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HISTORY OF POLISH POMERANIA


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Koło Byłych Żołnierzy
Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych

W U. S. A.



POLISH VETERANS OF WORLD WAR 2

POST 52 NSZ

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
PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY OF LOVERS OF HISTORY

POLISH VETERANS OF WORLD WAR 2

POST 52 NSZ

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P R E F A C E.

"The History of Polish Pomerania" is a resumé of a book published in Polish in 1927 by the Society of Lovers of History in Poznań under the same editorship as this outline. It represents a collective work composed of the following articles: "Prehistoric Times" by Dr. Joseph Kostrzewski, Professor of the University of Poznań; "Pomerania under the Bolesławs" by Dr. Kazimierz Tymieniecki, Professor of the University of Poznań; "Polish Pomerania and the Knights of the Cross" by Dr. Theodore Tyc, Docent of the University of Poznań; "Downfall of the State of the Teutonic Order in Pomerania" by Dr. Kazimierz Tymieniecki, Professor of the University of Poznań; "Union of Royal Prussia with the Crown Kingdom under the Jagiellonians (1454—1572)" by Kazimierz Słósarczyk, gymnasium teacher; "Royal Prussia in Union with Poland from 1572 to 1772" by Dr. Władysław Konopczyński, Professor of the University of Cracow; "Polish Baltic Policy" by the same; "Economic Life of Pomerania (Royal Prussia) in the Times of the Republic" by Marian Kniat, Assistant in the State Archives of Poznań; "Polish Literature in Pomerania" by Dr. Thaddeus Grabowski, Professor of the University of Poznań; "Prussian Annexations (before the Congress of Vienna)" by Dr. Andrew Wojtkowski, Vice-director of the Raczyński Library in Poznań; "Under the Prussian Rule" by the Rev. Father Alfonse Mańkowski, President of the Scientific Society in Toruń. The English translation was made by Dr. Eileen Znaniecka, lecturer of the University of Poznań.

Publication in the world-wide English language has been undertaken not for political purposes, but as the most efficient way of conveying information. Coming from the pen of specialists, it gives first-hand knowledge based on all the available historical sources and the whole scientific literature, German as well as Polish. The narrative is carried as far as the last

World War, which led to the reconstruction of the Polish state and re-established the connection of Pomerania with the rest of Poland. Only a part of this country has fallen to Germany, while another section has gone to make up the Free Town of Danzig. The history of the last ten years is not included in this work.

Dr. Kazimierz Tymieniecki,
Professor of the University of Poznań.

ERRATA.

p.	l.	18,	instead of	earlier,	read <i>later</i>
" 3,	" 32,	" "	" "	w	" <i>we</i>
" 7,	" 7,	" "	" "	observation	" <i>observations</i>
" "	" 9,	" "	" "	show thow that,	" <i>show that</i>
" 8,	" 4,	" "	" "	surounded	" <i>surrounded</i>
" 12,	" 4,	" "	" "	Wedian	" <i>Wendian</i>
" 17,	" 23,	" "	" "	Order	" <i>Oder</i>
" 22,	" 16,	" "	" "	Prusia	" <i>Prussia</i>
" 44,	" 27,	" "	" "	hod	" <i>had</i>
" 50,	" 16,	" "	" "	armes	" <i>armies</i>
" 56,	" 26,	" "	" "	inficiency	" <i>inefficiency</i>
" 57,	" 11,	" "	" "	Unionits	" <i>Unionists</i>
" 59,	" 37,	" "	" "	tendenciees	" <i>tendencies</i>
" 77,	" 6,	" "	" "	backgroud	" <i>background</i>
" 82,	" 31,	" "	" "	Stetin	" <i>Stettin</i>
" 92,	" 38,	" "	" "	possesions	" <i>possessions</i>
" 93,	" 17,	" "	" "	doubtfoul	" <i>doubtful</i>
" "	" 37,	" "	" "	its	" <i>it</i>
" 110,	" 15,	" "	" "	1722	" <i>1772</i>
" 117,	" 13,	" "	" "	recived	" <i>received</i>
" 124,	" 9,	" "	" "	manifest	" <i>manifesto</i>
" "	" 15,	" "	" "	imprevement	" <i>improvement</i>
" 136,	" 25,	" "	" "	subjest	" <i>subject</i>
" 142,	" 35,	" "	" "	fovorable	" <i>favorable</i>
" 143,	last l.	" "	" "	af	" <i>of</i>
" 145,	l. 39,	" "	" "	broak	" <i>break,</i>
" "	" 25,	" "	" "	readings	" <i>reading</i>
" 146,	" 35,	" "	" "	association	" <i>associations</i>
" 156,	" 3,	" "	" "	institution	" <i>institutions</i>
" 158,	" 9,	" "	" "	Berhard	" <i>Bernhard</i>
" "	" 31,	" "	" "	withderw	" <i>withdrew</i>
" 160,	" 34,	" "	" "	populations	" <i>population</i>

Prehistoric Times.

1. **The Stone Age.** The oldest traces of inhabitation appear in Pomerania only in the early phase of the post-glacial period. The first human agglomerations came — as it seems — by way of the Vistula from the southeast. But only from the middle stone age (Mezolithic) are the relics numerous. From the south there came to Pomerania a hunting population of Mediterranean origin which left a series of dune settlements with many small flint instruments of partially geometric form. At the same time another group of people from Jutland and the Danish islands reached Pomerania by way of the Baltic coast. These lived chiefly from fishing, as is proved by the implements of bone and horn fashioned by them into harpoons and hooks for angling-rods which have been found in the running waters and lakes as well as in the meadow-marl and turf formerly lake-beds. Both groups of people still led a nomadic existence, maintaining the Paleolithic traditions.

We meet the first beginnings of settled life in Pomerania only in the earlier stone age (Neolithic). This change occurred in close connection with the acquisition of higher forms of economic life (agriculture and cattle-rearing) by some of the then existing inhabitants of Pomerania. A great advance in the fashioning of stone implements appeared simultaneously, and the first earthen vessels came into use. Finally, we notice the oldest sepulchres testifying to the existence of a clear cult of the dead. The Neolithic population of Pomerania was not uniform. Leaving out of account the question of the eventual survival up to the Neolithic period of a part of the population from the middle stone age (concerning which we are at this time unable to state anything certain), we may

distinguish on the territory of Pomerania during the earlier stone age three different ethnic groups. The dominant role fell to the share of the northern people who are represented by the so-called Great Poland culture as well as by the culture of Megalithic tombs and the culture of cord-ornamented pottery. The Great Poland culture is characterized by two types of pottery: bowls with funnel shaped neck and flasks with a ruff, the original models of which are found in Jutiand. The appearance of these forms in Pomerania was thus the result of ethnic expansion along the Baltic in an eastern direction. The cord-ornamented pottery in Pomerania forms a local fragment of the cord pottery which developed on the lower Oder. A distinct and insignificant branch of the cord pottery culture is met on the Gulf of Danzig (*i. e.*, the Rzucewo culture). The Great Poland culture and the culture of cord-ornamented pottery are both known in Pomerania exclusively from settlements made on light sandy soil. This is closely connected with the whole mode of life of the population, which was still half nomadic. On the other hand, the third northern culture, called Megalithic, possessed a preeminently agricultural character, and was therefore concentrated on the fertile soil of Chelmno; while in Great Poland it appeared most frequently in fruitful Cujavia. The people of Megalithic culture buried their dead in stately stone tombs which were generally located in triangular or circular mounds of earth entirely surrounded with stones. These tombs constitute a further development of the so-called tombs of the giants found frequently in northwestern Germany. The burial chamber, built of smooth stones, generally contains a large number of skeletons, all furnished with clay pots, flint weapons, amber ornaments, and finally the bones of animals, testifying that meat was placed in the tomb for the deceased.

Incomparably poorer are the traces left in Pomerania by the population of southern (Danubian) origin, whose characteristic feature is the so-called ribbon ware or banded pottery. Small groups only of this people penetrated here by way of the Vistula from Little Poland, where they were concentrated in the fertile loess regions. The only settlement of the old ribbon pottery with volute ornamentation we know from Chełmża near Toruń; an isolated vessel has been reported from

the neighborhood of Grudziądz. Other vessels belonging to the later ribbon pottery (with impressed stroke ornamentation) have been dug up in Chełmża [Culmsee]. Since we are dealing here with a population pre-eminently agricultural, it is not surprising that their settlements did not extend beyond the boundaries of the fertile black soil of Chełmno.

Very scarcely represented in Pomerania is the so-called Baltic culture. Fragments of its characteristic comb pottery are known from some places in the districts of Toruń (Nieszawka), Sztum (Stuhm), Białogóra, Mikołajki, and Marienburg (Eichberg). These remnants are proof of the wanderings of a nomadic people, springing from the northeast, which some investigators consider to be pre-Finnish.

Near the end of the stone age the first copper objects appeared in Poland — as imports from the south. However, only the improved mixture of copper with tin, known as bronze, succeeded in obtaining a wider circulation here, thus initiating a new epoch: the bronze age.

2. **The Bronze Age** (2000—800 B. C.). In the first of the five periods into which we divide the bronze age, or in that of the so-called early bronze age (2000—1700 B. C.), the inhabitants of Pomerania — so it seems — continued to be the descendants of the population of Megalithic tombs, as may be concluded from the appearance in this period of cist sepulchres, partly covered with barrows (in Polish Konopat, in the district of Świecie), which are akin to the Neolithic tombs. Besides these we find, however, also flat skeleton tombs with the usual stone cover. Among the metal products of the first bronze age we meet a large number of southern imports, chiefly Italian and Danubian; but strong western influences are also noticeable. As against the neighboring Great Poland, in Pomerania we have up to now no local forms from this period which might suggest the existence of a native foundry.

The second period of the bronze age (1700—1400 B. C.), constituting together with the third period the so-called middle bronze age, is represented in Pomerania exclusively by scattered findings of metal objects, mostly axes with high edges, and a few "treasures" which were hidden in the ground or in water at a time of danger or placed there as an

offering to the gods. We know of no tombs in Pomerania dating from this period. The discovery of some axes of the eastern Baltic type testifies to certain influences from the lower Niemen and Pregel; while axes of the north German type prove western influences. The pre-Lusatian culture, so richly developed in neighboring Great Poland and Silesia, did not penetrate into Pomerania, although its influence manifested itself on the lower Oder.

Only in the third period of the bronze age (1400—1200 B. C.) did the "Lusatian" culture¹ (developed from the pre-Lusatian culture) spread over the territory of Pomerania, introducing a new sepulchral custom: cremation. This culture, which is attributed by the majority of Polish investigators to the pre-Slavic population, appeared in Pomerania in two separate groups. In the first of these, associated with the Kaszubian plateau (districts of Kartuzy and Słupsk [Stolp]), the typical form of sepulchre is a barrow. In the second group, confined to the land of Chełmno, we meet exclusively flat tombs. These tombs of "Lusatian" culture are noted for their rich supply of earthen vessels of various forms, while they are relatively poorly furnished with metal products (pins, bracelets, rings, buttons, fishing-hooks, etc.).

Also in the fourth and fifth periods of the bronze age, which are both embraced by the common name of later bronze age, Pomerania still formed a constituent part of the enormous field of "Lusatian" culture, which at this time stretched from the Baltic to beyond the Sudetic Mountains and from the middle Elbe to beyond the Vistula. In the fourth period (1200—1000 B. C.) the same contrast still persisted even here between the Kaszubian group, continually making use of barrows, and the rest of Pomerania using flat tombs. A characteristic feature of the Kaszubian group of "Lusatian" culture consists in the rather frequent appearance of metal objects of Scandinavian type, testifying to the influence of northern culture. These northern influences increased still more in the fifth period of the bronze age (1000—800 B. C.). In the east there appeared at this time from the lower Oder a collection

¹) It is so named because the pottery typical of this culture was first unearthed in Lusatia.

of bronze articles with a certain local Pomeranian stamp, which is attributed by German scientists to some recently formed group of German origin who subdued or expelled the former inhabitants and pushed as far as the line extending from Piła (Schneidemühle) through Chojnice to Tczew. Since the few tombs dating from this period — in spite of the presence in them of northern forms of metal — contain typical „Lusatian“ pottery, we may conclude that here at most it is a matter of a weak layer of that invading people, but not of an expulsion of the former inhabitants, as Kossinna himself recognizes. Most likely, however, it is not a question of invasion at all, but only of a strong cultural influence of neighbors from beyond the Oder. Beyond the line drawn as above we meet in the fifth period of the bronze age numerous flat cemeteries with the „Lusatian“ culture, concentrated most frequently on the right bank of the Vistula.

3. **The Iron Age** (800 B. C. — 1000 A. D.). In the first period of the iron age (from 800 to 500 B. C.), called the Hallstatt period (from the locality of Hallstatt in the eastern Alps), the northwestern part of Pomerania was still occupied by the „Lusatian“ population. Its continued existence is demonstrated by the flat tombs with stone cover, for their pottery in addition to certain forms of limited local significance possesses a character eminently „Lusatian“. Also in the contemporary settlements on this territory (Oliva near Gdańsk (Danzig) and Odry in the district of Chojnice), the „Lusatian“ forms predominate. The region embraced by this culture, which may be called simple „Pomeranian“ culture, stretched southward to the Noteć, thus reaching almost exactly to the later boundary of Pomerania. Another branch of the „Lusatian“ culture continued to occupy during the early period of the iron age the territory of Chełmno, which still preserved its independence.

About the middle of the first period of the iron age there appeared west of the lower Vistula a new culture which showed the greatest intensity on the Gulf of Danzig and in the district between the sea, the Vistula, and the Czarna Woda River. It is characterized by cist sepulchres built of square stone slabs and having the character of family vaults. In pottery the culture of the cist sepulchres is on the whole rather

primitive; most conspicuous are urns with faces. Great metallurgical attainments are demonstrated by the ornaments of this culture, particularly the so-called breast-plates. The origin of this new culture has not yet been explained. Against the supposition that it came together with a new population from over the sea is balanced the lack of analogous phenomena in Scandinavia with which this culture might be connected. Likewise, the hypothesis that the culture of cist sepulchres developed on the spot from the Pomeranian culture of the fifth period of the bronze age or from the "Lusatian" culture has not hitherto found satisfactory arguments to support it. Undoubtedly, we have here to do with a separate people who, springing from some relatively narrow district, spread over Pomerania during the early period of the iron age, occupied the entire left bank of the Vistula, crossed the Noteć, and wedged itself deep into Great Poland.

In the beginning of the second period of the iron age (from 500 B. C. to the Christian era), called the epoch of Latène (from the locality of Latène in Switzerland), the population of cist sepulchres still occupied the region of the "Lusatian" culture, in spite of opposition offered by the local population, who sought shelter in earthworks. And now the conquest extended over the land of Chełmno, a considerable part of what was later the Congress Kingdom, the rest of Great Poland, and a large portion of middle and lower Silesia to beyond the Oder. The former population now formed a subject class, which in southern Poland not only preserved its own nationality, but even absorbed the small class of invaders. In Pomerania, on the other hand, the population of cist sepulchres lost, in fact, during the course of the early and middle Latène period various characteristics of its culture (form of sepulchre, the urns with faces etc), but survived, as it seems, in part up to the later Latène, and even up to the Roman, period. This is shown by the appearance in these periods of pottery forms and more rarely of metal products which are clearly an inheritance from the earlier times. In the later phase of the Latène period (ca. 150 B. C.), there appeared in Pomerania a culture of pit sepulchres. This is characterized by sepulchres without urns containing, besides the calcined bones

of the deceased and burial offerings, the entire remains of the funeral pyre (charcoal, ashes, burnt earth). Besides these are found also tombs with cinerary urns on which the remnants of the funeral pyre were scattered. Until recently the appearance of this new funeral ceremony was associated with the invasion of some northern people from Bornholm and eastern Sweden. New observations, however, made in Great Poland have considerably shaken this hypothesis; for they show that similar pit sepulchres and urns with the remnants of the funeral pyre are found here within the realm of the "Lusatian" culture and in the later culture of cist sepulchres. Consequently, it may be surmised that the beginnings of the new mode of sepulchre which in the later Latène period spread over Pomerania are to be sought there in Great Poland, the more so since the custom of destroying and breaking up the funeral offerings and burning them together with the deceased on the funeral pyre — so characteristic of the culture of pit sepulchres — was introduced into Great Poland as early as the Hallstatt period. The main feature of the culture of pit sepulchres in Pomerania is the frequency in the sepulchres of weapons, sometimes embellished beautifully with ornaments hammered or etched with the help of vegetable acids.

The following, third period of the iron age (from the birth of Christ to 400 A. D.) is commonly called the Roman period because of the strong influence then exercised by the provincial Roman culture of the Rhine and the Danube on Polish territories. The proof of this influence is the large quantity of Roman coins found in Pomerania as well as the numerous imported articles (chiefly bronze and glass, more rarely earthen, vessels; further, glass beads and other decorations). Besides the former population, interring their dead in pit sepulchres or in urns with the residue of the funeral pyre, a new people now makes its appearance on the scene, burying the remains uncremated. These skeleton tombs, which are concentrated most thickly on both sides of the lower Vistula, nevertheless reach toward the east into the Prussian-Lithuanian territory and toward the west as far as Jutland. Besides the flat tombs we meet in Pomerania not infrequently mounds with

skeleton tombs. Among the most imposing are those tombs examined in 1926 in Odry in the district of Chojnice, having a diameter up to 20 meters and consisting of a stone nucleus covered with earth and surrounded by a circle of stones. In the skeleton tombs there are no weapons, but instead a more abundant display of splendid and original ornaments. Also in the culture of tombs of cremated bodies the custom disappears of providing the deceased with weapons. The skeleton tombs represent beyond any doubt an invading population of Scandinavian origin. The territory of Pomerania was occupied — so it seems — by Gothic peoples. Already in the latter half of the second century a considerable part of that invading population left Pomerania, moving in the direction of the Black Sea; and after it, in the third and fourth centuries, the so-called later Roman period, went the rest, as is shown by the rapid diminution of the number of relics as we approach the end of the Roman period.

From the period of folk-wanderings (400—600 A. D.) we have in Pomerania only a vanishing amount of relics; and these, moreover, possess no local character, but merely represent traces of the wanderings of various foreign races. The richest discovery from this period was made not long ago in Pruszcz (Praust) near Danzig. In spite of the scarceness of findings it is difficult to accept the proposition put forward by German scientists that Pomerania together with the rest of the Polish lands constituted an empty plain at this time. For likewise from the three following centuries (from the seventh to the ninth), when Pomerania was most certainly occupied by the ancestors of the present Polish inhabitants, we possess hardly any discoveries, but, on the other hand, many phenomena of the material and spiritual culture of the early historical period can be directly connected with analogous phenomena of the late Roman period (pottery, type of hut, form of sepulchre. The lack of findings from the period of the folk-wanderings, as from the commencement of the following period (the early historical), should therefore be explained otherwise; as, for example, by the negligent form of tombs, which was not conducive to their long preservation, lack of offerings in the tombs because of the impoverishment of the population.

which then became a subject one for a number of centuries, and finally, by a certain petrification of the form of material culture as a result of the cessation of importation of new products and stimuli from the south when the immigrant population, who had concentrated trade in their own hands, left Pomerania.

Only on the right bank of the lower Vistula, on the territory at that time ethnographically Prussian, do we find numerous relics; in the neighborhood of Elbląg (Elbing), we even have two cemeteries from this time (in Serpin and Lentzen), which were still used during the seventh century after Christ.

In the rest of Pomerania, as in general on the territory of all ethnographic Poland and of the ancient Western Slavs, we meet more frequent relics only in the tenth century after Christ, at the end of the early historical period (from 600 to 1000 A. D.). The Pomeranian population of this period rejected the old custom of cremation and under the influence of Christianity began to bury their dead uncremated. The inhabitants of the land of Chełmno usually built flat tombs. In Pomerania proper, however, barrows predominate, sometimes fenced in a square by large stones, and holding many skeletons. In the tombs of men we meet most frequently among the offerings iron knives, generally lying in leather sheaths with hammered bronze ornaments, more rarely whetstones, implements for fire-making, remnants of wooden pails with iron hoops and handles, sporadically also spurs and iron weapons; in the tombs of women we find most frequently strings of beads, rings, pendants, together with the national ornament of Slavic women, temple-rings. As against the Great Poland specimens, the Pomeranian temple-rings are sometimes made of thin silver plate bent into a little tube and embellished with embossed ornaments. A distinct, local character is presented by some other Pomeranian ornaments, known to us mainly from the treasures of broken silver. The extent of many cemeteries testify to the existence of populous settlements, having partly a defensive character. Such settlements for defense were, first of all, the earthen fortifications which were raised on hills commanding the environment or scattered in inaccessible marshes in places already protected by nature. The character of defensive settlements is also presented by the pile build-

ings met at this time in Pomerania. The Pomeranian population carried on a lively trade with their neighbors and even with far countries, as is proved by the articles of foreign origin found in Pomerania, especially the numerous foreign coins, coming on the one side from the Mohammedan countries and Byzantium and on the other from western Europe, and now forming part of the above mentioned silver treasures. A different character, on the other hand, is presented by relics of the Viking type found in Pomerania; for instance, the Viking tomb in Cieple in the district of Kwidzyn (Marienwerder), or the lower metal coverings of the Viking sword-sheaths found in Dąbrowa in the district of Chojnice and in Oksywie near the coast. These must be recognized as evidence of the invasion of Scandinavian troops, the more so because typical Viking boats have also been found in Pomerania, in Kiszpork (Christburg) in the district of Sztum (Stuhm) and in Charbrow in the district of Lębork (Lauenburg). Another interesting category of remains throws some light on the religious beliefs of part of the population of Pomerania. We have in mind here the stone carvings in rough work representing human figures (exclusively men). These are partly armed with swords and not infrequently represented with a horn in the hand or at the side. A series of such stone statues has been found in the district of Susz (Rosenberg), one comes from Kiszpork (Christburg) in the district of Sztum (Stuhm), and another from Lezno in the district Danzig. The distribution of these statues, which Demetrykiewicz considers to be tombstones, shows that we have here to do with Prussian and not Slavonic relics, for the Prussians had taken from the East the custom of erecting such tombstones.

On the eve of its début on the historical scene, Pomerania represents a domain possessing a relatively high degree of culture. The metal products of Pomerania and partly also its early historical pottery surpass in several respects the analogous products of Great Poland; and from historical sources we know that the religious beliefs of the Pomeranians were highly developed in comparison with other groups of Western Slavs. If in spite of these facts the crystallizing center of the Polish state was not formed here, it is a consequence of the lo-

cation of Pomerania on the border as well as of the lack of such eminent leaders among the Pomeranian dukes as were the first Piasts. As we have seen above, Pomerania throughout nearly the whole course of prehistoric times formed a gate of entrance for Scandinavian invasions — which, indeed, repeats itself in historical times, in the period of the Swedish wars. These invasions, however, left no permanent traces on the territory of Pomerania, as is evidenced by the purely Polish geographical nomenclature of this domain. The shorter or longer residence of invading tribes of Germans does not give them greater rights to Pomerania than, for instance, the domination of Franks, Visigoths, Longbeards, and Vandals, in France, Spain, Italy, and northern Africa, gives those races to these countries.

The Middle Ages.

1. **The Territory and Population of Pomerania.** Passing over earlier intelligence concerning the population, in particular, that of Ptolemy in the second century after Christ (who located the Wends, or Slavs, on the Wedian Gulf, *i. e.*, on the southern shore of the Baltic), we possess curious information from the ninth century. At that time the country was exclusively Slavic, without any foreign admixtures, and so it presented itself to the eyes of the Anglo-Saxon traveller Wulfstan. Sailing from Haedum (Schleswig), he coasted for seven days and nights along the shore belonging to the country of the Wends, or Slavs. Only after sailing past the mouth of the Vistula did he touch a country inhabited by another race, namely, the Lithuanian Prussians, whose settlements commenced in the neighborhood of present Elbląg (Elbing).

From among the Slavs dwelling on the Baltic, the Pomeranians became distinguished in the course of time as those dwelling on territories which were located approximately between the mouth of the Oder and the mouth of the Vistula. The name Pomeranians [Pomorzanie] had a geographical significance, and in Latin chronicles it was given as Pomorani or Pomerani. It was happily explained already in the twelfth century by the German chronicler Helmold; and the Polish Master Wincenty [Kadłubek] with equal justice used in this respect the appellation Maritimi. Likewise, the name given to them by the oldest Kiev chronicle is written Pomorianie, and thus signifies, "dwellers by the sea". The latter source is at the same time the oldest witness to the fact that Pomerania belonged to the Polish race. Thus, in the first paragraph of the chronicle, containing a catalog of the various

peoples, we find the information that the *Lachi* (the Ruthenian name for the Poles) alongside the Prussians and *Tchudi*, or Finns, bordered on the Varangian Sea, *i. e.*, the Baltic. A more detailed explanation of the above statement is found in the next paragraph dealing with the Slavs exclusively: namely, that the Slavs on the Vistula, or the *Lachi*, were divided into Polans, Lutyczans (probably the Lyutitzi west of the Oder), Mazovians, and Pomeranians. This intelligence given by the oldest Kiev chronicle is confirmed by modern linguistic researches. According to Kazimierz Nitsch, "all the dialects of the present united Polish territories may be divided first of all, into two groups: the Pomeranian-Polish or Kaszubian group, and the continental-Polish group. The latter again falls into two dialects: 1) that of Great Poland-Cujavia, Silesia, and Little Poland; 2) Mazovian. The extension of the general term Polish to the speech of the Kaszuby is quite as just as its extension to the Mazovian dialect." In fact, today the Kaszuby are, together with the few *Słowińcy* dwelling on the *Łeba* north of *Słupsk* (*Stolp*), the only descendants of the former Pomeranians. The same author states further that "there are a number of Kaszubian characteristics which do not appear in any of the continental-Polish dialects, but very few of these represent anything which is to be distinguished from the typical development of the Polish language. For the most part they are, so to speak, either condensed or expanded Polish peculiarities; wherefore Baudouin de Courtenay describes this dialect as more Polish than the Polish language itself. In this way, the Pomeranians formed a dialectic entity within the wider Polish domain. The exact boundaries of the Pomeranian settlements can no longer be defined, neither on the west, where they bordered on the Lyutitzi, nor on the south and east. A considerable part of present Polish Pomerania lying on the left bank of the Vistula is now occupied by continental-Polish dialects, and only in the north-west have the Kaszubian dialects been preserved. Linguistically, the most closely connected with the continental group from ancient times was the land of *Chelmno* on the right bank of the Vistula, the dialect of which is a modification of the Cujavian dialect. Historically, the *Chelmno* land was joined not to Pomerania, but to Cujavia and Mazovia, and that up to the set-

tlement of the Knights of the Cross here in the first part of the thirteenth century.

The real Pomeranian race settled a region which formed a geographical whole. This unity was due to the sea. With the geographical situation were also closely associated the occupations of the population. A more accurate picture of the country can be drawn only at the beginning of the twelfth century; but some of its characteristics at that time may be traced back through at least two centuries. Besides the usual agricultural occupations, fishing was developed, and also commerce by sea, which was closely connected — as usual at that stage of culture — with piracy. The population was for the most part concentrated near the sea, or on the rivers flowing into it. On the land side, however, Pomerania was cut up by extensive forests, which formed at that time a serious barrier against the maintenance of cultural and political relations. Wherefore, even in the tribal period, the separation of Pomerania from the neighboring Polans must have been considerable. This was intensified by the partially different occupations of the populations and the different characters springing therefrom. Archeological excavations show that the Pomeranians in the early historical period had a more highly developed material culture than the inland Slavs. In the sphere of spiritual culture, also, there was a higher development of the pagan religion, which attained here to definite cults of personal gods. The evidence, however, concerning these gods, their shrines and cults, is drawn entirely from later times when Christianity already prevailed among the inland Slavs, and we do not know exactly how far back to refer this higher development.

2. Pomerania in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries.

Relation to Poland. The Pomeranians owed this progress in material and spiritual culture in large measure to their wide relations with transmaritime peoples, sometimes even distant ones, and to the variety of influences to which they were subjected. However, the conditions of their existence did not always and in all respects lead to positive consequences for the development of the entire race. Trade and piracy, giving great wealth (which still in the twelfth century awakened the admiration of neighbors in the interior), created at the same time

a strong individualism which manifested itself equally in the political field. The early primitive Pomeranian tribes in course of time formed city republics under the control of the aristocracy. The advance of local organization, however, did not hasten, but rather even delayed the state organization of the whole country. Quite different were the cultural and political conditions among the near-by Polans on the territory later Great Poland. The Polish dynasty of the Piasts was undoubtedly of Great Poland origin; and already from the time of its first historical duke, Mieszko I, the neighboring tribes of Cujavia, Silesia, Little Poland, *i. e.*, the ancient land of the Wislanie on the upper Vistula, and finally Mazovia, became consolidated under its leadership. With the acceptance of Christianity within the domain of the evolving state in the year 966, influences began to reach it from the higher culture of the southwest which made it possible for the continental Slavs to outdistance considerably the pagans by the sea. Strengthened thus internally, the state of the Piasts did not content itself with the unification of the numerous peoples of the deeper continent, but strove likewise for power over Pomerania.

The occupation of Pomerania occurred already under Mieszko I, perhaps in the year 967 or shortly afterwards. The political situation, in particular, the friendly relations of the Christian duke of the Polans with the neighboring Germans, undoubtedly facilitated the execution of this undertaking. In the following years also Mieszko and, after him, Bolesław the Brave possessed absolute freedom of action in Pomeranian affairs. The assistance given by them to Emperor Otto III in his struggle with the pagans beyond the Elbe strengthened their position around the mouth of the Oder and in the regions lying further to the east. Not without significance, likewise, is the acknowledgment of the suzerainty of the Polish duke by the Scandinavian Vikings who then formed a military colony at Jomsborg, a suburb of Wolin.

The political control of Pomerania by Poland involved efforts to ingraft here the Christian faith. Mieszko I and Bolesław the Brave, who supported Christianity so energetically throughout their whole state and even beyond its boundaries,

undoubtedly did not forget Pomerania either. As to the results of these first attempts, however, we have no information. Only in 997 St. Wojciech (Adalbert), betaking himself on a missionary journey to Prussia, halted at Gdansk (Danzig) and here in the course of his few days' stay "christened many". The most eloquent proof, moreover, of the efforts of Bolesław I to introduce Christianity in Pomerania was the establishment of a bishopric in Kołobrzeg (Colberg). This was done in 1000 at the famous Gniezno Conference, simultaneously with the foundation of the metropolitan see of Gniezno and the bishoprics of Cracow and Wrocław. The Colberg bishopric, however, was of short duration. Its downfall, which was quite complete by the year 1013, is associated with the long struggle of Bolesław the Brave with the German Emperor Henry II. In this struggle the closest neighbors of the Pomeranians on the west, the pagan Lyutitzi, joined the German side; and the role which they played in the Polish-German war resulted in a reanimation of paganism on the northwest, turned against the Polish ruler. The waves of reaction from beyond the Oder spread at once over Pomerania. The political and religious bonds with Poland were broken; and Pomerania, after breaking with Poland, returned to its former political disintegration. In the following years Polish and Danish influences clashed here, but neither of them could prevail for long. Pomerania was separated from the cognate Poland by the pagan religion; and because of this, attempts on the part of Poland to Christianize these littoral provinces were perseveringly continued. Such an attempt was the establishment of the bishopric of Cujavia in the first years of the reign of Mieszko II (or even during Bolesław's life), with the task of influencing the near-by Pomeranians. The Cujavian bishopric was considered the continuation of the old bishopric of Colberg and even received the same name, St. Peter's.

Shortly afterwards, however, a new revival of paganism threatened the very existence of the Polish state. The son of Mieszko II, in consequence of a rebellion of his subjects, was forced to leave the country. On the north the Pomeranians in alliance with the Mazovians, who at that time had seceded from Poland, occupied a considerable part or even the whole of Cujavia (before 1038). But later Kazimierz (Casimir), returning to the country in 1038, defeated the Mazovian-Pomeranian

alliance and after 1047 even conquered the eastern part of Pomerania, which was left under the rule of a relative of the Piasts, Duke Ziemomysł, with the capital in Danzig, probably. Under the supremacy of Kazimierz and later of Bolesław II, the Liberal, Christianity once more grew strong on the lower Vistula and along the neighboring seacoast. However, already in 1066 a fresh outbreak of pagan revolt in the west in the lands of the Obodritzi awoke such a strong echo on the Vistula that once more the Christian Polish dukes were forced to withdraw from Pomerania. Near the end of the eleventh century the Pomeranians occupied considerable tracts of Cujavia and Great Poland, extending their possessions up to the Noteć. The expeditions of Władysław Herman and Wojewoda (Palatine) Sieciech into Pomerania in 1090 and 1091, in spite of temporary successes, terminated finally in complete failure. The same years (1086—1095) witnessed also the highest development of the piracy carried on by the Slavs, which at that time fell most heavily on the inhabitants of the Danish shores.

The excessive length of the seacoast of Pomerania acted against internal unity and favored the formation of several centers of political life. In this connection, beginning with the eleventh century a distinction manifested itself between western Pomerania (on the Order) and eastern Pomerania (on the Vistula), which exercised an influence also on the further destinies of these two parts of the country. West Pomerania, which was wealthier and more accustomed to sea-life, was the main center of separatism and paganism. East Pomerania was at that time more in touch with the state of the Bolesławs; moreover, Christianity was introduced here at least twice and probably never was completely extinguished, even in the second half of the eleventh century — as is evidenced by the omission of East Pomerania from later missionary endeavors and by the subsequent separation of the ecclesiastical organization to the east from that to the west of the river Leba, flowing into the Baltic.

3. Pomerania in the Twelfth Century. Final Division of Pomerania into East and West. The Polish state did not resign, however, its hope of possessing all Pomerania; and this hope was finally realized by Bolesław III, known as Wry-

mouthed. In his first expeditions, beginning as early as 1104, Bolesław, then still a young man, thought more of conquest and knightly fame from fighting the pagans than of permanent political acquisitions. However, already about 1110, the character of the Polish-Pomeranian struggles completely changed. Bolesław from that time on tended systematically to control the Pomeranian lands, first the Polish fortresses on the Noteć (which had earlier been seized by the Pomeranians), then Pomerania on the Vistula, and finally West Pomerania, the conquest of which was begun in 1119. The introduction of Christianity into Pomerania was without doubt one of the chief aims of Bolesław, the more so because it was an essential condition for the permanence of the political bond between Pomerania and Poland.

The question of a new mission to Pomerania was negotiated between Rome and Poland, in agreement — as it seems — likewise with the German emperor, who was indirectly interested in it because of his close proximity. The choice fell upon Otto, Bishop of Bamberg, who was well-known to the Polish duke as formerly active at the court of Władysław Herman in the character of a school-director and as at the same time a skilful politician mediating between Poland and Germany.

The first missionary journey of Otto was realized in the spring of 1124 and lasted until Easter of the following year. The expedition, which started from Gniezno, was very carefully prepared under the personal supervision of the Polish duke himself. The safety of the whole expedition was entrusted to a troop composed of three hundred warriors under the leadership of the castellan of Santok, Paul. The results of Otto's undertaking were unexpectedly successful. Especially the common people, allured by presents and the magnificence of the ceremonies, hastened in crowds from all sides, begging for baptism. The energetic conduct of Castellan Paul had a decisive influence on the course of the mission; he frankly announced to the Pomeranian nobles gathered in Szczecin (Stettin) that both he and the bishop came with the authority of the Polish duke. He gave as the reason for the journey the spread of the gospel and advised them to accept it, endeavoring

to act at the same time by mildness and by intimidation. In any case, the question of converting Pomerania then became a settled matter; for the Pomeranians were only interested in obtaining from Bolesław new guarantees of peace and a reduction of the tribute levied on them, in which, in fact, with the assistance of the bishop they were successful.

Less important was Otto's second missionary journey in 1127, undertaken with the view of strengthening the Christian faith in the converted country. In connection with the tendency to relapse into paganism which manifested itself at this time among the Pomeranians, a new attempt at an armed struggle was planned by Bolesław and prevented only by the intervention of the bishop at the request of the Pomeranians. With the final triumph of Christianity in Pomerania the influence of Poland was likewise confirmed. In the years 1139—40, already after the death of Bolesław III, a Pomeranian bishopric was organized with its capital in Wolin, transferred later to Kamień (Cammin). The first Pomeranian bishop was a Polish priest, Adalbert, a former chaplain of the Polish duke and later a collaborator in the missionary work of St. Otto. He had already been appointed to this position by the deceased duke on the advice of the apostle of Pomerania himself. At the time of its foundation the Pomeranian bishopric was undoubtedly suffragan to Gniezno, although later in consequence of political events this relationship fell into oblivion (probably in the years 1180—1188). Not without significance, likewise, is the fact that the Pomeranians built many churches under the name of St. Wojciech (St. Adalbert), adopting thus the Polish ecclesiastical tradition. Beyond the boundaries of the new bishopric there remained the portion of Pomerania east of the Leba, which was joined as a separate Pomeranian archdeaconate to the Cujavian diocese, no doubt on the ground of the old rights and pretensions of that bishopric.

Up to the moment of the final conversion of Pomerania German political aspirations had never concerned themselves with this country, even its western part. German influence, whenever it was to be distinguished here, was either negative, that is, counteracting Polish influence, especially in periods of open war between Germany and Poland; or indirect, when

the German Empire endeavored to extend its supremacy over all Poland. Bolesław III introduced once more a demarcation between German and Polish influences. When the former, as before, spread over the lands of the Lyutitzi and the Obodritzi, the latter reserved for themselves the whole of Pomerania. However, shortly after the conversion of Pomerania, the situation commenced to change. The elevation of the Saxon Duke Lothar to the German throne marked a new and stronger turning of imperial interests in an eastern direction. The enfeebled condition of Poland also exercised a considerable influence on Pomeranian affairs.


