoy that peace could be preserved on the Baltic only if England, the United Provinces and Sweden backed free elections in Poland at the tsar's court. Without their support, if Russia were to invade Poland, Turkey would surely intervene, leading to the outbreak of war²⁴.

Already in February 1733, Woodward reported that the Poles were inclined towards Stanisław Leszczyński, adding that if he were elected, France would have to back his candidacy with substantial funding²⁵. He emphasized that financial support for a chosen candidate was part of standard practice

¹⁸ Ibidem, Harrington do G. Woodward, Whitehall, 9 March 1732/3 o.s., f. 45–51.

¹⁹ For more references to Britain's neutral stance toward the Polish succession war, see: J. Black, *British Neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession, 1733–1735*, *The International History Review*, 1986, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 345–366; R. Lodge, *English Neutrality in the War of the Polish Succession: A Commentary upon Diplomatic Instructions*, Vol. 6: *France, 1727–1744*, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fourth Series, 1931, Vol. 14, pp. 141–173; A. C. Thompson, *Britain, Hanover and the Protestant interest, 1688–1756*, Woodbridge 2006, pp. 168–187.

²⁰ NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to E. Weston, Warsaw, 21 March 1733, f. 81v.

²¹ For more information on the efforts made by imperial and French diplomats in Poland-Lithuania in 1733, refer to: J. Dygdała, *Rywalizacja dwóch dyplomatów cesarskiego i francuskiego w Polsce 1733 roku – Heinrich Wilhelm von Wilczek i Antoine-Felix de Monti*, in: *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV–XVIII wieku*, ed. R. Skowrona, Kraków 2009, pp. 495–512.

²² NA, SP 88/41, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 23 March 1732/3 o.s., f. 73–73v.

²³ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 21 February 1733, f. 35–35v, 5 V 1733, f. 160v, G. Woodward to E. Weston, Warsaw, 21 March 1733, f. 81v.

²⁴ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 28 February 1733, f. 42, 16 V 1733, f. 186.

²⁵ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 21 February 1733, f. 35v, 7 III 1733, f. 59.

in the Polish-Lithuanian state, and it was not regarded as a violation of free election principles²⁶. Woodward also noted that Leszczyński would be strongly opposed by the Commonwealth's neighbors, in particular Russia whose ministers were openly critical about the candidate²⁷.

With time, the parties to the election crystallized their positions, but this did not make the situation in Poland-Lithuania any less complex. There were two main rivals to the throne: Stanisław Leszczyński, father-in-law to the French monarch, and Frederick August, Elector of Saxony and the deceased king's son²⁸. Woodward complied with his instructions, and he delivered detailed reports about the efforts made by France and its ambassador to enthrone Stanisław Leszczyński. He wrote about an excellently edited manifesto published at the Chambord castle (Leszczyński's residence in France), which listed the errors made during Augustus II's reign. He informed his superiors of massive sums of money that the French ambassador had distributed to Leszczyński's supporters. Woodward also wrote that France had been successful in winning the support of the highly influential and competing magnate alliances of Czartoryski and Potocki²⁹.

Unpopular in his first term of power (1704–1709) as a monarch who had been brought to the throne by alien forces, Stanisław was now winning the graces of most noblemen, and the fact that he was the father-in-law to France's powerful monarch only added to his appeal. The Poles were increasingly opposed to foreign candidates to the throne, arguing that "great Inconveniencys, were found, from His late Majesty's not knowing their Language, and their being obliged to address themselves to Him by Interpreters, besides his being so long and often absent from them"³⁰ (original spelling), and they manifested their support for Leszczyński with growing zeal. Most dietines (Polish: sejmiki) instructed their deputies to eliminate foreign pretenders to the Polish throne³¹, and the matter was officially sealed at the Diet of Convocation (22 May 1733)³².

²⁶ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 7 March 1733, f. 60v–61.

²⁷ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 21 February 1733, f. 36, 7 III 1733, f. 56–59, 24 III 1733, f. 88v–89.

²⁸ On 24 April 1733, the Saxon Elector sent his commissioners to the Primate to announce his plans of running in the elections; ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 25 April 1733, f. 134. In a letter to E. Weston of 14 April 1733, G. Woodward listed all native candidates to the throne; ibidem, f. 115v–116.

²⁹ Ibidem, G. Woodward do Harrington, Warsaw, 14 March 1733, f. 65, 21 March 1733, f. 77, 24 March 1733, f. 90, 11 April 1733, f. 99v–100v, 28 April 1733, f. 139v–141, G. Woodward to E. Weston, 14 April 1733, f. 116; ref.: J. Dygdała, op. cit., pp. 501–etc.

³⁰ NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 21 March 1733, f. 78.

³¹ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 24 March 1733, f. 85 and 90, 11 April 1733, f. 99.

³² Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 23 May 1733, f. 197–197v, 26 May 1733, f. 204, 30 May 1733, f. 207v. Ref.: E. Szklarska, *Kwestia wykluczenia cudzoziemca od tronu na sejmie konwokacyjnym 1733 r.*, in: *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia ku czci Profesora Jacka Staszewskiego*, vol. 2, Toruń 2003, pp. 561–573.

Despite the growing support of Polish and Lithuanian nobility, Leszczyński's candidacy continued to be rejected by the neighboring states. Russia and Austria began to plan an armed intervention in the event of Leszczyński's victory, openly declaring the size of troops that would invade the Commonwealth³³. Those threats caused an outrage among the nobility who regarded them as a violation of their liberties and privileges. The nobility's morale was lifted by Louis XV's statement (17 March 1733) in which the monarch guaranteed free elections to Poland and threatened to wage a war on Charles VI if his army were to cross the Polish border. Woodward wrote in his reports that the situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state was serious enough to plunge all of Europe into war. He suggested that the British king should urgently attempt to pacify the escalating conflict³⁴.

The advantage gained by Leszczyński's party made Russia and Austria realize that the only serious counter candidate was the Elector of Saxony, Frederick August, whom the two powers had opposed for a long time³⁵. Already in March 1733, Woodward expressed his surprise that the Saxon Elector and his supporters remained relatively idle in the face of the French party's heightened activity and the growing number of Leszczyński's adherents. He believed that if the Elector's party had demonstrated greater zeal for action, the Saxon candidate could have even won the support of the Czartoryski and Poniatowski families whose interests had been well protected during the reign of Frederick Augustus' father³⁶.

In Vienna, Saxon and imperial ministers debated on Charles VI's support for the Elector of Saxony in return for Frederick Augustus's recognition of the pragmatic sanction. Harrington provided Woodward with progress reports, and he instructed the envoy to support Frederick Augustus' candidacy with the same discretion that he had exercised to promote Leszczyński³⁷

³³ "...it is positively said, that the next Month, Muscovy will cause to March to the Frontiers of Poland, an Army of twenty two Thousand Foot, ten Thousand Horse, and thirty Thousand Cosacks, and the Emperor will have one of Eighteen Thousand Men upon the Frontiers of Silesia."(original spelling) NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 28 March 1733, f. 91v.

³⁴ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 11 April 1733, f. 100.

³⁵ Ref.: J. Staszewski, *"Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący..." Szkice i studia z czasów saskich*, Olsztyn 1997, pp. 134–140. In return for Russia's support, the Elector had to make concessions as regards Courland. NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 5 May 1733, f. 163, 12 May 1733, f. 177v.

³⁶ NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 24 March 1733, f. 89–90. Woodward maintained friendly relations with both families, and he openly admitted to it before his superiors; ibidem and SP 88/35, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 30 July 1729, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to E. Weston, 14 April 1733, f. 115–115 v.

³⁷ NA, SP 88/41, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 13 April 1733 o.s., f. 97, 4 May 1733 o.s., f. 147–147v, 11 May 1733 o.s., f. 158v, 29 V 1733 o.s., f. 202v. The talks were finalized only in July 1733, and this news was communicated to Woodward by the British ambassador to Austria, Thomas Robinson. NA, SP 88/42, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 25 July 1733, f. 42v.

if the negotiations were to end in success. The imperial ambassador, Heinrich Wilhelm von Wilczek, and the Russian minister, Friedrich Casimir von Löwenwolde, were hoping to solicit Woodward's support in their campaign against Stanisław Leszczyński, but the British diplomat explained that his orders were not that far reaching³⁸. Wilczek could not understand why they were not allowed to exclude Leszczyński's candidacy while the British were openly opposing the Pretender to the Polish throne. Woodward argued that this comparison was completely unjustified³⁹.

The Diet of Convocation that came to an end on 23 May was a reflection on Stanisław Leszczyński's strong position. It forced the courts in Petersburg and Vienna to take more decisive action. Their diplomats admitted to Woodward that further negotiations aiming to block Stanisław's candidacy would be useless. Their monarchs were faced with the following options: to prevent Leszczyński's election by force, to dethrone Leszczyński after he had been elected or to accept his election with complacency. The third solution would not be even taken into consideration. In a very long letter summing up the progress made at the Diet and the political situation in Poland, Woodward wrote that due to the violation of parliamentary procedures at the reported session, attempts were being made to establish a confederation among Leszczyński's opponents⁴⁰. He expressed his hope that the Prussian monarch, who had distanced himself from Russia and Austria, would be willing to resume his cooperation with the two powers. Woodward also noted that although the oath barring foreign candidates from the Polish throne worked in Leszczyński's favor, it would have never been decreed if it had not been for many magnates' monarchial aspirations. In an attempt to engage Great Britain in local affairs, Grand Equerry Duke Karl Gustav von Löwenwolde (Frederich Casimir's older brother) presented Woodward with a draft of a treaty supporting the Protestant community which was to be signed by England, the United Provinces, Russia and Prussia, but George II did not show an interest in the project⁴¹.

The language used by Löwenwolde in mid 1733 clearly suggested that it was only a matter of time before the Russian troops would enter Poland⁴². In July, Woodward informed London that the imperial army had crossed the

³⁸ NA, SP 88/41, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 18 April 1733, f. 117v–118.

³⁹ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 21 April 1733, f. 126v–127.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 30 May 1733, f. 207–216.

⁴¹ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 19 June 1733 o.s., f. 230v.

⁴² On one occasion, Löwenwolde made the following threat when Stanisław's name had been mentioned in passing:

“That the Poles wou'd do better, not to think of that Person, for it wou'd save both themselves and others, a great deal of pains and trouble.” Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 2 June 1733, f. 221. Other examples: ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 20 June 1733, f. 234v–235.

Silesian and Hungarian borders⁴³ and the Russian troops were marching towards the Commonwealth⁴⁴.

The deteriorating situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state did not improve Woodward's situation. Despite changes in the geopolitical landscape, the British envoy did not receive new instructions. Harrington praised Woodward for his conduct during talks with members of opposing political camps, but he made it clear that George II would not give new orders before the situation in Poland-Lithuania had stabilized⁴⁵. His merely instructed Woodward to convince his interlocutors that the British monarch was deeply committed to the preservation of peace in Europe⁴⁶. This was not an easy task in the face of Britain's blatantly passive attitude. Woodward's situation was further complicated by the fact that his neutrality failed to satisfy any political faction. The arrival of Russian troops on Polish-Lithuanian territory in mid August 1733 only fuelled the general resentment towards foreigners. The greatest hatred was directed towards Russian, Austrian and Saxon ministers, but after an attempted assassination of the younger of the Löwenwolde brothers (16 August 1733), who was mistaken for Grand Equerry Karl Gustav von Löwenwolde, Woodward wrote that "for 'tis sufficient reason to be attackt, that one does not wear their Dress, the Fury is such against Strangers"⁴⁷. The Englishman was afraid that when members of the nobility would begin their frenzied rush to the capital city for the Diet of Election, the foreigners, even those enjoying diplomatic immunity, would not be safe⁴⁸.

Woodward was not provided with new instructions after Poland had been invaded by Tsarina Anna's army⁴⁹ and after Stanisław Leszczyński's had been elected king on 12 September 1733⁵⁰. Although bound by an alliance with the emperor under the Treaty of Vienna, George II saw no reason

⁴³ NA, SP 88/42, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 7 July 1733, f. 5, 25 July 1733, f. 42v–43. On account of the upcoming confrontation with France in the Reich, the imperial army did not enter Poland despite pressure from Russia. George II also advised his ally against military intervention in Poland. *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 5 September 1733, f. 143v; *ibidem*, abstract of T. Robinson's letter to G. Woodward, [Vienna] 19 August 1733, f. 153–154.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 25 July 1733, f. 42, 28 July 1733, f. 59v, 1 August 1733, f. 63v–64v, 8 August 1733, f. 75–75v.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hampton Court, 7 August 1733 o.s., f. 61–61v, 17 August 1733 o.s., f. 79–79v.

⁴⁶ NA, SP 88/41, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 22 June 1733, f. 232.

⁴⁷ NA, SP 88/42, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 18 August 1733, f. 93–94v.

⁴⁸ Woodward frequently wrote to Harrington about the dangerous situation of foreign ministers and the authorities' efforts to secure them. *Ibidem*, Warsaw, 25 August 1733, f. 125–125v, 5 September 1733, f. 145, 8 September 1733, f. 158v–159v, G. Woodward to E. Weston, 12 September 1733, f. 182v.

⁴⁹ The secretary of state wrote with disarming honesty: "...in this uncertain state of affairs you will hardly expect any particular Commands from his Majesty." *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hampton Court, 31 August 1733 o.s., f. 110–110v.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hampton Court, 25 September 1733 o.s., f. 202–202v.

to put France's patience to the test. The letters forwarded by Harrington to Thomas Robinson, the British ambassador in Vienna, were marked by the same degree of reticence. Robinson was advised to act with great caution and restraint. If confronted by imperial ministers with an accusation that the British monarch was unwilling to support their candidate, he was to explain that an open declaration of support would only irritate Louis XV⁵¹.

On 18 September, Woodward was visited by two delegates who informed him of Leszczyński's election and asked the envoy to forward the news to his monarch. The diplomat promised to dispatch the message. He assured the visitors that George II had the highest respect and esteem for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and that it was his greatest desire for the nation to accept the newly elected king and to unite under his reign, in order to bring peace and happiness for all of Europe. The delegates admitted that although the nation was divided politically, they would find the means to overcome the differences if foreign powers ceased to intervene in the country's internal affairs⁵². Woodward wrote to Harrington that although all foreign diplomats had received such delegations, none of them, save for Swedish minister Carl Rudenschöld, had paid the new king a visit⁵³. The diplomatic corps' restraint was fully justified by a highly complex situation on the political arena. Two days after Leszczyński's election, Woodward wrote to London that a secessionist convention in Prague would proclaim the Saxon Elector king as soon as Russian troops had entered Poland. The Tsarist army was expected to invade Warsaw in 2–3 days. Meanwhile, Leszczyński's opponents were gaining strength, and they were planning to issue a manifesto to proclaim his election null and void. Leszczyński's supporters were growing increasingly concerned about the situation, and their ranks were decimated as many members of minor nobility had left Warsaw directly after the election⁵⁴. The situation was changing rapidly, and foreign ministers who did not openly manifest their support for either party to the conflict were quietly waiting for a resolution. Hasty actions could prove to be very costly. Woodward did what he thought was best at the time – he also waited patiently. He was very cautious not to offend any party or make any statements and declarations that would be difficult to withdraw at a later date⁵⁵. Harrington

⁵¹ A. C. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

⁵² NA, SP 88/42, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 19 September 1733, f. 198–198v.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 18 September 1733, f. 196.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 14 September 1733, f. 187–187v.

⁵⁵ A good example of the above is Woodward's conversation with the French ambassador a day before the latter's departure from Warsaw. Woodward attempted to convince the diplomat that his Polish mission was to preserve peace. In his opinion, Frederick Augustus was a guarantor of peace in the Polish-Lithuanian state, who was capable of making his subjects happy and the Commonwealth's neighbors satisfied. Woodward also claimed that he had heard much good about Stanisław Leszczyński, and if the nobles were able to join their forces, maybe they could find a way of appeasing Moscow. *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 22 September 1733, f. 207v–208.

fully supported Woodward's reticence. He emphasized that Woodward's stance had been fully approved by George II because it coincided with the monarch's heartfelt desire for peace in Europe⁵⁶.

Woodward's conciliatory skills were brought into play when the encroaching Russian army had fuelled the public's hatred towards Russian and Saxon ministers and the imperial ambassador. Crown Regimantar Józef Potocki ordered the guards to surround the Saxon Elector's palace and the Russian minister's residence. An armed attack was also planned on the residence of count Wilczek where Russian and Saxon ministers had taken refuge. Józef Potocki and Jan Tarło, the voivode of Lublin, dispatched a delegation to Woodward to assure the envoy that he was absolutely safe. The Englishman replied that he had never felt threatened in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but he cautioned the delegates against the plans they had envisaged for other foreign ministers. An attack on the residence of the imperial ambassador whose principal was a Polish-Lithuanian ally would be unthinkable. Any attempts to raid the palace of the Elector who, according to Woodward, had never done Poland any injustice, would also be completely unjustified. The British envoy warned the visitors that unpremeditated action could bring more disaster upon the country. He emphasized that he was dispensing this advice on account of the warm feelings that George II had for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Woodward did not mention the Russian ministers. He gave the following explanation to Harrington: "I made no particular mention of the Russian Ministers, their Case being very different from the Others"⁵⁷. The British envoy was unable to persuade the Poles to abandon their attack on the Saxon Elector's palace or the Russian minister's residence⁵⁸. The attackers argued that the palace's guard of 200 men could back the approaching Russian army. Woodward also intervened on behalf of the captured prisoners, pleading that they be treated with kindness. The British diplomat feared that the attackers, blinded by extreme hatred towards the Saxons and the Russians, could be brutal, or even cruel towards the prisoners. The imperial ambassador's residence had been barricaded, but it was never attacked⁵⁹. When visiting the residence, Woodward had to climb a ladder.

Woodward's delicate situation did not improve after Leszczyński had departed for Gdańsk on 22 September 1733⁶⁰ and after Frederick Augustus had been proclaimed king Augustus III by the noblemen's convention in Prague on 5 October 1733⁶¹. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had two

⁵⁶ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hampton Court, 2 October 1733 o.s., f. 214–214v.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 30 September 1733, f. 221.

⁵⁸ Allegedly, Woodward's support arrived too late after the orders had already been given. Ibidem, f. 222v–223.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 3 October 1733, f. 226v–227.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 26 September 1733, f. 216.

⁶¹ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 6 October 1733, f. 239, 14 October 1733, f. 250.

monarchs. The country was strongly antagonized, but the existing divisions did not have a stable foundation. The nobility's support for one of the two candidates was often a random choice. Gdańsk, Malbork and Elbląg recognized the legitimacy of Leszczyński's election, but Toruń denied its support. Even the officers of the royal guard were divided over the matter⁶². Woodward's dilemma was additionally deepened by disruptions in the postal service. Major roads were blocked by troops faithful to Leszczyński, and the correspondence from the Court of St. James's had been delayed for weeks⁶³. When the letters finally did arrive, their content must have been quite disappointing for Woodward. The British court limited itself to commending the envoy's conduct, sometimes throwing in a handful of news on the life of the royal family⁶⁴.

In the face of a highly unstable situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state, George II's envoy deemed it impossible to pursue his main objective which was to safeguard the interests of the Protestant community in the country. He was aware that Karl Gustav von Löwenwolde was willing to support the Protestant cause in Poland, but he believed that any measures initiated to achieve that goal would be ineffective during a political rift. Woodward did not abandon his cause altogether, but he limited his actions to private consultations with influential magnates whose powers were so far reaching that they would not be undermined by changes on the political scene⁶⁵.

On 17 November 1733, Woodward was visited by the starost of Wieluń who presented the envoy with a document justifying the appointment of Frederick Augustus as king, and asked the diplomat to forward it to the British court. Woodward wrote to Harrington that he was unable to deny the starost's request because the same set of documents had been handed to other foreign ministers and had been accepted⁶⁶. The Elector of Saxony was hoping to speed up his coronation and get a firm grasp of the Polish throne. Woodward was disoriented, and he informed Harrington that he had received divergent reports claiming that Stanisław Leszczyński's Diet of Coronation would be held in Cracow on 6 January 1734, and Augustus' coronation – also in Cracow, but on 19 January 1734. The British diplomat must have been relieved when he excused himself from attending Wettin's coronation with the following words: “a publick Minister cou'd not stir from the Place he

⁶² *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 10 October 1733, f. 242, 244–244v.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 22 October 1733, f. 254, 5 XI 1733, f. 277.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hampton Court, 26 October 1733 o.s., f. 252–253, Whitehall, 6 November 1733 o.s., f. 266–266v, 9 November 1733 o.s., f. 268, 13 November 1733 o.s., f. 275; NA, SP 88/43, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 12 March 1733/4 o.s., f. 29.

⁶⁵ NA, SP 88/42, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 29 October 1733, f. 271.

⁶⁶ The message was sent in a letter of 12 November 1733, but owing to problems with the post, Woodward was forced to compile reports covering several consecutive days into a single letter. The discussed news was registered on 18 November 1733. *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 12 November 1733, f. 291.

was sent to, without particular Orders from his Court⁶⁷. This diplomatic refusal earned him George II's esteem, and London politicians concluded that Woodward should develop an appropriate political stance by the time Augustus III arrives in Warsaw. Harrington promised to send the relevant instructions in the following letter, and he justified the British court's restraint in addressing the matter by the uncertainty as to whether the orders would directly reach the envoy⁶⁸. At the beginning of the new year, Harrington wrote that since George II had not yet decided to recognize Leszczyński or Frederick August as the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Woodward's conduct should be tuned in to the British monarch's position if either of the elects were to visit Warsaw. Dutch minister Carel Rumpf received similar instructions, and the British envoy was to consult the diplomat in the event of doubt. Should Woodward conclude that his actions were frowned upon, he was to leave Poland and await further orders in a safe location⁶⁹.

The arrival of the much awaited instructions did not change Woodward's hitherto course of action. They only asserted his conviction that the avoidance of direct confrontation was the most appropriate policy and the only reasonable choice in view of George II's position on the situation in Poland. Backed by the Saxon and Russian armies and a confederation formed in the election camp⁷⁰, Augustus III quickly assumed power and felt confident enough to reinstate normal operations in the court. Woodward had to resort to diplomatic excuses to deny invitations to royal receptions, balls and ceremonies⁷¹. It seems that Augustus III's ministers were aware of the British's envoy's predicament, and they made no attempts to further complicate his situation⁷².

In 1734, Woodward sent highly elaborate reports to the court in London. He wrote about everything that could be of interest to his superiors, including the situation in Gdańsk which had offered refuge to Stanisław Leszczyński⁷³

⁶⁷ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 7 December 1733, f. 308v–309. Augustus III's coronation was held on 17 January 1734, but the Diet of Coronation did not take place due to a poor turnout. J. Staszewski, *August III Sas*, Wrocław et al. 1989, p. 153.

⁶⁸ NA, SP 88/42, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 28 December 1733 o.s., f. 324–324v.

⁶⁹ NA, SP 88/43, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 1 January 1733/4 o.s., f. 1–2.

⁷⁰ W. Stanek, *Konfederacje generalne koronne w XVIII wieku*, Toruń 1991, p. 31

⁷¹ NA, SP 88/43, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 30 January 1734, f. 8v, 7 August 1734, f. 182v, 9 December 1734, f. 277; NA, SP 88/44, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 19 May 1735, f. 110v.

⁷² “[...] Orders will be given to their Minister in England, to thank the King for leaving me here, and tho’ they [Brühl and Sułkowski – B. K.-C.] find I cannot go to their Court, they don’t seem to take it ill in any wise, but say that they are in hopes. Affairs will soon take so favourable a turn for them, that I shall be accredited to the King their Master [...]”. NA, SP 88/43, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 9 December 1734, f. 276.

⁷³ For more information on the siege, see: E. Cieślak, *W obronie tronu króla Stanisława Leszczyńskiego*, Gdańsk 1986, pp. 51-etc. Joshua Kenworthy, a British resident in Gdańsk, delivered more in-depth reports on the situation in the city to Harrington in 1734. NA, SP 88/43, passim.

and had remained under Russian siege since January 1734. He reported on Leszczyński's stay in Königsberg, the plans and moves of both political camps and their leaders, the conflict between the Russians, Saxons and Leszczyński's supporters, the feelings and perceptions of the nobility, the Dzików Confederation formed on 5 November 1734 under the leadership of Adam Tarło⁷⁴, the instructions and activities of other diplomats residing in Poland. Woodward described various court events and reported on the health and well-being of prominent magnates. To make the picture complete, Woodward enclosed copies and abstracts of various documents, such as manifestos, legal acts, instructions and letters⁷⁵. In his reports, the British envoy made few references to the war of the Polish succession that broke out in the West in October 1733⁷⁶. In nearly all letters posted in 1734, Woodward complained about massive problems with the postal service. Continued political instability and the activity of Leszczyński's troops prevented letters from arriving on time, many parcels were opened and some never reached the addressees. The British diplomat wrote to Weston, the undersecretary of state: "so you see how the Law of the Nations is observed; To complain one does not know to whom, and if one did, I am persuaded 'twoud be to very little purpose"⁷⁷.

Woodward was probably beginning to feel increasingly ill at ease in Poland. The constant uncertainty as to his diplomatic mission, health problems resulting from the harsh Polish climate⁷⁸ and obstructed communication with England made his work very difficult in a country torn by civil war. The news that Dutch minister Rumpf, whom Woodward was to consult in his diplomatic endeavors, was to be temporarily transferred to an outpost to Berlin was the proverbial pinch of salt that was rubbed into the envoy's already festering wounds⁷⁹. Although convinced by Harrington that his stay in Poland was the most rational solution, Woodward was beginning to see the futility of his actions. During the time of unrest and disturbances, his departure from Warsaw could prove to be dangerous. George II had no other missions that he could entrust to Woodward. Realizing that the envoy's morale was running low, the undersecretary of state spared Woodward no praise, claiming that the diplomat had demonstrated great prudence in a highly complex situation and that his detailed reports were held in great esteem by the king⁸⁰.

The political situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state began to stabilize in 1735. The members of the Dzików confederation scored a certain success

⁷⁴ For more information on the confederation established in Leszczyński's defense, refer to: S. Truchim, *Konfederacja Dzikowska*, Poznań 1921.

⁷⁵ NA, SP 88/43, passim.

⁷⁶ Ref.: J. L. Sutton, *The King's honor & the King's Cardinal. The war of the Polish succession*, Lexington 1980.

⁷⁷ NA, SP 88/43, G. Woodward to E. Weston, Warsaw, 8 September 1734, f. 219v.

⁷⁸ NA, SP 88/44, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 9 July 1735, f. 177.

⁷⁹ NA, SP 88/43, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 12 March 1734, f. 41.

⁸⁰ Ibidem, Harrington to G. Woodward, Whitehall, 23 April 1734 o.s., f. 71-71v.

in the first half of the year, but they were hoping for foreign support, and their efforts lacked competence. Leszczyński's supporters initiated a wide-scale diplomatic campaign and sent diplomatic missions to several European countries⁸¹. Those efforts proved to be fruitless⁸². Augustus III's camp was quickly gaining power with a growing number of Leszczyński's former aides pledging loyalty to the House of Wettin⁸³. The possibility of George II recognizing Augustus III as the king of Poland was gradually becoming reality.

In the war waged in Western Europe, France and its allies achieved the anticipated goals. In mid 1735, Charles VI's army fighting on the Rhine was backed by 12,000 Russian soldiers under the command of Field Marshal Lascy, but this event had no bearing on the course of the war. Around that time, French and imperial diplomats embarked on secret peace talks in Vienna.

England and Holland recognized their role of conflict mediators, and at the beginning of 1735, they drafted a plan for reconciling the parties fighting in the war of the Polish succession. Their project accounted for the situation in Poland-Lithuania⁸⁴. A part of the plan pertaining to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth reached Woodward on 23 March 1735 with orders instructing the envoy to keep the information in strict confidence and discuss it only with Augustus III's ministers when absolutely necessary. By the time the document reached Woodward, its contents had already ceased to be confidential "as the whole Plan is now become public having been sent from Holland by several hands"⁸⁵. Woodward informed Harrington that the project had not met major opposition, then again, the British envoy made no attempts to subject it to serious debate⁸⁶.

In July 1735, Woodward had strong hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Polish-Lithuanian state⁸⁷. When Primate Teodor Potocki and Janusz Wiśniowiecki, the Castellan of Cracow, turned to Woodward with a request for George II's mediation in the conflict between the Commonwealth and Russia, the British envoy replied that although the British king wished Poland-Lithuania nothing but the best, he had no intentions of be-

⁸¹ Woodward informed Harrington of Dzików confederates' plans to send starost Jabłonowski to England and Holland. NA, SP 88/44, Warsaw, 12 January 1735, f. 6v.

⁸² For more information on confederate outposts in European courts, see: S. Askenazy, *Przedostatnie bezkrólewie*, in: S. Askenazy, *Dwa stulecia XVIII i XIX. Badania i przyczynki*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1903, pp. 131-etc.

⁸³ Numerous references to members of the confederation or entire divisions pledging support to Augustus III can be found in Woodward's letters in NA, SP 88/44, *passim*.

⁸⁴ NA, SP 88/44, *Projet l'Accommodement ou de pacification, qu'en suite de l'acceptation de l'Offre de leurs bons Offices le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et les Etats Generaux proposent aux Puissances engage'es dans la presente Guerre*, f. 42-47

⁸⁵ He is referring to a copy that the Dutch minister had received from the Hague. *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 24 March 1735, f. 79.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 31 March 1735, f. 81v, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw 23 July 1735, f. 197v-198.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to E. Weston, Warsaw, 30 July 1735, f. 209.

coming involved in its internal affairs (“mediation” implied official recognition of Augustus III as the king of Poland). If other issues were to require the British monarch’s mediation after the parties had brought the matter to a satisfactory closure, George II would be happy to offer his assistance⁸⁸.

The Diet of Pacification was scheduled for 27 September 1735. Woodward saw it as a prime opportunity to push for the Protestant cause. He asked Tilson, the Under-Secretary of State, whether he should bring up the issue before the Russian court “which is all mighty in these parts and nothing to be done without them”⁸⁹. Harrington instructed Woodward to seek the advice of Hermann Karl von Keyserling, the Russian minister in Warsaw, and the Secretary of State assured the envoy that appropriate steps would be taken in the Petersburg court⁹⁰. In the following letter, he informed Woodward that the Russian sovereign would dispatch appropriate instructions to its representative in Poland. Woodward was also provided with a copy of the letter that George II had received from the burgesses of Gdańsk, requesting the British monarch’s intercession on behalf of the dissidents in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Harrington instructed Woodward to support the dissidents’ cause in a shared effort with the ministers of other Protestant countries⁹¹. Heinrich von Brühl, a minister to Augustus III, and Russian minister Keyserling convinced the envoy that any attempts to place the Protestant issue on the agenda could break up the Diet of Pacification whose priority objective was to restore peace in the country⁹². George II fully agreed with their arguments, and he expressed his hopes that the Protestant community would understand that their fate could be improved only in a peaceful country that abides by the rule of law. The Court of St. James’s instructed Woodward to remain vigilant and continue working with Keyserling and other diplomats on the dissident issue⁹³. Woodward skillfully summarized the need to postpone the Protestant cause until better times: “We must let our Protestant Case sleep a while unless the Enemy awake”⁹⁴.

The abandonment of the Protestant case did not save the Diet of Pacification which ended its 6-week debate on 7 November without choosing a marshal of the Diet⁹⁵. On 3 October 1735, French and imperial diplomats signed preliminary peace treaties in Vienna⁹⁶. The news reached the Warsaw court on 21 October, and it was received with great dismay. Following

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 16 July 1735, f. 181v, 13 August 1735, f. 223v–224.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 9 July 1735, f. 177v.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hanover, 10/21 July 1735 o.s., f. 179–179v.

⁹¹ NA, SP 88/45, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hanover, 31 August/1 September 1735 o.s.

⁹² *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 27 August 1735, 10 September 1735.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, Harrington to G. Woodward, Hanover, 2/13 October 1735 o.s.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 8 October 1735.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 2 November 1735, 9 November 1735.

⁹⁶ E. Cieślak, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

a series of meetings with Charles VI's envoy, Franz Karl von Wratislaw von Mitrowitz, who was instructed to discretion, as well as Dutch and British ministers who were unable to produce any information as the French-Austrian peace talks had been held behind the back of maritime powers, many Poles were convinced that the news had been fabricated by Augustus III's court⁹⁷. The monarch's ministers were no less surprised. Woodward noted that "this Court seems surprized that the Imperial Ministers have made them no communication of their Negotiation with France"⁹⁸ (original spelling). For Leszczyński's supporters, Louis XV's conciliation with Charles VI meant an end to their dreams of victory. The Polish throne had been given to the House of Wettin. Leszczyński kept his royal title, and he was awarded the duchies of Bar and Lorraine which were to be incorporated into France after his death. The period of diarchy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came to an end when Stanisław Leszczyński signed an act of abdication on 27 January 1736 in Königsberg. His supporters vehemently opposed the declaration⁹⁹, but such were the wishes of the king of France, and Leszczyński lacked the power or the courage to dispute them.

George Woodward never witnessed the end of the succession conflict in Poland. He died in Warsaw on 11 December 1735 after a three weeks' illness at the age of 38. The letter in which George II recognized Augustus III as the king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was delivered to Grand Marshal Józef Mniszech by Denton Boate, secretary of the British outpost, who unofficially assumed Woodward's duties after his on 24 June 1736, i.e. on the eve of the Diet of Pacification, which put an end to the civil war¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁷ NA, SP 88/45, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 26 October 1735.

⁹⁸ Ibidem, G. Woodward to Harrington, Warsaw, 19 November 1735.

⁹⁹ NA, SP 88/46, A. Gibson to Harrington, Königsberg, 26 January 1736, G. Woodward to G. Tilson, Danzig, 4 February 1736.

¹⁰⁰ NA, SP 88/45, I. Coulliette to G. Tilson, Warsaw, 7 December 1735, 10 December 1735, 11 December 1735. The body was transported to the British Isles and buried in Hillesden, Buckingham. G. Lipscomb, *Journey into South Wales, through the counties of Oxford, Warwick, Worcester, Hereford, Salop, Stafford, Buckingham and Hertford; in the year 1799*, London 1802, pp. 365–366.

Tomasz Strzeżek

PIOTR KIEKIERNICKI – THE POLISH “KAMIKAZE” OF THE NOVEMBER UPRISING (1830–1831)

On 29 November 1830, an armed struggle that went down the history as the November Uprising broke out in Warsaw, the capital city of the Kingdom of Poland which was bound by a personal union with Russia. With time, the uprising spread to include Russia's western governorates (the former territories of pre-partition Poland, today a part of Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine), posing a threat to Russia's imperial rule. It was a significant event that has even been compared to Russia's war against Napoleon in 1812. It is quite remarkable that an insurrection with such far-reaching consequences had been initiated by people who had no close connections with political and military elites and did not hold top-notch posts in the state administration or the army. The insurgents were motivated by patriotism and the determination to improve their fate. Members of the Wysocki Conspiracy who took to the streets and mobilized the army and the civilians to stage a fight against Russia had no intentions to assume power in a country that was struggling to regain its independence. They entrusted this task to the old elites which, as they hoped, would lead the nation into battle. Titled politicians and officers took control over the uprising, but they had little belief in its military success. The majority of high-ranking commanders (from major upwards) shared this opinion. Most former officers from the era of Napoleonic wars supported the uprising, but they participated in the insurrection and the war against Russia out of civic duty to their country and the nation¹. Unlike younger officers and older non-commissioned officers, very few high-

¹ W. Tokarz, *Armia Królestwa Polskiego (1815–1831)*, Piotrków 1917, pp. 292–293; T. Strzeżek, *Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku. Zaprzepaszczona szansa powstania listopadowego*, Olsztyn 2002, p. 38.

ranking officers in the Polish army gave their unconditional support to the uprising. Piotr Kiekiernicki was a member of this small group of officers.

Kiekiernicki was born in 1789 to a Polish nobility family in the Wielkopolska region. He began his military career at the age of 20 by joining the third regiment of Galician-French infantry. He gained skill and experience in the armed struggle against the Austrian army which entered the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809. In July, he was awarded his first officer's rank of second lieutenant, and in 1810 he was promoted to lieutenant. In the war against Russia of 1812, Kiekiernicki served in the 15th infantry regiment of the Warsaw Duchy. He participated in the battles of Smolensk and Mozhaysk (Borodino). On 11 September, he was promoted to captain by Napoleon himself. He was transferred to the 20th infantry regiment formed in Lithuania, but he probably remained with the 15th regiment and fought in the battles of Chirikov, Voronov, Medynia and Berazino. In the 1813 campaign, Kiekiernicki participated in the battle of Leipzig (16–19 October), the largest battle of the Napoleonic era². He joined the Polish Kingdom army³ as captain and holder of the *Virtuti Militari* golden cross. He served in the 1st line infantry regiment until the outbreak of the November Uprising. In 1825, he was promoted to the rank of major, and in 1830, he was awarded a medal of honor for 20 years of "outstanding service". Kiekiernicki was a widower, and he had no children. He was close to his brother who had a son⁴.

Service in the Polish Kingdom army, commanded by Grand Duke Constantine (the tsar's brother), in particularly its infantry regiments, was quite an ordeal⁵. Kiekiernicki, an enthusiastic patriot⁶, found it difficult to adjust to the new reality, but he did not give up his struggle for independence. He was a close acquaintance of Walerian Łukasiński who started the National Freemasonry movement in 1819. Modeled on Masonic lodges, this organization had around 200 members. The fight for Poland's independence was not its direct goal, but it promoted the ambiguous concept of "preserving national identity". For Kiekiernicki, who was not a key member of the Freemasonry, this concept embodied all actions aiming to revive the Polish nation and

² J. Starosta, *Piotr Kiekiernicki*, *Polski słownik biograficzny*, vol. 12, book. 3, Kraków 1966–1967, pp. 400–401; R. Bielecki, *Słownik biograficzny oficerów powstania listopadowego*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1996, p. 268.

³ The Kingdom of Poland was created out of the Duchy of Warsaw at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It was bound by a personal union with Russia (the Russian Tsar was the king of Poland).

⁴ J. Starosta, *op. cit.*, p. 401; R. Bielecki, *op. cit.*, p. 268; *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, vol. 3: 1836, p. 76, Kiekiernicki bequeathed all of his funds to his nephew.

⁵ T. Strzeżek, *Kawaleria Królestwa Polskiego w powstaniu listopadowym-mobilizacja i podstawa funkcjonowania w wojnie*, Olsztyn 2006, pp. 21–30, 45–46.

⁶ In a suicide note of 1831, he wrote: "The vision of a torn and oppressed Country prevented me from enjoying life ever since I was a child. Everything was poisoned, I could never find my peace, and my heart was always torn by this sorry sight". *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, vol. 3: 1836, p. 76.

restore its full sovereignty⁷. There is lack of agreement on whether Kiekiernicki was a member of the Patriotic Society, a secret organization that replaced the National Freemasonry. The goal of the Patriotic Society was to reinstate Poland's independence in all three partitions by way of an uprising (in the long-term perspective and in a supporting climate on the international arena). Kiekiernicki was not tried in court with other members of the Patriotic Society (June 1827 to June 1828). The authorities were only aware of his memberships in the National Freemasonry⁸, and this fact undoubtedly influenced his fate. Kiekiernicki was not an active conspirator in fear of exposing his companions to the highly effective secret police. It seems highly probable that after 1828, he was a tacit supporter of a secret officers' organization created by second lieutenant Józef Zaliwski. The movement brought together lower-ranking officers and non-commissioned officers from the 1st, 4th and 5th line infantry regiments⁹. Kiekiernicki was not an active member, but he was prepared to join the organization's ranks in the event of an uprising¹⁰. In the summer of 1830, Zaliwski and his companions joined Piotr Wysocki's Conspiracy (formed in December 1828) that sparked the armed struggle on 29 November 1830. The number of conspirators was low (around 80 on 25 November), therefore efforts were made to solicit the support of more officers within several days¹¹. Kiekiernicki was probably one of them, and he became a fully-fledged member of the conspiracy. He represented a small group of higher-ranking officers who knew about the uprising and were willing to support it. He did not aspire to be the movement's leader: he joined the preparation process relatively late, and he lacked political ambitions. According to Szymon Askenazy, Kiekiernicki had a “passionate and tempestuous disposition”, and he was a “kind and generous soul”¹². He definitely lacked the resourcefulness and tenacity of those engaged in a cult of personality (Zaliwski was an expert in this respect). He was probably more similar to Piotr Wysocki whose chief motto in life was “nothing for self, everything for the Country”. Waclaw Tokarz wrote that Kiekiernicki was a prime example of “complete selflessness, a nearly complete absence of personal ambition” and a man who “...beamed with righteousness and per-

⁷ Sz. Askenazy, *Lukasiński*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1929, pp. 99, 276–277, 293, 318–319; W. Bortnowski, *Luna nad Solcem 1830. Blaski i cienie nocy listopadowej*, Warszawa 1982, p. 72.

⁸ Sz. Askenazy, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 316, vol. 2, pp. 30–31, 57, 450; W. Bortnowski, op. cit., p. 73.

⁹ [J. Zaliwski], *Rewolucja polska 29 listopada 1830 przez ...*, Paris 1833, p. 12. Józef Zaliwski was one of the uprising's organizers. W. Tokarz, *Sprzysiężenie Wysockiego i Noc Listopadowa*, Warszawa 1980, p. 150; T. Łepkowski, *Piotr Wysocki*, Warszawa 1981, p. 43; Bortnowski, op. cit., p. 161. Zaliwski was of the opinion that members of the former organizations, including the Freemasonry and the Patriotic Society, “never initiated any action on their own”.

¹⁰ [J. Zaliwski], op. cit., p. 12.

¹¹ T. Łepkowski, op. cit., pp. 47, 62; W. Bortnowski, op. cit., p. 160.

¹² Sz. Askenazy, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 31.

sonal integrity that won him the trust of young people...”¹³. Kiekiernicki handled his subordinates, officers and privates with great skill¹⁴. He became renowned for his bravery and courage already before the November Uprising. Ignacy Prądzyński, a distinguished staff officer and the author of operation plans, claimed that Kiekiernicki’s courage bordered on audacity. Kiekiernicki was a complete stranger to panic attacks which paralyze the best soldiers. According to Prądzyński, Kiekiernicki was one of the bravest and the “most singular” soldiers in the Polish army. The latter should not be associated with the fact that Kiekiernicki was a widower, but it is a reflection on his willingness to fight and take action, traits that were not very common among higher-ranking Polish officers during the uprising¹⁵. Wacław Tokarz argued that Kiekiernicki was “one of those intelligent and quick-witted officers among whom the Union [Wysocki’s Conspiracy – T.S.] should search for a leader that the uprising was in dire need of”. Tokarz referred to Kiekiernicki as a “very talented” man of “uncommon valor”¹⁶. He based his judgment on Kiekiernicki’s achievements during and before the uprising.

Józef Zaliwski, the originator of the plan to break up and take control over the Russian army in Warsaw, entrusted Kiekiernicki with a very important task. As the commander of the 1st infantry regiment, Kiekiernicki was to seize the bridges on the Vistula River, the powder magazine (ammunition storage) in Warsaw’s district of Praga¹⁷ and secure Praga on the side of Modlin which was occupied by Russian troops. By seizing those positions, Kiekiernicki would prevent the Russian army from retreating east from Warsaw. Kiekiernicki performed his duties outstandingly. He supplied ammunition from the captured powder magazine to the insurgents in Warsaw¹⁸. Józef Zaliwski claimed that Kiekiernicki “obeyed the orders with the utmost diligence – and this is what saved us all”¹⁹. This is quite possible as Kiekiernicki was highly esteemed by his soldiers. The indictment against the

¹³ W. Tokarz, *Sprzysiężenie...*, p. 58.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 150.

¹⁵ [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, Kraków 1909, vol. 1, p. 451, vol. 3, p. 86. Henryk Dembiński, who fought by Kiekiernicki’s side, remarked that when it came to personal courage, Kiekiernicki “had no equal”. He added that Kiekiernicki was a fearless officer ready to “**sacrifice himself and his army for the mission**”. This observation was consistent with Kiekiernicki’s character. H. Dembiński, *Pamiętniki o powstaniu w Polsce 1830–1831*, vol. 1, Kraków 1877, pp. 129, 200.

¹⁶ W. Tokarz, *Sprzysiężenie...*, pp. 150, 208.

¹⁷ Praga – district of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula.

¹⁸ *Akt oskarżenia w sprawie przeciwko osobom oddanym pod najwyższy sąd kryminalny w Królestwie Polskim w zarzucie spełnienia zbrodni, wyłączonych od ogólnego przebaczenia, jakie Najjaśniejszy Cesarz Wszech Rosseyi Król Polski itd w dniu 20 października | 1 listopada R. 1831 poddanym swym w Królestwie Polskim mającym udział w rokoszu z roku 1830 i 1831 najtąskawiej udzielić raczył wraz z summariuszem dowodów i konkluzjami prokuratora przy tymże sądzie*, (criminal indictment act), Warszawa 1834, pp. 119–120; W. Tokarz, *Sprzysiężenie...*, pp. 148, 206–208.

¹⁹ [J. Zaliwski], *op. cit.*, p. 25.

insurgents quotes the words that were used by Kiekiernicki to motivate them for battle. He urged his soldiers to show determination and perseverance not only when fighting for the capital city²⁰, but also in the war against Russia because “if our enemy regains its position, a much greater evil awaits us”²¹.

When troops were mobilized for the war against Russia, Kiekiernicki was put in charge of the third battalion of the 1st line infantry regiment. Contrary to the first two battalions, the third unit, formed in early December 1830, comprised dismissed officers who had been redrafted into the army as well as volunteers who were novices in the battle field. The latter accounted for around a third of Kiekiernicki’s soldiers. While sluggish officers who had fallen out of military practice detracted from the reputation of the third battalion, the 1st line infantry regiment was a shining example of military art. Kiekiernicki quickly turned it into a model instrument of war. Kiekiernicki’s battalion was one of the first to join the regiment already on 7 January 1831²².

The war that broke out when the Russian army of more than 100,000 men invaded the Kingdom of Poland (5-6 February 1831) made Kiekiernicki famous. His greatest military accomplishments included the battle of Warsaw (19-25 February 1831), comprising a series of battles that had started in Wawer (19 February), Olszynka Grochowska (20 February), Białołęka (24-25 February) and the largest scene of armed conflict, the battle of Grochów (25 February). On 19 February, the 1st line infantry regiment defended the outskirts of Olszynka Grochowska²³, and put up a bloody fight to maintain this territory on 20 February. In a report for the commander-in-chief, General Jan Krukowiecki mentioned Kiekiernicki as one of the officers who had made “an outstanding contribution” to the cause. The regiment’s commander spared him no praise. Stanisław Barzykowski, a representative of the government, erroneously placed Kiekiernicki on the list of officers who had been wounded and captured by the enemy²⁴.

The situation on the main front line in Olszynka Grochowska near Warsaw stabilized on 19 and 20 February. The two armies²⁵ found themselves in

²⁰ *Akt oskarżenia*, p. 119, “When I give an order, you shall obey it. This is the revolution, and you are under my command”, “A day came for every Pole to shed blood for his Country [...] This is the day of bloodshed, **we will fight till our last drop of blood**, we will crush the Muscovites, and when the Lithuanian Guard advances towards the new bridge, we will shoot it and attack it with our bayonets”.

²¹ *Akt oskarżenia...*, p. 119.

²² J. Ziółek, *Mobilizacja sił zbrojnych na lewobrzeżu Wisły 1830–1831*, Lublin 1973, pp. 97–98.

²³ A suburban wood, the key to Polish defensive positions.

²⁴ On 20 February, the 1st line infantry regiment lost around 232 soldiers, around 9% of the forces counted on 18 February. Library of the National Ossoliński Institute in Wrocław [hereinafter referred to as Oss.], microfilm 89a, No. 19; manuscript 3518/I, p. 28; *Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1931, pp. 380–382, 394–396; S. Barzykowski, *Historia powstania listopadowego*, vol. 2, Poznań 1883, p. 334.

²⁵ On 19 February, the Polish army was 45,000 soldiers and 143 cannons strong. The Russian army had 72,000 soldiers and 204 cannons. W. Majewski, *Grochów 1831*, Warszawa 1982, p. 146.

a face-to-face situation. Polish officers identified Russian army's weak point, namely the right wing comprising units of the 6th infantry corps commanded by General Grigory Rosen. The key to Russia's position was Dąbrowa Góra, a range of sandy hills several hundred meters away from Olszynka Grochowska which remained in Polish hands. Colonel Maciej Rybiński, commander of Kiekiernicki's regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ignacy Prądzyński presented General Józef Chłopicki with a plan of staging an infantry attack on the right wing of the Russian army with the aim of pushing it to the south. Chłopicki, formally only an advisor to Commander-in-Chief General Michał Radziwiłł, but in practice – the actual commander of the Polish army (partially accredited on 22 February 1831), rejected the plan on grounds of excessive risk²⁶. It was then that Kiekiernicki decided to propose his daring plan (Appendix 1) directly to General Radziwiłł²⁷.

Kiekiernicki asked for troops comprising of 500 bravest soldiers and 15 lower-rank officers – volunteers ready to sacrifice their lives for the country. Each of them would be equipped with arms corresponding to their respective military rank, including a broadsword for each private and a couple of pistols for every officer. The soldiers were to be provided with special nails and hammers for disabling Russian cannons. Kiekiernicki was also hoping for some spoils, and he requested 50 artillerymen and several horse convoys for pulling cannons. The troops were to be backed by 150 Scythemen²⁸ and a company of infantry rocketeers commanded by Captain Karol Skalski who would illuminate the battle field with Congreve rockets²⁹, causing havoc among the enemy's soldiers and horses. Kiekiernicki wanted to inspect Russian positions in the company of two officers and gather the troops near Olszynka Grochowska at night. The main target of his night escapade were Russian positions in Dąbrowa Góra³⁰ (Fig. 1).

Kiekiernicki was hoping to accomplish two tasks during the escapade: to capture or damage (by nailing down) Russian cannons and to cause havoc in the Russian camp. He knew that the operation would take many lives, but he was willing to repeat the escapade with those who survived³¹. Volunteer service and the willingness to sacrifice their lives for the country create a parallel between the Polish soldiers of 1831 and the Japanese kamikaze soldiers of World War II.

²⁶ Oss., manuscript 3518/I, pp. 29–30; [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 1, pp. 445–451; W. Tokarz, *Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830 i 1831*, Warszawa 1993, p. 187.

²⁷ [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 1, p. 451.

²⁸ The soldiers of the new infantry regiments were armed with scythes. Rifles were in short supply in the Polish army until the end of the war.

²⁹ Congreve rockets – incendiary and bombarding rockets (with bullets and bombs).

³⁰ I. Prądzyński, *Pamiętnik historyczny i wojskowy*, Petersburg 1898, p. 45, “a hill directly opposite our Olszynka”; [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, 1, p. 451.



Fig. 1. Region of Olszynka Grochowska and Dąbrowa Góra

Source: L. Mierosławski, *Powstanie narodu polskiego w roku 1830 i 1831*, vol. 1, Paris 1845.

Chłopiccki, who had a decisive voice in military operations, did not accept Kiekiernicki's plan³², probably deeming it even more insane than Prądzyński's and Rybiński's proposal. Despite the above, Kiekiernicki's bold scheme contributed to his reputation of an energetic man who was capable of greatness³³.

On 25 February 1831, during the battle of Grochów, Kiekiernicki defended a strategic position in Ząbki between two points occupied by the Polish army which were separated by a distance of several kilometers. He defended the “middle gate” through which the Russians could enter the district of Praga by separating Polish troops, attacking the army's rear and flank in Olszynka Grochowska and Grochów. According to Ignacy Prądzyński, Kiekiernicki had been waging a “lost battle” from the beginning³⁴. He was to guard his position with the aid of an infantry battalion, 50 cavalymen of the Krakusi regiment and a horse artillery battery. When the Russian infantry charged, Kiekiernicki's battalion lasted two hours in “dense fire” near a bridge by the road to Ząbki, repulsing the attack of the enemy's infantry backed by artillery and cavalry. He received support from an artillery unit,

³¹ Oss., microfilm 89a, No. 20.

³² [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 1, p. 451.

³³ When spurring his soldiers to fight in an order of 25 February, General Jan Krukowiecki took into account Kiekiernicki's “resilience”, i.e. his energy and courage. *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 1, p. 412.

³⁴ [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 1, p. 486; W. Chrzanowski, *Opisanie bitwy grochowskiej*, Kraków 1917, p. 68.

but Polish forces were outnumbered by the enemy. When the Russians made a repeated attempt to take over the bridge, Kiekiernicki dismounted the structure and ordered a retreat. He did it with great reluctance, and it took much convincing to prevent him from launching a direct bayonet attack on the much stronger Russian regiment approaching the bridge. Kiekiernicki finally retreated, but he did so without hurrying, as his priority was to safeguard the army. In his report, General Krukowiecki wrote that Kiekiernicki “put up a courageous fight in Ząbki in the face of a much greater army. He changed positions twice to gain advantage, and he ordered a retreat only when commanded to do so by General Umiński”. General Jan Nepomucen Umiński remarked on Kiekiernicki’s perseverance and determination³⁵. It was probably those traits of character that led to Kiekiernicki’s dispute with General Jan Weyssenhoff (commander of the entire cavalry in the uprising) who insisted that Kiekiernicki vacate the threatened position because his determination jeopardized the safety of the cavalry unit from Umiński’s corps³⁶.

The feud with a higher-ranking officer did not hinder Kiekiernicki’s military career. His ability to defend a seemingly hopeless position was duly recognized. His superiors expected Kiekiernicki to give a similar display courage and determination in defending the fortifications of Praga which remained under Polish control after the army had retreated to the left bank of the Vistula. On 26 February 1831, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, general Jan Skrzynecki, made Kiekiernicki the commander of Praga’s garrison (comprising two infantry battalions)³⁷. There are no surviving records to indicate the term of Kiekiernicki’s post, but it enabled him to expand his knowledge of the vast territories in the outskirts of Praga which was used by the command. On 31 March, Kiekiernicki commanded the vanguard of the Polish forces (General Rybiński’s infantry division) which moved north through Ząbki to detour General Fyodor Geismar’s troops in Wawer and Goćławek. In the second battle of Wawer which initiated the Polish spring offensive³⁸, Kiekiernicki attempted to cut off the Russian forces’ route back to the east. He was unable to surround the enemy completely, but his soldiers inflicted serious damage on Geismar’s troops. Kiekiernicki captured an entire regiment of Russian infantry with two companies. The division’s commander later reported on the bravery of Kiekiernicki’s battalion. Kiekiernicki’s cold-blooded stance and determination once again won him the acclaim

³⁵ *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 1, pp. 413–414, 416–418.

³⁶ J. Lewiński, *Pamiętniki z 1831 roku*, Poznań 1895, p. 22; [J. Weyssenhoff], *Pamiętniki generała...*, Warszawa 1904, p. 228.

³⁷ Order of 26 February 1831.

³⁸ T. Strzeżek, *Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku. Zaprzepaszczona szansa powstania listopadowego*, Olsztyn 2002. The Polish offensive took the lives of nearly 20,000 Russian soldiers (including 12,500 prisoners). The Poles captured 13 cannons and vast quantities of military equipment.

of military command. According to Maciej Rybiński's report, at one point, Kiekiernicki's unit suddenly faced three Russian infantry battalions. Kiekiernicki stopped his soldiers "as if to reconnoiter his situation and the threat", after which he rapidly charged the enemy's first battalion, breaking it up before proceeding to the remaining units³⁹. In his report, Rybiński not only proclaimed Kiekiernicki to be one of the most distinguished officers, but he also motioned with the Commander-in-Chief to reward and promote Kiekiernicki for his efforts⁴⁰. Duke Adam Czartoryski, Chairman of the Polish National Uprising Government, made a similar request. In a letter to Skrzynecki of 4 April 1831, he pointed to Kiekiernicki's remarkable achievements on 31 March, adding that such a great man should not be forgotten⁴¹. Kiekiernicki's fame and reputation of one of the bravest officers in the Polish infantry continued to grow⁴². After the battle of Wawer, he pursued the disintegrated corps of General Rosen. He fought in the battle of Czarna⁴³, and he attempted to take control over the crossing on the Liwiec River near Liw⁴⁴. The latter episode indicates that Kiekiernicki had the reputation of a man capable of performing special missions. His task was to destroy bridges on the Liwiec River, including near Liw. The Russian guard corps occupying territories north of the Bug River could use those bridges to attack the flank and the rear of the Polish army along the road from Warsaw to Brześć Litewski. Kiekiernicki set out on the mission with great determination. He was ready to sacrifice himself and his unit to safeguard the Polish army⁴⁵. But this time, the situation did not demand such a great sacrifice. When on the night of 3 April, Kiekiernicki's infantry unit stormed Liw ready to charge the enemy with their bayonets, they woke up colonel Henryk Dembiński's uhlans who had captured Liw and the river crossing a day earlier. According to reports, a fratricidal fight broke out as the parties were unable to recognize one another in the dark⁴⁶. Kiekiernicki had every right to expect the

³⁹ Oss., microfilm 89c, No. 179; manuscript 3518/I, p. 58; T. Strzeżek, *Polska ofensywa...*, pp. 96–101.

⁴⁰ Oss., microfilm 89c, No. 179.

⁴¹ *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 2, p. 103.

⁴² The cavalry also had its hero – General Ludwik Kicki, referred to as the “Polish Ajax” or the second Bayard. T. Strzeżek, *Bitwa pod Domanicami 10 kwietnia 1831 roku – epizod z dziejów kawalerii polskiej w powstaniu listopadowym*, in: *Czyn zbrojny w dziejach narodu polskiego. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Wojtasikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, Siedlce 2004, p. 157.

⁴³ Oss., microfilm 89c, No. 179; T. Strzeżek, *Polska ofensywa...*, p. 128.

⁴⁴ T. Strzeżek, *Zapomniane bitwy powstania listopadowego. Zmagania o przeprawę pod Liwem w lutym i pierwszej dekadzie kwietnia 1831 roku*, *Echa Przeszłości*, 2010, issue No. 11, p. 180.

⁴⁵ H. Dembiński, op. cit., p. 129, “unaware of the forces he would have to face, this fearless officer made a decision that was fully consistent with his character: **to sacrifice himself, with the entire regiment if need be, for the mission**. He wanted to charge the bridge and destroy it, even if he were to leave a greater force behind”.

⁴⁶ H. Dembiński, op. cit., p. 128; T. J. Chamski, *Opis krótki lat upłynionych*, Warszawa 1989, p. 394.

enemy when he entered a territory that had not been purged of Russian cavalry. He was keen on destroying all bridges instantly, but Dembiński finally convinced him to delay his plan for several hours. Kiekiernicki formed a special unit that took over the town of Węgrów across the Liwiec River where the Russian operated a supplies warehouse and a hospital. On 4 April, he reunited with the Polish army, bringing with him 240 prisoners⁴⁷. Kiekiernicki was highly rewarded for his efforts in the November Uprising. In an order of 6 April 1831, the Commander-in-Chief promoted Kiekiernicki to colonel (omitting the rank of lieutenant-colonel!) and put him in command of the 2nd rifles regiment and, temporarily, the infantry brigade of the 2nd division. This was an extraordinary career leap, even in an uprising situation (Henryk Dembiński earned an even faster promotion)⁴⁸. Kiekiernicki did not remain in the regiment's command for long. He did not rest on laurels in the following months of war. Having returned from Liw, he was directly commissioned for another serious mission. While the Polish army was struggling against the reinforced auxiliary units of General Rosen's 6th corps, Kiekiernicki formed a cordon securing the operation in the south⁴⁹. When the Russians started an offensive on 26 April, Kiekiernicki fought in the battle of Mińsk Mazowiecki. He defended the town for two hours, personally leading his soldiers in a series of bayonet attacks⁵⁰. On 19 May, the Polish troops were ordered to take Łomża, and Kiekiernicki was summoned to accompany General Antoni Giełgud on the mission. The operation was commanded by General Henryk Dembiński. Kiekiernicki, who led one of the three columns, assured Dembiński that he would be the first to advance on Łomża⁵¹. He did not keep his promise. Giełgud was an inept commander who was unable to harness his officers' talent and enthusiasm. The general's gross incompetence was further revealed during the mission to Lithuania. The cholera epidemic which reached Polish territory with the Russian army took a deadly toll. Kiekiernicki had contracted the disease probably already before the battle of Rajgród of 29 May 1831⁵². Despite his condition, he continued to be charged with responsible tasks. In the company of two infantry units, he defended the rear of the Polish corps that had advanced into Lithuania. He was later accused of retreating from Suwałki too rapidly without securing recruits and funds for the corps⁵³. The disease reached its

⁴⁷ T. Strzeżek, *Zapomniane bitwy...*, p. 180.

⁴⁸ Order of 6 April 1831; H. Dembiński, op. cit., p. 200, Kiekiernicki was "appointed to and then dismissed from the post of commander in a spur of the moment".

⁴⁹ Oss., microfilm 89d, No. 261, 262, 291; *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 2, pp. 118, 129; T. Strzeżek, *Polska ofensywa...*, pp. 169, 176, 182, 184.

⁵⁰ Oss., microfilm 89a, No. 571.

⁵¹ *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 3, pp. 44–45; H. Dembiński, op. cit., pp. 200, 251.

⁵² His regiment had already been placed in the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Wolski (formally from 13 June). A.Z. *Wojna na Litwie w roku 1831*, Kraków 1913, p. 51.

⁵³ [J. Szymanowski], *Pamiętniki jenerała...*, Lviv 1898, p. 127; [I. Prądzyński], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 3, p. 86.

peak in early June, and Kiekiernicki probably left the army⁵⁴. He was restored to service in the last days of June. General Dembiński put him in charge of the defense of the Vilya River near Kaunas. Kiekiernicki also organized an infantry brigade whose units were much less experienced than the members of his old army. Kiekiernicki assumed his duties on the night of 27 June, and on the following day, Kaunas was attacked by the vanguard of a massive Russian regiment⁵⁵. It seems that Kiekiernicki failed to obey Dembiński's orders and decided to defend Kaunas. His motives remain unclear. Kiekiernicki's decision has been attributed to weakness resulting from disease, but knowing his character, excessive courage could have blunted his reason. The Russians quickly defeated the Polish insurgents, and Kiekiernicki was captured together with 32 officers and some 600 soldiers. He could have escaped, but he gave his horse to Emilia Plater, the “Polish Valkyrie” and “Amazon” who later became the symbol of Polish women's fight for independence⁵⁶.

Kiekiernicki shared the fate of thousands of Polish insurgents, and he was deported to Slobodskoy (Слободской), 800 km east of Moscow. He committed suicide in May 1832, leaving behind a note in which he explained the reasons for his drastic decision (Appendix 2). Death, in whose face he looked in the battles of Warsaw and Liw, finally caught up with him nearly 2,000 km away from Poland, on distant Russian territory.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Piotr Kiekiernicki's plan of 23 February 1831⁵⁷

Plan

As it is my intention to eradicate the enemy from our beloved Country, I have the honor of proposing the following plan to the Commander-in-Chief:

1^o I would like to request a unit of 500 bravest soldiers who are ready to sacrifice their lives for the Country. – 15 lower-ranking officers.

2^o The unit has to be provided with nails, hammers or [hatchets?] for nailing down the cannons.

3^{tio} At night, those courageous men will gather and await my command in Lasek Olszowy where the battle was fought the day before yesterday. Soldiers will leave

⁵⁴ S. Barzykowski, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 262; A.Z, *Wojna na Litwie...*, p. 84.

⁵⁵ Kiekiernicki was in charge of around 1200 poorly trained and armed soldiers. The Russian regiment under General Malinovsky's command which attacked Kaunas was 2,000 men and 6 cannons strong. It was the vanguard of General Khilkov's army of 15,300 soldiers.

⁵⁶ *Zbiór pamiętników do powstania Litwy*, Paris 1835, pp. 227–228; *Pamiętniki Polskie*, vol. 4, Paris 1845, pp. 47–48; [I. Domejko], *Pamiętniki...* (1831–1838), Kraków 1908, pp. 26–30; H. Dembiński, op. cit., p. 304; S. Barzykowski, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 263–264; F. R. Sokulski, *W kraju i nad Bosforem*, Wrocław 1951, pp. 12–13; R. O. Spazier, *Historia powstania narodu polskiego w roku 1830 i 1831*, vol. 3, Paris 1833, pp. 133–134.

⁵⁷ Oss., microfilm 89a, No. 20.

rucksacks in their corps. In addition to standard weapons, every soldier will carry a broadsword, and every officer will be equipped with a couple of pistols.

4^{to} I request to be given absolute command over the unit which shall obey my orders to strike the enemy. Today, I will require two officers to reconnoiter the enemy's position during daytime.

5^{to} The unit shall comprise 50 artillerymen.

The unit shall attempt to:

1^o capture or nail down the enemy's cannons,

2^o evoke fear with [a morbid face?]⁵⁸ in the enemy's camp.

The soldiers who return from the first assignment will participate in missions on the successive nights.

23 February in Grochów Major Kiekiernicki, 1st line infantry regiment, Commander of the 3rd battalion

P.S. I could also use 150 Scythemen, horse convoys for pulling a dozen cannons, and rocketeers from General Skrzynecki's division.

signed Kiekiernicki Piotr

Annex 2: *A copy of Piotr Kiekiernicki's farewell note of 1832⁵⁹*

Slobodskoy, 8 May 1832

"I am no longer able to watch the downfall of my Country and the misery of my fellow companions. Those of you who come across this letter should know that there can be no happiness and no life when your Country is enslaved.

Those who do not harbor patriotic feelings are the dregs of society and hold no virtue.

The vision of a torn and oppressed Country prevented me from enjoying life ever since I was a child. Everything was poisoned, I could never find my peace, and my heart was always torn by this sorry sight. Dear Lord, You of all know that I am not guilty of any crime. This will be a painful death, knowing that I cannot rest in peace in my Country, among my brothers.

Kik. P. Polish Colonel

P.S. I am bidding farewell to my fellow prisoners of war: may the good Lord bless and keep you. I am not addressing any of you personally to spare you any trouble. I bought the shotgun from a villager, and I carried the powder and the pellets with me from Simbirsk⁶⁰. In the drawer, you will find 95 rubles in treasury bills, 2 gold ducats and 4 silver ducats which I bequeath to my nephew. I give all of my other possessions to my fellow companions as a keepsake.

⁵⁸ an uncompromising, implacable, fierce face or a terrifying, infernal face.

⁵⁹ *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej*, vol. 3: 1836, pp. 76–77.

⁶⁰ Simbirsk – presently known as Ulyanovsk on the Volga River.

Norbert Kasperek

IN QUEST OF SURRENDER. THE NOVEMBER UPRISING ARMY DURING CAPITULATION TALKS OF SEPTEMBER 1831

The November Uprising is generally associated with a series of remarkable victories and the courageous struggle put up by the small Kingdom of Poland against the powerful Russia. It featured the legendary battles of Stoczek, Olszynka Grochowska, Wawer and Iganie. The insurgents, among them Juliusz Konstanty Ordon, have been made immortal by Romantic poetry. The main army participated in capitulation talks on several occasions. Chłopicki did not want the cause to end with a “defeat of Naples”, Skrzynecki was afraid that the uprising would follow the fate of the battle of Maciejowice, while Rybiński was terrified that the armed struggle would conclude with a “second battle of Radoszyce”. Military defeat was not the only thing that concerned Polish generals. They were also intimidated by the possibility that their professional skills could be exposed to ridicule. Those fears were voiced in the final stage of the uprising, and they became intensified near the time of the battle of Warsaw (6–7 September 1831). In the disputes waged by Polish émigrés abroad, capitulation talks were not recognized as a tactical maneuver for fighting the enemy. The attitude displayed by General Hieronim (Girolamo) Ramorino’s second corps was the only exception¹. The discussion surrounding the second corps was ruthless and uncompromising. Ramorino’s retreat was regarded as the direct cause of the

¹ [S. Barzykowski], *Historia powstania listopadowego spisana przez...*, ed. Aër [A. Rządewski], vol. 5, Poznań 1884, p. 215. Barzykowski explains that the commander-in-chief always had higher authority than the chief of staff. Cf. N. Kasperek, *Korpus Ramorino a szturm Warszawy (pierwsza dekada września 1831 roku)*, in: *Od Franciszka Józefa do małych ojczyzn. Tom poświęcony pamięci Zbigniewa Frasa*, ed. M. Górny, Wrocław 2002, pp. 225–235; N. Kasperek, *Powstańczy epilog, Żołnierze listopadowi w dniach kłęski i internowania 1831–1832*, Olsztyn 2001, pp. 117–156.

defeat of Warsaw and the Polish army's march to Prussia. The discussion had a somewhat cathartic effect.

The collapse of the National Government after the events of 15 August brought General Jan Krukowiecki to power². His main aim was to continue the armed struggle. In mid August, the range of insurgent activity was limited to Warsaw and several regions bordering the Kingdom of Poland. The war required the formulation of new goals, and this was the purpose of the great war council that convened on 19 August. Most participants backed Prądzyński's concept of splitting the army³. Members of the high command, Jan Krukowiecki, Tomasz Łubieński, Ignacy Prądzyński and Klemens Kołaczkowski, developed the concept by creating four separate command units for operations groups. General Kazimierz Małachowski was appointed deputy commander-in-chief⁴, and he was also placed in charge of the forces that had remained behind in Warsaw. The Cracow region was assigned to general Piotr Szembek from General Samuel Różycki's corps. General Tomasz Łubieński took command over the unit dispatched to the Płock region. Prądzyński hoped to assume control over the 4th and most populous corps of key operational significance, but this responsible task was ultimately entrusted to a foreign officer, Girolamo Ramorino⁵.

Krukowiecki and Prądzyński looked to capitulation talks as their last resort, and they failed to protect the Polish capital, especially on the second day of the siege. During the siege of Warsaw, Russian commander Ivan Paskevich took the main theater of insurgent operations by storm, capturing military factories, stocks of firearms, ammunition, pontoons and equipment that could no longer be replaced. Paskevich inflicted the final blow on the morale of Polish commanders, robbing them of the remaining shreds of self-confidence, instilling in them a hatred for their own government and the Sejm, and urging them to surrender. Further military activity was out of the question. But one of the most important and still unresolved questions remains. The Polish generals and the Russian envoy, the shrewd General Berg, came to an arrangement, and the fatal night of 7 to 8 September witnessed scenes to which Waclaw Tokarz later referred to as "one of the darkest

² Michał Swędrowski's upcoming doctoral dissertation delivers a fascinating account of his involvement in the November Uprising and the events of 15 August and 6–7 September. Cf. M. Swędrowski, *Krukowiecki a wybór Skrzyneckiego na wodza naczelnego*, Meritum, vol. 1, [Olsztyn] 2009, pp. 47–68.

³ W. Węgliński, *Rada Wojenna z dnia 19 sierpnia 1831 r. Próba analizy założeń i realizacji przyjętego planu operacyjnego*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości", vol.18, 1972, part 1, pp. 146–152; [K. Forster], *Powstanie narodu polskiego w r. 1830–1831. Rys historyczny poparty papierami generała hr. Krukowieckiego przedostatniego prezesa Rządu Narodowego, skreślił...*, part 3: *Urzędowe papiery generała hr. Krukowieckiego, przekazane mi przez samego generała, a doręczone mi przez jego syna Aleksandra hr. Krukowieckiego*, Berlin 1873, pp. 97–122.

⁴ Krukowiecki requested General Pac who firmly rejected the proposal.

⁵ Cf. an excellent biography of Z. Zacharewicz – *Ramorino Antonio Girolamo*, in: *Polski słownik biograficzny* ("PSB"), vol. 30, Wrocław 1987, pp. 545–550.

episodes of our history in the 19th century”⁶. The negotiations with Berg⁷ sealed the capitulation of Warsaw and, from the insurgents’ perspective, of the entire uprising. The latter dilemma remains unresolved in historiography, and although many attempts have been made to answer this question, a unanimous solution has never surfaced. It remains unknown whether by surrendering the Polish capital, Małachowski⁸ was signing an act of capitulation for the entire army and, consequently, the uprising, or whether his main intention was to prevent bloodshed in Warsaw. This is a complex problem that still awaits its historian⁹. Władysław Zajewski wrote that the signed military convention had no political context. Some generals were of the opinion that Warsaw’s surrender was only a prelude to a general capitulation that “would take place in the coming days”¹⁰. This seemed to be General Małachowski’s main objective¹¹. His orders for Ramorino’s and Różycki’s troops foreboded the concentration of the Polish army with the aim of surrendering (Russian troops were to let through the regrouping Polish troops). These plans were completely inconsistent with the intentions of the National Government, Bonawentura Niemojowski and Sejm speaker Władysław Ostrowski¹². Małachowski denied it in his later letters, but the nightmare of Polish troops that had been disintegrated upon their retreat from Warsaw was a good “excuse” for capitulation. The retreat to the district of Praga¹³ and to Modlin through Jabłonna was a flight in panic. Lt. Colonel Józef Paszkowski, a skilled officer who had fought in the war of 1831 (the last artillery commander in the Modlin fortress) wrote: “Not a single officer accompanied his soldiers on foot. Most infantry officers rode their horses.

⁶ W. Tokarz, *Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830 i 1831*, Warszawa 1993, p. 528

⁷ The Russians later denied that any arrangements and negotiations had been conducted with the Poles. Shcherbatov (*Kampania polska księcia Paskiewicza*, Warszawa 1899) argued that “a treaty had never been signed with the National Government or Krukowiecki”.

⁸ Małachowski wrote: “I was cursed with the obligation to sign and seal a pitiful document that had been drafted by foreigners whilst I, having no knowledge of the impending disgrace, fought amidst the thundering fire of cannons. But the deed had to be done, as to my best knowledge, there was no other rescue” – [K. Małachowski], *Opowiadanie działań wojennych i wypadków zaszytych od 1 sierpnia do 10 września 1831 roku*, in: *Korpus 2 polski w 1831 roku, od 23 sierpnia do 16 września, czyli opisy działań, rad, marszów, uwagi, recenzje, rozkazy, odezwy*, ed. W. Zwierkowski, Paris 1844, pp. 38–39.

⁹ It has been overviewed by T. Strzeżek in his outstanding work, entitled *Obrona Warszawy 6–7 września 1831 roku*, Olsztyn 1996, pp. 213–216; idem, *Warszawa 1831*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 147–160.

¹⁰ W. Zajewski, *Powstanie Listopadowe 1830–1831*, Warszawa 1998, p. 228.

¹¹ Małachowski never mentioned the meeting with Berg in Praga where a decision had been made to surrender the district to the Russians.

¹² J. Dutkiewicz wrote (*Wybór źródeł do powstania listopadowego*, Wrocław 1957, p. LII) “Małachowski was merely authorized to sign the capitulation of Warsaw; the war was to continue”.

¹³ Praga was surrendered to the Russians together with the bridge, and this fact sealed Warsaw’s tragic fate. This solution had been engineered by General Krukowiecki, and any similarities to the war of 1809 were only too obvious.

Soldiers who wanted to wander off, did. Those who wanted to remain behind, were free to do so. Thousands of camp wagons followed every procession. What's worse, morale was equally low during battle. Those who fought were volunteers, those who did not want to fight [were free to leave – N. K.], and the only punishment they could expect was a bad reputation¹⁴. A nighttime march is very dangerous, even for an experienced army, and it proved to be disastrous for the defeated ranks of various military formations. Upon reaching Jabłonna on 8 September, General Małachowski ordered the concentration of Polish forces in the Modlin fortress. The army counted its losses. The infantry had lost 6471 men (since early September), the cavalry – 200 to 300 swords, and the artillery – 39 men¹⁵. The generals who remained in Warsaw (for various reasons, including wounds) were Jan Krukowiecki¹⁶, Ignacy Prądzyński, Wojciech Chrzanowski, Andrzej Rutty, Karol Turno (who had been taken ill), Jan Malletski (Mallet), Jakub Redel, Piotr Bontemps, Antoni Darewski, Stanisław Rychłowski¹⁷ Konstanty Przebendowski, Edward Żółtowski and Izydor Krasieński¹⁸.

In Modlin, the inept but righteous General Małachowski resigned from the post of commander-in-chief. His decision enabled him to pull out of the deal with the Russians that had been made on 8 September. The army, in particular lower-ranking officers, were opposed to the capitulation agreement proposed by Małachowski¹⁹. The army was in need of a new and energetic commander. Małachowski rightly concluded that the surrender of Warsaw had disqualified him as a leader. His ultimate defeat was sealed not so much by the capitulation of the Polish capital, but by his meeting with generals Neihardt and Berg in Praga. It was after that meeting that

¹⁴ [J. Paszkowski], *Wojna w Polsce roku 1831 przez oficera polskiego opisana w roku 1832*, Lwiv 1861, pp. 168–169.

¹⁵ Polish Library in Paris (“PLP”), manuscript 397, Documents of the Polish Army Headquarters of 1831, vol. 11: Polish artillery files of 1831, col. 251, 333, 437, 485, 863; B. Niemojowski, *O ostatnich wypadkach rewolucji polskiej w odpowiedzi na biografję generała Macieja Rybińskiego*, Paris 1833, tab; T. Strzeżek, *Obrona...*, pp. 222–223. The “soldiers killed” column in captain Łabanowski’s report of 9 September features the following entry marked as “the camp in Nowy Dwór”: “2nd lieutenant Ordon was ordered to take duty at the telescope; there has been no further news from him”.

¹⁶ W. Zajewski, *Krukowiecki Jan*, in: PSB, vol. 15, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1970, p. 395. On the second day of the battle of Warsaw, Krukowiecki dispatched his troops to Praga. On 7 September, around 8 p.m., he met with General Małachowski in the courtyard of Namiestnikowski Palace. Małachowski dismissed him on grounds of treason, but Krukowiecki had no intentions of leaving the army. Umiński threatened to shoot Krukowiecki if he disobeyed the orders, which is why Krukowiecki remained in Warsaw.

¹⁷ Z. Zacharewicz, *Rychłowski Stanisław*, in: PSB, vol. 33, Wrocław et al. 1992, p. 394. Rychłowski was seriously wounded, but he was one of the few officers who had not renewed his oath of alliance.

¹⁸ Cf. M. Tarczyński, *Generalicja powstania listopadowego*, Warszawa 1980, pp. 214–225; R. Durand, *Depesze z powstającej Warszawy 1830–1831. Raporty konsula francuskiego w Królestwie Polskim*, translated by R. Bielecki, Warszawa 1980, p. 238

¹⁹ Małachowski’s letter to Paskevich [K. Kołaczkowski], *Wspomnienia...*, vol. 5, p. 120.

Małachowski decided to surrender the bridge and Praga, to free Russian prisoners²⁰ and, in line with the act of capitulation, to march out to the Płock²¹ region with the second corps²². Bonawentura Niemojowski, head of the National Government, convened a council of war in Modlin on the night of 9 to 10 September. The meeting was attended by staff commanders and officers, brigades and independent troops. The council was to select three candidates for commander-in-chief. The meeting was more of a raucous session of a military sejmik. Niemojowski was shouted down by generals Henryk Dembiński²³ and Antoni Wroniecki²⁴, he stepped down, and agreed that the candidates be directly voted on by the participants. Rybiński received 18 out of the 72 votes cast, General Józef Bem – 16, generals Jan Nepomucen Umiński, Dembiński and others received 1, 2 or 3 votes each. After a moment of hesitation Rybiński stated that “there is but a small difference in the number of votes cast in favor of me and the next candidate; therefore, I wave military command on behalf of General Bem”. Bem concluded that he would be honored to serve under a man in whom the participants had vested the greatest trust²⁵. Before assuming command, Rybiński once again inquired whether General Ramorino had received the orders to unite with the main army. Małachowski and General Jakub Lewiński confirmed, adding that a bridge was being built to enable the 2nd corps to cross the Bug River at a safe distance from the Russian-occupied Praga. The chief of staff said: “General Ramorino must have been seen on the road to Siedlce. He was ordered to arrive at Bug on the 10th, and he should have reached Kamieńczyk on the 11th. His adjutants should arrive any moment now”²⁶. Rybiński assumed command after a debate on the state of the army and the enemy’s positions. He officially took control over the army on 10 September at 11:27 a.m.²⁷ when he

²⁰ K. Zieliński, *Wzięcie Warszawy, dalsze losy rządu i armii głównej*, in: *Wypisy źródłowe do historii polski sztuki wojennej*, book 12: *Polska sztuka wojenna w latach 1815-1831*, eds. W. Lewandowski, E. Kozłowski, M. Krwawicz, Warszawa 1959, p. 375.

²¹ This is a reference to the initial “proposals” made by Dybicz at the beginning of the war. Dybicz had suggested that the Polish army concentrate its forces in the Płock province to expose Warsaw. Płock had the worst roads in the Kingdom of Poland which stalled all military operations.

²² The march was divided into the following stages: 8 September - Modlin, 9 September – Czerwińsk, 10 September – repose, 11 September – Bodzanów, 12 September – Płock – W. Tokarz, *Wojna...*, p. 529, footnote 97.

²³ “And what did you do in Warsaw when I fought in Lithuania? I will tell you what – you drank, you ate and you reveled”.

²⁴ “Down with the Kalisz camp, down with Lelewel and the patriotic club. We don’t want the Sejm or civilian authorities.”

²⁵ W. Zwierkowski, *Działania wodza, rad wojennych, parlamentarzy, prezesa rządu i Sejmu od 8 września do 4 października 1831 roku*, Paris 1843, pp. 6–9.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²⁷ Małachowski (*Opowiadanie...*, p. 45) erroneously noted: “on the same night, i.e. on 10 September, General Rybiński was appointed the commander-in-chief, whilst some claim that the election took place on 9 September”.

was also promoted to the rank of division general²⁸. His biographer, Stefan Przewalski, noted that “by that time, his character had been largely flawed, he was a disheartened man, susceptible to external influences, marked by an absolute lack of initiative and flexibility. In most cases, he was an accurate judge of the situation, and he wanted to amalgamate all forces and incite them to fight, but he was unable to carry his plans through, thus further weakening the army’s morale”²⁹. Lelewel wrote about Rybiński with sarcasm: “as the commander-in-chief, he completed the campaign without firing a single shot”³⁰. Juliusz Falkowski, who participated in those events (wounded in the defense campaign, he remained behind in Warsaw) and kept chronicles towards the end of the uprising, wrote: “Rybiński was not born to be a hetman”, but he did not blame him for the defeat because the army “had already lost its morale, and nobody wanted to listen to his orders”³¹.

Maciej Rybiński “inherited” the problem of Russian negotiations from his predecessors. Theodor (Fyodor) Berg, the skilful and devious Russian general, met with the new commander-in-chief in Nowy Dwór in the presence of the head of the National Government. On 11 September, Rybiński announced to the soldiers: “Yesterday, Russian general Berg arrived in Nowy Dwór to propose changes in the distribution of the army. Having consulted the head of the government, I provided General Berg with a written reply stating that we are ready to embark on negotiations to restore peace in both nations provided that the proposed terms maintain the honor and the interests of our country”³². Rybiński’s intentions became clear already during that first meeting, and he channeled all of his energy to negotiations with the Russians who were very well informed about the condition of the Polish army and were hoping to keep the Polish forces at bay in Modlin³³. After the serious blow inflicted on the Russian army during the siege of Warsaw, every

²⁸ Appeal of the National Government and Rybiński’s orders; Cf. Czartoryski Library in Cracow (“Czart. L.”), manuscript 5312, “Rząd Narodowy. Miscellanea et annexa 1831”. Newspaper clippings, orders, letters and miscellaneous documents, col. 386.

²⁹ S. Przewalski, *Generał Maciej Rybiński ostatni wódz naczelny powstania listopadowego (1784–1874)*, Wrocław 1949, pp. 138–139.

³⁰ [J. Lelewel], *Polska odradzająca się, czyli dzieje Polski od roku 1795 potocznie opowiedziane, przez ...*, in: idem, *Historia Polski nowożytnej* [Dzieła, vol. 8], eds. J. Dutkiewicz, M.H. Serajski, H. Więckowska, Warszawa 1961, p. 160; Z. Fras, N. Kasperek, *Wstęp*, in: [M. Rybiński], *Moje przypomnienia od urodzenia. Pamiętniki ... ostatniego wodza naczelnego powstania listopadowego*, eds. Z. Fras and N. Kasperek, Wrocław 1993, pp. 25, 39. Rybiński retorted by calling him “an intellectual eunuch”, “a political eunuch”, “a man of a foul heart” “who is disgraced by his own stupidity” and who had “entered into a moral brotherhood with Poland’s enemies”, a “calendar historian who is good for nothing but collecting dates”.

³¹ [J. Falkowski], *Wspomnienia z roku 1848 i 1849 przez autora “Obrazów z życia kilku ostatnich pokoleń w Polsce”*, Poznań 1879, p. 166.

³² B. Czart., manuscript 5312, col. 387; Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Kórnik (“Kórnik L.”), manuscript 1548, col. 272

³³ Puzyrna (Ossolineum, manuscript 16159, k. 133) made a few accurate remarks when writing about the “alleged connections”.

military maneuver spelled danger. This explains the Russians' willingness to enter into peace talks which, starting on 13 September, were conducted by General Franciszek Morawski on Rybiński's behalf. The Polish side dictated the following terms of capitulation:

“1. The Płock province and the Modlin fortress will be evacuated by our forces by Embankment artillery will remain in the fortress, and all fortifications will be maintained in the same condition.

2. The Polish army will occupy the provinces of Cracow, Sandomierz and Lublin.

3. The Kalisz province will not be occupied by the Polish army, but the army will be entitled to all kinds of resources found therein.

4. The part of the Podlasie province adjacent to the Lublin province, with the width of 25 versts³⁴, will not be occupied by either army”.

5. The garrison in Modlin will unite with its army.

6. The itineraries of Polish and Russian troops marching to their points of destination will be indicated in the armistice agreement.

7. During the march, Russian guards will not approach the Polish army at a distance closer than 30 versts. The only exception will be the Łowicz³⁵ garrison which will transfer 5,000 infantry soldiers.

8. After four weeks, both parties may resume hostilities upon six days' notice³⁶.

For the Russians, it was clear that the Poles were attempting to amalgamate their forces. The deployment of the army to the south was an attempt to join forces with Różycki, Ramorino and the reserve. It would have been naive to believe that Paskevich would opt for this solution after the defeat of Warsaw. Polish officers continued to move back and forth between Modlin and Warsaw, and they could have informed Paskevich about the slacking discipline in the Polish army. General Berg formally consented to the terms dictated by Poland with a number of minor adjustments. He refused to acknowledge that the suspension of military activity (that had been enforced) were to be the first step to peace. The Russian general opposed the use of this phrase. “This is not a war between two nations, but an uprising against a legal monarch. Therefore, our aim is not to make peace, but to reinstate order in a rebellious country”³⁷, said Berg. The Russians wanted to prolong the discussion to lock Polish troops in Modlin, deprive them of initiative and keep them motionless. Paskevich could not afford to initi-

³⁴ 1 verst –1066.8 m.

³⁵ Łowicz was situated on the left bank of the river. It had seated the Russian headquarters and large hospitals.

³⁶ [K. Kołaczkowski], *Wspomnienia jenerała...*, vol. 5, Kraków 1901, p. 143; W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 35–36; [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, vol. 5, pp. 344–346.

³⁷ [J. Lewiński], *Jenerała ... pamiętniki z 1831 roku*, published by K. Kozłowski, Poznań 1895, p. 128.

ate more drastic measures due to the losses sustained during the siege of Warsaw³⁸.

On 12 September, the retreating captain Kowalski reported to Rybiński on the situation of the 2nd corps and General Ramorino's insubordination. Although Rybiński attempted to conceal the news from the army, the word quickly spread. The Sejm had been removed from Modlin, and it convened in the Capuchin Friars' church in Zakroczym. Initially, it comprised eight senators and 70 deputies. Stanisław Barzykowski gave a highly accurate account of the negotiations process: "at a time marked by the futile wander of the army, the Sejm, despite clear evidence of its dedication, had to lose its importance... In Modlin and Zakroczym, the Sejm ceased to be the highest authority"³⁹. General Klemens Kołaczkowski noted: "the national representation had no intentions of sanctioning the surrender"⁴⁰. All redundant officers, in particular those who held radical views and were fiercely opposed to capitulation, were removed from the fortress by Rybiński. His efforts received partial recognition. Captain Józef Puzyna, who had reached Modlin from Łubieński's corps, wrote in his dairy (which he continued to keep in the following years) about members of the patriotic club who "stirred anarchy. They claimed that they did not need street lamps to hang prisoners in Modlin. Szynglarski, Pułaski and others were locked in the casemates during the period of recollection"⁴¹. Rybiński gave out a number of orders to discipline the army, reduce the number of vehicles, carriages and prevent wasteful use of ammunition⁴². His aim was to facilitate the talks with the Russians and prepare the army for the ultimate pact with the tsar. Meanwhile, Ramorino's march towards the Austrian border weakened Poland's bargaining power. The Russians did not sleep when the Polish army remained idle. On 16 September, Berg commissioned Morawski to present the Polish army with a new set of terms. Paskevich refused to evacuate the Lublin province and could only be persuaded to preserve the "military route" to the fortress in Zamość. Negotiations were still in progress in Nowy Dwór when the final decision had been made in the south on 17 September.

In consequence of Poland's compliance with the provisions of the capitulation act, the Russians regained the route to Brest, and they began to surround Rybiński's army in Modlin. Russian forces outnumbered Polish troops. On 18 September, General Berg told the Poles that negotiations with the Polish army were futile because the commander-in-chief could be replaced by civilian authorities at any moment. The Paskevich-Berg duo were

³⁸ T. Strzeżek (*Obrona Warszawy...*, p. 222) claims that some 14,000–16,000 had been killed.

³⁹ [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 349.

⁴⁰ [K. Kołaczkowski], *Wspomnienia...*, vol. 5, p. 134.

⁴¹ Ossolineum, manuscript 16159, col. 132. Another prisoner confined to the casemates was dr Jan Brawacki who was later denied any help in Prussia, cf. BPP, manuscript 754, col. 141.

⁴² B. Czart., manuscript 5312, col. 389, 391.

hoping to move the Sejm away from Modlin. They were also awaiting the news of Ramorino's ultimate defeat. Niemojowski was fuelling the resistance of Polish officers who were keen to surrender. The Polish camp was still deluded by the hope of a union between Ramorino's and Różycki's⁴³ troops. The Russians were aware that unpredictable events could obstruct the resolution of the conflict in the south. On 19 September, Rybiński began campaigning for a partial cession of Niemojowski's powers, but his efforts met with resistance. The fear of a coup d'état convinced the deputies and the National Government that evacuation should proceed in the direction of Płock⁴⁴. They were tacitly hoping that the Polish troops marching from Płock along the Prussian border would make their way to the Cracow region⁴⁵. Already at the time of the battle of Grochów, there had been plans to convene the Sejm with a reduced composition, further south in Miechów. On 18–19 September, Rybiński realized that capitulation was unavoidable, but an absolute surrender was not an option. After the Sejm had ended its session, Rybiński told Berg that absolute power now rested in his hands, which was an obvious misinterpretation of facts⁴⁶. Berg did not respond, and he left Nowy Dwór where the negotiations had been taking place⁴⁷. The Russians formulated new demands on 20 September after Ramorino's troops had marched out to Galicia. Already on 19 September, the Poles were debating on dispatching a part of their forces to Płock under the command of the energetic and restless General Dembiński⁴⁸. The order was given on 20 September, and the troops set out on the night of 21 to 22 September⁴⁹. On 20 September, Rybiński decided to move away from Warsaw and vacate Modlin which had been previously reinforced with main army troops. Generals Franciszek Czarnomski, Franciszek Młokosiewicz, Antoni Pawłowski, Tomasz Łubieński⁵⁰, Teodor Szydłowski⁵¹ and Józef Zaruski resigned their

⁴³ I am under the impression that the combat ability of Różycki's corps was overrated.

⁴⁴ Cf. W. Rostocki, *Władza wodzów naczelnych w powstaniu listopadowym (Studium historycznoprawne)*, Wrocław 1955, pp. 178–179.

⁴⁵ A. Ostrowski, *Pamiętnik z czasów powstania listopadowego*, published by K. Rostocki and W. Rostocki, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1961, pp. 451–452.

⁴⁶ "The Sejm and the government had lost their authority, and now the sole power rests in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief".

⁴⁷ W. Tokarz, *Wojna...*, sp. 534.

⁴⁸ Juliusz Falkowski (*Upadek powstania polskiego 1831 roku. Rys historyczno-pamiętnikowy...* Poznań 1881, p. 308) wrote that the impractical and inept Dembiński who headed an army of 50,000 men "would take any action only when others have lost their heads, when horrible difficulties had mounted". In his scathing (and factually incorrect) account, Rybiński wrote that Dembiński left Modlin already on 15 September and spent the rest of the time in Płock. He did not cross the Vistula "because the water was too cold".

⁴⁹ BPP, manuscript 397, col. 20.

⁵⁰ R. Łubieński, *Generał Tomasz Pomian hrabia Lubieński*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1899, pp. 84, 87 – was down with typhoid in the Modlin fortress. He was officially dismissed by the orders of 28 September.

⁵¹ Only officially – he had left the army already before the siege of Warsaw as a result of Krukowiecki's allegations that he had supported Skrzynecki.

posts in Modlin. In a letter to General Morawski, the commander-in-chief urged him to make concessions, especially that the news of Ramorino's defeat had already reached the Polish camp. On 22 September, Polish troops reached Słupno where they rendezvoused with General Franciszek Morawski carrying new Russian demands:

- “Absolute surrender to the constitutional king;
- A delegation will be dispatched to the Emperor and the king;
- The army will remain stationed in the Płock province;
- Modlin will be surrendered immediately”.

General Berg, who had been clearly informed of the attempted offensive, threatened in Paskevich's name that “every general and every commander attempting to cross the Vistula and initiating hostile action would be proscribed”⁵². This was an actual ultimatum, and the Poles were ready to accept it. Rybiński and his chief of staff, General Jakub Lewiński, were devastated by Ramorino's defeat⁵³, and most commanders, not only those who had remained tacit, were keen on ending the war. Rybiński halted the march across the Vistula River and instructed Dembiński, who was in the vanguard of the troops approaching Gąbin on the left bank of the Vistula, to retreat to the sconce near the bridge.

Rybiński called a council of war in Słupno at 7 a.m. on 23 September. It was the first of the three great councils that convened under his command. In Słupno, the participants were to debate on a formal surrender to Russian demands. The meeting, which greatly resembled the boisterous councils in Ramorino's corps, was attended by 40 to 43 officers who huddled in a small room. Minutes were not officially taken. The majority of participants were infantry officers, not always regiment commanders. The artillery, which had demonstrated very high morale, was represented only by its commander, General Bem⁵⁴. Several commanding cavalry officers also attended. Generals Małachowski, Ludwik Pac, Stanisław Wojczyński and Tadeusz Suchorzewski held no command, and although not formally invited, they arrived at the council. General Dembiński, an advocate of continuing the war, did not participate on account of the inability to vacate his post in the vanguard. Bonawentura Niemojowski, head of the National Government, attended the meeting although he had not been formally invited⁵⁵. General Rybiński was

⁵² W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, p. 59.

⁵³ J. Bem, *O powstaniu narodowym w Polsce*, ed. E. Kozłowski, Warszawa 1956, pp. 157–159; *Korpus 2 polski...*, pp. 57–59 – Małachowski's report; [J. Lewiński], *Jenerała...*, pp. 128–131 – due to his unclear role, he cites the wrong chronology of events.

⁵⁴ Cf.: N. Kasperek, *Armia polska po upadku Warszawy w 1831 roku. Rola gen. Bema*, in: *Cień Generała Józefa Bema. W 150. rocznicę śmierci*, a collection of papers, eds. N. Kasperek and W. B. Łach, Węgorzewo 2000, pp. 49–68.

⁵⁵ Barzykowski (*Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 360) claims that Niemojowski had learned about the council and the first part of the vote from voivod Antoni Ostrowski, and he arrived in Słupno only after that. Blinded by hatred, Rybiński wrote that Niemojowski “had pushed his way through the crowd” in the meeting room.

restrained in nature, and he rarely spoke during the council. He put up the following problem for debate: “whether crossing the Vistula and prolonging the fight held any promise of a positive outcome”. The discussion was dominated by those who opposed capitulation. Loud arguments were incited by General Lewiński, quartermaster Lt. Marcin Klemensowski and deputy head of the National Government General Karol Zieliński. The head of government argued in favor of a continued military struggle, but he had left the room before the formal vote. Historians cite various results of the vote. According to some reports, from the total number of 43 votes cast, generals Pac, Małachowski, Wojczyński, Umiński, Bem, Emilian Węgierski and Lt. Col. Mikołaj Kamiński (commander of the 7th uhlán regiment) voted in favor of continuing the war. Some historians also placed General Stefan Ziemiecki in this group. Lt. Col. Bazyli Lewiński (2nd regiment of Krakusi cavalry) supported the plan to cross the Vistula (and continue the fight), but he abstained from voting. A clear voting pattern emerged: nearly all proponents of a continued war effort had never served in Constantine’s army⁵⁶. 36 votes were cast in favor of accepting Russian proposals. Rybiński’s position was ambiguous, and he sympathized with General Miller, the Skarzyński brothers, generals Wąsowicz and Jagmin who loudly argued in favor of surrender. Years after the council in Słupno, Rybiński wrote in his diary: “We did everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolution, and now, only death can save our honor”⁵⁷. But those declarations were made much later. The act of capitulation, announced nearly two weeks earlier, was voted through in Słupno! The council appointed a delegation to the tsar which comprised pre-uprising generals: Henryk Milberg, Franciszek Morawski and Kazimierz Dziekoński. The council’s decision to surrender came as shocking news, especially for the head of the government. Niemojowski convened the last Sejm session in the 19th century. It opened with private debates to lay down further course of action. Around 2 p.m., 35 members of both houses⁵⁸ arrived at Płock’s city hall. They accounted for the so called small quorum which was legally allowed. Niemojowski resigned his office to dismiss the commander-in-chief. The Sejm, presided over by Speaker Władysław Ostrowski, had to adopt “a decision concerning the Commander-in-Chief”. Both functions were entrusted to General Jan Nepomucen Umiński⁵⁹ who had filed his resignation and left for Płock after the Słupsk council. Despite the exerted pressure, Umiński declined the nomination for the government leader, arguing that he could not accept a function that had

⁵⁶ Based on W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 59–69; [J. N. Umiński], *Jenerała ... kilka słów o zaszczytłych wypadkach w Słupniei Plocku w dniu 23 września 1831. Bruksela 1843*, pp. 11–15; M. Tarczyński, *Generalicja...*, p. 222; N. Kasperek, *Powstańczy epilog...*, pp. 187–193.

⁵⁷ [M. Rybiński], *Moje przypomnienia...*, p. 27.

⁵⁸ Including two senators. Most of them represented the Taken Lands, and Rybiński referred to them as deputies “who had been elected in Warsaw’s taverns”.

⁵⁹ He received 22 votes, while generals Bem and Dembiński – 4 each.

remained beyond his capability. As a result, Niemojowski was reinstated to power. Umiński, an energetic division commander and a fervent opponent of capitulation, did not enjoy a high reputation among his contemporaries. His lack of concern for the soldiers whose lives he had endangered in Liw, his unskilled command in the battle of Warsaw and his well-deserved reputation of a gambler prompted some troops to disobey him. During the Sejm session, Umiński announced that all division and regiment commanders voting in favor of surrender would be removed from command “which should be vested in the hands of eager and enthusiastic men”⁶⁰. General Bem made a similar appeal before parliamentary deputies. When the news on the replacement of the commander-in-chief had unofficially reached Słupno, General Wroniecki was appointed the warlord of Płock, and he was dispatched to the city with colonel Breański’s guards. Breański had been instructed to restore order in Płock⁶¹. A court-martial headed by General Wroniecki passed a default judgment on Col. Antoni Szymański, Franciszek Wiśniowski, Lt. Col. Jan Adam Wyszowski, captain Szylicki, 2nd Lt. Biłocki (?)⁶² and father Szynglarski⁶³ “depriving them of their military ranks, honors and sentencing them to death” for invading his headquarters and “conspiring to assassinate the Commander-in-Chief”.

Umiński set out on an inspection of the army. He began his tour with General Ambroży Skarżyński’s cavalry regiment that had been stationed in the greatest proximity. Despite the reluctance expressed by General Wąsowicz and Colonel Wojciech Łączkowski, commander of the 4th uhlán regiment, Umiński instilled in the soldiers an enthusiasm for crossing the Vistula. General Skarżyński, who had been reviled by the soldiers for his attitude in Słupno, declared his readiness to obey Umiński’s orders. The 1st and 5th light cavalry regiments of Kazimierz Skarżyński’s division gave Umiński less than an enthusiastic welcome, but the remaining two regiments (10th uhlán regiment and 3rd light cavalry regiment) greeted him with ardor. Although Rybiński placidly accepted the Sejm’s decision⁶⁴ to deprive him of military command, higher-ranking infantry officers began to rebel against the new leader. Night was drawing near, and Umiński did not manage to visit the infantry which outnumbered the remaining divisions. Its officers

⁶⁰ [J. N. Umiński], *Jenerata...*, p. 72.

⁶¹ He gives a highly confusing account of this in his otherwise captivating memoirs [F. Breański], (*Generata ... autobiografia*, ed. J. Frejlich, Kraków 1914, pp. 33–35) he writes about “vodka glass heroes” and a “drinking bar” atmosphere.

⁶² He could be referring to Brawacki.

⁶³ BPP, manuscript 512, General Maciej Rybiński’s files, col. 877, report date 25 September. As lieutenant colonel and former camp master, he stayed in Prussia (where he had problems with accounting for his expenses, BPP, manuscript 349, col. 206, 235) and then left for Bourges. The French police inquired with General Dwernicki about Wyszowski and the events in Płock – V. Stefanyk National Academic Library in Lviv (formerly Ossolineum) (“Stefanyk Library”), Dwernicki’s files, manuscript 12, col. 53.

⁶⁴ With the following composition: Walenty Zwierkowski, Wincenty Chełmicki and Władysław Plater.

were heard chanting “Long live Rybiński!”. Major Wilhelm Lipiński of the guard regiment threatened to shoot Umiński’s adjutants should they attempt to speak to the infantry⁶⁵. Lt. Col. Antoni Roślakowski’s battalion and the 1st light infantry regiment surrounded Rybiński’s headquarters, threatening to put down any attempts at depriving the former chief of his command. Soldiers and lower-ranking officers were told that although Umiński had been proclaimed commander by members of the patriotic club in Płock, his nomination had not been legally sanctioned. Umiński later wrote in his diary that he initially wanted to “take several cavalry regiments and artillery batteries and bring the opponents to their senses by firing a few missile rounds”, but he concluded that his plans would only deepen the rift in the army, and he resigned his command⁶⁶. Generals Dembiński and Bem were the potential candidates, but on the night of 23 to 24 September, Niemojowski issued a written decree reinstating General Rybiński to the post of commander-in-chief⁶⁷. According to Rybiński, in that nomination, Niemojowski had also vested him with the powers of the head of the National Government. When Rybiński used that title in the *Address to the Parliament of Great Britain*⁶⁸, a controversy broke out among Polish politicians in exile. On 20 February 1843, Walenty Zwierkowski⁶⁹ and Wincenty Chełmicki issued an official protest. In a 16-page pamphlet, they attempted to prove that after 23 September, Rybiński not only had not held the office of government leader, but due to the absence of one signature on his nomination act, Rybiński’s commandership had never been legally sanctioned⁷⁰. They were

⁶⁵ After 3 October, he marched with his battalion straight to the Russians. *Kurier Litewski*, 14 October 1831; [K. Kołaczkowski], *Wspomnienia...*, vol. 5, p. 148; J. Świecicki, *Pamiętnik ostatniego dowódcy pułku 4 piechoty liniowej*, ed. R. Bielecki, Warszawa 1982, p. 155; L. Drewnicki, *Za moich czasów*, ed. J. Dutkiewicz, Warszawa 1971, pp. 230–231; R. Bielecki, *Słownik...*, vol. 3, pp. 43–44.

⁶⁶ [J. N. Umiński], *Jenerała...*, p. 17. His chief of staff, Lt. Col. Feliks Prószyński, convinced him of the infantry’s resistance and the futility of his attempts to enforce obedience. Umiński was forced to leave the army.

⁶⁷ The description of the events in Słupno and Płock on 23 September is based on: [J. U. Umiński], *Jenerała...*, pp. 10–20; B. Niemojowski, *O ostatnich wypadkach rewolucji polskiej w odpowiedzi na biografię jenerała Macieja Rybińskiego*, Paris 1833, pp. 16–19 – it addresses the idealized image of the last commander-in-chief, F. Chotomski, *Mathias Rybiński, dernier commandat en chef de l’Armée Natinale Polonaise*, in: J. Straszewicz, *Les Polonais et les Polonaises de la Revolution da 29 november 1830*, Paris 1832; W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 59–82; [J. Lewiński], *Jenerała...*, pp. 129–134; K. Zieliński, *Wzięcie Warszawy...*, pp. 378–381; [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, vol. 5, pp. 360–368; A. Ostrowski, *Pamiętnik...*, pp. 454–480; W. Rostocki, *Władza...*, pp. 180–187; N. Kasperek, *Powstańczy epilog...*, pp. 187–193.

⁶⁸ Paris 1843.

⁶⁹ Rybiński wrote that Zwierkowski had been drunk on 23 September and couldn’t possibly remember anything.

⁷⁰ [W. Chełmicki, W. Zwierkowski], *Objaśnienia na urzędowych dowodach oparte, dotyczące się przywłaszczenia władzy prezesa Rządu Narodowego przez gen. Rybińskiego, które delegowani z sejmu dla wręczenia temuż generałowi dymisji z naczelnego dowództwa dla wiadomości rodaków podają ...*, Paris 1843; cf. *Demokrata Polski 1842/1843*, vol. 5, part 3, p. 187; part 4, pp. 230–231.

wrong as regards the latter accusation. Colonel Ferdynand Dienheim Chotomski⁷¹, Rybiński's close aide, Teodor Morawski⁷² and General Jan Nepomucen Umiński⁷³ stood in Rybiński's defense. General Roman Sołtyk⁷⁴ argued in support of Rybiński's case in a series of printed appeals, and he faced opposition from Chełmicki and Zwierkowski⁷⁵. The situation provoked a fervent debate in the press: Rybiński was attacked by *Orzeł Biały* and *Dziennik Narodowy*, and he was defended by Józefat Bolesław Ostrowski, an untiring columnist of *Nowa Polska* (and member of the Military Alliance)⁷⁶. The discussion spread far and wide, it ceased to revolve around the events of 23 September 1831, addressing the general topic of Rybiński's leadership.

After his reinstatement, Rybiński ordered the demolition of the bridge to show the Russians that he was not contemplating offensive action. General Franciszek Morawski, the key negotiator in the talks with Russia after 13 September, had deserted in the most disgraceful manner on 23 September. Morawski wrote a letter of resignation, he placed it on a heap of other documents, and he defected to the Russian side. He crossed the Vistula near Wyszogród, and having arrived in Warsaw, he gave a detailed account of events in the Polish quarters⁷⁷. Not a single word of condemnation came from Rybiński's council, testifying to a dramatic drop in the army's morale. General Umiński was forced to leave the army⁷⁸, and General Henryk Milberg, former commander of the 4th infantry regiment, was appointed the new negotiator. When Dembiński inquired about orders for Milberg, Rybiński replied that a general needed no instructions. In the daily orders of 24 September, Rybiński reported on previous day's events, thus publicly

⁷¹ F. D. Chotomski, *Odpowiedź panom Chełmickiemu i Zwierkowskiemu na broszurę ogłoszoną przez nich w Paryżu 20 lutego 1843 roku pod tytułem: Objasnienia na urzędowych dowodach oparte, dotyczące się przywłaszczenia władzy prezesa Rządu Narodowego*, Paris 1843.

⁷² [T. Morawski], *Odpowiedź ... na odpowiedź pp. Chełmickiemu i Zwierkowskiemu ogłoszoną przez F.D. Chotomskiego w Paryżu*, Paris 1843.