The Concord of Kruszwica in 1148 was the last attempt to maintain an equilibrium between German and Polish influences east of the lower Oder. On the German side the party was no longer the Empire, but the new states in the east which had been erected on the ruins of the Slavic tribal state organizations. Soon afterwards, however, the part of Pomerania on the Oder fell under German influence. For a few decades following this, West Pomerania, still remained almost exclusively Slav, but already about the middle of the thirteenth century a violent Germanization process began, which led to the complete Germanization of the towns and of the whole upper class of country gentry. Only among the common people, in spite of the influx of Germans, the Slavic element still persisted for some centuries, though destined to be slowly extinguished as this portion of Pomerania became more and more definitely a German province.

Meanwhile the later history of the part of Pomerania situated on the Vistula presents itself quite differently, for it was henceforth considered a constituent part of the Polish state, *i. e.*, Polish Pomerania. During the period of provincial separatism it remained closely connected with the capital of the senior duke. Control over Pomerania was exercised in the name of the Polish grand duke by the general governor or "marchio" of Danzig. In the course of time, as the unity of the particular provinces grew weaker, the importance of the marchio increased. He began to use the title of prince ("princeps", not "dux"), and even intermarried with the Piasts. In this way originated the native dynasty of East

Pomerania, which did not at once rank as quite equal to the Piast family. After Sambor and his brother Mstiwój the principality was inherited by Świętopełk, with whose name the history of the following period is associated.

4. **Right Bank of the Vistula.** On the right bank of the Vistula Polish influence had long dominated in the land of Chelmno and, later probably, also in "Pomezania", lying on the north and stretching to the Nogath, the Druzno (Drausen) Lake, and the water-divide between the Dzierzgonia (Sorge) and the Pasłęka (Passarge). East of these lands and north of Mazovia (which was also subject to the Piasts and to Christianity) lay Prussia, inhabited by tribes of Lithuanian origin, still pagan and without a state organization. The inaccessibility of the country and the political disintegration of Prussia caused the problem of conquest and Christianization to take a different form here than in Pomerania; progress could be made slowly only by a long infiltration of influences beginning on the border and pushing into the interior of the country. Positive information as to Polish progress is scanty. Indirectly, however, it may be inferred from the evidence offered by the long-dead language of the Prussians. The old Prussian vocabulary, especially in the domains of Christian religion, political and knightly organization, and home industries, shows a whole mass of borrowings from the old Polish language. The civilizing influence of Poland was, therefore, very strong for a considerable time. Even as late as 1249, the population of Pomezania, when conquered by the Knights of the Cross and forced to accept Christian ceremonies, petitioned that they be granted "the temporal law and the temporal jurisdiction of the Poles, our neighbors"; for the Polish-Christian organization was evidently close and known to them.

The progress made by Poland in relation to Prussia, slow but sure, manifested itself particularly at the beginning of the thirteenth century in the activity of the Prussian mission which started in 1205 from the Cistercian monastery in Łekno, Great Poland. Undertaken with the authority of the pope and acting in concert with the archbishop of Gniezno, it developed favorably, until in 1215 the pope consecrated a monk, Christian, as Prussian bishop.



As always in the Middle Ages, simultaneously with the activity of the Polish ecclesiastical mission, advanced also the political activity of the Polish dukes. A further phenomenon common in those times was the dissension springing from a dissonance between ecclesiastical aims and political plans. In particular, instead of the former practice of a mission tinged with temporal politics, the now greatly strengthened papacy proposed a new theory of a mission, according to which religious aims were to be completely separated from temporal aims: the independence of the converted people should not be disturbed in any way, since they were to come under the special protection of the pope. In practice this led to a tendency to create in the missionary terrains new Christian state organisms subject not only to the spiritual, but also to the political direction of the pope; and, moreover, the local spiritual authority could suggest certain plans of this kind. In Prussia, particularly after 1215, the pope quite openly began to interfere with the political aims of the Polish dukes, perhaps even with the influence of the Polish Church, for he hoped to make the newly converted land a domain subject exclusively to Rome. The Prussian bishop, Christian, may have been guided by the ideal of his own ecclesiastical state in Prussia, the more so since such an ideal was being at that time realizèd on a large scale by Albert, incumbent of the archbishopric of Riga (created in the year 1215). Nevertheless Christian lacked the political talent of Albert; wherefore the influence of Rome predominated.

On the side of Poland, then divided into a number of duchies, the most interested were the two lands of Mazovia and East Pomerania. In the measure in which the mission advanced the settlement of the problem of the political dependence of the Prussian lands was liable to cause great trouble, just because of the entanglement of heterogeneous interests. Before it reached this point, however, the very work of the mission itself became seriously threatened by a reaction on the part of the Prussian pagans. This reaction appeared in the form of revolts and harrying attacks which commenced to fall on the Prussian territory occupied by the mission and at the same time on the bordering Polish regions, on Pomerania, and especially on Mazovia. The later tradition of the Knights of the

Cross magnified these to fantastic proportions; but their actual occurrence can not be denied, although it loses its glaring aspect when we take into consideration the method of carrying on war, especially border-warfare, in the Middle Ages. The greatest sufferer was naturally the missionary undertaking itself, since the territory occupied by it (Pomezania) fell entirely into pagan hands; next came the land of Chelmno, which was likewise raided and devastated by invaders.

The warlike behavior of the Prussians called forth the necessity of a warlike defense; in the place of a peaceful mission appeared once more the demand for a crusade. This project was discussed already in 1217; but only in 1222, after the serious invasion of 1220, occurred the collective crusading expedition of the Polish forces, in which part was taken by Leszek the White, Duke of Little Poland, Henry the Bearded, Duke of Silesia, Conrad, Duke of Mazovia, and all the Polish bishops. In the year 1223 there followed a second expedition in which the same — the most important — Polish dukes participated, as well as the dukes of East Pomerania, Świętopełk and Warcisław. In connection with these expeditions grants were made to Christian in the devastated land of Chelmno, which were to become the starting-point for the reconstruction of the interrupted work of the mission. These two crusading expeditions, although conducted with considerable forces, did not settle the most important problem; for what was needed was not a military season-expedition, but a permanent organization which would insure the safety of the Polish borders and at the same time protect the missionary work against pagan reactions. This obvious difficulty was understood at the time by the leaders of the expedition, and as a result efforts were made by the bishop to settle knights as vassals on the land of Chelmno; further, a "guard" was organized, *i. e.*, a border police, in which knights from distant provinces also joined. The encampment of warriors in fortresses and guard-houses of this kind was, however, not enough, and ended in failure.

5. Knights of the Cross. The solution of the problem was chosen from Western models, in the first place, from the Holy Land, the classical region of crusades: it was the settlement of a knightly Order, that characteristic Romance-German-

ic creation of the Middle Ages. It is not known whether from the beginning this idea was presented in the alternative form which it was given later in the years 1225—1228: that one of the Orders already existing in the West might be brought in, or a new Order established especially for the Prussian matter. At first, however, the conception of a foreign Order prevailed. There were then in existence knightly Orders which were predominantly Romance, as the Templars, St. John's Knights, Knights of Alcantara, Knights of Calatrava, Hospitalers of St. Lazarus; as well as German ones, like the Order of Our Lady of the German Home (1198), Order of the Knights of Christ in Livonia (1202). The fact is not without significance that a settlement of Knights of the Order of Calatrava is to be discovered in the years 1224—1228 in Tymawa in Pomerania on the Vistula; this Order had fought with the Moors in Spain and remained under the control of the Cistercians. We do not know who called it to Pomerania or with what object, but it may be that the appearance of these brethren there was in connection with the Cistercian Prussian mission. The choice, however, fell on the German Order of Our Lady. Gunter, Bishop of Płock, and Henry the Bearded, Duke of Silesia, are held to be the persons who may have directed the attention of Duke Conrad of Mazovia to the Knights of Our Lady.

Omitting secondary details, the introduction of the Knights of the Cross was presumably carried out in the following fashion. Most likely in the autumn or winter of 1225 Conrad applied to the grand master of the German Order with propositions whose exact content is unknown. Probably the duke promised to designate for the German Knights a "provision in the land of Chelmno" and in the territory bordering on it. The tradition is of interest which persisted in Poland up to the fourteenth century (1338—39), and undoubtedly had some real foundation, that Conrad wished to grant the Knights of the Cross the land of Chelmno for temporary possession only, with the obligation of returning it — some said — in twenty years. None of Conrad's later documents contained such a limitation, but from the phrase "*nihil utilitatis nobis reservantes vel in futurum sperantes*" in the document of 1228, it may be surmised that the project of temporary settlement existed, but also that it had already been rejected.

Before this, however, the bargain with Conrad was definitely concluded, in March, 1226. The German Order appealed to the emperor for a charter, which the emperor granted, permitting it to accept the gift which Conrad was to make of his lands in the future and to conquer at once the pagan land, on the ground that the Order was subject to the imperial authority. The Order thus planned in advance the formation of a complex of lands which would be based upon the Polish territory and comprehend later the land conquered from the pagans. What is more important, however, the program of the grand master, Herman v. Salza, which is contained in this charter, determined for the new settlers the character of the state of the Order, with rights equal to those which the dukes of the German Empire had at that time acquired for themselves. As to any dependence on Poland, there was not a single word; while the relation of dependence on the German Empire was only most generally defined.

The imperial charter of 1226 is exceedingly valuable and characteristic, on the one hand, for the understanding of the definite political program with which the Order came to the Vistula; and on the other hand, for its disloyal and cunning tactics.

It may be that already in 1226 two of the brethren of the Order arrived with a certain number of shield-bearers, who were given a place in the fortress on the left bank of the Vistula opposite modern Toruń (Thorn), but they were too weak to undertake any important independent activity. In view of the disappointed hopes of those who were expecting a speedy influx of Knights of the Cross from the West and in view of the small prospects in the near future — since at that time commenced the fifth crusade of Frederick II, in which the German Order actively participated — another project took real form in Mazovia, namely, the establishment of their own knightly Order on the Livonian model. This project was accepted presumably in December, 1227, or January, 1228; a new organization arose of "Knights of Christ", composed of about fifteen Knights, again Germans, with a master at the head. The Knights of Christ received from Conrad the fortified

town of Dobrzyń on the Vistula, with a belt of land stretching northwards as far as Prussia.

The formation of a special "Mazovian" Order disturbed the Knights of the Cross, who also in the spring of 1228 opened further negotiations with Conrad for the purpose of completing their contract. In May, 1228, Conrad gave them in Biecz a second charter, very cursorily defining the grant of the "land of Chelmno with its appurtenances". From a contemporary document of Christian's to the Order it appears that this grant did not include those possessions in the land of Chelmno which the Prussian bishop already held here and was therefore limited to the fortified town of Chelmno together with the ducal domains appertaining to it.

In the year 1230, after the conclusion of the crusade which had heretofore absorbed the whole attention of the Order, the negotiations, again resumed, resulted in a document which has not been preserved, but is known today only from its summary in a papal bull; there again it was a question of a grant of the "fortified town of Chelmno with appurtenances". A grant of a "castellanship" of this kind in a wider or narrower sense quite corresponds to the usual form of grants in perpetuity or for a time. A further paragraph of this document related to a matter which had not hitherto been mentioned in writing: namely, Conrad agreed that the land conquered in Prussia should become the property of the Order, but the question of state allegiance was not touched. Another document of this year, which did not receive Conrad's approval and therefore possessed no legality, seems to be an expression of certain postulates of the Knights of the Cross: an exact definition of their borders as well as of their regalia—mining, coinage, customs-duties.

This is all, therefore, that the Knights of the Cross received from Conrad by charter: they were given only certain definite possessions scattered over the land of Chelmno and lying there alongside the lands donated to the Prussian bishop and the estates owned by the gentry. The Knights of the Cross then began their attempts to consolidate their possessions in the land of Chelmno, especially everything which could serve

as a basis for state authority. The Prussian bishop played into their hands in so far as to surrender his rights in the land of Chelmno in exchange for other donations made to him in his purely private capacity and certain honorary rights; on the other hand, in reference to the conquest of Prussia he insisted on the rights granted him by the pope and, in accordance with the example of Livonia, agreed to yield them only one-third of this land. Chance hastened to assist the Order, for Bishop Christian was taken prisoner by the Prussians in 1233. The Order never moved a finger to obtain his release; but, on the contrary, did everything possible to seize the succession after him. The pope, seeing the failure of his plan to subject Prussia to Rome through the intermediation of the Prussian bishop, agreed to another solution: Prussia was to submit to the papal authority through the intermediation of the Order. For at this time the pope was shown a falsified document of Conrad's, apparently that of 1230, called the *Kruszwica* document, granting the Order the land of Chelmno and their Prussian conquests with the fullest measure of sovereign rights, defined according to the Roman law; the pope on his side took possession of this whole territory "*in ius et proprietatem beati Petri*" and gave it to the Order in perpetual possession.

Provoking also was the matter of the competitive Order of Dobrzyń. Spontaneously, without the knowledge or permission of Conrad, an amalgamation of this Order with the Order of the Knights of the Cross was carried out in 1234—45, although some of the Knights together with the master opposed it. The Knights of the Cross, nevertheless, occupied Dobrzyń. Only through the mediation of the papal legate was a compromise affected, in which Conrad regained the Dobrzyń territory in exchange for certain grants of property rights and the obligation to completely eliminate from the land of Chelmno all estate-owners who were not Knights of the Cross.

The Prussian bishop, returning in 1239 from his imprisonment, failed to regain his former position. At the time he was to receive only one-third of the land; but soon afterwards he was completely removed. A few years later he died in passive opposition, deprived of all influence on the work of his life. The pope in theory and the Order in practice were the only rulers

of the new Chelmno-Prussia territory. The papal charters on the one hand and the imperial ones on the other formed a double screen behind which the state of the Knights of the Cross developed, sovereign in fact.

Then, in the persons of Conrad on the one side and the Order on the other side, two diametrically opposite state tendencies were pitted against each other, two different conceptions of statehood crossed swords: the one, still dominant in Poland and characterized by the direct rule of the duke over the whole country with the aid of rather self-reliant officials; the other, a product of the West and particularly of Germany, where energetic local factors, temporary and spiritual, understood how to seize almost the whole public authority in their lands and to found so-called territorial states (*Landesherrschaft*). The policy of the Order from the beginning was to create for itself on the Vistula such a territorial state composed of grants from Conrad and conquests in Prussia. In Poland this type of state was new and unknown; therefore, no one was able to discover the real purpose in the moves of the Order or to counteract it. In granting to the German Order the fortified town of Chelmno and the ducal domains lying in that province, Conrad simply did not foresee that such a grant could serve as the starting-point for ambitions to found a state; for no such ambition ever arose among the bishops and magnates of his country who were endowed in a similar way. For this reason there can be no doubt that none of the documents of Conrad intended to free the Knights of the Cross from allegiance to the Polish state — at least, as to the land of Chelmno, for the conquest of Prussia appeared as only a remote prospect. But, on the other hand, none of the documents preserved to us especially reserved it, for it was a self-evident thing. In the same way, also, other ducal donations to laymen or clergy did not contain any such guarantee in Poland, since it was included by the customary law itself. Only later, after this bitter experience, Conrad in settling the rest of the Dobrzyń Knights on the Bug made such a stipulation.

Undoubtedly, in the full swing of contemporary events the distant consequences of these first ten years did not appear so drastic as we see them today; but nevertheless, it could not

long remain a secret to Conrad that the course of events was running unexpectedly in a line quite different from the one he had intended. Why did he not react against this as the Hungarian king did against the same Order in 1225? Because, from the moment of settling on the Vistula, the Order recognized only one occupation, the conquest of Prussia. Absorbing the Dobrzyń Knights in 1235, and in 1237 the Order of Knights of the Sword in Livonia (which was older than itself), it monopolized the whole struggle with the Baltic pagans. Conrad with reference to the Prussian matter took a different attitude. The chief aim of his whole policy from 1227 on was to gain the "primacy" among the Polish provincial dukes by reigning at Cracow. His entire Prussian policy suffered from this fundamental mistake, that it was a side-issue for him, actual only when it became a question of the immediate tranquillity of his province. The latter aim had been secured by the introduction of the Knights of the Cross; a reversal of his policy with regard to them would have meant at the same time reopening the Prussian problem. Perhaps he was also affected by the fact that the Knights of the Cross understood — as against the newly founded Dobrzyń Order — how to carry out at once what was undoubtedly one of the weightiest motives in the plan for settling there a knightly Order, *i. e.*, the organization of season immigration of German crusaders from abroad in sufficiently large numbers. This military strength of the Order advanced the Prussian work favorably; at the same time, however, it might at any moment be turned against some other adversary, even against Conrad himself.

6. **The Policy of the Pomeranian Świętopętk.** Still another extremely important political event coincided with the settlement of the Order in the land of Chełmno and with the vacancy in the Grand Duchy of Cracow in 1227. Pomerania on the Vistula, though formally annexed to the state organism of Poland and subject to the suzerainty of the senior duke, preserved nevertheless — as all lands in the Middle Ages — a considerable degree of independence. At the period of Conrad's introduction of the Order, the centrifugal forces in Pomerania profited of the general decentralization in Poland, the more easily because from the year 1220 the government here was

in the hands of a ruler of outstanding political individuality, who avoided his feudal obligations and on the model of the rest of the Polish dukes transformed himself into an entirely sovereign duke.

The Pomeranian land, breaking all its earlier bonds, found itself forced necessarily to adopt its own policy. In relation to Prussia, Świętopełk at first took the position of earnest collaboration in the whole crusading undertaking. As in the year 1223 he had taken part in the expedition of the Polish dukes, so in the year 1233 he joined them and the Knights of the Cross in a common crusade; and even the official chronicle of the Knights of the Cross was obliged to attribute the victory on the Dzierzgonia (Sorge, Sirgune) to his strategic experience. Further events, however, completely changed the situation. The Order, settled on the boundary of Mazovia, with uncommon speed and energy pushed its military expansion in a direction which was probably unforeseen by Pomerania, namely, northward in the valley of the Vistula in the years 1234—1239, and later along the sea towards the east, outflanking in this way the center of Prussian opposition, but at the same time also cutting Pomerania off from all prospects from the Prussian side and ignoring rights long ago acquired, though lost in consequence of the action of Prussia. Considering the still strong immigration of foreign crusaders and the striking manifestation of the Order's tendency to exclusiveness and sovereignty, we understand why the attitude of the Pomeranian duke to the new guest on the Vistula was bound to change fundamentally. In opposition to Conrad, the Prussian solution was for Świętopełk much more actual. *Vice versa*, for the Order the line of the Vistula, its main economic and military artery, likewise possessed enormous importance.

A basis for a conflict was easily found. Customs-duties and the matter of transportation by the Vistula sufficed; and, further, the domestic quarrel of Świętopełk with his brother, who immediately hastened to put himself under the wing of the Order, offering a change from his brother's Vistula policy. The quarrel, temporarily patched up, broke out again in full force in 1242. Simultaneously, the Prussians in all the territories

ruled by the Order broke out in armed revolt, hoping to throw off the yoke. This so-called First Prussian Revolt lasted from 1242 to 1253 and destroyed the whole work of the Knights of the Cross. During these same years from 1242—1253, with certain interruptions, a war was waged with the Pomeranian Świętopełk. In spite of this concurrence, however, the statement of later chroniclers of the Order that Świętopełk was the initiator and ally of the Prussian revolt cannot be maintained. Contemporary sources are quite silent about this; only after the struggle on both sides had lasted for a long time it must have offered an opportunity for reproaches that Świętopełk's policy was in fact equivalent to supporting the pagans.

The position of the Order, caught between two fires, was exceedingly difficult. Several times at this period the Knights of the Cross received the help of German crusaders from Austria, Brandenburg, Merseburg, and Anhalt; and thus, as already earlier and many times later, their superiority over local competitors manifested itself. But in spite of this the destinies of the Order depended in large measure upon the position taken by the Polish dukes. They, as a matter of fact, stood on the side of the Order. For such was the combination of circumstances that Świętopełk, before beginning his struggle with the Knights of the Cross, had a considerable difference with the dukes of Cujavia-Mazovia and of Great Poland.

Therefore, already in 1242, the Polish dukes joined their efforts to those of the Knights of the Cross against Świętopełk. The Great Poland forces retook Nakło, which had been captured by Świętopełk; Conrad with his sons, Bolesław and Kazimierz, concluded in this same year a formal alliance with the Order, from which we can see their offensive intentions. The gist of this act shows beyond doubt that Conrad counted on the conquest of Pomerania and its retention by himself, with the exception of Sambor and Ratibor. He had already arranged with the Order as to a new boundary and customs-duties, which in accordance with the demands of the Knights of the Cross were to be all abolished in Pomerania. Nor is it excluded that Conrad came forward with claims to the Pomeranian lands as duke of Cracow — Świętopełk is in this act called not "dux", but only "*dominus Pomeranie*"; for,

in fact, Conrad then for a short time (1241—1243) possessed Cracow, the aim of his policy for many years.

7. Pomerania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century. The efforts of Świętopełk ended in nothing. In the treaty of 1253 he was compelled to resign the lands he once possessed on the right bank of the Vistula; henceforth the Vistula was to be the boundary between Polish Pomerania and the Order. The Knights of the Cross, simultaneously with the overthrow of Świętopełk, crushed the Prussian uprising; the state of the Order became a real fact which had to be accepted.

Poland did not receive any direct benefit from this war. The treaty of peace with the Knights of the Cross did not even include the Polish dukes, who remained in a state of war with Świętopełk. The war took on the character of border fights, chiefly in the neighborhood of Nakło, a fortress in the borderland between Great Poland and Pomerania.

After a period of political expansion in the first half of the thirteenth century, Pomerania in the second half of the century became very weak. Among the descendants of Świętopełk (ca. 1266) dissensions soon broke out which gave the neighbors an opportunity to invade Pomerania and exercise influence there. One of the sons of Świętopełk, Mstiwój II, wishing to gain support against his brother — his suzerain Warcisław—assigned his own province to the margraves of Brandenburg, who from the middle of the thirteenth century had been making bold conquests north of the Warta, and received it back from them as a fief (1269). Captured by his brother and imprisoned, he succeeded in escaping and appealed to his suzerains for aid, promising in exchange the seaport of Danzig. The Brandenburg army arrived; Warcisław was driven out and died abroad, where he was trying to organize a countermove. It proved, however, that the Brandenburgers in accordance with the promises of Mstiwój II intended to keep Danzig; and in this they were supported by the German burghesses who had been settled there by the Pomeranian dukes, Mstiwój, faced with the loss of his capital, understood the recklessness of his policy and appealed for help to the duke of Great Poland, Bolesław the Pious, who had already been in

altercation for several years with Brandenburg because of intrusions into his domains. The army of Great Poland approached Danzig and conquered it after a sharp fight. Mstiwój, being put into possession there once more by them, again took control of the government of Pomerania in 1272.

The good understanding established between Great Poland and Polish Pomerania a few years after the death of Świętopełk proved to be a factor of great importance for the future. The close relations which connected Mstiwój with Bolesław the Pious were maintained also by the successor of the latter, Przemysł II. Already in 1282, in February, Mstiwój and Przemysł met with their followers in Kępno and concluded a treaty which made the destinies of Pomerania indissoluble from those of Poland. Mstiwój, having no descendants, made a grant to Przemysł of the duchy of Pomerania, obliging himself to hold it only in the name of Przemysł until the latter personally took over the government. The treaty received the approval of the Pomeranian dignitaries, and the Pomeranian nobles paid homage to Przemysł during the life-time of Mstiwój. This treaty is justly called "a political act of the utmost importance and of first-rate significance, so great and weighty that its positive consequences still endure today".

While Mstiwój lived, no misunderstanding marred the harmony between him and Przemysł. He died on December 25, 1294. The unification of Polish Pomerania with Great Poland became one of the most important moments in rebuilding the unity of Poland. Indeed, Pomerania had long ago been subject to the "*princeps*" or oldest of the Polish dukes, and the possession of this land was in a manner a symbol of supremacy and political unity.

This was shown most clearly when Przemysł, Duke of Great Poland and Pomerania, shortly after taking possession of Pomerania, with the agreement of the pope and the Polish Church was crowned King in Gniezno, restoring in this way the Polish Kingdom in the universal sense (1295).

Of short duration was the reign of Przemysł. In 1296 he fell the victim of an ambush organized in collusion with the margraves of Brandenburg. The government after him in Great Poland and Pomerania was taken over, in accordance with the

choice of the nobles, by Władysław the Short, Duke of Cujavia, who carried it on until the year 1300. Then he was forced to withdraw before the king of Bohemia, Waclaw II, who occupied Great Poland and Pomerania, and crowned himself in Gniezno as "Polish King". The rule of Waclaw lasted until 1305—1306: Władysław's return to the country and his struggle with the Bohemian government coincided happily with the death of Waclaw II and the murder in 1306 of Waclaw III, which involved the fall of the Bohemian power. The program of unifying Poland, outlined already by Henry IV of Silesia and Przemysł II, was adopted now with indefatigable energy by Władysław the Short, who was destined to realize it in the future. There can be no doubt that Pomerania also figured in this plan. Władysław, having occupied Little Poland and Cujavia, immediately turned to Pomerania and was very favorably received by society there (autumn and winter of 1306).

8. Conquest of Pomerania by the Knights of the Cross in 1308. Unfortunately a sudden and unforeseen danger was hanging over the Pomeranian situation. In the period of violent and short-lasting changes which began after the murder of Przemysł II, the swift transformations of government heightened the importance of certain local factors and awoke various ambitions and projects. The dispute of Władysław the Short with the powerful Święca family led the latter into a secret understanding with the margraves of Brandenburg. The Święcas promised to give them Pomerania in exchange for the hereditary dignity of Castellan of Słupsk (Stolp) and for the promise of certain castles in fief. Władysław hastened to Pomerania and frustrated this treason, arresting Peter Święca; obviously, the action of this influential family found no support in Pomeranian society (1307). Recalled once more to Little Poland, Władysław left the government of Pomerania in the faithful hands of his nephews, the Cujavian dukes, Kazimierz and Przemysł. Difficult problems awaited them, for the Brandenburgers in 1308 organized a military expedition against Pomerania and encamped near Danzig. Władysław could give no assistance; for which reason it was decided, with his consent, to apply for help where military success was assured, that is, to the neighboring Knights of the Cross. The Teutonic Order, as a military body strong from the very beginning of its Prussian activity and

unceasingly extending its conquests to the east, deep into the Prussian, Yatvingian, and Lithuanian lands, had already by this time become a first-rate military and political power on the Baltic. The Knights accepted the Polish proposal and bound themselves to defend Danzig in exchange for the return of war-costs.

The arrival of the Knights of the Cross turned the military situation in Władysław's favor. The Brandenburg forces withdrew from Pomerania. The Order, however, encamped in Danzig and had no intention of quitting it. First, they obtained the evacuation by the Polish troops of the other half of the fortress; and later the garrison of Knights fell on the town, massacred the garrison and knights who were there, and set fire to Danzig (November 14, 1308). From Danzig the troops of the Knights of the Cross pushed on to Tczew and forced Duke Kazimierz to capitulate.

At the news of such an unheard-of attack, Władysław hastened to the rescue, but he did not have a sufficient army to retake Pomerania by force. The Knights of the Cross demanded from him the payment of war-costs amounting to more than the value of the country. When Władysław rejected their demands, the Knights of the Cross found a way to the other side, against which they had come into Pomerania, and bought up from the margraves of Brandenburg, for 10,000 marks, their pretensions in the form of imperial documents recognizing that Pomerania belonged to Brandenburg. Strengthened by the possession of such legal titles, they completed the conquest of Pomerania, capturing Swiecie after a long siege. They immediately began to pacify the country in their own spirit, commencing with the exile of a certain number of knights suspected of loyalty to Władysław.

The Order became master of Pomerania. If the efforts of the Knights to free themselves from Conrad's overlordship with respect to the land of Chelmno may be characterized as "sharp practice", the taking of Polish Pomerania must be stigmatized as a brutal act of illegality and usurpation. It was, however, the fruit of a determined policy. The war undertaken with Świętopełk, which almost destroyed the newly settled Order, may have taught the politicians of the Knights of the

Cross that their eastern or southern policy depended very largely upon the position taken in any particular case by the ruler of Pomerania on the Vistula. Wherefore, first, the Order secured its frontier along the bank of the Vistula; then in the course of the thirteenth century we see several attempts of the Order to impose its rule also on the left bank, and with quite considerable success (Gniew). It must, therefore, be supposed that the acceptance of Władysław's offer in 1308 was dictated by the conviction that any interference whatever in Pomeranian affairs was sure to bring territorial advantages to the Order.

Perhaps, however, the Order did not exactly foresee the further consequences of its policy. Poland at that time, being only in the stage of organization, seemed to offer a field for easy conquests; it was impossible to predict its consolidation in the course of the fourteenth century. Moreover, they probably failed to understand what importance the Polish state and nation attached to the possession of Pomerania in virtue of the many-centuries-long tradition which showed Pomerania in closest bonds of dependence upon Poland; this tradition was fixed in a series of historical monuments and, incomparably firmer still, had taken root in the memory of many generations. The conquest of Pomerania disturbed permanently the relations of Poland with the Order, which up to then had been generally quite bearable. It did not at once react on the position of the petty dukes of Cujavia and Mazovia, but only on the line of Piasts, to whom the future was to belong. This Polish policy, touched in its most sensitive spot, found expression through the great monarchs, Władysław the Short (1306—1333) and Kazimierz the Great (1333—1370), father and son, each of whom in his own fashion and according to his own methods kept his attention fixed on the great purpose of recovering Polish Pomerania.

9. Attempts of Poland to Regain Pomerania in the Course of the First Half of the Fourteenth Century. Meanwhile the Polish state, freshly reconstructing its unity, was confronted by so many internal and external problems that no idea of a military vindication of its rights was possible. There were not lacking diplomatic overtures from the side of the Order (1311); but they did not lead to any result, for the Order was

unwilling to return Pomerania, and Władysław, again, could not agree to a complete forfeiture of this province. The fruitlessness of the direct negotiations with the Order suggested to Władysław the need of solving the Pomeranian situation in some other way; following the practice common in the Middle Ages, Poland brought up the matter as a law-suit to be tried before the tribunal of the pope, the more readily because the general political conjuncture at that time seemed to promise that Poland would have the support of the Curia. This law-suit was prosecuted throughout the year 1320 and the beginning of 1321 in Cujavian Brześć and Inowrocław. The decision, given February 10, 1321, in Inowrocław, condemned the Order to give back Pomerania and pay 30,000 marks damages, as well as return the law-costs. The Knights of the Cross, who had taken exceptions in advance, filed immediately after the decision a formal appeal to Rome. There the diplomacy of the Order knew how to checkmate the Polish endeavors. In consequence of a change of policy of the Roman Curia, which was unable to take a really impartial attitude in this case, the question of regaining Pomerania reached a dead-lock. The action of the Polish Church, begun at the same time as the political suit about Pomerania, and demanding the payment of "Peter's pence" from Pomerania and the land of Chelmno, was dragged on through a number of years (to 1330); the Knights of the Cross energetically opposed the levying of Peter's pence, since the "denarius of St. Peter" was considered a phenomenon peculiar to Polish lands. In spite of the failure of the law-suit, the matter of Peter's pence maintained unceasingly the actuality of the question to whom Pomerania belonged.

Władysław himself, however, in view of the fruitlessness of political efforts was forced to prepare for an armed struggle. The political situation of the Polish state in 1321 was much more favorable than in 1308. Nevertheless, in order to overcome the Knights of the Cross it was necessary to seek some allies. In 1325 occurred the first alliance of Poland and Lithuania, directed against the Order; this was a moment of enormous importance for the future, and was due to the conquest of Pomerania by the Order. The Knights of the Cross simultaneously reinforced themselves by a whole system of alliances with Halicz-Ruthenia, Mazovia, Bohemia, the Empire.

The widely scattered international combinations in which the Polish struggle against the Knights of the Cross for Pomerania was now involved caused the political and military efforts of Poland in the subsequent years to appear sometimes in quite distant terrains and with interruptions resulting from a whole mass of entangled problems. Besides this, there were not lacking direct encounters on Polish and Pomeranian land. In 1327 occurred the powerful attack of the Knights of the Cross on Cujavia; in 1329 Władysław ravaged and burnt the land of Chelmno; in this same year the Knights of the Cross and the Czechs retaliated by several harrying expeditions into Cujavia and Great Poland; in 1330 Władysław with the Hungarians again devastated the land of Chelmno; in 1331 the Knights in two terrible invasions laid waste Cujavia and Great Poland, although during the second expedition Władysław inflicted heavy losses on them near Płowce. In 1332 a new expedition started against Poland; the Knights of the Cross conquered Cujavia and fortified it with castles. Władysław was, indeed unable to drive them out of Cujavia; but still in the same summer of 1332 he set out for the land of Chelmno. Here, however, on the Drwęca, a truce was made on the basis of the existing state of possessions; it was agreed that the quarrel of Poland with the Teutonic Order was to be settled by the arbitration of the Bohemian and Hungarian kings.

Thus presents itself the great effort which Poland made with the purpose of regaining Pomerania; throughout the whole reign of Władysław, this question remained the center of his policy and brought about a series of destructive expeditions, the devastation of Great Poland, and the loss of Cujavia. The Polish state was militarily and financially not yet able to overcome the Order. When Władysław, soon after the conclusion of the armstice, died (1333), the situation was extremely difficult.

The policy of the new king, Kazimierz, was at first affected by the last events in the reign of his father. Wishing to avoid further war, Kazimierz several times prolonged the armstice with the Order, endeavoring to prepare the diplomatic ground for the decision of the arbiters. Too many general political matters were involved in the Polish-Order problems for

the decision to be anything but a simple compromise, the more so since the Knights of the Cross by the conquest of Cujavia in 1332 held a valuable object for bargaining, which allowed them to make concessions without releasing meanwhile Pomerania. The decision of the Bohemian King John and the Hungarian King Charles, given in Visegrad, November 26, 1335, and the new law-suit of Poland against the Knights of the Cross in 1339 before the papal delegate had no practical results.

Kazimierz the Great, not having gained anything by his efforts up to this time, but faithful to his far-sighted peaceable tactics, found himself absolutely forced, nevertheless, to compromise and content himself for the time being with regaining Cujavia. This compromise was effected in the Treaty of Kalisz (1343). The Order returned to Poland Cujavia and Dobrzyń, while Poland in exchange conceded to it as "alms" in perpetuity Pomerania, the land of Chelmno, and Michałowo. The documents presented by the Polish side have all been preserved; whereas the documents of the Knights of the Cross given to Poland almost all disappeared in an unaccountable fashion at the end of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, traces exist showing that the Order undertook certain honorary obligations for the benefit of Poland, which, however, soon ceased.

The Treaty of Kalisz was an evil necessity for the Polish king and the general public, the removal of which was to be the political plan of the future, as was shown already by the fact that in spite of specious attempts Kazimierz failed to induce his successor (then already designated), King Lewis of Hungary, to renounce Pomerania in accordance with the demands of the Knights of the Cross. From this we may justly conclude that the program of Kazimierz's successor was to be the recovery of this valuable land.

10. The Relation of Polish Society to the Matter of Pomerania in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century. In the records of both law-suits of Poland against the Knights of the Cross we possess useful and important historical material; for, besides its value for the reconstruction of the political events themselves, the testimony of the Polish witnesses makes it possible for us to determine how in the first half of the fourteenth century the Pomeranian matter and the relations of Poland with

the Order which resulted from it were regarded by Polish society, irrespective of provincial and class distinctions.

The arguments advanced by the Poles are of a historical and legal nature. Chief place was taken by the proof that Pomerania historically formed part of the Polish state organization; in particular, that Władysław in 1308 was actually and lawfully in possession of it, having acquired it legally by way of inheritance and by a supplemental election of its society; the Knights of the Cross, on the other hand, occupied it unlawfully, and in addition were guilty of disloyalty to the Polish duke. As to the land of Chelmno, it was shown that the grant of it was originally only temporary and that documents formerly existed which confirmed this fact, but they had been lost. Besides this, there appeared still another argument as to the ownership of these lands, more indirect and less emphasized, but valuable from our point of view; namely, the argument of nationality, that Pomerania was a constituent part of Poland, because its dukes were Poles and considered themselves as such, and the population of the land was Polish in speech and customs. In the course of subsequent disputes this argument was sometimes renewed; almost one and a half centuries later it sprang up again with great force in the negotiations before the Treaty of Toruń. The Pomeranian matter has thus its importance for the development of Polish consciousness of nationality

In general, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the genesis of Polish national consciousness was in large measure a reaction against the pressure of the German element, similarly as among the Czechs. On the other hand, in the genesis of the German consciousness of nationality, which also in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries made considerable progress, the relation to the Poles had little significance, and the Pomeranian matter played no role whatsoever. At most the Germans pointed to the alleged dependence of these lands on the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which did not correspond to their actual relationship to it. The Order of Knights of the Cross, although composed entirely of Germans, neither in the Pomeranian matter nor in any other could appeal to national arguments. This represented a considerable advantage for

Poland in the relation of the two parties to Pomeranian affairs, for it joined Pomerania organically with a much greater and more powerful problem: the construction of a national state. While in the thirteenth century Poland as a type of state remained behind the general level of Europe, yet in the fourteenth century it was already advancing with those contemporaneous movements to which the future belonged.

11. **The Government of the Order in Pomerania.** A German historian (Perlbach) states that Pomerania on the Vistula, in spite of a certain number of German immigrants, mostly in Danzig and Tczew, and in spite of quarrels with the Polish dukes, remained a Slav country with Polish state institutions and a policy tending finally to unification with the Polish state.

The rule of the Knights of the Cross must, naturally, have introduced many changes. First of all, these appeared in the administration of the country. The place of the old ducal administration, with considerable participation of a social factor, the gentry, was now taken by an efficient system of administration by the Order's officials, with a strong leaning to bureaucracy. In the ecclesiastical administration the changes were not so great. The Order was not able to sever the ecclesiastical union of Pomerania with the rest of Poland. The land of Chelmno, indeed, from the very moment it was given to the Knights of the Cross fell out of the domain of the ecclesiastical province of Gniezno; whereas Pomerania proper continued to belong to the Polish dioceses, *i. e.*, Cujavia and Gniezno, and remained under the direction of spiritual heads dependent on the Polish king. Likewise — in spite of persevering opposition from the Order — beginning with 1330 Pomerania and the land of Chelmno paid once more, together with the rest of the Polish lands, the Peter's pence characteristic of the latter.