⁷³ [J. N. Umiński], *Jenerata...*, passim.

⁷⁴ R. Sołtyk, *Kilka słów na broszurę pp. Chełmickiego i Zwierkowskiego wydana 20 II 1843 w Paryżu*, Paris 1843.

⁷⁵ W. Zwierkowski, W. Chełmicki, *Odpowiedź p. Sołtykowi na jego kilka słów ogłoszonych drukiem 2 V 1843 w Paryżu*, Paris 1843.

⁷⁶ Including *Nowa Polska* 1843, vol. 5, sheet 12, p. 720.

⁷⁷ Barzykowski (*Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 369) wrote: "he surrendered himself to the enemy, and he joined the Moscow camp. What could have prompted this decision? Was it the realization that Umiński's nomination had made any arrangement impossible or, more probably, the fear that the patriotic club would gain advantage under the new reign of the new commander, thus putting him, the negotiator, in danger? We cannot answer this question, but no reasons are sound enough to justify his disgraceful act". Kajetan Koźmian, Morawski's friend who wrote about the "Zakroczym rabble", approved of his desertion. *Pamiętniki*, vol. 3 Wrocław et al. 1972, p. 347.

⁷⁸ He left the army together with his adjutant Stefan Garczyński who had previously served in Dwernicki's corps and had escaped from exile in Galicia. He inspired Adam Mickiewicz to write "Reduta Ordon" (Ordon's Redoubt). Z. Szelaąg, *Stefan Garczyński. Zarys biografii*, Kielce 1983, p. 83. Dismissed "for health reasons"—B. Kórnicka 7864, military files up to 1831, col. 10.

acknowledging that he had abandoned any operations “which were deemed to be fruitless by the Commander-in-Chief who focused solely on future negotiations, referring to them as attempts »to reach truce«”⁷⁹. During the council of war, Rybiński confirmed that attempts had been made to assassinate him, adding that in order to deprive him of command, a method different than that selected by the Sejm on the previous day was needed. Rybiński argued that only the council of war which had elected him had the authority to remove the commander from power. The council decided that it would not wait for the Sejm’s decision, and it gave its unanimous support to Rybiński. In Płock, discipline was lax and morale was low. Despite the threats made by Płock’s warlord, General Antoni Wroniecki, the town resembled a raucous council meeting where loud arguments, fervent debates mixed with indecision and utter resignation. The Sejm and the government headed for Prussia. Rybiński’s strict adherence to procedural requirements obstructed the recovery of military funds.

The chaos also resulted from the commander-in-chief’s lack of a strategic concept. On 25 September, the headquarters moved from Słupno to Płock. The army’s ranks were depleted by desertion as well as formal “resignations” that had been readily signed by the reinstated chief. Aided by Morawski’s treacherous testimony, the Russians speeded up the march to the north, approaching Płock where the Poles had wasted three days: 23, 24 and 25 September. Meanwhile, Rybiński resolved matters with the National Government. Already on 23 September, the Cossacks detained castellan Narcyz Olizar and Wincenty Niemojowski in Rypin⁸⁰. Niemojowski sent the word to the commander-in-chief with a description of Schrieber’s partisan “exploits”. Niemojowski also pled for the rescue of his brother, former member of the National Government⁸¹. Rybiński dispatched several squadrons to the north to patrol the road to Prussia. He ignored the request to rescue the prisoners. Deputies and members of the National Government left Płock on 24 September, backed by two Krakusi squadrons commanded by deputy Walenty Zwierkowski (National Guard major, former non-commissioned officer of the famous light cavalry regiment) and two squadrons of the 6th uhlan regiment⁸². They were followed by a sizable group of “other men who were not welcomed by the Commander”⁸³. The news of previous day’s events in Rypin reached the party near Sierpc, and it encouraged Niemojowski to write a letter to Rybiński. In Rypin mayor’s residence, the head of the National Government

⁷⁹ S. Przewalski, *Generał Maciej Rybiński...*, p. 156.

⁸⁰ Cf. [N. Olizar], *Pamiętniki kasztelana...*, in: *Pamiętniki Polskie*, ed. K. Bronikowski, vol. 1, Przemyśl 1883, pp. 20–21.

⁸¹ B. Czart., manuscript 5586, col. 493.

⁸² On 25 September, they were instructed to patrol the area of Sierpc, Biezuń, Rypin and Skępe – *Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831 r.*, published by B. Pawłowski, vol. 4, Warszawa 1935, p. 244.

⁸³ W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, p. 88.

announced a manifesto in the presence of deputies. The document was countersigned by minister Józef Świrski. Although Rybiński's supporters in-exile had doubted his existence⁸⁴, the last commander-in-chief, shaken by the recent events, had undoubtedly authored the manifesto. The document stated as follows: "In an attempt to place the national army under the control of the commander-in-chief, the Polish Sejm, in a resolution of 24 January, limited his decision-making powers to the armistice issue, and placed the remaining authority in the hands of the National Government. By arriving at a ceasefire arrangement with the enemy in Modlin, Maciej Rybiński had not abused his powers. The Russian field marshal communicated the enemy's position on the matter with the involvement of General Morawski: Russia had no intentions of signing a truce with Poland, the Polish army was expected to surrender unconditionally and dispatch a delegation to the emperor. In a council of war called on 23 September in the headquarters, the commander-in-chief asked his generals and regiment commanders to vote on the delegation request. By doing so, the commander-in-chief had abused the powers granted to him by the aforementioned resolution". This was followed by an account of the events that had taken place in Płock on 23 September and the following statement: "The head of the Government had no other choice but to reinstate General Rybiński he realized that the National Government could not preside over the country with dignity if the Sejm's authority was not respected; he placed the Płock province committee in control of the treasury, he left Płock and the country". The manifesto also read: "the decisions made by the commander-in-chief in violation of his powers may never affect our honor or the nation"⁸⁵. This is a long quote, but it is worth citing. It was a sharp protest against Rybiński's attempts to strike a deal with the enemy. Unaware of Morawski's disgraceful desertion, Rybiński sent his adjutant after him. When the news broke out, General Milberg was dispatched to meet with the Russians. By the time he arrived in Nowy Dwór, General Berg had already left the town. Tipped by Morawski about changes in Polish command, he was afraid that the Polish army would begin its advance. Berg left behind a short statement on the initiation of war operations. The surprised Milberg asked Rybiński for instructions, and General Ledóchowski, the second delegate dispatched for the negotiations, specified their scope in greater detail on the "terms dictated by him [General Berg – N.K.]". Rybiński formulated the following instructions:

1. Absolute surrender to the Constitutional king;
2. A delegation will be dispatched to the tsar;
3. The army will be stationed around Płock (or in the Płock province);
4. Modlin will be directly surrendered to the Russian army.

⁸⁴ Polish émigrés in Paris (Kniaziewicz and Plater) stopped this publication to protect the Polish army's good name in France.

⁸⁵ *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 4, pp. 246–247; W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, p. 92.

Other points concerned technical details. Rybiński insisted that the armistice be signed directly, as if fearing that he would not have the time to surrender⁸⁶. His instructions were an actual act of capitulation: no references were made to amnesty, guarantees other than the preservation of the officers' military ranks were not demanded. On 26 September, General Milberg reported from Modlin on the progress that had been made in the negotiations. Initially, Berg had been represented by General Dellinghausen who signed the preliminary arrangement. On 27 September, the Polish army set out on a march along the Vistula River to move away from the advancing Russian troops. The headquarters were moved from Płock to Lenie Wielkie near Dobrzyń on the Vistula. Milberg was greatly relieved when General Berg arrived in Nowy Dwór in the evening with new terms of armistice. Although he assured the army of his willingness to continue the struggle, Rybiński did everything to almost unconditionally surrender to the Russians. The Polish army was seething with turmoil, and it advanced in the direction of Szpetal which was to host the general headquarters on 28 September. The news that two cavalry squadrons had been unexpectedly defeated in Płońsk reminded Rybiński that despite capitulation talks, a war was still on. The news was correctly interpreted by the commander-in-chief. A bridge was built across the Narew River. General Milberg was expected to arrive in Szpetal. Milberg was hoping to finalize the capitulation during a meeting with Berg, meanwhile he was told that Paskevich was no longer willing to negotiate, and that he had demanded absolute surrender. Berg presented the Polish envoy with a *note verbale*⁸⁷ calling for absolute obedience, declarations to be signed by the commander-in-chief and other high-ranking officers, as well as an oath of allegiance. In his *note verbale*, Paskevich expressed his disbelief "that the Polish army would duly observe their duties to the emperor and the king" for as long as the Modlin fortress remained under Polish control. Paskevich demanded an unconditional surrender of the fortress⁸⁸. It remains unknown whether this demand merely echoed the guarantees that had been made by Polish envoys and the commander-in-chief himself. An alternative section of the note called for immediate obedience to Paskevich and direct surrender of the fortresses in Modlin and Zamość. No references were made to amnesty or a return to the status quo from before the revolution of 29 November. The oath of 1815 did not contain the word "Fatherland" or the adjective "Constitutional" to describe the king. A council of war was called at 4 p.m. on 28 September in Szpetal Górny (on the right bank of the Vistula, opposite Włocławek). Rybiński demanded that all military and tactical units share their opinions about Russia's proposals. Milberg was certain

⁸⁶ *Źródła do dziejów...*, vol. 4, pp. 245–250; [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 370; W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 89, 95–96.

⁸⁷ An unsigned diplomatic note written in the third person, exchanged by public institutions in less important matters.

⁸⁸ W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 89, 95–96.

that Paskevich's ultimatum would be accepted, but his abrasive manner added to the rigidity of the Polish position. Officers opposing capitulation had become mobilized after the events in Słupno. During Milberg's speech in favor of surrender, the disabled General Suchorzewski used a stick to drag himself to the bedside of General Pac, begging the latter to use his authority and rescue the nation's honor. They were joined by General Wojczyński who had been of equally poor health. A touching scene ensued where three sick men, one still suffering from the wounds inflicted on him in the battle of Ostrołęka, slowly made their way to the council, enticing other battery commanders on their way to join them with loud cries "help us save the honor of the nation!". Did the fact that not a shadow of choice had been left have a decisive impact on the council's fate? The meeting opened with a controversy. Some participants were in favor of a secret ballot, and they were keen on beginning the vote with lower-ranking officers. This approach would provide senior officers with an insight into their subordinates' preferences. An open ballot starting with higher-ranking officers was ultimately voted through. The commander-in-chief divided a sheet of paper into two columns marked as "surrender" and "do not surrender". The first five⁸⁹ votes were cast in favor of surrender. The procedure with a seemingly sealed outcome was interrupted by General Ludwik Pac who stormed into the room in the company of Suchorzewski, Wojczyński and Ziemięcki. Pac made several sharp remarks to remind council participants of their duties towards the country. He was followed by General Emilian Węgierski who said: "Gentlemen! This table, these four walls will bear witness of our wicked deeds. Then again, they could testify to our honor". Senior generals Wojczyński and Suchorzewski and General Ziemięcki ceremoniously approached the table and cast their votes. No other votes in favor of capitulation were cast after that. General Miller and Colonel Benedykt Zielonka (commander of the 5th light cavalry regiment) abstained, arguing that they had not surveyed the opinions of the officers they represented. At one point, Rybiński interrupted the vote with the words: "We did everything in our power to bring about a peaceful resolution, and now, only death can save our honor"⁹⁰. Despite that, General Miller was dispatched to inform Berg that the council had requested several modifications to Russian demands. The letter clearly indicated that the Polish army was ready "to observe its duties before the Constitutional king who

⁸⁹ Other reports speak of six or eight votes cast by outstanding division commanders, including generals Milberg, Jagmin, Andrychiewicz, Bogusławski, Muchowski and Colonel Żeleński (Zieliński). Some historians add Colonel Wierzbicki (10th uhlán regiment), Antoni Gałczyński (2nd line infantry regiment) and Jerzy Niewęłowski (grenadier regiment) to this list. 34 votes were cast against the ultimatum.

⁹⁰ W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 101–104; [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 376; M. Kamiński, *Kilka wspomnień starego żołnierza*, Poznań 1872, pp. 41–42; [J. Lewiński], *Jenerata...*, pp. 137–138; [H. Dembiński], *Jenerata... pamiętnik o powstaniu w Polsce r. 1830-1831*, vol. 2, Kraków 1875, pp. 363–364; S. Przewalski, *Generał Maciej Rybiński...*, p. 163; N. Kasperek, *Powstańczy epilog...*, pp. 190–195.

would be assured of the Polish army's full obedience by a military delegation". This declaration marked a return to the provisions of the Słupno council. The council would not do anything to dishonor the nation, which was what Paskevich's latest demands boiled down to. The letter also communicated that the army would be charged with the consequences of new combat or appeals made to the law of nations on foreign ground. The addressee was assured that this was the final decision of the Polish command, but to leave the negotiations open, the letter was signed by General Milberg⁹¹. There is no doubt that its content had been approved by Rybiński, Lewiński and several higher-ranking officers. The letter is the last documented trace of Polish-Russian negotiations, and it was dismissed by Paskevich in silence. On 29 September, officers from different units began to voice their opinions regarding the matters addressed on the previous day. The replies of nearly all units had been documented. Officers of the first horse artillery battery were in favor of a truce with a guarantee of amnesty. Major Jerzy Bułharyn (1st regiment of Augustów cavalry), who was opposed to Russia's ultimatum, added that soldiers could not be counted on, mainly due to desertion. Officers of the 1st and the 3rd light infantry regiments, the 2nd, 12th and 16th light infantry regiments, the 4th, 7th, 10th and 13th uhlán regiments, the 3rd light cavalry regiment, the 1st light foot artillery company, the 3rd horse artillery battery and the 6th foot artillery company rejected Russia's terms in their entirety, claiming that "they would rather be slain in the battlefield as free men than take the oath and be bound by the shackles of tyranny and oppression". Some officers were in favor of entering Prussia⁹². Walenty Andrychiewicz, Ludwik Bogusławski, Kazimierz Dziekoński, Bonifacy Jagmin, Stanisław Wąsowicz, the Skarżyński⁹³ brothers and General Karol Zieliński, deputy head of the National Government, had left the army after the meeting in Szpetal⁹⁴.

On 3 October, another council of war was held in Rypin, and it was attended by all division, brigade, regiment and battery commanders. As most buildings in Rypin were too small to host such a large gathering, the commander-in-chief convened the meeting in a local pharmacy. It was not a typical council of war, and the meeting was called only to hear the officers' replies to the previously formulated questions:

⁹¹ BPP, manuscript 346, col. 49; W. Zwierkowski, *Działania...*, pp. 103, 104.

⁹² Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow ("PAU and PAN Library"), manuscript 1194; Materials documenting the history of the 1831 uprising, col. 49, 55, 65, 71, 73, 75, 83, 85, 89, 97, 99, 103, 132, 135.

⁹³ Generals Ambroży and Kazimierz Skarżyńscy were in favor of waging a battle with the Russians. Contrary to the others, they left for Prussia. They were probably described by *Gazeta Wielkiego Księstwa Poznańskiego* (1831, issue No. 231 of 5 October, p. 1233) in an article about two generals quarantined in Golub.

⁹⁴ Zieliński, (*Wzięcie Warszawy...*, p. 380) reports that after Umiński had been nominated commander-in-chief, he resigned the post of deputy head of the National Government; M. Tarczyński, *Generalicja...*, s. 403,404.

“1. Should the war be continued without any hope of victory and with much damage for the country?

2. Should the Polish army succumb to the humiliating terms dictated by Paskevich?

3. Should the army enter Prussia?”⁹⁵.

Not all answers had been recorded in the minutes, and those that had been documented show a variety of opinions. Soldiers of the 4th uhlán regiment which consisted of many non-commissioned officers and privates from the former light cavalry regiment of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard⁹⁶ (Kozietulski’s regiment) were keen on remaining in Poland, and they were supported by the regiment’s officers⁹⁷. The majority of officers of the 10th line infantry regiment were against moving into Prussia, although the plan had been supported by the unit’s soldiers. In the 8th line infantry regiment, nearly 1/8 soldiers were opposed to the Prussian plan. The scheme received the support of the officers and soldiers of the 2nd, 4th, 12th, 13th and 16th line infantry regiments, the 1st and 5th light infantry regiments, the 7th, 10th and 13th uhlán regiments, the 1st and 4th light cavalry regiments, the National Guard, the Mass Movement of the Warsaw district, war commissioner corps, engineer corps, sapper corps, the 1st light foot artillery company, the 6th foot artillery company and the 5th horse artillery battery⁹⁸. The responses of the 5th light cavalry regiment, the 9th line infantry regiment and the grenadier regiment remain unknown. Józef Miller⁹⁹ and Henryk Milberg had left the army shortly before it entered Prussia. Generals Maciej Rybiński, Jakub Lewiński, Wincenty Dobiecki, Kazimierz Małachowski, Stanisław Wojczyński, Antoni Wroniecki, Henryk Dembiński Stefan Ziemiecki, Tadeusz Suchorzewski, Emilian Węgierski, Mamert Dłuski, Ludwik Pac, Paweł Muchowski¹⁰⁰ and Józef Bem crossed the Prussian frontier and remained with the army until the very end.

The debate in General Ramorino’s 2nd corps took on a different turn. The news of the siege of Warsaw and the attitudes demonstrated by certain

⁹⁵ S. Przewalski, *Generał Maciej Rybiński...*, p. 170. He quotes a different version with an additional question: “Should we disband the army and surrender in Poland?”

⁹⁶ W. Tokarz, *Armja Królestwa Polskiego (1815–1830)*, Piotrków 1917, p.121.

⁹⁷ For more references to the corps on the last days of the uprising, refer to Puzyna – Ossolineum, manuscript 16159, col. 151–153. Many soldiers exiled to Prussia were reluctant to return to Poland – BPP, manuscript 407: Józef Bem’s files concerning the Polish army’s march through Germany in 1831–1832, col. 259.

⁹⁸ PAU and PAN Library, manuscript 1194, col. 48, 52, 53, 58, 60, 62, 64, 70, 76, 80, 86, 93, 100, 104, 118, 120, 121, 125, 131.

⁹⁹ He had kept the letter from General Miller, commander of the 1st cavalry brigade of the 2nd cavalry division, written during his exile in Prussia.

¹⁰⁰ Before entering Prussia, he had departed with the 1st infantry division. He was deprived of command on account of desertion. He entered Prussia and arrived in Warsaw on 19 October, claiming that he had marched from the Prussian border in Rokitnica – Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Government Commission of War, manuscript 477, col. 296.

battalions (“mollement”) had taken the command by surprise¹⁰¹. Ramorino called a council of war at 5 a.m. on 9 September in the army’s headquarters in a manor in Opole, near Siedlce¹⁰². The meeting was to be attended by the commanders as well as one lower-ranking officer from each unit. The debate was held with the participation of 17 higher-ranking and 11 lower-ranking officers. It was not attended by the commanders of units stationed further away from Opole, but they forwarded their remarks at a later date. Kruszewski wrote: “with all the strolling, talking and chaos, it hardly resembled a council of war [underlined in the original – N.K.]¹⁰³. New ideas were born, although the main aim of the meeting was to decide whether the 2nd corps should unite with the Warsaw corps or head south. The latter solution received the support of the chief of staff, Colonel Władysław Zamoyski, and lower-ranking officers. Higher-ranking officers, mostly commanders of large units, spoke in favor of marching to Modlin and joining the Warsaw corps¹⁰⁴. Save for the turmoil, the council’s legitimacy was also quite debatable owing to its composition. In principle, the meeting should have been attended by the commanders of all divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions (mostly partisan troops), companies and artillery batteries. The corps had 39 such officers, including the commander and the chief of staff. The list of participants was inclusive of Colonel Gallois¹⁰⁵ who should have never been “ranked as an officer”¹⁰⁶ before the case of Bronisze was cleared. The command ultimately decided to head back south, and at the time the decision was made (around 8 a.m. on 9 September), it was not a mistake or an act of insubordination. Ramorino and Zamoyski could have acted according to their best judgment because the instructions they had received provided them with a vast degree of freedom. The decision was motivated by the prospect of receiving support in the Zamość fortress, accessing the resources of the Zamość constituency and the proximity of the Austrian border. After the orders had been given, an envoy from the commander-in-chief, Captain Józef Kowalski, arrived at the 2nd corps’ quarters. He quickly realized that Ramorino had already made a decision that was contrary to the orders carried. On 6 September, the plan

¹⁰¹ [W. Zamoyski], *O zarzucanem...*, p. 13 (in French); *Korpus 2 polski...*, p. 144 (in Polish).

¹⁰² The minutes taken by Gustaw Małachowski were lost already in 1831.

¹⁰³ B. Kórnicka, manuscript 1473, col.160 (Kruszewski’s report).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. N. Kasperek, *Ostatnie dni II korpusu gen. Ramorino w powstaniu listopadowym (10–17 września 1831 roku)*, in: *Gdańsk – Polska – Europa. Praca zbiorowa pod redakcją Zdzisława Kropidłowskiego ofiarowana profesorowi doktorowi habilitowanemu Władysławowi Zajewskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, Gdańsk 2001, pp. 145–147; idem, *Korpus Ramorino a szturm Warszawy*, pp. 233–234; idem, *Powstańczy epilog...*, pp. 133–135.

¹⁰⁵ General Małachowski wrote that Gallois, who had been captured in Bronisze, escaped from prison. He arrived in Warsaw on 7 September, shortly after the signing of the capitulation agreement. He took a horse from imperial stables and rode it to meet with Ramorino – [K. Małachowski], *Opowiadanie...*, p. 40.

¹⁰⁶ [W. Horain], *Kilka słów o działaniach korpusu 2 armii polskiej na prawym brzegu Wisły, pomiędzy 22 sierpnia a 17 września 1831 roku*, Poznań 1849, pp. 30–31.

was to unite the Polish army (the 2nd corps and the forces ousted from Warsaw) between Kałuszyn and Siedlce. Acting in agreement with the enemy, Małachowski marched north. To a certain extent, the agreement also concerned the 2nd corps. The majority of officers, including nearly all higher-ranking staff members, instinctively hoped for the concentration of Polish forces. Ramorino and Colonel Władysław Zamoyski, his ambitious chief of staff who had been actively involved in politics since the beginning of the uprising, were afraid of the merger with the main army. They cited military arguments (a flank attack could be directed towards the Polish army from Praga), but their main fear was that the army would capitulate and put an end to the uprising¹⁰⁷. The distribution of Polish troops could be deduced based on observations of the events in Jabłonna and Modlin and the frequent journeys of Polish officers between the “Polish” Modlin and the “Russian” Warsaw. Ramorino was also concerned that the merger with the main army would further deteriorate his troops’ morale¹⁰⁸. In 1832, Boanwentura Niemojowski inquired whether “Ramorino, laboring under the misconception of a disgraceful surrender, could disobey the commander-in-chief’s orders without assuming any responsibility for his actions?”¹⁰⁹. Kowalski brought orders (No. 8748) issued in Jabłonna on 8 September. It was the second set of instructions addressed to the corps. The first order (No. 8744) instructed the unit to march to Stanisławów on 9 September, and then on to Modlin via Kobyłka. The letter never reached Ramorino. The second document ordered the commander to move further east by crossing a bridge in Kamienczyk. Captain Kowalczyk was familiar with the content of the carried orders, and he was to also to provide Ramorino with verbal instructions¹¹⁰. The commander was ordered to set out for Modlin and avoid armed conflict on the way. The commander-in-chief, notified of Ramorino’s and Zamoyski’s decision, approved of the detour to the south. He proved vulnerable to moral corruption. The Russians insisted on not crossing the Vistula, which became a fact due to various circumstances. Ramorino called a council of war on 16 September in Kosin. It was attended by nearly all generals (excluding Sierawski and Konarski who commanded the rearguard), regiment commanders, Czartoryski and Małachowski. The course of the meeting had not been documented. Another council convened on the same day in Borów, but for most participants and historians, the meetings of 16 September in Ramorino’s

¹⁰⁷ Such gossip was spread among the soldiers (Stefanyk Library, Dwernicki’s files, manuscript 3, col.17).

¹⁰⁸ Ossolineum, manuscript 4951/I, Tomasz Skrodzki, General remarks about the 1831 uprising, col. 114. Ramorino was hoping to move the theater of military operations to the Cracow province.

¹⁰⁹ B. Kórnicka, manuscript 1473, col.104.

¹¹⁰ *Korpus 2 Polski...*, pp. 52–55 (Małachowski’s report of 1832); [W. Zamoyski], *O zarzucanem dowódcy korpusu II generałowi Ramorino niedopełnieniu rozkazów danych mu przez naczelnego dowódcę po upadku Warszawy 1831 roku*, Paris 1844, p. 34.

corps have merged into a single event. The following postulates were made at the council in Kosin:

- fight a battle on local ground and take follow-up action based on its outcome;
- make way to Zamość;
- enter Galicia and surrender.

Capitulation was not an option. Information on General Różycki's passive stance had reached the 2nd corps. The council's ultimate decision remains unknown. According to some commentators, the participants had opted for armed conflict¹¹¹. Barzykowski argues that a decision had been made to seek shelter behind the cordon line along the border¹¹², while other sources claim that the commanders were willing to negotiate with General Rosen¹¹³. Colonel Kruszewski, who had left before the end of the meeting, wrote in his diary: "nobody spoke in favor of entering Galicia"¹¹⁴. The first option was rather unrealistic, and only the second and the third scenarios could be considered. Ludwik Nabelak noted that a decision had been made to enter Galicia, and that he had previously attempted to keep the army's position behind Kosin¹¹⁵, which was most likely the case. Adam J. Czartoryski was strongly opposed to a disgraceful solution for Poland, and he left the second corps directly after the council meeting. General Różycki wrote to Ramorino about the armistice on the left bank of the river: "perhaps you shall deem it appropriate to inform General Rosen of the armistice proposal, making it clear that his refusal will directly lead to bloodshed. The offensive will begin tomorrow at 10 p.m.; therefore, it is important that they make their way across at night before the indicated hour"¹¹⁶. The 2nd corps left its position near Kosin, it marched through Borów and crossed the marshy Sanna River. The unit was ready for combat in the vicinity of the Austrian frontier. A parliamentary deputy was dispatched to General Rosen with a proposal of a temporary truce, but the Russian commander rejected the offer¹¹⁷. Many officers were of the opinion that additional combat and bloodshed were completely futile ("The government and the army have surrendered... what can

¹¹¹ Cf. W. Bortnowski, *2 korpus w powstaniu listopadowym (22 VIII–18IX 1831r.)*, "Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości", vol. 9, 1963, part. 1, p. 230.

¹¹² [S. Barzykowski], *Historia...*, p. 392.

¹¹³ This is not mentioned by Wybranowski ([R. Wybranowski], *Pamiętniki generała...*, vol. 2, Lviv 1882, p. 145).

¹¹⁴ I. S. Kruszewski, *Pamiętniki z roku 1830–1831*, Warszawa 1930, p. 164.

¹¹⁵ The National Library in Warsaw, manuscript 6599/III: Ludwik Nabelak, Notes on military operations in 1831, col. 17.

¹¹⁶ [W. Zamoyski], *Jenerał Zamoyski 1803–1868*, vol. 2: 1830–1832, Poznań 1913, pp. 415–416.

¹¹⁷ Bortnowski (*2 Korpus...*, p. 230) writes that it was major Stahl of Austria, commander of the frontier section, who declared his readiness to mediate between the two parties. Colonel Podczaski visited the Russians and, according to Wybranowski, he delivered the only credible account. Podczaski served as envoy only once, although Wybranowski claims (*Pamiętniki...*, vol. 2, p. 149) that he performed this duty on three occasions.

we do?” “Nobody will fight and put their life in danger for Mr. Zamoyski’s cause”, etc.)¹¹⁸. The corps was decimated by desertion, mainly of officers who defected across the Austrian border. Ramorino convened yet another council of war. This time, lower-ranking officers were invited to the meeting. In a highly boisterous atmosphere, the participants debated on the following matters:

- “Advancing towards Zamość and keeping close to the Austrian frontier;
- Holding the position for three days until the Galicians build a bridge enabling the corps to cross the Vistula;
- Entering Galicia”¹¹⁹.

At this point, most participants were in favor of entering Galicia, although Zamoyski and Ramorino had attempted to push through formal plans of marching towards Zamość. Before the final outcome, General Sznayde had been dispatched to General Rosen¹²⁰. His mission was to negotiate a minimum 2-day armistice by making a reference to the truce reached by Różycki and Rüdiger, Paskevich and the main army. The Polish envoy awaited Rosen’s decision in Borów, probably in General Krassowski’s quarters. Rosen turned down Sznayde’s request and ordered that the envoy be kept until the morning. Sznayde had prepared himself for the worst (“they may kill me”), and he threatened to make a forceful escape to prove that “this procedure... is a violation of wartime conduct and laws”, adding that those complying with Rosen’s orders would be completely disgraced. Sznayde returned to the corps (he crossed the border half past midnight on 17 September), but Ramorino had not waited for the envoy, and the troops had already moved into Galicia¹²¹. Perhaps, Rosen was hoping that by holding the envoy captive, he would stall Ramorino’s advance into Galicia. If the Polish forces had attempted to cross the frontier during daytime, they would be greeted with Russian fire.

The fate of General Samuel Różycki’s corps had taken a completely different turn. In southern provinces, the last stage of the uprising, including the Polish troops’ march into Cracow and Galicia, did not raise controversy and was not widely documented in historical records. General Różycki, the main protagonist of those events, was not politically involved, and he did not have to account for his participation in the uprising. After the collapse of the uprising, Różycki delivered a public “report” on his activities in 1831 which

¹¹⁸ Cf. B. Kórnicka, manuscript 1473, col. 82–84; [W. Zamoyski], *Generał Zamoyski...*, vol. 2, pp. 418–419, 423; [R. Wybranowski], *Pamiętniki ...*, vol. 2, pp. 148–149, W. Podolski, *Wyprawa Ramorino (Fragment z rękopisu pamiętnika)*, [ed.] S. Płoski, Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 1930, vol. 3, p. 269.

¹¹⁹ Stefanyk Library, Dwernicki’s files, manuscript 3, col. 18; J. Grabowiecki, *Moje wspomnienia w emigracji od roku 1831–1854 spisane w Marsylii*, ed. E. H. Nieciowa, Warszawa 1970, p. 25.

¹²⁰ Barzykowski (*Historia...*, vol. 5, p. 394) writes that he was accompanied by major Stahl who had undertaken to mediate between the parties.

¹²¹ B. Kórnicka, manuscript 1473, col. 85–86.

was a masterly propaganda move¹²². The modest account submitted by Colonel Józef Zaliwski went almost unnoticed¹²³.

On 6 September, Różycki received orders that had been issued in Warsaw three days earlier before Krukowiecki's communication with Paskevich. The general was instructed to destroy Russian bridges near Janowiec and Zawichost¹²⁴. Those were the only instructions that had reached the corps from Warsaw. With strong pressure being exerted by Rüdiger's forces, Różycki found himself in a very difficult situation.

The Polish camp was visited by a Russian parliamentary deputy with a ceasefire proposal. He based his argument on the capitulation of Warsaw and the agreement reached in the capital. The deputy was initially treated with mistrust, but the veracity of his proposal was soon confirmed by General Małachowski's envoy, Captain Wincenty Nieszokoć, an active participant in the events of the November Night, who was allowed to pass through the Russian cordon line. His mission did not raise any suspicions. He carried with him Małachowski's orders (No. 8751) stating that "all hostilities would cease as a result of the armistice after the evacuation of Warsaw". Nieszokoć added that the commander-in-chief had demanded "that a truce be reached instantly, and that it is not interrupted until the enemy launches a hostile attack. General Różycki shall have full authority to negotiate the terms of the armistice at own discretion. Any other arrangements, including with Russian authorities or new authorities appointed by the Russian army, shall be made at the sole discretion of the commander-in-chief"¹²⁵. In his instructions, Małachowski quoted the agreement signed during the capitulation of Warsaw which had not been mentioned in the orders (No. 8748) addressed to Ramorino. Różycki initially dispatched captain Horain to Rüdiger, but the Russian general refused to speak with the envoy¹²⁶. A truce was reached only through the mediation of Colonel Jan Ledóchowski, Major Adolf Grochol-ski and captain Eustachy Januszkiewicz. The demarcation line cut Ramorino off from the Vistula which was not a good sign. The parties also agreed that the armistice could be called off upon 24 hours' notice. Ledochowski visited

¹²² S. Różycki, *Zdanie sprawy narodowi z czynności w roku 1831*, Bourges 1832. In certain parts, it merely delivers an account of the corps' business.

¹²³ [J. Zaliwski], *Odpowiedź podpułkownika ... na zarzuty jta Różyckiego*, Pamiętnik Emigracji, (Mieczysław III), 2nd annals: 1832, 1 November, pp. 7–8; W. Saletra, *Generał Samuel Różycki w kampanii 1831 roku*, Rocznik Świętokrzyski, vol. 16: 1989, pp. 7–8.

¹²⁴ BPP, manuscript 406, Files from the Polish Army Headquarters of 1831, vol. 20: general Samuel Różycki's corps, ed. Eustachy Januszkiewicz, col. 298; S. Różycki, *Zdanie sprawy...*, p. 34

¹²⁵ S. Różycki, *Zdanie sprawy...*, pp. 40–41.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 43. Rüdiger did not refuse on account Horain's low rank; he was angered by the fact that the Polish envoy had been transported through his camp without a blindfold. Horain was not blindfolded because the Russians had been convinced that this would be the end of the campaign and the war – M. Budzyński, *Wspomnienia z mojego życia*, vol. 1, Poznań 1880, pp. 85–87.

Rüdiger's quarters several times, and the parties exchanged prisoners, mostly those captured during recent battles. The news of the truce reached General Gabriel Biernacki in the Kalisz province, and he was authorized to take similar action. The proposal to suspend military operations rescued Różycki from his predicament. Facing fierce opposition from a much stronger Russian army, he was forced to seek shelter in the woods. The activation of reserve forces, which were often reluctant to become involved in combat, provided Różycki with hope of reinforcing his position.

Perhaps in the first days that followed the armistice, Różycki and his men were deluded that the war had come to an end. The exchange of prisoners seemed to suggest that the Russians had shared this view. But the battles waged by Ramorino and the refugees fleeing from Warsaw were best proof that the final decision to surrender had not yet been made. Różycki accelerated the reorganization of his corps, and he mobilized all existing forces. At the news that the 2nd corps could arrive in the Sandomierz province, Rüdiger loyally warned the Poles that he would cross the demarcation line, but not earlier than 36 hours after being notified of the Ramorino's arrival. Rüdiger emphasized that Różycki "should not regard this move as an incident breaking off the truce"¹²⁷. The Russian general hoped to immobilize Różycki and cut him off from the Vistula, the contact point with Ramorino's corps. On 21 September, after defeating the 2nd corps and reinforcing own troops, Rüdiger discontinued his correspondence with Różycki and demanded a surrender from the Polish corps¹²⁸. This explains why Różycki later moved into Galicia.

The remaining Polish troops, mainly rearguard formations, made singlehanded attempts to strike a deal with Russia. General Biernacki, the military commander of the Kalisz province, set out south. In the general chaos that ensued, some "citizens" returned "to patiently await their destiny", while others sought shelter behind the Prussian cordon line. A loose group of cavalry and infantry soldiers, for whom war was an adventure and an excuse to leave home, surrendered to the Russians under General Biernacki's command in Warsaw. This was the first, unfortunately not the last, incident of the type in the history of the Polish-Russian war. General Zygmunt Stryjeński, head of the cavalry reserve stationed in the Cracow province, arrived in Rüdiger's quarters. Stryjeński and his 2000 men¹²⁹ had capitulated on 26 September, and the event had been swiftly used by Nicholas as a propaganda measure. Stryjeński did not share the fate of General Jan Wyssenhoff, co-commander of the cavalry reserve who had been exiled to Kostroma after the fall of the uprising. Colonel Maciej Dembiński, yet another

¹²⁷ S. Różycki, *Zdanie sprawy...*, p. 46.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

¹²⁹ Mostly former officers and General Dwernicki's soldiers, volunteers from Galicia and the Kingdom.

er member of this incompetent group of officers, capitulated in Jędrzejów. In late 1831, the official press of the Kingdom of Poland published tsar Nicholas I's manifesto of 3/15 December granting pardon to a single battalion of the 6th line infantry regiment "which had surrendered on 17 September [29 September – N. K.] in Cracow"¹³⁰. Perhaps, the battalion had been assigned the number of a pre-uprising formation to strengthen the manifesto's propaganda effect.

The fortresses in Modlin and Zamość were preparing for surrender¹³¹. Since the beginning of the war, Modlin had remained under the command of General Ignacy Ledóchowski. The artillery unit was large, but deeply divided and somewhat outdated. The garrison had been set up under tents, and the soldiers were nearly completely deprived of winter clothing. Morale was low, desertion was on the rise with entire groups of soldiers defecting to the enemy's side¹³². The Russians informed the commander of the Polish army's retreat to the north. Modlin's soldiers remained under the impression that a part of the army had surrendered in Płock and that only small units had continued their march¹³³. This news seriously damaged the morale of privates as well as higher-ranking officers. A battalion of the 15th line infantry regiment was openly opposed to military engagement. On 6 October, confirmed news about Rybiński's advance into Prussia reached Modlin. A day later, generals Krasowski and Gołowin met with Ledóchowski, Czyżewski and Kołaczkowski and decided that Modlin would surrender to Prince Michał. Their graceful capitulation statement was accepted, and it read as follows: "after the sad reassurance that various corps of the Polish army had capitulated in the face of the enemy's overpowering strength, they are ready to surrender the fight which, although shrouding the Polish forces in glory, is no longer beneficial to the Polish case". Modlin's staff were ready to vacate the fortress and share the fate of their fellow soldiers. In a letter to Prince Michał, Ledóchowski wrote that "they will become faithful servants of His Imperial Highness King of Poland Nicholas I" on condition that "none of our soldiers, regardless of their origin, will be persecuted for their political or military actions". On 9 October, Polish soldiers surrendered and marched towards Wyszogród where most of them were disbanded¹³⁴. The officers proceeded to Warsaw to take the oath of servitude. After the fall of the uprising, Lt. Col. Maksymilian Ćwierczkiewicz (fortress major) discovered Polish regimental banners hidden in the fortress.

¹³⁰ Official Journal of Mazowsze Province, 1832, issue No. 16 of 9 January, p. 25.

¹³¹ This problem is not addressed by J. Feduszek in his book about the fortresses of the November Uprising, *Twierdze Modlin, Serock, Zamość w planach strategicznych powstania listopadowego*, Lublin 1999.

¹³² Cf. BPP, manuscript 397, col. 573-.

¹³³ [E. Iszkowski], *Wspomnienia...*, in: *Zbiór pamiętników do historii powstania polskiego z roku 1830–1831*, Lviv 1882, pp. 445–446.

¹³⁴ Based on: [K. Kołaczkowski], *Wspomnienia...*, vol. 5, p. 140–150.

The dramatic situation in Zamość, which had been blocked since the middle of the 1831 campaign, was coming to an end in the south. After the surrender of Modlin, Jan Krysiński, the commander of the Zamość fortress, was mistrustful of General Kaisarovov and, upon his consent, he dispatched officers to reconnoitre the situation in the country. His decision outraged the Russian authorities who were hoping to score spectacular results, and they ordered an armed siege of the fortress. Their instructions had not been carried out as on 21 October, Zamość surrendered on terms identical to those dictated in Modlin, including a guarantee of amnesty for the insurgents from the taken lands. Obviously, the Russians never fulfilled those obligations¹³⁵. Some officers openly opposed the capitulation, mostly the insurgents from Podole, among them poet Maurycy Gosławski¹³⁶ who composed one of his finest pieces of verse, "Zwątpienie" (Doubt), on 15 October. The officers and the soldiers officially parted on 22 October¹³⁷.

General Ramorino's corps was the only large Polish military unit which had not conducted capitulation talks with the Russian. Although many historians and authors have argued that it was Ramorino who had pushed for surrender of Polish forces, historical records provide evidence to the contrary.

¹³⁵ W. Tokarz, *Wojna...*, p. 553.

¹³⁶ After capitulation, Gosławski made his way to Galicia where he joined the conspiracy movement. He was arrested, and he died in prison in 1834.

¹³⁷ BPP, manuscript 538, vol. 1, col. 31 – the troops' farewell address to Aleksander Wereszczyński.

Andrzej Kopiczko

CHARITABLE INITIATIVES OF WARMIA'S CLERGY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Charity is defined as Church activities that aim to “minimize and eliminate poverty, to assist the needy in becoming financially independent and further their personal growth”¹. This type of assistance dates back to the beginnings of Christianity, and the first historical records mentioning charity work are found in the Acts of the Apostles and the letters of the Apostles. Beginning from the 4th century, attempts were made to institutionalize charitable work by opening church-run hospitals and poorhouses. The needy received help from brotherhoods and guilds, and as of the 15th century, from mounts of piety, institutional pawnbrokers run as a charity. The charitable initiatives that had originated before the Council of Trent were continued through the end of the 18th century, and they began to take on a different form only in the following century. Although church-run hospitals, shelters, foundations, donations and grants for the needy were still encountered, many countries introduced a system of state welfare provision. The Church also became more committed to helping the needy as part of the new institutions, mostly charity and welfare organizations. In historiography, this body of doctrine is referred to as Catholic social teaching.

In the 19th century, Warmia was a part of Prussia where social services were regulated by the General State Laws for the Prussian States of 1794. Citizens who had no relatives, but were registered tax payers, were entitled to assistance from their respective province. The others constituted the responsibility of the state, mostly through hospices. Unions and associations of the poor run by secular authorities played an important role, but they were unable to solve all social problems². Charity programs were also carried out

¹ R. Łukaszyk, F. Woronowski, *Dobroczyenne duszpasterstwo*, in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 3, Lublin 1985, col. 1385–1389.

² W. Schaffer, *Staatliche Neuordnung der Armenpflege seit Aufklärung und Säkularisation*, in: *Geschichte des kirchlichen Lebens in den deutschsprachigen Ländern seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Bd. 5: *Caritas und soziale Dienste*, hrsg. E. Gatz, Freiburg 1997, pp. 43–45.

by religious institutions and organizations, but in the 19th century, most of them were created on a local basis in parishes and monasteries³. The Kulturkampf policy put a temporary halt to the development of such organizations, but the law of 21 May 1886 reestablished the former role of nuns and monks in charity institutions. This legislative change revived hospitals, orphanages and care homes, and it fostered the emergence of new initiatives which, in the Warmia diocese, were introduced mainly by the Sisters of St. Catherine and St. Elizabeth with the support of local parish priests⁴.

In Warmia, the beginnings of the 19th century did not witness spectacular change. All brotherhoods serving the poor were closed down, but hospitals and hospices continued to operate. Most of them faced financial difficulties. In 1772, the possessions of bishops and the Cathedral Chapter were confiscated by the Prussian government which went on to seize the property of the Collegiate Chapter in Nowe Miasto and Bernardine estates in 1810. The Society of Jesus, which was not a major contributor of welfare services in the Warmia diocese, was dissolved in 1780. The former principal donors, the bishops and the Cathedral Chapter, were no longer able to give financial support to all social and charity initiatives. The hospitals financed by the Canons fell into decline. At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, Olsztyn had two hospitals that were financed mostly by the Cathedral Chapter in Frombork. The leprosy hospital and the Holy Spirit Hospital did not meet the new requirements, and they were sold in 1825 and 1872, respectively. The West witnessed the emergence of modern, well-equipped hospitals with professional medical staff, but Warmia lagged far behind in this regard. New epidemics and plagues, economic development and population growth forced the local authorities to build new hospitals. This was also the case in Olsztyn. A committee of 14 members was thus formed, and it was headed by Baltazar Józef Oster, a local pharmacist, member of the city council and the parish council. Archpriest Walenty Blockhagen, a highly esteemed member of the clerical community, a good organizer and a generous donor, also played an important role in the committee. The committee's composition testified to the local community's preference for parish-ran hospitals. This tradition was upheld in the draft statute which was forwarded for the approval of Warmia Bishop Józef Ambroży Geritz in March 1858. The new hospital was opened in 1867⁵.

³ E. Gatz, *Kirchliche Mitarbeit in der öffentlichen Armenpflege. Die Neuanfänge einer eigenständigen kirchlichen Armenpflege*, pp. 57–58. In the past, religious brotherhoods, hospices and orphanages had been operated mostly by parishes, but bishops and chapters significantly contributed to their efforts. In the 19th century, they mainly inspired and supervised charities, while the actual work was done by parish priests and monasteries. Due to growing costs and small revenues generated by grants and foundations, charity initiatives were largely financed by municipal authorities.

⁴ R. Traba, *Niemcy – Warmiacy – Polacy 1871–1914. Z dziejów niemieckiego ruchu katolickiego i stosunków polsko-niemieckich w Prusach*, Olsztyn 1994, p. 112.

⁵ A. Kopiczko, *Szpitalnictwo w Olsztynie w XIX i w pierwszej połowie XX wieku*, in: *Olsztyn 1353–2003*, eds. S. Achremczyk and W. Ogrodziński, Olsztyn 2003, pp. 242–244.

A detailed list of all foundations and charity institutions ran by local priests was developed on 14 August 1837, indicating that 26 organizations had been supervised by the Cathedral Chapter. The initiatives included student scholarships awarded by the Canons (15), a foundation for the sick and needy, the Holy Spirit Hospital in Frombork, donations for the patients, two foundations supporting the needy, including farmers, Bishop Potocki's foundation in Braniewo, a hospital in Święta Lipka, a fund supporting people suffering from an illness or disability, a fund for fire victims in Warmia, funds for young women and endowment funds. They were followed by charity organizations ran by the archdeaconry, including in Olsztyn, Königsberg and Orneta. The latter hosted the Holy Sprit Hospital and St. George's Hospital, while Olsztyn was the seat of the Holy Spirit Hospital and the Gemms Benefice in Bartąg (part of the Olsztyn archdeaconry). The highest number of foundations and charity institutions were set up in the Lidzbark archdeaconry (which, in theory, was still a seat of Warmia's bishops), including the castle hospital for patients from the bishop's palace, a hospital for the poor, St. George's hospital, a benefice, two foundations, as well as four organizations in the villages of Ignalin (2 foundations), Kraszewo (hospital) and Babiak (foundation). The Dobre Miasto archdeaconry operated five charities in the city (including the Holy Spirit Hospital) and two hospitals in the villages of Świątki and Ełdyty Wielkie. Braniewo was the seat of four hospitals of St. Andrew's, Maasianum, Barschianum and Nowe Miasto, while Pieniężno hosted St. George's Hospital and three foundations, including a fund for unmarried girls. Five charities each were found in the archdeaconry of Reszel and Jeziorany, including two hospitals (one hospital for the poor) and the Franciszek Schmidt foundation for single women in Reszel, and a hospital and foundations in Jeziorany. The Barczewo archdeaconry operated a hospital in the city and three health institutions in the villages of Klebark Wielki, Klewki and Ramsowo. Königsberg was mentioned at the end of the list as the seat of only one foundation for education⁶.

The above institutions and charities had been created before the 19th century, but they continued to receive financial support from the Canons of the Cathedral Chapter and parishes, testifying to the local clergy's dedication to helping the needy.

In the 19th century, the Sisters of St. Catherine and St. Elizabeth participated in the efforts to build modern hospitals, and they became increasingly involved in nursing services. From among 15 institutions erected at the time, several were built under the supervision of parish priests. Edward Hermann, the parish priest of Biskupiec Reszelski, later the auxiliary bishop of the Warmia diocese, initiated the construction of a hospital in Olsztyn and St. Joseph's Hospital in Biskupiec Reszelski in 1858. In both institutions, the board

⁶ Archive of the Warmia Archdiocese in Olsztyn (AAWO), AB J A 4. The new hospital in Kraszewo was built by the local parish priest, Piotr Krieger. – A. Kranich, *Kirche und Kirchspiel Reichenberg. Ein Gedenkblatt zum 50jährigen Priesterjubiläum des Pfarrers A. Hosmann 1853–1903*, Braunsberg 1903, p. 33.

of directors was headed by parish priests. St. Joseph's Hospital had 40 beds and a chapel, and the patients were nursed by the Sisters of St. Catherine⁷.

The legacy handed down by Ambroży Kampsfbach, the parish priest of Tolkowiec, enabled the construction of the Marian Hospital in Braniewo (1863) which was run by the local archdeaconry. Kampsfbach purchased a house and a garden near the Frombork Gate, and the estate was later transformed into a hospital. The facility was expanded in 1865, 1879, 1880 and 1881–1882. In 1863–1887, patients were nursed by the Sisters of St. Borromeus who were later replaced by the Sisters of St. Catherine. The hospital was supervised by the curia headed by the local archpriest⁸.

The Cathedral Canons were in charge of St. Joseph's Hospital in Frombork which was rebuilt in 1805 and expanded in 1855. The hospital could accommodate 16 pensioners. The patients were nursed by the Sisters of St. Catherine and treated by physicians from Frombork⁹. The archpriests of Dobrze Miasto ran a hospital by the same name in the city. The first building was erected in the 17th century, but it proved to be too small, and a new facility was built in 1878 in the vicinity of St. Nicholas' church. In 1892, the hospital underwent yet another expansion scheme, and it was provided with a chapel six years later. Medical care was provided by the local doctors, and nursing services were offered by the Sisters of St. Catherine¹⁰. The Marian Hospital in Malbork which was opened in 1866 also proved to be too small to accommodate the growing needs for medical services, and a reconstruction effort began in 1896. A chapel was added, and the building was merged with the Holy Spirit Hospital. The Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul were the hospital's nursing staff until the end of World War I.¹¹ St. George's Hospital in Pieniężno, built in the 17th century, was refurbished in 1887–1888 and adapted to modern medical standards. It continued to be operated by the parish, and the patients remained in the care of local physicians and the Sisters of St. Catherine (1888)¹².

Edward Stock, the parish priest of Barczewo in 1869–1889, bought in 1889 a house which was turned into St. Anthony's Hospital. The demand for medical care soon outgrew the hospital's capabilities, and in 1901, Barczewo's new parish priest, Jan Hirschberg, ordered the construction of a new building. The project was completed in 1903. The new hospital had two operating theaters, surgery preparation facilities, a sterilization room and a bath. The hospital remained parish property, and its staff comprised two doctors and six Sisters of St. Catherine¹³.

⁷ R. Teichert, *Geschichte der Stadt Bischofsburg*, Bischofsburg 1935, p. 105; J. Steinki, *Katholische Caritas und katholisches Vereinswesen in der Diözese Ermland*, Braunsberg 1931, p. 22.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 24–25.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 27–28.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 28.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 29; A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1821–1945*, part 2: *Słownik*, Olsztyn 2003, pp. 278–279.

Jan Briese, the parish priest of Orneta, was also deeply committed to charity work. Having assumed pastoral responsibilities in 1896, he became a member of the Prussian Landtag. In 1879, he organized celebrations commemorating the 500th jubilee of the parish in Orneta. Briese built St. Elisabeth's Hospital in the city and started a foundation by the same name. Funds were donated by a female resident of Karkajmy by the last name of von Chau. The first part of the new building was put into use in 1875, and the entire hospital was expanded in 1899 to accommodate 70 patients. Nursing services were provided by the Sisters of St. Catherine¹⁴.

In the 19th century, the Warmia diocese was deeply committed to caring for children, in particular orphans. Although orphan care was the domain of nuns (the Sisters of St. Vincent, St. Catherine and St. Elisabeth), the clergy readily offered their assistance, and care centers were often established in local parishes. The achievements of St. Joseph's orphanage in Lidzbark Warmiński deserve special mention. The facility was opened in 1859 by Warmia Bishop Józef Geritz, a distinguished supporter of charity initiatives. In 1851, Geritz donated 4,000 thalers to a church in Kwidzyn and 10,000 thalers to a mission in the diaspora. Three years later, he gave financial support to a girls' school in Jeziorany (1,000 thalers). His contribution fostered the reconstruction of the former bishops' castle in Lidzbark Warmiński in 1859, which was turned into an orphanage for 160 children aged 2 to 15 years. The bishop initially donated 25,000 marks to the project, expanding his contribution by a further 10,000 and 6,000 thalers in January and March of 1863. The Cathedral Chapel was placed in charge of the orphanage, and it appointed two curators for the job. Pastoral care was provided by chaplains, and the orphanage received financial support from many members of the clergy¹⁵.

Antoni Arendt, head of the Teaching Seminar in Braniewo, pioneered a project for teaching deaf children. In 1845, he opened a small school for hearing-impaired students in Braniewo. A similar initiative was launched in Reszel in 1881¹⁶. The local archpriest, Paweł Romahn, also contributed to the cause by creating the Warmian Society for Helping the Deaf. He was assisted in his work by vicar Eugeniusz Brachvogel¹⁷.

New foundations for the poor were started in the 19th century by Canons Jan Feyerstein (1888), Rudolf Borowski (15 April 1888, a facility for impover-

¹⁴ J. Steinki, *Katholische Caritas und katholisches Vereinswesen in der Diözese Ermland*, pp. 29–31; A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1821–1945*, part 2: *Słownik*, p. 38.

¹⁵ The list has been published in *Katalog duchowieństwa katolickiego w diecezji warmińskiej (do 1945 roku)*, p. 92. cf. *Das St. Josephi-Stift in Heilsberg 1859–1933*, Heilsberg 1933, p. 15nn.

¹⁶ Cf. A. Steinki, *Katholische Caritas und katholisches Vereinswesen in der Diözese Ermland*, pp. 82–84; A. Arendt also bequeathed funds to hospitals and charities (including 11,000 marks for Braniewo and around 355 marks in annuities for Orneta). – *Ermländisches Kirchenblatt*, 1936, p. 247; F. Buchholz, *Bilder aus Wormditts Vergangenheit*, 2nd ed., Wormditt 1931, p. 130.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 24; J. Steinki, *Katholische Caritas und katholisches Vereinswesen in der Diözese Ermland*, pp. 82–83.

ished maidens and widows) and Józef Neumann who established an endowment fund of 4,500 marks for elderly women in Bisztynek, donated 7,500 marks to the purchase of First Communion supplies and 3,000 marks to St. Joseph's orphanage in Lidzbark Warmiński. Extensive support was also provided by Warmia's bishops, in particular Andrzej S. Hatten, Józef Geritz (ordained before 1821) and Andrzej Thiel. Upon learning that some children from the poorest families could not afford a hot meal at school, Thiel ordered that 30 meals be served every day at his expense. He donated 565 marks, raised during celebrations of his 80th birthday, to a church construction project in Orzechowo near Olsztyn¹⁸. He also gave financial support to the reconstruction of a hospital in Reszel in 1897. Canon Karol Diters von Dittersdorf made a bequest to a monastery school in Braniewo¹⁹.

Warmia's parish priests also made frequent displays of generosity. Georg Matern mentioned a number of benefactors, among them fathers Franciszek Austen, Piotr Baranowski, Kazimierz Koitka, Jan Neubauer, Jan Pulta and Józef Setta (who made a bequest of 1,500 marks to single women in Bisztynek), adding that the list was incomplete²⁰. Father Jan Szadowski purchased property in Wielbark where he started an orphanage for Polish children²¹. Father Dominik Wobbe created a trust for the upkeep of two children in St. Joseph's orphanage in Lidzbark Warmiński²². Father Antoni Paschke established a mortgage bond of 7,000 thalers in his will, and the funds were to be divided equally between the Sisters of St. Borromeus (Sisters of Mercy) in Braniewo and the Cathedral Chapter in aid of the poor in East and West Prussia²³. Father Józef Teschner was also a generous donor who built churches in Pasy and Klebark Wielki, as well as two churches in Olsztyn in the 20th century²⁴. The list would not be complete without father Feliks Schreiber who initiated the Copernicus Catholic Home project in Olsztyn and personally participated in construction works²⁵.

¹⁸ AAWO, Olsztyn 935 (13 October 1906); E. Poschmann, *Der Kreis Rössel. Ein ostpreußisches Heimatbuch*, 3rd ed., Kaltenkirche/Holstein 1991, p. 300.

¹⁹ A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1525–1821*, part 2: *Słownik*, Olsztyn 2000, p. 54.

²⁰ G. Matern, *Die katholischen Wohltätigkeits-Anstalten und –Vereine sowie das katholisch-soziale Vereinsleben in der Diözese Ermland*, Freiburg 1900, pp. 47–49.

²¹ T. Grygier, *Z zagadnień diaspory na Warmii i Mazurach*, KMW, 1959, No. 2, p. 171.

²² *Das St. Josephi-Stift in Heilsberg 1859–1933*, p. 21.

²³ AAWO, AB, H 295e (Presbyteri in Crossen), p. 40.

²⁴ Cf. W. Barczewski, *Kiermaszy na Warmii i inne pisma wybrane*, ed. W. Ogrodziński, Olsztyn 1984, p. 162.

²⁵ Many priests financed the construction of new churches in Mazury. Financial grants supporting the construction of a shrine in Prabuty were made by Marcin Behlau of Sątopy, Adolf Keuchel of Dobre Miasto, Ferdynand Engelbrecht of Głotowo and Piotr Baranowski of Tychnowy. – *Ermländische Volksblätter*, 17 February 1874. Lists of the clergy who supported churches in Mazury were published by *Pastoralblatt für die Diözese Ermland* after collections organized by the St. Adalbert Association and the St. Brunon Association. Jan Oswald, a professor at the Hosianum Secondary School, bequeathed 15,000 marks to priests in mission

Other aid projects initiated by Warmia's clergy in the 19th century were a continuation of charity traditions from the previous centuries, and they included scholarships. Educational support was a priority goal in the charity work of bishops, the Cathedral Chapter and parish clergy. Several scholarship schemes from the previous centuries had been preserved, mostly the trusts and funds created by Frombork Canons Jan Preuck²⁶, Kazimierz Michał Dąbrowski, Paweł Dominik Drommler, Jan Hannowa, Eustachy Knobelsdorf, Michał Konarski, Jan Kreczmer, Józef Kretzmann, Jan Jerzy Kunigk, Marquardt and Runesius, Maciej Montanus, Jan Rucki (Rudzki), Michał Siedler, Przemysław Szemborowski, Szymon Treter and Euchard Zornhausen, Reszel Canon Laurenty Fredler and Sątopy Canon Piotr Filitz²⁷. The extent to which scholarship funds continued to be awarded in the 19th century remains unknown, but the fact that they were listed by the diocesan curia testifies to their significance.

In the first half of the 19th century, the scholarship scheme received a cash injection from a trust created by Bishop Andrzej S. Hatten. The bishop bequeathed 10,000 thalers to scholarships for youths attending a secondary school in Braniewo²⁸. Financial support was also provided by Henryk Schmülling, principal of Braniewo's secondary school in 1811–1827²⁹.

Bishop Józef Hohenzollern funded three annual awards for Seminary alumni who delivered the best sermons. The students of Józef Scheill and Bernard Busse financed scholarships for the authors of best papers in the subjects they taught³⁰.

Canon priest Rudolf Borowski (died in 1890) bequeathed 6,000 marks in Prussian bonds with 3.5% interest to the diocesan curia. The funds were to further the education of youths from the Borowski family as well as other students. The bequest was officially approved by the Prussian government in

outposts (including Kętrzyn, Wystruć, Bartoszyce). The legacy was approved by the Königsberg government on 8 November 1885 - Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin–Dahlem (GStA), HA, Rep. 76 IV, Sect. 2, Abt. XIX, No. 10, Bd. 1 Schenkungen und Vermächtnisse zu Gunsten des Bischöflichen Stuhls und des Domkapitels von Ermland 1869–1930 (dated 6 September and 8 November 1885).

²⁶ For more information, refer to the subchapter on the academic studies of Warmia's clergy. Cf. A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1525–1821*, part 1, Olsztyn 2000, p. 152. A list of scholarships for secondary school students was developed by Franciszek Dittrich in October 1906. The benefactors were: Paweł Dominik Drommler, Andrzej S. Hatten, Jan Kreczmer, Jan Jerzy Kunigk, Marcin Müller, Józef Neumann, Michał Sidler and Kuhn, a secular donor. – AAWO, Scholarship request files.

²⁷ Cf. AAWO, AB J A 4 (14 August 1837).

²⁸ *Zum Andenken an Andreas Stanislaus von Hatten, Bischof von Ermland. Festschrift zum fünfzigjährigen Priesterjubiläum des Herrn Prälaten Josef Carolus*, Braunsberg 1887, pp. 33–34; B.M. Rosenberg, *Das königliche und staatliche Gymnasium 1811–1933*, Zeitschrift für die Geschichte und Altertumskunde Ermlands, 1966, Bd. 30, p. 547.

²⁹ B.M. Rosenberg, *Das königliche und staatliche Gymnasium 1811–1933*, p. 547.

³⁰ A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1821–1945*, part 1: *Studium prozopograficzne*, Olsztyn 2004, p. 111.

a decision of 25 June 1887³¹. In his will dated 27 May 1876, Canon priest Jan Lingk bequeathed 6,600 marks (in mortgage bonds with 4% interest) to a scholarship fund for Catholic students. The fund was later expanded to include the bequest of Antoni Finck, the parish priest of Młynary³². August Hermann, the parish priest of Kolno, donated 12,000 marks to the construction of a church in Bartoszyce, an equal amount to a scholarship fund for talented youths hoping to study theology and 4,000 marks to the construction of a belfry clock in Kolno³³. In 1861, canon priest Józef Nauman made a donation to secondary school students from impoverished families in Braniewo and Reszel. Antoni Thiel funded a scholarship for secondary school students in Biskupiec, Braniewo and Dobre Miasto. Students also received financial support from Canon priests Antoni Eichhorn, Michał Krüger, Jan Lingk and Marcin Müller³⁴.

Parish priests also donated funds and made bequests to students. The archpriest of Dobre Miasto, father Herman Preuschoff, bequeathed 3,000 marks to a boys' school in the city³⁵. The parish priest of Krosno, August Schacht, contributed to the establishment of a home economics school in Orneta in 1890.³⁶ Each year, dean Jan Wermter of Dzierzgoń personally financed First Communion supplies for five children. Inspired by his generosity, Bishop Andrzej Thiel provided him with 100 thalers to be spent on school children. Dean Wermter used those funds to buy 40 books in German and 154 books in Polish³⁷. The Stipendium Warmiense scholarship fund also catered to the needs of school students in Reszel³⁸.

An organization supporting university students was founded 1885. In 1900, it had 120 members who made annual contributions of 3 marks each. The organization was headed by Franciszek Dittrich of Braniewo³⁹.

Annual grants were made as part of the *dos puellarum (pro dote puellarum)* trust for girls from impoverished families. Initially, the trust supported two centers in Olsztyn and Frombork which were merged on 8 November 1833 and placed under the supervision of the Cathedral Chapter in From-

³¹ GStA, HA, Rep. 76 IV, Sect. 2, Abt. XIX, No. 10, Bd. 1 Schenkungen und Vermächtnisse zu Gunsten des Bischöflichen Stuhls und des Domkapitels von Ermland 1869–1930 (dated 9 May and 25 June 1887).

³² Ibidem, dated 16 March 1889 and 11 April 1889.

³³ Ibidem, Last will and testament dated 22 February 1883.

³⁴ Cf. A. Kopiczko, *Duchowieństwo katolickie diecezji warmińskiej w latach 1821–1945*, part 2: *Słownik*, pp. 60, 154, 169, 189–190; G. Matern, *Die katholischen Wohlthätigkeits-Anstalten und – Vereine sowie das katholisch-soziale Vereinsleben in der Diözese Ermland*, p. 49.

³⁵ G. Beckmann, *Geschichte der Stadt Guttstadt. Festschrift zum sechshundertjährigen Stadtjubiläum (neuere Zeit)*, Guttstadt 1929, p. 158.

³⁶ F. Buchholz, *Bilder aus Wormditts Vergangenheit*, 2nd ed., pp. 65–66.

³⁷ A. Szorc, *Dzierzgoń. Od początku do dni naszych 1248–1998*, Dzierzgoń 1998, p. 345; AAWO, AB JS 84, pp 91–92.

³⁸ AAWO, AK I W 21 (1882–1919).

³⁹ G. Matern, *Die katholischen Wohlthätigkeits-Anstalten und –Vereine sowie das katholisch-soziale Vereinsleben in der Diözese Ermland*, p. 50.

bork. The trust's beneficiaries were Cathedral Hill staff members and Frombork residents.

The chapter offered financial support to fire victims. The Fonds für Abgebrannte (foundation for fire victims was created in aid of this cause, and it was financed mainly by the Krämera (Kraemerische Stiftung) foundation. Most contributions amounted to 50 marks, but higher sums were also donated⁴⁰.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the German church saw the need to create an organization that would consolidate and coordinate charities in the fight against progressing poverty. In 1879, its efforts gave rise to the German Caritas Association (Caritasverband) seated in Freiburg. On 23 August 1916, the Convention of German Bishops proclaimed the association the official representative of the Catholic Caritas agency⁴¹.

The Caritas association in Warmia was established in 1906 under the name of Caritasverband für die Diözese Ermland. The founding meeting, held on 23 March 1906 at the Hunting Lodge in Königsberg, was attended by representatives of all charity institutions in the diocese. Meeting participants appointed the association's first board with the following composition: Andrzej Hinzmann of Orneta as the chairman, Jerzy Matern of Szalmia as the operating director, Wichert of Braniewo as a secular treasurer, Bishop Andrzej Thiel as the honorary chairman, followed by successive ordinaries⁴². The successive years witnessed only minor changes in the composition of the diocese's authorities. Jerzy Materna was replaced by Artur Kather of Elbląg in 1919, by Józef Steinki in 1924 and father Augustyn Scharnowski in 1936. The board of the diocese had minimum 12 members. The chairman and the director were appointed by the ordinary, whereas parish divisions were headed by parochial vicars. The association became responsible for nearly all types of charity projects. Caritas worked with parishes, charity institutions, associations and brotherhoods⁴³. Relief centers were created around the country. Kindergartens, girls' schools and organizations preparing girls for family life were opened in 52 towns and cities. The association refurbished hospitals, pensioner centers, it organized holiday camps for children from impoverished families and the Ruhr Basin.

⁴⁰ A. Kopiczko, *Dzieje Warmińskiej Kapituły Katedralnej*, part 1: *od 1821 roku*, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 52–53.

⁴¹ J. Majka, *Caritas*, in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 2, Lublin 1985, col. 1333.

⁴² Other priests were also members of the first board, among them Franciszek Dittrich, Paweł Küssner, Maksymilian Reichelt and Franciszek Schulz. – *Ermländische Zeitung*, 23 August 1906; R. Traba, *Niemcy–Warmiacy–Polacy*, p. 116.

⁴³ J. Steinki, *Katholische Caritas und katholisches Vereinswesen in der Diözese Ermland*, pp. 9–11.

Roman Jurkowski

THE CONGRESS OF VILNIUS IN 1906
AND THE CONGRESS OF KIEV IN 1907.
THE ATTEMPTS OF THE POLISH GENTRY FROM
THE TAKEN LANDS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON
POLITICAL PLATFORM DURING ELECTIONS
TO THE SECOND AND THIRD STATE DUMA

The relatively small Polish gentry communities occupying nine guberniyas (governorates) of Western Russia were successful in introducing to the First State Duma gentry 16 deputies out of the total of 84 mandates awarded to the region¹. Polish deputies vastly influenced the choice of four deputies who were not landowners². This was a huge achievement, and the Polish gentry were hoping to repeat that success in the elections to the Second Duma which were based on the same set of statutes. The elections to the First Duma were largely improvised, and the “constitutional enthusiasm” of candidates representing various nationalities in western guberniyas and the entire country lacked a specific political undertone. The Polish gentry failed to form organizations whose territorial reach extended beyond election committees at the district and guberniya level. Polish communities were characterized by a general uniformity of political views, and their potential opponents (state authorities, Russian nationalists, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarussian nationalists) were even less well prepared for the elections. The situation began to change rapidly after the short-lived term of the First Duma. The presence of two separate Polish groups in the Duma spurred the

¹ For more information about elections to the State Duma and the State Council, refer to: R. Jurkowski, *Sukcesy i porażki. Ziemiaństwo polskie Ziem Zabrzanych w wyborach do Dumy Państwowej i Rady Państwa 1906–1913*, Olsztyn 2009.

² They were Catholic priests: Bishop Edward Ropp and Father Antoni Songajłło, and two peasant deputies: Michał Gotowiecki and Marcin Żukowski.

political polarization of the Polish gentry, in particular in the associated intellectual communities of Vilnius, Kiev and, to a smaller extent, Minsk. The emergence of *Dziennik Wileński*³ and *Dziennik Kijowski*⁴, daily newspapers with a strong national-democratic orientation, accelerated this process, as demonstrated by press disputes of growing frequency and vehemence (mainly the Kiev Daily and the Lithuanian Courier in Vilnius) concerning the political program of deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia. During a short election campaign for the Second Duma (from 8 (21) July 1906, the dissolution of the First Duma, to January 1907, when the elections for the Second Duma took place), Polish press titles published in Vilnius, Kiev and Warsaw featured an extensive debate on whether the deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia should join forces with the Circle of the Polish Kingdom. Przemysław Dąbrowski⁵ recently presented us with an account of the National Democrats' position on the matter, but his views seem to be biased by newspapers sympathizing with the National Democrats. For this reason, this paper attempts to analyze the political and organizational aspects of two resolutions adopted during constituent congresses. The resolutions are presented in Annex 1 and Annex 2.

The National-Democrats' heightened press activity forced conservative and loyalist circles which controlled the vast majority of the Polish gentry to state their political views with greater openness and precision. This process fostered the emergence of ideological and political criteria which could be adopted by a successive group of candidates from the Taken Lands running for the Second Duma. The gentry working for the respective guberniyas' election committees decided to organize meetings where they could consolidate their views and action plans. The conservative members of that community were hoping to demonstrate that by outnumbering the National Democrats, they would emerge as the victors in the upcoming elections⁶. Organizational matters were of equal importance. Polish gentry representatives

³ The promotional issue came out on 6 (19) July 1906, and the first regular issue – on (14) September 1906. Cf.: R. Jurkowski, *"Kurier Litewski" w latach 1905–1907*, "Kwartalnik Historii Prasy Polskiej", R. XXII, (1983), No. 1, p. 89.

⁴ The first issue was published on 1 (14) February 1906. Cf.: M. Korzeniowski, *Za Złotą Bramą, Działalność społeczno-kulturalna Polaków w Kijowie w latach 1905–1920*, Lublin 2009, pp. 257–278.

⁵ P. Dąbrowski, *Narodowa Demokracja byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, Studium z zakresu myśli politycznej i działalności obozu narodowego na ziemiach litewsko-białoruskich w latach 1897–1918*, Kraków 2010, pp. 207–230.

⁶ In an analysis of the Vilnius congress, P. Dąbrowski (ibidem, p. 222) wrote that "the text somewhat changed the National Democrats' views about the solidarity of Polish deputies in the State Duma", which is a certain simplification because the National Democrats' decision was not influenced by the "text" but rather by the fact that they constituted a minority among the gentry. They were also a minority at the congress where resolutions were passed by a simple majority vote. Three National Democrats were outvoted by 20 members of the gentry. The author also erroneously spells the first name of Father Drucki-Lubecki (correct version: Hieronim) and the last name of Kazimierz Kaczkowski (not "Kuczkowski").

from nine guberniyas were able to convene only after the announcement of electoral laws for the Bulhygin Duma and the October Manifesto of 17 (30) October 1905. The gentry were hoping to debate on the establishment of a Central Elections Office covering the nine guberniyas, the methods of financing the operation of election committees as well as Lithuanian and Ruthenian representation in Petersburg. Those were the main objectives of the Vilnius Congress of 6–7 (19–20) December 1906. Similar topics were discussed in Kiev on 1–2 (14–15) September 1907, while the Vilnius Congress of 8–9 (21–22) January 1908 debated mainly on financial matters and failed to adopt any formal resolutions.

I. Political issues

The resolution published after the Vilnius congress contained guidelines for three categories of election committees at the municipal, district and guberniya level. In line with these recommendations, the selected candidates, electors and deputies had to officially comply with the provisions detailed in six paragraphs of the resolution (cf. Annex No. 1). Under paragraphs 1 and 4, the candidates had to accept the constitutional monarchy system (§1) and support measures aiming to develop an internal system of state rule (§4 – decentralization and territorial self-government). Paragraph 2 made a general reference to “constitutional freedoms” guaranteed to Russian citizens after 17 (30) October 1905 (equal treatment for members of various national and religious groups). Property rights and ownership laws in agriculture were discussed in §3. The last two paragraphs (§5 and §6) concerned the representation of Polish communities living in Lithuania and Ruthenia in the Duma. While the provisions of §5 which advised the deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia to join forces with representatives of other national groups did not stir heightened emotions⁷, paragraph 6, which recommended that “Polish Circle deputies abide by the principle of mutual support and solidarity in external action” spurred a long-term debate. The conflict was appeased only in 1912 when three of the five deputies elected for the Fourth Duma were members of the National Democratic Party. The vagueness of these provisions supported the formulation of various opinions, including Aleksander Chomiński’s statement which was readily cited by Józef Hłasko, editor-in-chief of *Dziennik Wileński*, namely that “the congress made it absolutely clear that an understanding should be reached with the Circle of the Polish Kingdom”⁸. The notion of “solidarity in external action”

⁷ Before the elections to the First Duma, *The principal declaration of Polish national election committees in the Kingdom of Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia during the first elections to the representative assembly of the Russian State* spoke of “local fractions” of the Polish Circle rather than a separate circle of deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia (P. Dąbrowski, op. cit. p. 211).

⁸ J. Hłasko, *Po zjeździe wileńskim*, “Dziennik Wileński”, No. 94 of 21 December 1906 (2 January 1907).

produced similar interpretation difficulties. Every speech delivered by members of the Polish Circle or the Circle of Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia in the Duma constituted “external action”, therefore, all statements and speeches were acts of solidarity, while “mutual support” could apply to all or selected matters on the agenda. The above also allowed a vast freedom of interpretation.

There are no surviving records of the three meetings in Vilnius. The laconic reference in Edward Woyniłłowicz’s memoirs does not contribute any valuable information⁹. A brief report on the Vilnius congress, delivered by count Ksawery Orłowski on 13 (26) December 1906 at a meeting of the Election Committee of the Podolian Guberniya¹⁰, is much more informative. According to the report, the Polish Election Committee of the Vilnius Guberniya initiated a debate on the self-proposed resolution of 23 October (5 November) 1906 containing 18 postulates (with additional sub-points) which constituted the committee’s election program¹¹. “Mr. Woyniłłowicz and Mr. Korwin Milewski gave harsh criticism to the proposed resolution. They argued that the resolution had been drafted in excessive detail and that it offered a variety of *mandats imperatifs* which would tie our deputies’ hands, turning them into mere pawns in the political game. They objected to such mandates and argued that the method had proven to be quite useless and harmful during Duma sessions. The Polish Circle was deprived of decision-making powers, and it had to consult all important matters with the central office of the National-Democratic Party in Warsaw. This procedure led to errors. The discussion about Poland’s autonomy was completely [this word was crossed out in pencil – R. J.] badly timed and presented in an inappropriate manner, which is why it received a very cold welcome at the Duma. The resolution was also criticized on account of its length. The election platform for our guberniyas should be laid out in a succinct fashion to contain only the most important postulates, while providing the deputies with extensive freedom of action”¹². The report suggests that meeting participants subscribed to the opinions of E. Woyniłłowicz and H. Korwin-Milewski.

⁹ He wrote: “Those congresses were always marked by the emergence of two completely opposite movements: an «all-Polish» trend which received its slogans from the National Democratic Party in the Kingdom of Poland, and a «domestic» movement that accounted for the local specificity and national identity of the Taken Lands and was more ideologically similar to the «party of realists» and «loyalists». (E. Woyniłłowicz, *Wspomnienia 1847–1928*, part 1, Wilno 1931, p. 173).

¹⁰ *Protokół posiedzenia polskiego podolskiego komitetu gubernialnego z dnia 13 Grudnia 1906 r. w Winnicy*, in: *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu a Duma Państwowa 1906–1907 i Rada Państwa 1907–1909. Materiały zebrane przez Kaliksta Dunin-Borkowskiego*, Jagiellonian Library, Manuscript Department, Rkps 7989 IV, k. 51–56.

¹¹ *Akcja gubernialna wileńska. Powstanie i organizacja Polskiego Gubernialnego Komitetu Wyborczego Wileńskiego. Uchwała Wileńskiego Polskiego Gubernialnego Komitetu Wyborczego z dnia 23 października 1906 roku*, “Kurier Litewski”, No. 246 of 29 October (11 November) 1906.

¹² *Protokół posiedzenia polskiego podolskiego komitetu gubernialnego z dnia 13 Grudnia 1906 r. w Winnicy*, in: *Polscy wielcy właściciele...*

A special committee responsible for drafting the “election platform” was appointed. Its performance was discussed at the following meeting and “the final editorial work was entrusted to Mr. Milewski to ensure the platform’s compliance with legal requirements”¹³. Ksawery Orłowski also remarked on the provisions of §§2, 5 and 6 of the Vilnius resolution: “the instructions for territorial groups and their relations with the Polish Circle were modeled on the regulations of our Circle in Vienna and the rules of P. circles [“P.” probably denotes “Polish” – R.J.] in the State Council. During a debate on the equal treatment of various nationalities, no reservations were made against the Jews”¹⁴.

E. Woyniłłowicz and H. Korwin-Milewski thus contributed to the formulation of a compendious election platform, and the latter was also responsible for the final shape of the six paragraphs of the Vilnius resolution. In view of later role the played by those two gentry members in the State Council and the Polish political community, E. Woyniłłowicz’s criticism of the Vilnius Guberniya Committee’s program stemmed from his “practical and civil” approach to politics. He was only too aware that members of the Polish gentry were inclined to discussion, conflict and hair-splitting, and he could have been afraid that a highly specific program (such as that proposed on 23 October (5 November) 1906) would divide and weaken the Polish community before the following elections. This explains why he lobbied for a short and highly generalized resolution. While H. Korwin-Milewski could have been guided by a similar logic, he held his political skills in very high esteem, therefore, a highly specific election program with strict instructions for parliamentary conduct would significantly restrict his freedom. Korwin-Milewski would never consent to such a solution, which directly led to his dismissal from the post of Vilnius deputy in the State Council in 1908–1909. In 1909, the Vilnius gentry granted to Korwin-Milewski a special privilege to speak individually (without the prior approval of Lithuanian and Ruthenian Circles) in the State Council¹⁵.

It quickly became apparent that the Vilnius resolution was not a golden measure. As is usually the case, it attracted both praise and criticism. To give more precision to §6 of the Vilnius resolution, it was further expanded during the congress in Kiev “to avoid interpretations that are inconsistent with the spirit and the original intention of Vilnius resolutions”. The follow-

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Ibidem. K. Orłowski refers to “territorial groups” in the plural. This implies that the Poles in the region of Podolia expected the constituents from Lithuania and Ruthenia to form two separate groups, while the gentry in north-western guberniyas always looked to the Circle of Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia as a single group and juxtaposed it against the Polish Circle from the Kingdom. The above implies strong regional separatism which became even more clearly manifested during the establishment of the constituency office in Petersburg.

¹⁵ For a detailed description and an analysis of Hipolit Korwin-Milewski’s efforts during elections to the State Council and his conduct in this house of the Russian parliament, refer to: R. Jurkowski, *Sukcesy i porażki...*, pp. 337, 354–367, 374–377, 381–384.

ing provisions were added: 1) it was unanimously decided that deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia “should create a separate and an unconditionally autonomous circle”. They should be able to choose whether they wanted to initiate any action “in solidarity with the Circle of the Polish Kingdom” and on the “principle of mutual reciprocity” in matters pertaining to “Polish national interests”, and in any other matters – “at the discretion of the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia” (cf. Annex No. 2). 2) This “solidarity on the principle of mutual reciprocity” was further restricted by “vital interests of our country” which, although second to “the general needs of the Polish nation”, proved to be more important than “Polish national affairs” because “our deputies should support all initiatives of the Polish Circle that do not stand in opposition to the interests of our Country”. The above statement emphasized the full autonomy of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian Circle, while the “solidarity of the two circles in matters pertaining to Polish national interests”, often postulated by press titles sympathizing with the National Democrats, was nothing more than the Polish gentry’s declaration of support for the Polish Circle’s postulates and projects concerning mainly the Kingdom of Poland (unless they “stood in opposition to the interests of our Country”, which was a highly generalized formula).

During the Kiev congress, the interpretation of the provisions of §6 the Vilnius resolution was actually expanded, and this accomplishment was a success of the conservative fraction of Polish landowners. It evoked protest from the National Democrats attending the congress as well as several landowners who were not party members but were responsible for communication between the two Polish circles in the Duma. Marcin Chełchowski and count Wawrzyniec Puttkamer, the most outstanding members of the National Democratic Party in the Vilnius guberniya, decreed the Kiev resolution to be “deficient and not sufficiently conducive to the promotion of solidarity”. They were joined by Bronisław Umiastowski and Bolesław Jałowiecki¹⁶, both official delegates of the Vilnius guberniya. In their votum separatum, they underlined that their objections to the amended §6 of the Vilnius resolution resulted from “diffuseness and ambiguity of the edited text which could lead to the misinterpretation of the essence of solidarity between the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia and the Circle of Royal Deputies”. Needless to say, the authors never defined the “essence of solidarity” or its practical implications¹⁷. The third group of delegates who raised objec-

¹⁶ Bolesław Jałowiecki did not even sympathize with the National Democrats, but he supported cooperation between the two circles for purely practical reasons. He believed that by joining forces, the two groups would stand greater changes in elections and parliamentary alliances.

¹⁷ P. Dąbrowski quotes an article in *Dziennik Wileński (Uchwała zjazdu kijowskiego)*, No. 202 of 5(18) September 1907) about a meeting of congress participants who protested against or were opposed to the expanded content of §6. In this context, he mentions Henryk Dymśza, although Dymśza had never expressed any remarks or objections on the list of signatories printed in the official text of the resolution (cf.: *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu...*, k. 232, printed leaflet).

tions to the amended version of §6 of the Vilnius resolution comprised Stanisław Horwatt and Kazimierz Kaczkowski, members of the Kiev guberniya committee. Although they voted for the amendments, they also remarked that the “Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia may exercise autonomy only under extraordinary circumstances and in the last resort”. This statement was more of a reflection on the NDP’s powerful influence on the Kiev guberniya committee than an expression of the delegates’ personal views.

As it could be expected in the light of §6 of the Vilnius resolution, National-Democratic press was less critical. Similarly to the above NDP activists from the Vilnius guberniya, Józef Hłasko also criticized the ambiguity of the solidarity provision “which could lead to skirmishes, making the task even more difficult for our deputies”¹⁸. *Dziennik Kijowski* formulated its opinions more openly: “regrettably, this interpretation is not quite successful in reconciling opposites”, but it also attempted to identify the common areas between the Polish gentry and the NDP: “despite poor editing, it undoubtedly emphasizes that the two circles will join forces in all matters pertaining to vital Polish interests. The deputies from the eastern territories would take independent action only if the Polish Circle’s decisions stood in opposition to the interests of our country”¹⁹. The reasons for this highly restrictive commentary in National-Democratic press, which was renowned for its highly aggressive stance towards conservative deputies²⁰, lay elsewhere, and I will mention them towards the end of this sub-chapter.

Although the resolutions adopted by both congresses attracted most criticism from the communities sympathizing with the National Democrats who opposed the concept of a civil society and accentuated its “Polishness”, skeptical voices were also heard among the loyalists who argued that the Vilnius resolution “was founded on nationalistic and not civil grounds”. This far-reaching interpretation of the Vilnius resolution (which made no references to the Polishness of election committees or the election of constituents who were Polish nationals – cf. Annex No. 2) was proposed by the district election committee in Kaunas. In a resolution of 30 January (12 February) 1907, “Kaunas delegates’ decision to sign the appeal of the Polish gentry representing nine guberniyas during the Vilnius congress was deemed as inappropriate”²¹. The reasons for the above were complex and they stemmed from the

¹⁸ J. Hłasko, *Uchwata Zjazdu kijowskiego*, “Dziennik Wileński”, No. 203 of 6 (19) September 1907.

¹⁹ *Uchwały Kijowskie*, introduction, “Dziennik Kijowski”, No. 202 of 6 (19) September 1907.

²⁰ In 1907–1909, the National Democrats were engaged in a conflict with the Polish Domestic Alliance in Ruthenia. (R. Jurkowski, *Polskie Stronnictwo Krajowe na Rusi 1907–1909*, “Echa Przeszłości”, vol. X, (2009), pp. 191–219.

²¹ M. Br[ensztejnl], *Kowno, prawyборы ziemiańskie*, “Kurier Litewski”, No. 26 of 2 (15) February 1907.

election strategy of the Kaunas gentry who were hoping to solicit the support of politically undecided Lithuanians by promoting to loyalist slogans²². This gave rise to the short-lived concept of the “non-curial principle” which aimed to ensure that church curias selected candidates from districts outside the respective curia in parliamentary elections. The deputies were to be selected on account of “their ability and character”²³ rather than nationality or social status. For this reason, the criticism given to the “nationalistic” resolutions adopted at the Vilnius congress quickly subsided after the Polish deputies from Kaunas had lost the elections to the Second Duma.

The Podolia gentry began to have doubts. During a pre-election meeting in the guberniya on 3 (16) February 1907, they inquired why the word “Polish” had been omitted in the title of the Vilnius program. Count Ksawery Orłowski, the meeting chairman, gave the following explanation: “the title has been developed by delegates from guberniya committees, and each committee chose to operate under a different name. Many committees had mixed composition, and their delegates could not come to an agreement on the program’s title. Coming from Poland, chauvinism would be grossly out of place in reference to something as trivial as a title, because the entire program clearly asserts the participants’ Polishness and the fact that it had been developed for the Poles”²⁴. The discussion at the meeting indicates that the Podolia gentry had very limited knowledge about nationalistic and political relations in Lithuanian and Belarusian guberniyas. Gentry member Waclaw Skibniewski emphasized that “Lithuania abides by different relations, it has a different composition of national groups. In Lithuania, constitutional-democratic principles do not pose a threat for nationalistic ideas, and a vote based on four democratic principles is possible”. In Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, a vote based on those principles would completely eliminate the Polish minority from every platform of public life. Skibniewski asked the chairman and the Podolia delegate to the Vilnius congress “what guarantee is there that our union with Lithuania will not result in a rift?”²⁵. In his answer, K. Orłowski emphasized the strongest bond between members of the Polish gentry in Ruthenia and Lithuania: “we share the same views on the agricultural problem. The Vilnius congress was of the opinion that members of territorial circles were not allowed to join Russian political parties. The above could not have been contained in the program for a variety of reasons”. His reply cut the discussion short. Count Orłowski argued that the vagueness and terseness of the Vilnius resolution was dictated by “the Lithuanians’ caution and fear of being attacked by various par-

²² I have discussed this in detail in: *Sukcesy i porażki...*, pp. 168–169, 435.

²³ M. Br.[ensztein], *Akcja wyborcza w guberni kowieńskiej*, KL, No. 27 of 4 (17) February 1907.

²⁴ *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu...*, k. 85.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, k. 86.

ties”²⁶. The following resolution was adopted unanimously: “Polish voters in Podolia advise their constituents to abide by the postulates of the Vilnius resolution and seek union with the Circle of the Polish Kingdom”²⁷.

The unconditional formation of a separate circle of Polish deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia, as decreed by the resolution of the Kiev congress, was a huge blow for the Nationalists both in the Kingdom and the Taken Lands. In this situation, the NDP actually benefited from the vagueness of §6. Józef Hłasko, the leading National-Democratic journalist in Vilnius, praised the Vilnius resolution and searched for weaknesses in the Kiev resolution. But the NDP played a more subtle game which was not based on mere praise or criticism. The National-Democrats chose to praise the Vilnius resolution only after the Kiev congress had put an end to the free interpretation of the relations between the two circles (or at least its selected aspects) that was allowed under the vague provisions of §6. Before the Kiev congress, National-Democratic press strongly criticized the Vilnius resolution for its failure to directly address the merger with the Polish Circle. Despite the above, the National Democrats were reluctant to attack the Kiev resolution for at least two reasons: 1) they constituted a minority among Polish guberniya committees and Polish deputy groups from nine guberniyas, and excessive criticism of the Kiev resolution would cost them the support of populous gentry communities that held conservative views or simply refused to accept National-Democratic ideas. For this reason, the criticism given by National-Democratic deputies in Kiev was toned down, and it merely pointed to the resolution’s lengthy and ambiguous character which was “not sufficiently conducive to the promotion of solidarity”. The National-Democrats did not directly criticize the formation of a separate circle of deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia or the principles of cooperation between both Polish circles in the Duma; 2) the former National-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma (M. Chełchowski, M. Węśławski and W. Puttkamer), publishers of National-Democratic newspapers in Vilnius and Kiev, were fully aware that the relations between the two Polish circles in the Second Duma had been far less optimistic than described by National-Democratic press²⁸. They realized that the Kiev resolution summarized the attitudes of the loyalist

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem. k. 86.

²⁸ Przemysław Dąbrowski had no knowledge of archive materials from Russia, and basing his views on press reports and the biased opinions of Włodzimierz Dworzaczek (in a series of articles in *Dziennik Wileński*, later *Dziennik Kijowski*, published in a brochure entitled *Polityka “Koła postów Polaków z Litwy i Rusi”*, Wilno 1907), he portrayed the cooperation between two circles as nearly harmonious (op. cit., pp. 225–226). The fact that such collaboration did not exist despite shared meetings and committees is illustrated not only by archive materials, but also by the fact (which was cited and misinterpreted by Dąbrowski who argued that it had led to the dissolution of the Second Duma) that the circles had been unable to agree on meeting regulations or the terms of parliamentary cooperation during the 100 days in the Duma.

gentry circle and other communities who perceived the National Democrats to be the main source of political conflict in the Taken Lands and objected against the instrumental treatment offered by the Polish Circle to the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia in the Second Duma. The choice of National-Democratic constituents for the Third Duma (the elections were scheduled for 1907, less than a month after the Kiev congress) was completely determined by the gentry curia which was dominated by land-owners who sympathized with the loyalists and had neutral or hostile attitudes towards the NDP. The above fact fully explains the National Democrats' restraint in formulating opinions about the Kiev resolution²⁹.

Could the resolutions of the congresses in Vilnius and Kiev be regarded as an effective platform for Polish gentry's election committees? The Vilnius resolution did prove to be helpful, but only to the extent that it offered general political advice for the candidates. Czesław Jankowski referred to them as "election slogans" which "should be adopted by the candidates to solicit the support of their voters"³⁰. The vagueness of the Vilnius resolution and the fact that the Kiev resolution merely supplemented the last paragraph of the document drafted in Vilnius clearly demonstrated that the committees from nine guberniyas of Western Russia could not hope to develop a shared political program or electoral procedures. Even if the progressing political diversification among the Polish gentry was not a factor obstructing the development of shared principles, the vagueness of the Vilnius resolution was also affected by the local characteristics of Polish gentry from nine guberniyas, the differences in their social and political views and, above all, their attitudes towards parliamentary rule in Russia.

II. Organizational matters

The only press coverage given to a two-day meeting in Aleksander Chomiński's apartment in Świętojerska St. (later 21/5 Mickiewicza St.)³¹ included the publication of the adopted resolutions. This decision was proba-

²⁹ However, their restraint did not bring the anticipated results. The loyalist gentry were hoping that by opposing the National Democrats, they would attract the support of other national groups in the Taken Lands, thus silencing the anti-Polish propaganda of Russian nationalists and winning the authorities' approval. They were reluctant to support National Democratic candidates in elections to the Third Duma. None of them were elected, and a parliamentary seat went only to Father Stanisław Maciejewicz who was supported by the National Democrats, but was elected in Vilnius (not by the gentry) (refer to: R. Jurkowski, *Sukcesy i porażki...*, pp. 335–336).

³⁰ Cz. Jankowski, *Po zjeździe, cz. II*, "Kurier Litewski", No. 281 of 12 (25) December 1906.

³¹ At the time, A. Chomiński chaired the Polish Election Committee of the Vilnius Guberniya. According to his son's unpublished memoirs, Chomiński was the event's initiator (L. Chomiński, *Pamiętniki*, T. IV, National Library, Manuscript Department, Akc. 9736, k. 14–15). The memoirs describe differences in the delegates' political views and deliver an overtly hagiographic account of Aleksander Chomiński's role in formulating and adopting the resolution.

bly made deliberately in order not to raise the suspicions of the authorities who continued to scrutinize Polish gentry's political activities and were resentful of any communication between the Poles in the Taken Lands that escaped the formal constraints of the guberniya framework³². A meeting agenda was probably drafted, but the document was lost. In Jan Olizar's letter to Stanisław Syroczyński of 19 January (1 February) 1907, found in the Manuscripts Department of the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in Kiev, we read that meeting participants debated on the incorporation of an institution combining all election committees from nine guberniyas in Western Russia. Count Jan Olizar wrote to his colleague, a member of the State Council: "Many persons are of the opinion that we need a permanent organization to coordinate our election efforts and represent us in various political matters, both in Petersburg and at home. I believe that such an organizations should begin their operations only after the elections, and for practical reasons, they should be created separately by every guberniya with a postulate regarding their [illegible word – R.J.] communication, while one organization should represent all guberniyas, as it has been suggested in Vilnius [...]. The main goal is to create such organizations everywhere. Their form may vary, but those differences will level out with time, and an understanding will be reached"³³. At the time, Olizar's concept had not yet fully matured, and he failed to specify how those institutions were to "represent us in Petersburg". Nevertheless, he proposed to create more permanent institutions than the committees running election campaigns to the Duma and the State Council. Olizar was probably referring to elections to the planned lands, but the cited letter clearly indicates that members of the Vilnius-based meeting had debated on an institution coordinating the work of elec-

³² The correspondence exchanged by Włodzimierz Suchomlinow, General-Governor of Vohlynia, Kiev and Podolia, and Paweł Ignatiew, Kiev Governor, after the Kiev congress indicates that those fears were not unfounded. Although the congress's organizers, Stanisław Horwatt, Stanisław Syroczyński and Piotr Podgórski, had the resolution officially approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Petersburg, Suchomlinow had his doubts about a meeting "that was a continuation of the congress [...] without a program, without outsider participation, that did not fit the definition of a public meeting" (from S. Syroczyński's letter to P. Ignatiew, dated 4 (17) September 1907 in: Центральний Державний Історичний Архів України у Києві, ф. 442, оп. 857, д. 430, л. 3). He argued that the presence of "landowners from non-Ukrainian guberniyas" during a meeting held after the formal part of the congress "could not be regarded as an ordinary meeting, and pursuant to the provisions of §17 of the law of 4 (17) March 1906, it falls subject to the decisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose approval had not been obtained". The organizers reported the meeting only to the civilian governor. For more information, refer to: *Sukcesy i porażki...*, pp. 429–430. The general-governor's reaction to a closed-doors meeting (reported to the governor) attended by 9 former deputies to the State Duma and 4 deputies to the State Council (in accordance with the law of official ranks, the latter ranked higher in the court hierarchy than general-governors) testified not only to general W. Suchomlinow's hostility, but to Russian authorities' open reluctance towards any movements organized by the Polish gentry on a scale broader than the guberniya.

³³ Національна Бібліотека Академії Наук України імені В. Вернадського, Рукописний Відділ, ф. XXIV, д. 2036, Станіслав Сырочинський.

tion campaigns. Unfortunately, their plans never materialized, and the hostility of the authorities was not the only reason. The committees in each guberniya were founded by the local gentry, and they were characterized by different organizational standards and level of activity. Some guberniya committees (the several dozen district and municipal committees would require a book-length study) were very active and effectively organized, among them Kaunas, Vilnius and Podolia, while others, including Kiev, Volhynia and Minsk, had no permanent address in late 1907³⁴. The efforts to establish a Central Office³⁵ were also impaired by the fact that several signatories of the Vilnius program later failed to observe its provisions or complied with them at their sole discretion. The above example of the district committee in Kaunas and the way it influenced the Kaunas Guberniya Committee fully asserts this observation.

Although the debates were not followed by any concrete action aiming to create a central institution assisting election committees, several months after assuming their post in the Second Duma, the members of the gentry noted that the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia should receive legal and administrative support from a constituency office. Whether such support should be provided by a Central Office in one of the largest cities in the western guberniyas or a Petersburg-based office was the second most ardently debated topic during the Kiev congress. A full meeting agenda did not survive to our days, but information on the topics discussed during the congress can be found in other sources. Count Ksawery Orłowski attended the Kiev congress as a delegate of the Podolian Election Committee. The committee's agenda of 16 and 17 September 1907 features Orłowski's abridged report: "The congress was chaired by Stanisław Horwatt, Mr. Montwiłł and Tołoczko [the correct spelling is "Tołłoczko" – R.J.] acted as its vice chairmen, and Mr. Dymcza held the post of secretary. During the first part of the meeting, the participants debated on the establishment of a legal office and a spokesman's office in Petersburg which would

³⁴ This information can be found in a letter of 7 (20) December 1907 written by Bronisław Umiastowski, vice chairman and secretary of the Polish Voters Committee of the Vilnius Guberniya, in response to Michał Brensztejn's, secretary of the Telsiai District Committee, request for the addresses of all guberniya committees. Umiastowski wrote: "We are not in possession of the exact addresses of all guberniya committees. Despite our numerous requests, we have not been provided with the relevant data. Below you will find «temporary» addresses to which we mail our correspondence". In the list, Roman Skirmunt's address in the Minsk guberniya section features a question mark, and the Volhynian, Kiev and Podolian committees are linked to S. Horwatt's address with a note "these three committees have a single central office", which was not true at the time the letter was written. (Государственный Архив Российской Федерации в Москве, [ГАРФ], ф. 5122, оп. 1, д. 70, л. 41).

³⁵ This is how Michał Brensztejn referred to the planned institution in the report from a meeting of representatives of 8 guberniya election committees in Vilnius on 8-9 January 1908 (Lietuvos Valstybės Istorijos Archyvas, Vilnius, [LVIA], ô. 1135, id'. 6, ä. 16, ë. 31, *Protokół z posiedzenia przedstawicieli komitetów wyborczych gubernialnych Kijowskiego, Wołyńskiego, Mohylowskiego, Mińskiego, Witebskiego, Grodzieńskiego, Kowieńskiego i Wileńskiego z 8 i 9 I 1908 r.*).

monitor the press and respond to any negative publicity. The proposed institution would also be a constituency office. The annual cost of running an office was estimated at 18,000 rubles, divided equally into 2,000 rubles per each of the nine guberniyas. The first down payment of 1,000 rubles would be made directly after the office opened³⁶. Michał Brensztejn, secretary of the Election Committee of the Kaunas Guberniya³⁷, gave a more detailed account of the Kiev debate in a report of 17 September 1907: "Members of the Kiev congress deemed it appropriate to create a permanent constituency office in Petersburg in addition to the permanent guberniya organization. The constituency office would develop projects in collaboration with experts, it would collect information and statistical materials, perform chancellery services, collect and store documents between the Duma's successive terms, transfer those documents to the new Circle and maintain our representation in the Duma. The cost has been calculated in Kiev at 18,000 rubles, including office and library furnishing expenses, etc. Every Lithuanian guberniya shall contribute 2,000 rubles annually³⁸, one-half this year, and one-half in 1908"³⁹. None of the reports mention the Central Office, and only M. Brensztejn makes a reference to a "permanent guberniya organization" which, similarly to the organizations quoted in J. Olizar's letter to S. Syroczyński, could imply gentry organizations at the guberniyas level which, in addition to their involvement in the elections for the Duma and the State Council, fostered the development of social and cultural life in Polish communities. He makes no reference to a spokesman's office mentioned by count K. Orłowski, although it can be presumed that the project to open a spokesman's office and a constituency office had been approved by the delegates in Kaunas. The Kiev congress decided to create a constituency office in Petersburg, and its upkeep would be paid for equally by Lithuanian and Ruthenian guberniyas in annual installments of 2,000 rubles each. The efforts to set up the office began in late December 1907⁴⁰.

It could seem that the high cost of maintaining a constituency office would discourage the gentry from reactivating the Central Office concept for guberniya election committees, but this was not the case. In the following,

³⁶ *Protokół posiedzenia Podolskiego Komitetu Gubernialnego d. 16 i 17 Września 1907 r. w Winnicy*, in: *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu...*, k. 149–153.

³⁷ We do not know if he attended the Kiev congress, and whether the report was a direct account or was based on second-hand information. He was not listed in the official resolution, but this does not mean that he had not attended the congress. Only the delegates voted on the resolution, and only their names were printed in the text. Therefore, it is highly probable that he was a member of the Kaunas delegation.

³⁸ M. Brensztejn probably forgot to add "and Ruthenian" in this sentence. Even if Lithuania were treated as a group of 6 north-eastern guberniyas, it would not raise 18,000 rubles in installments of 2,000 rubles each. A total of nine guberniyas had to contribute to raise the required amount.

³⁹ LVIA, ф. 1135, оп. 6, л. 2, л. 45.

⁴⁰ Refer to: R. Jurkowski, *Sukcesy i porażki...*, pp. 437–446.

heavily publicized congress of delegates from guberniya committees (delegates from Podolia did not attend) which took place in Vilnius on 8–9 January 1908, the matter was readdressed by Józef Montwiłł, the congress’s initiator and organizer⁴¹. “Montwiłł proposed to create a central office in Vilnius to which all legislative drafts would be forwarded for the general use of guberniya committees”⁴². The idea did not pick up, and it was ultimately abandoned when Kazimierz Zawisza, a Kaunas guberniya deputy to the Third Duma, declared to distribute government drafts to all guberniya committees. The congress rejected Professor Józef Ziemacki’s motion to “establish a magazine defending Polish interests in Petersburg”, but admitted that “a spokesman’s division should open in the constituency office to distribute information on the deputies’ activities and issue disclaimers in response to false information printed in Russian and foreign press”⁴³. The gentry in Vilnius recognized the dire need for a special newspaper presenting the Polish community’s views and opposing the increasingly aggressive Russian nationalism. As always, funding was the main problem. The high cost of running the constituency office had already impaired the committees’ financing capabilities, which is why the following provision was entered in the congress report: “Should the Circle’s funds prove to be insufficient [for creating a “spokesman’s office” – R. J.], we hereby ask the Circle of Deputies to create an additional budget and communicate it to guberniya committees”. In practice, this implied that the spokesman’s office project would never take off⁴⁴.

The majority of the proposed projects could not be implemented for reasons of financial difficulty. The constituency office in Petersburg drained the committees’ funds, and it was practically the only initiative of Vilnius and Kiev congresses that had been implemented⁴⁵. The joint meetings of three Lithuanian guberniya in Vilnius – the Podolia Organization project developed by the Podolia guberniya committee – was open to the remaining

⁴¹ The congress was chaired by count Jan Olizar, his deputies were Edmund Bortkiewicz and Michał Węśławski, and the secretaries were Tomasz Zan and Bronisław Umiastowski.

⁴² LVIA, ф. 1135, оп. 6, д. 16, л. 31, *Protokół z posiedzenia przedstawicieli...*

⁴³ Ibidem. The same report can be found in ГАРФ, ф. 5122, оп. 1, д. 70, л. 57. It also indicates that Professor J. Ziemacki raised an additional motion to “instruct the spokesman’s office in the Deputy Circle to investigate the newspaper’s establishment [...] for protecting Polish national rights”.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ Although funding had been allegedly scarce, three guberniya committees in Russia gave 1,000 rubles, a significant amount at the time, to cover the cost of “welcoming the delegates for the Kiev committee”. The report from the meeting of the Podolian Guberniya Committee of 16–17 September 1907 reads: “The cost of welcoming election committee delegates from 6 Lithuanian guberniyas to the first and the second congress amounted to 1,000 rubles, and it would be covered in equal part by Podolia, Volhynia and Ukraine; therefore, it was agreed that Fr.[anciszek] Jaroszyński would pay to count X. Orłowski 333 rubles and 33 kopeks from the committee’s budget in virtue of Podolia’s contribution” (*Protokół posiedzenia Podolskiego Komitetu Gubernialnego d. 16 i 17 Września 1907 r. w Winnicy*, in: *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu...*, k. 149–153).

guberniyas in the Ukraine, and it paved the way to cooperation at the supra-local level. Nevertheless, a single central institution was never created. The Polish gentry were gradually losing their interest in political and social matters. Russian nationalism was expanding, fuelled by the Orthodox Church and state authorities, and it prompted many Polish landowners to adopt the “wait quietly for better times” strategy that had guaranteed their survival after the January Uprising. The new electoral law of 3 (16) June 1907 cut the number of Polish gentry deputies from seven in the Third Duma to five in the Fourth Duma. The Third and the Fourth Duma no longer addressed the issue of “expropriation of private land”, therefore they did not pose a threat to the gentry, and the peasants’ revolutionary inclinations, which had raised the gentry’s fears during the First and the Second Duma, were effectively put down by a repressive state policy.

* * *

In an attempt to evaluate the political significance of the discussed congresses, it seems that E. Wyoniłowicz’s and H. Korwin-Milewski’s proposal to formulate election postulates in a rather vague and succinct manner was a clever tactical maneuver. It laid the foundations for developing detailed programs and formulating the gentry’s standpoint towards other political parties, both Polish and foreign. The decisions passed at both congresses paved the way to a resolution of the Podolian Guberniya Committee of 17 September 1907 which was adopted after a stormy debate over the political program of the Polish Domestic Alliance, an organization created in Ruthenia in 1907: “The Podolian guberniya Committee hereby approves the resolutions adapted on 6 and 7 December 1906 and 1 and 2 September 1907 at the Kiev congress and the Vilnius congress of delegates from 9 guberniyas as its shared election platform that shall be binding for our organization during negotiations with other political groups. No other program of any other political alliance shall be binding”⁴⁶. The provisions of the Vilnius resolution also served as a venture point in discussions and agreements during the creation of temporary election alliances in Grodno, Vitebsk, Minsk, Mohyliv and Żytomierz. They were the last point of reference below which no concessions were made.

According to Wincent Lisowski, the only Polish deputy from three Ukrainian guberniyas, the Kiev Congress and the Vilnius Congress had convened “to cope with our inability to cooperate. The future is bleak, we do not know how the Ruthenian problem will be resolved. It could pose a significant difficulty, and we should come up with an effective strategy”⁴⁷. This highly accurate observation of the future Podolian deputy pointed to the dire need for cooperation between Polish gentry groups in the Taken Lands.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, col. 85.

Both the Kiev congress and the Vilnius congress brought together the leading members of the Polish gentry from the distant guberniyas of Western Russia but it was only the beginning of the long road that was drastically blocked by the war and the revolution. Polish landowners from the Kaunas region differed significantly from members of the gentry residing in Ploskirov or Olgopol, and this issue still waits to be explored. Count K. Orłowski's account of Lithuanian and Belorussian gentry delivered to members of the Podolian community after his return from the Vilnius congress suggest that even the most prosperous circles of the Polish gentry had very little knowledge about their countrymen residing in other parts of the country, especially their social and political views. The congresses paved the way to communication and dialogue between the Poles inhabiting the Taken Lands which greatly aided their efforts during the war and the February revolution in Russia. Unfortunately, those efforts were not sufficient to rescue the Polish gentry residing in those territories.

Annex No. 1

Resolution adopted by the congress of election committee delegates from nine guberniyas and the city of Vilnius regarding election principles and the conduct of deputies to the Second Duma. Vilnius, 6-7 (19-20) December 1906.

Congress of Election Committee delegates

“With the aim of ensuring the successful representation of Lithuania and Ruthenia in the future State Duma, the delegates of Election Committees from nine guberniyas and the city of Vilnius have thus convened in Vilnius on 6 and 7 December 1906, in the presence of six deputies to the State Council, to recommend to guberniya, district and municipal committees that the candidates for deputies support and observe the following principles:

1. Implementation and development of constitutional principles.
2. Equal rights to all national and religious groups.
3. Inviolability of property, formal regulation of title to property and property possession, abolishing geographical separation of farmland and servitude, land consolidation, improving farming culture in small estates.
4. Decentralization of state and public institutions, promotion of territorial self-government rule.
5. Polish deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia will form a unified circle, and they will attempt to reach an understanding with deputies from other national groups inhabiting our country – as an integral part of this program.
6. An understanding will be reached with the Circle of Deputies from the Kingdom of Poland for the purpose of mutual support and joined external action.