In addition, changes followed in Pomerania in the composition of the population and in the obligatory law. Even under the government of the Pomeranian dukes in the thirteenth century there was a German population in Pomerania in the character of the burghers who had settled in Danzig and Tczew, and the peasant colonists. Their numerical importance was obviously trifling. The government of the Knights of the Cross brought a numerical growth in the German

immigration, especially to the towns. The official German language of the sources of the Order naturally makes it difficult to recognize the nationalities of the subjects of the Order; in general, the sources which can be used for this purpose are very few. Nevertheless, it clearly appears from them that there was no question of overcoming the great predominance of the Polish national element, except in the towns. Hand in hand with the immigration of a German population went the reception of German law; the latter was, however, a process much more wide-spread, since German law was also given to Polish settlements. German law gained in this period a very great influence in Pomerania. Alongside of it existed, nevertheless, Polish law; we even owe to the Knights of the Cross its being set down in writing for the first time.

But, indeed, both these phenomena — the colonization by Germans and the simultaneous organization of the native population according to German economic and legal models — appear by no means confined to the lands of the Order. This great process occurred in the thirteenth century in all the lands of central-west Europe, in Bohemia, Hungary, Poland, Red Ruthenia, and along the entire Baltic, obviously with certain territorial variations. Even pagan Lithuania tried to adapt the new forms to itself. Polish Pomerania, which found itself under the government of the Order, was in this respect nowise different from other countries. The powerful influence of German law and the accompanying, but weaker, German immigration of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were undoubtedly a consequence of seniority of civilization with regard to eastern neighbors — from which fact, however, it is difficult to draw any conclusions especially applicable to Pomerania.

In the fourteenth century the same process occurred simultaneously everywhere throughout all Poland, thanks particularly to Kazimierz the Great, who with all his force urged Poland along the road towards European civilization. In the manner of introducing German rural institutions much similarity in details may be discovered between Poland and the state of Order; they even developed in Poland more strongly and earlier — already in the thirteenth century in Silesia

and Great Poland; whereas under the Knights of the Cross rural institutions were actively developed only near the very end of this century. In Pomerania also, while still in the hands of the dukes, the corresponding models were taken mostly from Poland. *Vice versa*, the variation of Magdeburg law made in the fourteenth century in Chelmno, known as Chelmno law, enjoyed in Poland a great vogue along with the Magdeburg-Środa law. In spite of the difference in the organization of state administration in the state of the Order and in Poland, the economic and legal conditions showed many common features. There existed differences resulting from the greater strength of the state under the Knights of the Cross, but the political frontier dividing Polish Pomerania from Poland did not establish any cultural frontier in the deeper sense of the word.

Undoubtedly, Polish Pomerania owed very much to the knightly Order, especially in the field of material civilization. Monuments of this activity are, preeminently, those colossal buildings which date from the epoch of the Knights of the Cross. The fourteenth century, especially the era of Grand Master Winrich von Kniprode (1351—1382), was the golden age of the state of the Order. It embraced besides Prussia, Chelmno, and Pomerania, part of Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Esthonia, the islands of Oesel and Dagö, and for a few years also Swedish Gotland; forming in this way an imposing Baltic empire which overwhelmed the neighbors with its marvellous organization, military power, and wealth of inexhaustible finances. But, nevertheless, this empire had two organic weaknesses, reaching deep into its very foundations.

The first was the very idea of a state of the Knights of the Cross. The fourteenth century was a period in which two political tendencies were developed: one aimed at the consolidation of national states; the second led to the formation of great dynastic unions. The state of the Order did not correspond to either of these currents. It was erected by conquest made on the basis of the already anachronous idea of crusading, which was still kept continuously alive by means of seasonal expeditions deep into Lithuania. Having arisen thanks to the support given it by the universal

powers of a Catholic and imperial Europe and under the protection of their charters, as a matter of fact, nevertheless — as Sigismund of Luxemburg reproached it in a moment of irritation — it obeyed neither the pope nor the emperor. It stood by the egoism of one knightly corporation in a period when other worldly-minded Orders had long since either fallen from power or become subject to the sharp criticism and disfavor of society (Templars, Cistercians).

We understand, thus, why this state of a strong military "company" awoke besides a chorus celebrating its material and organizing power — with that respect which the wisdom of this world dictates for every actual power — also very grave doubts, especially in the more thoughtful heads and warmer hearts of this century. Besides the sharp criticism which, especially in the fourteenth century, reached Europe from the injured parties (Poland, Lithuania, Riga), an unfavorable opinion about the Order was expressed by the English genius, Roger Bacon (1214—1295), who stated at the time of the struggles with the Prussians that all the Baltic pagan nations would have been converted long before, if it had not been for the repression of the German brethren, who did not wish to permit this because they aimed, first of all, to subdue them and subject them to their own authority. Later, the famous Swede, St. Bridget (1302—1372), at the time of the struggle with the Lithuanians, in inspired words castigated the Knights of the Cross, who were to be the useful bees on the frontiers of Christian lands, but instead had risen against Christ, oppressing the souls and bodies of the pagan people and carrying on wars only for pride and greed. In the fourteenth century, however, no such radical change in the general views as to relations with the pagans was affected as that needed to condemn the whole program of conversion by the sword; the inevitable crisis appeared only at the moment when, as a result of the christening of Lithuania, there simply were no pagans left.

Besides the fact that the idea of a knightly state had quite outlived itself, there still existed in connection with it a second evil in the form of the relation of the Order to the generality of its subjects. These subjects, Christians, dwelling on lands conquered and consolidated by the sword,

formed a variegated ethnical mosaic: Prussians, Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians, Poles, Germans, and Scandinavians. In relation to all these, even to the Germans, the ruling corporation applied the principle of exclusiveness; its ranks were recruited only from abroad from the German knighthood, with the fundamental exclusion of all natives, even Germans. Wherefore a German historian (Lohmeyer) considers as one of the most essential characteristics of this state that the government of the Order remained from the beginning to the end a foreign government (*"Fremdherrschaft"*). What is more, the corporation formed in this fashion did not admit the local population to cooperation; the latter, though bearing the burdens of the state, remained nevertheless barred from influencing internal government and external politics. This unorganic — if we may so say — "colonial" empire of the Order stood thus in striking contrast to the government by estates then developing everywhere, in which, standing by the side of the ruler, society directed the ship of state. Wherefore, even in the fourteenth century, there was no lack of facts showing a conflict between the Order and its subjects; we are especially struck by the information that during riots in Danzig in 1360 the cry was heard "Cracow, Cracow" — the same cry which formed the Polish battle-shout at Płowce (1331) and at Grunwald (1410).

12. The Order with Regard to the Union of Poland and Lithuania, and the Connection of the Union with the Pomeranian Situation. Great War of 1410. A political event which possessed a special significance for the German Order was the union of Lithuania with Poland and its conversion in 1386. The Christianization of Lithuania — which the Order had failed to accomplish — now undermined the missionary basis of this organization and brought into prominence the question, which had been mooted in the West ever since the Council of Lyons in 1245, of the uselessness of knightly Orders. The reception of the new faith from the hands of Poland placed Lithuania under the influence of the latter, especially since in the recently formed alliance Poland undoubtedly possessed not only cultural, but also political, supremacy. The political plan of the Order to conquer Lithuania, which had never been completely renounced, now fell to the ground; and at the same time

a new danger arose from the side of Poland and its old aims at revindication. In the first years following the union, however, the political initiative belonged to the Order, which developed very energetic activity for the purpose of destroying it. In negotiations with Jagiello and the Polish nobles the Order did not recognize any interest common to both Poland and Lithuania. In relation to Poland the Order desired to preserve the conditions of the Treaty of Kalisz in 1343; whereas with respect to Lithuania it advanced claims tending to provoke and irritate the other party. The answer of the Polish side was the assumption by Jagiello of the title of "heir to Pomerania", which had never been completely resigned. In this manner the Pomeranian matter became henceforth associated with the Lithuanian. And although the center of the stage was taken during the next years by the Lithuanian war, nevertheless, the Pomeranian matter was approaching a new solution. In its policy the Order now manifested a more peaceable tendency: it did not resign its territorial conquests, but withdrew from its traditional war of extermination against the Lithuanians, whom it continuously treated as pagans. Within the limits of the new political program was, first of all, the maintenance of overland communication with Germany, which concerned Pomerania; as well as the possession of Samogitia as a bridge between Prussia and Livonia. The confirmation of the Order on precisely these bases would have been a great political success for it, and would have meant completely cutting off Poland as well as Lithuania from the Baltic Sea. This cutting-off would have had a significance mainly political, but also economic. And that the latter was then regarded as a great danger to Poland is proved by Jagiello's efforts in 1390 to direct the most important Polish trade-route (which started from the capital, Cracow) through Kalisz and Wronki to Santok and Stettin, thus leaving out the Prussian towns. The conjuncture of circumstances, which was quite in favor of the state of the Order, was not yet stabilized, however. On the northwest the Order itself created difficulties by trying to extend its territorial connection with Germany, and thus provoked a quarrel with Poland as to the New March on the Noteć. More burning, however, at this moment was the matter of Samogitia on the northeast, which country remained (under

the government of the Order) the only unextinguished hearth of paganism, testifying to the inefficiency of the monk-knights in propagating the true faith.

In the first half of 1409 both sides realized the importance of the situation. The Order sent one delegation after another to the western courts with accusations against Poland for favoring pagans and Russian schismatics. In the Polish replies these charges are denied and the Order in turn accused of putting its chief emphasis on the right of the sword and entertaining only contempt and hatred for the eastern peoples to whom it should carry faith and enlightenment as a gift. Confident in its own political and military situation the Order boldly took the aggressive against Poland, demanding absolutely the cessation of the assistance given to Witold and Lithuania. At a general meeting in Łęczyca in July, 1409, the idea of the identity of Poland's interests with Lithuania's nevertheless conquered. A reply in this spirit was carried by the Polish delegation to the grand master. The consequence of this was a declaration of war against Poland by the Order on August 6 of this year. However, as early as October an armistice was made, to be binding until June 24 of the following year. Both sides submitted to the arbitration of Wacław, King of Bohemia. His decision, given in Prague, February 15, 1410, was judged by the Poles to be partial, and they refused to accept it. As the armistice was about to expire, Polish and Lithuanian armies were approaching close to the Prussian borders from all sides. Their meeting place was to be Czerwińsk on the right bank of Vistula. According to the plan of the Polish leader, they were to start from there and go by the shortest road to Marienburg, the capital of the state of the Order. Two days after the capture by the Poles of the town of Dąbrowno on July 13, and hence on July 15, the Polish-Lithuanian army met the army of the Knights of the Cross in the fields between the villages of Tannenberg and Grunwald.

The Knights of the Cross, who besides a splendid knight-hood possessed also artillery, planned to fight a defensive-aggressive battle, closing the way to the further progress of the Polish army. On the Polish side, the king hesitated in beginning the battle purposely in order to induce the enemy to

abandon their favorable position. Ultimately, at about noon, after preliminary skirmishes of the knights, both sides simultaneously commenced the combat. The Lithuanians placed on the right Polish wing did not sustain the onslaught from the guests of the Order who were fighting under the standard of St. George, and quickly fled from the battle-field. The left Polish wing, on the contrary, where the forces from Great Poland and Mazovia stood, pushed back considerably the right wing of the Knights of the Cross. The main battle was waged in the center, particularly when the Polish forces there were attacked by the grand master himself, Ulrich v. Jungingen, with the chosen troops of the Knights of the Cross, supported likewise by the guests of the Order who had returned from their pursuit of the Lithuanians. Two moments were especially critical for the Poles: when the great royal standard fell, and when the king finding himself at some distance on a small hill was in danger of his life. Finally, however, the Polish knights stood the onslaught and the situation in the center quickly began to improve. Before evening the army of the Knights of the Cross was scattered and the most famous Knights and almost all the leaders lay on the field of battle. After the Poles had taken the encampment where for some time the defeated Germans endeavored to make a stand, the army of the Order ceased to exist: so that late at night only stray fugitives from the general disaster were being pursued. Among the prisoners were represented all the German lands, but most numerous those of eastern Germany. On the following day by order of the king waggons were sent to Marienburg with the remains taken from the battle-field of the grand master, the grand marshal, the grand commander and twenty-two commanders of the Order.

13. The Consequences of the Defeat of the Order. Inclination of the Prussian States to Poland. The immediate result of the defeat was the complete disorganization of the state of the Order. The castles of the Knights of the Cross surrendered without resistance to the Polish king, and in many places the common people themselves disarmed and imprisoned the brethren of the Order. Very general also was the defection of the gentry and of the towns, especially in the ethnically Polish land of Chelmno; from whence this movement quickly spread over

the left bank of the river to Pomerania, which was likewise Polish. In disloyalty to the Order the German patricians of the most important Prussian¹ towns — Danzig, Toruń, Elbląg (Elbing) — did not remain behind the others. It seemed that in all Prussia there was not a single faction which would undertake the defense of the state thus threatened with complete downfall. Salvation came from those circles where the old tradition of the Knights of the Cross was strongest, in the person of the commander of Świecie, Henry v. Plauen, who had not participated in the battle of Grunwald. Plauen arrived still in time at Marienburg and took into his energetic hands the defence of the capital. This was the turning-point in the entire "Great War". In the more remote part of Prussia, near the sea, whither the Poles had not yet had time to penetrate, new armies of the Knights of the Cross began simultaneously to collect, whose leaders could, however, do nothing but carry on negotiations with the formidable enemy. A fatal influence on the further course of events was exercised by the long (eight weeks) and fruitless siege of Marienburg. This, the largest of the fortresses of the Knights of the Cross, defended by the brave Plauen, proved invincible. Moreover, the besieging army, composed of a general levy of knights, was incapable of reducing it by starvation. It was soon to appear that the retreat of the royal armies from Marienburg signified the abandonment of the immediate advantages gained by the victory at Grunwald. Even during the prolonged siege of the capital of the Order, Plauen had not been inclined to grant any fundamental concessions to the enemy. It was, therefore, still more difficult to obtain such after the withdrawal of the Poles, since the weakly garrisoned castles in Prussia fell one after another into the possession of their former owners. The attitude of the population also changed; and with satisfaction or with resignation they returned to the hard government of the brethren of the Order. Only the large towns of Danzig and Toruń maintained their freedom still; and the Order was, in fact, obliged to recognize their neutrality. The situation was not essentially

¹ The Knights of the Cross were called also "*domini de Prussia*", wherefore with time the name of Prussia was extended likewise to the land of Chelmno and Pomerania. The name Prussia was used by the Polish side officially for the first time in 1454 only, in connection with the changed political situation (see p. 58).

improved by the new victory of the Polish knighthood on October 10, in the neighborhood of Koronowo. Both sides were anxious for peace, which was actually concluded February 1, 1411, in Toruń. The conditions were as follows: cessation of hostilities; surrender of prisoners and also of castles, towns, and territories; emancipation from their oath of loyalty of all subjects of the adversary. Pomerania and the land of Chelmino remained further under the government of the Order; and even Samogitia was to be held by the king and Witold only for life. The one advantage gained by the Peace of Toruń was the ignoring of the decision of Wacław of Bohemia, which was still less favorable to Poland, and the levying of a large war contribution upon the Order.

The consequences of the "Great War" were many and various. Externally, the Poles concluded a treaty with Sigismund, King of Hungary and Rome, whose armes had disturbed the southern boundaries of Poland during the military activities in Prussia (1412). With Lithuania the conditions of a new union were laid down in Horodło (1414). Here the representatives of both nations met; and as the basis for future relations the watchword "mutual love" was proposed. These events in Poland were in radical contrast to the contemporary happenings in the state of the Order. The savior of the Order, Plauen, at present grand master, in violation of the conditions of the Peace of Toruń now began a policy of bloody repression against those who in recent years had deserted the Order. In particular, the leaders of the nobility of Chelmino were forced to seek shelter in Poland or lose their heads under the executioner's sword. An equally tragic fate befell the burgomasters of Danzig and of a few of the smaller towns. However, this too-far-reaching repression together with his irritating attitude towards Poland caused the more moderate party to remove Plauen from the highest office of the Order. The indignation against the government of the Order on the part of its own subjects which had unexpectedly manifested itself at the time of its greatest trouble was now for a certain time smothered, but it did not entirely disappear. Meanwhile, on the Polish side voices were already raised demanding the return of the lands formerly seized by the Order. Among these the most prominent was the voice of Paul Włodkowic at the Council of

Constance. In his second large treatise, presented to the Council, the Cracow scholar openly stated that the Knights of the Cross should return to Poland the lands formerly taken, and enumerated Pomerania and the lands of Chelmno and Michałowo. Włodkowic, besides this, demanded the complete abolition of the Order, which had failed to fulfil its function. He incorporated all of this in his treatise, written with the aim of justifying the Polish position in the late war. The force of Paul's demonstrations lay in the high level of his moral attitude. In a number of learned reports he presented to the Council the Polish-Order quarrel on the ground of an essentially ideal conflict. Condemning the method of conversion by means of sword, he defended at the same time the principles of honesty and justice in international law and extended the application of these principles likewise to the pagans.

At this time, also, in the characteristic testimony of Jagiello statements were issued from an official Polish source, which attributed to the Treaty of Kalisz the significance of an indefinite truce and also emphasized the rights of Poland to the lands of Pomerania and Chelmno. After the Treaty of Melno in 1422, representing one of the stages in the Polish-Order relation in the first half of the fifteenth century, the words in the royal title: "*Pomeraniae... dominus et haeres*", appear even in the acts presented to the Knights of the Cross, although formerly they had been avoided. The popularization of the matter of Pomerania in Polish society was further assisted by the international law-suit with the Knights of the Cross in which in the character of judges and arbitrators either the emperor or the pope, or the delegates of the latter, appeared. In particular, the law-suit heard by the papal delegate Antonio Zeno, which began in the last half of 1422 and lasted until the beginning of the following year, recalled by its extent and character the great suits of the fourteenth century. Among the witnesses summoned, besides a certain number of foreigners, chiefly Italians, the most prominent persons of Poland were called; and these brought out clearly the inextinguishable rights of Poland. As a century before, so now, the leading assertion of the Polish side was that Pomerania lay "*infra limites Regni*". Very keen also was the feeling that ethnically Pomerania belonged to Poland — which, indeed, cor-

responded to the real situation. Therefore, a few decades later, in the negotiations of 1464, the Polish delegates as well as the representatives of the Prussian states could affirm that the lands of Pomerania, Chelmno and Michałowo "were first tilled and inhabited by the Polish nation"; that "it gave them the names which survive to this day according to the peculiarities of the Polish speech"; and that "a nation with Polish speech has tilled and inhabited these lands up to the present time". In all Pomerania the German element was strongly represented chiefly in the towns, where it formed the local aristocracy directing all matters; although even here, as the investigations of W. Kętrzyński have shown, the influx of the Polish population was considerable. The conjuncture of circumstances under the government of the Order led, however, not to a reciprocal struggle between the German and Polish elements, but to their joint opposition to the despotic government of the monk-knights.

The former organization of the state of the Order could not be maintained after the defeat at Grunwald; but the Order was unable to make any essential changes. From that time, moreover, the differences of government between the state of the Order and Poland were the most important cause of the further collapse of the former and of the rise of the latter. In Poland at this period the progressive development of the liberties of the estates, which was particularly manifest beginning with the second half of the preceding century, was a factor of political expansion. The liberties of the estates played an enormous role in relation to Lithuania, which gradually became assimilated in its organization to Poland. The liberties of the estates likewise attracted to Poland Pomerania and the other lands of the Order which were in the future to form together the Polish or Royal Prussia; they reacted not only on the knighthood, but also on the towns, which were unwilling to suffer longer the political and economic pressure of the German Order. The mistakes made by the Order in its internal policy immediately after Grunwald likewise in the long run undermined its position in these lands, especially since foreign affairs were now uncertain.

The Peace of Toruń and the withdrawal of Plauen by no means cured the antagonism between Poland and the Knights

of the Cross, although they introduced at least temporary quiet. Every few years new wars broke out which did not in fact lead to any solution, although the situation of the Order continually became worse, particularly in relation to its subjects. In the treaty of peace of 1422 a point was even inserted saying that the subjects of the state which should break the peace were absolved from obedience to their lawful sovereign. This stipulation was directed against the Order and opened the way to the Prussian estates to express their opinion about the policy of the Knights as well as to influence the latter. In the next struggles the Order was seriously endangered by a movement among its own subjects (especially in the land of Chelmno), purposing to deny it obedience. In the treaty of 1433 the Polish side even succeeded in introducing two principles which must be considered a radical change in the history of the Order, imposed on it by force. In relations between the Order and Poland all intervention of the emperor and even of the pope was to be henceforth excluded. On the other hand, the Prussian estates were summoned as a guarantee that the terms of the treaty would be observed; otherwise they might deny their allegiance to the Order. This condition was still more strongly emphasized in the permanent peace concluded in Cujavian Brześć, December 23, 1435, which terminated a new war carried on by the Order. The increasing importance of the estates, developed in connection with external politics, could not bring strength, but only weakness to the state of the Order. In the Prussian estates Poland possessed henceforth a faithful ally.

14. The Prussian Union and Its Relations to the Order. Thirteen Years' War. Recovery of Pomerania. In the course of the twenty years separating the Treaty of Brześć from the outbreak of the Thirteen Years' War, both sides, *i. e.*, Poland and the Order, preserved the peace. On the contrary, the internal chasm in the state of the Order, existing since the battle of Grunwald between the Order as supreme authority and the Prussian estates, deepened with the course of time; and parallel with this grew the inclination of the latter to Poland, which appeared with varying intensity in different parts of the state of the Order. The politics of the estates were carried on by the nobles and the towns; and already in 1433

the nobility of Chelmno wished to introduce among its members the Polish laws of noblesse. The towns, which for the time being maintained a greater reserve, were nevertheless about to advance still further in renunciation of the Order. Among the factors particularly irritating must here be reckoned the economic competition of the Order, which kept all trading on a large scale in its own hands. Five years after the Treaty of Brześć, in 1440, arose the "Prussian Union", whose plans included aims that were clearly revolutionary. Besides the political and financial pressure from the side of the Order, the opposition of the Prussian estates was intensified primarily by the attractiveness of the liberties possessed by the Polish estates, which also determined the direction of the political aspirations of the nobility and the towns in the western, formerly Polish, portions of the state of the Order. On the other hand, there is no proof that the initiation of the Union was suggested by Poland. Within the limits of the Union, besides the nobility of Chelmno, an important role was played by the towns in the basin of the Vistula, with the then powerful Danzig at the head. Control was thus in the hands of the most influential and wealthy elements; whereas the poorer elements, although more fundamentally Polish than these, had not so much importance. In its activities the Polish and German elements were united, and the basis of its demands for freedom were not so much national as preeminently political and social.

The danger ceaselessly threatening it from the "Prussian Union" forced the Order to observe strictly the terms of the Treaty of Brześć. The policy of the grand master, Conrad v. Erlichshausen, tended in the same direction, although at the same time he wished to weaken and dissolve the Union. However, a dangerous inflammation of relations with the Union was brought about only by Conrad's less skilful successor, Ludwig v. Erlichshausen; while simultaneously the neighborly relations of the subjects of the Order with Poland became more and more cordial. The grand master wished to submit the conflict with the Union to the decision of the emperor, which he succeeded in doing. The Union actually accepted the contest with the Order on this ground, but simultaneously developed its own activity independently of this, purposing to prepare for an armed struggle against the Order as well as to gain the

aid and protection of the Polish king. Delegations from the Union were sent under various pretexts to Poland, although Poland maintained much reserve. As late as July 1453 the Polish king could with all sincerity assure the grand master that he would not give aid to either party. Poland, however, noted with dissatisfaction the imperial interference in Prussian affairs, which finally inclined it to active measures. On the side of the Union it was foreseen in advance that the decision of the emperor would be favorable to the Order, as it in fact proved to be; and therefore greater efforts were made to induce Poland to agree to united action with it.

At the beginning of February, 1454, a bloody insurrection broke out in Prussia, which the Unionists commenced with real revolutionary fury. Somewhat earlier, on January 19 of this year, in Sandomir, Kazimierz the Jagiellonian accepted the services of the Prussian estates, which had for a year and a half been offered to him. All efforts of the Order to prevent Poland from joining in the struggle proved ineffectual. The sequel to the agreement with the delegates of the Union was a solemn act incorporating Prussia, proclaimed March 4 of this year, which became the legal basis for the future relation to Poland of the lands recovered from the Order. The real gist of the act was a far-reaching autonomy for the Prussian lands. All the estates took an oath of allegiance on April 15 at Toruń, in which the Prussian bishops also joined two months later. In this way the movement directed at a union with Poland expanded beyond the limits of the lands which had earlier belonged to Poland, and embraced territories formerly Prussian — where it was, however, to prove much weaker.

The act uniting to Poland the whole country subjected to the Prussian branch of the German Order was premature with regard to the real state of affairs, especially as the Order — finding moral support in the Diet of the German Empire — had no intention of yielding voluntarily. The strongest fortified towns — Toruń, Danzig, Elbląg (Elbing), Königsberg — had already fallen, in fact, into the hands of the Unionists; but the capital of the Order, Marienburg, and some of the larger castles remained longer in the possession of their former lords.


Much importance for the further course of the war must be ascribed to the early misfortunes of the Poles, which culmi-

nated in a defeat of the common levy near Chojnice on September 19, 1454. The main cause of this disaster was the politics of the nobles, who instead of thinking of the fight demanded from the king a number of important privileges for themselves (in Cerekwice, near Chojnice, September 15). The situation of the Order was in spite of this unfortunate. Relying almost exclusively on hired troops, the Order fell into dependence upon its mercenaries, to whom it was forced to pledge all its fortresses together with the capital, Marienburg. Temporary successes were not sufficient to ward off the complications which hung menacingly over the future, although they gave the Order the possibility of a longer defence and even of saving part of its possessions. From Poland, meanwhile, in the late fall of this year a new warlike expedition took the field to revenge the defeat at Chojnice. However, it did not come to any serious military engagement. The great significance of this expedition regards only the parliamentary history of Poland, because of the statutes issued from the camp near Nieszawa on November 11 and 12, which regulated a whole series of the most important internal affairs—political, administrative, and judicial; in their totality they represent the victory of the lower nobility over the Crown and the magnates. On the other hand, with respect to the war carried on with the Order the winter expedition of this year possessed at most the significance of a military demonstration to strengthen the courage of the Prussian Unionists. The inefficiency of the common levy on the field of battle showed itself in full. Although in the further course of the Prussian war, the calling of the common levy was not completely discontinued, society at large was henceforward forced, first of all, to make money contributions; and the chief military power now became, in addition to the Unionists, hired troops composed of Poles and foreigners, chiefly Czechs. However, before the war reached this new phase, the Order succeeded in regaining a whole series of lost positions.

The friends of the Order were mainly concentrated in the eastern part of the country, near the sea, in the so-called low country (around Königsberg) and further towards the southeast in the country of hills and lakes; whereas in the west and southwest Polish sympathies decidedly predominated. In this

way, at the beginning of the war the division of the country was clearly designated which subsequently was to become permanent. Even in the west, however, the Order managed to seize many castles, which later the Poles together with the Unionists were obliged to reconquer with much trouble. On the Polish side conspicuous service was rendered by Danzig, which, ignoring the proscriptions of the emperor, not only preserved its loyalty to the Polish king, but took upon itself a large share of the war burdens, in spite even of the hard conditions in which it often found itself. The fidelity of Danzig and of the other Unionists was the more important because in Poland itself the popularity of the Prussian war was not able to maintain itself on its proper level in the face of the serious difficulties connected with it. The greatest interest in the war of revindication was displayed by the society of Great Poland, in which the tradition of the old violence of the Order was most vivid. The greatest indifference, on the other hand, was betrayed by Little Poland. The Lithuanians, in spite of the efforts of the king, who by the offer of East Prussia sought to draw them into the war, remained outside, preserving to the end an official neutrality. In such conditions a leading role was played by the personal energy of the king, who was supported valiantly by the learned circles gathered around the University of Cracow.

An event which pushed forward considerably the matter of acquiring Prussia was the purchase of the castles of the Knights of the Cross from the hands of their mercenaries. The respective treaty was concluded in the summer of 1456; and after the collection of the enormous sums needed to realize the purchase, Poland entered into possession of the fortresses. Especially painful to the Order must have been the moment when the leader of the unpaid mercenaries, Ulryk Czerwonka, handed over to the Polish king the castle of the grand master in Marienburg (June 8, 1457). The war dragged on, nevertheless, particularly since part of the hired troops persisted in their loyalty to the German Order. Among the most important events should be especially mentioned the brave defence of the town of Marienburg, which surrendered to the Poles on August 6, 1460, after a twenty-weeks' siege; as well as the battle of Żarnowiec in which an army composed of hired Poles and



Unionists gained a decided victory over the somewhat more numerous mercenaries of the Order on September 17, 1462. In spite of this the war still continued, causing dreadful devastation to the country. In the period from 1462 to 1464 the last strongholds of the Knights of the Cross on the Vistula were captured and simultaneously the war was transferred to the east, especially to Warmia (Ermeland). No decisive blows, however, fell on the Order until the surrender of the bishop of Warmia with all the territory subject to him, March 16, 1464; next, the deliverance into Polish hands of Starogard, June 23, 1466; and, finally, the fall of Chojnice (September 26 of this year), which had held out the longest. It is to the credit of the Polish king that the offers of mediation made on various sides had heretofore not been accepted. The papal legate, Hieronymus, Archbishop of Crete, was not even admitted to the country, although he threatened that a crusade against Poland would be proclaimed by the pope (1460). The loss by the Order of all Pomerania, the land of Chelmno, the territory around Marienburg and Elbląg (Elbing), as well as Warmia, forced the grand master to sue for peace directly from the Polish king.

15. **The Treaty of Torun in 1466 and Its Further Fate up to the Secularization of Prussia.** At the moment of making peace with the Knights of the Cross the political claims of Poland were no longer limited to the lands formerly lost by Poland, *i. e.*, Pomerania and the land of Chelmno; but nevertheless, they did not embrace all Prussia. The enlargement of its demands beyond the mere recovery of the lands of Pomerania and Chelmno was due to events during recent years, beginning with 1454; the movement toward Poland embraced also parts of the other Prussian lands; wherefore the Polish king had revived the title formerly used against the Knights of the Cross, "Pomeraniae dominus et haeres", and substituted for it the title "Prussiae dominus et haeres", which was still more turned against the interests of the Order. This latter title, resulting from the application of the principle of self-determination to districts which had never before then belonged to Poland, was henceforth preserved. As a consequence, however, of the failure to completely control the state of the Order, at least in the autoch-

thionically Prussian part, the conception of the Prussia which was to be subject to the king became more restricted. The remaining portion of Prussia, still subject to the Order, was to be nevertheless dependent on Poland.

The peace negotiations already commenced in 1464, but later broken off, were once more reopened in Torun, 1466. In the character of mediator the new papal legate, Rudolf of Rüdeshheim, was now admitted; and he showed particular favor to the Polish king with a view to winning him subsequently to anti-Czech plans. In spite of attempts at opposition on the part of the delegates of the Order, the Poles carried through their most important postulates. Directly to the king of Poland were returned all the lands lost to the Order in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; and besides this, the Polish side for certain "good reasons and for the maintenance of the present peace" insisted firmly on keeping Marienburg, Elbląg (Elbing), Christburg, and Sztum (Stuhm), although these were situated beyond the borders of the historical claims of the Polish crown. From the lands thus annexed three województwos [administrative provinces] were subsequently formed, those of Pomerania, Chelmno and Marienburg. The bishop of Warmia likewise fell under Polish suzerainty together with the whole territory subject to him. On the other hand, the Order kept the then disputable Pomerania and fragments of the districts of Elbląg (Elbing) and Kiszpork (Christburg). For all the lands which remained in the possession of the Order the grand master paid homage to the king: they were likewise to be a constituent part of the Polish state. Furthermore, the grand master as a Polish provincial duke, breaking all bonds with the emperor, became a member of the Crown Council and was obliged to furnish military forces. The Order of the Knights of the Cross was obliged in the future to accept subjects of the Polish kingdom up to half of its members. The terms of the treaty were signed October 19, 1466.

As regards the population of the lands incorporated into Poland (known henceforward as Royal Prussia) the treaty completely corresponded to the tendencies which had prevailed there throughout the long and destructive strife up to the very end. Poland regained the mouth of the Vistula and connection

with the sea, the chief advantages of which were to fall to Danzig, generously endowed with commercial privileges. Nevertheless, difficulties appeared in getting external recognition of the treaty. In spite of the participation of the legate and the fact that both sides had bound themselves to apply to the pope for confirmation, the latter was not obtained. Still worse was the situation as regards the Empire, which had long before refused to acknowledge the Polish claims to the lands of Chelmino, Michalowo and Pomerania, and was now unwilling to renounce its own claims to supremacy over Prussia. However, on the Polish side there was no idea of any concessions; Kazimierz the Jagiellonian and his successors in an unequivocal manner made it very clear that they would consider any one as an enemy who tried to disturb the "perpetual peace". Nor did the Poles think of renouncing the rights accruing to them in relation to that part of Prussia left under the Order. The idea occurred to them of raising to the position of grand master some Pole, in particular, a member of the reigning family, as was possible according to the Treaty of Torun. Some circles even discussed the notion of transferring the Order, which would result in a devolution of these lands to Poland after the vassal then holding them. The Knights of the Cross, on the other hand, emboldened undoubtedly by the position taken by the emperor, considered the Treaty of Torun as temporary coercion.

In connection with the question of the recognition or the non-recognition of this second Treaty of Toruń evolved the further history of the Order up to its secularization in 1525. The first new grand master after the Treaty of Toruń, Henry Plauen, persuaded the pope not to confirm the treaty in 1468. His successor, Grand Master Martin Truchsess, revolted openly and had to be forcibly compelled to pay homage in 1479. During the Wallachian expedition the closest adviser of King John Olbracht, next to the Italian Kallimach, was Łukasz Watzelrode, Bishop of Warmia, and he advised that the Knights of the Cross be transferred from Prussia to the southeastern borderlands. Łukasz in the same spirit suggested that by a proper policy in Royal Prussia the Prussia of the Order could be attracted to it. However, the defeat in Wallachia in 1497 brought disaster to the Polish policy on the Baltic. To the position of

grand master was chosen Frederick, Duke of Saxony, who refused homage to the king and even demanded an alteration of the Treaty of Toruń by the return of Malborg (Marienburg), Elbląg (Elbing), Kiszpork (Christburg), and Sztum (Stuhm), which had earlier never belonged to the Polish crown. Polish attempts to obtain homage, made also abroad, especially at the court of Pope Julius II, and direct negotiations with the Order in Marienburg did not have any results; neither had a subsequent meeting in Poznań in 1510. After the death of Frederick in the same year, the choice for grand master fell once more on a member of one of the German ducal houses which could count on the support of the German Empire; namely, on Albert Hohenzollern of the Anspach line of the family, who was also a nephew of Sigismund I. The politics of Albert were founded upon an alliance with the emperor and with the Empire, which was then anxious to act for the defence of the "new Germany", even together with Muscovy. Albert proceeded to an armed struggle with Poland in 1519; he commanded mainly mercenaries who were paid with Muscovite and German money. On the Polish side, however, the Toruń Diet voted large taxes for this war, which was destined to put an end to the period of the Order's existence in Prussia. In the war, which lasted until the beginning of 1521, an especially active part was taken by Danzig as a violent antagonist of the Order. The course of the war was unfavorable to Albert; in spite of which, however, in April 1521, he secured an armistice of four years. At the expiration of this time he felt himself obliged to come to an understanding with Poland. An agreement was made April 8, 1525, already after the secularization of Prussia; and two days later Albert Hohenzollern paid homage in Cracow to King Sigismund I. The principle of the feudal suzerainty of Poland was once more acknowledged; and thereby the feudal devolution of the land together with the removal of the Order from Prussia and the formation of a lay dukedom was considerably facilitated. The connection of this part of Prussia, now Ducal Prussia, with the Polish crown became henceforth closer. The Prussian vassal broke definitely with the Empire, which still refused to recognize the Treaty of Toruń as well as that of Cracow, and outside of the Polish crown there was no place for him. It has quite justly been remarked (by Papée) that such

phenomena as the active participation of Albert in Polish affairs, his "fraternity" with the Polish lords, his grants to Poles, and even an extended colonization of Mazovians in the southern part of East Prussia could not have been even imagined in the times of the Order. The Polish king, according to the principle of the Treaty of Cracow, was "omnium terrarum Prussiae dominus et haeres"; Albert, on the other hand, was not even duke of Prussia, but only duke in Prussia (*dux in Prussia*). The fact of founding the Prussian state on these new bases gave it, however, vital forces which the old state of the Order did not possess.

Modern Times.

1. **Union of Royal Prussia with the Crown Kingdom under the Jagiellonians.** In the charter of incorporation executed in Cracow March 6, 1454, the king accepted the "voluntary and uncoerced submission of Prussia", spoke of the reincorporation and invisceration of the country into the Crown, admitted its inhabitants to the enjoyment of the rights of barons, prelates, and nobility of the Kingdom and, in particular, to the election and coronation of the king; he promised further to defend the country and not to permit it to be wrestled from Poland; and, finally, to maintain all the inhabitants of Prussia in their rights, freedom, and privileges. Furthermore, out of kindness and liberality, he abolished the customs-duty levied by the Order on the pound and all others, by water as well as by land; and he promised to observe the laws of the country. Some towns acquired the right to coin money — Danzig and Elbing permanently, and Toruń and Königsberg in wartime; and all were granted freedom to trade throughout the entire extent of the Crown and Grand Duchy as well as freedom of export and import. The king reserved for himself only the usual foreign customs and staple right in the towns of the Kingdom. He resigned, likewise, the tax payable in cattle, an old tax dating from Polish times, and the right of "flotsam and jetsam" from sea-wrecks, which had been exercised by the Knights of the Cross.