Signed by delegates of the following Committees:

Vilnius:

– Aleksander Chomiński, Wawrzyniec Puttkamer,

City of Vilnius:

– W. Węsławski – Chairman of the Polish Committee of Central Vilnius

Grodno:

– Juljan Tołłoczko, Józef Bańkowski,

Kaunas:

– Tadeusz Dowgird, Zygmunt Węcławowicz,

Minsk:

– Hieronim Drucki-Lubecki, Józef Świącicki,

Vitebsk:

– Henryk Dymśa, Bohdan Szachno,

Mohyliv:

– Waldemar Doria-Dernałowicz, Waclaw Wasilewski,

Kiev:

– Stanisław Horwatt, Kazimierz Kaczkowski,

Volhynia:

– Szczęsny Poniatowski, Jan Olizar,

Podolia:

– Ksawery Orłowski,

The undersigned State Council deputies give their support to the above mentioned resolution: Edward Woyniłłowicz, Hipolit Korwin-Milewski, Dymitr Korybut-Daszkiewicz, Count Aleksander Tyszkiewicz, Stanisław Łopaciński, Jan Olizar”.

[source:] *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu a Duma Państwowa 1906-1907 i Rada Państwa 1907-1909. Materiały zebrane przez Kaliksta Dunin-Borkowskiego*, Jagiellonian Library, Manuscript Department, Rkps 7989 IV, k. 232, printed leaflet; text of the resolution: *Akcja przedwyborcza dziewięciu guberni*, “Kurier Litewski”, No. 279 of 8 (21) December 1906.

Annex No. 2***Resolution adopted by the Kiev congress of delegates from election committees in nine guberniyas of Lithuania and Ruthenia. Kiev, 1-2 (14-15) September 1907.***

“During a meeting of 1-2 September 1907, the Kiev congress of delegates from election committees in nine guberniyas of Lithuania and Ruthenia approves the resolutions adopted by the Vilnius congress on 6-7 December 1906, but in order to avoid interpretations that are inconsistent with the spirit and the original intention of Vilnius resolutions, the Kiev congress hereby declares that our that deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia shall

create a separate and an unconditionally autonomous circle. In addition to the general needs of the Polish nation, the Circle should promote the interests of our country. Its decisions and independent strategies shall be formulated in consideration of the diverse characteristics of our country. It shall promote the interests of all nationalities inhabiting the country, and it shall foster the growth of amicable relations on the principle of equality. It should initiate action in solidarity with the Circle of the Polish Kingdom and on the principle of mutual reciprocity in matters pertaining to Polish national interests, and in any other matters – at the discretion of the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia. Our deputies shall support all initiatives of the Polish Circle that do not stand in opposition to the interests of our Country. The rules of cooperation between the two Circles shall be formulated by the deputies of Lithuania and Ruthenia.

Guberniya delegates:

Kiev: – we sign this resolution in the name of solidarity, but we are of the opinion that the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia may exercise autonomy only under extraordinary circumstances and in the last resort:

– Stanisław Horwatt, Kazimierz Kaczkowski

Volhynia:

– Szczęsny Poniatowski, E[ugeniusz] Starczewski

Podolia:

– Ksawery Orłowski, J[ózef] Orłowski

Vilnius: Two Vilnius deputies made reservations. We voted against the resolution to supplement §6 of the Resolution of the Vilnius Congress of 6-7 December 1906 due to the diffuseness and ambiguity of the edited text which could lead to the misinterpretation of the essence of solidarity between the Circle of Polish Deputies from Lithuania and Ruthenia and the Circle of Royal Deputies - Bolesław Jałowicki, Bronisław Umiastowski.

Grodno:

– Julian Tołłoczko, Adam Zamoyski

Minsk:

– M[ichał] Jastrzębski, R[oman] Skirmunt

Vitebsk:

– Henryk Dymśa, former deputy, K[onrad] Niedźwiecki

Mohyliv:

– K[onstanty] Gordziałkowski, Michał Obieziński

Kaunas:

– Józef Montwiłł, Feliks Raczkowski

Members of the State Council, present:

– E[dward] Woyniłłowicz, Jan Olizar, W[ładysław] Woynicz] Sianożęcki, Aleksander Tyszkiewicz

Former deputies:

- A[leksander] Chomiński, former deputy W[incenty] Lisowski, Henryk Dymśa,
- M[arian] Chełchowski – nonetheless, I consider the congress's resolution to be deficient and not sufficiently conducive to the promotion of solidarity.
- W[awrzyniec] Puttkamer – I subscribe to the above opinion”.

[source:] *Polscy wielcy właściciele ziemscy na Podolu a Duma Państwowa 1906–1907 i Rada Państwa 1907–1909. Materiały zebrane przez Kaliksta Dunin-Borkowskiego*, Jagiellonian Library, Manuscript Department, Rkps 7989 IV, k. 230, printed leaflet; text of the resolution: *Uchwała zjazdu kijowskiego*, “Dziennik Wileński”, No. 202 of 5 (18) September 1907.

Jan Sobczak

ALEXEI NIKOLAEVICH, TSAREVICH OF RUSSIA

This article does not aspire to give an exhaustive account of the life of Alexei Nikolaevich, not only for reasons of limited space. The role played by the young lad who was much loved by the nation, became the Russian tsesarevich and was murdered at the tender age of 14, would not justify such an effort. In addition to delivering general biographical information about Alexei that can be found in a variety of sources, I will attempt to throw some light on the less known aspects of his life that profoundly affected the fate of the Russian Empire and brought tragic consequences for the young imperial heir¹.

Alexei Nikolaevich was born in Peterhof on 12 August (30 July) 1904 on Friday at noon, during an unusually hot summer that had started already in February, at the beginning of Russia's much unfortunate war against Japan. Alexei was the fifth child and the only son of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna. He had four older sisters who were the Grand Duchesses: Olga (8.5 years older than Alexei), Tatiana (7 years older), Maria (5 years older) and Anastasia (3 years older). In line with the law of succession, Alexei automatically became heir to the throne, and his birth was heralded to the public by a 300-gun salute from the Peter and Paul Fortress. According to Nicholas II, the imperial heir was named Alexei to break away from a nearly century-old tradition of naming the oldest sons Alexander and Nicholas and to commemorate Peter the Great's father, Alexei Mikhailovich, the second tsar of the Romanov dynasty that had ruled over Russia for nearly 300 years from the 17th century. Nicholas II held Alexei Mikhailovich in greatest esteem from among all of his predecessors. A supreme manifesto was issued on the occasion, stating that in the event of the Tsar's premature death, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich was to become the regent, and it placed the imperial heir in Alexandra's care².

¹ For the unabridged version of this article, refer to: *Aleksy (1904–1918) – ostatni cesarzewicz i następcą tronu rosyjskiego* in the memorial book published by Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań to commemorate the 70th birthday anniversary of Professor Artur Kijas. See: *Studia z dziejów Europy Wschodniej*, ed. G. Błaszczyk and P. Kraszewski, Poznań 2010, pp. 267–287.

² S.S. Oldenburg, *Tsarstvovanye Imperatora Nikolaya II*, Moscow 1992, p. 227.

The beaming father wrote in his meticulously kept diary: “An unforgettable and great day, on which we received so evident a sign of God’s love. At a quarter past one in the afternoon Alix had a son, who was named Alexei during prayers. [...] No words are adequate to thank God for the consolation he has bestowed on us in this year of difficult tribulations!”³ Alexei’s mother, Alexandra, wrote: “Weight – 4660, height – 58, head circumference – 38, chest circumference – 39”⁴. The royal family’s joy knew no bounds as the birth of four successive daughters left Nicholas II and Alexandra with little hope of producing an imperial heir. Various treatments, visits to the spa, pilgrimages to holy places and the assistance of venerated elders did not bring the desired results. Alexandra was even diagnosed with a false pregnancy. Suddenly, great happiness was bestowed upon the family.

The prolonged waiting for the birth of a successor to the monarch’s throne caused concern in the royal court and political circles across the country, turning into a serious worry that occupied the tsar’s mind. After Alexandra had given birth to their third daughter, Maria, in 1899, Nicholas II became so irritated that he had to take a long walk in the park before greeting his newborn child⁵. The tsarina’s every successive pregnancy raised hopes, and every delivery that did not meet expectations fuelled public speculations⁶. The inability to produce a successor became a state affair. In his coronation manifesto, published in Livadya on 3 November (21 October) 1894 directly after the death of Alexander III, Nicholas II requested an oath of allegiance not only to the monarch but also to Duke George “*who would remain his legal successor until God blesses his future marriage with Princess Alix of Hesse*”⁷. This was not an extraordinary request. During regular and

³ From Nicky’s diary, *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra: nieznaną korespondencją*, Selection, A. Maylunas, S. Mironienko, translated by M. Dors, Warszawa 1998, pp. 267–268. English translation: article by Augusta Pobedinskaja, Royal Russia – Directory, <http://www.angelfire.com/pa/ImperialRussian/royalty/russia/aleksei.html>. For the original Russian text of the cited excerpt, refer to: *Dnyevniki Imperatora Nikolaya II*, ed. K. F. Shachillo, Moscow 1991, p. 222.

⁴ From the diary of Alexandra Feodorovna, *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 267.

⁵ G. King, *Imperatritsa Alexandra Feodorovna. Biografia*, Zakharov-Moscow 2000, p. 185.

⁶ During his stay in Gatchina on 10 June (29 May) 1897 when the tsar’s oldest daughter, Olga, was born, Grand Duke Constantine Constantinovich, the tsar’s uncle, wrote in his diary: “*The news traveled fast, but everyone was disappointed because this time, they were expecting a boy*” in: From KR’s diary, *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 183. The tsar’s brother, George, also noted in a letter to Nicholas II “*I hope you will forgive me – I felt slightly disappointed that it was a girl. I was getting ready to retire [to give up his function of imperial heir], but it looks like I will not be able to do so for a while*”, George’s letter to Nicky of 14 (2) June 1897 from Abbas Tuman, *ibidem*. Similar attitudes are found in the letters written by other members of the tsar’s family, including tsarina Alexandra and Queen Victoria, upon the birth of successive daughters. Some of them, including Grand Duke Constantine Constantinovich, wrote after Maria’s birth: “*I do regret that it was not a boy. Poor Alix! Russia will be so disappointed by this news*”. From the diary of KR, 26 (14) June 1899, *ibidem*, p. 205.

⁷ See J. Sobczak, *Cesarz Mikołaj II. Młodość i pierwsze lata panowania 1868–1900*, Part I – *Młodość*, Olsztyn 1998, p. 326. About Nicholas II see also *idem*, *Nicholas II – the Last Emperor of All the Russias: the study of personage and the evolution of power*, translated by J. Hetman-Pawlaczyk, Olsztyn 2010, p. 329.

obligatory services for the imperial family in Orthodox and Catholic churches, members of the congregation raised their prayers to “*His Highness the Almighty Great Monarch, Emperor and Autocrat of All Russias, Our King Nicholas II Alexandrovich*” as well as “*His Successor, the Revered Tsesarevich Grand Duke George Alexandrovich*”⁸. After George’s death in 1899, the throne was passed down to the Tsar’s younger brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, yet the issue of royal succession remained unresolved. Some grand dukes argued that neither George nor Mikhail had formally used the titles of tsesarevich and imperial heir. As noted by Grand Duke Constantine Constantinovich during a mourning service for George on the morning of 10 July (29 June) 1899: “*the names of the tsar, both tsarinas and the entire royal family were mentioned, but not a word was said about the heir to the throne*”. The following statement found its way to the announcement of the tsarevich’s death: “*since God chose not to bless us with a son, under the sacred laws of the Empire, the right of succession to the Russian throne belongs to our dear brother, Grand Duke Mikhail*”⁹. The announcement did not resolve the matter. The problem of succession resurfaced in late 1900 when Nicholas II was stricken down with typhoid fever during his stay in Crimea¹⁰. The issue was discussed at length by Count Sergei Witte and the tsar’s mother who complained that neither of her sons had the character or the will power required of a monarch¹¹. An unrealistic suggestion was made to pass down the throne to Olga, the monarch’s oldest daughter. The matter was discussed with Witte in the company of several ministers and Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. Mikhail’s candidacy was considered as the natural and formally acclaimed choice. The question remained, however, whether Mikhail should give up the throne if the tsarina, who was once again pregnant, would produce a male heir. Court speculators turned their attention to Alexander III’s younger brother and Nicholas II’s uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, and his children as potential successors to the imperial throne in the event of formal complications. Alexei’s birth put an end to those speculations, but they had already reached tsarina Alexandra, making her resentful of Witte¹².

In these circumstances, it does not come as a surprise that Alexandra Feodorovna was very anxious to give birth to a male heir. But to her great

⁸ *Modlitwa za Monarchę i Dom Cesarski. Książeczka modlitewna do nabożeństw, b.m.w.* [1895], pp. 496–499. See J. Sobczak, *Mikołaj II – ostatni car*, pp. 105–106.

⁹ From the diary of KR, *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 206; Y. Kudrina, *Imperatritsa Maria Feodorovna Romanova, (1847–1928 gg.). Dnyevniki. Pisma. Vospominanya*, Moscow 2000, p. 83.

¹⁰ *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, pp. 219–222.

¹¹ Y. Kudrina, *Imperatritsa Maria Feodorovna.*, p. 91. Although the book is excellently researched, the author is wrong in dating the tsar’s illness in Crimea to late 1902.

¹² See D. Lieven, *Nicholas II. Emperor of all the Russias*, London 1993, p. 162; *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 220; S. Y. Witte, *Isbranye vospominanya, 1849–1911 gg.*, Moscow 1991, pp. 386–388.

disappointment, consecutive pregnancies produced daughters who could succeed to the throne only if all of the tsar's male relatives died or were removed from the line of succession. In 1900, Alexandra took the advice of Princesses Milica and Anastasia of Montenegro, the wives of Grand Dukes Nicholas and Peter Nikolaevich, and she became engaged in occult practices and hypnosis that were to guarantee the birth of a healthy son. The first alleged doctor who set out to help the tsarina was Philippe of Lyons, France. The performed treatments required Philippe's presence in Alexandra's private quarters which fuelled gossip about the tsarina's alleged affair. Maria Feodorovna, the tsar's mother and widow of Alexander III, demanded that the Frenchman be ousted from the court, but Nicholas II was unable to refuse his wife's pleas to receive treatment in which she vested high hopes. Philippe assured Alexandra that the position of the stars guaranteed a male heir, but in 1901, the tsarina gave birth to the fourth daughter, Anastasia¹³. The ridiculed Frenchman was first replaced by yurodivy ("holy fool") Dimitri and later by Daria Osipowa who suffered from epilepsy and was proclaimed a prophet by the grand duchesses. Next, for many days, the tsar and his wife prayed in solitude by the grave of Seraphim of Sarov. Nicholas II deeply believed that it was only thanks to the saint's assistance that Alexandra's fifth pregnancy produced the long awaited male heir¹⁴. The birth of a son, a successor to the throne, came as a relief to Russia's political elites who supported the monarchy¹⁵. Already upon birth, the infant was given the title of His Imperial Highness, tsesarevich, heir to the throne (the tsar's brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, ceased to hold this title) and grand duke.

The imperial heir was baptized on 3 September 1904 in the Orthodox chapel at the Peterhof court. The ceremony was attended by numerous member of the tsar's family, including his great-grandfather, Christian IX of Denmark, who was 87 at the time. Alexei's principal godparents were his paternal grandmother, Maria Feodorovna, and Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich Romanov. His other godparents included his eldest sister, Grand Duchess Olga, his great-grandfather Christian IX of Denmark, the Prince of Wales Edward Windsor later King of England as Edward II, William II Hohenzollern, Kaiser of Germany, and Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich Romanov. Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna were not present because

¹³ E. Radziński, *Jak naprawdę zginął car Mikołaj II*, translated by E. Siemaszkiewicz, Warszawa 1994, pp. 88–90.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 91–94.

¹⁵ The atmosphere that accompanied the long waiting and the gossip surrounding the tsarevich's birth also gave rise to less joyous attitudes in the public. Alexander Suvorin quotes his carpenter in a rather spiteful entry of his diary dated 31 July 1904: "*Carpenter Mikhailov told me today: I'm riding the train to the city from my summer cottage. The passengers are talking about the newly born monarch. Suddenly, a man says out loud: 'Those Russians are strange. A new lice has infested their hair; it will soon start biting, but they're all happy.' Everyone suddenly went quiet. It is surprising how candid people can be about it*". A. Suvorin, *Dziennik*, translated by Jerzy Pański, Warszawa 1975, p. 521.

according to the Orthodox tradition, the parents do not attend the ceremony. Personal confessor to the imperial family, father Ioann Yanishev, dipped the infant in the baptismal font, evoking a loud cry of shock from the tsarevich when his head came into contact with cold water.

Alexei's birth was celebrated with revelry throughout the country. According to Sophie Buxhoeveden's memoirs, in a manifesto issued on the occasion, the tsar granted many favors to his subjects, including amnesties, shorter prison sentences, medals and cash prizes¹⁶. The tsarevich was appointed commander of several regiments formed in his honor. Alexei made the impression of a strong and healthy boy upon birth. Pierre Gillard referred to his student as a very lively and even naughty child who was more inclined to play than study. But unlike his sisters, Alexei was not allowed to play tennis or ride a bicycle, and he spent most of his days under the watchful eye of two guards, sailor Clemens Nagorny and retired boatswain Andrei Derevenko. Alexandra Feodorovna took personal care of her son when he was not feeling well. In consequence, Alexei was an extremely spoiled child, and any attempts at instilling in him the principles of court etiquette ended in failure. The tsarevich openly mocked his father's guests when he was allowed to attend official receptions. Sometimes, he would even jokingly slap the people who bowed before him in greeting¹⁷. Alexei was a whimsical child who gave frequent displays of rude behavior. When the tsarevich was 6, he saw Alexander Izvolsky, the minister of foreign affairs, waiting outside the tsar's office. The man did not rise from his chair at the sight of Alexei. The boy, completely taken aback by the lack of respect to which he had been accustomed, approached Izvolsky and reprimanded him loudly: "*when the heir to the Russian throne enters the room, people have to rise*"¹⁸.

Alexei was tenderly called Sunshine, Agunyushek, Little Man or Baby by his parents. Several weeks after birth, he was diagnosed with hemophilia, the *disease of kings*, which he had inherited from his mother, the carrier of a defective gene, and from his maternal great-grandmother, Queen Victoria. The disease was incurable at the time, and the young monarch was constantly at risk of premature death. The first symptoms of hemophilia, a sudden bleeding that was very difficult to staunch, surfaced when Alexei was only 6 weeks old¹⁹.

¹⁶ S. Buxhoeveden, *The Russo-Japanese War and the Birth of Alexis*, Wikipedia. Alexei Suvorin, who was very critical about the tsar in his diary, noted with sarcasm that on the joyous occasion of the tsarevich's baptism, the monarch did not announce the Russian fleet's another defeat in the war against Japan. He was referring to the sinking of the Russian cruiser Novik near Sakhalin: "*Defeats and disasters are not acknowledged when the tsar is rejoicing*". See A. Surovin, *Dziennik*, p. 530.

¹⁷ G. King, P. Wilson: *The Fate of the Romanovs*. John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p. 53; E. Heresch: *Mikołaj II. "Tchórzostwo, kłamstwo i zdrada"*. Gdynia 1995, p. 138.

¹⁸ R. K. Massie, *Mikołaj i Aleksandra*, translated by K. Kwiatkowski, Warszawa 1995, p. 126.

¹⁹ *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 271; *Dnyevniki Imperatora*, p. 228.

On the third day, the blood flow from the navel stopped completely, but in the months and years that followed, every time the toddler, and later the little boy, tripped and fell, his arms and legs would become covered with bruises and bumps that turned into blue swellings. The blood under the boy's skin would not clot. When he was three and a half, Alexei tripped and hit his face which swelled so profoundly that he was unable to open his eyes. At one point, the parents had to become reconciled with the sad truth that the long-awaited heir to the throne suffered from hemophilia. The disease was long kept secret, and Alexei's personal physician was the only member of the court who knew the truth. But no secret can be kept eternally, especially if it concerns a monarch and those closest to him. With time, it became obvious that the tsarevich suffered from a health problem. The carefully guarded secret was gradually revealed to a broader public, although it was not officially communicated for a long time. Rumors began to spread. Already in mid December 1904, Alexandra Bogdanovich, the general's wife and a renowned scandalmonger in the royal court and not only, wrote in her memoirs that she had overheard Boris Stürmer, an influential politician, later the Russian prime minister, talk about the tsarevich's hereditary disease. She did not mention the name of the ailment, but went on to add that a surgeon was permanently stationed in the court on account of the disease²⁰. The gene responsible for the blood clotting disorder was passed down by mothers to their sons (tsarina Alexandra was the granddaughter of Queen Victoria, a hemophilia carrier)²¹. Every skin cut and nose bleed posed a threat to Alexei's life, but joint bleeding was the most painful and almost crippling experience. The tsarevich's illness severely depressed his mother. Ever since the disease had been discovered, Alexandra devoted every minute of her life to Alexei, even at the expense of her daughters. The life of the entire family became focused on the heir. United in their concern for Alexei's well-being, members of the family isolated themselves from social life and its elites. Pierre Gillard, the tsarevich's Swiss tutor, recalled that the atmosphere in tsar's court was largely dependent on Alexei's health and mood on a given day. For as long as it was possible, the tsar's family concealed the boy's disease, even from the servants and the children's tutors, and when the secret finally came out, they never told the entire truth about the severity of his condition and his attacks. Alexei was fully aware of the state of his health and the fact that he could die. During attacks of hemophilia, he welcomed the possibility of death as the much coveted relief from his suffering²².

²⁰ A. Bogdanowicz, *Tri poslednikh samodyertsy. Dnyevnik*, foreword by A. Bokhanov, Moscow 1990, p. 313.

²¹ See J. Thorwald, *Krew królów. Dramatyczne dzieje hemofilii w europejskich rodach książęcych*, translated by K. Jachimczak, Kraków 1994, p. 230.

²² "When I die, it won't hurt any more, will it, mum?," he asked one day. When he started to recover several days later, he told his parents: "When I die, build me a little tomb of stones in the park." G. King, *Imperatritsa Alexandra...*, p. 238.

Alexei received a well-rounded education, and he grew to become a handsome and energetic young man with a lively disposal, many talents and interests. The tsarevich's French tutor, Pierre Gillard, left behind detailed memoirs which he wrote only after the revolution of 1917. Initially published in English, they were later translated into many languages, including an abridged version in Polish²³. "*Alexei was the center of this united family, the focus of all its hopes and affections. His sisters worshipped him. He was his parents' pride and joy. When he was well, the palace was transformed. Everyone and everything in it seemed bathed in sunshine,*" wrote Gillard²⁴.

Just like his father, Alexei loved military parades. Upon birth, he was appointed hetman of all Cossack regiments, and he received a Cossack uniform, complete with a fur hat, boots and a dagger. In the summer, he donned the uniform of a sailor from the tsar's fleet. Alexei was a very musical child. His sisters played the piano, but he had a preference for the balalaika. He enjoyed playing with pets.

Nicholas liked to show his son off before the guests, emphasizing his good looks. The tsar sometimes took Alexei with him to regiment parades. The amused soldiers would cheer *Hurray*, and Alexei would smile sweetly. It seemed that after the rather unfortunate reign of Nicholas II, who despite many reforms and the successful transformation of Russia from a tyrannical state to a nearly constitutional monarchy was unable to gain social acclaim, a wise, energetic and popular monarch would finally ascend the Russian throne. There was just one problem – the above-mentioned disease.

Due to hemophilia, Alexei grew up under the close supervision of nurses. When he turned 5, physicians recommended that the young tsarevich be placed in the care of two male nurses, and sailors Derevenko and Nagorny were given the job. Their duty was to keep the boy safe from any physical injury, and they often took him for walks in the park and carriage rides. In some periods of his childhood, Alexei seemed to be free of the disease, and he would play boisterously with his sisters. He was a loud, lively and naughty child, but he also enjoyed *serious conversations* with adults. Like many boys of his age, Alexei collected treasures such as nails, pieces of string and pebbles in his pockets. Gilliard wrote in his memoirs: "*Alexei [—] was tall for his age. He had an oval, beautifully carved face with delicate features, auburn hair with a coppery glint and large grey-blue eyes like his mother's. He was a cheerful child, and he enjoyed life whenever he could. Alexei was a happy, mischievous boy. His preferences were not sophisticated, and he never drew*

²³ *Imperator Nikolay II i yevo semya (Peterhof, sentyabr 1905 – Yekaterinburg, may 1918). Po lichnym vospominanyam P. Zihlara, byvsheho nastavnika naslednika Alexeya Nikolaevicha*, foreword by S.D. Sazonov, Vienna 1921, reprinted in Moscow 1991; P. Zhiliar, *Imperator Nikolay II i yevo semya*, Moscow 1992; P. Gilliard, *Tragiczny los cara Mikołaja II i jego rodziny*, translated by J. P. Zajączkowski, Warszawa 1990.

²⁴ Robert K. Massie, *Nicholas and Alexandra*, Dell Publishing Co., 1967, p. 137.

false satisfaction from his position of imperial heir which was the last thing on his mind. [...] He was very bright and inquisitive, he took a lively interest in everything. Sometimes, he would take me by surprise by asking questions which showed that he was mature beyond his age, sensitive and highly intuitive"²⁵. This is not to imply that Alexei was unaware of his special status in the family. During formal occasions, he would occupy the seat by his father's side. The crowds in the streets would greet him with joyful cheers *Tsesarevich, successor to the throne*. Passers-by would gather around Alexei in hope of touching him, and delegations of peasants would drop to their knees before the tsarevich. It was Alexei, and not his sisters, who received regimental delegations and was showered with gifts.

Despite the above, Alexei was generally an obedient child, and he would succumb to his sisters' authority without much protest. Lively and curious as little boys are, he rarely remembered to exercise caution during play. He could not come to terms with the fact that unlike his peers, he was deprived of many pleasures of boyhood. Alexei was not allowed to ride the bicycle as it entailed a significant risk of falling. He ignored all bans and orders. In addition to his natural desire to play, it was also his way of protesting against the excessive care of his over-protective parents and tutors. During the tsar's inspection of the palace guard, Alexei took everyone by surprise by riding an appropriated bicycle into the center of the palace square. To make up for all the pleasures of childhood that Alexei was denied, his parents tried to bribe him with expensive and safe gifts. The boy's room was filled with extraordinary toys, but they could never compensate for unbridled fun outdoors. Alexei's education was frequently interrupted on account of his disease, and the boy grew to be somewhat lazy without much interest in books. He was intellectually mature beyond his age, and he was able to produce a clever and witty riposte that testified to the depth of his thought and judgment. He liked to think and wonder. When asked what he was thinking about, he would answer that he enjoyed the sun and the beauty of summer as long as he could because one of these days, he could be prevented from doing it. Alexei was a clever boy, but like his sisters, save for Olga, he was a reluctant academic. He often asked penetrating questions that testified to an intellect well beyond his years. Due to his disease, he was brought up in greater isolation than the tsar's remaining children. Next to his parents, the youngest of his sisters, Anastasia, was the family member he felt closest to.

Yevgeny Botkin, privat-docent at the Military Medical Academy in Petersburg, was the court physician for the tsar's family who was much liked by Nicholas' children. The Peterhof Palace and the imperial residence in Tsarskoye Selo were also visited by specialists. Vladimir Derevenko, a young doctor, personally attended to Alexei when his disease took a worse turn. Derevenko's daughter, Tatiana, wrote extensively in her memoirs about the

²⁵ *Z pamiętników Pierre'a Gilliarda, in: Mikołaj II i Aleksandra, p. 402.*

respect that Alexei and the entire imperial family bestowed upon the court physicians, including Botkin²⁶.

The constant fears that Alexei might be killed by the then incurable disease contributed to the much overrated influence of Grigori Rasputin, a self-proclaimed prophet, drunk and debaucher, in the imperial court. Rasputin was purported to have supernatural powers (which are explained by parapsychology today) that gave him the ability to alleviate pain and stop bleeding²⁷. Alexandra Feodorovna believed that Rasputin could heal Alexei even from a distance by speaking to the boy on the telephone or sending a soothing telegram. Skeptics attribute Rasputin's healing powers to hypnosis. Rasputin had a considerable influence on Alexandra who turned a deaf ear to any reports about his scandalizing life style and disastrous influence on the imperial family's reputation. Alexandra Feodorovna believed that only Rasputin could heal her son²⁸. The suggestion that tsarevich Alexei was the son of *starets Grigori*, made by Maxim Gorky in a letter to his friend Alexander Amfiteatrov in 1914²⁹, is completely absurd. Rasputin had been nowhere near the imperial court when Alexei was born in 1904.

The absolute trust that the neurotic and superstitious tsarina Alexandra had vested in Rasputin whom she believed to be the only man capable of keeping her beloved son alive, her ignorance of any evidence that pointed to Rasputin's immoral behavior and corrupt political practices undermined the public's trust in the imperial family. Rasputin's influence tends to be exaggerated in literature, but he undoubtedly exercised some control over the tsar's family, and he was responsible for the dismissal of at least two successive prime ministers, Pyotr Stolypin and Vladimir Kokovtsov³⁰. The above could substantiate a hypothesis that if it were not for Alexei's birth and hemophilia which initiated this chain of unfortunate events and demonic forces, if it were not for Rasputin's contribution to alleviating Alexei's suffering and the influence he exercised on Alexandra and Nicholas, if it were not for the mystic healer's attempts to undermine the reputation of the tsarist family, especially during World War I, the Russian monarchy would have

²⁶ See T. Mielnik (Razhdyennaya Botkina), *Vospominanya o tsarskoy semlye i yevo zhizny do e posle revalutsyi*, Moscow 1993, p. 208.

²⁷ For a broader reference, see E. Radziński, *Rasputin*, translated by E. Madejski, Warszawa 2000, p. 408.

²⁸ E. Heresch, *Mikołaj II. Tchórzostwo, kłamstwo i zdrada*, Gdynia 1995, pp. 241–242, 260, 278; E. Radziński, *Jak naprawdę zginął...*, pp. 252, 266.

²⁹ *Literaturnoye nasledstvo*, Vol. 95: *Gorky e ruskaya zhurnalistka nachala XX vyeku*, Moscow 1988, p. 453.

³⁰ W.N. Kokovtsov, *Is moyevo proshlovo. Vospominanya 1911-1919*, selection, ed., foreword by S.A. Volkh, Moscow 1991, pp. 410-418; A.P. Borodin, *Stolypin, Reformy vo imya Rasyi*, Moscow 2004; J. Sobczak, *Postać Griszki Rasputina w świetle ostatnich publikacji historycznych*, in: J. Sobczak, *Rosyjskie ścieżki Klio. Wybór szkiców i esejów historycznych oraz fragmentów "Dziennika" Autora wydany z okazji jego 75. rocznicy urodzin*, Pułtusk-Warszawa 2007, pp. 155–167.

survived for many more years, and the reforms initiated by Alexander II and Nicholas II would have advanced Russia's industrial, civilization and social development.

When Alexei was around 8 or 9, Nicholas II began to prepare him for his duties of a monarch. He would take Alexei to meetings with government ministers and military commanders, and he forced the boy to wear a gala uniform which is something that Alexei quickly grew fond of. From his earliest years, Alexei spoke only Russian, and his parents instilled in him a love for Russian cuisine, folk art and costumes. Advised by Gillard, they ceased to control Alexei's every move in hope of teaching their son to become responsible for his own safety. With age, Alexei suffered fewer life-threatening attacks of hemophilia. The most serious occurrence took place in the fall of 1912 when the Tsar and his family were at their hunting lodge in Spala, near the Koziencice Primeval Forest in Poland. Alexei injured himself, and the bruising caused a blood infection. The tsarevich was in suffering for 11 days, and the doctors began preparing his parents for the worst. An official statement about Alexei's condition was published. During daily prayers for the tsesarevich, the lodge was surrounded by crowds of Polish peasants weeping for a sick child³¹. Alexei recovered only after Rasputin's inexplicable, remote intervention. Prime minister Kokovtsov gave a detailed account of those bleak days in his memoirs. He wrote that all Russian officials had been frozen still, as if waiting for Alexei's death that would ultimately lead to a national tragedy. Even Kokovtsov did not have the heart to send urgent paperwork to the monarch, although Alexei's illness coincided with elections to the Fourth State Duma, and the tsar's attention was required to analyze the potential distribution of political forces in the new parliament³². The above example demonstrates that in a country where the autocratic system had been abolished, although Nicholas II undoubtedly continued to exercise his power in an autocratic style, the health of the imperial family's member had a staggering effect on state affairs. In an attempt to celebrate Alexei's recovery and, as Nicholas told Kokovtsov in Spala, to do some good, the tsar pardoned members of the security service who, during Kiev celebrations of September 1911, failed to preempt an assassination attempt on Pyotr Stolypin, General Pavel Kurlov, deputy minister of the interior and commander of the Gendarmes, Nikolai Kulabka, Chief of the Kiev Okhranka, Mitrofan Verigin, deputy director of the police department and assistant to General Kurlov, and General Alexander Spiridovich, chief of the tsar's personal police³³.

Alexei's disease had serious consequences for the imperial succession procedure in the Romanov dynasty. The rumors about the heir's premature

³¹ Y.W. Kudrina, *Imperatritsa Maria Feodorovna*, p. 134.

³² W.N. Kokovtsov, *Is moyevo proshlovo*, p. 166.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 175. See also: L. Bazyłow, *Ostatnie lata Rosji carskiej. Rządy Stołypina*, Warszawa 1972, pp. 448–450.

death forced Nicholas' brother, Grand Duke Mikhail, to take decisive action. Mikhail would assume the throne in the event of Alexei's death. The Grand Duke was convinced that under these circumstances, the imperial family would never consent to his marriage with Natalia Wulfert-Brasova, the former wife of an ordinary cavalry captain, who had been twice divorced. In 1908, Mikhail fell passionately in love with Natalia who gave birth to their son, George, already in July of that year. On 31 October 1912, Maria Feodorovna, the tsar's widow, received a letter from Cannes: "*My Dear Mother! [—] My heart is heavy with the news I have to share with you [—], but two weeks ago, I married Natalia Sergejevna. I might have never taken that step if it were not for little Alexei's illness*"³⁴. The wedding ceremony took place at the Serbian Orthodox Church in Vienna. Mikhail notified the tsar of his morganatic marriage. Nicholas II refused to acknowledge it, he banned Mikhail from re-entering Russia, he dismissed him from all posts in the army and exercised other sanctions, including financial. Mikhail's marriage to Natalia was legitimized only after the outbreak of World War I. Mikhail was allowed to return to Russia and continue his service in the army. Natalia and their son were granted the noble title of Brasov counts³⁵.

After the outbreak of World War I and Nicholas II's rise to the post of Chief Commander of the Russian Army, the tsar willingly took Alexei to the General Headquarters. The boy was fascinated by adult life, war and the company of men which differed radically from the predominantly female surroundings in Tsarskoye Selo. Wearing the army uniform, he took a great interest in cannons, riflemen training, he strolled down the trenches and other fortifications and learned more about daily life in the army. Alexei accompanied his father during trips to dislocated regiments of the army. In recognition of his visit to the south-western regiment that was stationed near the area of military operations, he received a 4th class Order of St. George as well as his first and last military rank of corporal. The soldiers warmed towards the little boy, their future monarch, who liked to play a soldier. Those experiences and the awareness of the deadly risks carried by hemophilia made Alexei more serious and sensitive to other people's needs.

In March 1917, Nicholas II decided to abdicate in favor of tsesarevich Alexei, and proclaimed his brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Romanov, as the regent. Nicholas signed the manifesto on the night of 15 (2) to 16 (3) March under which a 13-year-old boy would become the ruler of a giant empire. General Ruzsky, pleased that the monarch had easily made a historic decision, presented Nicholas II with an abdication statement from the General Headquarters. Nicholas signed it. The clock struck 3 p.m., and the document was dated 15 March. In line with the law of imperial succession, the Russian

³⁴ E. Radziński, *Rasputin*, translated by E. Madejski, Warszawa 2000, p. 181.

³⁵ The title refers to the grand duke's estate in the Orlov governorate. See W.I. Fiedorczenko, *Rasiysky Imperatorskyi Dom e yevropeyskiye monarkhi*, Moscow 2006, pp. 193–194.

throne would be passed down from father to son. But Petrograd officials insisted that the abdication statement be signed by witnesses. Alexander Guchkov and Vasil Shulgin, deputies to the Fourth Duma, were dispatched to Nicholas, and the document was not to be published before their return. While the deputies were on their way, Nicholas had the time to rethink his decision and answer a question that had been long occupying his mind: should he place the burden of power on the arms of his underage and sick son in those troubled times? He had a long and honest talk with the court surgeon, Professor Sergei Feodorov³⁶, who further asserted Nicholas' fears that Alexei was not a prime candidate for imperial monarch on account of his disease and the probability of premature death. The surgeon also pointed out that the young monarch would have to be separated from the family to prevent his dethroned parents from influencing his decisions. As the result of this sad consultation, the tsar changed his initial decision to make Alexei his successor and his brother Mikhail the regent. Having arrived from Petrograd which was engulfed by the revolution, Guchkov delivered an elaborate explanation relating to the abdication statement. The tsar interrupted him, saying that the abdication statement had already been drafted but in a new, changed form. Nicholas II abdicated the throne on behalf of himself and his 13-year-old son, tsarevich Alexei, nominating his brother, Mikhail, to succeed him. "*Since We do not wish to part from Our beloved son, We transmit the succession to Our brother, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich, and give Him Our blessing to mount the Throne of the Russian Empire,*" read the statement³⁷.

The statement spurred controversy and criticism among the monarchists who argued that Nicholas had no right to abdicate and deprive his underage son of the right to succession. Nikolai Basily, Director of the Diplomatic Chancellery at the General Headquarters of the Chief Commander of the Russian Army, who drafted the first version of the abdication statement, did not hide his indignation: "*The tsarevich's ascension to the throne was the only measure that could have stopped the revolution. The young Alexei Nikolaevich would have been backed not only by law, but also by the army and the nation*"³⁸. Perhaps this would have been the case. Sergei Sazanov, former (until 1916) minister of external affairs, confessed to the French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, that: "*I do not need to assure you of my love and dedication to the tsar*" – he said with tears in his eyes. "*But until my dying day, I shall never forgive him for abdicating in his son's name. He hadn't the least right to do it. Is there a law anywhere in the world that can deprive a minor of his*

³⁶ Not with Yevgeny Botkin, as claimed by Mikhail Heller in *Historia Imperium rosjskiego*.

³⁷ *Akt abdykacji Mikołaja II*, in: *Mikołaj II i Aleksandra*, p. 571. English translation: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_II_of_Russia. Various Polish translations of this document are cited in many publications.

³⁸ J. Sobczak, *Mikołaj II – ostatni car Rosji*, p. 524.

rights?"³⁹ To this day, the Russian monarchists continue to argue that the abdication statement signed on Alexei's behalf was illegal because it violated the law of imperial succession, yet in their indignation, they fail to account for the fear of a father who trembled at the very thought of parting with his son. The tragedy that occurred in the basement of the special purpose house in Yekaterinburg on the night of 16 to 17 July 1918 could not have been foreseen by the best strategist. The story of this atrocious murder, committed 92 years ago, has been widely discussed in many publications, and there is no need to repeat the details. Let me only say that Alexei was two weeks shy of his fourteenth birthday when he was murdered⁴⁰.

The search for the bodies of the tsar's family, in particular the tsesarevich, continued for a very long time. The Romanovs' remains were discovered in June 1991, and they were buried in St. Peter and Paul's Cathedral in St. Petersburg on 17 June 1998. The excavated remains were never officially identified as those of Alexei and his sister Maria, however. Their skeleton fragments were found only in August 2007 near the mass graves where the remaining bodies had been buried.

The long search for Alexei's remains and personal belongings fuelled rumors about his miraculous survival and escape from Yekaterinburg. As a result of this, there have been men who pretended to be the tsarevich, among them Michał Goleniewski, a high-ranking official of the secret service in socialist Poland, who emigrated to Western Europe and proclaimed himself the son of former tsar Nicholas II⁴¹. There is also the sensational version by the three Russian authors of *The Escape of Alexei*⁴² who claimed that Alexei had miraculously survived the execution and went on to live as

³⁹ Ibidem. The original story of the tsar's abdication, enforced by a plot of Stavka generals headed by Mikhail Alexeiev, and an interesting portrait of Alexei as the imperial successor is given by: V. Kobylin, *Anatomiya ismyeni. Imperator Nikolay II e Gyeneral-adyutant M. V. Alexeiev*, ed. L. E. Bolotin, *Istoki antimonarkhicheskovo zagovora*, S.-Pieterburg 1998, pp. 288–335.

⁴⁰ See S. P. Mielgunow, *Sudba imperatora Nikolaya II posle otrycheniya*, New York 1991, pp. 422; V. V. Alexeiev, *Ghibel tsarskoy semly: mify e ryalnost, Noviye dokumenty o tragedii na Urale*, Yekaterinburg 1993; E.E. Alfieriew, *Pisma tsarskoy semly is zatocheniya*, Jordanville 1984; P. Benckendorf, *Last days of Tsarskoe Selo*, London 1927; Y. Bogosłowski, *Tayna tsesazhevicha: dlhnnaya doroga k istnye*, *PiK*, 8 February 1997, No. 8(747); Y. Buranov, V. Khrustalov, *Ghibel tsarskovo doma*, Moskwa 1992; Y. Buranov, V. Khrustalov, *Uhbeytsy tsara. Uhnichtozhenye dinastyi*, Moscow 1997; *Tayna tsarskeh ostankov. Materyali nauchnoy konferentsy "Paslednaya straniitsa istoriyi tsarskoy semyi: itogi isuchenya Yekaterinburhskoy tregedyi"*, Yekaterinburg 1994; P. Zylhiar, *Trahicheskaya suhdba ruhskoy imperatorskoy familii*, Tallin 1921.

⁴¹ See Z. Siemiątkowski: *Wywiad a władza. Wywiad cywilny w systemie sprawowania władzy politycznej PRL*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 93–97, 151–153.

⁴² G.B. Egorov, I.B. Lysenko, V.V. Petrov, *Spaseniye tsarevicha Alexeia. Istoriko-kriminalisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya rastryela tsarskoy semly*, St. Petersburg 1998, pp. 288. The story of the alleged escape of the tsar's children, including Alexei, exists in different versions. See A.N. Griannik, *Zaveshchanye Nikolaya II*, part I-II, Riga 1993; N. Wojtowicz, *Sehodnya kahzdy delayet vybor. Intervyew s imperatorem Nikolayem III*, *Kaleidoscope*, January/February 1997, No. 5(236), p. 5.

a provincial teacher of geography under the name of Vasil Ksenfontovich **Filatov**. According to the authors, Filatov had revealed his true identity to his children and family shortly before he died in 1988. The assumption that a provincial teacher was the escaped monarch is highly improbable, even impossible, but it cannot be ruled out. The tsar's family were murdered and their bodies were transported to the grave at night and in complete organizational chaos where anything could happen. Most of the guards were drunk. It should also be noted that Russia has a strong and historically rooted tradition of "samosvanets", impostors who appear from nowhere and make claims to the Russian throne⁴³.

⁴³ A current manifestation of the enduring myth of survival of members of the Imperial Family is a book by the prominent Russian historian Vladlen Sirotkin, entitled: *Anastassia ili komu vygoden mif o gibeli Romanovykh*, Moskva 2010, p. 255.

Dariusz Radziwiłłowicz

THE GRUNWALD TRADITION IN THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE WORLD POWER LEGION

The World Power Legion (Legia Mocarstwowa) was one of the few, if not the only, national organization linked to Józef Piłsudski that drew upon the tradition of Poland's victory in the Battle of Grunwald. It was a reflection on the World Power Work Union¹ (Związek Pracy Mocarstwowej) whose main goal was to promote "the spirit of generosity and the concept of the Polish World Power across all social strata"².

In an effort to pursue this goal, the Union organized lectures, meetings, reading rooms, libraries, community centers, educational and sports facilities for workers. It initiated and supported social, economic, cultural, educational and military training organizations. Hierarchy and discipline were highly respected values in the World Power Work Union. Its authorities, except for the High Committee, were elected by nomination.

The Union placed special emphasis on the World Power Legion whose members had to enlist for military training to learn "genuine military skills and become worthy successors to the knights who fought in Grunwald,

¹ The world power movement entered the Polish political scene after the coup d'état of May 1926. The "World Power Thought" academic association was established by Rowmund Piłsudski and Jerzy Giedroyc. Their ambition was to create a pan-national organization that would reach out to other youth communities in the Second Republic of Poland. This mission was entrusted to the World Power Work Union created in 1928. The union recruited supporters and expanded its sphere of influence through political organizations in various communities. The World Power Thought association united university students. The World Power Legion was a sports and educational organization open to all youths. Ref. T. Selimowski, *Polskie legalne stronnictwa polityczne*, Warszawa 1934, p. 25; D. Radziwiłłowicz, *Tradycja grunwaldzka w świadomości politycznej społeczeństwa polskiego w latach 1910–1945*, Olsztyn 2003, pp. 133–146; R. Tomczyk, *Mysł Mocarstwowa. Z dziejów młodego pokolenia II Rzeczypospolitej*, Szczecin 2008.

² *Związek Pracy Mocarstwowej. Jego zadania i cele*, Mocarstwowiec, 1929, No. 2, p. 5.

Chocim and Vienna, the heroes of Raclawice, Somosierra and Grochów, Polish soldiers of the Great War and the war over the eastern border”³.

The World Power Work Union proclaimed Piłsudski to be its leader, and it hoped to “actively support Him in His laborious, ongoing effort to lay the foundations for a powerful State”⁴.

The union deemed itself a successor of insurgent organizations. At the same time, it attempted to amalgamate diverse trends on the Polish political arena. Before Poland regained its independence, the nationalist camp and left-wing insurgents had received public acclaim. “Nationalism maintained Poland’s national identity, while socialism dampened the invaders’ spirits through subversive action”⁵, wrote *Mocarstwowiec*, a publication of the World Power Work Union.

The unionists claimed that the nationalist camp (representatives of National Democracy) and the Polish Socialist Party (PSP) became harmful for the state after Poland had regained its independence. The national democrats promoted slogans which distanced “Poles from their fellow countrymen of different nationality, preventing them from working in union for the good of the Nation”. They accused the PSP of promoting class struggle ideology that undermined the cohesiveness of the “Polish State” and argued that by succumbing to the influences of “the international union governed by German socialists, the PSP exposed Poland to its greatest enemies”⁶. According to the union, social and educational associations supporting nationalist or socialist ideology were unable to produce citizens that “Poland is in dire need of today”.

The World Power Legion was created to pursue that mission “that had not yet been fulfilled”. Its educational activities emphasized “the interests of the State are the supreme law to which the interests of all social classes and groups should be subordinated”. The unionists argued that owing to its critical location between two aggressive powers, Russia and Germany, Poland could maintain its sovereignty only by attaining the status of a world power. For this reason, the World Power Legion was a strong advocate of the Grunwald tradition. Poland’s victory in the Battle of Grunwald laid the foundations for the “Polish Intermarium” stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. According to the unionists, the “world power” scheme could be implemented “only if the Polish society is permeated with the spirit of its fellow Slavs within the confines of one great State”⁷. Rowmund Piłsudski, Józef Piłsudski’s nephew, became the Chief Commander and Head of the World Power Legion⁸.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ *Ku czemu dąży Legia Mocarstwowa*, *Mocarstwowiec*, 1929, No. 3.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ R. Juchnowski, *Rowmund Piłsudski 1903–1988. Koncepcje polityczne i społeczne*, Wrocław 2009; R. Juchnowski, *Koncepcje federalistyczne Rowmunda Piłsudskiego*, in: *Europa i integracja europejska w polskiej myśli politycznej XX wieku*, Wrocław 2003.

Similarly to the national democrats, the World Power Legion argued that Germany would always pose a threat to Poland. In anticipation of the unavoidable armed conflict with the Germans, the unionists wrote: "During the war, Germany will take no prisoners, and it will not make any allowances for the human feelings of any party to the conflict. Through its conduct in the war, Poland will take the world by surprise. It takes superhuman commitment and bloody sacrifice to wipe away the indignity and the suffering wrought on us by the Germans". Starting with the eight issue, the *Mocarstwowiec* monthly magazine was to be dedicated in its entirety to the war with Germany until the arrival of "the new Grunwald Victory Day"⁹.

According to Rowmund Piłsudski, by instilling the spirit of "world power thinking" into the nation, the generation of young Poles would "put an end to the culture of weakness, suffering and pain". The Polish society should draw the strength for its "work on behalf of the State" from "memories of the Polish Nation's inexhaustible strength, not its moments of weakness". The World Power Legion chose "the most important date in the history of Poland", the anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald, as the symbol of "faith in the glowing future of a resurrected Polish State"¹⁰. "Grunwald marked the birth of the Polish World Power, it was a triumph of peaceful coexistence between the Polish people and fellow Slavs within one great Polish State. Grunwald is the Nation's conscious desire to exercise undivided control of the Baltic. Grunwald is a symbol of a victorious Poland, not Casimir's Poland which was weak and thrown upon the mercy of German nobles. Grunwald means Polish leadership throughout all Slavic lands and protection from Germanic aggression. Bearing this historical testament in mind, the young generation of Poles can look into the future with optimism despite the adversities of the present day"¹¹.

The cult of the Grunwald tradition gave rise to several publications devoted to this victorious military event. Grunwald was perceived as the ideal example of military action that was untainted by "political foibles". "The granite foundations of Poland's powerful statehood have been chiseled by swords, not diplomacy – as it has always been the case throughout our history". This statement is a reflection on the essence of the conflict between Piłsudski's camp and the national democrats. Piłsudski's call for military action was juxtaposed against Dmowski's diplomatic measures: "It was not political small talk, but our soldiers' bloodshed that resurrected Poland". The World Power Legion stood in agreement with the national democrats only over a single matter, namely Poland's claim to the territories annexed by Prussia. "Just as it was the case more than 500 years ago, the foundations of a new Poland rest in the ruins of the Prussian empire. We are gathering our

⁹ *O ducha ofensywy*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1931, No. 9, 28 February.

¹⁰ *Na czasie*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1930, No. 8.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

strength, and guided by the shining beacon of Grunwald, we know which road to take to turn the Republic of Poland into a global power”¹².

On the tenth anniversary of the referendum in Warmia and Mazury, the unionists declared that the Germans had committed “hideous fraud” during the plebiscite. In the ballots, the voters had to choose between:

“Poland”
“East Prussia”

According to the Legion, the people had voted to remain in East Prussia, not Germany. If “East Prussia” were replaced with “Germany” in the ballot, thousands of inhabitants from the region of Warmia and Mazury would have voted for Poland. The results of the referendum were not a reflection on the Polish people’s choice, therefore, they were not legally binding, claimed the unionists¹³.

The World Power Legion fully supported the incorporation of East Prussia into Poland. Already in 1930, it was one of the first Polish organizations to support the establishment of the national border on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka Rivers. The unionists looked to the Grunwald tradition in their quest for the new frontier. This notion was further explored by H. J. Szyszko in an article entitled “East Prussia for Poland”, published in *Mocarstwowiec*: “We know that an armed conflict with Germany is unavoidable. We have to gather momentum for this historical event! Our Lord, who has been guiding Poland in the last millennium, is on our side. The young generation is on a mission to give Grunwald a new name in Polish history. The Grunwald tradition will reign supreme in Berlin, bringing defeat to Germany and paralyzing the very heart of Prussia! Our goal is to seal Poland in the West along the natural boundary of the Odra and Nysa Łużycka Rivers, and to bring Prussian territory between the Spree and the Pregolya back into Poland! Thrust toward the West – is an absolute order for the Polish Nation!”¹⁴.

At the time, even the most radical factions of the nationalist camp did not have such a far-reaching territorial program. Even if Poland scored a victory over Germany, in 1930, such plans were considered to be a pipe dream, if not sheer madness.

The celebrations of the 520th anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald provided the World Power Legion and other organizations with an opportunity to popularize the Grunwald tradition. The festivities were organized by the World Power Work Union, the World Power Legion, the Legion’s factory workers’ clubs, the Union of People’s Groups of the Polish World Power and the Academic Union of World Power Thought. The campaign was advertised by posters in all Polish cities. *Polska Zbrojna*, the Polish Army’s daily news-

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ *Prusy Wschodnie dla Polski*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1930, No. 8, p. 8; *Drang nach Westen*, *Mocarstwowiec*, No. 7, 1930; *Krzyżacy*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1931, No. 12.

¹⁴ *Prusy Wschodnie dla Polski*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1930, No. 8.

paper, wrote that the initiative had been warmly welcomed “by all social groups, except for the national democrats and the communists who scheduled their own celebrations for that day...”¹⁵.

In Warsaw, unionist celebrations opened with a service in the Bernadine Church on Krakowskie Przedmieście. The sermon delivered by father Edward Detkiens carried a powerful message which promoted the Polish World Power. He appealed to the congregation to join their forces in pursuit of the Jagiellonian tradition, and he postulated that the Slavs and the Lithuanians unite “under the scepter of the Republic of Poland against the hostile avarice of the Teutons”. He pointed out that the aggressor across the western border continued to pose a threat, and that Poland would face its enemy “when the moment of the new Grunwald arrives in a not so distant future”¹⁶.

The Grunwald meeting was the high point of the celebrations. The national anthem was played, and Rowmund Piłsudski delivered a speech. He postulated that the anniversary of the Battle of Grunwald should be a public holiday. “As the first fruit of Jagiellonian ideology promoting the establishment of a Slavic state under the reign of the Polish nation, Grunwald marks the birth of the Polish World Power,” he said. Rowmund Piłsudski declared that the authorities of the World Power Work Union and the World Power Legion would celebrate the anniversary of the Grunwald Battle as an organizational holiday “to freshen the public’s memory and give the event a pan-national status”. The list of speakers was inclusive of Gustaw Orlicz-Dreszer who discussed the historical background of the Polish-Teutonic war¹⁷.

The World Power Legion ardently opposed German propaganda aimed against the Polish Pomerania and Poland’s access to the Baltic. In retaliation, the Legion formulated postulates claiming the recovery of territories that had been part of Bolesław Chrobry’s kingdom. The main emphasis was on reinstating Poland’s access to the sea. The unionists cited the example of Jagiellonian Poland that had reigned over the Baltic coastline “stretching more than 1000 km from the Słupia River all the way to Parnu in the Gulf of Finland”¹⁸. The Legion also addressed Poles residing on German territory. It demanded that Polish schools in Germany be provided with textbooks covering in detail the history of “western Slavs, Silesia, Pomerania and Prussia, to ensure that German propaganda never taints youthful souls that have been forced to receive an education in German schools on those territories”¹⁹. Many publications were dedicated to the history of the Polabian Slavs who lived between the Elbe and the Oder. After centuries of German

¹⁵ *Obchód rocznicy zwycięstwa grunwaldzkiego*, Polska Zbrojna 1930, No. 190, 14 July.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Kto zwycięży*, Mocarstwowiec 1930, No. 8.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*; *Zagadnienie morskie*, Mocarstwowiec 1930, No. 9; *Walka gospodarcza o dostęp do morza*, Mocarstwowiec 1930, No. 9.

campaigns, Polabian territories were turned into “a huge cemetery of the Slavic peoples”²⁰.

Germany’s anti-Polish campaigns and propaganda opposing the creation of a Polish “corridor” significantly contributed to the rise of the active nationalist movement in the legion. The legion postulated that Poland had to “give up its policy of defensive protest. We will not surrender the land of our fathers. The inviolability of treaties should no longer be used as an excuse. The great Polish Nation can no longer seek the humiliating assistance of international institutions”. Rowmund Piłsudski wrote: “Europe is growing weary of our complaints, and it is beginning to believe that those whose only salvation rests with treaties that had been made by others are in the wrong. Moreover, they regard us as very oppressive “friends”, and they fear that they could be forced to shed blood in our defense. Poland can no longer be a nation of eternal martyrs and gloomy psalmists”²¹.

According to R. Piłsudski, German aggression could not be counteracted by passive resistance, “and if we do not answer to their demands with equally ruthless postulates, if the diplomatic battles of today and the armed conflicts of tomorrow are waged only over the Polish territories in Pomerania and Silesia and not thousands of our oppressed brothers in Germany, that battle will surely be lost”²². R. Piłsudski made fervent appeals to the young generation who, in his opinion, were Poland’s only salvation. According to R. Piłsudski, members of the young generation who felt unrestrained by obstacles “of a diplomatic nature, who were bursting with pride to be part of the Nation that emerged victorious in Płowce and Grunwald [...], would pick up the Teutonic gauntlet and defend not only their own borders, but also liberate the territories that have always been a part of Poland – Warmia, Mazury and Opole Silesia”²³. Active nationalism had a number of positive aspects. Above all, it spurred various publications dedicated to Slavic territories occupied by Germany over the past millennium²⁴. It turned the public’s attention to the fate of Poles living in the Reich, and it warned them of the German threat. On the negative side, active nationalists were biased in portraying the “eternal foe” as purely evil. The legion’s publications relied on the following expressions to describe the Germans: “uncivilized strangers from the north, deadly enemies of the Slavs and the pan-European culture – Germans”, “uncivilized, bearded and dirty barbarians who occupy the lowest strata of civilized society and thrive on robbery”, “Teutonic bandits”, “the attacks staged by Nordic muggers poisoned Europe with a bloody vapor”, “the poisonous blood of the Teutonic beast”, “Teutonic spawn”, “Nordic bar-

²⁰ *Na zachód od granic Rzplitej*, Mocarstwowiec 1931, No. 9, 23 February.

²¹ *O ducha ofensywy*, Mocarstwowiec 1931, No. 9, 28 February.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Morze Wendyjskie*, Mocarstwowiec 1931, No. 9 and No. 28.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

barians”²⁵. The purpose of such language was to incite negative connotations, even hatred, to instill “an aggressive spirit” in the nation and turn the future Polish-German war into the second Grunwald victory.

The legion’s fervent attempts to pursue the Grunwald tradition gave rise to the Grunwald Swords plaque. The medal symbolized the struggle against Germany as well as the other oppressor, the heir to Russian imperial ideology which collaborated with Germany – the USSR. This issue was clearly addressed by an appeal published in *Mocarstwowiec*: “Two Grunwald swords, straight swords that passed from Teutonic to Polish hands, swords pointing to the West and the East will be your sign, a symbol of expansion to the West and the East, a sign that we will courageously face up to the German challenge, that we will fight until the last German soldier leaves Poland’s ancient lands, until the Mongolian culture on Polish territories occupied by Russia no longer taints red Slavic blood, until all Slavic souls are freed from German captivity and the Polish World Power prevails. This is the true meaning of the plaque forged in black iron, a symbol that you will wear with pride”²⁶.

The World Power Legion also looked to the Grunwald tradition as an instrument in “leveling the differences in development between Germany and Poland. The legion’s leaders were fully aware of Germany’s technical supremacy over Poland, and they promoted the «fighting spirit» theory to boost morale before the prospective military conflict”.

According to the legion, Poland would score yet another Grunwald victory by relying on the “fighting spirit of the knights” which had always “played a decisive role in armed struggle” and, as demonstrated during World War I, “its role would continue to grow” with civilizational development. By resorting to a simplified analogy, the legion compared Piłsudski’s Poland to King Jagiełło’s Poland. The civic education principles instilled by Jagiełło and Zawisza Czarny in their knights were portrayed as nearly identical to the contemporary educational measures. “The principles instilled in young knights by Zawisza Czarny’s academy have survived until this day in military training and physical education classes”²⁷. The “fighting spirit” that brought victory in Grunwald would lay the ground for Poland’s “power of expansion”, its mission as a world power and the hope that good would prevail²⁸. Above all, the World Power Legion looked to Grunwald as a political reference for the future, as Jagiełło’s historical testament, a symbol of Poland’s mission in the West and an important lesson in history for the State²⁹.

In 1931, the unionists staged particularly festive celebrations of the Grunwald anniversary. In addition to festivals in the World Power Legion’s

²⁶ *Grunwaldzkie miecze*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1931, No. 12.

²⁷ *Czego nas uczy Grunwald*, *Mocarstwowiec* 1931, No. 12.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

148 local divisions, the main celebrations in Pomerania were divided into two parts:

1. Grunwald Race – a cycle race down the historical route marking King Jagiełło's march to Malbork;

2. A convention of the World Power Legion's divisions in Uzdowo, Pomerania, in the immediate vicinity of the Grunwald battlefield. The convention featured sports competitions and military training³⁰. A monument dedicated to the battle of Grunwald was unveiled in Uzdowo³¹.

The main Grunwald day celebrations were held in Działdowo on 11 and 12 July. They were attended by delegations from across Poland.

The example of the World Power Legion shows that some members of Piłsudski's camp went to great lengths to address the German threat and uphold the Grunwald tradition. But not all of them recognized the full magnitude of the German threat. *Droga* (The Road), a monthly magazine linked to Piłsudski's camp, wrote in 1931 that Germany's alleged march to the East "is merely a reflection on our irrational fears [...]. The future of Germany does not lie east of the Elbe, its future is on the Rhine [...]. Germany's main focus is on the Rhine [...]. Germany no longer has anti-Polish interests, the German people's fear of Poland is a much greater cause for concern [...]. Drang nach Osten is coming to an end"³².

It is difficult to resist the impression that the World Power Legion's program did make a reference to national democratic ideology, although its theories were not consciously emulated. The legion's publications and activities in the following years fully support this observation. The organization explored nationalist ideas that had been objectified and validated by political developments. The World Power Legion never weakened the cult of Józef Piłsudski as the father of independent Poland³³.

³⁰ *Święto Mocarstwowe*, Mocarstwowiec 1931, No. 12.

³¹ Archives of New Records, Pomorskie Regional Office. Legionists' Union. Ref. 273/III-22, p. 20.

³² *Z powodu książki Romana Dmowskiego*, *Droga* 1931, No. 11, pp. 912–913.

³³ *Na czasie*, Mocarstwowiec 1930, No. 8.

Mirosław Janusz Hoffmann

NAZI IDEOLOGY IN THE ARCHEOLOGY OF EAST PRUSSIA

The 1920s and the early 1930s, the years that directly preceded the most tragic and shameful period in Germany's history between 1933 and 1945, were a very difficult time for the Weimar Republic. A lost war and the ensuing economic crisis plunged ordinary Germans deeper into despair and frustration, kindling a common sense of injustice. Most of them still had vivid memories of the recent prosperity, forgetting that this time of plenty had been largely financed from the French reparations after the Franco-Prussian war.

Economic decline and the disillusionment among the members of the working class contributed to the popularity of the radical National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) headed by Adolf Hitler. The *Führer* promised quick change, a powerful Germany, work, prosperity and new territories awaiting colonization. But those postulates required a number of radical measures, above all, the elimination of racial enemies, in particular the Jews, from the fabric of the German society. The future of the Slavs was not clearly laid out in Hitler's program. In the Third Reich, the Slavs would be reduced to the role of inferior people, primarily suited for slave labor. In other territories, they would be allowed a certain degree of freedom, provided, of course, that they yielded to German control.

The Nazis' views of Germany's global supremacy did not come as a surprise, and they were a natural consequence of the theory postulating the superiority of the Germanic peoples in Europe, which had been instilled in the Germans from the early 19th century. The Nazi ideology, which relied on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and the views of certain German historians, including Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840), was further expanded by one of the Third Reich's propagandists, Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), arguing that the human races were not equal and placing the "Aryan" race

at the top of the racial ladder. In his book entitled *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, published in 1930, Rosenberg justified racism and Germany's policy of persecution against the Slavic nations. Although Rosenberg had a decisive role in shaping NSDAP's ideology, he was merely a party official with no previous record of academic achievement. His views and theories lacked substantial weight, therefore, they required additional substantiation from scientific knowledge and findings, mainly in the area of archeology, linguistics and history. Aside from other areas of life and the economy, Hitler's rise to power in 1933 had an immense impact on the prehistory of Germany and East Prussia.

The twelve years that followed were given different names in German historiography. In the introduction to his dissertation on Prussian history, Carl Engel (1896–1947), one of the most accomplished and relatively politically neutral archeologists from East Prussia, referred to it as the *period of a national revolution*¹. According to Engel, the demand for scientific evidence postulated by the Nazi authorities created a wealth of opportunities for archeology. Archeology played a vital role in the eastern provinces of the Third Reich, in particular East Prussia, Germany's most east-bound stronghold before its territorial expansion of the late 1930s. The only problem was that Königsberg, East Prussia's academic hub, had never achieved excellence even by eastern province's standards. The Albertus University of Königsberg, founded in 1544, ranked low in the hierarchy of German schools of higher education. It was a provincial university that had produced only one world-famous alumnus, Immanuel Kant, in the course of its 400-year history. The status of its academic staff was never impressive, and the university employed a mere 171 lecturers upon the outbreak of World War I².

Despite the above, Königsberg and, in broader terms, East Prussia were of vital significance for the Nazis for geopolitical reasons. After its defeat in the war and in consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, East Prussia was cut off from Germany, becoming an enclave between Poland and Lithuania, two countries that had only just regained their autonomy. The political situation contributed to an atmosphere of a "fortress under siege" in Germany, in particular in East Prussia. Regardless of the political undertones, the Weimar government not only did nothing to appease those feelings, but it actually fuelled them. A number of measures were initiated to reinforce the German identity in this region. Those efforts raised fears and justified the claims made by members of the Polish political elite, mainly Roman Dmowski and the National Democracy, who demanded East Prussia's political separation from Germany and the annexation of the territories between the lower Vistula and the Nemen to Poland³.

¹ C. Engel, *Vorgeschichte der altpreußischen Stämme*, Bd. I, Königsberg 1935, p. 12.

² J. Serczyk, *Albertyna. Uniwersytet w Królewcu (1544–1945)*, Olsztyn 1994, p. 146.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 146–147.

The Albertus University of Königsberg was the ideal academic hub for incubating the Nazi ideology also for other reasons. The Pan-Germanic doctrine had been promoted by some of the university's academics since the late 19th century, and their views were articulated in a more or less explicit manner. The main advocate of the Pan-Germanic ideology was Adalbert Bezenberger (1851–1922), an outstanding linguist, historian and ethnographer⁴. Bezenberger represented the last generation of scientists who combined archeological and ethnographic research and validated their findings by analyzing archeological sources in folk traditions that were preserved by the region's autochthonous population for generations⁵. In the 19th century, this research method was a generally observed rule. Bezenberger served three terms in office as the university's rector, and he was one of the few scientists who contributed to the university's rank of a modern academic institution⁶. A native of Hessen, he became a well-established name in Königsberg's academic community also, and perhaps above all, by popularizing archeological findings in the spirit of nationalism, using prehistoric arguments to justify German expansion to Eastern Europe. According to Bezenberger, Germany was fully justified in its attempts to reclaim Germanic territories that had been colonized by the Baltic people in the early Middle Ages. Bezenberger gave a fuller account of his views in the introduction to *Analysen vorgeschichtlicher Bronzen Ostpreussens*, an otherwise prominent work in the area of linguistics, published in 1904 in Königsberg. The scientist made the most powerful statement regarding the supremacy of German academia during his third term in office as the university's rector during World War I: "A Germany academic lecturer is, more than anyone else, bound by the obligation to cultivate the purity of German thought. For his attempts to be successful, we have to address not only the intellect, but also the hearts of our listeners. We mustn't simply train theologians or lawyers, we have to educate scientists with a strong German backbone, people who will take every opportunity to invoke and strengthen the German spirit"⁷. This kind of language had never been spoken at the Albertus University before, and it marked the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new era. It was a harbinger of changes that would soon take place in German and East Prussian archeology. Regardless of the political turmoil of the 1930s, the above quote, an excerpt from Bezenberger's speech delivered before the

⁴ M. J. Hoffmann, *Adalbert Bezenberger – archeolog, językoznawca, historyk i etnograf*, „Borussia”, vol. 1 (1992), pp. 97-101.

⁵ M. J. Hoffmann, *Kultura i osadnictwo południowo-wschodniej strefy nadbałtyckiej w I tysiącleciu p.n.e.*, Olsztyn 2000, p. 9.

⁶ J. Serczyk, *Uniwersytet w Królewcu w XIX i XX wieku jako ośrodek badań historycznych*, in: *Dzieje historiografii Prus Wschodnich i Zachodnich do 1920 roku. Kierunki, ośrodki, najwybitniejsi przedstawiciele*, Toruń 1989, pp. 25–27.

⁷ G. von Selle, *Geschichte der Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg in Preussen*, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1956, p. 327.

senate of the Königsberg university, had a profound impact on research into East Prussia's prehistory.

Since Königsberg and East Prussia were exclaves of the Weimar Republic, Albertus came to be regarded as a university of the Reich (*Reichsuniversität*). An identical term was applied to describe the Strasbourg university after Alsace had been annexed by Germany in the Franco-Prussian war. After 1939, attempts were made to set up the *Reichsuniversität* Posen in Poznań⁸. In a recently published book on the history of East and West Prussia, Hartmut Boockmann observes that the university in Königsberg enjoyed the status of a leading German academic center in the interwar period. To back his claim, Boockmann cites a list of outstanding German historians who lectured at the Albertus University at the time, among them Friedrich Baethgen (1890–1972), Erich Caspar (1879–1935), Herbert Grundmann (1902–1970), Hans Rothfels (1891–1976) and Theodor Schieder (1908–1984). Germany's national socialist government went to great lengths to elevate the university's rank, and its academic staff spared no effort in meeting their patron's demands. An example of the above is a book published in 1934 by Hans Rothfels, a historian with Jewish roots, entitled *Ostraum – Preussentum und Reichsgedanke* (Eastern Lands – Prussian Identity and the Ideals of the Reich)⁹.

In the early 1930s, the university in Königsberg opened a number of new departments, including the Institute for East European Studies (Institut für das Studium Osteuropas), the East Prussian Institute (Ostpreussen-Institut) and the Institute of Prehistory and Early History (Institut für Vor- und Frühgeschichte). The following language courses were placed in the university's curriculum: Estonian, Finnish, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian and Romanian. The Institute of Prehistory and Early History became one of the university's most prominent units for its devout efforts promoting the Nazi ideology. Wolfgang La Baume (1885–1971) of Gdańsk, the institute's first director and lecturer, was replaced by Professor Bolko von Richthofen (1899–1983) already in 1934. Thanks to von Richthofen, who, beginning from 1935, was backed by Hans-Lütjen Janssen, yet another avid supporter of the Nazi doctrine, the role of the Institute of Prehistory and Early History continued to grow rapidly in the structure of the *Reichsuniversität* in Königsberg. As part of its "service for Germany's eastern provinces", the institute held lectures and published articles in tune with the Nazi doctrine, in particular in the *Altpreussen. Vierteljahresschrift für Vorgeschichte und Volkskunde* quarterly magazine, published from 1935 and covering also ethnography¹⁰. The enthu-

⁸ J. Serczyk, *Albertyna*..., p. 148.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 149.

¹⁰ e.g. von Richthofen, *Rasse und Volkstum in der bolschewistischen Wissenschaft (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vor- und Frühgeschichte)*, *Altpreussen*, vol. 1, 1935, pp. 129–144; *Der Ursprung der Ostjuden und die Chazaren*, *Altpreussen*, vol. 3, 1938, pp. 33–38 or Janssen, *Vom Wesen nationalsozialistischer Sinnbilder*, *Altpreussen*, vol. 1, 1935, pp. 36–38.

siasm of the university's pro-Nazi staff members continued to grow each year with increasingly grotesque manifestations of their support that included lecture titles, such as Hans-Lütjen Janssen's speech of 1938 entitled *Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Vorgeschichte, Rassenkunde und Volkskunde*¹¹ and Bolko von Richthofen's lecture *Judengegnerische Bewegungen ausserhalb Deutschlands*¹².

A series of carefully-planned lectures and study tours was engineered to prepare the students of Institut für Vor- und Frühgeschichte for the prominent role they would play in the future. In 1937–1938, Professor Janssen's students participated in a series of foreign study tours – in Lithuania in the summer of 1937, in Poland in the spring of 1938, in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark in July and August 1938. The Polish study tour included a visit to Toruń (a presentation of Toruń Municipal Museum's collection was delivered by Lebiński, MA), Bydgoszcz and Poznań where museum collections were presented by Dr. Karpińska and the university's collection – by Dr. Rajewski (1907–1974). In Cracow, the students were given a tour of the Archeological Museum by Professor Sulimowski (1898–1983). According to Janssen's account, the group proceeded to Lwów/Lemberg (Lviv) where the university's collection was presented by Dr. Smieszko, and Dr. Pasternak guided the students through the archeological treasures of the Ukrainian Taras Shevchenko Museum. The next stop on the route was Warsaw where the visitors toured the Majewski Museum and the National Archeological Museum with the assistance of Dr. Jazdzewski (1908–1985). The last two destinations were Grodno and Vilnius where Dr. Hołubiczowa assisted the students in exploring the collection of the Archeological Museum¹³. Study tours were undoubtedly a great attraction for the students, especially as all travel expenses were covered by the *Reichsuniversität*.

Archeology was also included in the curriculum of the *SS-Hochschule für Lehrerbildung*, founded in Elbląg in 1934. The program comprised lectures in German prehistory, with a strong emphasis on the Germanic roots of eastern provinces. Universities of the type opened in many cities of the Reich, including the *SS-Hochschule für Lehrerbildung* in Łębork where in 1937, Hellmut Agde (1909–1940) became a docent of prehistory and history teaching methods at the age of 28. Agde, former assistant at the Königsberg monument conservation office, was a model example of career opportunism

¹¹ M. Jahn, *Vorgeschichte an den deutschen Universitäten und Technischen Hochschulen. Vorlesungsverzeichnis des Sommersemesters 1938*, Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Vorzeit, vol. 14, 1938, p. 52

¹² S. Gollub, *Vorgeschichte an den deutschen Universitäten und Technischen Hochschulen. Vorlesungsverzeichnis des Wintersemesters 1939/40*, Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Vorzeit, vol. 15, 1939, p. 104.

¹³ H.-L. Janssen, *Auslandsstudienfahrten des Seminars für Vor- und Frühgeschichte der Albertusuniversität Königsberg in Pr. 1937/1938*, Nachrichtenblatt für deutsche Vorzeit, vol. 15, 1939, pp. 161–167, table 46.

that affected many young supporters of the Nazi ideology. In 1930, Agde joined the NSDAP at the age of 21. He became a member of the SA in 1933 and joined the ranks of the SS in 1937. Having fulfilled his mission in Lębork, he transferred to the university in Friburg holding the title of docent habilitated. Several months later, he joined German troops on the frontline where he was killed on 12 May 1940.

The impact of Nazi ideology on archeology is most profoundly demonstrated by the publications of the time, in particular the periodicals founded after 1933. In addition to the cited *Altpreußen...*, other prominent examples included *Germanen-Erbe. Monatsschrift für Deutsche Vorgeschichte*, a flagship publication of Reichsbund für Deutsche Vorgeschichte. Published in Leipzig, this monthly magazine reached every corner of the Third Reich. The covered issues, the underlying propaganda and graphic design make it by far the most prominent example of nationalistic publications in history.

The extent to which the Nazi ideology affected the lowest strata of archeological and conservation employees in East Prussia, namely social custodians of architectural monuments, is a fascinating issue that has not been researched to date. The social custodian initiative, implemented in East Prussia by Wilhelm Gaerte (1890–1958) in the mid 1920, was far from being a success at the beginning. Yet thanks to a training scheme, several years later, some social custodians had scored many achievements in the area of archeological restoration, contributing to the salvation of many valuable sites. Until 1931, only selected districts had social custodians. This was to change in 1934 when social custodians were appointed in nearly all (except two) of East Prussia's 32 districts. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of the new social custodians believed in, or at least manifested their support for the Nazi doctrine. Social custodians did not leave a visible imprint on the archeological science in East Prussia. Most of them did not conduct field research, they were not published authors, nonetheless, some took their "service for the eastern provinces" very seriously. One of them was Paul Lemke, a teacher and a custodian of Kreis Preussisch Eylau, who authored an article in a high-circulation regional calendar for the two mentioned East Prussian districts¹⁴. The article is an account of Paul Lemke's cycling trip to an early iron age kurgan necropolis in Głamsławki when the site was investigated by Dr. Otto Kleemann in the summer of 1935 (1911–2003).

Having arrived at the site and browsed through the results of archeological explorations, Lemke asked Kleemann: "Why do you study these graves, anyway?". Kleemann replied: "Many people still fail to understand it. But in these trenches, shovel in hand, we fight for our fatherland, just the way soldiers do with their guns. You can still read in the papers that according to

¹⁴ S. Szczepański, *Archaeology in the service of the Nazis: Himmler's propaganda and the excavations at the hillfort site in Stary Dzierzgoń (Alt Christburg)*, Lietuvos Archeologija, vol. 35, 2009, pp. 83–84.

some Lithuanians and Poles, our Ostpreussen had belonged to them in ancient times. Our mission is to prove that the Lithuanians and the Poles had never settled in this land. No historical records have survived from those times, and our only evidence are archeological treasures which, although mute, provide us with the clearest proof. That's why we cherish every broken clay vessel, every rust-stained javelin tip. They tell us that this country had never been colonized by the Lithuanians or the Poles, and that their claims are completely unfounded. We tell every farmer and every field worker to report any findings directly to a school teacher or a social custodian of archeological monuments. This evidence will enable us to shout to the world that this land will always be German land because it had never been colonized by any of those nations, and it was the hard work of our ancestors that turned this country into the land of the German people"¹⁵.

By virtue of their function, social custodians maintained direct contacts with members of the rural community. The effectiveness and the mechanisms underlying the custodians' attempts to instill Nazi ideals in the locals is an interesting, yet unresearched issue. The above example suggests that such measures could have been effective, and that the arguments justifying "Germany's eternal right" to the territory between the lower Vistula and the Nemen were probably more than obvious for the average reader of *Natanger Heimatkalender für die Kreise Heiligenbeil und Pr. Eylau*. The situation probably differed across districts. Social custodians from the districts of Kwidzyn, Susz, Sztum (Waldemar Heym [1883–1967])¹⁶ and, in particular, Olsztyn, which was part of the Catholic region of Warmia (Leonhard Fromm [1887–1975]), had been active field archeologists since the early 1920s, and they probably had little interest in the national socialist doctrine. A higher level of support for the Nazi ideology was reported in the traditionally "Polish" region of Mazury. Adolf Pogoda, a teacher and social custodian in Ełk, was renowned for his nationalist ideas which he disseminated in *Unsere Masurenland*, a local newspaper. The social custodian in Szczytno, Hans Tiska (1892–1969), a teacher and a native of Mazury, like Pogoda¹⁷, was an active field researcher at the turn of the 1920s and the 1930s who had scored numerous achievements in archeology and started a museum in Szczytno. Tiska was also one of the region's most active employees of Bund Deutscher Osten which was founded by Alfred Rosenberg in 1933. The union brought together the leading German organizations conducting anti-Polish activities

¹⁵ P. Lemke, *Das Hügelgrab im Glamslacker Walde*, *Natanger Heimatkalender für die Kreise Heiligenbeil und Pr. Eylau*, Pr. Eylau, vol. 9, 1936, p. 56.

¹⁶ S. Tatara, M. J. Hoffmann, *Waldemar Heym – kwidzyński muzealnik, etnograf i archeolog. W czterdziestolecie śmierci*, in: „Acta Archaeologica Pomoranica III. XVI Sesja Pomorzoznawcza, Szczecin 22–24. listopada 2007 r.”, part 2, (ed. Andrzej Janowski, Krzysztof Kowalski, Sławomir Słowiński), Szczecin 2009, pp. 399–414.

¹⁷ J. Sobieraj, *Hans Tiska – szczycieński nauczyciel, opiekun zabytków i muzealnik*, *Rocznik Mazurski*, vol. IV, 1999, pp. 53–60.

“that neither the party nor the government should attempt to perform”. The union grouped the most devoted fighters for “the German eastern provinces” in the Nazi movement, and it worked closely with the NSDAP, military organizations and the German secret police. In recognition of his services for Bund Deutscher Osten, Tiska became the head of the *Untergruppe Ostpreussen Süd*, which covered the southern part of East Prussia, before the outbreak of the war.

Social custodians of architectural monuments manifested various degrees of support for the Nazi propaganda in the “eastern provinces”. The most politically involved activists were the custodians in the traditionally “Polish” region of Mazury, a fact that cannot be attributed to coincidence.

Karol Sacewicz

CONCEPTS OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
POSITION OF THE POLISH UNDERGROUND STATE
IN RESPONSE TO THE RED ARMY'S INVASION
OF THE EASTERN TERRITORIES OF THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF POLAND (1943–1944)
– A BROAD OUTLINE

During World War II, the main aim of the Polish President, the Polish Government in Exile, the Polish Armed Forces in Exile and the Polish Army in occupied Poland was to regain full sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Polish state. The achievement of that goal was determined not only by the defeat of the Third Reich but also by the policies exercised by the USSR, one of aggressors who dismembered the Second Republic of Poland in September 1939 and later joined the Great Coalition. During the war, Soviet policies addressing Poland's quest for independence posed the greatest legal challenge for the Polish Government in Exile and its home divisions. The Western Allies approached the political aspects of that struggle with a vast degree of ambiguity.

The complexity of the problem in Polish foreign policy resulted from the fact that upon Germany's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union automatically broke off its close alliance with Hitler, becoming the key member of the anti-German camp. In the years that followed, the Soviet army engaged the German (and not only) forces in a series of battles that inflicted a devastating blow on the military and economic potential of the Third Reich and its allies. The Red Army's continued success gave impetus to the Soviet Union's expansive, imperial foreign policy. The Soviets launched aggressive propaganda campaigns which undermined Poland's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Eastern Borderlands¹. Those measures

¹ W. Materski., *Zerwanie stosunków polsko-sowieckich* in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, ed. W. Michowicz, vol. 5: 1939–1945, Warszawa 1999, pp. 319–387; idem, *Na widencie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 655–701.

weakened Poland's efforts to protect its rights in the east. The Western Allies turned a blind eye on Poland's struggle in fear of severing their relations with Moscow², especially since they failed to open a second theater of war³.

The vast disproportions in Poland's and the USSR's military and economic potential detracted from the government-in-exile's significance in the Allied camp. Owing to British and American war strategies, President Raczkiewicz and the successive prime ministers (Sikorski and Mikołajczyk) found their efforts to protect Polish sovereignty in the eastern territories not only difficult but, in the contemporary military reality, completely impossible and futile. The Western Allies' attitudes towards the Polish problem were best illustrated during the breakthrough period in Polish-Soviet relations in April 1943 when the Germans had discovered a mass grave of Polish officers murdered by the NKVD in 1940 in Smolensk⁴.

The USSR's decision to break off diplomatic relations was a powerful blow for the Polish authorities and their struggle to secure Polish rights in the Eastern Borderlands. This problem took on a new significance in the face of suspicions that the Soviet army would be the first to enter the territory of the Nazi-occupied Poland. In the second half of 1943, Polish-Soviet relations did not focus entirely on the Eastern Borderlands, but they also addressed rudimentary issues, namely Poland's independence which, despite Poland's efforts on the anti-German front, became highly debatable in the face of Russia's increasingly blatant imperial ambitions.

The Red Army's advance towards Poland's pre-war borders was one of the key problems facing the Polish Government in Exile and, above all, its factions in the occupied country. The Polish underground movement, in particular the Polish Underground State, became divided over the matter at the turn of 1943 and 1944. The differences concerned the structure of the conspiracy movement which was to be preserved in the face of the encroaching troops of "our allies' ally".

² J. Tebinka J., *Polityka brytyjska wobec problemu granicy polsko-radzieckiej 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1998, passim; M. Hałas, *Goście czy intruzi? Rząd polski na uchodźstwie. Wrzesień 1939 – lipiec 1943*, Warszawa 1996, passim.

³ According to the Western Allies, there was a threat of a repeated scenario from 1918 when Russia and Germany had signed a peace treaty. In the absence of Anglo-Saxon armies on the continent, the Western Allies were particularly cautious not to generate tension in their relations with Russia.

⁴ *Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów*, ed. J. Mackiewicz, Londyn 1982, p. 85; W. Materski, *Zerwanie stosunków...*, p. 374; idem, *Na widecie...*, p. 701; E. Duraczyński, *Rząd Polski na uchodźstwie 1939–1945. Organizacja, personalia, polityka*, Warszawa 1993, p. 222; cf. *Prawdziwa historia Polaków. Ilustrowane wypisy źródłowe 1939–1945*, ed. D. Baliszewski, A.K. Kunert, vol. 2: *1943–1944*, Warszawa 1999, p. 1005; Andrzej K. Kunert and Dariusz Baliszewski suggest the date of 11 April 1943; for more information on the discovery of the mass grave, refer to: A. Paul, *Katyń. Staliniowska masakra i tryumf prawdy*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 197–209.

The strategy to be adopted in the event of a Soviet invasion was one of the key points of a national uprising plan developed by the 3rd Division of the General Command of the Union of Armed Struggle (KG ZWZ) and the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters. In the initial uprising plan, "Operations Report No. 54", forwarded to London on 5 February 1941, KG ZWZ accounted for the threat to insurgent operations that could be posed by the second occupant, USSR, on the anti-Nazi front⁵. A defense strategy accounting for the Red Army's hostility towards the insurgents had been developed before the Soviet-German war in a completely different political reality. The Soviet occupation of Poland's Eastern Borderlands plunged the USSR and the Second Republic of Poland into a state of war, and the Red Army's potential advance was perceived as the greatest threat to Polish military efforts and quest for independence both from the political and the military perspective. After 22 June 1941, Polish territory was occupied by only one aggressor, and the signing of the Sikorski–Mayski agreement completely changed the initial concept of the anti-German uprising in Poland⁶. The USSR's attitude to the military and political strategies of the Polish Underground State was an important consideration in the decision-making process both for the Government in Exile and its domestic divisions. Despite the fact that Poland and the Soviet Union had established official diplomatic relations, that a Polish army was being organized in the USSR and that both countries were members of the same political and military camp, by 1942, the command of the Polish Army in exile⁷ and at home feared the military and political consequences of the Red Army's invasion of Poland. On 22 June 1942, General

⁵ M. Ney-Krwawicz, *Koncepcje powstania powszechnego na ziemiach polskich* in: *Operacja "Burza" i Powstanie Warszawskie 1944*, ed. K. Komorowski, Warszawa 2004, pp. 68–71; idem, *Koncepcje walki i powstania in: Armia Krajowa. Szkice z dziejów Sił Zbrojnych Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego*, ed. K. Komorowski, Warszawa 1999, pp. 207–212; see also: idem, *Koncepcje walki Armii Krajowej in: Władze RP na obczyźnie podczas II wojny światowej*, ed. Z. Błażyński, Londyn 1994, pp. 527–533.

⁶ In "Personal and classified instructions for the national commander" of 8 March 1942", Commander-in-Chief general Sikorski argued that the possibility of a Polish-Soviet treaty should be taken into account in operation plans; *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 2: VI 1941 – IV 1943, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1990, p. 202.

⁷ In his instructions addressed to General Rowecki ("Rakoń", "Kalina", "Grot"), General Sikorski noted that the Soviet army, pressured by German forces, could launch a counterattack already in 1942. As the result "Germany would be defeated, and the Russian army would enter German territory, partially through Poland". Sikorski emphasized that if the envisioned situation were to take place, "we would be unable to actively counteract the Russian troops entering Poland in pursuit of the withdrawing German army. The State and the Polish Armed Forces at Home could be effectively reinstated only if Russia were to act in good will to fulfill the undertaken obligations [...]". General Sikorski observed that anti-Russian campaigns could be completely incomprehensible for the Western Allies; therefore, they could be subjected to acute criticism, and they could be used by the Soviets as a pretext to "break off the agreement and occupy our Country. This could lead to unnecessary bloodshed". Nonetheless, "we should be fully prepared when the Bolsheviks encroach into our territory", argued Sikorski, and the Polish Armed Forces at Home would stage a military attack against German troops; *ibidem*, p. 203.

Rowecki, Commander of the Home Army, forwarded "Report No. 132. Poland's position on Russia and our options in the eastern territories"⁸ to the Commander-in-Chief. The report listed issues that had a decisive impact on Polish operation plans in the Soviet front. General Rowecki wrote that "Russia always has been and always will be our enemy"⁹. In "Instructions 1111/42", Rowecki recommended the observance of the provisions of the Sikorski-Mayski agreement in the Polish army's operation plans, and referred to the agreement as "a tool in the battle against Germany. The agreement was not a manifestation of the Poles' and the Bolsheviks' free will, but it was imposed on both parties by the German invasion of Russia"¹⁰. Rowecki thus implied that political guarantees would not offer real protection to Polish interests in the event of the Red Army's advance. In the "Kalina" report, he analyzed three hypothetical case scenarios in the eastern front, he described their impact on the planned uprising and the ensuing threat from the Soviet armed forces. As regards the most pessimistic third variant which envisaged the Soviet army's victory over German forces and the USSR's advance into Europe in the footsteps of withdrawing Nazi troops, General Rowecki was of the opinion that an armed struggle should not be initiated against the Germans. He argued that the German occupation would be swiftly replaced by Soviet military control. The following recommendations were formulated in the "Kalina" report: protecting state administration by appointing the Government Delegate for Poland, his cabinet and public security agencies (National Security Corps /PKB/ and Internal Affairs Department /DSW/), keeping the Polish army in exile and refraining from exposing the Home Army¹¹. The possibility of armed retaliation against Soviet aggression could not be ruled out¹².

Although the USSR was listed in the "allies"¹³ section of the successive uprising plan detailed in "Orientation report No. 154", developed by the

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 273–278.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 273.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 274.

¹¹ According to General Rowecki "The Home Army would emerge from hiding only when we have a sufficient guarantee that Moscow will be loyal, and that it will not hinder our efforts to restore an independent Polish Republic". The Soviets were expected to provide such a guarantee as the result of the efforts undertaken by the Polish Government in Exile on the international arena with the full involvement of the Western Allies; *ibidem*, p. 275.

¹² According to the General Command of the Home Army, an armed retaliation was part of the third option during the anti-German rising. When faced with the threat of being disarmed by the approaching Soviet troops, the Polish Armed Forces at Home stationed in the insurgent base (the "redoubt") would take military action to shake the conscience of the West and give a clear answer to Britain's and the USA's position on the Polish-Soviet conflict. Rowecki did not support this scenario because it would imply Poland's defeat, nevertheless "even if we are in for a hopeless fight, we can't give it up on account of our responsibility to the future generations"; *ibidem*, p. 277.

¹³ Rowecki wrote: "Russia. I consider it to be an ally only for formal reasons, and I deeply believe that Russia will demonstrate a hostile attitude to Poland as soon as it has regained its strength [...]"; *ibidem*, p. 332.

General Command of the Home Army on 8 September 1942, the author of the “Kalina” report demonstrated a highly cautious, if not pessimistic, approach to the Soviet invasion of Poland. General Rowecki was of the opinion that the Red Army’s advance into Poland would ultimately end in yet another occupation which the country would not be able to resist effectively. According to the Home Army commander, the Polish Armed Forces should remain a part of the conspiracy movement, and their existence could be communicated to the public only upon the commander-in-chief’s explicit orders¹⁴.

As the eastern front advanced towards Poland’s pre-war borders, the Soviet threat became a predominant topic of debate in the underground movement’s plans to stage an anti-German uprising¹⁵. In radiogram messages forwarded in 1943, General Rowecki proposed to replace the plans detailed in reports No. 54 and 154 with a series of local uprisings. Leaving aside the military considerations, in particular the combat potential of the Polish Armed Forces on the German front, the purpose of an armed struggle was to manifest the “Polishness” of the Eastern Borderlands. In the face of USSR’s increasingly brutal territorial claims¹⁶, this concept became a crucial motivator underlying the Polish military effort. The local uprising concept proposed by General Rowecki was approved by the Commander-in-Chief who wrote in a telegram of 25 March 1943 that in the event of the Red Army’s invasion, only the civilian administration should be revealed, whereas Home Army troops exposed during military struggle against the Germans should be “withdrawn deeper into the country to prevent their destruction”¹⁷.

The USSR’s decision to break off diplomatic ties with Poland was a clear sign of the Soviets’ true intentions towards Poland, in particular on the eve of the Red Army’s invasion of Poland’s eastern territories. On 25 April 1943, the former Soviet ally became the “our allies’ ally”, and this fact had a significant bearing on emergency scenarios developed by the Polish authorities. The Polish government had to swiftly develop clear guidelines for facing the Soviet army and preserving Poland’s sovereignty. This urgent need was communicated by General Rowecki¹⁸ in his telegrams to the Com-

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 333.

¹⁵ According to General Rowecki’s report of 26 February 1943, the outbreak of the uprising should be coordinated with “the encroachment of the Russian army, rather than the collapse of Germany”; ibidem, p. 423; see also: M. Ney-Krwawicz, *Koncepcje powstania...*, p. 78; idem, *Koncepcje walki...*, p. 216; idem, *Koncepcje walki Armii Krajowej...*, pp. 540–541.

¹⁶ Ref. W. Materski, *Na widecie...*, pp. 685–700.

¹⁷ *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach...*, vol. 2, pp. 485–486.

¹⁸ In the telegram of 19 June 1943, he wrote: “Whereas I am fully aware that our Soviet policy is wrought with problems, I find it difficult to keep track of the sudden and unexpected twists in political relations. In the underground world, every change of orders is extremely difficult to execute, and when it comes to the eastern borderlines – it is practically impossible. [...] I can command the army to adopt only one attitude towards the Russians at a time”; *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 3: *IV 1943 – VII 1944*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1990, p. 29. According to “Kalina”, a defensive position defined in a cohesive and logical manner would lay the foundations for a further plan of action which would be consistent with the operations on the anti-German front; ibidem, p. 32.

mander-in-Chief. Based on the former Soviet policy addressing Poland, Rowecki argued that Poland should adopt “an active and defensive stance, therefore, a generally hostile stance” towards the USSR¹⁹.

The General Command of the Home Army became clearly divided over the Polish-Russian issue in 1943, in particular in the second half of the year. The General Commander of the Polish Army, General Komorowski – Bór, Chief of Staff General Pełczyński and Colonel Irenek – Osmecki upheld their uncompromising positions regarding Soviet territorial claims. They were clearly opposed by other Home Army officers, among them General Stanisław Tatar (“Erazm”), head of the 3rd Division of General Command, and lieutenant colonel Marian Drobik (“Dzięcioł”), head of the 2nd Division of General Command²⁰, who argued that in consequence of Soviet victory in the eastern front, the Red Army would invade Poland already in the winter of 1943/1944. They claimed that Poland’s fate would be decided by the USSR, and any attempts to resist the Soviets would be sheer madness, a futile struggle aimed at saving Poland’s honor that would ultimately lead to the downfall of the Polish Underground State²¹. They advocated a flexible tactic towards the USSR that would be based on a rational analysis of Poland’s resources in 1943 and 1944 and its ability to win the political and military conflict with the Soviets. The results of the analysis left no room for hope – every confrontation with the USSR would end in a devastating defeat of Poland. General Tatar and Lieutenant Colonel Drobik suggested in two separate reports that urgent attempts should be made to reach agreement with the Kremlin, even at the expense of the Eastern Borderlines²². In their opinion, the proposed solution was Poland’s only chance of establishing its own

¹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 30, 31. General Rowecki argued that depicting the Soviets as allies to the Polish independence movement was a big mistake which undermined the Polish army’s morale and disintegrated social unity; ibidem, p. 30.

²⁰ W. Bułhak, *Raport szefa Oddziału II KG AK ppłk. dypl. Mariana Drobika “Bieżąca polityka polska a rzeczywistość” i sprawa jego aresztowania (listopad–grudzień 1943)* in: *Wywiad i Kontrywywiad Armii Krajowej*, ed. W. Bułhak, Warszawa 2008, pp. 15, 23–47.

²¹ Drobik was of the opinion that continued passivity without any efforts to reach a broader compromise with the USSR was sheer madness that was deprived of any logic; ref. *Pokonani w obozie zwycięzców – o sprawie polskiej w latach II wojny światowej z Markiem Kazimierzem Kamińskim i Tadeuszem Kisielewskim rozmawiają Władysław Bułhak i Barbara Polak*, “Biuletyn IPN” 2005, No. 5–6(52–53), p. 40; see also: W. Bułhak, op. cit., p. 27; Z.S. Siemaszko, *Działalność generała Tatara 1943–1949*, Lublin 2004, p. 24

²² Z. S. Siemaszko, op. cit., p. 24, J. Stepień, Lieutenant Colonel Marian Drobik’s memorandum of November 1943 advocating changes in Poland’s policy towards the USSR, “Teki Archiwalne”, new series, 2001, vol. 6 (28), pp. 173–198; The authors of the memorandum, in particular Drobik, subscribed to Winston Churchill’s opinion that the Polish-Soviet conflict could be permanently pacified by satisfying the USSR’s territorial claims. M. K. Kamiński argued that this line of thought offered no guarantee that Russia would accept Polish independence after the war. The authors of the memorandum seemed to disregard the idealistic foundations of Soviet expansionism. For the USSR, the annexation of Poland’s eastern territories was not the ultimate goal. For critical remarks to Drobik’s memorandum, refer to: W. Bułhak, op. cit., pp. 39–40.

overnment and rescuing everything else that could be saved. Generals Komorowski and Pełczyński²³ were openly resentful of the concept and, consequently, the proposal was rejected by the General Command. Drobik²⁴ was arrested by the Gestapo on 8 December 1943, and Tatar²⁵ was dispatched to London on 14/15 April 1944 as part of operation "Bridge 1", therefore, the contents of their reports did not influence the Home Army's official position on Soviet claims.

The Polish Underground State's action plan in the event of a Soviet invasion was based on a set of instructions forwarded by the Council of Ministers to the Home Army commander and the Government Delegate at Home on 26 October 1943²⁶. Three case scenarios were analyzed: 1) reinstatement of diplomatic relations between the government of the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Council of People's Commissars, 2) continued absence of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, 3) conclusion of a separate agreement between the USSR and the Third Reich. According to the first, most optimistic variant, underground administration would officially take command over Polish territories, and the reinstated Polish Armed Forces at Home would remain a part of the conspiracy. Should the Red Army attempt to incorporate Polish territories into the Soviet Union, Poland would file an official complaint on the United Nations forum²⁷, and the Home Army would restrict its operations to self-defense measures. In the event of the second scenario, the Polish government announced that "the matter would be brought to the attention of the United Nations in an official protest against the violation of Polish sovereignty – Soviet troops invaded Poland without consulting the Polish government. In its communiqué, the Polish government would also renounce any cooperation with the Soviets"²⁸. The national authorities should remain underground, and the armed forces would act in self-defense in the event of Soviet repression. In the third variant, the government advocated the scenario that had already taken place before 22 June 1941 – civilian and military authorities should go even deeper underground, limiting themselves to the "most necessary acts of self-defense"²⁹.

In the face of the Red Army's imminent advance into Poland's eastern territories, Home Army soldiers in eastern districts had to be provided with instructions for responding to Soviet regular and partisan troops. The commanders of Home Army districts were given the following orders under Instructions No. 1300, issued on 20 November 1943 for Operation Storm:

²³ W. Baliński, *Człowiek w cieniu. Tadeusz Pełczyński. Zarys biografii*, Kraków 1994, p. 84.

²⁴ Refer to: Bułhak, op. cit., p. 47.

²⁵ Z.S. Siemaszko, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁶ *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1332-1334; see also: *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach...*, vol. 3, pp. 182-185.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 1333.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 1334.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

"1) Soviet partisan troops entering Polish territory should not be prevented from engaging in military combat with the Germans. Direct engagement with the Soviet enemy should be avoided. Polish troops that had already entered into a conflict with the enemy and, therefore, would be unable to repair their relations with the Soviets should be relocated. Our operations will be limited strictly to self-defense"³⁰. Polish soldiers were advised to play host to the advancing Soviet troops, obstruct any attempts at incorporating Home Army units into Berling's army and obey only the orders and directives given by legal Polish authorities.

The threat of the Red Army's regular troops crossing Poland's pre-war borders gave rise to yet another dilemma, namely the choice of strategy addressing Soviet partisan units that had already made their way to Poland³¹. Home Army commanders fully recognized the problem. In a series of telegrams sent in October 1943, General Komorowski, Home Army commander, informed the Commander-in-Chief of a series of attacks staged by the Soviet partisans³². The problem was not solved in 1943. Komorowski was faced with the difficult task of protecting national interests and, at the same time, controlling anti-Soviet attitudes among his soldiers. In order No. 126 of 12 January 1944³³, Komorowski argued that in view of the logic of war, Poland was unable to deny the USSR the right to fight against Germany on Polish territory, therefore, no such attempts would be made by the Polish government. Whereas Poland sanctioned the Soviet partisans' struggle against the German army and administration, it would not tolerate any political efforts aimed against the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the Republic of Poland. In this regard, General Komorowski instructed his troops to resist any such attempts by acting in self-defense.

During the occupation, the attitude towards the Soviets was a frequent topic of debate in various press titles associated with the conspiracy movement. In 1943, with the eastern front approaching Polish territory and the continued absence of diplomatic relations with Russia, this issue was widely discussed by underground publications. Those articles were an important awareness-building tool which prepared soldiers and members of the con-

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 1373.

³¹ Zob. K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa Polski Podziemnej wobec komunistów polskich (1939-1945)*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 135-168; idem, *Obraz sowieckich akcji dywersyjnych w okupowanej Polsce (1941-1943) na łamach "Biuletynu Informacyjnego"*, "Echa Przeszłości" 2003, vol. 4, pp. 127-151; Puławski A., *Sowiecki partyzant – polski problem*, "Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość" 2006, No. 1(9), pp. 217-254.

³² *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach...*, vol. 3, p. 154.

³³ AAN, 203/I-2, *Żołnierze Sił Zbrojnych w Kraju*, 12 January 1944, col. 48-48a (also AIPN, 0397/251, vol. 2, col. 344-345); refer to: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 3 February 1944, No. 5(212) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3: *Przedruk rocznika 1944. Konspiracja*, "Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy" 2003, special issue No. 3(200), pp. 1793-1796; *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1449-1451; *Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski w relacjach i dokumentach*, ed. A.K. Kunert, Warszawa 2000, pp. 120-122.

spiracy movement for the possibility of a Soviet invasion. They featured recommendations, guidelines, instructions and analyses of future Polish-Soviet relations. Above all, those publications attempted to answer the following question: which political and military force was approaching Polish borders? *Biuletyn Informacyjny*, the flagship publication of the Information and Propaganda Bureau of the General Command of the Home Army (BIP KG AK), attempted to provide the answer already in November 1943. Its article stated that the Red Army was the military force of an imperial state “which is not an army of friends or a liberation army for Poland”³⁴. The authors emphasized the USSR’s aggressive claims to Polish territory, its attempts to disintegrate the Polish political scene by creating pro-Soviet initiatives, such as the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) and Berling’s army “which enabled Russia to engulf the remaining Polish territories through Sovietization”³⁵. In conclusion, the authors wrote that “[...] Poland’s historic aggressor, Russia, is approaching the Polish border without much display of good will, fighting our deadly enemy, Germany, on its way [...]. Our nation will be forced to take one of the most important political exams in its history”³⁶.

As part of national preparations for the arrival of Soviet troops, efforts were made to manifest the Polish roots of the Eastern Borderlands. This goal was to be achieved through the revolutionary ardor of Polish civilian authorities during Operation Storm and displays of national spirit in the local community. In official communication of 15 November 1943, the Government Delegate at Home instructed local residents not to panic and to remain in their respective territories to protect Polish property and support the national authorities. Members of the local community were also told to act “with dignity and politeness” in the face of the encroaching Soviet army³⁷. In addition to the orders instructing Polish people to give uncompromising support to the Government in Exile and to preserve national unity³⁸, the

³⁴ *Front wschodni – u granic Polski*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 18 November 1943, No. 46(201) in: “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, part 2: *Przedruk roczników 1942–1943*, “Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy” 2002, special issue No. 2(195), p. 1598.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 1598.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ *Wskazania dla obywateli ziem kresowych*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 25 November 1943, No. 47(202) in: “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, part 2, p. 1611. An underground publication of the Polish Socialist Party – Freedom, Equality, Independence (WRN) also issued an appeal to the Polish citizens inhabiting eastern territories, instructing them to stay put and refrain from panic. The authors of the appeal wrote: “We will show the Red Army that these territories are our home where we have set our roots, that we are still citizens of the Republic of Poland. We will demand respect for our rights, including the right to self-determination, within the framework laid down by the Polish national authorities”; *Jeżeli wkroczy armia rosyjska*, “Robotnik w Walce”, 21 November 1943, No. 6.

³⁸ Refer to: *O właściwą postawę*, “Ajencja A.”, 10 December 1943, No. 12; *Jeżeli wkroczy armii rosyjska*, “Robotnik w walce”, 21 November 1943, No. 6. WRN wrote: “[...] loyal to our authorities and the Polish Republic until the end, we will demand that the encroaching Russian army fully respects our rights to self-determination”. See also: *Przed kresem drogi*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”,

manifestations of Polish identity in the Eastern Borderlands were a key element in political and social preparations for the Soviet invasion. The authorities appealed to the public not to give in to hostile propaganda, to remain calm and to steady their nerves when the moment finally arrived³⁹.

The Red Army crossed the eastern border of the Second Republic of Poland on the night of 3 to 4 January 1944⁴⁰. The Polish territory was invaded by the military forces of “our allies’ ally”, a hostile power which did not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Poland. In the face of the Soviet offensive, the underground authorities were forced to develop detailed propaganda instructions as well as an official political and military position. Whereas the Home Army required an in-depth interpretation of the provisions of instructions No. 1300, the political elites were confronted with a serious organizational challenge in the process of responding to a tangible Soviet threat.

In January 1944, the General Command’s Information and Propaganda Bureau issued propaganda guidelines, signed by Colonel Rzepacki, that were a reflection of the Home Army’s position on the Soviet invasion. The following statement was made: “Poland desires good neighbor relations and cooperation with Russia on terms that do not hinder our country. It was not Poland’s decision to break off its diplomatic relations with Russia. If our diplomatic ties are reinstated, we are ready to collaborate with the Russian army on Polish territory. We demand that Russia respects our independence and territorial integrity and ceases to intervene in our internal affairs”⁴¹.

6 January 1944, No. 1(208); The Government Delegate’s Office for Home wrote: “The Polish government represents the Polish State and the Polish nation engaged in an armed struggle in the country. [...] Maximum unity symbolizes maximum democracy”; *Jeden jest tylko polski ośrodek władzy*, “Kraj. Agencja Informacyjna IP”, 4 January 1944, No. 1(18). These appeals took on a special significance not only in the face of the approaching eastern front but also the heightened activity of the communist underground; See also: K. Sacewicz, *Centralna prasa...*, p. 293-.

³⁹ *Noworoczne wskazania*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny. Z Frontu Walki Podziemnej”, 30 December 1943, supplement to “Biuletyn Informacyjny” No. 52(207) in: “*Biuletyn Informacyjny*”, part 3, p. 1731. The appeals were continued in 1944, refer to: *Oświadczenie*, “Agencja Prasowa”, 20 April 1944, No. 16 (209).

⁴⁰ M.K. Kamiński, *Dyplomacja polska wobec dyktatu mocarstw (lipiec 1943 – luty 1944)* in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, ed. W. Michowicz, vol. 5: 1939–1945, Warszawa 1999, p. 467; refer to: *Wojska sowieckie w granicach Polski*, “WRN”, 14 January 1944, No. 1(132); *Powaga sytuacji*, “Przegląd”, 21 February 1944, No. 16; *Przekroczenie granicy Polski przez wojska sowieckie*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 13 January 1944, No. 2(209) in: “*Biuletyn Informacyjny*”, part 3, pp. 1759–1760. Members of the Polish underground argued that the encroachment of the Red Army into Polish territory fuelled the communist propaganda. They warned the public of the propaganda’s negative consequences. Refer to: *Taniec szaleńców*, “Polak”, 2 March 1944, No. 4; AAN, 206/2, *Polacy! Robotnicy! Chłopi polscy!*, July 1944, col. 4–4a.