The king promised to settle all the more important matters touching the above mentioned lands only by the common advice of the nobility, clergy, and large towns, and only at meetings of the Prussian Council. During his absence from

Prussia, the king agreed to nominate on the advice of the estates a governor of the country as his substitute. The latter had to be native, as indeed followed from the point dealing with the Prussian indigenate, "that pearl of Prussian freedom", as it was later called. In it the king promised "to bestow honors, offices, castles, and other places upon natives only, in accordance with the laws of the other countries in the Kingdom".

The autonomy of Prussia must be considered a great prize attained by the estates. Their influence on the government of the country far exceeded that of the estates in an analogous situation — in Lithuania, for instance. The charter brought enormous benefits in the first place to the towns, granting them rights which put them on a level with the towns of the German Empire and exceeded all the liberties of the towns in the Kingdom. It is therefore not strange that they understood how to defend these rights so stubbornly. The thought of the return of the Knights of the Cross filled the estates still in the sixteenth century with the greatest fear — the union with Poland was for the autonomy of the country a question of life or death. Soon, however, the matter of Prussian autonomy became an object of dispute between the Crown and the estates of this province. Heretofore, the relation of Prussia to the Crown insured almost all the advantages to Prussia, especially to the Prussian towns. The revenues of the king from this country did not cover (at best) the interest on the colossal expenditures of the Crown at that time. In case of an eventual war the whole burden of the defence of the country fell on Poland; whereas the Prussians, according to their charter, were not obliged at all to defend the frontiers of the Crown. Standing on the ground of a personal union, interpreted in a quite one-sided spirit, the Prussian estates were completely indifferent to matters concerning the State in general. Such a condition of affairs was inconsistent with State unity. The king as well as all the Polish nobility understood this. A conflict with the provincial element was inevitable.

In the first instance, it was a question of the admission of members of the Prussian Council to the Senate and of Prussian delegates to the Polish Chamber of Deputies. The Poles expected that this would insure all other points of the program

of unification. A strong inclination towards unity appeared in the sixteenth century, particularly about the middle of the century; it became clear that, in the face of the approaching real union with Lithuania, Prussian separatism could not last. Prussian delegates had come to the Polish Diet as early as 1467 and 1469, for instance; also councillors as well as delegates of the nobility (though seldom) and of the towns. They could not, however, be considered by any means as deputies, respectively senators, in the strict sense, but rather as messengers to convey information. In this character they communicated with the king and with the Polish estates. They did not participate in the Senate nor in the Diet; they had no right to bind themselves in any way; taxes were voted only after their return home.

From the middle of the sixteenth century the heads of the party of separatists were the wojewoda (palatine) of Malborg (Marienburg), Achacius Czema (von Zehmen), and the wojewoda of Chelmno, John Dzialyński. Among the burgesses the most concerned in this activity were Klefeldt, Ferber and Rosenberg of Danzig and Schultz of Elbing. Its bases were, however, weak among the nobility, for the matter of the "execution" of the Crown properties held in private possession, which was very popular among them, inclined them to the side of the adversary. The soul of the latter party was the powerful family of Kostka with John, Castellan of Danzig, at the head; among the clergy, Heczius and (most important of all) Karnkowski, Bishop of Cujavia, to whose diocese — although he did not sit on the Council — the greater part of Pomerania belonged. In the Diets of 1562 and 1564 a rupture occurred among the Prussian delegates: the Kostka party openly joined the king's camp and many of the Prussian dignitaries resigned their illegally possessed estates; from those who were absent such estates were taken soon afterwards. Thus the opponents of execution and of unification received a heavy blow, to which another was added by the death of their leader, Wojewoda Czema, (1565). They resisted still longer, however, and a number of subsequent Diets were entirely unattended by them in spite of continual royal summonses. On the other hand, the Polish Diets (for instance, that of 1567), paying no attention to the absentation of the Prussians, extended to them the force of their own statutes. Finally, Karn-

kowski and Hozius in 1568 brought a special royal commission to Danzig and Elbing with the apparent purpose of curtailing the abuses of the town councils. In Elbing the commissioners suspended the burgomasters and arranged supplementary elections; but the haughty Danzig, in spite of the orders of the king and the summons of the States-General, closed their gates to them. The commissioners, however, made such an impression that the provincial Diet of Prussia voted that the whole Council with the exception of the under-chamberlains should go to the Polish Diet after a five-years' absence; delegates of the lower estates were also sent. The Danzig affair divided the Council into the two camps already known to us; the nobility even consented secretly to unification, with the reservation of certain separate rights for Prussia. Finally, it was agreed to submit the affair to the king for decision, and he eagerly undertook this mission. In a decree of March 16, 1568, the king decided thus: "we declare, testify, and determine by this our own letter for always and in perpetuity that councillors of the Prussian lands are councillors of the Crown and their place is in the Senate, and that when summoned by us and our successors, the Polish kings, they are to deliberate in the bosom of the Senate of the Kingdom and to vote together with the other councils of this Kingdom, both as to affairs of Prussia and as to affairs of the Kingdom, as it suitable for members of one indivisible body. Likewise, also, deputies of the Prussian lands have their place among the deputies of the Kingdom and are to confer together with them". The king menaced the disobedient with punishment, removal from office, and the fact that even in the absence of the Prussians the Polish Diet would decide Prussian matters. Immediately after this the decree went into effect. In the historic year of 1569 the signatures of Prussian senators appeared together with those of Polish and Lithuanian senators to the Act of Union of Lublin. Not long afterwards Danzig was forced to humble itself. In 1570 taxes for the war in Livonia were extended by a statute of the Diet over Prussia, to which the Prussian delegates in Warsaw had to agree *ex post facto*.

2. Polish Baltic Policy under the Last Jagiellonians. Polish politics included a Baltic program on the realization of which depended the development of the then Royal Prussia.

This program was given a name by Stanisław Karnkowski, Bishop of Cujavia, Commissioner of the King and of the Republic in Danzig, at the end of the reign of Sigismund Augustus. *Dominium Maris Baltici* — this is what Karnkowski demanded for his monarch: a proud and euphonious slogan, but with a very modest meaning behind the words. The Polish Crown interpreted its *dominium* simply as control of its own coast and of the neighboring waters from Żarnowiec to Braniewo; likewise suzerainty over the vassal shore of Ducal Prussia to Kłajpeda and over the Courland-Livonian shore up to Riga. Only to have its own ports and ships, only to exercise on its own coast those prerogatives possessed, for instance, by the dukes of Holstein, Meklenburg, and Pomerania — the Republic had no idea of any different dominion which would curtail the liberty of others. By the side of this minimum and defensive sea program, there sometimes flashed a maximum program of expansion; for a state which possessed the central course of the Warta, the whole Vistula, the upper and middle course of the Niemen, and the upper and middle Dwina, needed for the goods floated by these arteries free ports from Stettin to Riga inclusively. Three-fourths of the population of the Republic, nineteen-twentieths of its burgesses were interested in carrying out this program, even at the cost of certain sacrifices in the southeast, sacrifices which would be felt only by the circles of landed magnates and would be quite without significance for Polish trade, since the routes leading through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean had been cut.

Nevertheless, in speaking of the Polish Baltic program it must be remembered that it was rather the program of the Polish Crown than of the Commonwealth. The nobility had no inborn inclination for the sea; quite the contrary, they were afraid of its treacherous waves and attracted towards the fertile Ukrainian steppes. The wider public opinion only reacted on the Baltic problem in so far as the monarch understood how to develop it energetically and enthusiastically in instructions to the provincial diets and in speaking to the Diet. The old Polish publicists discussed much more brilliantly and loudly about southeastern Poland, about the settlement of Cossack matters, about infidels and pagans than about Danzig, Elbing, or Puck. The statesmen who appreciated these ports and all

Pomerania were few. The province of Prussia remained in the position of "borderlands", not necessarily the most important ones — pushed to one side in separatistic isolation. And this turn of affairs was chiefly the consequence of the insufficiently conscious and insufficiently concentrated Baltic policy of the former Republic.

During the first period following the Thirteen Years' War (1466—1525) the problem of this policy was to repulse the German contra-offensive. With the homage of Albert on the market-place of Cracow commenced a new stage of the Baltic matter. The contra-attack having been repelled, the acquired possessions had to be fortified and access to the sea extended towards the north, to the advantage of Lithuania.

In relation to Danzig the social and religious disturbances of the year 1526 gave Sigismund I cause to take energetic action, which prevented the creation in Danzig of a center for German Protestant propaganda. After the suppression of these disturbances, the king gave the town a new ordinance containing very severe provisions against "heretics" and making it difficult to admit foreign elements to citizenship; but there could be no question of revoking the overgrown commercial privileges of Danzig, as long as Poland had no other bases for its *dominium maris Baltici*. Precisely this last point furnished one of the main motives for the policy of Sigismund (II) Augustus in Livonia.

In his hard struggle for Livonia Sigismund Augustus made one move which was fatal in its consequences: wishing to gain at least the friendly neutrality of Albert of Prussia, he acknowledged the right of the Brandenburg line of Hohenzollerns to the succession of Ducal Prussia (1563); and when Albert died his son, Albert Frederick, in paying homage in the Diet of Lublin permitted delegates of the margraves of Brandenburg to "take the banner" as a sign of the extension of the investiture to them. At the time that looked quite innocent: it was expected that the successor to the Polish Jagiellonian king would come from the Hohenzollern family and that the Hohenzollerns would thus in the future reunite Poland and Lithuania with all Prussia: so for the time being they were given a piece of parchment. Meanwhile, Sigismund Augustus maintained possession of the

real conquest of Courland-Livonia, which gave him a strong foothold on a broad belt of new sea-coast.

None of the Polish kings understood so well the importance of the sea for the State as this last king of the Jagiellonian House. Perhaps he exaggerated somewhat in his letters of admonition to the pope, the emperor, the Danish king, and the English queen, when he foretold the end of free trade on the Baltic from the moment Czar Ivan or Eric XIV filled it with his "pirates". But that a political balance of power, and thus the exploitation of the sea by all the governments on its shores, could alone safeguard trade and navigation was quite true, according to the then prevailing opinions as to *mare clausum* and *mare apertum*. A condition of this exploitation was safety under the protection of one's own fleet. The king of Denmark claimed armed assistance on the sea from Sigismund Augustus. The Polish king had to explain to him that "the nations under his suzerainty not only had never tested their strength in sea warfare, but did not even trust their fate to sea navies". Later, having tried in vain to obtain a fleet from the dukes of Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and Brunswick, and having received a similar refusal from Danzig, Sigismund Augustus decided to arm privateers of his own under the flag of Spiring and Wasowicz. The immediate problem was to safeguard Prussia from a Swedish invasion and to break up the Muscovite navigation from Narva, which was developing, although forbidden by Denmark and Poland. Some years later the acts of the privateersmen irritated the burgesses of Danzig so much that at first they drove them from the town and later condemned to death those whom they caught on the pretext of some small theft. The enriched town had learned how to treat lightly the Polish kings, to whom it sometimes lent money. Having in its archives the "Great Charter" of 1457, which permitted it to control the shore and also "to open and shut" the navigation with the knowledge and permission of the Polish kings, Danzig interpreted this knowledge and permission in a restricted sense as touching only navigation and not administration; whereas the Polish lawyers embraced by it the entire supremacy of the sea.

The rebellious action of Danzig with regard to the privateersmen was taken advantage of in Warsaw as an oppor-

tunity for trying to enforce the Polish point of view. The famous exponent of the latter, Stanisław Karnkowski, proceeded to Danzig in 1569 at the head of a senatorial commission for the purpose of investigating the town charters. The gates were shut in the face of the commissicners, for which the delegates of Danzig atoned in the Diet of Lublin. At the same time the king broke by his memorable decree (March 12) the resistance of the Prussian States-General against sending deputies to the common Diets of the whole Republic. The renewed commission drew up a number of resolutions, which were subsequently confirmed in the Diet of Warsaw in 1570, as the *Constitutiones Civitati Gedanensi praescriptae*. Besides the numerous provisions required to regulate the legal and economic business of the Free Town, we find here a confirmation of the "clear authority and dominion" of the Polish kings over the sea-coast and the sea, with a heavy penalty on every one who encroached upon these rights of the king's majesty.

But what was this, when in the very text of the „constitutions" it was said that in the future they would be reconciled with the charters of the town, thus proving that the king did not count upon the absolute realization of the whole principle? In fact, the statutes of Karnkowski were suspended; and the king (now ill) accepted a sum of money from Danzig as compensation, in exchange for which he pardoned the magistrates and confirmed the charter of 1457. Indeed, strength was lacking to carry out the entire program, since the eastern frontier was being threatened continuously; men's minds were full of the union with Lithuania, the successor to the throne, and religious matters; moreover, foreign countries did not promise any effective assistance. A change did, in fact, occur on the north: after the cruel madman, Eric, had been dethroned, his brother John, brother-in-law of Sigismund Augustus, became friendly with Poland and turned his weapons against Muscovy; while the King of Denmark, formerly an ally, now become an adversary, seized and destroyed the Polish privateers. The Treaty of Stettin (1570—1) did not furnish the hoped-for solution of Livonian affairs. Sweden remained in possession of Esthonia; Denmark retained Oesel; the navigation from Narva was left open; and both Scandinavian states recognized in principle the supremacy of the German

Empire over the former territories of the Teutonic Order. In view of the protests of the Polish plenipotentiaries, Kromer and Solikowski, the matter of the navigation from Narva, as well as the Livonian affair, was left subject to a question mark. The king held Riga and Libau; but in Königsberg the Hohenzollerns prolonged their dominion for an indefinite period; and their dominion was bound, in the eventuality of a union between Königsberg and Berlin, sooner or later to menace Poland's access to the sea.

3. Autonomy of Royal Prussia. The union hastened considerably the process of the social, administrative, and cultural assimilation of this province. In the course of the sixteenth century the Council, or Senate, ceased to be the directing organ; and the imperfect "open meeting of the estates" was finally crystallized in the form of a States-General; while on the models furnished by the neighboring Great Poland and Mazovia, dietines arose in the wojewódstvos and later in the districts.

The latter were initiated in 1594 by the wojewoda of Pomerania, Ludwig Mortęski, at the request of the nobility; and the nobility were so pleased with them that they loudly complained when the wojewoda neglected to call the district dietines in 1605.

The dietines in the wojewódstvos, which were two generations older, were regulated in 1526 by Sigismund the Old, who provided them with a sanction (2 marks' fine for absence) in the constitutions of the Prussian province of 1537-8. The dietines did not — neither those of the districts nor those of the wojewodstvos — so it seems, fulfil any self-governing functions beyond the election of candidates to the land court. The former were preparatory for the latter; and the latter (in the wojewódstvos) elected deputies to the States-General. In the latter only was concentrated the life of the autonomous province and thence it exercised its influence on the public affairs of the whole state.

The States-General was composed of two chambers: the Senate, or Council, and the Chamber of Deputies. In the former sat the bishop of Warmia, as president, together with the bishop of Chelmno, the wojewodas of Chelmno, Marienburg,

and Pomerania, the castellans of Chelmno, Elbing, and Danzig, the under-chamberlains of the three wojewódstvos, the under-treasurer of the Prussian lands, as well as two delegates from each of the large Prussian towns, *i. e.*, Danzig, Elbing, and Toruń. The smaller towns in spite of the favors which were liberally granted them by the king (decree of John Kazimierz in 1654), by the provincial Senate (statute of 1621), and by their powerful protector, Danzig, after 1662 preferred to withdraw from the States-General rather than listen to the clamors and threats of the nobility who thronged it. The chambers heard the propositions of the king's delegate at a joint meeting, after which they separated, since the Senate attached much importance to having separate sessions. The number of deputies in the States-General was unlimited; the wojewódstwo of Pomerania was the best represented, the wojewódstwo of Marienburg the least so. Such a session of the States-General lasted a few days or a fortnight; the meeting-place was usually Marienburg or Grudziądz, exceptionally only Danzig, Tuchola, Nowe, Chelmno, Toruń, or Oliva. Only in 1735 the wojewódstwo of Pomerania obtained a promise that every third States-General would meet at Gniew; but in the general stagnation of political life into which the province then fell, this concession was not utilized. The statutes of the States-General were sometimes called, in order to distinguish them from those of the wojewódstvos and of the districts, *constitutiones* (not *lauda*). They were filed in the archives of Toruń; and Elbing was the keeper-of-the-seal. The provincial treasury was under the direction of an under-treasurer for the Prussian lands, whose office was established by Kazimierz the Jagiellonian.

After the offices of wojewoda and starosta had been ingrafted upon the Pomerania-Chelmno administration, the reception of other authorities and dignities followed. By the side of the old standard-bearers appeared castellans, under-chamberlains, under-wojewodas, sword-bearers, and whole Pleiades of titled landed dignitaries similar to those of the Crown lands. After the union with Poland the judicial procedure and the organization of the courts formed at first a strange amalgamation. Kazimierz the Jagiellonian confirmed in the incorpora-

ting charter all four systems of law which had been obligatory before 1454 — those of Magdeburg, Chelmno, Poland and Prussia — and authorized every person to "pass (*transmigrare*) from one system to another" in the future, provided no one was injured thereby. Later, in view of the conflicts which this variety provoked, he withdrew the above license (1476) and extended the law of Chelmno over the whole country except within township limits. Before the latter law was finally codified in an orderly fashion, the nobility (being pleased with Polish class exclusiveness) worked out for themselves a separate land law which made difficult the subdivision of landed estates, then formally allodial. That *Jus terrestre nobilitatis Prussiae correctum* was issued in 1599. The revision of the law of Chelmno, three times undertaken, succeeded only in regulating township and peasant relations; in the years 1623 and 1643 it was printed in a Polish translation for those districts where the German language was no longer known. Elbing, Frauenberg, and Braunsberg continued to govern themselves, as a matter of exception, by the law of Lubeck.

Obviously it was easier to adapt the organization of the courts to Polish models than the civil and criminal law. Thus, in the beginning burgh courts were introduced which were inseparably connected with the office of wojewoda; in this respect the pure Polish type stood higher, for it guaranteed the independence of the judiciary from the administrative department. Judicial records were introduced; the old land courts were reorganized in conformance with the recently acquired privileges of the Polish nobility, *i. e.*, with the Statutes of Nieszawa, in such a way that the king continued to nominate one of four candidates presented to him by the Diet for the offices of judge, under-judge, and secretary, respectively. The starostas had jurisdiction over the peasants on the royal domains entrusted to them, and the steward of Marienburg and his bailiff had a separate sphere of rights. In the villages under the law of Chelmno the soltys [mayor] with some assistants were judges. The institution of interim courts penetrated into Prussia during the interregnum (from 1587), but the towns did not wish to submit to them. When a tribunal was established in Poland in 1578, the Prussian deputies did not

neglect to declare solemnly that for many reasons they could not agree to appeals to a court outside of their own province. However, as early as 1585, the nobility of the whole province acceded to the Crown tribunal, at first only as a matter of trial, with the right to return to the old order of appeals. The trial proved not so bad, since from that time on appeals from land courts passed over the States-General and went directly to Piotrków or Lublin, where the Crown tribunal used to sit. Likewise the Aulic Council, or Assessors Court, as the court of appeal in town affairs, the Diet sitting as a court, and the Court of Reference (for complaints of the peasants on royal domains against their superiors) decided the various suits addressed to Warsaw from Prussia which fell within their respective jurisdictions. The variety and heterogeneousness in the fields of procedural law and jurisdiction — a phenomenon quite common in those times, especially in states which arose by a process of conglomeration — offers one more proof of the unheard-of toleration with which the Polish government and nation treated this "incorporated" and subsequently "unionized" province.

4. **Composition of the Population.** In order to comprehend how the autonomy of Prussia fitted into the whole State and functioned within it, let us glance at the society inhabiting this province.

The higher clergy were represented by the prince-bishop of Warmia and the bishop of Chelmno, each surrounded by his own chapter; but the wojewódstwo of Pomerania belonged to the diocese of Cujavia-Włocławek. Not much less influence was exercised by the wealthy abbots of Oliva, Pelplin, Kartuzy, Żarnowiec, Koronowo, and Żukowo. The social structure of the nobility was similar to that of Great Poland, which means, few families of magnates and relatively few small farmers. The type of opulent land-owner possessing one or at most three or four estates predominated. In the levy books for the years 1570—1 there figured about 1,500 landowners to every 1,000 villages or estates; and in some of the villages were found persons with coats-of-arms who bore characteristically vulgar surnames. Undoubtedly, these were remnants of the native Kaszubian petty nobility who gradually grew poorer and were squeezed of the land. There were barely a dozen *magnates* so rich as to

possess from ten to twenty villages each; and there was no such thing as a Pomeranian "princeling". If with time new families arose on the ruins of the old, they owed this mostly to royal munificence. "For good services", the wojewódstwo of Malborg (Marienburg) provided seven starostwos, the wojewódstwo of Chelmino fourteen, and that of Pomerania nineteen. The starostas in the burghs were administrative officials with judicial functions; the others merely tenants. The towns scattered gold more liberally than the petty nobility, and hence three of them sat in the provincial Senate; these were "beautiful Toruń", "strong Elbing", and "wealthy Danzig". The other, "smaller" towns (*civitates minores*) were numerous, but (as today) none too populous; they had no reason to envy the towns of the German Empire which had been devastated by the Thirty Years' War; and they could look down on the bourgeoisie of Poland proper, for they had preserved their much prized right to purchase landed estates.

As to the condition of the country people, it may be stated generally that it was better not only than in Mazovia, but than in Great Poland also. In particular, the peasants and the colonists, who were brought into the country by the lords without any scruples or preferences as to their nationality, were better treated than the Polish peasantry. The percentage of tenants free from socage duties was large and the development of the manor weaker than elsewhere in Poland. The villages were small — from six to twenty-five farms; for the farms also were not subdivided. About 50% of the peasants possessed 15—30 Polish morgs of land, the rest 7—15; cottages with a little land formed about 7½% and landless lodgers about 4½% of the total number.

The national constitution of the population presented an amalgamation difficult to express in figures. At the period of the Union of Lublin, and hence one hundred years after the Treaty of Toruń, Polish culture was emerging everywhere from under the thick coat of German varnish. The nobility, as is evident from the levy registries for the year 1570—1, was Polish by a great majority; the names of country localities had recovered or adopted Polish forms. The bourgeoisie in the towns stood almost everywhere as the guardian of the German language and culture.

The sixteenth century — the epoch of humanism and reformation in every country — deepened the national consciousness. While Luther on the one side was struggling for a German religious service and emphasizing the value of the German language in literature, and on the other side in Poland Nicholas Rey was doing the same from similar motives, it is not surprising that in Pomerania also the question of nationality appeared to the cultured classes to be, though not a political problem for the State, yet a social and moral problem for the individual. The national character of the province depended on the victory of the "pure evangel", or Catholicism, since Lutheranism represented the German spirit; whereas Catholicism, in the first place stood for Rome and then for Poland. The Protestantism of Royal Prussia was defeated in the last half of the sixteenth century together with the religious reform movement in all Poland; the Catholicism of this province triumphed together with the Catholicism of all Poland. As a result, owing to the energetic action of the Jesuits settled in Braunsberg (1565), a religious and cultural understanding was effected between the nobility and clergy of this province and their brethren in the Republic. The towns with their environs formed Protestant islands, whereas the villages under the protection or pressure of their lay and ecclesiastical lords remained prevalently Catholic. Only a few large abbeys, as those of Pelplin and particularly of Kartuzy, for a long time championed Germanism.

The attractile force of the Polish democracy of nobles acted upon the nobility of Pomerania, Chelmno, and Malborg (Marienburg), and led to many intermarriages of their citizens with those of the Republic itself; in the common Diets and elections the discussions were perhaps conducted at the outset in Latin, but the cries and chatter were in Polish.

It is not surprising that in such conditions from Baisen was born Bażeński; von Mortangen took the name Mortęski; Zehmen in the seventeenth century called himself Czema; some Krockows wished to be Krokowskis, and von Felden, Zakrzewski. It occurred to von Damerau that he was Dąbrowski; von Prebendow was Przebendowski and von Konopath Kono-packi. The Denhofs and Wejhers did not change their names, but that did not prevent them from thinking, speaking, and

acting Polish. And all this happened without the least pressure on the part of the government, without any laws as to language, and almost without protest on the part of the nobility that was becoming Polonized. In vain one of the present historians of Danzig invents some Polish *Bedrückungen und Vergewaltigungen* on the national background¹. Against him stands, like a witness from the grave, a greater historian, Godfrey Lengnich, who, although he never changed his name to Bogumił, but on the contrary felt as a German, lamented Polonization and defended the separate culture and autonomy of Prussia as well as Danzig, nevertheless, in his invaluable work could not find a single word to say as to any violent assimilation of the Prussians.

Bibl. Jag.

This is how, according to Lengnich, the further process of Polonizing the provincial Diet of Prussia appeared. In 1570 for the first time the estates listened to the royal instructions drawn up in Polish; at the States-General in Grudziądz in 1572 every one spoke Polish except the wojewoda of Malborg (Marienburg), Fabian Czema, and the deputies of the larger towns. The under-chamberlains of Malborg (Marienburg) and the deputies of the large towns protested against the new custom (*mehr und mehr üblich*). In 1574 again "*eine Neuerung*": the bishop of Chelmno answered in Polish the German welcome of the burgesses. In 1579 "*eine Neuerung*": during the session of the States-General as court of appeals even the lawyers made their addresses in Polish. Toruń, Elbląg, and Danzig protested, but the Senate decided that from then on every one was allowed to plead either in German or in Polish². In the year 1591 the wojewoda of Marienburg resigned the presidency of the Senate to the Pomeranian wojewoda, because the latter was more efficient in Polish "*welcher Sprache man sich nunmehr sonst gegen die Gesandte, als gegen die Unterstände gemeinlich bediente*".

In the Royal Prussian Chamber of Deputies, where the nobility predominated, the Polish language was thus already in use.

¹ J. Kaufmann, in a collective work *Der Kampf um die Weichsel*, p. 87.

² *Geschichte der Preuss. Lande* II, 399—400, 412; III, 8, 26, 118, 313; IV, 33.

Polonization, however, spread also to the towns. In this process the land of Chelmno led, that of Malborg (Marienburg) remained behind. The quickest to become Polonized were, according to J. Kaufmann, Lidzbark, Golubia, Kowalewo, Chełmża and Radzyń. In Tuchola, Polish and Latin were exclusively used from the seventeenth century on; in Brodnica they became preponderating at this time. In Chelmno German vanished from the judicial records about 1600. The further to the north, however, the more difficult the assimilation of the towns. The German towns remained, nevertheless, merely islands in the Polish population. That the enormous majority of the country population was Polish is proved by the treasury records, which furnish abundant sources from the middle of the sixteenth century on.

The state authority likewise remained neutral with regard to the Jewish element penetrating into Prussia. It is curious, but quite comprehensible, that the strongest opposition to this immigration was made by the towns; the starostas rather encouraged it. The mass of Prussian nobles followed, though not without some hesitation, the anti-Semitic direction of the towns. Already in 1528 all the towns complained that the Jews bought and exported various goods without paying duties, to the great injury of the markets. In 1589 they begged the king not to settle Jews in customs-houses. In 1593 the smaller towns gave warning that the Jews, hitherto rarely to be seen in the province, were spreading over it under the protection of the lord starostas; and immediately after this, in the next year, at a meeting of the States-General in Toruń an edict was issued forbidding the Jews to reside and trade in the province. This, as well as later edicts, failed to prevent the further infiltration of the Jewish element into Pomerania.

5. The Polish Baltic Policy up to the Treaty of Oliva in 1660. "*Classis maritima*" was not forgotten by the heirs of Sigismund Augustus. "Every lord and every nation", wrote Solikowski in 1573, "is more interested in controlling the sea than the land; for the advantages of the sea are greater and speedier than those of the land, and greater and speedier are the injuries and dangers that come from it. There-

fore, whoever has the rule of the sea and does not make use of it, or permits it to be torn away, resigns all advantages for himself and brings all losses on himself: from a free man he becomes a slave, from wealthy poor, from independent dependent; from a lord he becomes a vassal. In the human body the eye is the most important member, and also the most noble, since if he does not possess that a man becomes a useless block. And so also the Crown, having permitted itself to be despoiled of the port of Danzig, that eye with which to regard the whole world, will be nothing but a churl plowing for the benefit of others and moreover will suffer want".

Henry of Valois did not provide the promised fleet; wherefore Stephen Batory at once in the first year of his reign hastened to seize control of Danzig and of the Polish littoral on the Baltic. In striking words he explained to the nobility how abnormal was the relation of the Free Town to the Republic. However, because of the insufficiently decided attitude of the nobility the siege of Danzig was not crowned with success. It ended in the acceptance of homage and tribute from the burghesses, and a new confirmation of the charters. In the matter of Ducal Prussia a similar compromise was made with the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns, whom Stephen recognized as guardians of the sickly Prussian duke. Although he defeated the growing power of Muscovy, King Stephen gained nothing thereby for his Baltic policy; and he finally concluded a compromise with Danzig on February 26, 1585, concerning the division of the customs-duties of the port (*tractus portorii*).

The Polish Baltic policy enters a new stage with the accession of Sigismund Vasa to the throne. A dynastic and later (perhaps) personal union between Warsaw and Stockholm seemed to be the surest foundation for the rights of both sides to the sea. Reality, however, was preparing for Poland a great disillusionment, while it likewise failed to bring any permanent advantage to Sweden, which by this union was incited not to peaceable cooperation but to gigantic, ruinous ambitions. John Zamoyski, as well as his Swedish collaborators, in arranging the election of Sigismund was tempted by the maximum, *i. e.*, union, before realizing the minimum program, a close and sincere friendship. An alliance was natural and justifiable against

Muscovy, which though repulsed was not broken; but a union involved the danger of competition over the person of the king and the enticement of either Poland or Sweden into political by-paths not absolutely in accordance with its interests. Soon, also, Sigismund lost the Swedish throne to his uncle Charles, Duke of Sudermania; and under his successor, the renowned Gustavus Adolphus, in connection with dreams of a Swedish hegemony in the north and a protectorate over lower Germany, a plan was concocted in Stockholm to cut Poland off completely from the Baltic.

In the struggle with Sweden for Livonia (1621—4), the conquests of Sigismund Augustus were almost all taken away; and calamity now hung over the prize of Kazimierz the Jagiellonian, Pomerania and Danzig — a calamity the more threatening because double-faced. It must be realized that from the first months of the Polish-Swedish war the duke-administrator of Prussia consciously adopted a clever method, which he and his successors were to follow always in similar circumstances. Under the cover of a specious neutrality their real disloyalty to Poland was able to accomplish much. And, in fact, the House of Brandenburg gained not a little, in spite of the difficulties and dangers incidental to the two wars by which it was surrounded — the Thirty Years' War and the war between Poland and Sweden. Fate itself offered Poland several opportunities to lay hands on the duchy of Prussia: Albert Frederick, though suffering from melancholia, ruled fifty years; and his heir presumptive, the Elector John Sigismund, as a Calvinist had against him the entire Lutheran opinion of the country. While Albert Frederick lived, it was possible to bargain at every change of guardianship with the new regent for stronger Polish control over the government of Ducal Prussia. But not all the parties interested in this matter were inclined to profit of the occasion. The most opposed to the Hohenzollerns were the nobles of Ducal Prussia; much more friendly were the towns. In Poland the Senate strongly insisted on the rights of the Republic, and the Chamber of Deputies still more strongly. The Crown Marshal, Myszkowski, advised Sigismund to incorporate the duchy in order to contribute to the spread of the Catholic faith (1603); the opinion of other senators was that the "sea-ports, like Danzig,

Elbing, and Riga, would not kick so much, and Courland and Livonia could not so easily make sport of the Crown, if Brandenburg were to take itself out of Ducal Prussia". In fact, the whole littoral interest of the Republic was here at stake, the whole program of its *dominium maris*, in the modest Polish interpretation as possession of a sufficient belt of sea-coast. *Vice versa*, from the German point of view it was a question of a *Drang nach Osten*, and not merely of the reputation of one or another of the Hohenzollerns; therefore, in 1610 a magnificent delegation from the elector introduced into the Diet at Warsaw intercessors from Mecklenburg, Würtemberg, and even from Denmark and France.

Here, obviously the Polish king had the most to say. Now, on the one hand, Sigismund III with his characteristic scrupulousness wished to respect the promises of his predecessors; but, on the other hand, with the obstinacy also characteristic of him he accepted everything that could aid him to recover the crown of the Swedes, Gauts, and Wends. He hastened at every stage of the negotiations to stipulate for himself financial, military, and naval assistance, leaving to Ducal Prussia the possibility of appealing to Warsaw, and to Poland the fading hope of incorporating the duchy some time after the extinction of the Hohenzollerns. Thus, in 1605, without consulting the Diet, the king recognized the guardianship of the Elector Joachim over Albert Frederick; in 1609 he transferred it to John Sigismund; in 1611 he received homage from the latter as the Prussian duke (November 16, at Krakowskie Przedmieście in Warsaw). In vain the papal nuncio protested; in vain the Prussian malcontents so-called (*Querulierende*) demanded for themselves the same freedom as the Poles possessed. As to what was written in the treaty concerning the promise of ships, armed auxiliaries, and vassal subsidies, the "Great Prussian War" of the years 1626—9 proved its value.

At this stage of the struggle for the Baltic both the king and the Diet showed a fairly good understanding of the maritime interests of the Republic. Sigismund in due time negotiated with Vienna and Madrid for the creation on the Baltic of a common marine force under the command of Prince Władysław. The Diet voted considerable levies; the commander-in-chief,

Konieczpolski, manifested great energy in defence of the menaced province, and thanks to him the second Polish fleet has come down to memory as the victor at Oliva (November 28, 1627). But the resources of the State were exhausted after so many wars on all its borders. In the course of the year 1626 the whole coast from Pillau to Puck, with Braunsberg, Fromberg, Elbląg, Marienburg, Tczew, Głowa, Gniew — Danzig alone being excepted — fell into the hands of the invader. The Hapsburgs failed on the sea and were of little use on land, although their own interests dictated resistance to Gustavus Adolphus in Poland in order to prevent him from joining in the Thirty Years' War. The Hohenzollern George William "intermediated", *i. e.*, played the traitor: his army shot with blank cartridges and surrendered without a struggle. Danzig ignored the offers and threats of Sweden, but cooperated with Poland rather sluggishly. Finally through the mediation of France (Ambassador de Charnacé) and of England (Sir Thomas Roe) a six-years' truce was signed at Altmark on St. Michael's Day, 1629, which stands together with the Customs Treaty between Sweden and Danzig of February 18, 1630 as a monument of disaster to the Polish northern policy. Not only Livonia beyond the Dwina remained in the hands of Gustavus, but the whole coast with the ports of Kłajpeda [Memel], Pillau, Elbing, Braunsberg, was occupied by Swedish garrisons. Sztum (Stuhm), Malborg (Marienburg) and Głowa were surrendered to the disloyal elector for sequestration; Danzig was forced to divide the port customs with Sweden. Now only through Puck, as through a narrow little window, could Poland regard its one and only sea; the dream of Gustavus that the Baltic was to be a Swedish lake was approaching its realization with great bounds. The hero of the north next threw himself on Pomerania-Stetin in order to cut the northern part of Germany off from the sea in its turn and make it dependent upon himself. If he had not perished near Lützen, it is simply impossible to say what further misfortunes would have fallen upon Poland.

In this fatal condition Władysław IV inherited the Baltic affair. After having dealt victoriously with Muscovy near Smolensk in the years 1633 and 1634 and repelled the Turkish attack on the Dniester, he directed all his energy towards the north in the hope of recovering the Swedish crown and thus

cutting the Baltic knot at one stroke. There can be no doubt that he acted mainly for dynastic purposes and not merely from desire for Poland's good. Worse still, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies did not understand how far Władysław's ambitions were in accordance with the interests of the Polish State: instead of supporting their war-like king and together with him obtaining the evacuation of Prussia as well as of Livonia — which seems to have been quite possible after the severe defeat of the Swedes at Nördlingen — they appointed a commission to discuss the matter at Stuhmsdorf (Sztumska wieś) with the aim of controlling the royal policy and not permitting a break with the Swedish Queen Christina. The result was that the Truce of Stuhmsdorf (September 12, 1635), concluded through the mediation of France in the interest of Sweden rather than of Poland, released the Polish ports from the hands of Sweden, but left Livonia in possession of the enemy. The nation not only did not give any military assistance to the efforts of the king, but did not even support the position taken by Władysław in a matter incomparably closer and more actual for Poland, for its trade and agriculture. In the Truce of Stuhmsdorf the maritime states stipulated with the concurrence of Sweden that the Republic should not collect any customs in the ports freed from occupation; the king was permitted to take part of the customs of Gustavus for two years only, in lieu of damages. It was made clear by the opposition of these competing states that those customs-duties were most necessary — to Poland itself. Władysław IV, having received at once a lump-sum in compensation from Danzig, planned to build a fleet on the Baltic and to establish a customs-duty in Danzig for his own benefit and that of the Republic. Thus, in this matter he wished to go hand-in-hand with the nation and to supply the Polish treasury with an income for any eventuality from the importation of foreign goods as well as from the work of the Polish husbandman and handiworker. What could be more proper? And, indeed, heated by the eloquence of Chancellor Ossoliński, the Diet in 1637 passed a constitution concerning the port-duties which "are due to us and to the Republic *ex dominio maris*". This was opposed for inconceivable reasons by Lithuania, and for motives unfortunately comprehensible by Royal Prussia. The latter, though

it had suffered the most from Gustavus Adolphus, did not wish the king to become so established on the Baltic as to diminish its slight "freedom". Therefore, only once (in the *laudum* of 1636) did it vote in favor of the establishment of a fleet. The king ignored these protests and with the aid of four ships stationed in the mouth of the Vistula began to collect the Danzig customs under the form of supplementary payments, or *Zulage*. An effort was made, as before under Stephan Batory, to direct trade from Danzig to Elbing. Denmark, aroused by Danzig, reacted violently against the king's regulations; the Danish admiral destroyed the small Polish squadron and brought forty ships into Danzig without paying duty. The only dignified answer on the part of Poland would have been to build a fleet, break off commercial and diplomatic relations with Denmark, and reduce Danzig by starvation. Such an answer was not given, however, by the Warsaw Diet of 1638. On the contrary, the king discovered in the course of it that the town had more defenders in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies than he had himself. It ended in futile recriminations as to the recklessness displayed in beginning the matter and in the appointment of a senatorial commission which was to settle the customs difficulty as favorably as possible for Poland. The king, deserted, sold his claims (as formerly Sigismund Augustus) for 600,000 thalers. Of those proud dreams there remained only sad memories and two forts on Hel, Władysławowo and Kazimierzowo, which were destroyed about fifteen years later by the Swedes, and have since vanished without trace in the sand dunes where now stand the little villages of Kuźnice and Chałupy.