⁴¹ AAN, 203/July-1, Wytuczne propagandowe No. 1/44, January 1944, col. 5; zob. też AAN, 203/VII-1, *Wskazówki do prowadzenia rozmów z Armią Czerwoną*, 1944, col. 12–15; *Polskie Państwo Podziemne w obliczu ofensywy Sowietów*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 4 May 1944, No. 18(225) in: “*Biuletyn Informacyjny*”, part 3, p. 1987–1989; *O wolną Polskę*, “Wolność Robotnicza”, 21 February 1944, No. 4(6).

The Red Army invasion spurred a debate in the political community. The People's Party (SL) advocated a polite stance to the Soviets without surrendering the key goals of Poland's eastern policy⁴². In the absence of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, the following recommendations were formulated: "a) resist forced or voluntary conscription to the Soviet army and Berling's units by all means available, b) refrain from taking up employment in the Soviet political administration or the Soviet police, c) refrain from participating in election campaigns held by the Soviet authorities, d) go deeper underground in the event of a Soviet occupation – the Polish Workers' Party is better versed in the conspiracy movement than the Gestapo"⁴³.

In its public appeal, entitled "Citizens" (Obywatele), the Convention of Independence Organizations claimed: "Our country is invaded by Russian troops, the army of our second eternal enemy"⁴⁴. This was a clear signal that Poles should adopt the same attitude towards the Red Army that they had exercised with regard to Wehrmacht forces, or at least a very cautious approach.

The same stance was adopted by the command of the National Armed Forces (NSZ) which wrote in "General instructions No. 3" of 15 January 1944: "In addition to its claims covering half of Poland's territory, the USSR relies on the Polish Workers' Party and the People's Army to carry out a revolutionary communist campaign aimed against the entire Polish nation. [...]. In line with the NSZ's statement claiming that 'Poland's eastern borders established by the Treaty of Riga are not debatable', I hereby announce that the National Armed Forces will fight to restore Poland's eastern territories. The following guidelines and orders are hereby issued: 1) Soviet forces on Polish territory shall have enemy status. 2) In view of the situation in the

⁴² "Polska Ludowa", a press publication of the "Roch" People's Alliance, wrote: "We firmly claim Poland's eastern border as defined by the Treaty of Riga in 1921"; Polska a Rosja, "Polska Ludowa", January 1944, No. 1 (42).

⁴³ AAN, 200/2, Circular letter No. 6: Do zarządów wojewódzkich i powiatowych, March 1944, col. 27–28.

⁴⁴ As cited by W. Chojnacki, *Bibliografia zwartych i ulotnych druków konspiracyjnych wydanych pod okupacją niemiecką w latach 1939–1945*, Warszawa 2005, p. 461. Already in April 1943, a similar position towards the Soviet army was adopted by the "Blok" Anti-Communist Alliance, yet another right-wing movement in the Polish Underground State, headed by Henryk Glass. Glass addressed a "Memorandum on the dangers of a communist revolution in Poland" to the key decision-makers. He wrote: "Poland has not one, but two deadly enemies: the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Russia, 2) the German-Russian war and the gradual deterioration of both military powers significantly benefits the interests of the Polish State and nation [...] 4) Poland may not aid either party in this war". An evaluation of the communist underground, based on *Memoriał w sprawie niebezpieczeństwa rewolucji komunistycznej w Polsce* (April 1943), ed. K. Sacewicz, "Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość" 2009, No. 1(14), p. 413. The "Blok" Alliance regarded the Soviet offensive in the eastern front as a measure supporting the achievement of Moscow's imperialistic ambitions. Ref. "Blok" Henryka Glassa wobec zagrożenia sowiecko-komunistycznego na podstawie "Planu C" (październik 1943 r.), ed. K. Sacewicz, "Echa Przeszłości" 2007, vol. 8, p. 226.

international arena and the need to unite all enemy forces in the battle against the German occupant, [...] any conflict with regular Soviet troops should be avoided [...]. 3). In view of the Polish government's instructions of 27 October 1943, indicating that any collaboration with Soviet troops would be allowed only after the reinstatement of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, any attempts at cooperating with the Soviet military forces will be regarded as a breach of national interests and treason. 4) The efforts to restore diplomatic relations with the USSR and the achievement of this goal will not put an end to our struggle against the spread of communism and the establishment of Bolshevik agencies on Polish territory"⁴⁵.

The National Armed Forces' guidelines differed significantly from the instructions formulated in the report entitled "The independence movement and the Soviet invasion", developed by the Information and Propaganda Bureau of the Home Army's General Command on 16 February 1944⁴⁶. The report postulated that the absence of anti-German measures would support the "Soviet game", and Poland "would be liberated from German rule by Bolsheviks and their Polish agencies"⁴⁷. The above could shift the public's support away from the Polish government and towards the communists. The administrative authorities⁴⁸ were to emerge from hiding upon the Soviet invasion, although in the face of an anti-Polish campaign staged by the Ukrainians, they would not make their presence known in areas where the Polish community had been decimated and where agreement could not be reached with the national minorities. It was postulated that partisan forces which had exposed themselves during anti-German operations should emerge from the underground. The need for a second conspiracy movement "comprising members of political and military elites, with a uniform structure throughout the entire territory"⁴⁹ was advocated in the event of a civil war, Soviet military intervention and "persistent police control which takes place in a formally independent state"⁵⁰. The author of the report concluded

⁴⁵ "NSZ", 23 February 1944, No. 2; see also: Wróg, "NSZ", 5 April 1944, No. 3; A. Rawicz [J. Lilpop], *O co walczą Narodowe Siły Zbrojne?*, Warszawa 1943 in: *Narodowe Siły Zbrojne. Dokumenty, struktury, personalia*, ed. L. Żebrowski, vol. 1, Warszawa 1994, p. 92.

⁴⁶ AAN, 203/VII-38, *Ruch niepodległościowy wobec wkroczenia wojsk sowieckich*, 16 February 1944, col. 7-9

⁴⁷ Ibidem, col. 8.

⁴⁸ The report provided for other activities aiming to influence the Poles' attitudes towards the Soviets in Polish territories situated east and west of the Curzon line. Its authors envisaged a long-term occupation of the Eastern Borderlands, and a shorter period of foreign control in central Poland. They believed that Anglo-Saxon support would prevent the Sovietization of Poland. The existence of economic relations between the USSR and the Western Allies would enable the latter to exert political pressure on Moscow; *ibidem*, col. 7.

⁴⁹ Ibidem. Starting in the fall of 1943, a secret organization under the cryptonym "NIE" was developed under the orders of the Home Army's commander to safeguard Polish interests in the event of a Soviet invasion; see also: A. Chmielarz, *Epilog Armii Krajowej* in: *Armia Krajowa. Szkice z...*, pp. 323-328.

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

that the failure to initiate an anti-German rising and the escalation of Polish-Soviet hostilities would be a serious mistake. Poland vested high hopes in the support of the Anglo-Saxon countries, but according to the author, only a British and American intervention could bring positive results⁵¹. The report emphasized that unless those powers interfered in the immediate future “any hopes of a post-war intervention would be completely futile”⁵².

Soviet military encroachment in the footsteps of withdrawing German forces brought diplomatic consequences that had been detailed in the government’s instructions of 26 October 1943. On 5 January 1944, the Polish government printed a statement in the London-based dailies *Dziennik Polski* and *Dziennik Żołnierza*⁵³. The British authorities intervened, and the statement was largely toned down in the part relating to Poland’s territorial integrity and its position towards the USSR. The published postulates were also a part of Prime Minister Mikołajczyk’s radio speech broadcast in Poland, and they were distributed in underground press and on leaflets⁵⁴.

The Soviet authorities gave a clearly negative answer. The message broadcast on 11 January by the TASS news agency dispelled all illusions⁵⁵.

⁵¹ The Polish authorities were advised to adopt the Western Allies’ political position.

⁵² AAN, 203/VII-38, *Ruch niepodległościowy wobec wkroczenia wojsk sowieckich*, 16 February 1944, col. 9.

⁵³ *Oczekujemy uszanowania praw Rzplitej i jej obywateli. Oświadczenie Rządu RP Gdy armia czerwona wkraca na ziemie polskie*, “Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza”, 6 January 1944, No. 4 in: *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, p. 1433. It emphasized the constitutional legality of the Polish government and the willingness to reinstate international relations that had been severed in April 1943, on condition that the USSR showed respect for the rights and interests of Poland and its citizens. Reports on the prime minister’s operations in the occupied Poland were delivered by “Biuletyn Informacyjny”; see also: *Oświadczenie premiera do kraju*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 13 January 1944, No. 2(209) in: “*Biuletyn Informacyjny*”, part 3, pp. 1755–1756.

⁵⁴ The statement read: “Having regard to Poland’s unconditional right to independence, the declarations and obligations undertaken by our allies, we demand that the rights and interests of the Polish Republic, its state authorities and citizens be respected in every war and every political situation in the international arena. We demand full recognition and respect for our rights”; *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, p. 1437; *Oświadczenie premiera do Kraju*, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 13 January 1944, No. 2(209) in: “*Biuletyn Informacyjny*”, part 3, pp. 1755–1759. The government’s position was fully approved by the Home Political Representation (KRP), the Government Delegate for Poland and the Council of National Unity; *ibidem*, pp. 1438–1439; *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach...*, vol. 3, p. 247.

⁵⁵ *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, p. 1446. The Polish Workers’ Party argued that the “contents and form of the government’s statement is in keeping with the traditional, anti-Soviet propaganda”: *Koniunkturalne łamańce*, “Przegląd Tygodnia”, 13 January 1944, No. 2(51) in: *Publicystyka konspiracyjna PPR 1942–1945. Wybór artykułów*, ed. A. Przygoński, vol. 3: *1944–1945*, Warszawa 1967, pp. 42–45. “Głos Warszawy”, another communist newspaper, was of the opinion that the Soviet position “demonstrated the USSR’s understanding [...] that the Polish problem should be solved in the spirit of historical justice, and that this process may not be disrupted by a group of schemers and rabble-rousers”. *Wytknięta droga*, “Głos Warszawy”, 18 January 1944, No. 6(98) in: *Publicystyka...*, vol. 3, p. 49–51; see also: *Bankruci brną dalej*, “Trybuna Wolności”, 15 January 1944, No. 48 in: *ibidem*, pp. 47–48.

The USSR refused to acknowledge Polish borders established by the Treaty of Riga, and acting on the decision of the People's Assemblies of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, it claimed every right to annex Poland's eastern territories. The Soviets argued that the Polish government's negligence of the nation's problems and desires had led to a crisis in the two countries' mutual relations. On 14 January, the Polish government issued a tempered statement in response to Soviet accusations, requesting the Allies' direct intervention with the Soviet authorities⁵⁶. In a statement of 17 January, the Kremlin officially criticized all Polish initiatives⁵⁷.

The Soviets' position evoked much criticism in underground press published both in Poland⁵⁸ and abroad⁵⁹, thus further consolidating the nation around the Government in Exile and its home divisions. According to the journalists, Moscow's reactions exposed the real goals and qualities of the Soviet state⁶⁰. Some reporters hoped that the Western Allies would no longer turn a blind eye on Poland's dilemma in the face of the USSR's increasingly imperialistic policies⁶¹.

In response to the Soviet statement, on 20 January 1944, the Council of National Unity and the Government Delegate for Poland sent a telegram to Prime Minister Mikołajczyk whose contents were published in underground press⁶². In the weeks that followed, the USSR's growing animosity towards the Polish government, in particular its claims to Poland's eastern territories, evoked a powerful response from the underground community which

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 1456; M.K. Kamiński, *op. cit.*, p. 473; *Odpowiedź rządu polskiego*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 20 January 1944, No. 3(210) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, pp. 1768–1769.

⁵⁷ M.K. Kamiński, *op. cit.*, p. 473; *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1465–1466; *Rosja odmawia rozmów z Rządem Polskim*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny. Z Frontu Walki Podziemnej", 13 January 1944, supplement to "Biuletyn Informacyjny" No. 2(209) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, pp. 1770–1771. The "Antyk" subdivision of the Information and Propaganda Bureau of the Home Army's General Command referred to Soviet diplomatic tactics as "double-dealing and outrageous"; *Czy dojdzie do porozumienia z Rosją*, "Wolność Robotnicza", 18 January 1944, No. 2(8). A completely different view was offered by the press of Polish Workers' Party, ref. *Dwa oświadczenia*, "Przegląd Tygodnia", 20 January 1944, No. 3(52) in: *Publicystyka...*, vol. 3, pp. 52–54.

⁵⁸ Ref. *Nie będzie Targowicy*, "WRN", 14 January 1944, No. 1(132); *Stanowisko rządu sowieckiego wobec Polski*, "Przez walkę do zwycięstwa", 20 January 1944, No. 2(98). *Spór polsko-rosyjski*, "Głos Ludu", 21 January 1944, No. 2.

⁵⁹ Ref. *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1446–1447.

⁶⁰ Ref. *Moskwa bez maski*, "Robotnik w Walce", 23 January 1944, No. 2(10); *Zdemaskowanie polityki Moskwy*, "Robotnik w Walce", 23 January 1944, No. 2(10); *Czy dojdzie do porozumienia z Rosją*, "Wolność Robotnicza", 18 January 1944, No. 2(8); *Zaborczość bez ostonek*, "Robotnik w Walce", 19 March 1944, No. 5(13).

⁶¹ Ref. *Zdemaskowanie polityki Moskwy*, "Robotnik w walce", 23 January 1944, No. 2(10); *Polska a Rosja*, "Polska Ludowa", January 1944, No. 1(42); *Nasze stanowisko*, "Rzeczpospolita Polska", 6 March 1944, No. 3(75); *Dziś i Jutro*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 27 January 1944, No. 4(211) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3., p. 1179.

⁶² S. Dzieciotłowski, *Parlament Polski Podziemnej 1939–1945*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 49, 181–182; see also: "Rzeczpospolita Polska", 7 February 1944, No. 2(74); "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 24 February 1944, No. 8(215) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, p. 1837.

was not limited to official approval for the Council of Minister's policies⁶³. The roots of the Polish-Soviet conflict were widely discussed in government⁶⁴ and party press⁶⁵. Those reports had a purely informative purpose, but by spreading the awareness that Poland was threatened by the loss of its territory to its eastern neighbor, they built support for the preservation of Polish integrity, and they shaped social attitudes towards the Red Army. They also came as a response to underground communist publications which supported Western Ukraine's and Western Belarus' rights to self-determination, i.e. the annexation of those territories to the USSR⁶⁶. Members of the independence movement could not remain a passive witness to those claims⁶⁷.

The Polish underground was fully aware of Russia's imperialistic ambitions. In 1943 and in early 1944, members of the conspiracy movement knew that Poland was not about to be liberated from German occupation by an allied army in the name of building an independent, sovereign and territorially integral Polish state, but that the intervention served Soviet military goals. Despite this awareness, the independence movement was not united

⁶³ Ref. *Podziemne Państwo Polskie wokół jednolitych władz – zjednoczone społeczeństwo*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 13 January 1944, No. 2(209) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, pp. 1753–1755; "Biuletyn Informacyjny. Z Frontu Walki Podziemnej", 3 February 1944, supplement to "Biuletyn Informacyjny" No. 5(212) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, pp. 1803–1805; *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1454–1455. The appeal of the Polish Underground State reads: "This appeal is a summons and an order. **Summons: if the Country is disciplined and united in solidarity, we will overcome the greatest obstacles, and we will find sufficient strength to fend off the enemy, [...] Order: [...] Poles have to overcome the existing divisions. Those who disobey the call for unity and solidarity are not only mad – they are criminals!**"

⁶⁴ Ref. *Kraj wobec roszczeń sowieckich. Kraj stoi na stanowisku nienaruszalności wschodniej granicy Rzeczypospolitej, ustalonej w traktacie ryskim*, "Rzeczpospolita Polska", 10 March 1944, special supplement in: *Prawdziwa...*, vol. 2, pp. 1511–1512; *Po linii grabieży z 1939 r.*, "Kraj. Agencja Informacyjna IP", 15 March 1944, No. 11(28); *Polska a Sowiety*, "Biuletyn Informacyjny", 16 March 1944, No. 11(218) in: "Biuletyn Informacyjny", part 3, pp. 1383–1384; ref. W. Chojnacki, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶⁵ Ref. *Rosyjskie apetyty na Polskę* [supplement] "WRN", 25 February 1944, No. 4(135); *Curzon – Ribbentrop – Mołotow*, "WRN", 24 March 1944, No. 6(137); *Porachunki dziejowe*, "Droga", 10 May 1944, No. 5; *Wschodnie granice*, "Droga", 10 May 1944, No. 5; AAN, 203/VII-19, Linia Curzona to linia 3 rozbioru, col. 7.

⁶⁶ Ref. *Problem granic polskich*, "Głos Warszawy", 4 January 1944, No. 2(94) in: *Publicystyka...*, vol. 3, pp. 35–37; *Problem granic wschodnich*, "Przegląd Tygodnia", 6 January 1944, No. 1(50) in: ibidem, pp. 37–39; *Naród polski a Sowiety*, "Głos Warszawy", 8 February 1944, No. 12(104) in: ibidem, pp. 76–79; *Czy Polska etnograficzna*, "Trybuna Wolności", 20 February 1944, No. 50 in: ibidem, pp. 91–93.

⁶⁷ The Socialists of WRN wrote: "We are exposing Soviet lies about Poland's right to self-determination every step of the way. We have to oppose the Soviet propaganda that is being spread by the Polish Workers' Party. Millions of Polish citizens will unite in protest against Soviet aggression. If we don't willfully succumb to Russia, it will never break the spirit of the Polish nation, and the democratic world headed by our allies will force Russia to give up its territorial appetite"; *Rosyjskie apetyty na Polskę* [supplement] "WRN", 25 February 1944, No. 4(135).

in its attitudes towards the Soviet army. While some factions postulated that the USSR was an enemy just like the Nazis, others argued that although the Soviets demonstrated a hostile and aggressive attitude towards Poland, they were “our allies’ ally”. Regardless of the dominant option, Poland was unable to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent the annexation of its Eastern Borderlines and the Sovietization of social and political life, in particular in the face of the Western Allies’ negligence and the helplessness. Despite the brutality of the Nazi occupation, the Soviet army was greeted by the Polish Underground State with much reluctance and mistrust, if not open hostility. Many initiatives undertaken by Poland’s puppet communist authorities, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, were torpedoed by the conspiracy movement and its propaganda, bringing humiliation to communist organizations in Poland⁶⁸.

⁶⁸ Ref. T. Żencykowski, *Polska Lubelska 1944*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 113–116.

Witold Gieszczyński

HUMAN MIGRATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER EAST PRUSSIA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Following the ratification of treaties to partition Poland dated 5 August 1772, the Royal Prussia with Warmia (*Germ. Ermland*), excluding Gdańsk and Toruń, and the Noteć District (*Germ. Netzedistrikt*) with Bydgoszcz were annexed by the Kingdom of Prussia¹. Under a decree of 31 January 1773, the kingdom of Frederic II was expanded to include “West Prussia” (*Germ. Westpreussen*) as well as an administrative unit referred to as the “East Prussia province” (*Germ. Provinz Ostpreussen*), comprising Warmia, a region in pre-partition Poland, and Royal Prussia, a fiefdom of the Crown of Poland in 1525–1657². Beginning with the unification of Germany in 1871, East Prussia became a part of the Reich. In 1829, both provinces were formally united into a single “province of Prussia”, but the former division into two provinces of “West Prussia” and “East Prussia” was restored already in 1878³.

After the World War I, in an attempt to resolve the Polish-German dispute over the territories in Warmia, Mazury and Powiśle, the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919 ordered a poll in Prussia. On 11 July 1920, the majority of the local constituents chose to be a part of East

¹ S. Salmonowicz, *Prusy. Dzieje państwa i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, p. 212; Ch. Clark, *Prusy. Powstanie i upadek 1600–1947*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 220–221; *Prusy w okresie monarchii absolutnej (1701–1806)*, ed. B. Wachowiak, Poznań 2010, pp. 38–341; W. Czapliński, A. Galos, W. Korta, *Historia Niemiec*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 349–350.

² H. Boockmann, *Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Ostpreussen und Westpreussen*, Berlin 1995, p. 320.

³ E. Korc, *Zmiany administracyjno-terytorialne na obszarze byłych Prus Wschodnich ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem terenu województwa olsztyńskiego*, “Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie” (hereinafter: KMW), 1997, No. 1, pp. 3–22.

Prussia⁴. Ultimately, the eastern part of West Prussia was ceded to the German province of East Prussia, while the district of Działdowo (*Germ. Soldau*) was annexed to Poland together with the Klaipeda Region (*Germ. Memelland*). Initially placed under the administrative rule of the League of Nations, the Klaipeda Region was taken over by Lithuania in January 1923⁵. On 22 March 1939, the Klaipeda Region was annexed by Nazi Germany and reintegrated into the Reich⁶. On the eve of World War II, East Prussia had a population of 2,488,000, of whom 372,000 resided in Królewiec (*Germ. Königsberg*), the capital city of the province⁷. The province of East Prussia was divided into four administrative districts: Królewiec, Gąbin, West Prussia and Olsztyn, and each district was further subdivided into counties⁸. The majority of East Prussians were Protestants (84%) and Roman Catholics (14.1%), while the remaining religious congregations accounted for only 1.6% of the local population⁹. In addition to Germans, the territory had been long colonized by the Warmians and Masurians, as well as the Poles, Lithuanians, Jews and members of other nationalities who contributed to the multi-ethnic character of East Prussia¹⁰.

Owing to its geo-political location, East Prussia was an ethnic tinderbox and a potential conflict hot spot for Poland since the beginning of its existence. After the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, any attempts at establishing national security had to include a postulate to eliminate the East Prussian enclave after the end of World War II¹¹. Already in November 1939, General Władysław Sikorski's government postulated the need to establish safe borders for Poland and put an end to German rule in East Prussia¹². In a circular letter of 19 February 1940 addressed to Polish

⁴ See: W. Wrzesiński, *Polska–Prusy Wschodnie. Plebiscyty na Warmii i Mazurach oraz na Powiślu w 1920 roku*, Olsztyn 2010; *Plebiscyty na Warmii, Mazurach i Powiślu w 1920 roku. Wybór źródeł*, ed. P. Stawecki, W. Wrzesiński, Olsztyn 1986; *Plebiscyty jako metoda rozwiązywania konfliktów międzynarodowych. W 90. rocznicę plebiscytów na Warmii, Mazurach i Powiślu*, pod red. S. Achremczyka, Olsztyn 2010.

⁵ P. Łossowski, *Kłajpeda kontra Memel. Problem Kłajpedy w latach 1918–1939–1945*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 37–53; Z. Kiaupa, *The History of Lithuania*, Vilnius 2004, p. 256; P. Mast, *Ostpreussen und Westpreussen und die Deutschen aus Litauen*, München 2001, p. 178.

⁶ P. Łossowski, op. cit., pp. 172–193; Z. Kiaupa, op. cit., p. 269.

⁷ G. Hermanowski, *Ostpreussen Lexikon... für alle, die Ostpreussen lieben*, Würzburg 2001, pp. 165–166.

⁸ S. Srokowski, *Prusy Wschodnie. Studium geograficzne, gospodarcze i społeczne*, Gdańsk–Bydgoszcz–Toruń 1945, pp. 117–118.

⁹ See: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1914*, Berlin 1914, p. 9.

¹⁰ See: A. Kossert, *Prusy Wschodnie. Historia i mit*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 152–163; R. Traba, "Wschodniopruskość". *Tożsamość regionalna i narodowa w kulturze politycznej Niemiec*, Olsztyn 2007, passim; A. Sakson, *Stosunki narodowościowe na Warmii i Mazurach 1945–1997*, Poznań 1998, p. 11.

¹¹ W. Wrzesiński, *Prusy Wschodnie w polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1945*, Olsztyn 1994, p. 336.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 337–338.

diplomatic outposts, August Zaleski, the foreign affairs minister, argued that the incorporation of East Prussia into Poland was one of the key objectives of the war¹³. Polish politicians made the most of every opportunity to raise this postulate during diplomatic talks with the Allies¹⁴. The majority of Polish political groups also supported the concept of incorporating East Prussia into Polish territory. They backed their claims with strategic and historical arguments, citing economic, populational and nationalist interests. In this situation, Polish settlement in post-war East Prussia became a pressing problem that was duly addressed by the Polish Underground State¹⁵. Polish ethnic territories were the first to be covered by the future resettlement plan. The northern parts of the province with mostly German inhabitants were to be addressed in successive stages of the scheme with the aim of expelling the German population¹⁶.

Yet the fate of the East Prussian problem was *decided* mostly by political strategy. During the Teheran Conference (28 November – 1 December 1943), the big three Allied leaders (the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom) decided to divide East Prussia. At the request of Stalin who demanded that the Soviet Union be given the use of a warm water port on the Baltic, the northern part of the East Prussian province with Königsberg was to be annexed to the USSR, and the remaining territories – to Poland¹⁷. The Soviets demanded 10,110 km² of East Prussia's combined territory of 36,992 km², and the requested area had a population of 994,000¹⁸. The final agreement establishing the Polish-Soviet border was signed on 27 July 1944 by the Soviet government and the Moscow-based Polish Committee of National Liberation. Under the agreement, the "northern part of East Prussia with the city of and port of Königsberg would be ceded to the Soviet Union, while the remaining East Prussian territories (...) would be incorporated into Poland"¹⁹. At the Yalta Conference (4–11 February 1945), the Allies confirmed their position on the partitioning of East Prussia,

¹³ *W stronę Odry i Bałtyku. Wybór źródeł (1795–1950)*, ed. W. Wrzesiński, vol. 3: *O Odrę, Nysę Łużycką i Bałtyk (1939–1945)*, ed. Z. Dymarski, Z. Derwiński, Wrocław–Warszawa 1990, p. 12.

¹⁴ W. Wrzesiński, *Przyczynki do problemu wschodniopruskiego w czasie II wojny światowej*, KMW, 1965, No. 1, pp. 93–; id., *Prusy Wschodnie a bezpieczeństwo europejskie. Stanowisko Francji, USA, Wielkiej Brytanii, ZSRS i Polski wobec przyszłości Prus Wschodnich 1939–1945*, KMW, 1996, No. 2, pp. 163–179.

¹⁵ G. Górski, *Prusy Wschodnie w koncepcjach ZWZ-AK*, KMW, 1989, No. 1–4, p. 116; W. Grabowski, *Delegatura Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na Kraj*, Warszawa 1995, pp. 63–64; M. Ney-Krwawicz, *Komenda Główna Armii Krajowej 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1990, p. 48.

¹⁶ W. Wrzesiński, *Prusy Wschodnie w polskiej myśli politycznej...*, pp. 394–427.

¹⁷ *Teheran–Jalta–Poczdam. Dokumenty konferencji szefów rządów wielkich mocarstw*, Warszawa 1970, pp. 86–87.

¹⁸ W. Wrzesiński, *O przyszłość państwową Królewca w latach II wojny światowej*, KMW, 1992, No. 3–4, pp. 331–336.

¹⁹ *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich*, vol. 8, Warszawa 1974, doc. 76, pp. 158–159.

as previously agreed in Teheran²⁰. In a statement of 13 February 1945, the Polish government-in-exile in London objected against the Yalta resolutions, claiming that all decisions had been made without Poland's involvement or authorization²¹. The division of East Prussia was finally decided by point IX of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 in which the Allies upheld their previous position on the matter²².

In mid October 1944, the Soviet army entered East Prussia, occupying the borderland territories in the district of Gąbin, including the southern part of the Klaipeda Region²³. By the end of 1944, half a million people had been evacuated from East Prussia to Germany²⁴. The bitterly cold winter of 1944/1945 was a time of "complete and ultimate *nemesis*"²⁵. Another Red Army offensive began in January 1945 with the aim of penetrating East Prussia. In the north-eastern parts of East Prussia, the main thrust of the offensive was conducted by the 3rd Belarusian Front on 13 January 1945. A day later, the armed forces were joined by the 2nd Belarusian Front in the south. The Red Army offensive forced East Prussians to flee from the advancing front line²⁶. Hunger, freezing temperatures and exhaustion contributed to a high number of casualties in the German population²⁷. Continuing the offensive in a series of fierce battles, the Soviet Army occupied Olsztyn (*Germ. Allenstein*) on 22 January 1945, Elbląg (*Germ. Elbing*) on 10 February 1945, Braniewo (*Germ. Braunsberg*) on 20 March 1945, Königsberg on 9 April 1945, and the town and port of Pilawa (*Germ. Pillau*) on 25 April 1945²⁸. Already in January 1945, Hitler ordered that Klaipeda (*Germ. Memel*) be evacuated by sea²⁹. Military action in East Prussia continued, and it ceased only after the war³⁰.

²⁰ *Teheran–Jałta–Poczdam...*, p. 169.

²¹ *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945*, vol. 5, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1991, doc. 1423, pp. 275–277.

²² *Teheran–Jałta–Poczdam...*, p. 476.

²³ T. Gajownik, J. Maroń, *Utracony bastion. (Prusy Wschodnie w latach 1918–1945)*, in: *Wielkie wojny w Prusach. Działania militarne między Wisłą a Niemnem na przestrzeni wieków*, ed. W. Gieszczyński, N. Kasperek, Olsztyn 2010, pp. 271–274; Ch. Bellamy, *Wojna absolutna. Związek Sowiecki w II wojnie światowej*, Warszawa 2010, p. 726.

²⁴ B. Nitschke, *Wysiedlenie ludności niemieckiej z Polski w latach 1945–1949*, Zielona Góra 1999, pp. 50–52.

²⁵ N. Davies, *Europa*, Kraków 1998, p. 1110.

²⁶ See: H. Schön, *Flucht aus Ostpreussen 1945. Die Menschenjagd der Roten Armee*, Kiel 2001; A. Seaton, *Wojna totalna. Wehrmacht przeciw Armii Czerwonej 1941–1945*, Kraków 2010, p. 704.

²⁷ See: N. Davies, *Europa walczy 1939–1945. Nie takie proste zwycięstwo*, Kraków 2008, pp. 453–455. In consequence of torpedo attacks launched by the Soviet submarines, thousands of refugees from East Prussia died during evacuation by sea, including on board of M.S. Wilhelm Gustloff on 30 January 1945, M.S. General von Steuben which was sunk on 10 February 1945, and M.S. Goya on 16 April 1945.

²⁸ See: I. Denny, *Upadek twierdzy Hitlera. Bitwa o Królewiec*, Warszawa 2008.

²⁹ M. Gilbert, *Druga wojna światowa*, Poznań 2000, p. 754.

³⁰ W. Wróblewski, *Przebieg operacji wschodniopruskiej*, in: *Działania militarne w Prusach Wschodnich*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 331–342.

The part of East Prussia conquered by the Soviet Union was placed under the rule of Soviet military administration, and the first Red Army command posts were set up in the area already in January 1945³¹. This was a highly dramatic period in the region's history because the Soviets treated East Prussia as conquered enemy territory. Thousands of East Prussians were deported to distant parts of the USSR. The Red Army plundered everything that had any value, including livestock, farming products, railway tracks, rolling stock, cars, factory equipment, even household goods and objects of daily use³². The evacuation effort wrought massive destruction on houses and farms that had survived the military offensive³³. East Prussia, the most eastward part of the Third Reich, was invaded by the Red Army which was motivated by a desire for revenge, and the local population became victim to the most atrocious crime perpetrated by the victors³⁴. Königsberg, the capital city of East Prussia, was most heavily affected by the Red Army's brutality³⁵.

The fighting had not yet ceased, when the first attempts at establishing Polish rule were made in the southern part of East Prussia. On 3 February 1945, the Office of Polish Republic's Plenipotentiary to East Prussia was established on the initiative of Białystok voivod Jerzy Sztachelski. The office was headed by Henryk Olejniczak³⁶ with the main aim of developing a local administration network and helping Polish expatriates to settle in East Prussia. On 14 March 1945, the Council of Ministers decreed a provisional split of former German territories annexed by Poland after the war. East Prussia was one of the created administrative districts, headed by Jerzy Sztachelski, a representative of the Polish government. On 30 March 1945, Sztachelski was replaced by colonel Jakub Prawin, and East Prussia, the 4th administrative district, was renamed to the Masurian District with its seat in Olsztyn. Initially, the Masurian District spanned the area of 27,000 km², covering the counties of Bartoszyce, Braniewo, Darkiejmy, Elbląg, Ełk,

³¹ A. Magierska, *Ziemie zachodnie i północne w 1945 roku. Kształtowanie się polityki integracyjnej państwa polskiego*, Warszawa 1978, p. 21.

³² See: J. Gancewski, W. Gieszczyński, *Gewalttaten, Zerstörungen und Verwüstungen von Hab und Gut durch die Rote Armee im ehemaligen Ostpreussen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, "Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung", No. 56/1, Marburg 2007, pp. 115–129.

³³ Archives of New Records in Warsaw (hereinafter: AAN), Ministry of Public Administration (hereinafter: MAP), Ref. No. 2460, doc. 17–18. Report of the Polish Government's Representative to Colonel Jakub Prawin's 3rd Belarusian Front for the Council of Ministers, dated 23 March 1945; *Okręg Mazurski w raportach Jakuba Prawina. Wybór dokumentów. 1945 rok*, ed. T. Baryła, Olsztyn 1996, doc. 15, pp. 53–55; *ibid.*, doc. 9, pp. 41–43; *ibid.*, doc. 22, pp. 66–71.

³⁴ M. Dönhoff, *Nazwy, których nikt już nie wymienia*, Olsztyn 2001, p. 12.

³⁵ J. Jasiński, *Historia Królewca. Szkice z XIII–XX stulecia*, Olsztyn 1994, pp. 265–267; W. Galcow, *Obwód kaliningradzki w latach 1945–1991. Społeczeństwo, gospodarka, kultura*, KMW, 1996, No. 2, p. 206.

³⁶ *Okręg Mazurski w raportach Jakuba Prawina...*, doc. 13, pp. 50–51; *ibid.*, doc. 14, pp. 51–52.

Gierdawy, Giżycko, Gołdap, Iława, Kętrzyn, Lidzbark, Malbork, Morąg, Mrągowo, Nidzica, Oleck, Olsztyn, Ostróda, Pasłęk, Pisk, Reszel, Susz, Szczytno, Sztum, Świętomiejsce and Węgorzewo³⁷. Under a resolution of 7 July 1945, the Polish government modified the administrative borders of the Masurian District by shifting the counties of Elbląg, Kwidzyn, Malbork and Sztum to the Gdańsk voivodeship, and the counties of Ełk, Gołdap and Oleck – to the Białystok voivodeship³⁸.

The Polish-Soviet border determined by the agreement of 16 August 1945 was a separate issue. Pursuant to article 3 of the agreement, the section of the border “adjacent to the Baltic Sea shall run eastward along the line from a point on the eastern coast of the Gdańsk Bay, north of the town of Bransberg – Goldap”³⁹. The provisions of the agreement did not give this section of the Polish-Soviet border its final shape which was defined more than ten years later⁴⁰. Owing to the absence of a precise geographical demarcation line separating the two countries, the Soviets made an arbitrary decision to move the border from several to more than ten kilometers to Poland’s disadvantage⁴¹. This situation enforced a number of changes in the administrative division of the Masurian District. The Polish section of Świętomiejsce county was incorporated into Braniewo county, and a part of Darkjemy county was annexed to Węgorzewo county. After the elimination of Gierdawy county in November 1945, an agency of Gierdawy was created in Skandawa, but it was subsequently incorporated into Kętrzyn county.

The resolution of the Council of Ministers of 29 May 1946 abolished the Masurian District, replacing it with the Olsztyn voivodeship comprising 18 counties: Bartoszyce, Braniewo, Giżycko, Iława, Kętrzyn, Lidzbark, Morąg, Mrągowo, Nidzica, Olsztyn, Ostróda, Pasłęk, Pisz, Reszel, Susz, Szczytno, Węgorzewo and the Olsztyn urban county⁴². The new administrative division of the region of Warmia and Mazury survived four years. Under a resolution of 28 June 1950, the Olsztyn voivodeship was expanded to incorporate Nowe

³⁷ E. Korc, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁸ State Archives in Olsztyn (hereinafter: APO), Office of the Polish Government’s Representative for the Masurian District (hereinafter: UPR), Ref. No. 390/57. Excerpt from a Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 7 July 1945.

³⁹ *Dokumenty i materiały...*, doc. 314, pp. 580–581.

⁴⁰ Journal of Laws, People’s Republic of Poland, 1958, No. 37, item 166. Agreement of 5 March 1957 on mapping the State boundary in the part adjacent to the Baltic Sea.

⁴¹ APO, UPR, Ref. No. 390/59., doc. 25–27. A Letter from the Polish Government’s Representative for the Masurian District to the Ministry of the Recovered Territories, dated 10 January 1946; *Okręg Mazurski w raportach Jakuba Prawina...*, doc. 35, pp. 142–144; *ibid.*, doc. 37, pp. 156–157; *ibid.*, doc. 39, pp. 160–167, *ibid.*, doc. 40, pp. 172–173.

⁴² Official Journal of the Ministry of the Recovered Territories, 1946, No. 6, item 72. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland of 29 May 1946; Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (hereinafter: Dz. U. RP), 1946, No. 28, item 177. Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland of 29 May 1946 on the provisional administrative system in the Recovered Territories.

Miasto county from the Bydgoszcz voivodeship and Działdowo county from the Warsaw voivodeship⁴³.

Despite a steadily growing number of Polish settlers in the first months after the war, Germans accounted for the majority of Masurian District's population⁴⁴. A vast part of East Prussia's civilian population fled in the fall of 1944 and the winter of 1945 during the advance of the Russian Army. The Polish authorities forced the remaining inhabitants to participate in public works programs for which they were not paid, but only received small allowances of basic goods. This group of inhabitants was subsequently included in the food ration scheme which led to massive hunger and casualties among the Germans⁴⁵. With time, the Polish authorities began to deport Germans from the cities to work in the rural areas of the Masurian District. In the mid 1945, a "voluntary" evacuation campaign was initiated, and Germans were allowed to migrate to the Allied occupied zones based on individual passes. The campaign reached a high point in the period between August and October 1945⁴⁶. A compulsory resettlement scheme was to begin shortly. An estimated 25,000 to 60,000 Germans left or were expelled from the Masurian District to the territories west to the Oder line by the end of 1945⁴⁷.

Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 ordered the resettlement of the Germans living in Poland to the Allied occupation zones in Germany. The provisions of this article applied to practically all residents of German nationality. The evacuation began with the unemployed and persons who were believed to pose a political threat. The next phase of the expulsion campaign witnessed the resettlement of Germans from rural farms that had been already occupied by Poles as well as unqualified factory workers⁴⁸.

⁴³ Dz. U. RP, 1950, No. 28, item 255. Act amending the administrative division of the State.

⁴⁴ AAN, Ministry of the Recovered Territories (hereinafter: MZO), Ref. No. 1666. According to data of 25 July 1945, there were 142 312 ethnic Germans in the Masurian District, accounting for 57.5% of the district's total population. Poles became the predominant ethnic group only as of September 1945.

⁴⁵ APO, Voivodeship Office in Olsztyn (hereinafter: UW), Ref. No. 391/266, doc. 27. Report on the Olsztyn Voivodeship Office's Social and Political Activities for the period from 1 March to 30 September 1946.

⁴⁶ APO, UPR, Ref. No. 390/71, doc. 12. Confidential instructions for the Polish Government's Representative for the Masurian District, Colonel J. Prawin, of 22 June 1945; *Warmiaci i Mazurzy w PRL. Wybór dokumentów. Rok 1945*; ed. T. Baryła, Olsztyn 1994, doc. 31, p. 43; APO, Olsztyn City Board, Ref. No. 411/111, doc. 98–101. Circular letter No. 172 from the the Polish Government's Representative for the Masurian District, Colonel J. Prawin, of 1 October 1945.

⁴⁷ S. Żyromski, *Procesy migracyjne w województwie olsztyńskim w latach 1945–1949*, Olsztyn 1971, p. 24; A. Magierska, op. cit., p. 130; *Warmia i Mazury w PRL. Wybór dokumentów. Rok 1945...*, p. VII.

⁴⁸ *Wysiedlenie Niemców z województwa olsztyńskiego po II wojnie światowej (wybór dokumentów archiwalnych z lat 1945–1948)*, ed. W. Gieszczyński, "Echa Przeszłości", 2000, No. 1, pp. 195–220; *Niemcy w Polsce 1945–1950. Wybór dokumentów*, ed. W. Borodziej, H. Lemberg, vol. 1, Warszawa 2000.

According to estimates, on 14 February 1946, the Masurian District was inhabited by 98,466 Germans who accounted for 28% of the local population⁴⁹. Several months later, the Polish authorities began to evacuate Germans from the Olsztyn voivodeship. The first transport left for Germany on 14 August 1946⁵⁰. The campaign continued in the following years. According to official data, a total of 65,398 Germans were expelled from the Olsztyn voivodeship between 1946 and 1948⁵¹. Not all East Prussians who had been citizens of the Reich before the war were forced to leave. In consequence of the “nationality verification” campaign, 103,122 Warmians and Masurians who acquired Polish citizenship after the war were granted residence in the Olsztyn voivodeship⁵².

Deserted German homes and farms were occupied by Polish settlers. Most of them resettled from central Poland and the eastern territories that were ceded to the Soviet Union after the war⁵³. The first wave of settlement included Polish workers who had been deported by the Germans to forced labor camps in East Prussia in 1939–1945⁵⁴. After the war, some of them decided to stay and start a new life in East Prussia.

Although the inhabitants of areas particularly devastated during the war were offered priority in the resettlement scheme, Poles who had been living in the eastern territories for generations were reluctant to move. Yet due to political decisions, they settled in the Masurian District in an “atmosphere of clear group coercion”⁵⁵. In most cases, the resettlement to Warmia and Mazury included the residents of Vilnius and Nowogród regions and, less frequently, Polesie and Volyn. The resettlement scheme, carried out by the National Repatriation Office, reached its peak in 1945–1948⁵⁶. During

⁴⁹ *Powszechny sumaryczny spis ludności z 14 II 1946 r.*, “Statystyka Polski”, 1947, series D, vol. 1, p. XVI.

⁵⁰ APO, UW, Ref. No. 391/268., doc. 150. A letter from the Olsztyn Voivod to MZO concerning the resettlement of German inhabitants.

⁵¹ *Wysiedlenie Niemców z województwa olsztyńskiego...*, p. 196.

⁵² See: L. Belzyt, *Między Polską a Niemcami. Weryfikacja narodowościowa i jej następstwa na Warmii, Mazurach i Powiślu w latach 1945–1950*, Toruń 1996; A. Sakson, *Stosunki narodowościowe...*, pp. 80–106.

⁵³ See: J. Czerniakiewicz, *Repatriacja ludności polskiej z ZSRR 1944–1948*, Warszawa 1987; S. Ciesielski, *Przesiedlenie ludności polskiej z kresów wschodnich do Polski 1944–1947*, Warszawa 1999.

⁵⁴ In 1939–1945, Germans hired around 300,000 forced laborers in East Prussia, of whom around 200,000 were Poles. See: *Ostpreussen. Wspomnienia Polaków wywiezionych na roboty przymusowe do Prus Wschodnich w latach 1939–1945*, Warszawa 2010, p. 6.

⁵⁵ See: W. Wrześniński, *Dziedzictwo a tożsamość. Prusy Wschodnie–Warmia i Mazury–Olsztyńskie*, KMW, 1997, No. 1, pp. 43–44.

⁵⁶ See: S. Banasiak, *Działalność osadnicza Państwowego Urzędu Repatriacyjnego na Ziemiach Odzyskanych w latach 1945–1947*, Poznań 1963; W. Gieszczyński, *Państwowy Urząd Repatriacyjny w osadnictwie na Warmii i Mazurach (1945–1950)*, Olsztyn 1999; D. Sula, *Działalność przesiedleńczo-repatriacyjna Państwowego Urzędu Repatriacyjnego w latach 1944–1951*, Lublin 2002.

that time, 234,794 people from central Poland and 65,313 former inhabitants of the eastern territories were resettled to rural areas in the Olsztyn voivodeship⁵⁷. Urban areas witnessed the resettlement of 95,194 people from central Poland and 50,031 from the eastern territories⁵⁸. In 1947, 55,448 Ukrainians were coerced into moving to the Olsztyn voivodeship from south-eastern Poland as part of the “Vistula” campaign initiated by the Polish authorities⁵⁹. Initially, the Polish expatriates were reluctant or even hostile towards the Ukrainians on account of the massive crimes committed by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Volyn and East Galicia during the war. According to a population census of 1950, the Olsztyn voivodeship had a total population of 610,173, including 184,212 in the cities and 425,961 in rural areas⁶⁰.

The northern part of East Prussia became an official province of the Soviet Union as the Kenigsbergskaya Special Military Zone under the command of General Kuzma Galitskii. The territory was divided into 15 regions plus Königsberg, an autonomous administrative unit⁶¹. Under a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of 7 April 1946, the Soviet enclave in East Prussia became the Kenigsbergskaya Oblast, an official province of the USSR⁶². On 4 July 1946, the city of Königsberg was renamed to Kaliningrad⁶³, and the Kenigsbergskaya Oblast – to the Kaliningrad Oblast⁶⁴. On 4 September 1946, the district’s administrative system was replaced with 14 regions: Bagrationovsky, Chernyakhovsky, Gvardeysky, Guryevsky, Gusevsky, Krasnoznamensky, Ladushkinsky, Nesterovsky, Ozyorsky, Pravdinsky, Primorsky, Polessky, Slavsky and Sovetsky, as well as the city of Kaliningrad⁶⁵.

⁵⁷ APO, Voivodship Committee of the Polish Workers’ Party in Olsztyn (hereinafter: KW PPR), Ref. No. 1073/173. Polish population in the eastern and northern territories as on 31 December 1948.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ APO, UW, Ref. No.. 391/272. Ukrainians resettled during the “Vistula” campaign to the Olsztyn voivodeship in 1947. See: *Akcja “Wisła”. Dokumenty*, ed. E. Misiło, Warszawa 1993; W. Gieszczyński, *Osadnictwo ludności ukraińskiej na terenie województwa olsztyńskiego w ramach akcji “Wisła” (w świetle dokumentów urzędowych)*, Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Olsztynie. Prace Historyczne, 1997, vol. I, pp. 125–134.

⁶⁰ *Narodowy spis powszechny z 3 XII 1950 r.*, Warszawa 1952.

⁶¹ W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 204.

⁶² *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają. Pierwsze lata Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego we wspomnieniach i dokumentach*. Ed. J.W. Kostjaszow, Olsztyn 2000, doc. II, p. 263.

⁶³ Königsberg was renamed to Kaliningrad in honor of Soviet communist activist Mikhail Kalinin who died on 3 June 1946. In 1919–1938, Kalinin presided over the Central Executive Committee, and in 1938–1946, he was the Chairman of the Supreme Council.

⁶⁴ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, doc. V, p. 274.

⁶⁵ Ibid., doc. IX, p. 285; cf. W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 204. The Kaliningrad Oblast was given a new administrative system under the agreement of 25 July 1947. Kaliningrad was divided into four districts: Baltic, Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, and the number of regions in the Kaliningrad Oblast was increased to 17.

Although the majority of East Prussia's inhabitants had evacuated before the winter of 1945, ethnic Germans initially represented the majority of Kenigsbergskaya Oblast's population⁶⁶. Women, children, the elderly and the disabled accounted for 70% of the population, while those capable of work were employed in industrial plants and farms. Most Germans worked 12-hour days, and in return, they were entitled to food rations amounting to 400 g of bread and 600 g of potatoes, while those not employed received even smaller allowances. Food shortages and dire living conditions contributed to high mortality rates among the German population⁶⁷. The citizens of Königsberg suffered particular hardship, and according to Soviet documents, dying people were found practically everywhere: in health clinics, at homes, even in city streets⁶⁸. According to the Civil Affairs Office, 1933 deaths were registered in October 1945 alone⁶⁹. In addition to hunger, appalling sanitary conditions contributed to the spread of contagious diseases, in particular typhoid which, according to the local authorities, had reached a pandemic stage. According to official data, the death toll from contagious diseases reached more than 20,000 between September 1945 and April 1946⁷⁰. Despite that threat, the Soviet administration was initially keen on keeping the locals who were a source of cheap labor, as Germans accounted for nearly half of the workers at sovkhoz farms and factories⁷¹. For this reason, the first plans to expel Germans from the Kaliningrad Oblast were developed only at the beginning of 1947 with the aim of resettling 3,390 people. Under a decree of 11 October 1947, the Soviet government decided to resettle the German inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Oblast to the Allied occupied zone in Germany⁷². The authorities had initially planned to expel 30,000 Germans by the end of 1947, but the deportation scheme reached its peak in 1947–1948. According to Yuri Kostyashov's estimates, a total of 102,494 people had been deported to the Soviet occupied zone in Germany in 1947–1952⁷³.

During this mass evacuation scheme, the Soviet authorities made simultaneous efforts to colonize the Kaliningrad Oblast. The first settlers were the Red Army soldiers whose task was to disarm the region, clear it of mines and tear down the ruins. The following group of newcomers consisted of demobilized soldiers participating in military action in East Prussia. 12,000 of

⁶⁶ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, p. 193. As at 1 September 1945, the Soviet authorities registered 129,614 persons in the entire district, including 68,014 in Königsberg; cf. A. Kossert, op. cit., p. 308. According to German sources, on 1 September 1945, the parts of East Prussia annexed to the Soviet Union after the war were inhabited by 174,125 Germans, including 84,651 in Königsberg.

⁶⁷ W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 205.

⁶⁸ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, doc. XI, pp. 288–289.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, doc. X, p. 287; W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 205.

⁷¹ W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 206.

⁷² *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, doc. XIII, pp. 292–293. A secret ordinance of the Soviet internal affairs minister, General Sergei Kruglov, No. 001067 dated 14 October 1947, supplemented the government's resolution of 11 October 1947.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 18; W. Galcow, op. cit., pp. 206–207.

kolkhoz families from other regions of the USSR were moved to rural areas on a “voluntary basis”. By 1950, 46,000 families had been resettled to farms in the Kaliningrad Oblast⁷⁴. Attempts were also made to further the region’s development by bringing in groups of resettlers whose task was to revive Kaliningrad’s war-torn economy that now catered mainly to the needs of the arms industry⁷⁵. Engineers, teachers, doctors and other specialists were moved to the Kaliningrad Oblast as part of compulsory resettlement schemes launched by the communist party. Other social groups accounted for expatriates who had been prisoners of compulsory labor camps in Germany during the war as well as former political prisoners and exiles who decided to settle down in the Kaliningrad Oblast⁷⁶. The expatriates were offered various incentives, such as free transportation, including livestock and personal belongings up to 2 tons per family, resettlement benefits amounting to 1,000 rubles per head of the family and 300 rubles per every family member, a house in the country or an apartment in the city as well as financial grants for purchasing livestock. The resettlers were exempted from liability for unpaid taxes, they were also exempted from income tax and compulsory deliveries to the state over a period of three years⁷⁷. According to Olga Stepanova, the resettlement process could be divided into three principal stages: 1 – spring of 1945–1946, 2 – summer of 1946–December 1946, 3 – 1947–1950 when the Kaliningrad Oblast’s population topped 400,000⁷⁸. Most of the citizens had been resettled from Russia (70%), Belarus (11.1%) and the Ukraine (7%), while the former inhabitants of other regions of the USSR, including the four Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) of Chuvash, Mordovian, Mari and Tatar, accounted for 11.9% of the local population⁷⁹. Due to its strategic importance in the Baltic Sea region, the Kaliningrad Oblast was one of the most heavily militarized regions with Soviet troops stationing in the area.

When the Red Army entered Klaipėda in January 1945, the city was damaged and nearly completely deserted⁸⁰. After the war, the city and the entire Klaipėda Region were annexed to the Lithuanian SSR, a part of the Soviet Union. The region was divided into three administrative units: Klaipėda, Šilokarčiama and Pogieg⁸¹. New settlers began to arrive in Klaipėda already in the first months of 1945, initially spontaneously and later as part

⁷⁴ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, doc. VI, pp. 275–281; O. Stiepanova, *Zasiedlenie obwodu kalingradzkiego w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej*, KMW, 1996, No. 2, p. 195.

⁷⁵ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, doc. IV, pp. 267–273. Resolution of the Soviet Council of Ministers No. 1298 of 21 June 1946.

⁷⁶ O. Stiepanova, op. cit., p. 194.

⁷⁷ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, pp. 28–30, doc. IV, pp. 267–273, doc. VI, pp. 275–281.

⁷⁸ See: O. Stiepanova, op. cit., pp. 193–196; W. Galcow, op. cit., p. 208.

⁷⁹ *Przesiedleńcy opowiadają...*, p. 20; O. Stiepanova, op. cit., pp. 195–197.

⁸⁰ P. Łossowski, op. cit., p. 212.

⁸¹ A. Sakson, *Kraj Kłajpedzki. Zmiany ludnościowe 1945–1950*, “Przegląd Zachodni”, 2007, No. 3, p. 107.

of organized resettlement schemes. Most of them were the Lithuanians and Russians, but the Ukrainians, Belarusians and Poles were also a part of resettler groups. The region's former Lithuanian and German inhabitants began to return to Klaipeda. According to Soviet estimates, as on 1 January 1946, the Klaipeda Region had 55,000 inhabitants, which accounted for less than 10% of the region's population in 1939⁸².

On 23 March 1946, the Lithuanian SSR adopted a decree to colonize the Klaipeda Region. Despite initial plans to resettle 13,000 families to the area, only 5,300 families had taken residence in the region, mostly in rural areas. The population of Klaipeda city increased from 6,000 in late 1945 to 51,000 in 1947. The local community suffered from food and fuel shortages⁸³. A large Russian population and Lithuania's annexation by the USSR contributed to the rapid Sovietization of the Klaipeda Region.