Likewise, under John Kazimierz the royal claims might have been a trump card to play in the State interests of Poland, whereas their easy resignation would not have pacified for certain such extortioners as Charles Gustavus and his generals. But the Republic, shaken by the Ukrainian revolt, oppressed by the Muscovite invasion, could not freely play its trumps, for it was obliged to avoid every possibility of attack. At such a moment Charles Gustavus Wittelsbach planned to wrest away from Poland and win for himself *Roya!* Prussia, forging Ducal Prussia on to it. Meanwhile the ruler of the latter, Frederick William Hohenzollern, from the beginning of his domination

there was endeavoring to loosen his dependence upon the Republic. As soon as their desires and ambitions were mutually understood, the elector began to dream about wrenching from Poland the border territories in addition, and the Swedish king outlined for himself a gigantic plan of annexation, according to which he would push Poland far from the Baltic and take away from her not only Pomerania, but likewise Lithuania and the belt of Mazovia lying between Lithuania and Great Poland. But there was no common understanding as to the fate of Ducal Prussia. The Swedish king wished to have it as a fief of his own, but the Brandenburg ruler aimed at complete independence. This difference explains why their plans of conquest developed in accord only up to a certain moment.

In these terrible troubles it is a fact that the policy of John Kazimierz and of the whole nation did not waver even for a second from the point of defending the minimum maritime program. In the worst days, when the originally Polish wojewódstvos lost heart, it would have been possible to win over the elector by giving him one or another district or by offering to release him from his feudal dependence; but from the time the vassal became a traitor and dared to make war around Warsaw, John Kazimierz declared that he was ready to fight for Royal Prussia for one hundred years, and in the end he carried his point. Poland resigned thousands of square miles of White Russia and the Ukraine, but defended to the last every foot of Pomerania. Muscovy was cleverly allured by a mirage of the Jagiellonian crown after John Kazimierz, and its regiments were directed into Livonia; Holland was so skilfully interested in the matter of free trade at the mouth of the Vistula that the Dutch in 1656 broke the blockade of Danzig; an alliance was successfully concluded with Austria and Denmark, and they forced the invader to retire from the banks of the Vistula to Oresund. Exhausted, the Republic finally bought peace and an alliance with Frederick William (in Welawa [Wehlau], September 19, 1657) and in Bydgoszcz (November 6) by the recognition of the independence of Ducal Prussia with the addition of a few territorial concessions: Lębork (Lauenburg) and Bytow (Buetow) were given to him in fief, and Elbing was granted him in fee, but with a reservation of the right to repurchase it. In the making of the Treaties of Welawa and Byd-

goszcz, as well as at the Congress of Oliva (1660), France under the direction of Cardinal Mazarini contributed to settle the Baltic affairs in a manner very unfavorable to Poland; Poland then lost suzerainty over Königsberg and resigned forever Riga. The only gain was a not bad *modus vivendi* with Sweden, cutting Muscovy off from the Baltic — although based on the line of the Dwina and not on the frontier which under Stephan Batory could have been drawn between Polish Livonia and Swedish Esthonia.

In Prussia everything was not yet lost. It is worth mentioning that the connection of Poland with the Baltic was most prized not by the Prussian nobility or by the still more distant Polish nobility, but by the towns. Danzig maintained itself splendidly during the whole time of the Second Northern War (1654—60), and opposed strongly the surrender of Elbing to the elector. Later, after the Peace of Oliva, Elbing itself — perhaps regretting the ease with which it had received the Swedes — petitioned John Kazimierz to keep it under his own domination. The withdrawal of Ducal Prussia from Polish suzerainty and protection aroused consternation and attempts at opposition among the local nobility and townspeople. Only by force did Frederick William compel the estates of Königsberg to pay him homage. Poland, however, being distracted internally by the military rebellions of 1661—3, could not decide to extend a hand to the Prussians leaning towards her.

6. Internal Conditions of Royal Prussia. The chief terrain on which centralizing tendencies came into conflict with decentralizing ones was in the parliamentary life of the estates. The dietines of the districts and of the wojewódstvos were in no wise different from those in the other Crown lands, except in that their executive organs were weaker, their development having been left — like the entire economic self-government — to the States-General. The States-General passed through a characteristic evolution: in the beginning its essential elements were the Council and representatives of the towns; delegates from the nobles gained access in indeterminate numbers. Gradually the principle became established that for a minimum quorum without which the States-General could not meet the presence of one senator and one representative of

the towns sufficed, provided that delegates from all three wojewódstvos participated. The parliamentary Union of Lublin was regarded by separatists like Lengnich of Danzig as an evil which could not be remedied. Among the nobles, however, there were few who shared these regrets. The province from 1569 to 1772 was represented at about one hundred regular Diets of the Republic, presented a mass of written petitions, complaints, reservations, manifestoes, but had no reason to regret its participation in the Diets. It was quite natural that a country with a distinct social structure, which had imbibed non-Catholic creeds and had been for a long time Germanized and colonized by the Knights of the Cross should sometimes rebel against the centralizing tendencies of Warsaw; such reactions, however, occurred even in the thoroughly Polish lands of Mazovia and Oświęcim; and in even the oldest provinces of the State particularism expressed itself, sometimes more quietly, sometimes more loudly. When every province cried "nothing about us without us", when each considered its own private instructions as an absolute rule of conduct for its delegates, when throughout the whole State the principle of unanimous approval of statutes and unanimous election of the king triumphed, what is there surprising in the fact that Royal Prussia also was unwilling to acknowledge statutes passed by Diets without its agreement? The separatists demanded still more — that the province be subject only to the common king and not to the common Diet; and they not only tried to hold responsible delegates who did not follow their instructions, but denied the validity of statutes for which the delegates had voted in spite of their mandates. Such pretensions were practically never advanced by other wojewódstvos, and in this respect the quantitatively greater degree of separatism in Prussia manifested itself.

The spirit of particularism cropped up in the Diets and struggled against the consciousness of belonging to one political nation. For a certain time the Prussian delegation with the senators and the towns obtained from the kings the right to hold separate sessions; these, though recognized by Władysław IV ended with the coronation of John III, for from that time on the deputies of the larger towns ceased to go to Warsaw, and the deputies and senators from the nobility joined the provincial

sessions of Great Poland. Prussia furnished the Chamber of Deputies with a few Marshals (John Gniński, 1664—5, and Thomas Działyński, 1690), demanded permanent place in the constitutional deputation, and tried to get a share in concluding international treaties. The number of its representatives who attended the meetings in Warsaw and Grodno was undefined and unproportional: before 1640 the largest number elected was 13; but in 1648, 38 were elected; in 1680, 53; in 1689, 74; in 1699, 105; in 1730, 118; and in 1735, again only 61. However not all those elected actually served; to some the mere title of deputy gave sufficient satisfaction. The excessive number of Prussian delegates is very easily explicable by the application of the principle of unanimity, according to which neither one hundred nor ten, nor even one deputy could be outvoted. The Prussians presented a whole series of protests against various constitutions. Some of these — as Lengnich boasts — were suggested by the secretaries of the larger towns (Toruń, Elbing, and Danzig), who attended the Diets regularly, though not in the character of deputies. To the honor of Pomerania and of the land of Chelmno we can prove that these protests were rather in the nature of formal legal proceedings, aiming to secure certain exceptions and advantages to the province and not to disintegrate the State.

What was hidden under these manifestations of opposition and discontent? Perhaps a violated instinct of national independence, or a longing for unity with the state of the Hohenzollerns or with the German Empire? An unequivocal answer to this question is to be seen in the sentiments reflected in the *lauda* [resolutions] and instruction of the seventeenth century. The Prussian States-General preserved, in fact, a remnant of the feeling of attachment to their comrades in Ducal Prussia whose ancestors had fought together with their own for the common liberty; they wished these comrades well and precisely therefore they regarded the lords of the latter, the Prussian dukes, with the liveliest aversion and distrust. Let the Republic settle its conflict with the elector of Brandenburg in such a way as not to cause any injury to the direct supremacy of the king over Prussia, or to the rights of its inhabitants (especially in the matter of appeal to the royal court), or the Catholic religion (1607). Let the elector conscientiously

protect Pillau, threatened by Sweden (1625); let him leave off his neutrality and assist Poland in conformance with his oath of allegiance (1628). The granting of the rights of natives in Ducal Prussia to intruders from Silesia and other countries (that is, mostly from the German Empire) should cease; and if newcomers of common origin have acquired land, it should be taken from them (1636, 1638). Let the elector pay his debt to the Republic (1642), repel the Swedish invasion (1655), furnish Poland assistance in its eastern war in accordance with the treaty (1664). The States-General intervened (1668) in order to preserve the rights and privileges not only of the nobility of Ducal Prussia, but also those of the nobility of Brandenburg; and when Frederick William broke with Poland complaints poured in from the dietine of Marienburg (1664), asking why the elector had been granted Ducal Prussia with sovereign rights without consulting the Prussian estates. Thus, Prussian separatism did not possess at all at that time the character of national irredentism, although certain elements in the towns tried to give it such a tone. The nobles and ultimately also the townspeople were concerned with very tangible interests: finances, taxes, and vacancies. Royal Prussia made a strong stand on these three ramparts of its autonomy.

As to financial affairs, the province occupied such an important position with respect to the whole Republic that without an understanding with it, and in particular with the large towns, no great reform in coinage could be introduced. In the course of the seventeenth century there were nineteen joint commissions on coinage. When in the Crown Kingdom after the Swedish war (in the reign of John Kazimierz), the mint of Tynff and Boratini lowered the value of silver money, Prussia protested against this, and the depreciated coins became current in Prussia at half their nominal value; henceforth the original Prussian money was designated as "good" in contrast to the depreciated Polish currency.

Toruń, Elbing, and Danzig at the end of the eighteenth century still coined their own money. Conflicts as to public finance were not lacking, either. The Prussian prized special types of taxation for themselves and maintained the principle that they should be voted in Marienburg or Grudziądz, and not in Warsaw. The struggle over this

raged furiously. The Poles recalled the "reciprocal compact" (*reciproca sponsio*) of 1454 and the decree of Sigismund Augustus. Their Prussian brothers replied that the union of their country with Poland had been made with the reservation of local rights, among which belonged the voting of taxes for their own and not for another's benefit; that from the old promise to support the king with counsel and supplies an obligation to pay taxes in common with the rest of the Crown did not result; that the Prussian States-General should be consulted as to taxes; etc.

However, since Prussia wished to have a decisive influence on all "important affairs" of the Kingdom, since every instruction passed from narrow provincial matters over into the terrain of general Polish politics, it was difficult to maintain the purely autonomous standpoint. And in fact, the Prussian deputies, as well as their colleagues, understood how to break their instructions bravely (1611, 1613, 1618, 1632, 1676, 1677, 1685), and also how to vote for taxes at the meetings of the dietines preliminary to those of the Diet (1655, 1685, 1689, 1696). Not less burdensome than taxes was personal military service, and therefore this interest likewise assumed the garment of a separatistic ideal. Prussia agreed to the common levy, but only within the borders of the province, as it had been in the times of the Knights of the Cross. But, since the Polish wars were waged for the most part on the Dwina, the Dnieper, and the Dniester, and the untrained common levy was quite powerless against the only enemies that Pomerania actually saw (the Swedes and Brandenburgers), Prussia — as Lengnich affirms — always gave money for the common defence, but seldom helped with an army.

As to customs-duties, foreign as well as domestic, the Prussians had their own particular point of view, springing from the commercial spirit of the townspeople. While in Poland proper the nobles claimed for themselves exemption from customs-duties and only at the most critical periods agreed to a general customs-duty (1661, 1764), burdening the other estates with both foreign and domestic duties, in Royal Prussia the towns succeeded in arousing the solidary opposition of all classes against this kind of taxes. Danzig was able to make

millions of profits on imported goods by the so-called *Zulage*; it could tolerate the royal customs known as pile duties (*Pfahlgeld*), since it received one-half of them for its share; but beyond this, freedom from customs-duties was everywhere the rule, as the system most beneficial to a transit country. "Old" customs-houses were ultimately tolerated, new ones always provoked an outcry. Not only domestic customs-duties within the province roiled the blood of its "patriots"; every increase of customs-duties in Poland, even outside of the Prussian frontiers, in the furthest wojewódstvos of the Crown, provoked grumbling from these advocates of free trade; complaints made in 1590, 1634, 1696 stigmatized such increases as against the rights of the province.

Another equally material foundation, without any connection with national sentiment, lay at the basis of the obstinate defence of the Prussian indigénate. Essentially, as Lengnich declares, a Prussian native or indigenous person could only be a child of a Prussian born in Prussia; but the latter condition fell away of itself as too narrow even for the natives. This exclusiveness, both in Poland and outside of it, was characteristic of all provinces freshly annexed and not yet sufficiently amalgamated into one nation. Not a single government in Europe could absolutely respect this type of egoism, if it cared (at least a little) for unity of administration. Thus, the Polish king took the usual line in solemnly confirming this principle — and delicately making exceptions to it. Following the example of Kazimierz the Jagiellonian (who had granted the charter of incorporation), Sigismund I, Sigismund Augustus, Henry of Valois, and Stephen Batory confirmed the indigénate. Sigismund III offered in 1605 to have this right confirmed at a regular meeting of the Diet (an offer which was of doubtful legal value, since the indigénate passed as a holy relic older than the Polish Diets themselves); and when the Diet of the Republic tried to do away with it, he seems to have prevented them. Władysław IV actually introduced in 1647 a constitution granting all vacancies to Prussian natives. John Kazimierz included the indigénate in the general confirmation of the laws of the Kingdom; Sobieski confirmed it three times (1674, 1676, 1683), Augustus II laconically, Augustus III with prolixity — but, eventually, each admitted exceptions to this rule.

Who fell under this much-prized designation of "native" and what rights did it confer on him? The townspeople were careful in 1648 not to explain the indigenate for the sole benefit of the nobility, but little by little they allowed themselves to be excluded from its advantages. The nobility step by step established their conception of the indigenate; in 1640 they demanded that the abbeys of Oliva and of Pelplin be bestowed only on priests who were nobles of Prussian origin; to episcopal sees they wished to admit from outside the province only the sons of kings who belonged to local chapters. However, they were unable to prevent the nomination to these sees of many Poles; under John Kazimierz even Italians became canons, profiting of which King Michael Wiśniowiecki and King John Sobieski made Poles and Lithuanians eligible for these offices. Gradually the conception of a native began to merge into that of an estate-owner; for in the course of the seventeenth century the nobility continually insisted that those occupying starostwos, the royal domains, offices, senatorial chairs, not only must have been born from a local family, but must possess landed estates in the province. The indigenate could be granted only by the local States-General and that (according to the *laudum* of 1666) on the basis of the unanimous recommendation of the dietine of a *województwo*. Decisions on this subject were made either orally or (after 1640) in writing under the provincial seal.

The indigenate served only the one who received it and his immediate successors, but not collateral relations; it was formally confirmed by the king, and therefore no one could receive it during an interregnum. The Prussian "patriots" tried to prohibit nobles from other parts from acquiring landed estates (1600), and in the following year they obtained a constitution excluding foreigners, *e. g.*, those from Ducal Prussia or Brandenburg, but admitting nobles from the entire Polish Republic, who by the very acquisition of estates gained the right to take an active part in elections in the Prussian dietines. They endeavored likewise to shut the burgesses out from landed estates (as had been done in the rest of the Republic), but Danzig and Toruń succeeded in preventing this.

Positions and possessions for their own — this cry was not unknown in other Polish *województwos*, in the Cujavian, for in-

stance; but in the Prussian province it resounded most loudly. Nevertheless, it was impossible to prevent Pomeranians from falling in love with Poznanians, or Cujavians from marrying daughters of the land Chelmno. Thus, by marriage, inheritance of estates, political and military comradeship, an intimacy sprung up between the nobility of the three littoral wojewódstvos and the large noble family of the Republic; and this intimacy opened the way to the indiginate.

With unrestrainable force the elemental impulses of their brother nobles in the Crown Kingdom and Lithuania spread to the Prussian province. The ideology of the year 1573 — direct election of the king by all the citizens, *pacta conventa*, refusal of obedience — became the common ideology of the nobility from the Carpathians and the Dnieper to Puck and Rosienie. The *liberum veto* followed in triumphal procession. There were some efforts in the Prussian province not only to decline this most doubtful social acquisition of the nobility, but to limit its use even in Poland. And later, when the evil had already multiplied fatally, the provincial Diet at Grudziądz again tried to cure Warsaw of this "plague", advising that those who broke up a Diet should not be permitted to leave the meeting place until the end of the session (1667) and that a Diet Court should be created to judge violent acts of the deputies. But this very Grudziądz in these same years advocated the foolish idea that even in senatorial discussion „*unius contradictio valeat*“.

This indicates that the same plague had infected the legal consciousness of the Prussian States-General itself and undermined its autonomy. Although the wojewódstvos of Pomerania and Marienburg secured in Warsaw in 1613 a constitution for the choice of delegates and deputies by a majority and by the votes of landowners only, they did not utilize this privilege: if at their meetings a motion was not unanimously accepted, they dismissed it and went on to other matters. In any case, if we pass over the initiative of the years 1616-8 (which was such as any of the older Polish wojewódstvos might have been capable of), it is not evident that the town element, which was prevalently German and accustomed to government by the majority, exercised any educative influence in this respect on the mass of local nobility; the towns were satisfied with the

declaration that they were not guilty of breaking up public deliberations. In fact, they were indirectly contributors, since they had inspired those protests against the decisions of the Diets about which Lengnich speaks and which gradually led to the institution of the veto. While the latter institution was early accepted in this mixed province, because it suited the egoism and conservatism of the whole body of nobles, that other peculiarity of Old Poland — the Confederation — found there a less fertile field; for it represented (as it were) a violent, radical act.

The facts set forth above as characterizing the legal and political relation between Pomerania and the land of Chelmino, on the one side, and the rest of the Republic, on the other side, take on a deeper sense and a more vivid color when they are compared in the first instance with the biased presentation of them in German science, and next with analogous phenomena in other countries. Vain is the effort to represent the process of assimilation of Royal Prussia as a violent one, and its opposition as the defence of a separate and higher national culture. A tendency towards unification must have existed in Warsaw — and, indeed, what kind of a state organism would it have been which failed to react to such conduct from a province that formed its breathing organ, its main link with the cultural life of the West? But this tendency was expressed with unheard-of gentleness, even languor, in a tone compared with which that of the Jagiellonians appears strikingly vigorous; and it would be simply ridiculous even to compare this tone with that of other rulers in the East and in the West, with the hard energy of the Philips, the Ferdinands, the Charleses, and the Fredericks, in similar circumstances. And this explains the strange phenomenon that in the period of the rise of absolutistic and centralistic tendencies, when the liberty of provinces and of estates was defended desperately, even to rebellion, against the ruling monarchs, when France had a Fronde in which Condé and Turenne participated, when the Danish estates had a traitor Ulfeld, the estates of Sweden and Livonia Patkul, the estates of Brandenburg-Prussia Kalkstein and Roth, when in Great Poland Opaliński rebelled, in Mazovia Radziejowski, in Little Poland Lubomirski, in Lithuania Radziwiłł, at that time this country of Pomerania, Marienburg, and Chelmino did not make

a single revolt and did not show a single known traitor. Neither the Prussian Catholics nor the Protestants tried to secede from Poland; no one wished to go under the protecting wing of Sweden, where neither Catholicism nor Calvinism was tolerated, nor under the sceptre of the Hohenzollern, whose Lutheran, Calvinist, and Mennonite subjects lived in violent "theological hatred". It is evident that the religious oppression, examples of which are now being quoted by a publicist and historian of Danzig,¹ was not intolerable.

7. Economic Significance of Royal Prussia. The Vistula acquired importance in the sixteenth century as the chief trade-route leading from Poland to the Baltic. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Cracow and Toruń had raised obstacles to its use; by virtue of the staple right granted them, these towns forced all travelling foreign merchants to sell their goods to their own inhabitants. Yet in spite of this, even as early as the middle of the fifteenth century, a lively trade developed on the lower Vistula, especially between Toruń and Danzig. At the end of the fifteenth century the privileges of Cracow fell into oblivion. Toruń's staple right, which had been extended on the basis of the royal charter of 1456 also to grain, was abolished by the decision of King Alexander in 1505. In consequence, trade on the Vistula increased, especially traffic in grain. Already near the end of the fifteenth century in some years 10,000 lasts of grain were exported through Danzig; this raised the value of Danzig's staple right, which it possessed throughout the Middle Ages and kept up to the end of the eighteenth century.

One feature of the traffic on the Vistula was the predominate role in it which was played by the great landowners. Almost all agriculturalists obtained freedom from customs-duties. As to the nobility, already in the second half of the fifteenth century, the principle was accepted that it need not pay customs anywhere throughout the entire extent of the state, neither on goods transported "from home" or "to home" (Statutes of Nieszawa, 1454, and Constitution of 1496). A statute of the Diet in 1504 made it clear that this principle also

¹ Hans Hübner in the collective work "*Der Kampf um die Weichsel*", p. 98.

applied to the clergy; and in 1538 it was extended to the peasant serfs of the nobles and clergy, but because of the system of socage labor on estates, which was established in Poland in the sixteenth century, the peasants on their small farms could not succeed in producing enough grain to undertake its export themselves. Immune from customs-duties were likewise all those individuals and institutions to whom the king by virtue of his royal right granted this privilege. He had authority to free from customs any single export of a specified amount of goods or the permanent export from certain estates to which special privileges in this respect were granted. Generally the starostas profited of this, seldom the towns. In the sixteenth century the inhabitants of Łowicz, Skierniewice, Włocławek, Brześć in Cujavia, and Old Warsaw gained this right. But at any rate the large landowners, namely the nobles and the clergy, drew the greatest benefits from it. It encouraged them to avoid the mediation of professional merchants in the towns, who were generally obliged to pay duties on the transportation of goods. If, nevertheless, the townspeople still participated in the buying and selling of agricultural products, it was due simply to the fact that the Polish duties were not excessive.

The general export of grain continued to increase in the sixteenth century. The lowering of the export figures in some years of this century was merely the result of poor harvests. Before 1550 the yearly export of grain passing through the customs-house in Włocławek — leaving out of account the transportation which commenced below Włocławek — often reached 7,600 lasts. Only in the reign of Sigismund Augustus did this amount increase still further, and then the export almost always reached more than 10,000 lasts a year; in the years 1555 and 1556 it went as high as 20,000, and in 1568 even up to 25,000 lasts. In this, rye held the first place and the nobles remained the chief exporters. Besides freedom from customs-duties, they had the advantage of cheap transportation, for they made use for this purpose of the unpaid socage labor of their peasants and thus avoided the cost of the mediation of town merchants. The share of the latter in the export of grain fluctuated within the limits of from 23 to 33%. Besides grain, forest products were also exported in considerable quantities in the sixteenth century — wood, ashes, pitch, and wax. Among in-

dustrial products the main export was linen, which was handled by the merchants of Sandomir and Cracow.

From the mines salt and certain metals were shipped by the Vistula. The salt remained mostly within the borders of the Crown Kingdom; sometimes, however, the customs-house in Włocławek noted also its further transportation. The traffic in metals, the export of which possessed much significance in the Middle Ages, in the sixteenth century no longer played an important role. Only the transportation of Hungarian copper still reached any considerable proportions. But, in general, agricultural and forest products enormously preponderated among the exports.

In comparison with the tremendous traffic in goods down the Vistula, the traffic going up the Vistula appeared trifling. In the Middle Ages it usually went only as far as Toruń, whence the greater part of the goods imported was carried further by inland routes. The mediation of the merchants of Toruń in this trade was one of the bases of the splendid growth of the town at the end of the Middle Ages. In the sixteenth century this importation reached further up the Vistula also, but still remained quite limited in size. The chief place among imports was taken by sea-fish; and the trade in these lay in the hands of town merchants. Foreign salt was also imported; but the State opposed this, for its policy was to provide all Poland with domestic salt. From Danzig beer was sometimes imported to Poland, particularly in the reign of Sigismund Augustus. Quite important also in the sixteenth century was the importation of cloth from Flanders and England, as well as various southern products purchased through the mediation of the Flanders markets — in particular, wine, olives, and fruit. This trade gradually became an overland one. In the sixteenth century it used the route by the Vistula only to a slight extent.

The most splendid development of the export trade in Polish goods occurred in the reigns of Sigismund III and Wladyslaw IV and in the first years of John Kazimierz's reign. As in the sixteenth century, it was not limited to grain alone, but the latter far surpassed both in quantity and in value all the other goods conveyed down the Vistula. The figures which we have concerning the exportation of grain at this period refer to its

export from Danzig. They show that it amounted to 100,000 lasts per annum, and that in the year 1618 it reached the record amount of 128,000 lasts. These figures may be taken to correspond with the total amount of grain shipped from Poland, though for Danzig they must, in fact, be somewhat lowered, considering that Danzig might export also grain coming from other neighboring countries. This amount must have been rather insignificant, however, and was balanced by the grain exported through Elbing, which in reckoning the Polish exports should also be taken into account.

The wars during John Kazimierz's time greatly diminished the proportions of the trade on the Vistula. The exportation of grain from Poland to Danzig fell far below 50,000 lasts, and there were years in which it completely disappeared. After the termination of these stormy times, at the very end of John Kazimierz's reign and for some years afterwards as well as in the quieter period of John Sobieski's rule, the number of lasts exported again exceeded 50,000. The greatest fall in exports occurred in the times of Augustus II and Augustus III; there were only five years in which the exports exceeded 50,000 lasts a year.

As in the sixteenth century, so in the seventeenth and at the beginning of the eighteenth rye was the most important export, for it generally comprized two-thirds of the total amount of grain exported. From the end of the reign of Augustus II wheat began to play a greater role. Only quite small quantities of other kinds of grain were included.

In this period the export of grain absolutely preponderated over the export of all other goods. Forest products still occupied the second place, but near the end of the sixteenth century the amount of these decreased, because the forests became thinned out. Among other products in the seventeenth century Polish lead and Hungarian copper still went by way of the Vistula. However, in the eighteenth century, their transportation was no longer heard of.

The importation of goods by the Vistula from Danzig to Poland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was probably stronger than before. In the eighteenth century, besides fish, many colonial products were brought in — in particular,

southern fruit — and also much French and Spanish wine. The lack of proper data unfortunately prevents us from defining more exactly the extent of this importation; but, at any rate, it could not be compared with the exportation. It seems certain that the importation of goods from Danzig to Poland by land-routes was more highly developed. In the years from 1615 to 1628 the average yearly export through Danzig amounted to 13,000,000 Polish zloty; the average yearly importation from Danzig to Poland, on the other hand, represented a value of 10,000,000 zloty, with a maximum record of 17,500,000 zloty. Thus, though trade by way of the Vistula was much less to Poland than it was in the opposite direction, there must have been a quite intensive land traffic of goods from Danzig to Poland. This included, in the first place, industrial products, chiefly porcelain, faience, and glass articles.

The chief mediator in the Baltic trade was Danzig, commanding the mouth of the Vistula and possessing the best Polish port. It was the only place in Poland where the townspeople kept from the Middle Ages onward a monopoly of trade in relation to outside merchants. All strangers not possessing local township rights could sell their goods only to town merchants. The charter of Kazimierz the Jagiellonian secured for Danzig the rights of a Free Town and strengthened its resistance to the economic and political rivalry of the nobles and starostas, who were hindering the development of other Polish towns. From the moment Pomerania was united with Poland Danzig raised its trade to unheard-of proportions, thus laying the foundation for its brilliant development. The Vistula and its tributaries, the Bug and the Narew, opened up to it trading relations with the wealthiest part of Poland. Danzig understood how to profit of its favorable location and great privileges in such a way as to forward its growth and increase its wealth. In its policy towards Poland its own interest was its guiding principle: in the first place, it always defended its rights and privileges, assuring for itself unbounded freedom of trade; and it was the only factor which limited the free trade of the nobility. Its enormous profits arose chiefly from the fact that the prices paid to the Poles who sent grain to Danzig were much lower than the prices paid by foreign merchants. Acting as mediator be-

tween the agricultural producer in Poland and the foreign buyer, the Danzig merchants exerted themselves in every possible way in order to buy cheap and sell dear. For instance, in 1638 they paid for grain coming by way of the Vistula not fully 60% of the price they received in Danzig from foreign merchants. Besides this, Danzig acquired for itself the right of closing the export of grain, and took advantage of it not only in order to prevent a dearth of grain in the town, but also to lower the prices for agricultural products paid to those who furnished them. On the other hand, for goods imported from abroad for Polish buyers they tried to get as high prices as possible. Such an interpretation by Danzig of the rights belonging to it naturally led to disputes with Poland, and in the reign of Sigismund I the nobles violently protested in the Diets against these privileges. Stephen Batory during his struggle with Danzig thought of directing the Baltic trade to Elbing, which at that time, unfortunately, was almost completely ruined. The natural predominance of Danzig and technical difficulties defeated the realization of these projects. Danzig preserved, therefore, its privileges, which permitted it to take the leading place among Polish towns as the chief center of trade and the most important port on the Baltic. All the advantages fell to it which Poland did not succeed in gaining for itself from its access to the sea.

After Danzig, the next most important trading town in Pomerania was Toruń. By being deprived of its staple right it suffered great losses, which redounded chiefly to the advantage of Danzig. The significance which the town attached to this privilege is shown by the frequently renewed efforts to regain it and by the attempts often made to continue to exercise staple right with respect to merchants travelling to the Baltic by overland routes. The question of this privilege was more than once a cause of misunderstanding with Danzig. Toruń, in any case, remained a prominent town during the whole period of Polish rule. The local merchants recouped the losses they suffered in consequence of the abolition of staple right by the advantageous trade connections they made at the end of the fifteenth century in Cujavia and Mazovia — first of all, collecting grain from these terrains for exportation to Danzig. Furthermore, they carried on a trade with those neighborhoods in in-

dustrial products and colonial wares. The development of this traffic was undoubtedly assisted by the storehouse for salt in Toruń, which had been established by Sigismund, and also by his restrictions on the importation of salt from abroad. These circumstances forced even merchants from distant parts to maintain relations with Toruń; and by thus centralizing in its market the trade of considerable districts, Toruń hindered the development of the neighboring smaller towns.

In the exportation of agricultural products from Pomerania itself the largest share was taken by the fertile land of Chelmno. Its grain was sent to Grudziądz and Chelmno, from whence it was forwarded by water to Danzig. The chief role in this respect was played by Grudziądz: here the river-boats were loaded with the greater part of the grain to be exported, and at the same time many of the agricultural producers and the smaller towns in the neighborhood were furnished with industrial articles and colonial wares. The result was that the town — which was usually very slightly affected by the wars — grew considerably under Polish dominion. Certainly the customs-house, which had been transferred thither from Włocławek in 1567, contributed also in this; for from that time on boats going by the Vistula were obliged to stop at Grudziądz.

In the northern part of Pomerania the most important station for the exportation of grain was Tczew. This town was destroyed during the Thirteen Years' War; but under Polish rule, because of its excellent location on the Vistula and the sufficient supply of land possessed by the townspeople, it enjoyed a new epoch of successful development. The wars in the middle of the seventeenth century again caused its decline and it was never able afterwards to return to its former level.

Elbing could not in Polish times play a very important role as a trading port because of the rivalry of Danzig and Königsberg. It possessed a good location which permitted it to share in the Polish trade by the Baltic as well as in the exportation from Ducal Prussia; but because the commercial interests of Poland and, in particular, of Royal Prussia, on the one side, and of Ducal Prussia on the other side were conflicting, the advantages accruing to it from natural conditions were soon lost. Ducal Prussia and Royal Prussia did, indeed, exchange

their products with each other, especially grain, but this did not soften the hostility arising from the freedom of trade which Polish exporters enjoyed. In their interest the king refrained from putting any limitations on the exportation of agricultural products from his Baltic ports. Merchants from Danzig and Elbing therefore bought grain in Ducal Prussia and thus raised the prices there. The requests of the Prussian duke (1551, 1553) that the exportation of grain from Polish ports be restricted had no effect; wherefore the authorities of Ducal Prussia began to place difficulties in the way of the purchase of grain by Polish merchants within their borders, which favored considerably the development of the commerce of Königsberg. Though Danzig did not need to worry about the consequent losses, Elbing suffered very much from them, as it shown by the complaint addressed to the king in the year 1522. The latter town thus found itself between two serious rivals whose competition deprived it of favorable conditions for development.

Besides its share in transportation to the Baltic ports, Pomeranian traffic was also concerned with certain products of native industry, chiefly cloth, linen materials, and metal articles, which merchants from the towns and villages supplied to Royal Prussia itself and transported to the East, even beyond the boundaries of the Republic. The profits made in this way formed the main foundation for the development of the towns that were partly agricultural and located far from the Vistula, the chief trade route.

Some of the advantages from trade were taken from the town merchants by the Jews, who acted as middlemen between the towns and the country and carried goods to the East. The Jewish population in Royal Prussia was less numerous than in other Polish provinces. At the end of the eighteenth century we find a considerable number of them in the near neighborhood of Danzig, where they collected because here were the best opportunities for intermediation in trade. One-third of the Jews of all Royal Prussia were concentrated in three such places.

The stagnation and decay of town life which manifested itself in the middle of the seventeenth century throughout all Poland appeared also in Royal Prussia. It was caused not only

by the military disasters, but also by the economic rivalry of the starostas and the nobles; and sometimes certain special circumstances must also be taken into account. Some towns as early as the end of the fifteenth century suffered considerable losses by being deprived of their character as administrative and military centers. It sometimes happened also that the larger towns by their competition entirely prevented the development of the neighboring smaller towns. The most pronounced influence in this direction was exercised by Danzig; and the history of Puck is a curious example of it. This little town, which from the very nature of its location had small chances of growth, was in 1491 pawned by Kazimierz for a certain sum of money to Danzig, under whose government it remained until 1545. During this period the egoistic policy of Danzig placed heavy burdens on Puck. The Danzig authorities collected from the burgesses of Puck large amounts for socage duties, rent, and various other charges, especially on pisciculture; and the townspeople of Danzig violated their privileges in a great many cases, inflicting in this way enormous losses on them. The most damage was caused by the centralization of trade in Danzig, which deprived Puck of all possible revenues from this source. Its situation improved after its redemption by Poland; in particular economic life revived there when King Sigismund Augustus, wishing to create a rudimentary Polish navy for his struggle in Livonia, ordered his privateers to transfer themselves from the port of Danzig to the station at Puck (1567). Then the building of new ships and the repairing of old ones, their equipment for the expedition, and the ceaseless influx of volunteers opened up new sources of income for the inhabitants. Still more important for Puck were the efforts of Sigismund III to create an armed marine force. Among the handworkers and laborers employed at that time in building vessels the majority came from the local population. Unfortunately, the plan of creating in Puck a basis for a Polish maritime power was too quickly dropped to be able to contribute much to the more permanent development of the town.

Royal Prussia displayed great vitality in its economic life from the Treaty of Toruń to the First Partition; especially lively was the development of its system of agriculture, which easily adapted itself to the economic conjuncture. Landowner-

ship tended towards the form of estates organized on a basis of socage labor, but this form remained elastic enough not to interfere with further evolution; and it returned to the rental system whenever the latter offer greater advantages or was demanded by economic necessities. The basic element in the organization of landed property was, thus, a combination of an estate worked by socage labor and tenant farms, and the latter usually possessed more importance. The elasticity of the system of agriculture mentioned above was a contributing factor in the speed with which Pomerania usually rebuilt the districts devastated by war and extended agricultural production over the new terrains. This development influenced favorably the condition of the towns. In addition, the burgesses drew considerable benefits from the Baltic trade carried on by Poland and other southern countries, for which Royal Prussia served as a corridor leading to the sea-routes. The profits from this source fell chiefly to the towns on the Vistula, while the special political and economic privileges of Danzig secured it the lion's share of these. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some towns fell into decay and various productive enterprises were reduced to ruin. This is particularly true of towns located far from the main trade route and not possessing good conditions of development. On the other hand, towns located on the Vistula, in view of the favorable conjuncture created by the trade relations of Poland with foreign countries, remained for the most part on their earlier level or even rose still higher in consequence of the successful growth of handiwork and trade. In general, the economic life of Pomerania recouperated easily and quickly in the great majority of cases from the many disasters which befell it.

8. Polish Baltic Policy from the Treaty of Oliva to the First Partition (1660—1772). With the Treaty of Oliva the Polish Baltic policy enters a new stage, which may be summarized as the gradual tightening of a Brandenburg-Prussian circle and later also of a Russian circle around those two corridors by which the Republic still communicated with the sea, the Pomeranian on the west and that through Samogitia and Courland on the east, respectively. The whole course of the Vistula still belonged to Poland and the navigation of the Niemen and the Dwina was still open; but the crumbling of its frontiers had

already begun. Having taken Lębork (Lauenburg) and Bytów (Buetow) the elector in the years 1668 seized the starostwo of Drahim; and naturally he did not resign Elbing. One of the only two possible outcomes from such a situation was inevitable: either Poland would bridle this deadly and insidious enemy and again widen its access to the sea; or it would lose even what it still possessed. John Sobieski with deep penetration into these complications formed an alliance with Louis XIV (1675) and with Sweden (1677) for the purpose of conquering by his own or the Swedish arms Electoral Prussia. The plan had a real basis: the blood of the Prussian "patriot" Kalkstein, a traitor seized in Warsaw by agents of Brandenburg and put to death for seeking the protection of Poland, testified that the nobility of this province (the ancestors of the later Prussian Junkers) still longed for a Polish protectorate. The prospects of military success from the alliance with the powerful France and Sweden, in conjunction with a suitable effort on the part of Poland, looked alluring. But the execution of this program was hindered by a prolonged war with Turkey, which was caused by the hopeless entanglements in the Ukraine. The wise enterprise of the king was paralyzed to no less a degree also by the turbulent magnates, in the first place the Pacs and Wisnio-wieckis, who at the instigation of courts hostile to Sobieski and France (those of Brandenburg, Austria, and Denmark) alarmed the wider circle of nobles and forced King John to cease his warlike preparations.

Sobieski, like every one of the more prominent Polish kings, loved the blue Baltic. He remained for a long time and with beneficial consequences in Prussia (May, 1677 to February, 1678), when he gave Danzig a new organization admitting the delegates of the guilds to represent the third "order". He ransomed from the hands of the Radziwiłłs in 1685 Wejherowo with its whole demesne of villages and estates; and in Rzucewo and Kolibki he built beautiful little palaces. He carried through the redemption of Puck, which had been pawned to Danzig (1678), and he interested himself also in cleaning out the harbor of Połaga [Polangen].

He took up once more his projects for regaining Electoral Prussia ten years later, already after Vienna, at the time of the

new war between the Great Coalition and Louis XIV. The French were eager for it and secret encouragement was still given by the circles of Ducal Prussian estate-owners; but a favorable occasion never occurred again.

The Saxon period threatened afresh the complete loss of Royal Prussia. Augustus the Strong from the beginning of his reign turned to the easy conquest of Riga, in close alliance with Tsar Peter and the king of Denmark. He promised Poland restoration of the provinces wrested away from it and revenge on its former rival, Sweden. However, in the depths of his soul, he did not intend Livonia for Poland and did not aim to solve by its conquest the Polish Baltic problem; but simply as a German, a Wettin, he wished to enrich himself by a few hundred thousand German and Lettish Protestant subjects. Worse still, from the beginning of this adventure he was ready to accommodate his neighbor, Frederick III of Brandenburg, with a piece of Pomerania, as he unequivocally showed by tolerating first the seizure of Elbing in 1698 and later, when Poland insisted upon its rights and recovered it, by conceding to the Hohenzollern (1701) the title of King in Prussia (*König in Preussen*, in the same way as the preceding dukes had had their title recognized by the Republic as *in Preussen* and not *von Preussen*). This first Prussian king began at once to spin out from his new title inferences which augured ill for the Republic. Again and again in the course of the Third Northern War (1700—1721) suggestions issued from Berlin to annex either a part or the whole of Royal Prussia, sometimes even with the addition of Samogitia and Courland. They germinated in the brain of the greedy but cowardly Hohenzollern, and there were moments when the perfidious Polish king accepted, nay, even provoked them as a bait (1702—4, 1709—10, 1721, 1732). There were also moments when Charles XII of Sweden in order to conciliate and attach Frederick I to his own interests acknowledged his right to Elbing or Warmia; and Stanislaw Leszczyński, the Polish anti-king set up by Charles, did not see how he could protest against such acts. As far as is known, these projects were never accepted by Tsar Peter, who at the commencement of his reign prudently respected the rights of Poland and later as victor at Poltawa extended his protectorate over all Poland.

In these troublesome and unhappy years it is in general difficult to discern any real Polish Baltic policy. Livonia, which had been promised to Augustus and the Republic by the Treaty of Narva in 1704, was appropriated by the Tsar; Courland was occupied by him temporarily from 1705 to 1707, and permanently after 1710. Augustus was unable to defend Danzig against the outrages of Sweden or the protectorship of Prussia, or later against Muscovy, which took vengeance upon the town for having dared to treat with the enemy. On the background of such fatal prospects the scene must have appeared very strange to Augustus the Strong when, after having been temporarily dispossessed by Leszczyński and the Swedes, he once more regained the Polish throne. Just as the Swedish littoral dominions were about to be liquidated, some unknown statesman from the court entourage recalled the fact that Stettin and Rügen had belonged to Poland at the time of the Bolesławs and in a memorial presented at a Public Meeting in Warsaw (1710) summoned the king to revive again this ideal of past generations¹. There was no lack of response to this appeal. Augustus the Saxon on September 26, 1711, signed an agreement with the king of Denmark which if realized, would have given him West Pomerania with Rügen². It is needless to say that the Wettin entertained these illusions of his exclusively as elector and not as successor after six centuries to Bolesław the Wry-mouthed. A few years later they were all swept away: Stettin and Rügen were occupied by Frederick William I of the Hohenzollern family, who was in turn destined to dream his whole life about a *via regia* between Königsberg and Berlin, or again about the whole of Polish Pomerania or Courland.

On the Baltic, control passed from the hands of Scandinavia to those of Russia. When Stanisław Leszczyński, driven out of his capital by Russian bayonets, sought refuge in Danzig and the loyal burgesses resisted the mad charges of Münnich, neither Danish nor any other ships but a few French ones hastened to the relief of the Free Town and the lawfully elected king; there was no mention of Polish "cannon", and neither

¹ *Proposals at a Public Meeting in Warsaw*, (in Polish), Reports in the Library of the Krasieński Ordination, Warsaw, 4081.

² S. Bonnesen, *Studier öfver August d. Starkes utrikes politik*, Kwart. Historyczny, 1925, 123.

England nor Holland troubled themselves about the balance of power or freedom on the Baltic. The important problems of maritime policy provoked only a very faint and indistinct echo among the followers of Augustus III. The Chancellor John Małachowski drew up and the king in 1752 granted the inhabitants of Danzig an ordinance in accordance with the demands of the third estate — its fourth ordinance, the earlier ones being those of 1526, 1570, and 1677. The same chancellor, however, having become acquainted with the unlimited egoism of Danzig, devised a scheme in 1757 for directing the Vistula trade to Elbing, and tried to interest France in it. Augustus, again, like his predecessor of the same name, Sigismund Augustus, sent an envoy extraordinary to Danzig (1760) to check the abuses of the townspeople. Unfortunately, his mission had nothing in common with the promotion of the Polish *dominium Maris Baltici*; it was merely a question of exacting a lavish souvenir for the private benefit of the Saxon court. And this occurred at a critical moment, when on one side the appetite of Prussia and on the other that of Muscovy was being whetted for Danzig and when much must have depended on attaching the practical townspeople to Poland. During these same years appeared the last chance of uniting to the Republic Ducal Prussia, which was temporarily occupied by Russia (1758—62); with this was associated the hope of the complete disruption of the Hohenzollern monarchy by the coalition formed in Versailles and, moreover, a proposal advanced by Russia to exchange this country for extensive lands on the Dnieper. Nevertheless, in the conditions prevailing at that time the State, then powerless and reduced to dependence upon its neighbors, could not even think of annexation or exchange.

Annihilation was inevitable from the moment when Frederick the Great came out of the Seven Years' War whole and formed an alliance with Catherine. He had for some decades past been preparing to execute the plans of conquest of his father and grandfather as well as his own, which he had written about intimately in some private, youthful confidences (1731), in political testaments (1752, 1768), in orders to his generals (1756), in diplomatic instructions (1759). In Poland his intentions were divined from the first days of his reign and there were some individuals who tried consistently to frustrate them. The entire

policy of the Czartoryskis, speciously Russo-phil, both in its first phase (1743—56) when it also relied on Austria, and in its second phase when it flattered the pride of Catherine II, tended to save Pomerania and Great Poland by arousing in St. Petersburg a jealous and exclusive ambition to dominate over all Poland. But the Czartoryskis were fatally mistaken precisely in this effort; for by allowing Russia to govern Courland with violence they failed to prevent, but rather hastened, the parallel attack of Frederick on Royal Prussia.

This attack was in the years 1768-72 directed sometimes against Warmia and sometimes also against Danzig. In any case, Pomerania and the land of Chelmno seemed — in opposition, for example, to narrow Warmia — to offer quite considerable material advantages which might compensate for the moral injury commonly accompanying the seizure of some one else's property. Frederick was forced, however, in 1771 to begin his bargaining with demands much more modest, and he inflated them little by little in the measure in which Russia resigned its claims to exclusive rule over Poland. At first the historical point of view still dominated over Prussian politics so far that Frederick in opening the discussion in St. Petersburg demanded the annexation of those countries to which Minister Hertzberg showed him something like a hereditary right not yet superannuated, and thus the Pomeranian wojewódstwo with Danzig and with the addition of the districts lying north of the Noteć as well as north of the fictitious prolongation of its middle course towards the Vistula. As a matter of fact the ministers, Finckenstein and Hertzberg, expressed scepticism as to these claims: "*Plus on approfondit la matière, et plus on découvre leur faiblesse*". But the king knew best that it is not historians who determine the amount of the spoils¹.

The first Prussian propositions met a completely different counter-proposition: instead of Pomerania and Danzig, Russia offered to Prussia Warmia together with the wojewódstvos of Marienburg and Chelmno with Toruń. Frederick agreed for the

¹ Frederick II himself acknowledged in a letter to Damhard (Correspondence, Vol. IV. 1772) that "the inhabitants, especially those of the wojewódstwo of Pomerania, are predominantly Polish in nationality".

time being to this change (June 14) under the condition that he be given also Elbing. But almost simultaneously he ventured on a somewhat risky attempt and advanced his recently unearthed Silesian pretensions to the adjacent districts in Great Poland as well as the old rights to Elbing; and in exchange for the resignation of these Silesian pretensions together with Danzig, he demanded all Prussia with the exception of Danzig and Warmia. His envoy, Solms, understood besides how to make the best of the situation in its further development; for in exchange for Toruń he gained also Warmia and the districts on the Noteć. Frederick closed this transaction with a still further gain, for he forced in addition a promise of Elbing.

Such dimensions for the Prussian annexations were confirmed, first, by the Convention between Prussia and Russia (January 15, actually signed February 17, 1722), later by the St. Petersburg Convention of all three courts on August 5. Having swallowed the "trunk", the Hohenzollern king felt an enormous appetite for the "head" also, that is, for Danzig; and in the middle of September — if we may make use of the excellent allegory of Joan Schopenhauer — he "fell like a vampire" on the inhabitants, seized Neufahrwasser with the whole left bank of the Vistula and sucked the vital fluid out of Danzig until it became completely exhausted.

These attacks were, however, opposed by the sea powers with the help of Russia.

Protests against the partition on the part of the king and the confederates at Bar were sent to all the courts, but without avail; there could no longer be any hope of separating Russia or Austria from the two other partitioners, as Sigismund Augustus had tried to do. The Warsaw Diet (under a threat of still further partition) confirmed in September, 1773, the treaty with the Prussian king by force of which, out of the whole Pomerania-Chelmno province, only Toruń and Danzig remained with Poland.

9. Prussian Annexations in the Years 1772 and 1793.
Policy of Germanization. Royal Prussia, occupied by Frederick in 1772 (with the exclusion of Warmia and the inclusion of the district on the Noteć and the districts of Lębork [Lauenburg] and Bytów [Buetow], was called by him West Prussia and joined with East Prussia under the rule of Domhardt, President

of the Administrative Chamber in Königsberg. The Polish administrative system was immediately abolished and the strongly centralized Prussian system introduced. The central authority at that time in Prussia was the General Directory. However, at the beginning West Prussia was not subject to it, but directly to the king; only in 1782, after the death of Domhardt, was it put under the General Directory. The highest provincial authority was the Chamber of Marienwerder (Kwidzyń). The highest judicial authority was the Regency of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder). Separation of the administration from the judiciary was not closely maintained. The Chamber might, for example, judge a theft perpetrated on State domains, and the Regency regulated ecclesiastical and educational matters.

The Prussian government made a new division into districts of a twofold kind: districts of land councillors (*Landräte*) comprising the villages; and districts of tax councillors (*Steuerräte*) comprising the towns. West Prussia was thus divided into seven land councillor districts and four tax councillor districts.

The two towns taken in 1793, Danzig and Toruń, were joined to West Prussia and put under the Chamber of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder). The first ordinance of the Prussian authorities was to remove the existing administration in both towns and introduce new authorities.

The occupation of Pomerania was desired by Frederick II for many reasons, but the strongest motive was the possibility of increasing his permanent army. Already in the year before the First Partition he planned in case of annexation of Pomerania to Prussia to create four new regiments of infantry, four garrison battalions, one regiment of hussars and a body of artillery composed of one thousand men. In case of war, moreover, Frederick intended to take from Pomerania six thousand artillery servants ("*Artillerieknechte*").

After the occupation of Pomerania as many as five new regiments of infantry were formed¹. It is therefore not surprising that, already in the first budget year, of the revenues from West Prussia, estimated at 1,719,944 thalers, about 70% or 1,200,000 thalers were assigned to the army. Only 120,000

¹ *Publikationen aus den Königl. Preussischen Staatsarchiven*, Vol. 83 (Leipzig 1909), pp. 503—506.

thalers were appropriated to the administration. The surplus remaining (400,000 thalers) was to be forwarded to the central treasury in Berlin¹.

The above figures, cited from an official Prussian publication, best enlighten us as to the truth of the statements made by German historians that Frederick took over this country in a quite wild state, a desert, menaced with the greatest poverty and despair, that he performed an act of charity in taking it under his protection, and that he nourished it with the surplus drawn from the administration of the other Prussian provinces of German nationality. It was exactly the opposite. Pomerania already from the first year yielded an enormous excess of income over expenditures, which was used to increase the military force of Prussia and to strengthen the central treasury of the state. Thus, Pomerania was not, as the German historians affirm, a deficit province ("*Zuschussprovinz*"), but from the very beginning of the Prussian rule a surplus province ("*Ueberschussprovinz*"). The conclusion is evident that Prussia received this country in an excellent condition.

The investments made by Frederick in Pomerania in the course of fourteen years (1774—1786) amounted to 7,452,498 thalers, which were in fact taken from the budget surplus of Pomerania itself. Of these, 3,258,000 thalers were employed in building fortresses, and only 11,600 thalers in building churches and schools².

Still more than this financial pressure for the benefit of the provinces of German nationality, the Polish population in Pomerania feared military service in the Prussian ranks. Under Polish rule, there had been no compulsory military service at all, whereas under Prussian rule the obligation of military service fell exclusively on the peasants and on those townsmen who were employed in tilling the soil. The nobility, on the other hand, officials and their sons, as also the sons of the well-to-do (having property worth at least 6,000 thalers), colonists, all persons famous for any reason whatsoever, in

¹ *Ibid* p. 261. This according to the preliminary budget; actually, the treasury received more, namely, 1,728,103 thalers; see *ibid*, p. 264. In the following, the second budget year, a larger income was received, namely 1,734,564 thalers.

² *Ibid* p. 268.

a word, the wealthiest people in Prussia were free from military service¹. In the period of "enlightened" absolutism in Prussia the weakest and poorest, the serfs, were most ruthlessly oppressed and exploited.

Those who lived near the Polish frontier saved themselves by flight to Poland, with the result that the belt along the border quickly became depopulated. From one province alone on the Noteć, there escaped up to March, 1776, 1,100 "cantonists", as those were called who were obliged to do military service. Two years later, during the War of the Bavarian Succession, the desertions increased still more. Some even emigrated who were not afraid of recruitment: whole families with their servants and cattle fled to Poland. From the time the army marched out up to the spring of 1779, 3,750 persons fled from Pomerania and the district on the Noteć. Armed opposition to recruiting was even attempted. In the neighborhood of Kartuzy young people from a few villages ran off to the forests and with weapons in hand opposed the officials and soldiers hunting for them. Evidently they did not succeed in reaching Poland, for it was too far to the frontier. In view of this, the king ordered the land councillors and the tax councillors to take the recruits unawares and keep them locked up until the arrival of the recruiting officers².

The result of the latter order was that as soon as any village learned of the approach of some official all the young men ran away. The chief of the office at Kruswica writes about this in a report of February 18, 1778, asking to be relieved from the duty of making administrative reports because of the impossibility of gathering the necessary information on the spot in the particular villages under him. In view of this a deputation of the Chamber of Bydgoszcz relieved him from the obligation of visiting those villages until the population became somewhat quieter and recovered from its fright³.

¹ *Publikationen aus den Kgl. Preuss. Staatsarchiven*, Vol. 83, pp. 504—505.

² All the above facts are taken from the official publication cited above, pp. 504—505.

³ State Archives, Poznań Registry, Chamber I, Z I, Vol. II b, folio 156-7.

But the alarm and consternation caused by recruiting still continued. Those whom the land councillors and the tax councillors surprised and caught unawares escaped on the road. In 1779, in spite of civil and military guards, 80% of the young men broke out of the barracks in Wieleń, whither they had been carried to the regiments. But all were retaken within a short time; for one of the councillors, foreseeing such an eventuality, had mobilized the whole region for the capture of deserters¹.

In the records there are many complaints of the population about the arbitrariness and violence of the recruiting officers, who hunted especially for tall men, even though they might not be bound to perform military service. Most eloquent is the lamentation of a peasant woman from a certain village of the Castellan Bniński. Her husband had been seized for the army and the soldiers had beaten her. She begs that he be released "*um Gottes Willen*", "*um Jesu Blut und Tod*". The commander of the force, the Duke of Beveru, explained that the seizure was made before the occupation of the district on the Noteć and that therefore the recruit, as a foreign subject, was not entitled to protection from the Prussian authorities. Besides, was it worth while, wrote the duke, to bother about a man who was a mere shepherd ("*ein blosser Schäferknecht*")? Why, even he, the Duke of Beveru, during the Seven Years' War had ordered a tall Silesian merchant to be taken by force, although the latter had a document exempting him from military service, and nevertheless the heavens had not fallen; that "*langer Kerl*" had performed his service excellently until he was shot in some battle².

It is not surprising, then, that as a consequence of such Prussian methods of governing the Polish lands, squeezing out taxes, and hunting for recruits, and of the arbitrariness and violence of the Prussian soldiery, 10,219 individuals ran away from Pomerania alone up to 1786³. "No threat of gibbet, cutting-off of ears, or confiscation of property could restrain those in danger of military service from running away".

¹ *Ibid.* folio 146.

² State Archives, Poznań Registry, Chamber II, IV, 2, Nr. 1 a. Vol. I.

³ Rev. Kazimierz Zimmermann, *Frederick the Great* (in Polish), Vol. I, p. 107.

The losses sustained as a result of desertion from the levies Frederick made good by attracting colonists to Pomerania and to the district on the Noteć. One of the king's plans was, moreover, to mix the Polish population where it was compactly located with a German element ("*mit Teutsche zu meliren*", as he wrote). This element had long been quite numerous in Pomerania. Polish historians estimate it at 30% of the entire population in the year 1772¹. In the course of fourteen years, up to 1786, 3,221 families of colonists were settled in Pomerania and in the district on the Noteć².

The settlement of colonists and the expulsion of the Polish element acted as one method of Germanization. A second was denationalization; and in the application of this method Frederick showed himself also a master and a model for future Prussian generations. As early as 1765 he founded in Słupsk (Stolp) in Prussian Pomerania a school for the children of the poorest noble families living in Polish Pomerania. From 7 up to 15 years the children, taken from their parents, were to be brought up in that school "in all the knowledge needed by an officer"³. In 1776 Frederick founded a second such school in Chelmno. It was through and through an institution for Germanization, and many of the young nobles of Pomerania became Germanized and accepted Lutheranism.

The efforts of the king were supported by the German estate-owners in Pomerania. One of the German travellers stated in 1777 that "the great difference which appears between the Kaszubian and the German languages is disagreeable for the nobility possessing estates in Kaszubia; and therefore the land-owners there try hard (hitherto without any result) to introduce everywhere the German language and to suppress the Kaszubian. They recommend that in church immediately after the sermon

¹ Stanisław Komornicki, *Poland in the West* (in Polish), Lwów 1894, p. 163. Rev. Paul Czapski, *Outline of the History of the Polish Nationality in Royal and in Ducal Prussia* (in Polish), Memoranda of the Scientific Society of Toruń, IV, 9 (1919).

² *Publikationen aus den Kgl. Preuss. Staatsarchiven*, Vol. 83, pp. 332, 335.

³ Rev. Kazimierz Zimmermann, *Frederick the Great and his Colonization on Polish Lands* (in Polish), Vol. 1, p. 277.

in Kaszubian a sermon in German be given, at which their subjects must also be present¹.

Not less dangerous was Germanization as carried on by the school. In 1772 the Prussian government found on the territory of the First Partition eight gymnasiums, for the most part Jesuitic. These schools remained practically unaltered up to 1780, *i. e.*, up to the publication of the breve expelling the Jesuits from Prussia. From 1780 to 1795 all were closed except the gymnasiums in Braunsberg, Grudziądz and Walcz². And these three soon fell, so that in a short time there was not a single Catholic gymnasium in West Prussia. Polish youth seeking an education had to attend Protestant gymnasiums in which not a single Polish word was heard³. And when in 1815 the first Catholic gymnasium was established in Chojnice, the Polish language was not permitted in it.

Occupying Pomerania in 1772, Frederick discovered irreconcilable enemies in only two classes of Pomeranian society, namely, the nobility and the clergy. Wherefore, he decided to weaken them in material respects. He struck strongly at the nobility by depriving it of the starostwos and laying on it a tax of 25% of the net profit from estates, while Germans and Protestants then paid only 20%. The clergy, on the other hand, which formerly was very wealthy, was made dependent on public finances by the confiscation of ecclesiastical domains and the payment of salaries computed on a very niggardly scale. And, finally, all Jews not possessing at least 1,000 thalers worth of property were expelled into Poland.

The incumbents of starostwos who were removed from their farms were paid for the stock located on the 40 public domains of West Prussia and on the 16 in the district on the Noteć the trifling sum of 10,000 thalers⁴. The clergy received a total yearly compensation of 111,921 thalers, although the revenues

¹ *Ibid.* p. 263.

² A. Karbowski, *The Prussian School on the Polish Lands* (in Polish), Lwów, 1904, p. 51.

³ Ignatius Łyskowski, *Beiträge zur Beleuchtung der Gleichberechtigungsfrage der polnischen Sprache in Westpreussen*, Poznań, 1872, p. 8.

⁴ *Publikationen aus den Königl. Preussischen Staatsarchiven*, Vol. 83, p. 269 and note.

of the bishopric of Warmia alone amounted to 138,000 thalers a year.

A great source of income was invented by Frederick in the establishment of a customs-house at Fordon. Placing an *ad valorem* duty of 12% on all transit trade to Poland going by way of the Vistula and through West Prussia, Frederick considerably hampered the water communication of Poland with the rest of the world. The "Pomeranian corridor" in the possession of Prussia was a powerful and effective check on the development of Poland.

Much more arbitrary was Frederick's treatment of Danzig, which in spite of his great efforts he did not obtain in the First Partition. Indignant at not having received this source of enormous revenues (according to Domhardt the State revenues from Danzig alone equalled those from all West Prussia), Frederick decided to persecute the recalcitrant town until it begged for annexation to Prussia. The most recent German investigations deny, indeed, that the king ordered the town to be deprived of water by turning the Radun out of its course; but there still remains much chicanery whose employment by Frederick's officials cannot be questioned. This subversion of the welfare and trade of Danzig lasted for twenty years until the town was taken by the Prussians in 1793. As late as 1820 the townspeople of Danzig still bore strongly in mind the tricks of Frederick and of his successor. Sadly and unwillingly returning to the Prussian domination in 1814, after a short period of liberty in the Napoleonic epoch, they were unable still for a long time to become inured to the Prussian army and bureaucracy.

10. Part Taken by Pomerania and by the Land of Chelmno in Struggle for Independence (1794). News of the taking of Great Poland and Toruń by Prussia in 1793 provoked enormous excitement in Danzig. "Crowds of people marched through the streets threatening the Prussians, calling to arms, and singing the then new hymn of freedom, the Marseillaise"¹. These manifestations hastened the occupation of the patriotic town by the Prussians. With a declaration of the Prussian government reproaching the burgesses of Danzig with a false conception of liberty and unfriendly feelings for Prussia, as well as sympathy

¹ Askenazy, *Danzig and Poland* (in Polish), first ed., p. 76.

for revolutionary France, a strong Prussian corps appeared under the walls of Danzig in March, 1793.

Since there was no way out of the situation and no help from anywhere, the representatives of Danzig decided that the town must be given up to the Prussians. When the Senate had already arranged the surrender of the outer fortifications to the enemy and the Prussians were just about to enter the town, then the population in crowds surrounded the town-hall, charging the Senate with cowardice and treason and demanding that the invader be resisted up to the last extremity. Besides the proletariat, sailors, port laborers, and soldiers of the garrison at the mouth of the Vistula, the merchants, handworkers, and guilds (with the butchers' at the head) insisted upon armed defence. This insurrection went as far as the seizure of the arsenal and the cannon on the ramparts of the town; shots were at once fired from the cannon and from hand guns at the advancing Prussian columns. In the cannonading from both sides many of the defenders of Danzig's allegiance to Poland perished. When, after a few days, the Prussians nevertheless penetrated into the town, the "soldiers of the town garrison and those of the port broke up their weapons, crying that they did not wish to serve the Prussians against Poland and France". All of them, however, were made prisoners and later forcibly incorporated into the hated Prussian ranks.

It is certain that at this time arose the famous conspiracy of the Danzig gymnasium student, Godfrey Benjamin Bartholdy, directed against the Prussians. German historians' endeavor to make light of the whole affair as a student frolic. It is stated, namely, that the organizer of the conspiracy was interested in realizing in Prussia the slogans of the French Revolution and not in separating Danzig from Prussia. One of these historians was obliged, however, to acknowledge that Bartholdy deplored exceedingly the incorporation of Danzig into Prussia and that the expedition of Madaliński and Dąbrowski with the Kościuszko insurrectionists into Great Poland in 1794 aroused great enthusiasm in him and the hope of a speedy change as soon as the

¹ Erich Keyser, *Die Verschwörung des Danziger Gymnasiasten Bartholdy im Jahre 1797*. Zeitschrift des Westpreuss. Geschichtsvereins. No. 62, p. 73 ff.

Polish troops should approach Danzig. These plans ended in nothing, since Dąbrowski came only as far as Bydgoszcz. Askenazy claims that Bartholdy's conspiracy maintained relations with the Polish emigration in France as well as with Dąbrowski, the leader of the Polish legions formed in Italy under General Bonaparte. In April, in Holy Week, 1797, Bartholdy wished to commence the rebellion, the conspirators having been furnished with weapons and ammunition; but in consequence of the treachery of one of the conspirators the Prussians learned all about it in time and frustrated the outbreak. Bartholdy was first condemned to decapitation; but this was later commuted to life imprisonment, and after five years he was set free. Reaching France, he joined the army of Napoleon.

We have little information as to the effect of the Kościuszko Insurrection on Pomerania. Dąbrowski and Madaliński, interrupting in Gniezno their march on Poznan and turning to the north towards Bydgoszcz, had doubtlessly planned in advance to enter Pomerania. Bydgoszcz they took by storm October 2 1794. The bombardment of the town was directed only against military objects, and private homes were spared. This was acknowledged by the Chamber of Bydgoszcz in a report of November 1¹, with the addition of a statement that the town had not been pillaged. "In general, we cannot refuse to the Poles, in particular to their chief leaders, the justice which we owe even to any enemy, to acknowledge that they maintained order and the strictest discipline" (*"strenge Ordnung und Manneszucht"*).

The well-known Wybicki of Pomeranian origin organized the administration in the freed part of the district on the Noteć. He established a Commission of Public Order of the Cujavian Wojewódstwo (consisting of seven members) which proclaimed emancipation from the Prussian yoke wherever the Polish arms reached, and commanded that taxes be paid into its treasury for the benefit of the Polish State². On October 11, 1794, the Commission of Public Order further commanded the citizens of the district of Bydgoszcz to organize an insurrection and to

¹ Poznań Archives, *Acta Camerae von Erstattung der Zeitungsberichte*, Vol. IX, fol. 101 et seq. Registry of Chamber I, 21.

² Proclamation of the Commission of October 4, 1794. *Vide* Registry of Chamber I, 1, 6, folios 25 and 32 (original and copy).

furnish recruits to the infantry. It employed a seal with the inscription "Commission of Public Order of the Cujavian Województwo" and the slogans of Kościuszko "Liberty, Integrity, Independence"¹.

In Bydgoszcz a Deputation of this Commission arose. At its head stood the merchant Oppermann, who covered many of its expenses out of his own pocket². The records of its insurrectionary government were seized by the Prussian authorities after the downfall of the insurrection and used in the prosecution instituted against the insurgents³.

After the capture of Bydgoszcz fear fell upon the Prussian authorities throughout all Pomerania. The Chamber and the Regency of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder) were so convinced of the possibility of the further progress of Dąbrowski towards Danzig that they transferred themselves to Elbing; and as they did not soon return from there, it was necessary to organize in Kwidzyń (Marienwerder) a Commission of the Chamber, which was confirmed at the end of October by the General Directory⁴.

The greatest obstacle which checked the advance of Dąbrowski into the interior of Pomerania was certainly Toruń, strongly surrounded by ramparts and defended by a numerous garrison. Dąbrowski hesitated long whether to go forward in spite of this or to attempt to take Toruń. An expedition was actually made in the middle of October and ended in failure.

At the same time, however, Dąbrowski dispatched strong patrols deep into Pomerania. Their appointed leaders were to collect boats on the Vistula and hold them ready at the place where the main body was to cross the river. Dąbrowski nominated Anthony Kruszyński major-general of the insurrection in Pomerania. The occupation of Swiecie and the organization there of a Commission of Public Order represented the furthest penetration of the Kościuszko Insurrection into Pomerania. The epilogue of the Kościuszko Insurrection in Pomerania was the long criminal prosecution of the insurgents in Königsberg.

¹ *Ibid.* f. 33.

² Registry of Chamber I, 3, Vol. II, f. 146.

³ For a list of these records, *vide ibid.* Vol. III, ff. 29—30. As to the dispersal of the Deputation and the sealing of the records, *vide ibid.* Vol. I, f. 84.

⁴ Pres. Kom. 181, f. 64.

11. **In Napoleonic Times 1806—1815.** In the beginning of the year 1806, after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstädt, the whole district on the Noteć and the greater part of West Prussia were taken by the French army. But Polish administration was introduced only in the district on the Noteć, which was formed into a separate department. In West Prussia, on the other hand, French generals and intendants governed.

In the Peace of Tilsit, besides the department of Bydgoszcz, reduced by the loss of a part of the districts of Walecz and of Kamień, the wojewódstwo of Chelmno with the land of Michalowo was joined to the Duchy of Warsaw.

In this manner the smaller, southern part of West Prussia was incorporated into the Duchy of Warsaw; the northern part — the larger — after Danzig with its environs had been separated from it remained however with Prussia. Danzig was made into a Free Town under the protectorate of the Saxon and Prussian kings; the boundaries of its territory were fixed at the Convention of Elbing in December, 1807. The dimensions of the Free Town at this time were somewhat smaller than those fixed by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

Pomerania also took part in the struggles for independence in the years 1806 and 1807. On November 3, 1806, the creators of the Polish legions under Napoleon I, Dąbrowski and Wybicki, sent to Poznań from Berlin a summons to raise from 30,000 to 40,000 armed men. During December a field division of the common levy was established in the wojewódstwo of Pomerania, then under Prussian occupation. This division under Kosiński was joined by the "Corps of Pomeranian Insurgents" in Siemno, January 2, 1807. Kosiński's division likewise had a "Companion" Regiment ("Regiment Towarzysz") formed by Major Dziewanowski of deserters who had served in the Prussian Regiment of Companions. Kosiński soon reached Swiecie and from thence patrolled as far as Grudziądz. On January 11, the Companion Regiment of Dziewanowski fought a successful skirmish with the rear of the Prussian cuirassiers and hussars, taking some prisoners. On this occasion Kosiński praised the Polish soldiers, many of whom had torn uniforms and none of whom possessed an overcoat. Although the Prussians had new coats, the Polish soldiers did not deprive their prisoners of anything.

On January 14, the general of the Pomeranian wojewódstwo, Komierowski, fought an unfortunate engagement near Nowe, and he himself fell in it. After him, the command over the Pomeranian insurgents was taken by Kruszyński, who had already in 1794 been the organizer of the Pomeranian wojewódstwo.

January 20, 1807, Dąbrowski started at the head his division from Bydgoszcz to Pomerania. Kosiński commanded the left wing and the advance-guard. Three days later the vanguard took up its position on the line from Chojnice to Tuchola; and on January 24 Kosiński at the head of the van took Czersk. Four days later the corps of Dąbrowski approached Skarszewy, which had earlier been seized by the troops of Major Ulatowski, but the latter had been attacked on the night of January 28—29 by a Prussian detachment and driven from the town. Although Kosiński checked the Prussian impetus, nevertheless, the corps retreated to the line Wojtal-Mokre-Kossobudy. January 29, a detachment of cavalry seized Starogard. Four weeks later, February 23, 1807, Dąbrowski took Tczew by storm; and the next day Colonel Dziewanowski halted only one and a half miles from Danzig. On March 10, Dąbrowski's division took part in the siege of Danzig.

The share of the Pomeranians in the struggles for independence in 1806-7 likewise assumed the form sometimes of direct aid given by the civil population to the French army. We know that this was the case at the time of the capture of Toruń, December 5, 1806, for it was even mentioned in the 46th bulletin of the Grand Army dated from Poznan, December 9, 1806.

In February, 1814, the Prussians incorporated the Free Town of Danzig into West Prussia, and in the following year they made themselves masters of the whole department of Bydgoszcz. This region, together with those parts of the Poznań and Kalisz departments which fell to Prussia, was to constitute in accordance with the decisions of the Congress of Vienna the Grand Duchy of Poznań. But the Prussian government separated from this region the districts of Chelmno and Michałowo (later called the district of Brodnica), and added them to West Prussia. It was in vain that the first Diets of the Grand Duchy of Poznań laid claim to these districts later.

12. **Prussian Government in the Years 1815 to 1846.** From the time Royal Prussia was joined to the rest of the Prussian annexations, in 1815, its development — nationally, economically and culturally — depended almost entirely on the province of Poznan, where a larger agglomeration of Polish population was found and more lively traditions of the independence of the Republic. The Grand Duchy of Poznań, as the center and stronghold of national tendencies, became the chief object of the anti-Polish policy of Berlin. Royal Prussia, which was weaker also because of the fact that in it the Polish population had no capital to centralize all the various tendencies and desires, played therefore a much smaller political role. There were few distinct manifestations on its part.

The *Congress of Vienna* in settling the fate of the Polish nation, on the one hand, deprived it of political independence but nevertheless, on the other hand, recognized it as a national and commercial whole under the protection of the partitioning powers. It was expressly provided that the movement of trade, industry, and communication should continue unhampered by any customs restrictions, not only in the border belt, but without reservation throughout the whole area of the Republic according to its limits in the year 1772. Other parts of the partitioning powers were not to profit of this exemption from customs and imposts. Moreover, an irrevocable postulate in Polish relations was proclaimed in the principle that national and civic development should not be obstructed; for the last act of the Congress declared that Poles should receive in all three partitions national representation and national institutions.

The final act of the Congress under date of June 9, 1815, signed by the partitioning powers, bound them to grant the Poles "institutions assuring the maintenance of their nationality". This obligation was referred by the Prussian king only to the Grand Duchy of Poznań, as acquired in its entirety. There, indeed, relative equality of rights prevailed; beyond its borders the Polish element and language were merely tolerated. The treaty between Russia and Prussia on April 21 declared that the Poles of both states were to receive "institutions assuring the maintenance of their nationality according to the forms of political existence that each of the governments to which they belong recognizes as useful and appropriate" (art. 3). The direction of

the deliberations of which this treaty was the result was probably influenced decisively by a note of the English cabinet signed by Viscount Castlereagh on January 12, 1815. It placed emphasis on the point that in the territory of former Poland peace was to be secured on strong and liberal bases with a system of administration which should be conciliatory and conformable to the spirit of the nation: the Poles must be treated as Poles, their customs, manners, and language remaining undisturbed.

The manifest joining the parts of the Kingdom of Warsaw, with Toruń and Danzig, to the province of West Prussia promised the new province participation in the constitution which all Prussia was to receive, gave assurance that its subjects would return to their former relations with the country to which they had originally belonged, and in addition guaranteed the economic improvement of the province. As to national equality or even the concession of certain liberties and national facilities in line with the Treaty of Vienna, there was no mention in the patent of occupation. This silence and the arbitrariness, or rather perversity, of interpretation of the provisions of the treaty were a bad omen. In the summer of 1815 the Polish estate-owners of the land of Chelmno and Michałowo petitioned for unification with the Grand Duchy of Poznań. The Germans protested, begging that they be left with West Prussia. Von Blumberg of Kitnów received an answer from the ministers Hardenberg and Bülow, forwarded from Paris, saying that the districts in question would not be separated from West Prussia because of the loyal attitude shown by their inhabitants in the year 1807. Civil authority was taken over by Klingspern, Councillor of the Regency of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder), and homage was accepted in Danzig August 2 by Auerswald, Head President of East Prussia.

The first quarter century of Prussian government in Pomerania is associated with the names of the Head President *Schön* and his *pupil Flotwell*. The former, an advocate of bureaucratic absolutism, made himself as independent as possible of the central authorities in Berlin; full of temperament and sarcasm, but autocratic, he antagonized people and made many enemies among them. An irreconcilable enemy of the Poles, especially of the nobility, he came to Danzig with the determination which he himself expressed in the words "from slaves to make freemen, from Slavs Germans". *Schön* begged to be given as assistant

in his new office his former collaborator in Gąbin, Flottwell, a very capable official, who for the whole ten years following stood at the head of the Grand Duchy of Poznań. Both teacher and pupil were ousted from their high positions in the Polish provinces by the conciliatory policy of Frederick William IV.