The Red Army's offensive in the winter of 1945 put an end to German rule in East Prussia. While military action was still in progress, the big three Allies decided on the fate of East Prussia whose north-eastern part was ceded to the Soviet Union, and the rest was annexed to Poland. Political change spurred massive human migration in the area. A vast number of East Prussia's inhabitants evacuated to the Reich in the fall of 1944 or fled from the advancing Red Army in the winter of 1945. In the light of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, the remaining citizens were to be expelled to the Allied occupied zones in Germany. According to estimates, East Prussia had lost nearly 95% of its pre-war inhabitants⁸⁴. This has led to dramatic changes in the ethnic composition of the region's population. After the war, a very small fraction of ethnic Germans remained in East Prussia which was colonized by the Poles, Lithuanians, Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and other national groups who settled in the region voluntarily or under coercion, weaving a new social fabric of East Prussia. This historical region is marked by significant diversity in terms of culture, nationality and traditions⁸⁵. Today, the former East Prussian territories are part of three sovereign states: the Republic of Poland (Warmia and Mazury), the Russian Federation (Kaliningrad Oblast) and the Republic of Lithuania (Klaipeda Region). The area is also intersected by the border between Russia and the European Union. Although East Prussia is no longer marked on the map, for many people who reside on this territory, it is their homeland and still very much alive⁸⁶.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 122–123; P. Łossowski, op. cit., p. 212; A. Kossert, op. cit., p. 336.

⁸³ A. Sakson, *Kraj Kłajpedzki...*, pp. 110–111.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 109.

⁸⁵ A. Sakson, *Stosunki narodowościowe...*, pp. 11–14, 381–395.

⁸⁶ See: J. Jasiński, *Polska wobec dziedzictwa historycznego Prus Wschodnich po 1945 roku*, in: *Między Prusami a Polską. Rozprawy i szkice z dziejów Warmii i Mazur w XVIII–XX wieku*, Olsztyn 2003, pp. 136–167; S. Kargopolow, *Obwód kaliningradzki na obszarze byłych Prus Wschodnich*, "Borussia", No. 10/1995, p. 81; A. Sakson, *Od Kłajpedy do Olsztyna. Współcześni mieszkańcy byłych Prus Wschodnich: Kraj Kłajpedzki, Obwód Kaliningradzki, Warmia i Mazury*, Poznań 2011.

DEBATES, REVIEWS AND OVERVIEWS

Roman Jurkowski, *Sukcesy i porażki. Ziemiaństwo polskie Ziem Zabrzanych w wyborach do Dumy Państwowej i Rady Państwa 1906-1913 (Success and defeat. Polish gentry of the Taken Lands during elections to the Russian Duma and the State Council in 1906-1913)*, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Olsztyn 2009, 550 pages.

The history of Polish communities, in particular the Polish gentry, in the Taken Lands has captured Roman Jurkowski's interest ever since he wrote his Master's thesis in 1980 at the University of Gdańsk under the supervision of Professor Roman Wapiński. The thesis, entitled *Polish gentry in Belarus and Poland's Eastern policy in 1919–1921*, received a special mention. Roman Jurkowski's doctoral thesis entitled "Polish gentry in the North-Eastern Territories in 1864–1904. Social and economic activity" (600 pages) was published in 2001 as part of the *Bibliotheca Europae Orientalis* series printed by *Przegląd Wschodni*.

Jurkowski's most recent book, *Success and failure. Polish gentry of the Taken Lands during elections to the Russian Duma and the State Council in 1906–1913* (University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Olsztyn 2009, 550 pages), is excellently researched, and it received the *Przegląd Wschodni* Award. The author has examined a vast number of source documents in Russian, Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Polish libraries and archives. The results are impressive. His research is also based on 35 Polish and Russian press titles dating back to the studied period. The obtained results enabled Jurkowski to significantly expand his survey questionnaire. He was aided in his efforts by various official forms and memoirs of the Polish gentry, although there is a general scarcity of the latter, both in printed and manuscript form. This may come as a surprise because many members of the Polish gentry living in Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine kept diaries and historical records. Several years ago, when browsing through a section of the Russian State Historical Archives in Petersburg devoted to private banks operating in Russia from 1917, I was amazed to discover that the banking sector had employed many Poles, including in managerial positions. Many of them had left behind written accounts of their time which could open a new avenue of research for the author who, as I believe, will continue to investigate the history of the Polish gentry in the Taken Lands.

The structure of the book fully supports its main purpose. In Chapter I, Jurkowski discusses the election statute of the successive Dumas and State Councils. The first chapter spans a total of 60 pages, and some passages gave me the impression that this part of the book could have been abridged. Yet ultimately, I concluded that a detailed description of the cited resolutions and ordinances provides the necessary basis for the discussion that follows in subsequent chapters.

In the following four chapters that constitute the main body of his work, Jurkowski examines the course of elections in different curias to determine whether the Polish gentry made the most of the opportunity to bring its representatives into the state bodies in Petersburg. Poles were presented with quite a few opportunities for governance, but many of those chances were forfeited due to the gentry's inability to cooperate with other national groups, in particular the Lithuanians. Yet in view of the frequent amendments to the election statute as well as the popular conviction that few changes could be forced through via the parliamentary route in Russia, some members of the gentry lost all interest in political activity. The degree of their political engagement was further minimized by the Russians' and other national groups' progressing resentment of Poles. The fact that some Poles were related to the Russian gentry is an equally important consideration. Those members of the Polish gentry were less politically active since their main focus was on maintaining good family relations.

In the discussed four chapters, the author did not limit himself to portraying the attitudes of the Polish gentry only on Lithuanian and Belarusian territories, but he extended the scope of his investigations to cover also the Ukraine. This approach enabled Jurkowski to capture the specific local factors that determined the political engagement of the Polish gentry and to pinpoint the differences between Vilnius and the Vilna Governorate (Guberniya), and the Minsk, Volhynian, Podolia and Kiev Governorates (Guberniyas).

The author skillfully depicts the circumstances that prevented the Polish gentry from regaining their political status from before the January Uprising. The members of the Polish community could, to a certain extent, be blamed for this state of affairs, yet in general, the situation from before 1863 could never be restored. Those four chapters deliver a thorough analysis of the Polish gentry's status in the Taken Lands, and in my opinion, they are the book's greatest strength. The discussed four chapters are also of great cognitive value. Jurkowski was able to identify and elaborate on various aspects of social and political life engaging all nationalities and social groups in the Taken Lands.

Chapter VI, entitled "Towards the Elections", discusses the preparations for the election campaign, the course of the campaign and the vast number of legal irregularities and instances of abuse of authority observed in the process. In this overview, I would like to focus on the negative role played by the Orthodox clergy in the elections. The clergy exerted significant influence

not only on the Russians, but also on members of Belarusian and, obviously, Ukrainian communities. The cited facts fully substantiate the argument that the leaders of the January Uprising, regardless of whether they had formed alliances with the Reds or the Whites, had every reason to defy Mikhail Bakunin's postulates that after the abolition of Tsar's rule in 1863, the inhabitants of the Taken Lands should be allowed the freedom of choosing Poland or Russia as their home country. In their opinion, that choice could never have been made independently by the Ukrainians or the Belarusians whose fate was decided by the Orthodox clergy. If this situation were to materialize, we can assume that the realm of influence exercised by the Orthodox Church would be even greater than during the elections to the Duma and the State Council.

The book ends with Chapter VII which paints a collective portrait of parliamentary deputies. The presented information provides a solid basis for further analyses of Polish gentry's political activity in the Duma and the State Council. I strongly believe that Roman Jurkowski is the most competent candidate for portraying the activity of Polish deputies residing in the Taken Lands during the successive terms of the Russian Duma and the State Council. There is a pressing need for such an analysis since the existing body of work addressing the topic is largely outdated (I'm referring mostly to the works of Zygmunt Łukawski and Mirosław Wierchowski), while other publications tackle only minor aspects of the problem.

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***W kręgu sporów polsko-litewskich na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Wybór materiałów*, t. 1–2, (The Polish-Lithuanian Conflict at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries. A Selection of Source Texts, vol. 1–2), selected and edited by Marian Zaczyński and Beata Kalęba, Jagiellonian University Press, vol. 1 – Kraków 2004, p. 214; vol. 2 – Kraków 2009, p. 244.**

The first volume of the book entitled *W kręgu sporów polsko-litewskich na przełomie XIX i XX wieku* was published in 2004 by Jagiellonian University Press. The following part of the anthology was published in 2009. It is a compilation of selected sources that make a reference to complex Polish-Lithuanian relations. Chronologically, both volumes cover the years from 1883 to 1919. The oldest text is the article "Objaw litewski" (The Lithuanian Symptom) which was printed in 1883 in *Dziennik Poznański*, Vaclovas Biržiška's piece, "Golgota litewska" (The Lithuanian Golgotha), initially printed in *Głos Litwy* in 1919, is a more contemporary feature. The discussed anthology is the first source study devoted to Polish-Lithuanian relations

during the exceptional period that witnessed the rise of Lithuanian national identity. Researchers dealing with the problematic aspects of Polish-Lithuanian relations will be happy to learn that the publisher is planning a continuation of the series.

There are 16 source texts in the first volume which opens with the article "Objaw litewski". This feature began the famous polemic with the Lithuanian *Aušra*¹ in *Dziennik Poznański*. Other materials in the discussed collection also touch upon the argument between the two periodicals, including *Aušra* and *Dziennik Poznański* by *Aušra*'s editor Jonas Basanavičius (also from 1883) and a series of articles entitled "W sprawie litewskiej" (In the Lithuanian Cause), published in *Dziennik Poznański* in 1884. These texts give an introduction to the Polish-Lithuanian problem, as they make the first published reference to the conflict. The following source publication is "Głos Litwinów do młodej generacji magnatów, obywateli i szlachty na Litwie" (The Lithuanian Appeal to the Young Generation of Magnates, Citizens and Nobles in Lithuania) (2nd edition, Kaunas 1906) by Adomas Jakštas [pen name of priest Aleksandras Dambrauskas]. The article is an important voice in the Polish-Lithuanian dialogue or, as noted by its authors, a fervent attempt to establish such a dialogue. The pamphlet provoked a wide-ranging discussion, evidence of which is also included in this volume in the form of numerous Polish responses. Konstancja Skirmuntt (pen name Futurus) referred to Adomas Jakštas's manifesto in her work entitled "O prawdę i zgodę. Z powodu «Głosu Litwinów do magnatów, obywateli i szlachty na Litwie» i odpowiedzi na nią młodego szlachcica litewskiego" (For Truth and Conciliation. A Young Lithuanian Nobleman's Reply to «The Lithuanian Appeal to the Young Generation of Magnates, Citizens and Nobles in Lithuania») (2nd edition, Lviv, 1906). It is believed that the argument with Adomas Jakštas was initiated by Szymon Meysztowicz, a young member of Lithuanian nobility, who revealed his views on Poland's and Lithuania's shared past and future in the article "Głos Litwinów" (The Lithuanian Voice) (reprint from Krakow's *Czas* of 1903) and the pamphlet "Przenigdy! Odpowiedź na "Głos Litwinów do młodej generacji magnatów, obywateli i szlachty na Litwie" (Never! A Reply to «The Lithuanian Appeal to the Young Generation of Magnates, Citizens and Nobles in Lithuania») (Krakow, 1903). Adomas Jakštas's pamphlet and the contrary opinions juxtapose the arguments of both sides to this conflict, which is an enormous advantage. However, the credentials of the pamphlet's author are not given consistently throughout the anthology with the name Adomas Jakštas-Dambrauskas and the pen name Aleksandras Dambrauskas being used interchangeably in the table of contents and bibliographic notes. The citation style requires greater consistency. The first volume features texts written by Roman Skirmuntt under a fairly

¹ For more information about the debate involving *Aušra* and *Dziennik Poznański*, see: J. Ochmański, *Litewski ruch narodowo-kulturalny w XIX wieku (do 1890 r.)*, Białystok 1965.

obvious pen name of Ro...munt. These pamphlets are entitled “Nowe hasła w sprawie odrodzenia narodowości litewskiej” (New Slogans In the Cause of the Lithuanian National Revival) (published in Lviv in 1904) and “Głos przeszłości a potrzeba chwili (Stanowisko szlachty w Litwie i Rusi)” (A Voice of the Past and the Present Need. The Standpoint of Nobility in Lithuania And Russia) published in 1905 in Lviv. The first volume also contains Tadeusz Korzon’s article “Notatki krytyczne” (Critical Remarks) (reprint from the Warsaw-based *Gazeta Polska* of 1904), as well as Michał Römer’s essay “Litwini w Prusiech Książęcych” (Lithuanians in the Duchy of Prussia) (published in *Świat Słowiański* in 1911 as well as in the form of a separate pamphlet). The essay is a very valuable piece of work that gives an account of the Lithuanian national revival on Lithuanian territory annexed by Prussia. This text is not strictly related to the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, therefore it stands in contrast to the remaining articles in the collection. The reviewed publication could benefit from amalgamating another article by Römer, entitled “Stosunki etnograficzno-kulturalne na Litwie” (Ethnographic and Cultural Relations in Lithuania) (Krakow 1906), which is more consistent with the tone of the discussed anthology. The first volume closes with Beata Kalęba’s “Kilka słów o litewskim odrodzeniu narodowym” (A Few Words About Lithuanian National Revival) which highlights the most important events relating to the Lithuanian national revival for the benefit of readers who are not acquainted with the national movement in modern-day Lithuania.

The second volume consists of 17 texts. Similarly to the previous volume, it presents the opinions voiced by both sides to the Polish-Lithuanian conflict as well as those expressed by impartial advocates of mutual settlement. The members of the latter group look into the personification of the state idea, among them Konstacja Skirmuntt in “Nasza «tutejszość»” (Our Local Roots) (Warsaw 1907) and Henryk Gierszyński, whose pamphlet entitled “W kwestii polsko-litewskiej” (About the Polish-Lithuanian Issue) (Chicago 1897) makes a reference to the Polish tradition of statehood and acknowledges Lithuania’s national aspirations. A similar tone is adopted by Feliks Konieczny’s “Polska a kwestia litewska” (Poland and the Lithuanian Issue), initially published in *Świat Słowiański* in 1910, where the author worked as an editor. Radical Lithuanian viewpoints are presented by Jonas Šliūpas in “Litwini i Polacy” (Lithuanians and Poles), published in 1887 in New York. The two articles authored by Józef Albin Herbaczewski, a declared supporter of Lithuanian nationalism and a great advocate of Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation (“Tragizm odrodzenia narodowego Litwy” /The Tragedy of Lithuania’s National Revival/ and “Litwa i kwestia polska” /Lithuania And the Polish Issue/, both reprints from *Świat Słowiański*, dated 1909 and 1910, respectively), offer a fascinating glimpse of the conflict. Other noteworthy contributors are Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (“Kwestia alfabetu litewskiego w państwie rosyjskim i jej rozwiązanie” /The Lithuanian Alphabet in Russia and A Solution to the

Problem/, Krakow 1904) and Vaclovas Biržiška (“Golgota litewska”) who discuss the Lithuanians’ struggle for the right to publish books in the national language.

The anthology compiles source texts of limited availability, mostly reprints of press articles, jobbing prints and journalistic pamphlets printed in Vilnius, Lviv, Tilsit, Warsaw, New York, Chicago, Kaunas and Krakow. Although the publication presents the opinions voiced by both sides to the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, the exclusive use of national and ethnic criteria would be a gross simplification since both collections feature authors who are conscious of their Lithuanian ethnicity (among them Jonas Šliūpas and Jonas Basanavičius), as well as Lithuanians who fit Mickiewicz’s definition of “gente Lituanus, natione Polonus” (Szymon Meysztowicz and Roman Skirmuntt). Political opinions vary across those groups. This approach enabled the editors to deliver a multifaceted presentation of the problem which greatly enhances our understanding of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict at the turn of the 20th century. It provides the researcher community with improved access to Lithuanian journalistic output of that period. As an additional advantage, the choice of materials is inclusive of articles by Michał Römer, Konstancja Skirmuntt, Józef Albin Herbaczewski, Czesław Jankowski, Petras Vileišis, Jonas Šliūpas and Jonas Basanavičius, the most prominent journalists who reported on the Polish-Lithuanian conflict. Beata Kalęba and Marian Zaczyński deserve the highest praise for the enormous amount of work they put into compiling source materials. The chosen texts complement one another, in particular in the first volume which features debates surrounding Adomas Jakštas’ pamphlet and selected articles from *Aušra* and *Dziennik Poznański*. This approach has been abandoned in the second volume, but it does not detract from the outstanding value of the publication. It is regrettable that Jan Witort’s reply to Jonas Šliūpas’ “Litwomani” (Lithuomaniacs), published in *Przegląd Literacki* (supplement to the *Kraj* weekly newspaper)² in 1889, did not find its way to the anthology.

The second volume of the reviewed work includes articles that are not strictly related to the main subject of Polish-Lithuanian relations. Marian Zdziechowski (“Przed pomnikiem Katarzyny” /Before Catherine’s Monument/), Alexander Meysztowicz (“List otwarty obywatela z Litwy do profesora Zdziechowskiego w sprawie obecności szlachty litewskiej pod pomnikiem imperatorowej Katarzyny” /An Open Letter From a Lithuanian Citizen to Professor Zdziechowski About the Presence of Lithuanian Nobility at the Monument of Empress Catherine/) and Czesław Jankowski (“Z powodu Uroczystości wileńskiej. Głos jednego z wielu” /About the Vilnius Ceremony. One of

² See: J. Witort, „Litwomani”, *Przegląd Literacki*, supplement to *Kraj*, issue No. 32 of 11 (23) August 1889; ibidem, No. 33 of 18 (30) August 1889; ibidem, No. 34 of 25 August (6 September) 1889; ibidem, No. 35 of 1 September (13 September) 1889; ibidem, No. 36 of 8 September (20 September) 1889.

Many Voices/) discuss the ceremony of unveiling tsarina Catherine's monument in Vilnius in 1904 which was attended by Lithuanian nobility. This event stirred outrage in the Polish community³, and it provoked a discussion on the Polish elites' right to participate in the ceremony. Although they provide for an interesting reading, the above articles seem to be weakly connected to the primary subject of the book.

The books include bibliographic notes, and the entire text is augmented with footnotes. As emphasized by the authors, the texts were deliberately left without comments for an unbiased presentation of political, historical and cultural thought in Poland and Lithuania at the turn of the 20th century. The reviewed publication has immense academic value owing to the excellent choice of source materials. It is a helpful tool for researchers investigating the history of Polish-Lithuanian relations.

Monika Krogulska-Krysiak
(Olsztyn)

Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling, Senare avdelningen, Bd. 13: Brev från Jacob Spens och Jan Rutgers, utgivna av Arne Jönsson, Stockholm 2007, pp. 643.

The thirteenth volume of the second series of the monumental collection of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's diplomatic correspondence is a much-awaited publication. The collection dates back to 1888 when volume one of the first series of letters written by the chancellor himself came out in print¹. In the most recent body of work, the letters to the chancellor authored by Sir James Spens and Jan Rutgers have been edited by Arne Jönsson, professor of classical languages at Lund University.

It is highly unlikely that the thirteenth volume will be the last part of the impressive publishing effort spanning more than 120 years. The collection of letters written and received by the chancellor during his 40-year reign comprises 500 volumes. The previous publication accounted for the letters authored by Axel Oxenstierna until 1636, while the correspondence addressed to the chancellor included letters from King Gustav II Adolf and

³ For further information about this event in contemporary literature, see: R. Jurkowski, *Ziemiaństwo polskie Kresów Północno-Wschodnich 1864–1904. Działalność społeczno-gospodarcza*, Warsaw 2001, pp. 515–536; idem, Aleksander Meysztowicz, „Fragment Wspomnień – Książę Mirski”, *Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne*, vol. 21 (2004), pp. 218–249.

¹ Sixteen volumes have been published as part of the first series, the most recent being *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevväxling*. Avd. 1, Bd. 16: *Brev 1636–1654*, Del 1 och 2, utg. av H. Backhaus, Stockholm 2009. I would like to thank Ms. Ewa Berndtsson of Riksarkivet in Stockholm for providing me a copy of the reviewed publication.

key figures in the state, among them pfalzgraf Jan Kazimierz, Johan Skytte, the chancellor's brother – Gabriel Gustavsson Oxenstierna, Per Brahe, Swedish army commanders Johan Banér, Gustav Horn, Lennart Torstenson, Carl Gustav Wrangl, as well as Herman Wrangl and Hugo Grotius. As indicated by the Publisher (page 10), this list is also inclusive of “two important figures in Oxenstierna's diplomatic network”, namely Sir James Spens and Jan Rutgers.

Spens was a Scottish officer and a military entrepreneur who served as Swedish ambassador to London and British ambassador to Stockholm. He embarked on his diplomatic career in 1612–1613 as ambassador to James I Stuart during peace talks between Christian IV and Gustav II Adolf. Commissioned by the Swedish king, Spens served two diplomatic missions in London in 1613–1620 and 1623–1626. In 1627, he was appointed British ambassador to Prussia, and he fought in the Swedish army during the Polish-Swedish war of 1626–1629. His last task was to recruit Scottish soldiers for the Swedish army and transport the troops to the theater of the Thirty Years' War in Germany.

Jan Rutgers was a Dutch philologist and a lawyer who became a diplomat. As a Swedish representative, he served as emissary to the Dutch Republic and the Czech Republic (1620), and he participated in peace talks with Poland in Riga (1622–1623). Rutgers' sudden death in the Hague in 1625 put an abrupt end to his promising career. He was 36. Both diplomats played an important role in Sweden's diplomatic activities in the first half of the 17th century. Their letters to the chancellor provide readers with an insight into Sweden's diplomatic policies and methods of the time.

In addition to the diplomats' correspondence, the publication features a foreword, an introduction, publishing principles, biographical notes, references and an index of terms. A short foreword by Helmut Backhaus, Arne Jönsson and Per-Gunnar Ottoson delivers information about Axel Oxenstierna and both series of *Rikskansleren...* In the Introduction (pages 10–20), the Editor provides biographical sketches of Spens and Rutgers with an indication of the referenced sources.

In publishing the collection of letters, A. Jönsson relied mostly on the principles developed by Herman Brulin in 1907 with modernized and updated Swedish and Latin spelling. The format of previous publications has been preserved: every letter begins with an indication of the place and the date on which it was written (giving the letter an informal title), it is followed by an English abstract and the text of the original letter. In line with the formula of the series, letters are published in the old style, i.e. according to the Julian calendar. As regards letters written between 1 January and 25 March, marked as “stilo Anglico”, their dates were changed by the Publisher in line with the principles of the Julian calendar. For example, a letter written by Spens on 7 March 1618 according to the English style was dated 7 March 1619 in the Julian calendar. The latest publication has been written in

English, whereas the preceding parts of the series were developed for the benefit of Swedish-speaking readers.

The edited source materials comprise 86 letters written by James Spens in 1613–1630 and 185 letters addressed by Jan Rutgers to Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna in 1615–1625. Succinct reviews do not support an analysis of the entire body of correspondence, nevertheless, A. Jönsson has edited his sources carefully by adhering to the good practices of his predecessors. The letters written by Spens and Rutgers constitute a valuable supplement to the previously published correspondence. They throw more light on diplomatic campaigns in Europe and Sweden's international relations at the outbreak of and during the Thirty Years' War. As professional diplomats who found themselves at the heart of turbulent events, Spens and Rutgers were not only effective informants, but also excellent observers of reality. The letters contain many encrypted details which have been deciphered by A. Jönsson. The letters written by Spens in 1627 during his stay in Prussia – Elbing and Pillau (pages 204–212), are particularly valuable for Polish researchers. The latest addition to the collection of the chancellor's letters also explores the intricate methods of building a diplomatic network in 17th century Europe.

The publication is supplemented by several hundred short biographical notes, some with an indication of the referenced sources. An index of the terms used in the text is found at the back of the book. My only critical remark is that the Editor has failed to indicate the present names of the discussed geographical locations and that he was not very consistent as regards their spelling. The vast majority of place names are given in English, although on some occasions, the authentic spelling is provided, such as “Kraków”.

The reviewed publication significantly expands our knowledge about diplomatic policies in the first half of the 17th century. Until now, the letters of Spens and Rutgers have been accessible to few researchers, mostly those exploring the Riksarkivet in Stockholm. The latest addition to the series will provide historians world-wide with an insight into the meanders of Sweden's diplomatic relations in the first half of the 17th century. It is our sincere hope that the project to publish Axel Oxenstierna's correspondence will be continued.

Andrzej Korytko
(Olsztyn)

ACADEMIC CHRONICLE

Roman Jurkowski

TSARIST RUSSIA – BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA
– *CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA*. SPECIAL SESSION WITH
THE CEREMONY OF CONFERRING THE TITLE
OF DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF WARSAW TO PROFESSOR RICHARD PIPES, WARSAW,
29–30 JUNE 2010

The ceremony of conferring the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Warsaw to Professor Richard Pipes, an outstanding American academic who specializes in the history of Russia, was preceded by a special conference dedicated to three eras in the history of Russia: Tsarist rule, Bolshevik rule and contemporary Russia. The organizers were able to bring together 18 renowned historians and political science experts, including two from the Ukraine and one from the USA, on very short notice, and much of the credit goes to the Laureate himself as well as Jan Malicki, Director of the Center for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, the founder of the initiative to award the honorary title to Professor Richard Pipes. The University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn and the Institute of History and International Relations were represented by Assistant Professor Roman Jurkowski. The conference was divided into four parts spanning two days, and it ended one hour before the ceremony of conferring the Doctor Honoris Causa title to Professor Richard Pipes. The four parts of the conference were further subdivided into thematic sessions devoted to each period in Russia's history. The first part was dedicated to Tsarist Russia, the third – to Bolshevik Russia, while the second and the fourth part combined Russia's modern history with political issues.

Set in the magnificent Senate Hall of the University of Warsaw, the conference was opened by Jan Malicki who thanked the participants for attending the event on such short notice. The date of the ceremony and the academic session was set at the very last moment to accommodate Professor

Pipes' busy schedule. Mr. Malicki added that the session was organized on the initiative of Professor Mirosław Filipowicz of the Catholic University of Lublin. He apologized for the short speaking times granted to the lecturers (15 minutes), adding with a smile that this restriction would not apply only to the first speaker – Professor Pipes.

The first session was chaired by Professor Andrzej Nowak who welcomed the Laureate and the participants and gave the floor to Professor Pipes. Richard Pipes delivered his paper, entitled “From the Annals of Polish Sovietology”, in English, and he read the quotes in excellent Polish. The paper summed up the 200-year history of Polish-Russian relations as documented by Polish academics, writers and journalists. The speaker performed a critical evaluation of the work of Zygmunt Krasiński, Jerzy Giedroyc, Franciszek Duchiniński, Wojciech Dzieduszycki, Stanisław Kutrzeba, Józef Piłsudski, Roman Dmowski, Józef Mackiewicz, Bogumił Jasinowski, Feliks Koneczny and Jan Parandowski. In the opening speech, Professor Pipes said that “quotes will be in Polish because there is no point in translating the language of the source into English”. In the paper, which he referred to as “a few reflections on the Poles speaking about Russia”, the Professor admitted that his work had been profoundly influenced by Polish historians, mostly Jan Kucharzewski. Professor Pipes expressed his regret that Jan Kucharzewski's prominent book *Od białego caratu do czerwonego* (From White Tsardom to Red) has been published in Western Europe and the USA in the form of a single, abridged volume that “does not do this extraordinary piece of work any justice”.

The second speaker was Professor Hubert Łaszkiwicz of the Catholic University of Lublin whose paper, entitled “A Journey to the East of the Moscow Empire: 16th and 17th Centuries”, put forward a thesis that it was not the state nor the monarch who were responsible for the success of Russia's eastward expansion, but its ordinary citizens, mostly the merchants (Stroganovs). The second thesis postulated that Russia's eastward expansion in the 16th century (in 1581, Yermak set out on a voyage to conquer western and southern territories) was initially a marginal undertaking that generated massive benefits in modern times.

Dr. Henryk Głębocki of the Jagiellonian University painted a portrait of count Adam Gurowski, a highly fascinating historical figure of dubious moral and ethical conduct (“Russia and the United States as the «Countries of the Future”. Count Adam Gurowski – America's intellectual guide to Russia and Russia's guide to America (1849-1866)”). Gurowski, the initiator of the plot to assassinate Tsar Nicholas I in Warsaw in 1829, the most radical émigré after the November Uprising, suddenly declared his support for the Pan-Slavic movement. He left for Russia where he worked as an office clerk. He wrote petitions to Nicholas I and “argued with Katkov over how to deprive the Poles of their national identity”. Gurowski later left for the US, Russia's ally in the Crimean war, where he became the “Americans' guide to knowledge

about Russia”. According to Dr. Głębocki, “Gurowski significantly contributed to Russia’s positive image in the eyes of American citizens”.

Professor Wiesław Caban of the Jan Kochanowski University of Humanities and Sciences in Kielce, who is renowned for his ability to present succinct reviews of his work, narrowed down the presentation of his paper (“In Service of the Tsar. Polish Soldiers in the Tsar’s Army in the 19th Century. Population and Distribution”) to eight points focusing on the size of the Polish conscription, the Jewish population in the Tsar’s army, the myths and facts about Polish soldiers stationed in garrisons throughout Russia, the reasons for enlisting soldiers in different military formations, the number of Poles in the officer corps, the restrictions imposed on Polish soldiers and the role of Polish commanders in the Russian army.

Assistant Professor Roman Jurkowski of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn attempted to explain the underlying causes of Russian Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin’s hostility towards the Poles (“I Left Many Friends There. Pyotr Stolypin and the Polish Gentry in the Taken Lands in 1988–1911”). He argued that contrary to popular belief in Polish historical science, Stolypin was not an advocate of Russification, nor was his activity aimed against the Poles during his term in office as the marshal of the Kovno guberniya. According to the speaker, the theory postulating that Stolypin became a Russian nationalist and an enemy of the Polish people during his stay in Kovno was unfounded. The governor’s views became more radical after Stolypin had assumed the post of the minister of the interior and, subsequently, the prime minister, and they mirrored the policies that he implemented after 1907.

According to conference chairman Professor Andrzej Nowak, the following speaker, Professor Antoni Mironowicz “summarized the history of the Orthodox Church in Russia in 15 minutes” (“The Orthodox Church in Russia”). The paper traced the evolution of the Orthodox Church in Russia from the reign of Tsar Peter I until 1917 when it became an instrument of state policy.

The second session, moderated by Professor Roman Bäcker, was devoted to East European affairs. Professor Andrzej Nowak (“Does Eastern Europe Still Exist? Questions About the Region’s Place in Contemporary Western Historiography”) cited several definitions of Eastern Europe, including the “new Eastern Europe”, implying the countries that had joined the European Union, the “broader Eastern Europe”, signifying this part of the continent without Russia, “Slavic territories” and the “Second World”, which encompasses the region together with Russia. In Japan, Eastern Europe denotes the western part of Eurasia – the western region annexed to Russia. According to Professor Bäcker, the state of contemporary Western research investigating Eastern Europe resembles the situation encountered in the 18th, 19th and the 20th century – the researchers’ attention is drawn to Russia, not the neighboring states. Russia has a sense of national identity without Europe, while Poland’s history had always been closely intertwined with the European continent.

Professor Mykola Ryabchuk of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kiev (“In Russia’s Shadow: The «New Eastern Europe» and East Slavonic «Ummah» – Uneasy Emancipation”) made a reference to Professor Nowak’s paper. According to Ryabchuk, we are currently dealing with four concepts of Eastern Europe: the “Europe in Russia’s shadow”, covering the former Soviet block countries, the “New Eastern Europe” of countries that are not EU members (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and three Caucasian states), the “Slavonic Ummah” (by analogy to the Muslim Ummah) which denotes the Pan-Slavic community in Europe, and the fourth category of countries that will be emancipated from the Slavonic Ummah. The speaker claimed that each of the four concepts of Eastern Europe are perceived as a threat in the West.

Professor John Micgiel of the Columbia University, USA (“Reflections on Contemporary Polish-Russian Relations”) based his paper on Alain Besancon’s statement: “The mere fact that Russia has adopted a policy of conciliation does not mean that it wants to become reconciled”. Making a reference to the Russian authorities’ reluctance to address the Katyn massacre, Micgiel said that “It is difficult to escape the impression that the Polish government is naive to think that Russia is willing to make amends for the Katyn issue”.

Professor Jarosław Hrycak of the Lviv University and the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv delivered a gripping paper (“The Return of Nationalism in Russian-Ukrainian Relations”) which presented a number of counterarguments to Mykola Ryabchuk’s theses. In his paper, Hrycak negated the 19th century belief that a nation-state could not be established in Orthodox countries. This line of thought underlined most of Borys Yeltsin’s policies addressing the Ukraine, while Vladimir Putin believed that Ukrainian national identity was fully manifested only in the western part of the country, which proved to be Russia’s greatest mistake during the Orange Revolution. According to Hrycek, the difference between Russia and the Ukraine is best portrayed by those countries’ attitudes towards Stalin.

The current political situation in Ukraine was the topic of a 30 minute discussion. A representative of the Polish Radio External Service asked Professor Ryabchuk and Professor Nowak about the European Union’s foreign policy in Eastern Europe. According to Ryabchuk, the EU’s policy has two goals: to push East Europe away from the “old” EU and to engage East European countries in European affairs. Although those goals are mutually exclusive, the EU is hoping to work out a compromise on the assumption that this policy is not the European Union’s priority. Professor Jan Holzer of the Masaryk University in Brno initiated a debate in the realm of terminology and axiology by questioning the true meaning of the term “Western values” in contemporary Europe. Professor Mironowicz argued that political scientists who are experts on Eastern Europe tend to overrate the state-building role of the Orthodox Church.

On day two, the third session was opened by Dr. Adolf Juzwenko, Director of the Ossoliński National Institute in Wrocław, who invited Professor Wiktoria Śliwowska to deliver her paper entitled “Does the Title of Jan Kucharzewski’s book *Od białego caratu do czerwonego* (From White Tsardom to Red) Contribute to Our Understanding of the USSR?”. The author strongly opposed the thesis that there were no differences between Tsarist Russia and Bolshevik Russia. Śliwowska argued that by the same token, Bismarck’s Prussia should be equated with the Third Reich. She noted that Tsarist Russia was a law-abiding state where even false informers were sentenced to penal labor, and Nicholas I, the creator of the social control system, used to say: “доносы люблю но досчииков терпеть не могу”.

In his captivating lecture (“The Concept of Totalitarian Rule and Democracy According to Richard Pipes), Professor Jan Holzer of the Masaryk University in Brno analyzed the politological terms applied by Richard Pipes in his work. According to the lecturer, the notion of democracy serves as a point of reference for Professor Pipes. In his work, Pipes looks to democracy as a model system characterized by specific attributes, and he deploys that model to describe his attitudes towards totalitarian rule.

Professor Leszek Zasztowt, Chairman of the Mianowski Fund and employee of the Center for East European Studies, delivered a paper entitled “Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Science. The Insufferable Problem of the «Academic Outlook»” in which he discussed the influence of Soviet academia on research in the People’s Republic of Poland. In his opinion, the Polish academic community’s dependence on Soviet influences varied throughout the years, reaching its peak in 1948-1953. The exerted influence can be classified into two domains: organizational-structural and philosophical-ideological. According to Professor Zasztowt, as regards the latter, “classical Marxism had never taken root in Poland”.

Professor Mirosław Filipowicz of the Catholic University of Lublin was the second speaker who focused on a selected aspect of Richard Pipes’ work. His paper, entitled “Vera Zasulich in Richard Pipes’ Court” skillfully traced the evolution of Professor Pipes’ thoughts concerning Vera Zasulich’s trial, the court’s attitude toward the defendant and the place of that trial in Russia’s judicial system. According to Filipowicz, Richard Pipes’ investigations into the matter were laborious, and they were crowned with an extensive article, “The Trial of Vera Zasulich”, published in 2010 in *Russian History* (currently published in Leiden), in which the author claimed that “we should investigate the crime, but we should not forget about the punishment”.

Professor Włodzimierz Marciniak of the Polish Academy of Sciences gave an account of Yakov Sverdlov (“The First Gensek. A Stage in the Battle for Power in the Bolshevik Party”). Sverdlov was a terrifying yet a bland figure, but an insight into Sverdlov’s personality cult is vital for an understanding of the cults built by the successive Secretaries General of the Communist

Party. Sverdlov's preference for long, black leather coats, a trend that was picked up by other Bolshevik leaders, gave rise to the expression "black Bolshevik devil".

Professor Mikołaj Iwanow of Opole University, employee of the Center for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, delivered a paper entitled "Jews – Farmers in the USSR and the Soviet Jewish Policy in 1921–1935". The establishment of experimental national autonomies on the Soviet territory in the 1930s had tragic consequences for the Poles, Germans and Jews, and the latter are still experiencing its effects today. Immigrants from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Birobidzhan (near Khabarovsk) account for more than half of the population of 30,000 in the town of Batian near Jerusalem. Professor Iwanow ended his lecture with an anecdote: "Where is pure Yiddish spoken today? – In the Jewish Theater in Warsaw, in New York and in Batiana near Jerusalem".

The fourth session, chaired by Professor Jan Holzer, was the shortest part of the conference due to the upcoming ceremony of conferring the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to Professor Pipes. The first speaker was Wiktor Ross, a former Polish Ambassador to Moldova and Armenia. His paper ("Evolution of the Russian Political System During the Presidency of Putin and Medvedev") traced the general trends in the process of political transformations in the Russian Federation during Putin's reign: progressing oligarchization of power, intensive ideologization that refueled Soviet resentments, and Russia's power status based on vast energy resources.

Professor Roman Bäcker, Vice Chairman of the Polish Political Science Association, delivered a captivating and very well presented paper ("Russia Under the Reign of Recent Presidents") that classified Russia's current assets into three groups: material resources, institutional resources and civic awareness. In his opinion, Russia, the world's largest source of energy reserves (in June 2010, financial reserves generated from the sale of raw materials totaled USD 455 billion), is a classical authoritarian regime where civic awareness is shaped by the state-building myth of the 9th of May. Entropic trends are gradually rising to the surface in contemporary Russia, but this does not imply that a top-down, or even less likely, a grassroots revolution could take place.

After Professor Bäcker's speech, Professor Richard Pipes, accompanied by Jan Malicki, Director of the Center for East European Studies, made an appearance in the Ballroom of the Potocki Palace which hosted the second conference day. Professor Pipes said that he was honored to attend the sessions on both days of the conference. He added that Russian studies in Poland contribute to the understanding of Russia on the global arena, unfortunately, the achievements scored in this academic field are still weakly recognized in the world. Poland's relations with Russia span 1000 years, and Polish people, especially members of the academic community, have a good grasp of Russian events, and this knowledge should be popularized around

the globe. The Russians are well aware of that, which is why they are resentful of Polish experts dealing with Russia. Stanisław Ulam, Zbigniew Brzeziński and the speaker himself were accused by the Russians on several occasions that their Polish roots influence their opinions and deteriorate Russia's relations with the West. Professor Pipes' speech received a thunderous applause.

Jan Malicki made a reference to the fact that the achievements of Polish academics specializing in Russian affairs remain unknown in the West by declaring that the materials from this conference would be published in English. He emphasized that Professor Pipes had lectured on many occasions at the Summer School of the Center for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw.

The last speaker was Professor Witold Rodkiewicz of the University of Warsaw ("The Recent Russian Proposal of a European Security Treaty: An Interpretation"). His brief paper discussed the Russian establishment's notions about the role of contemporary Russia in the world. After World War II, Russia was incorrectly deemed a weak state. The international system pushes for American supremacy on the global arena, while Russia aims for a multipolar system. Russia should reinstate its power in every aspect. As regards the latter, Professor Rodkiewicz pointed to an analogy between Russian leaders' political views and the business strategies of Russian oligarchs.

The fourth session was not followed by a discussion due to the upcoming ceremony of conferring the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to Professor Richard Pipes. The ceremony was held in the Senate Hall of the University of Warsaw. The supervisor was Professor Henryk Samsonowicz, while Professor Wojciech Materski, Professor Władysław Serczyk and Professor Wiktoria Śliwowska acted as the reviewers. The Rector of the University of Warsaw Professor Katarzyna Chałasińska-Macukow read the Senate's unanimous resolution of 20 January 2010 to confer the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to Professor Richard Pipes. In the laudation, Professor Samsonowicz emphasized the Laureate's achievements in the field of historical science as well as his political activity as President Reagan's advisor on Soviet and East European affairs that supported Polish interests. In a warm acceptance speech, Professor Pipes recalled his childhood and youth in Cieszyn and Warsaw. In October 1939, Pipes emigrated to America with a forged Portuguese passport. He ended his moving speech with the following words: "In late September 1939, I was standing in Krakowskie Przedmieście, watching two Nazi soldiers guard the gate to the University. A female Polish student burst into tears at this sight. Today, I passed the very same gate on my way here, and I realized that history is not always as terrifying as we might think".

Alicja Dobrosielska, Jan Gancewski

SUMMARY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ENTITLED
*THE HISTORY, IDEOLOGY AND OPERATIONS
OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER – HISTORIC SYMBOLS,*
OLSZTYN, 2 JULY 2010

A Polish-German conference entitled “The History, Ideology and Operations of the Teutonic Order – Historic Symbols” was held on 2 July 2010 at the Faculty of Humanities, the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. The event was organized by the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, the Order of Brothers of the German House Saint Mary in Jerusalem, the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, the Institute of History and International Relations at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, the Olsztyn Branch of the Polish Historical Society, the City of Olsztyn, Purda Municipality, Olsztyn District Office and the Pruthenian Society. The conference was held under the auspices of the Rector of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Professor Józef Górniewicz, and the Marshal of the Warmia and Mazury Region, Jacek Protas. It was attended by eight speakers representing the University of Warmia and Mazury, the University of Bonn, the Central Archive of the Teutonic Order in Vienna, and the modern Teutonic Order. The opening ceremony was hosted by Professor Tadeusz Rawa, Pro-Rector of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Jolanta Szulc, Vice Marshal of the Warmia and Mazury Region, and Piotr Grzymowicz, Mayor of Olsztyn. The opening speech was delivered by Professor Norbert Kasperek, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn (UWM).

The conference was divided into two sessions. The first session was chaired by Dr. Jan Gancewski (UWM Olsztyn), and it opened with a lecture by Dr. Bruno Platter, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in Vienna, entitled “*The historical characteristics underlying the contemporary Teutonic Order*”¹. Dr. Platter discussed the evangelical roots of the Teutonic Order by tracing the historical characteristics that continue to underlie its operations today. The Teutonic Knights were described as a religious order, a provider of hospital services and a culture-promoting organization that was engaged in social, political and economic life to promote evangelical, social, charity, cul-

¹ The original speech titles are listed in the collection of materials from the conference: *Zakon krzyżacki w historii, ideologii i działaniu – symbole dziejowe. Der deutsche Orden in Geschichte, Ideologie und Wirkung*, edited by J. Gancewski, Olsztyn 2010, p. 295.

tural and educational work throughout the centuries. By focusing on the evangelic, cultural and social aspects of the order's operations, the speaker was able to avoid historical controversies surrounding the Teutonic Knights' activity in Prussia which was marked by a great degree of evangelical ambiguity. Dr. Platter emphasized the Order's contribution to the promotion of welfare, charity and culture in modern times by citing numerous examples from the Teutonic Knights' recent history, including the persecution of the Order's members in various European regimes.

In his speech entitled "*The Warmia Diocese and the Teutonic Order in 1243-1525*", Professor Alojzy Szorc (UWM in Olsztyn) discussed two distinct periods in Warmia Diocese's relations with the Teutonic Knights. The first period began with the appointment of four bishops in Prussia, and it ended in 1466. According to Professor Szorc, this period was marked by the "protective embrace" of the Teutonic Order which clearly intervened in the diocese's internal affairs (in particular administrative and economic issues) to prevent Warmia's bishops from acquiring political sovereignty. According to the speaker, the Second Toruń Peace Treaty of 1466 was a breakthrough moment in Warmia's relations with the Teutonic Order which marked the onset of the second period. In line with the peace treaty, the entire region of Warmia was annexed to Poland, and the Warmia diocese was split between Poland and the Teutonic State. Teutonic Knights ceased to be the diocese's sole "benefactors". This was a serious blow for the Order which, according to Professor Szorc, "was thirsty for revenge". A truce was called only in 1521, and following the introduction of Lutheranism in Prussia, Catholicism was preserved only in Warmia, a Polish dominion as of 1466.

Professor Udo Arnold (University of Bonn) spoke about "*The Teutonic Order as an object of political ideology in the 19th and the 20th centuries*". By relying on analyses of school textbooks, press articles, posters and photographs, Professor Arnold argued that the history of the Teutonic Order, in particular the history of the Battle of Grunwald which was given the status of a political symbol, was a propaganda tool and a political instrument used in the past to create and uphold stereotypes in Polish-German relations. According to the speaker, these sensitive issues that were often used in political debate, no longer evoke such heated emotions from Poles or Germans. Professor Arnold attributed this success to the efforts of historical researchers, conferences, conventions, academic publications and scientific works addressed to the broad public.

Professor Arnold chaired the second session which opened with Dr. Kazimierz Grażawski's (UWM in Olsztyn) lecture entitled "*The first phase of the Great War – the Teutonic invasion of Dobrzyń Land in 1409*". The speech integrated new information into the existing body of knowledge on the annexation of Dobrzyń Land by the Teutonic Knights, including the results of archeological research conducted in the former Teutonic strongholds in Bobrowniki and Dobrzyń on the Vistula River. Dr. Grażawski summarized the

historical accounts of the war in an attempt to describe the military potential of those strongholds.

“Selected economic aspects of the Teutonic Order’s activity in the 15th century” was the title of a speech delivered by Dr. Jan Gancewski who attempted to identify distinct phases marking the development of the Order’s economic activity in the 15th century. According to the speaker, the turn of the 14th and the 15th centuries was an era of economic stability, while the period between the Great War of 1409–1411 and the 1420s as well as the Thirteen Years’ War (1454–1466) were a time of stagnation and great destruction. Dr. Gancewski noted that neither the Battle of Grunwald nor the Great War were able to break the Teutonic economy which, despite many negative trends (including the mass abandonment of crop fields), continued to flourish directly after the First Toruń Peace Treaty. The period that followed the Thirteen Years’ War was marked by frequent changes and new trends in the Teutonic Order’s economy. Property was privatized, and the ownership of land, farming estates and facilities in the Teutonic State underwent significant transformation.

Frank Bayard (head of the Central Archive of the Teutonic Order in Vienna) delivered a lecture entitled *“A change of times – a time of change. The long 19th century”*. The speaker discussed the key events in the Order’s most recent history in chronological order. He spoke of changes in ownership structure, legal issues and reforms that were carried out in the Teutonic Order during the reign of Emperor Maximilian when the Order became “an independent clerical and knighthood institution that reported directly to the emperor”. At the time of the Austrian empire, the Teutonic Knights resumed their charity and hospital work which is continued to this day despite many formal obstacles, such as the loss of Teutonic holdings in the early 20th century which were nationalized or annexed by new countries that refused to respect the Order’s historical privileges.

Dr. Dariusz Radziwiłowicz (UWM in Olsztyn) delivered a speech entitled *“The Grunwald tradition in Polish political groups’ fight for an independent Republic of Poland in 1918–1920”*. According to the lecturer, from among the two political trends that had the greatest impact on the formation of the Polish state, namely the movements headed by Józef Piłsudski and Roman Dmowski (National Democracy), only the latter was a continuator of the Grunwald tradition. The National Democracy was able to make full use of that tradition as a symbol of struggle against German oppression, the claims to restore Poland’s access to the Baltic Sea and recover Western territories.

The conference ended with Dr. Izabela Lewandowska’s speech entitled *“Teutonic castles in north-eastern Poland after World War II (1945–2005)”*. The lecturer discussed the condition of selected Teutonic castles on territories that had been annexed to Poland after the war. Dr. Lewandowska used the collective term of “Teutonic castles” to refer to strongholds built and operated by the Teutonic Knights, bishops and the chapter. According to the speaker, regard-

less of the owner and the assigned function, most castles were built in a similar style, therefore the identification of strongholds administered by the Order, the bishop or the chapter proves to be difficult today owing to their architectural similarity. The author also noted that the present condition of Teutonic strongholds largely reflects their fate before World War II.

The discussion was opened by Romuald Odoj, retired director of the Museum of the Battle of Grunwald in Stębark, who spoke of outdoor events marking the battle's anniversary in the previous years. He was followed by Professor Janusz Małek, Doctor Honoris Causa of the UWM in Olsztyn, who thanked the organizers for staging this long-awaited conference. Dr. Bruno Platter also shared a few warm words of tribute for the event's organizers. Dr. Wiesław Łach (UWM in Olsztyn) talked about stereotypes and difficult moments in Polish-German relations. The discussion was closed by Jerzy Laskowski, the administrator of Purda municipality, who thanked all participants for attending the conference and commended the university for its efforts. Dr. Jan Gancewski gave a closing speech thanking the participants, lecturers, guests and all those who had contributed to the conference's success.

Witold Gieszczyński

**ACADEMIC CONFERENCE:
*UNDERGROUND PRESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF POLAND, OLSZTYN, 3–5 NOVEMBER 2010***

Political censorship reigned supreme in the People's Republic of Poland, and anti-communist activists initiated measures to break down the authorities' monopoly on information. An underground press system, literally referred to as the second circulation, was born, and independent publications were produced by illegal printing houses. Underground press was a crucial part of illegal printing. According to estimates, more than 5,500 press titles had escaped communist censorship in Poland between 1976 and 1989. This phenomenon continues to spur fascinating research.

A national academic conference entitled *Underground press in the People's Republic of Poland* was held on 3–5 November 2010 in the Library of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. The event was organized by the Olsztyn Delegation of the Institute of National Remembrance and the University Library. The conference had an extensive program comprising 27 speeches delivered by historians, political scientists and sociologists representing key academic centers in the country: Warsaw, Łódź, Gdańsk, Toruń, Szczecin, Rzeszów, Bydgoszcz and Olsztyn.

On the first day of the conference, lectures were delivered by: Konrad Knoch, *Liberal underground press in 1979–1990*, Andrzej W. Kaczorowski, *Independent rural press 1977–1989*, Tomasz Truskawa, *Institutional press of the 1980s in the People's Republic of Poland*, Grzegorz Wołk, *Underground press in the Office for Preservation and Dissemination of Archival Records of the Institute of National Remembrance – a general overview*, Joanna Bachtin, *Collections of independent publications at the National Library*, Marta Marcinkiewicz, *Dissident press*, Grzegorz Majchrzak, *Not only press. The phenomenon of Radio Solidarity*, Dr. Krzysztof Osiński, *Radio Solidarity in Bydgoszcz*, Dr. Dominika Rafalska, *Underground press of the Independent Students' Union at the University of Warsaw in 1980–1981*. The first day of the conference ended with a debate addressing the delivered speeches. The first volume of the *Encyklopedia Solidarności* (Solidarity Encyclopedia), a compendium of knowledge on political opposition in the People's Republic of Poland in 1976–1989, was also promoted during the event.

The second day was divided into the morning session and the afternoon session. In the morning, lectures were delivered by eight speakers: Dr. hab. Mirosław Golon, *The Soviet Union in Polish underground press of the 1980s – selected issues*, Professor Ryszard Sudziński, *Polish community press in Chicago reports on the events in Poland in 1980–1990*, Bartosz Kaliski, *Ethos and fighting. A comparison of two periodicals: "Hutnicy '82" (Warsaw) and "Hutnik" (Cracow)*, Arkadiusz Kazański, *"Sensibility and Solidarity" – a publication of the underground Solidarity movement in Gdańsk's Lenin Shipyard in 1982–1988*, Karol Nawrocki, *Underground press in Elbląg in 1982–1988*, Paweł Szulc, *Underground press in Szczecin in 1989*, Katarzyna Kyc, *Independent press in Rzeszów in 1985–1990*, Jan Olszszek, *A overview of Agency News (1984–1990)*.

The afternoon session featured lectures by: Kamila Churska, *The elections of 1989 in Bydgoszcz's underground press*, Dr. Przemysław Wojtowicz, *"Free Speech. News service." A newsletter of Toruń Solidarity*, Dr. Sebastian Pilarski, *Underground press in Łódź and political transitions in Poland in 1989*, Józef Śreniowski, *Press distributors and underground publications of the 1980s (after 13 December 1981) in the Łódź city and area*, Dr. Sławomir Cenckiewicz, *Paweł Wikłasz – a sketch for a portrait of an underground publisher and informer*. This part of the conference also closed with a discussion and a promotion of two books: *Papierem w system. Prasa drugoobiegowa w PRL* (Breaking the system with paper. Underground press in the People's Republic of Poland), edited by Marta Marcinkiewicz and Sebastian Ligarski, and *Dziennikarze władzy, władza dziennikarzom. Aparat represji wobec środowiska dziennikarskiego 1945–1990* (Journalists for the authorities, authorities for the journalists. The political repression apparatus in the journalist community in 1945–1990), edited by Tadeusz Wolsza and Sebastian Ligarski.

The last day of the conference was dedicated to lectures by Olsztyn's historians: Dominik Krysiak, *Polish reality of the 1980s as portrayed by the*

“Rezonans” periodical in Olsztyn, Renata Gieszczyńska, “Larwa” – an underground publication of the Federation of Fighting Youths in Warmia and Mazury, Dr. Witold Gieszczyński, Report on the strike in the Olsztyn Graphics Plant in 1981 in the “Gazeta Olsztyńska” daily, Dr. Piotr Kardela, “Inicjatywy Warmińskie” – a publication of liberal oppositionists in Olsztyn, Paweł Warot, Secret Service operations aimed against local underground press on the example of the “Echo Mragowa” daily. This part of the conference ended with a discussion which was attended by speakers and guests.

The conference was accompanied by two exhibitions, organized by the Olsztyn Delegation of the Institute of National Remembrance and the Special Collections Department of the Library at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, entitled: *Independent press and publications in Warmia and Mazury in 1980–1989* and *A strike in the Olsztyn Graphics Plant in 1981. For the printer’s personal dignity, truth and veracity of speech.*