On both these men the material and national development of Pomerania was mainly dependent. Their influence was first exercised on *economic* relations.

The losses and damage to the province in consequence of the Napoleonic wars are estimated at 120,000,000 thalers. Landed property was so burdened with debts that it was acquired for $\frac{1}{6}$, even for $\frac{1}{10}$ of the value which it possessed later at the beginning of the twentieth century. The damage to the towns from the wars amounted to, for instance, 2,000,000 thalers in Elbing, and 12,000,000 thalers in Danzig; while the town of Tilsit only shortly before the World's War paid its debts from Napoleonic times. The Prussian government appropriated the sum of 3,780,000 thalers from the State funds for the economic rebuilding of the province. This was the so-called *Retablissementsfonds*. This sum was so applied by the Head President Schön as to react most unfavorably on the great Polish landowners. In the days of the Duchy of Warsaw the estate-owners, who were for the most part Poles, paid no interest on loans from the Landowners' Credit Association of Marienwerder (Kwidzyn), which was based on the principle of mutuality. After 1815 under pressure from Schön the Credit Association demanded the immediate liquidation of all indebtedness. Many proprietors were unable to pay their debts, Germans as well as Poles. For the moment Schön held his hand. From the above funds, "*Retablissementsgelder*", he assisted the Germans, but refused help to the Poles. Numerous forced sales followed, which deprived many of their family estates; their successors were wealthy German arrivals from Hanover, Saxony, Brunswick, and the Duchies of Anhalt.

In the thirties a second wave of disaster fell upon the landowners. England, the only country to which grain was at that time exported from Pomerania, laid a protective tariff on the importation of this grain into England. The prices of grain fell so low that many landowners became impoverished, and the

debtors in the Marienwerder Credit Association could not meet their payments. This institution was threatened with ruin; in order to maintain its credit, Head President Schön took it into government sequestration. This state of compulsory management lasted from 1824 to 1830, and again many Polish estates fell under the hammer. Assistance from the State funds was granted only to German proprietors who were in danger of losing the basis of their material existence and to those who had bought up the Polish estates sold at auction. It should be mentioned that Schön employed the same method with regard to the Polish landowners in East Prussia, depriving in this way the Polish population in Warmia and Mazovia of the only lay representatives at that time of Polish culture, education, and traditions.

The peasants held their land on the tenure of *emphyteusis*, or perpetual lease. They were permitted to redeem their rent, hitherto paid to the owners in cash, either by a lump sum or by surrendering a piece of land to their landlords. The land possessed little value, credit was difficult, and therefore the helpless peasant (*boor*) preferred to give up a part of his field. The regulation of the economic relations of the manor with the peasants exercised a less baleful influence on the latter, whereas the division of peasant fields, executed in the years 1835 to 1845 on the basis of the law of 1821, caused them much trouble and loss; though in itself a good and salutary measure, it found the Polish peasants unprepared. The school and agricultural association, which were designed to acquaint the peasant with modern husbandry, had a German character and were therefore not very accessible, as also the lectures of the instructors delegated by the government to particular localities. Slowly, indeed, the new system of husbandry made its way in; strong, healthy individuals held their own, but many inefficient peasants, addicted to alcoholism and without credit, surrendered their possessions to the manors, which were for the most part German; and then they preferred to emigrate. In Pomerania tens, if not hundreds, of estates can be counted which arose from the purchase and agglomeration of peasant farms.

The Treaty of Vienna guaranteed to all the Polish lands within the boundaries of 1772 free communication by river as well as by land and freedom of trade without any imposts or

customs. The partitioning powers, however, failed to carry out these obligations, permitting only a limited exchange of goods and agricultural products in the border-belt. When in 1833 the German Customs Union was established, factories and other productive enterprises suffered, for they could not compete with the better organized German factories. Head President Schön endeavored to develop the towns, especially Danzig, granting state credits; and in order to improve and facilitate communication he also built highroads of a total length of 17 miles.

Germanization was supported and maintained by the *school system*, to which Schön devoted careful attention. Under his government 400 common schools arose. It was impossible to omit completely the Polish language in these, and therefore the general statute for school organization in 1819 declared that "in all schools conducted in foreign languages, besides the native language, full instruction should be given in the German language, according to the grade of the school", which the ministerial ordinance of 1832 defined or rather limited in such a manner that in all classes of the common schools 7 hours a week should be devoted to learning to *read* Polish.

A much greater wrong was done to the Poles in the domain of higher education. In order to picture that, it is necessary to recall the situation at the moment of the First Partition. Then there were the following institutions of higher education: the Academy of Chelmno with two departments; the Academic Gymnasium in Szotland; the Jesuit gymnasiums in Grudziądz, Wałcz, and Chojnice; in addition, there existed the Latin schools of the monasteries in Wejherowo, Nowe, Świecie, Tczew and St. Wojciech [St. Adalbert] near Danzig. In these schools the Polish language was protected and supported, for it was the basis of instruction and the teachers were for the most part Poles. It had been predicted that "the occupation of West Prussia would open to the Polish population the road to progress and the blessings of education", but it turned out quite otherwise. The Academy of Chelmno was forbidden to import its professors from Cracow, in consequence of which it was slowly reduced to the level of a departmental school; the gymnasium of Grudziądz became a pro-gymnasium, and was subsequently converted into a teachers' seminary; the last of the monastery schools, that of

Wejherowo, ceased to function in 1824. In 1815 there were no higher schools in West Prussia guarding the Polish language, with the exception of the ecclesiastical seminary in Chelmno, which had however only three professors and about fifteen alumni, and also the German gymnasium in Danzig in which for some time the Polish language was taught outside of the obligatory program of instruction by Pastor Mrongowius, the well-known author of the dictionary. This was no accidental combination of circumstances, but a systematic tendency to effect a national change through the medium of the foreign idiom. To the Lutheran gymnasiums (in Danzig, Torun, and Elbing) was added as fourth a Catholic one in Chojnice in 1816; a fifth, also Catholic, was founded in Chelmno in 1837. However, neither in Chojnice nor in Chelmno did the program of instruction consider in the least the Polish language; even instruction in religion and divine service for the gymnasium (with a sermon) were conducted in German.

Teachers for the common schools were provided up to 1816 by the teachers' seminary in Marienburg, which was not hospitable to the Polish language. In 1816 the Regency "having considered the needs of Catholic education in the province of West Prussia, which demands absolutely the establishment of a separate teachers' seminary for Catholic and Polish teachers in the future and in a locality prevalently Polish, most suitably Grudziądz", established such a seminary; but the course of lessons in it included only three hours in the Polish language per week for those students who as volunteers desired to perfect themselves in it.

It should be mentioned also that Head President Schön founded in Danzig the so-called *Friedensgesellschaft*, which granted stipends to youth for studying; the Polish youth, however, got no benefit from it.

As in the school system, so in other branches of *administration* and in the *judiciary* the indications of the Congress of Vienna were not followed. In the lands of Chelmno and Michalowo all was, for the time being, left as it was; but already from January 1 the Napoleonic Code was abrogated and the native Prussian law substituted for it. The Polish courts were left for a short time subject to Kwidzyn (Marienwerder), but they soon made way for the Prussian judicature with German

as the only official language; the mediators between the judge and the public were interpreters who sometimes possessed doubtful qualifications, since there were no Polish schools in which such interpreters could acquire the necessary skill in the Polish language. Land councillors had the right and the authority to publish official proclamations, whenever it seemed necessary, also in Polish; and writings addressed to the *Landrath* (Council) might be drawn up in Polish, though it was obligatory to attach thereto a German translation, for which, however, no extra charge was made. Conformable to the Cabinet Order of May 20, 1816, a "Collection of the Laws of the Prussian State" was for many years published also in Polish. The lower authorities, however, disregarded this order, which provided that in West Prussia (as in the Grand Duchy of Poznan and Upper Silesia), wherever the Polish population predominated, the official regulations should be published in Polish. They succeeded likewise in evading the practical execution of another cabinet order, *i. e.*, the regulation of 1838, that every land councillor (*landrat*) in a district with mixed languages should be submitted to a definite examination. The last Polish land councillor in West Prussia was Wybicki, the former sub-prefect of the district of Michałowo, who resigned his office in 1840. Later there were only Germans in all the districts; and no one ever heard that fluency in Polish was demanded of any land councillor, as superintendent of manorial estates, or of any tax councillor, as superintendent of peasant villages. Neither they nor even their substitutes, the secretaries of the districts, had the Polish language at command.

The concession of 1838 was the only one made by the government to the Diet of the Prussian estates, which beginning with the year 1831 pointed out by means of petitions the need of a proper regard for the Polish language in public life. For the first time on April 2, the Prussian Diet requested that in regions with mixed languages proclamations be published and printed in both languages; the king answered that this need would vanish in the measure in which acquaintance with the German language became wide-spread through the medium of the school; however, orders might be proclaimed orally also in Polish. A few years later the Diet called attention to the fact

that in the above mentioned neighborhoods there was a lack of teachers, officials, and merchants who understood both languages; it therefore expressed the desire that the program of instruction in the gymnasiums of Chelmno and Toruń should include also French and Polish; the youth gaining fluency in these languages would be able to approach the people personally, gain their confidence, and profit from their experiences. The answer was a refusal. Finally, the Diet brought forward the point with emphasis that the greater part of the poor theologians and Catholic pedagogues, particularly in regions where the Polish population predominated numerically, did not possess the indispensable cultural and scientific qualifications; wherefore this lack should be made good by granting them stipends in the same way as assistance was already given to Protestants. The king promised to consider this request, but that was the end of it.

In the epoch under discussion the *Catholic Church* was "*in vinculis*"; its freedom of movement was severely cramped by governmental regulations arising from the Prussian reason of state — the omnipotence of the government. Bishop Sedlag well described the situation when he wrote that "a bishop was left little other power than that of ordaining priests". The interference of the lay authorities in the internal affairs of the Church made the position and activity of the bishop as well as of the clergy terribly difficult. Already in the eighteenth century the government sometimes commanded that sermons be preached on occasions of State successes. Sermons of Prussian patriotism were ordered also in the years 1815 and 1816, and even in 1840, when in honor of the deceased king, Frederick William III, and on the anniversary of the death of Queen Louise sermons had to be given on a prescribed text. In Protestant churches Polish sermons were delivered in Brodnica, Lidzbark, Lubawa, and Danzig; in 1822 Head President Schön offered Mrongowius a better position, so that the government could abolish the office of Polish preacher for the Protestant congregation of St. Anne in Danzig. Mrongowius did not accept the proposal.

The Jews, even as early as this, claimed that they belonged to the German nationality.

13. In the Period of the "Spring of the Peoples". The Germanizing efforts of Prussia were not fruitless, though the tradition of the Polish Republic was too recent to be forgotten, as was shown when the famous *November Night* (November 29, 1830) summoned the natives of all the Polish lands to arms under the national flag. In spite of its spiritual lifelessness and the tendency to denationalization, representatives from Royal Prussia were not lacking. The struggle for independence (though ending in a strategic defeat), the march over the Prussian frontier, the tragic death of some soldiers at the hands of the Prussians at Fischau near Elbing, the enthusiastic reception of the champions of freedom in southern and western Germany — all this could not be without influence on the minds of the Poles of Pomerania. True, the population was still for the most part asleep, but the nobility quickly awoke under the instigation of Great Poland, where the policy of Flottwell was making itself felt. Emigration emissaries were received at Polish manors and negotiations carried on; the ground was being prepared for political activities.

The Poznań insurrection organized by a central committee at Versailles with Mierosławski at the head was unable to develop, for the Prussian police crushed it in the bud by throwing into prison 1,100 persons suspected of conspiracy. In Pomerania, an *expedition against Starogard* was prepared under the leadership of Cejnowa and Kleszczyński with the purpose of disarming the Prussian hussars and taking control of the town; the insurgents, however, being betrayed, could not attempt to fight, but laid down their arms without bloodshed. The sequel of these efforts was an enormous prosecution of 254 persons charged with treason. The penalties were severe: in 1847, 8 were condemned to death, 109 to prison or a fortress (among them 23 Pomeranians, including many well-known persons); and the rest (139) were set free. This was a great and sad disappointment, but it demonstrated a fact which was nevertheless satisfactory and very significant, namely, that the national traditions still lived and that only a stronger motive was needed to awake a vigorous demand for liberty.

It was not necessary to wait long for such a motive. The longings for freedom stirring in European societies for some

fifty years were preparing a volcanic outbreak. After the Napoleonic wars a constitutional government had been promised to Prussia, but this promise was quickly forgotten. Wishing to avoid the threatening storm, a so-called United Diet was summoned to Berlin in 1847; this was composed of delegates from the provincial Diets, but only three delegates came from Royal Prussia. The narrow field of activity of the Diet did not satisfy the subjects of the Prussian monarchy. Following the example of Paris and Vienna, a *revolution* burst out in Berlin in March, 1848, which broke down absolutism and brought to the Poznań and Pomeranian prisoners liberation by the populace of the capital and amnesty from the king.

The national organizations of Poznań entered into close understanding with the leaders in the land of Chelmno. Natalis Sulerzyski was nominated organizer to arm the Polish population — on the condition, however, of peaceful cooperation with the Germans. The plan was to seek, first of all, constitutional and national liberties as well as the separation of the Polish provinces. In western Germany, even in the court circles of Berlin, the possibility of a war with Russia, that stronghold of reaction, was seriously considered; wherefore a united German-Polish front against the latter was being formed.

Sulerzyski and the other members of the "Provisional" National Committee (Major Korewa, Elzanowski, Rev. Tułdziecki, etc.) issued two proclamations. The first, under the title of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity", promulgated the equality of estates and of nations, and called to arms against Muscovite despotism and to observance of discipline with respect to the district commissaries. It ended with the words: "Long live free Germany; long live free Poland!" The second, more moderate one declared that not only the province of Poznań but also West Prussia, being inhabited preponderatingly by Poles, was entitled to be separate from the German Confederacy; and that, therefore, the Poles of this province would not take part in elections to the *Parliament of Frankfurt*, but would send Ignatius Łyskowski to Frankfurt to act in close connection with the province of Poznań in convincing the delegates that these provinces were unjustly included in the Confederacy. Finally, it summoned to arms against Muscovy and against all possible

uprisings and disturbances. The slogan announced by the National Committee received a general hearing. With the Poles abstaining, only Germans were elected to Frankfurt; of the 18 delegates from Royal Prussia, not one was a Pole. Łyskowski fulfilled with dignity the task imposed upon him and at a full Parliament read a declaration protesting against the inclusion of the Polish districts of Royal Prussia into the German Confederation.

The attitude of the Germans in the Polish districts of West Prussia was not at the beginning hostile to Polish tendencies. Soon, however, a change took place in their sentiments, reaction gradually gained headway; and numerous arrests of Poles followed. In Lubawa, pitiable events occurred. There was a meeting of Poles to demand national rights without any provocation to any one — for the principle of the National Committee that peace was to be kept between the various denominations and nationalities was recognized as binding; but in consequence of some misunderstanding or an act of bad will the Germans threw themselves on the Poles, wounding many of them. The next day the revenge of the Poles was crushed with much bloodshed by the troops requisitioned from Iława [Eylau].

Nevertheless, all the efforts to put down the movement for liberty were unable to resuscitate absolutism. The thunderbolt that struck Central-European societies in 1848, shook not only the political, but also the moral and social bases of the antecedent form of existence. It was generally known why armed contests were being carried on in the province of Poznań and abroad. Known also was the fact that the Parliament of Frankfurt stamped the partition of Poland as a crime; and that later, though it did not recognize nationality as the principle which should be followed in fixing the boundaries of states, yet it granted to non-German nationalities included within the confines of the Confederacy full national rights as to church, state, administration and, in general, public life. Its resolutions, indeed, never became effective, but several elections to the Parliament of Frankfurt and to the Prussian Diet gave the Polish population of Pomerania also the opportunity to express its desires and needs in the domain of public life. In a still greater degree this was effected by meetings of the Polish

National League, use of the right to make petitions, and the press. In these organizations and activities the national spirit of the Polish population of Royal Prussia found true expression.

The protest which Ignatius Łyskowski read at the preliminary Parliament in Frankfurt had been submitted on his motion to all the electors of the districts of Brodnica and Lubawa. There were 79 of them. The Germans, 27 in number, disregarding the Polish abstention, participated in the elections. The court assessor Wolff became a deputy. In the other districts preponderatingly Polish, the elections occurred in the same fashion. The Poles solidarily refrained from voting, but the Germans took advantage of their rights. Such a German deputy went, indeed, to Frankfurt, but for a long time the question was not settled whether he was entitled to sit there and vote, for the Parliament did not wish to regard him as a real representative of the total population.

Łyskowski's declaration was received with thunderous applause. A resolution was even passed that the partition of Poland was a crime and that it was a duty of honor for the Germans to try to resurrect Poland. Nevertheless, it was ultimately decided to incorporate the Polish districts of West Prussia into united Germany. In May of the following year (1849) another Parliament, elected on the basis of the definite regulations, met in Frankfurt. Łyskowski, elected for the second time by 170 Polish votes against 60 German votes, as deputy for the districts of Brodnica and Lubawa protested against incorporation, but this time without any success. The Germans refused liberty and equal rights to the other nationalities within the confines of the Confederation.

Almost simultaneously with the first Frankfurt elections, elections to the Prussian Diet were held in Royal Prussia (May, 1848). The Diet, or rather the so-called *National Assembly*, with a liberal and democratic majority (which was therefore radical and in opposition to the government), quickly fell into conflict with the government and was dissolved. According to the regulations imposed upon the country together with the so-called *Octroyé* (or *Granted*) Constitution, Pomerania sent five Polish deputies. However, this Diet did not sit long, either. Dissolved in May, 1849, it gave place to another which was

chosen in August of the same year on the basis of the new statute on elections. This Diet deliberated mainly on the revision of the constitution. The Polish deputies did all that lay in their power to secure the rights due to the Polish nationality. In January, 1850, all deputies were to take an oath to the so-called Revised Constitution. The deputies from Poznań resigned their mandates, announcing that they refused the oath because the new constitution did not guarantee national rights. The deputies from Royal Prussia, however, took the oath, the purport of their public declaration being that, since the constitution could be changed by ordinary legislation, they wished to make use of all possible legal means to change the regulations which threatened the prerogatives of the church and the national rights of the Polish population. The author of the declaration, the Rev. Father Klingenberg, as early as 1852 requested in the Diet that greater recognition be given the Polish language in the public schools of Prussia and Silesia and that the number of school councillors knowing Polish sufficiently be augmented. Deputy Pokrzywnicki demanded — unfortunately without avail — that official proclamations be also made in Polish. The Polish efforts were supported by the deputy from Danzig, the Regency Councillor Osterrath, who called for the incorporation into the Prussian Constitution of sec. 115 of the Constitution of Frankfurt as to the equal rights of the Poles; but the majority rejected his motion.

The public and political tendencies of the Poles in the whole region under Prussian occupation found their chief expression in the *Polish National League*. It was founded in Berlin, June 25, 1848, with the collaboration of the deputies Klingenberg, Richter, Pomieczyński and Pokrzywnicki; its aim was to concentrate at one focus the moral and material forces of the Polish population at home as well as abroad for open and lawful activities for the benefit of the Polish nationality. The League was divided into departments: 1) internal affairs — the collection and elaboration of information on all subjects which might contribute to improve the education and welfare of the Polish people; 2) external affairs — the maintenance of relations with persons and associations abroad that were favorable to the Polish cause; 3) publication matters — the editing of books and periodicals as well as the calling of meetings; 4) financial

affairs. Besides the initiator, Augustus Cieszkowski, the deputies Richter and Pokrzywnicki among others belonged to the board of directors. Local leagues, generally parish ones, were combined into district leagues, whose delegates went to Chelmno to the quarterly provincial sitting; and, besides these, there were general meetings to which delegates were sent. The principles enunciated by the founders of the League quickly spread; they were willingly accepted also in the province of Pomerania. The most active were the territories which had once formed part of the Duchy of Warsaw, but in the northern districts were found likewise many proofs of unity and cooperation. In the provincial council and in the particular leagues zealous and uninterrupted work was carried on in almost all branches of public life. They recommended the foundation of associations of mutual aid on the model of the one already existing in Chelmno; they subscribed for and read Polish periodicals; they demanded from the government the establishment of a trade school; they supported the Society for Scientific Assistance, which had been founded chiefly through the efforts of Matthew Slaski; they asked the bishop to send Polish priests to Polish parishes; they encouraged the landowners to take workmen who had been discharged by German employers for voting for Polish candidates to the Diet. The lack of a proper regard for the Polish language in the school, the administration, and the judiciary was the subject of strenuous exertions culminating in a series of petitions. The moral aspect of social education was not forgotten either, namely, struggle against alcoholism and protection of orphans. Ignatius Łyskowski most ardently occupied himself with libraries and public reading. He and Count Francis Czapski of Bukowiec advised estate-owners to join agricultural associations; they drew up and published statutes for such associations. In 1850 a petition presented to the ministry by a deputation defined the minimum which was due to the Polish population in the educational domain. The petition was prefaced by concise preliminary remarks giving a clear picture of the injuries done to the Polish population beginning with the year 1772.

Placing the main emphasis on cultural and economic matters, the League only occasionally concerned itself with current politics. When in 1850 the government announced elec-

tions to the Parliament of the Confederation which was to meet at Erfurt, the provincial council recommended abstention for a fundamental reason: participation of the Poles would be a direct expression of agreement with the inclusion of the Polish districts of Royal Prussia into the German Confederacy. The decision of the council to support Polish emigrants in France did not cross the line into politics, for it had rather a merely charitable character. The League, covering the whole region with a thick net of filiated societies, taught and trained the people in modern norms of state and social existence. The government took the League seriously into account and carried out its postulates in part, introducing (besides Polish religious services) instruction in the Polish language in the gymnasiums of Chelmno and Chojnice as well as in the teachers' seminary in Grudziądz. Outside of the League independent associations were here and there formed with a national character. Foundations were laid for a Polish library for the gymnasium students of Chojnice and Chelmno. Self-educating societies began to spring up in this epoch among the school youth.

An integral parts this movement was the *press*, represented by the *Szkołka Narodowa* [The Little National School], which later became the *Szkoła Narodowa* [The National School], and the *Biedaczek* [The Poor Man]. In these periodicals the stress and strain of public life at this period is very clearly reflected. From the very commencement, mainly through the medium of periodicals, the public were given political orientation concerning the legal and political relations of the Poles of Royal Prussia to the government, the Diet, and the Parliament, as to what factors create and develop nationality, and as to what obligations are imposed by the fact of belonging to a nation in such a position as the Poles then were.

On June 5, 1850, the ministry issued a new statute on the press, limiting freedom of publication. All political newspapers and other periodicals were to furnish surety — of at least 1,000 thalers — which was to be confiscated by the government after three condemnations of publisher or editor. The statute also refused to allow the post to distribute those papers which the government considered organs of the opposition. The statute on associations of March 11 of the same year forbade political associations to establish connections among themselves.

This resolution undermined the existence of the Polish League, whose strength lay precisely in the alliance of regional and district leagues. Deprived of this connection all the leagues in a short time collapsed.

14. **Period of Reaction (1851—1858).** Times of reaction followed, crushing all manifestations of national life in Polish society. In order to reduce the number of Polish deputies to a minimum, the government not only introduced a new scheme of election districts, but designated the most distant towns as the places for casting votes. In the territory under the Regency of Kwidzyń (Marienwerder), the division of districts was a natural one; but in that of Danzig, Starogard (together with Tczew) was joined to Marienburg and Elbing, while in Danzig voted the electors of the districts of Wejherowo and Kartuzy as well as those of Kościerzyna and Danzig. Unheard-of abuses were practised, violent pressure was put on electors to force them to vote for government candidates, conservatists. In 1852 no deputy from Royal Prussia or from Silesia sat in the Polish Circle in Parliament. In each province only one deputy was elected and that "under such conditions as did not permit him to take the same position as that occupied on principle by the Polish deputies from Poznań"; the object of these conditions was, in fact, to prevent the deputies from joining the Polish Circle. Before the elections of 1855 the government ordered the severest repression to be applied in the Polish and Catholic districts; therefore, only six Polish deputies were chosen for the whole region under German occupation. Not being able to form a separate party according to the Diet regulations, they sought the support of the Catholic faction. Royal Prussia had only one Polish representative, the Rev. Father Klingenberg, a former member of the Polish Circle; but he was elected by a district in Westphalia and voted with the Catholic faction. This oppression lasted eight years. In those sad times, literature was the only prop and comfort. The chief merit was Ignatius Łyskowski's: three months after the downfall of the *Szkoła Narodowa* he called into life the *Nadwiślanin* [On the Vistula] together with the *Gospodarz* [The Farmer], and himself directed it for two years. This paper struggled through its numerous difficulties and survived the period of reaction. Besides this, many works appeared in

Pomerania in the fields of popular novels, popular history, and agricultural literature. The period of enforced political inactivity was at the same time a period of labor in strengthening the moral and economic bases of society, which was suffering not only from the oppression of the occupying power but also from the effects of natural disasters and poor harvests.

15. **Ceaseless Political Opposition and Development of Organic Work** (1859—1871). At the end of the fifties a *strong liberal movement against reaction* arose throughout all Europe. In Prussia so great was the indignation at the general abuse and violence of the occupying power as well as at the restrictions on the press (which was deprived of the possibility of exposing the unheard-of transgressions executed with the knowledge and by the will of the government), that the Berlin government was seriously considering the possible danger of obstinately maintaining its policy of extreme retrogression. The era of the "Regency" administered by Prince William as substitute for the mentally deranged king brought with it (in December, 1858) a narrowing of the power of the police authorities to control printing and book-selling. Persecution of the opposition as such ceased; and in the following year a new and fairer grouping of electoral districts was made. Even as early as 1858, when 17 deputies were elected in the province of Poznań and 2 in Royal Prussia (Rev. Father Klingenberg and Judge M. Łyskowski), the tone of the *Nadwiślanin* became freer in discussing current political affairs. Liberalism, then from the nature of things an ally of the Poles, soon overcame the reaction.

The election of 1861 swept away the governmental majority and gave the preponderancy to the progressive party which, dissatisfied with the action of the government in the matter of the reform of the German Confederation, refused credits for the army. It did not help the government to dissolve the Diet the next year: the new elections proved a complete victory for the progressives, who again crossed the expenditures for reorganization of the army off the budget. The conflict grew sharper when Bismarck became head of the government in 1862. A third trial of strength in 1863 closed with the same result; for Poland it was distinctive and important that, whereas in the years 1861 and 1862 there were 23 Polish deputies (4 from Royal Prussia),

in 1863, 26 of them were sent into the Diet arena — 20 from Poznań and 6 from Royal Prussia. The deputies from Pomerania were few, but they took an active share in the work of the Diet, demanding that the Polish language be given equal rights in official regulations of public life, protesting against the misuse of religious teaching for Germanizing purposes, asking for a guarantee of the territorial unity of the three divided parts of Poland as stipulated by the Congress Vienna.

The opposition was, however, reconciled by the victorious policy of Bismarck, *i. e.*, the defeat of Austria, the formation of the North German Confederation, and the introduction throughout this Confederation of an equal right to vote for Parliament; it not only granted indemnity for past illegal acts but henceforth supported Bismarck and willingly forwarded his anti-Polish politics. Still in 1863 by a formal resolution it condemned the military Prussian-Russian Convention held by him and directed against the Insurrection, but this was in fact the last act of sympathy towards the efforts of the Polish nation to regain its independence. The formation of the North German Confederation necessitated a new decision as to the incorporation of the Polish provinces into the confederation of German states. On December 30, 1866, the deputies to the Diet from West Prussia (there were 5 of them) declared in the *Nadwiślanin* that "*elections to the Diet of the North German Confederation will soon occur. As deputies of this province we have protested in the Prussian Diet against its incorporation into the Confederation. This protest should be repeated in the Diet of the North German Confederation, and for this purpose the Polish people must take part in these elections*". A summons to the election was issued by the "Central Electoral Committee for West Prussia to the Parliament of the North German Confederation", which had been formed *ad hoc*. After reading a "protest against the act of compulsion" carried out by the Parliament, all the deputies (including the Pomeranian ones) handed in their mandates on the day before the closing of the Diet. The Central Electoral Committee for Poznań and Prussia in the same year issued a call to the new elections in the "Grand Duchy of Poznań, West Prussia, East Prussia, and Silesia". These elections to Parliament had an unfavorable result; but on the other hand, the Germans of the Chelmno-Michałowo region did not participate in the elections

to the House of Lords, for only those owners of manorial estates were entitled to vote who had been in possession of them for at least 50 years. The Poles, constituting the majority, chose Ludwik Slaski. The German Parliament, convened after the abasement of France and the unification of Germany, furnished an opportunity once more to demand the territorial independence of the Polish regions from the Confederacy. The anti-Polish majority of the Parliament rejected the protest and in the new constitution which was then adopted joined the fates of the Polish regions to those of the other, German provinces.

About the middle of the nineteenth century the conviction took root in Polish society in the territory under German occupation that it was impossible to help the cause of the fatherland by politics alone. It is to the credit of those who created the Polish National League, and directed it, that after the experiences of the years 1846—1848 they realized it was necessary, without neglecting politics in any way, first of all, *by means of social, economic, and educational self-help* to strive for a better existence and increased welfare. Unfortunately, the very short duration of the League did not allow it to go beyond the early stages of organizing work. When the pressure exerted by the reaction lessened, the watchword of self-help revived and even received greater emphasis, as the danger threatening a nation deprived of external freedom and internal force became clearer and clearer. Those who should have guarded officially the inviolability of the international compacts of Vienna either violated them themselves or kept silent. Meanwhile, national rights fell into still greater disregard; the state of the Polish possessions grew narrower from year to year. The absorption of the Poznań-Prussian fragment of the Polish nation into the political, economic, and cultural life of Germany, and its compulsory participation in the common weal led by the force of historical necessity to an increasing divergence from its own special line of development in all directions of national life.

The Nadwiślanin opened the action by discussing in the years 1858 and 1859 in a series of articles — quite general and circumspect, for the time being — the needs of the Polish population in West Prussia; for this purpose it reprinted the petition of February 14, 1850. Ignatius Łyskowski became the ex-

ponent of public opinion, when, following the *Dziennik Poznański* [Poznań Daily] and the *Nadwiślanin*, he strongly accented *work* as the chief condition for the betterment of society.

The foundation on September 3, 1861 in Brodnica of a *Polish Agricultural Association* for estate-owners — the first in Royal Prussia — showed what was the most pressing need. It was high time, perhaps the last possible moment, to commence the organization of self-help in this domain. All the financial strength of the Poles in the territory under German occupation was concentrated and rested in a small group of large estate-owners. Not only did agriculture as a whole not enjoy State protection, but the entire development of political events, in particular, participation in the insurrections and their support, as well as the tendency of the government to reduce the larger properties to a minimum, the disastrous weather conditions of the years 1853—1856, the economic pressure in Germany due to the excessive growth of industry (1850—1857), producing a dearness of credit and an unheard-of fall in the prices of land — these were the factors which caused a shifting of land *en masse* into the hands of the richer German arrivals from the West, especially in the years 1856—1858. Statistics throw some light upon these conditions: in the whole territory under Prussian occupation, Germans acquired from Poles in the years 1848—1860 nearly half a million morgs; in Royal Prussia, in 1838, Poles formed $\frac{3}{4}$ and Germans $\frac{1}{4}$ of the large estate-owners; in 1848, Poles $\frac{5}{8}$ and Germans $\frac{3}{8}$, while in 1856 the Germans were already in the majority. Still worse conditions prevailed among the peasants, whose misery (due to bad harvests and lack of credit) was aggravated still more by alcoholism and inability to adapt themselves to the new methods of agricultural technique, especially rotation of crops. The result was a rush to get rid of the land and a long period of emigration of Polish peasants, to a slight degree to the Congress Kingdom and to a much larger degree to the United States of North America, whither they were allured by the favorable opportunities for earning a living. Germans also sold their holdings and emigrated to America, but many went to the western part of Germany, where the growing industry stood in need of labor and afforded better living conditions. The land offered at a cheap price was bought up by the manor-owners to round out their estates, but was also acquired

largely by farmers coming from the interior of Germany to build up new farms. This they could do, for in spite of the difficult economic situation they were able to manage better and had more resources than the peasants. Scattered all through Pomerania are many estates which arose in these times by the agglomeration of peasant holdings. The emigrating "madness" became the object of Diet disputes, newspaper discussions, and consultations in the bosom of the government, but it was not to be stopped. After 1860 the excess of emigration over immigration in the province of West Prussia amounted to 32,000 persons; and in the following decade it even reached 104,900. The immigration (which, at best, was small) was composed of newly arrived German farmers and merchants as well as officials and, in addition, Poles from the Congress Kingdom (especially after the insurrection of 1863), who were at this time not yet forbidden to settle in Prussia.

Other agricultural associations followed the Brodnica one. This form of organization developed so quickly that within a few years almost every district was supplied with an association of its own in connection with a *library* — for general education was consciously and purposefully spread alongside with agricultural technique. The work of these associations would have halted half-way without a mutual understanding as to their aims and means; wherefore Ignatius Łyskowski "as early as 1866 advocated in the public press the idea of agricultural meetings at which volunteers and specialists could raise current problems of agriculture and by the concentration of both volunteers and specially trained forces go to the aid of the social economy now falling into decline among us". The first "agricultural dietine" in Toruń, convoked by the initiator together with T. Donimirski and H. Jackowski, met in the following year and formed the commencement of a long series of yearly meetings whose high level and importance is attested very positively by the Annuals of the Agricultural Dietines in Toruń. The interests of estate-owners was promoted for many years by the Bank Kredytowy Donimirski, Kalkstein, Łyskowski et Co. in Toruń, which was founded in 1866 by Mieczysław Łyskowski, and from 1871 on by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank in Starogard established by the initiative of Hyacinth Jackowski. These organizations were connected, the need of them pointed out, their information theoretic-

cally and fundamentally deepened and developed from 1867 on by the *Gazeta Toruńska* "founded by the efforts of the citizens of West Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Poznań. It was not to neglect politics, especially internal and Polish politics, but its main task was, according to the idea of the founders, to foster all associations, of whatever kind, as the only possible salvation from the present sad situation".

A *central town* in which the more important roads of communication converge and where the economic and cultural life is concentrated is an indispensable condition of progress and affects in a large measure the influence of any given province. Royal Prussia, cut into two parts by the Vistula and not ethnographically uniform, never had such a natural center. For many years Chełmno, though a small town, yet the most Polish and moreover invested with authority from its historical past, acted as a sort of capital, concentrating all the efforts directed towards the revivification of Polish society in the neighborhood. When, however, the new Berlin-Insterburg (Wystruć) railway passed around Chełmno, the seat of Polish institutions had to be removed to a town which was not too remote and possessed modern communication. Toruń was chosen in consideration of its proximity to the Congress Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Poznań, which provided ethnographical, national and cultural support.

If self-help was necessary for estate-owners, who as the richest in material and intellectual resources understood better how to take care of their property, how much more indispensable was it for the peasants and the townspeople? For the former Julius Kraziewicz became the man of the occasion: on October 1, 1862, he established a *Peasants' Agricultural Association in Piaseczno* near Gnień — the first one not only in Royal Prussia, but in all Poland as well — and also a number of other cooperative associations. In 1867 all the agricultural associations of the province numbered 2,174 members, of these 1,687 peasants. The work of the agricultural association in Piaseczno became famous: the social workers of Poznań (among them Maximilian Jackowski, later Patron of the Agricultural Circles) visited Piaseczno to examine more closely the activity of Kraziewicz and to transplant to Great Poland the idea which he had embodied in action.

On March 23, 1862 was founded a cooperative *Credit Association for Merchants of the Town of Brodnica and Neighborhood*, which was the first of its kind in Royal Prussia. The founder was the first cooperatist in theory and in practice, Judge Mieczysław Łyskowski of Brodnica. The next association was formed in May of the same year in Gołub; others followed within a few years (till 1867) in Gniew, Chelmno, Robów, and Pelplin; in 1873 there were already 16 of them. In the beginning only handworkers and the intelligentsia belonged to town associations, but a few years after their foundation farmers were also accepted as members.

From 1861 on an important movement was in preparation in the Congress Kingdom, which was to affect the fate of the largest fragment of the Polish nation. It stirred hearts and minds throughout all Royal Prussia, where the course of events was observed with tense interest and growing excitement. The editors of the *Nadwiślanin* and the *Przyjaciół Ludu* [Friend of the People] devoted most of their space and attention precisely to these matters; consequently, when at the critical moment the *national government declared war against Russia*, the youth of all classes thronged to the "uprising". In accordance with a secret convention made with Russia, the Prussian government (realizing perfectly that, as Bismarck then stated, "if the Warsaw insurrection should succeed, the future independent Poland would certainly demand the return of Pomerania and Danzig") made the whole frontier secure from Kłajpeda to Myslowice, while the district of Brodnica was occupied by the brigade of General Bronsart v. Schellendorf. Nevertheless, insurgents singly and in whole divisions stole through to the Congress Kingdom by way of the Drwęca and the Lidzbark forests; many others, however, were seized by the Prussian gendarmes or the Russian frontier guards. The convention and the severe regulations of the land councillor of Brodnica, Joung, provoked in the Diet an energetic interpellation of the Liberal-Progressive Party, which was supported by Deputy Hennig. The whole policy directed against the Poles was condemned also by the older guild of Danzig merchants. This was the last time the Germans showed any sympathy in the Diet with the Polish cause. The armed outbreak was a clear and unmistakable proof of inflexible determination to regain independence, but in Royal Prussia likewise it

led to enormous sacrifices of life and property. In the great prosecution in Berlin, which was conducted most harshly, among others the following were sentenced to prison or to a fortress: Dr. Kazimierz Szulc, the two Jackowskis, N. Sulerzyski, Röhr, E. Kalkstein, B. Chotomski, Wojciech Kętrzyński (the well-known historian), Iłowiecki, Rev. Father Łebiński and Rev. Father Marański.

The failure of the uprising did not produce any disillusionment or depression, for it had not been difficult to foresee that an armed outbreak had no chance of success. The work of social organization was not impeded either by the preparations for the conflict and the guerrilla warfare, or by the prosecution and its results. On the contrary, the work continued without interruption; it even seemed that economic defence was organized with redoubled energy. Furthermore, petitions were presented to the Diet in the years 1859, 1861, and 1868, demanding the rights due to the Polish language in public life, in the schools and offices; these had no favorable effects, but they remain as proof that no occasion was neglected to manifest the national attitude.

The growing intensity and vivid pulsation of public life was markedly expressed in the tendency to self-education and in literature. In connection with the agricultural association arose *libraries* for the parishes. The association in Brodnica established at once 40 such readings-rooms in the districts of Brodnica and Lubawa. In the early days of January, 1863, a group of citizens founded a "Library of the Polish Landowners in the Province of Pomerania" at Pelplin. Polish *Literature* flourished quite exuberantly in this period; new printing presses were continually being established for printing Polish books, in which Chelmno as usual still held the first place. At the same time in Danzig and Swiecie appeared (in the Kaszubian dialect) the writings of Cejnowa.

The reenforcement of the material bases of society by agricultural and credit association led Ignatius Łyskowski to fear that the development of public opinion and social work would go too far in this direction, causing egoism and materialism. The result of his reaction was the founding by him in 1869 of a *Society a Moral Interests*, which was to extend its sphere

of activity also to Poznań. This society, according to the program of its founder, was to adopt social and civilizing, national and political aims; it was to be the inspiration and leader of public opinion and activities. Its too general character and the lack of precision as to its ends and means became the object of a wide-spread public discussion attacking the weak side of the new organization; but the remarkable personality of its creator, who knew how to attract and convince many people, caused the "Moral Society" as it was commonly called for short, to perform a real service during the following fifteen years or so in the field of popular reading and education, not only in Royal Prussia, but also in the northern part of the province Poznań.

Thanks to a large number of eminent and public-spirited persons, Royal Prussia had a brilliant record in the history of the social work of the 60's. It was an example to Great Poland: it encouraged the latter to form agricultural associations for the peasants, for which its statutes furnished the model; and its introduction into use of cooperative loan associations induced Great Poland to undertake the same kind of activity.

16. "Struggle for Culture" [*Kulturkampf*] and Policy of Germanization in the Years from 1871 to 1886. The unheard-of military successes which led to such political consequences as the North German Confederation and the unification of states in the new German Empire brought on a crisis of the Prussian *raison d'état*. It expressed itself in the conviction that the State was all-powerful in the political, national, and religious domains. This was no new idea, but rather a return to the pre-revolutionary absolutistic theory, which now however manifested itself in a different form. Whereas formerly the king and the government were its bearers, now the majority of the representatives of the people in the Diets and in the Parliament, blinded by success, became a passive instrument in the hands of Bismarck, that mighty director of the international and external policy of Prussia and of the Empire, whose thirty-years' rule in a considerable measure moulded the character of the German nation, impressing on it the stamp of racial and religious hatred. Already in 1866, after the defeat of Austria, the voices of an increasingly boastful public opinion spread the

theory of the inferiority of Catholicism as a religious and creative political force, and called on the government to combat this "retrogressiveness". After the humiliation of France the intoxication and fury based upon a feeling of indomitable strength reached the most extreme limits.

A "Struggle for Culture" commenced. The Constitution of the Empire had few provisions touching the domain of ecclesiastical politics, and consequently the Prussian Diet became the main field of a violent and passionate struggle on the basis of a long series of motions introduced there within a short space of time by the governments. Both houses passed the statutes by a large majority, and the monarch approved them. Thus, the Department of Catholic Affairs (created in 1840 in the Ministry of Religion) was abolished; a tribunal of last instance for ecclesiastical matters was established; the office of field-bishop was done away with; a statute was passed on the administration of bishoprics; the Order of Jesuits and similar religious bodies were banished; provision was made for the education of the clergy and its remuneration from the State treasury, and also for civil marriages. All this tended to eliminate the most important factor in the Catholic Church, the Apostolic See, and to the subjection of the Church and its institutions to the decisive influence of the State. The "*Landeskirche*" was to become the common Church in Prussia and Germany. The ecclesiastical seminary in Pelplin was closed in 1876; Pomeranian theologians pursued their studies at the universities and were ordained outside of Prussia; most frequently they took advantage of the hospitality of the Bavarian bishops, and there also they worked in the parishes. Payment was withheld of all salaries from the State treasury owed by the government according to the bull *De salute animarum*, which had the significance of a concordat. The gendarmes and police arranged searches and hunts for "May priests", *i. e.*, those not recognized by the government (the main anti-clerical statutes having been passed in May, 1873), if they performed any clerical function whatsoever. When caught they were condemned to fines and imprisonment. Their orphaned parishes were administered by neighboring priests who had been ordained and appointed before the "May Statutes" went into effect. The monastic orders were expelled from the country; their schools were

either closed or turned over to the care of secular teaching forces. The government in the course of a few years recognized that in view of the persistent, though passive, opposition of the Catholic population and the consequent failure of its policy all along the line, a further struggle would be fruitless.

This "Struggle for Culture" caused suffering and loss, especially in the sphere of education and state rights, for after its finish not everything returned to its former condition. Nevertheless, as a whole, it presented an encouraging prospect: in the epoch of materialism, the power of the ideal manifested itself. The Catholic population showed an enthusiastic admiration for the hunted and persecuted priests; knowledge of the truths of religion was deepened, and religious convictions strengthened; there was a great readiness for sacrifices, an imposing solidarity and endurance in suffering. The mightiest power of the period, whose leader proudly declared that he would not go to Canossa, was obliged to confess its helplessness against the Church.

However, the hand of the government was particularly heavy on the Poles. The political situation here was in general quite other than it was in western Germany. In opposition to the latter, Polish society was entirely Catholic; while the government was German and Protestant. Religious questions were thus complicated by national antagonism. Therefore, in Poland the "Struggle for Culture" manifested itself in a sharper form and lasted considerably longer.

Simultaneously with the war with the Church the government carried on a *struggle against the Polish language*. The primary object of its care and control was the school. Scarcely (in March, 1872) had the priests been deprived of supervision over the Catholic schools in order "to free them from the Polonizing tendency of the clergy", and a statute providing for exclusive State control of the schools received the sanction of the king, when — still in the same year — on the recommendation of the Minister of Education the Head President of the two provinces of East Prussia and West Prussia invited some men of good standing to Königsberg to decide whether it would not be proper to suppress entirely the Polish language in the common schools; besides pedagogs, governmental officials, landed pro-

prietors, and clergymen were present. In July of this year the above mentioned Head President with the consent of the ministry issued regulations in accordance with the conclusions of the conference, introducing a complete change from religious instruction in the Polish language in the common schools: "in all subjects of instruction the language employed in teaching is to be the German language. The only exception is to be instruction in religion and in church singing in the lowest department" (for children from 6 to 9 years old).

In the following years the government did not relax its Germanizing activities, but rather extended them. Teachers in common schools who showed unusual zeal in teaching German received from the government rewards, so-called "gratifications", amounting to 80 marks each time. This practice commenced in the year 1872. In 1873 the government took in hand the complete exclusion of the Polish language from the judiciary and from the whole State and communal administration. A statute passed in 1876 proclaimed the German language to be the official one and repealed simultaneously all earlier statutes, ordinances, and customs permitting the use of the Polish language. Henceforth statutes were no longer published in a Polish translation. Trifling exceptions were admitted whenever a judge recognized a case as of sufficient importance. In the Polish provinces, the number increased of so-called popular defenders, who represented before the courts persons unable to participate in the discussions; there were so many of them that in the year 1883 for the district of Poznań, they averaged one to every 1,813 inhabitants, and in the districts of Bydgoszcz and Kwidzyn (Marienwerder) one to every 2,314; whereas in Hanover there was only one to every 11,623 inhabitants. The official interpreter mediating between the judge and the Polish public in law-suits frequently had a poor command over Polish and was the cause of unjust decisions. Striking instances of this were cited by Deputy Leon Czarliński during Parliamentary debates. Up to 1896 the king might permit the commune or school representatives in certain districts and neighborhoods of the provinces of Poznań and West Prussia to use the Polish language in oral discussions. None of the motions introduced by the Polish Circle succeeded in convincing the governmental factors that the repeal of the anti-Polish statutes was dictated

by justice. At this period it became the general custom to Germanize the Polish names for localities; thus, in 1877, a Prussian minister himself acknowledged that "in the last 3 years 200 Polish names for localities have been changed into German ones."

The Germanizing activity of the government continued to spread over wide circles and affected also the field of meetings and assemblies. On December 14, 1875, the bailiff Gerdey dissolved a Polish Catholic assembly in Nowacerkiew near Pelplin, motivating his action by the fact that the assembly was opened and the discussion carried on in Polish; whereas German must be used because the police official sent to supervise the assembly did not understand Polish and yet was bound to perform his duty properly according to the intention of the statute. After this first prohibition others followed, motivated in the same manner; it was clear that the lower functionaries were acting under pressure from above. The matter was taken up by the councillor of the Landowners' Association, Hyacinth Jackowski of Jabłowo, who brought it before the courts; having carried it through the whole judicial hierarchy, he obtained on September 26, 1876, a favorable decision from the highest administrative tribunal: the right and liberty to discuss in Polish were acknowledged and the authorities advised in case of need to find an interpreter able to follow the course and content of the discussions. This time the attack failed. Minister Eulenburg did, in fact, announce that he intended to introduce a statute permitting only the official language in discussions at associations and meetings, but he did not keep his word. Instead, the ministry a few years later found another means of "de-Polonizing the eastern provinces". From the 60's on there was a large emigration and immigration; in the years from 1871 to 1880, however, the former exceeded the latter by 135,300 individuals in the province of Poznań and by 104,900 in Royal Prussia and in the following decade by 232,300 in the province of Poznań and by 197,600 in Prussia; in particular, in the years 1871—1880, 53,760 permanent emigrants from Poznań crossed the seas, and 64,904 from West Prussia; from 1881 to 1890, 113,669 from Poznań, and 121,770 from Prussia. In southern and western Germany the number of persons born in Royal Prussia was counted in 1880 as 22,879, and in 1890 as 50,921. The cause of

the emigration after 1870 was to a small extent the religious struggle and to a much larger degree economic poverty and the favorable prospects of earning a living in Germany and the United States. Because of the natural increase in population, which was greater than among the Germans, and also because of the settlement in Pomerania of Poles from the Congress Kingdom with lower cultural demands, the Polish population steadily increased after 1870 throughout the whole territory under Prussian occupation in a relatively greater proportion than the German population. From the various projects for dealing with this situation banishment was chosen. In reply to interpellations in the Diet of members from East Prussia and West Prussia demanding an explanation of the position of the government in the matter of expelling from the limits of the German State Poles who were not Prussian subjects, Minister Puttkamer replied: "The Poles propagate too fast and become objects for the Polish propaganda originating in Toruń." On March 26, 1885, a regulation of the same minister was issued ordering unconditional deportation. A monstrous *banishment* began in spite of retaliation by the Russian government and sharp debates in the Austrian Delegations. Old people who had already lived some decades under Prussian rule and had even performed their military service there, and infants — none were spared. Before the end of the year more than 30,000 persons had been expelled; in particular, 200 men were obliged to leave Chelmno, 800 persons the district of Toruń, 2,000 that of Brodnica, while 164 persons were in one day evicted from the little town of Liebenberg in East Prussia. Another form of banishment was the admission of only a small number of Poles to offices in Polish provinces; a considerable number of the officials transferred to German provinces lost their feeling of nationality and were absorbed into the German population.

From the beginning of the 70's, while a new provincial ordinance was being prepared, a strong movement arose in West Prussia aimed at breaking the unity of West Prussia with East Prussia, with which it had been joined into one province in 1823. It is a curious thing that both the advocates and the opponents of this division considered it indispensable to make use of the anti-Polish slogans which were already popular. When the press of Königsberg argued that "if they separate you

from us, you won't be able to manage the Poles" the townspeople of Danzig with Burgomaster Winter at their head assured them: "Give us a separate province, and we will look after the Poles". The influential *National Zeitung* affirmed that only Poles and ultramontanes desired a division, while the *Danziger Zeitung* maintained that the Poles and ultramontanes were afraid of nothing so much as of division. Whether the government also viewed division as a certain facilitation of its anti-Polish policy, we do not know; on the other hand, when in 1905 a new district of the Regency of Olsztyn was formed in East Prussia, it was expressly acknowledged that one of the decisive reasons for it was the possibility of effective struggle against the "agitation of Great Poland". On April 1, 1878, the statute went into force which created a new province of West Prussia.

The Polish defense was not without results, although the amount of land held by Poles, especially large properties, continually declined. Even in the province of Poznań, in 1882, the greater part of the large properties was in the hands of Germans. In Pomerania it was worse: in 1886, 719,748 hectares were in their hands, while the Poles then held only 257,557 hectares. Simultaneously with the general economic depression, work in the agricultural associations lost its intensity in some neighborhoods, and in others was even seized by a certain apathy. But, for the same reason, the development of credit cooperative associations was successful; before 1877, 19 had arisen within the limits of Royal Prussia, but later neither in the province of Poznań nor in Pomerania was any new one founded until 1886; the existing organizations were with difficulty maintained as long as the economic crisis lasted. It should be noticed also that several times Poles and Germans established and maintained in common cooperative associations of the Raiffeisen type; there were even some among them in which Poles formed the majority and had the deciding voice. On the Parliamentary terrain the Polish deputies neglected no occasion to demand energetically the rights of the Polish population in all domains of public life. But this was a labor of Sisyphus; if there were any results at all, they were slight; on the whole, one had to be satisfied with the feeling of having done one's duty. The provincial Diet offered less opportunity for protecting the inter-

ests of the Polish population, and the class laws as to election enormously hindered Poles from reaching it.

Of the *organizations for self-help* the meritorious Society for Scientific Assistance in West Prussia had by 1868, the twentieth year of its existence, granted 311 stipends. The same function was fulfilled for Polish girls by the Society for Scientific Assistance founded in Toruń in 1869, with a branch in Poznań. As early as 1882 it had 433 members; and it remained active without interruption up to a very recent date. The Society of Moral Interests, holding its general meetings after every agricultural dietine, watched over the educational interests of the Polish population; for instance, a primer prepared by Ignatius Łyskowski and published by it reached in a short time a sale of 70,000 copies. From this association evolved in 1875 the Scientific Society of Toruń, which has continued to exist and to carry on its publishing activity without interruption up to the present time.

All Polish associations, in particular (after 1881) the Society of Public Libraries, and even the Scientific Society in Toruń, were surrounded by the undesirable and unpleasant oversight of Ministerial Commissioner Rex (former burgomaster of Kosmin) which lasted fifteen years (d. 1889).

17. Policy of Germanization and Further Organization of the Polish Opposition in the Years from 1886 to 1918. Bismarck, having provoked the "Struggle for Culture", saw too late that he had made a great mistake in blocking the Catholic Germans and Poles into one strong hostile camp and thus reenforcing the position of the Poles, his chief opponents. After ending the war with the Church he decided to isolate the Poles and by the use on a grand scale of the resources of the State finally to disinherit and denationalize them until they ceased to be a factor of any importance whatsoever in external or internal politics. Henceforth the whole activity of the government — with the exception of a few years in the era of compromise — was performed under the slogan: deprive the Poles of the land. *The Statute of Colonization* of April 26, 1886, (with a first installment of one hundred million marks) was to strike at the Polish nobility; it was presumed that a people without leaders would yield submission to the Prussian State policy as the Mazurs in East Prussia had

done. A separate Colonization Commission put the statute into effect; its main purpose was to purchase land from the Poles and settle Germans on it. Provision was also made for colonization on the public domains; but not until the year 1901 was the parcellation of some of these undertaken.

The importance of the activity of the new anti-Polish institution may be best shown by some statistical data. Up to 1908 the Commission had acquired in the district of Wąbrzeźno 24.9% of the total area of the district, and 38.7% of the large properties of this district. In the whole province of West Prussia it had acquired 3.7% in that of Poznań 8%. In the colonized villages of the provinces of Poznań and Pomerania the German population was increased by 109,000 persons; of these $\frac{3}{4}$ came from outside the borders of these provinces. In the years from 1886 to 1911, in Royal Prussia 219 estates and 90 peasant properties were bought up; namely, 181 + 48 from Germans and 38 + 42 from Poles; they constituted an area of 123,690 hectares and cost all together 107,615,080 marks, or on the average 870 marks per hectare. Up to 1915 the total purchases amounted to 128,495 hectares (= 515,000 Magdeburg morgs), or $\frac{1}{22}$ part of the whole area of the province. The greatest detriment was caused by colonization in the district of Wąbrzeźno (18,464 hectares), that of Swiecie (17,662 hectares), and that of Brodnica (19,455 hectares). Not all was divided, for part remained as State domains and forests. For small farms 110,030 hectares were appropriated. During these years 4,549 small properties were created — freehold and leasehold farms, and workingmen's houses; besides which, there were 406 farms all ready, waiting for colonists. The total cost including administration was reckoned as a milliard marks.

Not all the Poles parted with their estates lightly or unnecessarily; there were some who were driven to it by the difficult economic situation at this period, especially by the lack of credit. Already in 1884 Mieczysław Łyskowski, foreseeing the threatening danger, pointed out "the importance and need among us of an agrarian bank". Theodore Kalkstein became the leader of the defensive action. He founded two agricultural credit associations, in Waldowo (district of Chelmno) in 1887 and in Pinczyno (district of Starogard) in 1888, with the object of parcelling the land among the Polish peasants. In 1888 Kalk-

stein accepted the directorship of the Landowners' Bank founded in 1886 in Poznan, and established a Landowners' Association in Toruń. Both institution divided the larger properties into small farms, but they could not be compared as to amount of work with the Colonization Commission. Nevertheless, the total result of their work reached 80,000 morgs in the two provinces.

After Bismarck's dismissal Caprivi's "era of compromise" followed. The new period found expression among other ways in a statute concerning *leasehold peasant farms* in the year 1891. In the opinion of the chancellor, this was to be a remedy palliating the consequences of the activity of the Colonization Commission and pacifying the Polish population. A General Commission of Bydgoszcz put the statute into execution in the provinces of Poznań, West Prussia, and East Prussia with the help of a Leasehold Bank, which granted capital to the newly created leaseholds with the object of redeeming the capitalized rental or making improvements. Both State institutions assisted likewise the Landowners' Bank and the Landowners' Association in the formation of peasant farms, where the conditions were favorable for them. Owing to this collaboration 1,296 Germans and 568 Poles were given farms before the end of 1893. When in Prussia the Hakatist movement triumphed over compromise after the foundation in 1894 of the "Society to Protect Germanism in the Eastern Marches"¹ (changed in 1899 into the "*Ostmarkenverein*") and government circles returned to their former inexorable policy of extermination with regard to the Poles, the suppression of parcellation of leasehold farms among the Poles was more and more insistently demanded; the General Commission of Bydgoszcz was advised to come to an understanding with the Colonization Commission; and in 1901 appeared an absolute prohibition from admitting Poles to the benefits derived from the statute on leasehold farms. Another severe blow was given by the statute of June 30, 1904, forbid-

¹ This society was founded by the banker Hansemann and the large landed proprietors Kennemann and Tiedemann of the province of Poznań. From the initials of its founders the society was frequently termed the "H. K. T.", or according to the Polish pronunciation of these letters the "Hakatist Society". A short account of its activities is given in "How Prussia Governed Poland", Edition Atar, Geneva, pp. 35—38.

ding the creation of any new peasant farms and the building of new dwelling-houses. In consequence of the latter provision some peasants lived in gypsy waggons (Drzymala in the province of Poznań and Gackowski in the district of Swiecie in Pomerania), and one in a cave (Sternicki near Brodnica). Nevertheless, as long as its funds held out the Polish party continued to parcel the land it had acquired among the neighbors, settle mortgage questions, and mediate in buying and selling matters. Finally, however, parcellation activity completely ceased.

Besides continually fortifying the resources of the Colonization Commission by grants of new funds as needed, the government with the support of the Diet consolidated German landed property by the creation of new *majorats* (primogenitures) and trusts; of these 21, with an area of 85,562 hectares, were created in Royal Prussia up to 1899 and 6 new ones up to 1905, all with the aim of exercising a Germanizing influence on the surrounding Polish population in accordance with governmental plans. After 1906 the governmental Bauernbank of Danzig gave help in maintaining the state of German possessions not only by granting necessary credits, but also by reserving for itself the deciding voice in case of a sale of the property in order to exclude Poles from purchasing the land. The crown of all these "legal" efforts was expropriation. The time between the proposal of the statute on November 23, 1907 and its adoption on March 20, 1908 was filled with a heated newspaper polemic, a violent conflict in the Diet, rejoicings of the socialists at the commencement of the realization of their program (which embraces among other things the confiscation of private property), and an unheard-of interest on the part of the whole cultural world, particularly of the Slavic countries. Some estates (1700 hectares) were actually appropriated by the government in 1912 — in Pomerania Lipienki, which had for centuries belonged to the family of Sas Jaworski.

In spite of all this the extent of Polish possessions did not shrink, but steadily expanded. Economic and social conditions proved stronger than the State policy of absolute extermination. The vital point of the agrarian question shifted from the large to the small properties, the demand for which increased so much because of their proportionately greater returns that they became relatively dearer than the larger properties. The Polish

people, excluded from office, saved money and worked at home and abroad in order to earn enough to buy a house with a piece of land in ownership. Already in 1896 the Poles in Royal Prussia had gained, after deducting German acquisitions, 2,491 hectares; in 1898, 1,167 hectares; and in 1899, 7,998 hectares. Simultaneously, the situation of the large Polish landed properties improved and became stabilized. Parcellation was in fact, more energetic after 1896, but it took place chiefly at the cost of the large German estates. Berhard (*Polnisches Gemeinwesen*) reckoned the net gain of the Poles in the struggle for land in the years from 1896 to 1905 at 60,513 hectares (of this 29,079 hectares in West Prussia), while the Prussian government reckoned this gain in those same years at 62,642 hectares in the provinces of Poznań and Prussia.

Together with the growing adhesion of the Polish population to the land, the *cooperative movement* spread and waxed strong. Cooperative organizations not only raised the resources of the people, but taught disciplined collaboration in organizing work under the prescriptions and restraints imposed by the authorities; and although they did not occupy themselves with politics, they formed a stronghold of Polonism and national spirit, particularly in the towns which the German element threatened to swamp — in Tczew, for instance. A governmental order issued to officials to withdraw their savings from Polish associations and attempts made here and there in the district savings banks by demanding the return of capital loaned to Polish clients to force them to sell their property to the Colonization Commission or its agents not only came to nothing, but brought complete fiasco to the initiators; for Polish sources of credit — in West Prussia also — received the benefit of the deposits which the Poles in retaliation withdrew from the State banks. The enormous economic progress of Germany after 1900 caused the cooperative associations to grow and become an important factor in the development of small and middle-sized commerce, industry, and agriculture.

Prussian policy in the Polish provinces was entirely based on "the extermination of the Polish population in all domains of economic life": it was officially proclaimed that the strengthening of Germanism in the eastern provinces was the historical task of Prussia and that the aim of the exceptional and severe regula-

tions and statutes was the destruction of the opponent. These intentions were expressed in the clearest manner by Emperor William at Marienburg in 1902 in the words: "Polish shamelessness [as he called the self-defence of the Polish population] again harasses the Germans, and I am forced to summon my people to defend our national possessions". In the same year German landowners began to employ Ukrainian season-immigrants in field-work instead of Poles, and three years later a prohibition was issued against using Polish season-immigrants from other regions. The Polish people, evicted from the villages by the agrarian policy of the government, turned towards the towns, which were growing as a result of the general prosperity, in order to earn their living by industry and trade. So strong was the influx in the years 1891 to 1900 that in Pomerania the increase of the Polish population in the towns was twice as large as the corresponding increase of the German population. When the statute of 1887 created five new districts in Royal Prussia, the government explained the need of a new division thus: "The administration of a large region is too difficult for land councillors, if the population speaks two different languages. Moreover, land councillors can now fight the Polish agitation more effectively and ward off from the German population the danger of emigration or Polonization".

The Head President of the province of West Prussia, Goessler (1891—1902), former Minister of Religion and Education, and his successor, Jagow, were thoroughly imbued with the Prussian *raison d'état*. The former with the help of the Danzig merchant, Münsterberg, as professional adviser, brought into existence a whole series of factories in the neighborhood of Danzig "in order to elevate Germanism in the east"; but the greater part of them, lacking the natural and economic conditions for existence, collapsed even during the life-time of their initiator. It was his idea to order that all merchant firms throughout the whole province should display the full name of the owner. This regulation was to protect Germans from the danger of buying goods from Poles; but it could not have had much effect, since in Pomerania as in other localities with mixed nationalities names do not always correspond with the nationality of their owners. Both presidents generously distributed the funds placed at their disposal by statutes of the Diet in order to assist the acclimatiz-

ation of the German intelligentsia coming from the western provinces as well as to support German trade and industry. Passing over the other anti-Polish methods common to the whole territory under Prussian occupation, it is to be remarked merely that as they did not succeed in wrenching the land from the hands of the natives, so also they failed to stifle industrial and commercial enterprise. Some agricultural and industrial exhibitions, for instance that of Kościerzyna in 1911 and Toruń in 1913, could not in fact reach the level of the German displays subventioned by the government, but they furnished evidence that in spite of all obstacles and difficulties Polish thought was at work and producing fruit.

Danzig, cut off from the basis of its trade and the source of its former prosperity, was unable to develop properly. Several times it underwent a crisis when commercial and customs treaties unfavorable to it undermined its trade, as in the year 1821—1822 and later in 1879 and 1885. A railroad from Marienburg to Mława as the shortest line of communication with Warsaw was demanded as early as 1862 by the older merchants' guild of Danzig, but received only in 1877; even this, however, could not take the place of the open frontiers guaranteed by the Congress of Vienna. The transport of Polish and Russian grain to Danzig fell in the years 1890—1900 from 145,000 tons to 103,000 tons, and the transport of wood from 500,000 to 379,000 cubic meters in the period from 1891 to 1911. But after the conclusion of a favorable commercial treaty between Russia and Germany in 1903 a sudden rise in the figures for freight is to be noticed: thus, the transport by sea to Danzig in the years 1903—1913 increased from 600,000 to 800,000 tons. The expansion of the town was promoted also by the unification of fourteen suburban communes with Danzig in 1877; still more important was the fact that in 1878 Danzig became the capital of a separate province and thus the center of a whole series of offices and institutions, not only civil but also military. Its populations amounted to 80,000 inhabitants in 1850; 100,000 in 1877, 170,000 in 1910.

Domestic political life manifested itself most clearly in elections to the legislative bodies, namely, to the German Parliament and the Prussian Diet. To the former deputies were elected on the basis of a universal, equal, and secret ballot. The Poles always carried the following electoral districts: 1. Kartuzy—

Wejherowo—Puck; 2) Kościerzyna—Starogard—Tczew; 3) Chojnice—Tuchola. The other districts were uncertain; a Pole was elected by the district of Kwidzyn (Marienwerder)—Szłum (Stuhm) in 1892 and 1893; by Lubawa—Sus (Rosenberg) in the years 1890—1893; by Grudziądz—Brodnica in 1881, 1884, 1890, and 1893; by Chelmno—Toruń in the years 1871, 1878—1887, 1890—1898, and 1903; by Swiecie in 1874, 1881, 1897 and 1907. Elections to the Prussian Diet were governed by a three-class electoral system based on the tax-paying ability of electors. Poles were always elected by the district of Lubawa (in which in 1913 there were 165 Polish and 52 German electors), and by the district of Wejherowo—Kartuzy—Puck; in the latter, however, in consequence of the progress of Germanization the number of Polish electors continually diminished in favor of German Catholics, so that the loss of this district in the near future was to be foreseen. No Pole received the majority of votes in the electoral district of Brodnica, although in 1910 Poles formed 66% of the population, for in 1913 there were only 94 Polish electors and 130 German ones; nor in the district of Swiecie, where 54% of the population was Polish; nor in the district of Chojnice—Tuchola. Proprietors of the larger estates were sent to the Prussian House of Lords by the vote of estate-owners who had held possession of their estates for at least 50 years without interruption; of such electors there were in the land of Chelmno, in 1912, 12 Poles and 13 Germans; in 1893, 11 Poles and 18 Germans. In the other parts of the country the proportion of votes was still more unfavorable.

Public activity through the medium of assemblies and associations had been greatly hindered and even partly prevented by the statute on associations and meetings of April 19, 1908, considerably restricting the former rights of the Polish language; with the exception of the time preceding elections, henceforth public Polish meetings were permitted only in districts having a population more than 60% Polish, namely, in the districts of Tuchola, Starogard, Kartuzy, Puck, Lubawa, and Brodnica.

At the conclusion of the "struggle for culture", happy, peaceful times were by no means in store for the Catholic Church, for the Prussian government continued working persistently and planfully to secure supremacy for itself. Through its Catholic officials it induced the Catholic authorities to

increase the number of sermons, Sunday schools, and masses in German. It bought up estates which possessed the right and duty to act as patron to the neighboring church. By subventions it attached to itself some adherents of its ecclesiastical policy among the clergy. In 1906 it summoned all German collators to present the parishes of their collations to the candidates appointed by the government. Polish parishes, seeing that the rights of their language at church were threatened, adopted among other methods of defence that consisting in the introduction of their own candidates into ecclesiastical offices by rallying the greatest possible number of votes at church elections. Famous throughout all Germany were the ecclesiastical elections of Grudziądz in 1893, in which the Poles gained a majority of 85%—90%; less famous, but of the same type, were the elections in Tczew in 1908. The bishops sometimes submitted to government compulsion, but they were by no means blind instruments in the hands of the State authorities.

The school system became more and more the most important object of governmental care. In 1887 an order of Minister Goessler abolished at once and absolutely instruction in the Polish language in the common schools of West Prussia, leaving it only in East Prussia; simultaneously, instruction in the Polish language was almost eliminated from the teachers' seminary in Kościerzyna, while in those of Grudziądz and Tuchola, it remained as an optional subject. In order to make impossible with the course of time all communication between teachers and Polish children in the native tongue of the latter, candidates for teachers were sought (after the middle of the 90's) in western Germany. The Prussian budget for the years 1897-8 contained six items (amounting to 2,000,000 marks) among school expenditures which were openly anti-Polish, and one-third of which were destined for Royal Prussia. Remuneration in the form of so-called "supplements for the eastern marches (*Ostmarkenzulage*)" were granted to common school teachers from 1903 on "in order to successfully uphold German school teaching in Polish-German parts of the country", which naturally did not affect positively the relations of the school to the children or to Polish society. The arbitrary orders of governmental authorities in the province of Poznań provoked a school strike in 1906, which in October spread from Poznań into Prussia; counting the two provinces it

embraced about 100,000 Polish children. Again in May of the following year, 900 children struck in the territory of the Regency of Danzig, and 100 in the Regency of Kwidzyn (Marienwerder). Many Polish teachers were transferred from common schools, teachers' seminaries, and gymnasiums to western Germany. For giving private lessons in Polish a fine was inflicted. Polish university students were forbidden to form societies; some gymnasium students who belonged to a secret society for the study of Polish history and literature were condemned to imprisonment at a trial in Toruń on September 12, 1901.

Nevertheless, Polish *literature* grew in size and depth during this period. Journalism, in particular, developed and expanded powerfully, winning a wide circle of readers. The *Grudziądz Gazette* took the lead in number of copies sold — more than 100,000 copies in 1914. The representatives of the young-Kaszubian school revived the traditions of Ceynowa and Derdowski in their publication "*Gryf*" [The Griffin]. Isidor Gulowski of Wdzydze and his wife uncovered Kaszubian folk-art, developed and popularized it.

The last hundred years of the history of Royal Prussia represent a hard struggle of the Polish population for the right to live. The descendants, heirs, and successors of those whom the early historian Długosz called *latrones cruce signati*, not content with external political conquest, smothered and suppressed all signs of national life. The German population, though taking advantage of the benefits given them by their privileged position, did not in the beginning participate in these efforts of the government; but with the course of time came forward actively, demanding through their representatives that the government should use more and more radical methods of extermination. This collaboration produced slight results, however. If it be true that the Poles of Pomerania were quite unprepared to fight the splendidly organized State of the occupying power, nevertheless, it cannot be denied that they held their own fairly well: to restrain the persecution was beyond their strength and they were not always able to avoid material losses; but, in fighting, the Polish population grew strong and increased its cultural, moral, and intellectual resources in various domains and directions. The World's War disclosed at once the international character of

the problem of restoring Poland, and the victory of the coalition gave Pomerania and the land of Chelmno to the resurrected Fatherland.

By the Treaty of Versailles on June 29, 1919, of the German province of West Prussia (formerly Royal Prussia) containing altogether 25,523 sq. kilometers, Poland was given 15,853 sq. kilometers and the Free Town of Danzig 1,888 sq. kilometers, leaving 7,782 sq. kilometers to Germany. On the other hand, from the German province of East Prussia, Poland received only 501 sq. kilometers. The territories granted to Poland were formed into the wojewódstwo of Pomerania, in which according to the census of 1921 the civil population amounts to 939,254 persons, of whom 79,1% are Polish.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR PRONUNCIATION OF POLISH NAMES.

The main differences between Polish and English pronunciation are the following:

In words of more than one syllable the stress almost always falls upon the syllable before the last — the penult.

All letters must be distinctly pronounced: there are no reduced or slurred vowels.

- a is always the continental a as in father, except in the combination aj, which is pronounced about the same as English I, eye.
- ą is nasal like French *on* or approximately as in English song
- c represents the combination ts, like German z
- ć (or ci before a vowel) = English ch as in chin
- ci without a following vowel = ć plus i
- ch = h fricative, articulated with the back of the tongue raised towards the soft palate as in Scottish loch or German ach
- cz = English ch as in chalk, but with the tongue further back
- dź (or dzi before a vowel) English j, ge
- dzi without a following vowel = dz plus i
- dż is like j or ge, but made further back
- e is always open, except in the combination ej, when it is like the English diphthong ay in day
- ę is nasal, like French *in*
- g is always like English g in go, never as in gem
- h is never silent
- i = English ee as in see
- j as consonant = English y as in yes
was originally a palatal liquid but is now generally pronounced like English w
- ń (or ni before a vowel) is a palatal consonant, articulated in the same place as French *gn* (Cf. English new, onion)
- ni without a following vowel = ń plus i
- o = English aw as in saw
- ó is the same as Polish u, French ou, English oo as in fool
- rz = English j, g
- s is always a voiceless ss
- ś = English sh
- sz is like sh, but made further back
- u = French ou, English oo as in fool
- w = v
- y = short i as in English din
- ź = z as in azure, that is, it is made between the tongue and palate at a place further back than ordinary z
- ż is the z as in azure, but with the tongue still further back.

It becomes voiceless sh at the end or before voiceless consonants.

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MAP OF POMERANIA AND PRUSSIA UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER.

MAP OF POLISH (EAST) POMERANIA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY — (ACCORDING TO FRANCIS DUDA)

- Boundaries of Polish (East) Pomerania from the Middle of the Thirteenth Century (or 13th Century)
- Original Boundaries of Polish (East) Pomerania

WEST POMERANIA

LOWER POMERANIA

POMERANIA

UPPER POMERANIA

GREAT POMERANIA

LAND OF SZCZYTNO-RACIAZ

LAND OF CHELMNO

LAND OF DOBRZYŃ

GREAT POLAND

MAZOVIA

PRUSSIA

CUJAVIA

GOLF OF GDANSK (DANZIG)

GOLF OF PUCK

ZUCAWA

GDANSK

LEBORG

BYTORO

WINERA

WIRO

KIOTBRZEG

RADHJA

BIELGARD

BIELSK

L. WADZYDZE

POMERANIA

ZANTYR

LINKI

ERVIDZYN II.

NOWE

L. NOGACKIE

ERVIDZYN I.

GRUDZIADZ

RADZYN

DRZYCEIN

SWIECIE

CHETMNO

ST. CHETMNO

WYSZOGROD

TORUN

NAKLO

BYDGOSZCZ

LABISZYN

UJSCIE

R. Noteć (Netze)

WIELKI

CZARNKORO

DRZENI

SANTOK

PIERZYCE

SZCZECIN (STETTIN)

WOLIN

FIAMIN

REGA

PERSANTA

STRAITZIG

SZCZECINEK

LAND

BIALA

SZCZYTNO

CHOJNICE

RACIAZ

DOBRYNKA

KAMIONKA

KAMIEN

SEPOLNO

PROCH

ZLOTORO

ERJOJANKA

WATCZ

DOBRYNKA

PUTNICA

GRADA

DOBRYNKA

PROCH

ZLOTORO

ERJOJANKA

DOBRYNKA

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Bibl. Jag.



MAP OF WEST PRUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH (OR 19TH) CENTURY.

MAP OF ROYAL PRUSSIA PRIOR TO 1772 (ACCORDING TO WŁADYSŁAW SEMKOWICZ)

Scale 1:1,000,000

Explanation:

- Boundaries of the State.
- " " " Województwo
- Towns. Capitals (or Chief Towns) of the Województwo.
- Other Places not Possessing an Adm. Charakter.
- + Cloisters.
- G. Burghs under Starostas.
- S. District (or Provincial) Dietines.
- 5g. General Dietines.
- * Alternative Seats for Dietines.

LIBRARY
FOLKLORE MUSEUM
MUSEUM OF ETHNOLOGY
MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY
MUSEUM OF ANTHROPOLOGY
MUSEUM OF GEOGRAPHY